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Action Ukraine Report

"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT"
In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis, and Commentary

"The Art of Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion,
Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World"

"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT" Year 04, Number 91
Action Ukraine Coalition (AUC), Washington, D.C.
Ukrainian Federation of America (UFA), Huntingdon Valley, PA
morganw@patriot.net, ArtUkraine.com@starpower.net
Washington, D.C.; Kyiv, Ukraine, WEDNESDAY, June 2, 2004

-----INDEX OF ARTICLES-----
"Major International News Headlines and Articles"

1. "UKRAINE AND THE WORLD"
Speech by Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
At the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy
Kyiv, Ukraine, Friday, May 14, 2004

2. A NOTE TO SCHOLARS, ANALYSTS, AND JOURNALISTS
COVERING UKRAINE
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski's Visit to Kyiv in May
Celeste A. Wallander, Director
Russia and Eurasia Program and Trustee Fellow
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Washington, D.C., Tuesday, 1 June 2004

3. BOEING SEES POTENTIAL FOR MORE SALES IN UKRAINE
REUTERS, Kiev, Ukraine, Tuesday, June 1, 2004

4. IN BATTLE BETWEEN UKRAINE AND EU STEEL SECTORS,
POLAND MAY BE THE LOSER
"Yet further proof Ukraine is turning away from Europe"
Polish News Bulletin, Warsaw, Poland, Tuesday, Jun 01, 2004

5. HE'S A SOLDIER, HE'S A POLITICIAN, HE'S VISITING KYIV
US four-star general Wesley Clark in Ukraine
Willard News Service (WNS), Kyiv, Ukraine, Wednesday, June 2, 2004

6. "UNDERPAID, UNDERQUALIFIED, AND UNDER THE GUN"
UKRAINE'S JUDICIARY: A PROFESSION WITHOUT HONOR
Ukraine's judiciary faces mounting obstacles as corruption worsens,
political influence becomes inescapable, and professional standards plummet.
COMMENTARY: by Ivan Lozowy, Transitions Online (TOL)
Prague, Czech Republic, Thursday, 27 May 2004

7. "YANUKOVYCH TRIES TO CLEAN UP HIS IMAGE"
COMMENTARY: by Taras Kuzio, Eurasian Daily Monitor
Volume 1, Issue 21, The Jamestown Foundation
Washington, D.C., Tuesday, 1 June 2004
========================================================
THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No. 91: ARTICLE NUMBER ONE
Politics and Governance, Building a Strong, Democratic Ukraine
http://www.artukraine.com/buildukraine/index.htm
========================================================
1. "UKRAINE AND THE WORLD"

Speech by Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
At the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy
Kyiv, Ukraine, May 14, 2004

DR. BRIUKHOVETSKY, PRESIDENT OF KYIV MOHYLA ACADEMY:

Ukraine is a very important part of Europe and it depends to a great extent
on us, but not on Professor Brzezinski. Now I would like before I invite
Mr. Brzezinski to make his speech.I would like to give him a diploma and
give him the title of honorary professor at our university since the year
2000. (Long Pause) Diploma number 212, of the National University Kyiv
Mohyla Academy dated June 28, 2000, the title of honorary professor of this
university was given to Professor Brzezinski in recognition of his
outstanding achievements.

Now I would like to give the floor to Professor Brzezinski and I would like
to say that we propose the following procedure for this event. Professor
Brzezinski will speak for about 25 minutes then we'll have a Q and A
session. Our students will ask their questions first and then we will
allocate 10 minutes, beginning at 6:20 or 6:30, to ask questions by members
of the press and by the guests. We'll try to stick to this procedure. Dr.
Brzezinski-the floor is yours.

DR. BRZEZINSKI:

Distinguished rector, members of the faculty, ladies and gentlemen and also
some personal friends whom I recognize in the audience and who I'm delighted
to see again. First of all let me say how very honored I am to receive
today a doctorate of this renowned, internationally recognized, and
important institution. I am familiar with its history and the role it has
played in the intellectual life and in the national consciousness of the
Ukrainian people. Founded many centuries ago, much earlier than most
institutions in America. Suppressed 202 years later and then reborn some
175 years later. This institution is also a testimonial, a testimonial to
the desire of the Ukrainian people to shape their own destiny, to define
their identity, and to contribute to the common European heritage of which
Ukraine is so very much an integral part. Anyone even remotely familiar
with the history of Europe knows that this city here, a thousand years ago,
was already then a center of European culture, a center of learning, of
thought, and also of searching for something beyond human existence, of
searching for some definition of the meaning of life. So you are a part of
an important tradition and your renewal and vitality is a triumph of the
spirit as well as a source of satisfaction to your friends. I consider
myself one of your friends.

Today I plan to speak to you about a very big subject, Ukraine and the
world. And of course all of you here know much more about that subject than
I do, since the first word in the subject is Ukraine. So I want to add a
qualification, namely that I will speak of Ukraine and the world as seen
from the outside, as seen from far away, by someone who is interested in the
condition of the world and who is interested in the place of Ukraine in that
world. I consider Ukraine's independence to be truly a major historical
event of great international significance. This was not appreciated at
first, particularly in the West and specifically in the United States. Even
now, in my view, there is not sufficient international appreciation of the
international significance of Ukraine. It has to be emphasized over and
over again that an independent Ukraine has redefined the frontiers of Europe
and an independent Ukraine is transforming Russia into a national state.
These are extraordinarily important developments. It is now a decade and a
half since the turbulent days of the rebirth of your national independence.
It is appropriate therefore to ask what has been accomplished in those 15
years, and a great deal has been accomplished. First of all, Ukrainian
independence has been consolidated internationally. Secondly, its
territorial integrity has been preserved; I need only mention Crimea or
Tuzla. Thirdly, Ukraine has carried out very effective and internationally
positive nuclear disarmament. Fourthly, Ukraine has had a remarkably
impressive presidential transition, and I speak particularly of the
elections which led from president Kravchuk to President Kuchma. Next,
Ukraine's economic growth today, after some years, is now most impressive;
indeed, it is among the highest in Europe. And Ukraine, last but not least,
is participating in peacekeeping in the Balkans and now in Iraq and these
are important contributions and thus this is an impressive record.

But we have to recognize that global conditions, as well as Ukraine's own
internal affairs, are still quite fluid, and let us take therefore a closer
look at both global affairs and internal Ukrainian issues and consider their
possible implications. If basic currently ongoing political economic and
military trends continue for another 25 or 30, years we are likely to see a
world in which the global hierarchy of power, the global hierarchy of
influential states, is likely to be as follows. At the top there will still
be the United States. Secondly, probably the most influential power would
be the European Union, by then including both Turkey and Ukraine. Thirdly
it will be China. Fourth it will be Japan and fifth it will be India.
Notice the significant shift of global gravity, of the center of global
gravity to Asia. In that setting the democratic core of the world, the
Atlantic community, will still be the principal impulse for innovation, the
critical source of stability, and the point of origin of the radiating
appeal of democracy. However only, only, if present trends continue, and
they could be reversed or even derailed and there are already some symptoms
of mounting global disorder and some signs of basic misjudgments that give
cause for prudent, cautious concern. Let me note first of all, and it is
not a criticism but a statement of fact, that today America is more
isolated, more mistrusted, and in some places even more hated than ever
before. America could even become bogged down in a huge portion of Eurasia,
in an area from Suez to Xinjiang, from southern Russia to the Arabian Sea,
an area that I call the global Balkans, especially if its engagement in that
part of the world remains largely solitary. It is also not a prediction but
a real possibility that Europe's unification will continue to be largely
socioeconomic with Europe remaining politically diffused and inward oriented
without a defined strategic vision of the larger world and without the
political will and the military means to genuinely influence the
developments in the world and without defining jointly with the U.S. common
strategic goals. In that context the engagement of Russia in a closer
association with Europe might be diverted towards traditions of imperial
goals to the detriment of both democracy in Russia and national independence
of Russia's recently emancipated but still vulnerable neighbors. One has to
note also that it is far from certain that the wide gap between the
trajectories of China's socioeconomic transformation, which do produce more
pluralism, and of its much slower political transformation, may not cause
major political upheavals, which will be detrimental to the stability of the
Far East. And last but not least, the growing access not only by states but
by terrorist or criminal organizations to weapons of mass destruction in the
setting of percolating global turmoil and intense political resentments that
cannot be understood merely by the repetitive invocation of the word
"terrorism" host the risk of the progressive degradation of global order, as
well as the growing vulnerability of democratic societies. The cumulative
effect of these negative tendencies could be escalating global chaos
detrimental particularly to weaker states.

In that context a closer connection between America and an expanding Europe
is clearly needed. In essence, we need to promote the further expansion
both of the European Union and of NATO. Neither political geography nor
geostrategy is a static concept. They evolve and the recent expansions of
both organizations place now on the agenda the future status of Ukraine, of
Turkey, and of the newly independent states of the Caucasus. Their eventual
association will then facilitate the constructive engagement of Russia with
its imperial option altogether than foreclosed.

However, such a large Atlantic community that includes Ukraine is not
possible without Ukrainian efforts. Ukrainians themselves must overcome,
and they must overcome themselves, the twin burdens inflicted upon them by
the negative historical legacies of prolonged foreign domination and of
destructive communism. Both have hindered the emergence of a pervasive
Ukrainian patriotic civic consciousness, which is essential to democracy and
independence. Both, I mean foreign domination and communism, have created
the tradition of state control over national resources, which in the new
conditions of market economy have generated enormous opportunities for
avarice by only a few self enriching people. Both precluded and established
supremacy of law over politics as well as over the disposition of national
resources thereby facilitating corruption. Last but not least, both have
favored the habitual tendencies of bureaucrats and those in power to control
freedom of information, to stifle criticism, and to manipulate elections.
The persistence of these negative tendencies is damaging Ukraine's good name
in the world and they are being exploited by outsiders to penetrate,
manipulate, and weaken Ukraine's independence.

When Ukrainians make a judgment about these domestic developments, they
should not measure themselves by what has been happening in Russia and they
should not take refuge that conditions in Russia in some respects are worse.
They should measure themselves by what has been happening in the Baltic
republics or in Poland. If these negative trends within Ukraine were to
intersect with some negative global trends that I have mentioned, Ukraine
could become very similar to the Poland of the 18th century. That is to
say, like the Polish magnates, some sectors of the newly powerful and the
newly rich could become seduced by Ukraine's more powerful neighbor which
could then exploit international instability, including the failure of
America and Europe to work together, and exploit Ukraine's relatively still
weak national consciousness to turn Ukraine into its satellite even if not
again into just its province. It follows, therefore, that we in the West
must strive for a vital European-American partnership and build deliberately
an Atlantic community that redefines the geography of Europe. And let us
not forget that the Central Europe of today was the Eastern Europe of just
yesterday. We must build an Atlantic community open to the new Eastern
Europe, and not an Atlantic community that is closed and self-centered.

The time is now right for the Atlantic community to focus with a sense of
strategic purpose on the third phase of the Atlantic community's
enlargement. The first phase, which we might call the Warsaw round,
enlarged NATO to parts of Central Europe including Ukraine's immediate
neighbor, Poland. The second phase, which we might call the Vilnius round,
resulted in the rest of Central Europe being included in both NATO and the
EU. The next phase, which I'd like to call the Kiev round, should look
further east. June will provide such opportunities, especially the
Istanbul-NATO summit. And one desirable outcome in the not too distant
future, if not in June, should be a Membership Action Plan for Ukraine. In
doing so, we in the West must recognize and respect Ukraine's
accomplishments but also be alert to its shortcomings. To make that
possible, the Ukrainians must also on their own vigilantly consolidate a
genuinely constitutional state in which there is no room for politically
expedient constitutional manipulation. They must hold genuinely free
presidential elections, thereby setting a contrasting example with recent
experiences in Russia. That these elections be free, that they be
absolutely legitimate, is more important than who wins them. That the
elections be free is more important than who wins them. And the world will
watch closely and will draw its own conclusions. Ukrainians must also
foster a civic society based on a deep social awareness of ancient Ukrainian
traditions, which as I said earlier, made Kiev at one point one of Europe's
cultural and religious centers. Historically rooted patriotic pride can
reinforce a self-confident civic society. Ukrainians in that context should
increasingly see themselves as Central Europeans and as part of a Central
Europe with which Ukrainians have much culturally in common, and with
Russia-now the Eastern Europe of Europe. Ukrainians, last but not least,
must protect freedom of the press and subordinate political life to the rule
of law, both of which are essential components of democratic society, and in
so doing strive to meet the objective criteria for membership in the
European Union and NATO. All of that requires time and deliberate effort.
I hope you'll not be offended by my speaking so frankly, but I feel I have
the right to do so because I have been a friend of your country for years
and I have been dedicated to your independence. I believe that your success
will not only redefine Ukraine as one of Europe's leading nations, it will
also set an important example for Russia, facilitating Russia's own road to
Europe, and thus further redefining both Europe as well as Russia, and that
in turn will further enhance the prospects for a genuinely better world.
What you do in the near future and how you do it is therefore important to
all of us who wish you well. Thank you.

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION

QUESTION:
High officials of the European Union have announced that they do not see
Ukraine as the European Union's member even in 20 years. Do you think this
can change the strategy of Ukraine's foreign policy focus on integration,
influencing our vision of Ukraine as part of Europe? What do you think
about what high officials of Europe have said-is it true?
DR. BRZEZINSKI:
They have said exactly what you cite them as saying. Ten years ago they
were saying that the Baltic republics will never be part of NATO or the
European Union. Fifteen years ago they were saying that Poland will never
be part of NATO and of the European Union. Bureaucrats are not known
for political imagination. Before you clap too much, let me remind you of
something else. They did not change their minds about Poland or the Baltic
republics because all of the sudden lightning hit their heads and they
acquired political imagination. Why did they change their minds? Because
the Poles and the Balts, the citizens of the Baltic republics, created
objective conditions to which there had to be a response, facts had to be
realized. Don't wait for invitations from Europe or from NATO because
you will not get them. These are not clubs which go around inviting people
to join. They are communities which accept countries when it is in the
interest
of the community to have those countries inside. And you have to create
conditions that convince NATO, convince the European Union, that it is in
their interests to have you. I think it is, and I think we should be
receptive, but it is really up to you and therefore how you handle your
political life, how you handle your economic life, will determine who you
will be and where you will be. Maybe not even in 20 years, conceivably even
in 10 years.
QUESTION:
What changes in U.S.-Ukrainian relations may take place after the loss by
Bush of the election campaign?
DR. BRZEZINSKI:
I don't think there will be that much change, in part for reasons that I
have already explained. The relationship between Ukraine and America is at
least as much a function of what Ukraine does as it is of what America does.
America in general is interested in a larger Europe, and America is
interested in a partnership with Europe. America also doesn't want to see a
zone of instability around Europe, and America welcomes additions to Europe
that consolidate a larger zone of peace and progress but also increase the
probability of a partnership between Europeans and Americans. So I think
that the policy itself will not change much.
I think in our relationship there is a lot of opportunity for expansion of
specific relations. If I were in America, I would be more directly critical
of some specific aspects of American policy towards Ukraine, but in general
I think that on both sides there has to be a recognition of mutual interests
in the expansion of a more constructive partnership.
QUESTION:
If Europe loses Ukraine now, what will it lose in the future?
DR. BRZEZINSKI:
Well, it will lose two things. If Europe loses Ukraine it will also lose
Russia, and by losing both Ukraine and Russia, it will be less secure. So
there is a European stake in a close relationship with Ukraine. But Ukraine
and Russia are not going to enter Europe at the same time. The differences
between the two countries are significant, not only geographically, and
there has to be a sequential process. Ukraine's entrance into Europe will
accelerate also in the longer run a more comprehensive and more satisfactory
relationship between Europe and Russia.
QUESTION:
Dr. Brzezinski, you said in Ukraine it is more important not who wins the
election, but how the election will go. If we don't have democratic
elections here in Ukraine, if they elections don't meet European or American
standards, what will the reaction of the West be because regarding, for
example, countries like Pakistan, which had some political upheavals,
America changed its position towards the leaders of those countries who came
to power in a non-democratic manner. If we don't have democratic elections
in Ukraine, is there a chance that America will change its attitude to the
Ukrainian leaders? What will the reaction of the West be if we do not have
Western-style elections in this country?
DR. BRZEZINSKI:
Well, first of all, I don't think you should compare yourself even
indirectly with Pakistan. The situation there is so different. I think you
should ask yourself what would have been the reaction of the United States
if, for example, in the elections in Slovakia a certain politician had won.
I think the relationship would have been much cooler, much more distant. I
think that, however, even more important than that is the character of the
elections, because if the elections are free and fair and legitimate, then
no matter who wins them it has a cumulative effect on the evolution of a
democratic society.
Ukraine is an important country with which it is in the interest of Europe
and of America to have a positive relationship, so we don't take a position
on who wins your elections because we are confident that if the elections
are free and legitimate, that in itself will help to define the character of
the regime that emerges from the elections, no matter who has won them.
QUESTION:
I am student from the Department of Environmental Specialists, so I will ask
an environmental question. I see that America consumes too much and it is
going the wrong way. As far as I can see, in Ukraine we are making
Ukrainian development, because we are the future of Ukraine and we see
another way of development. What do you think about how America can
change its way of development, if it wants to?
DR. BRZEZINSKI:
Well, first of all, it doesn't want to.
COMMENT:
Yes, I see. Well, it needs to. As far as we can see.
DR. BRZEZINSKI:
You may be right. I think in an abstract philosophical way, you may be
right, but facts are facts-the vast majority of Americans like their life
style, they value their high consumption, and they are not particularly
interested in fundamentally changing the way they live. Over time I think
there is developing an increasing consciousness about the environment, about
consumption, and gradually I think there is going to be change. But it's
not going to be dramatic and it's only going to be decided by the American
people themselves because we are a democracy and we have certain
traditions that we value. [Comments from audience-inaudible]
QUESTION:
How would you comment on the recent elections in Mukachevo?
DR. BRZEZINSKI:
Thank you very much. The question ends by saying thank you very much,
and I am inclined to say thank you very much for the question. Well,
clearly there's a problem. I don't know how it will be resolved, but
there's no
doubt that there is a problem and even if one doesn't agree about this or
that specific, and even if one doesn't know, at least I don't know, how to
determine responsibility for what happened, there is still a problem and I
think it is therefore important to face that problem, because in the eyes of
many this could be viewed as a symptom of a potentially larger problem.
And it is obviously in the interests of Ukraine or Mukachevo not to become
the symptom of a larger problem. So I think it is in the interests of
everybody who accepts the idea that it is in the interests of Ukraine to
have free and legitimate elections, to address this problem in a manner that
restores confidence and that is reassuring regarding the future prospects
of the electoral process in Ukraine.
QUESTION:
Sir, I would like to ask you if there is going to be another country after
Afghanistan and Iraq, and what's in Ukraine for it? What I meant to say is
that Ukraine has decided to dispatch its troops to Iraq and I understand it
was a smart move.
DR. BRZEZINSKI:
Well, whether dispatching your troops to Iraq was a smart move is your
decision not my decision. I am more responsible for what happens insofar
as American actions are concerned. I personally, and I now speak as a
private citizen, make a distinction between Afghanistan and Iraq.
DR. BRZEZINSKI:
[Inaudible, in response to inaudible question] I also think that Russia
will be more successful for its own people as a nation state. I happen to
remember a speech delivered in the center of Kyiv in 1990 or 1991, I think
by Boris Yeltsin, who told the Ukrainian people, but also indirectly told
the Russian people, that nothing good has come for the Russian people from
being the center of an empire. That being an empire causes costs and
precipitates hatred and that Russia has a better prospect for development
for normal life, for modernity, as a nation state. And I certainly think
that Ukrainians will do better on their own.
But I'm not in the position to urge you to be nationally independent if you
don't want to be nationally independent. I don't know the person who sent
this note, but if he or she wants to join Russia, you can either urge your
fellow Ukrainians to join Russia or you can simply pack your suitcase and
move to Russia. As far as America is concerned, I don't think we are
becoming the evil empire or the world gendarme. I happen to be critical of
our policy in Iraq, but it is quite different from our policy in
Afghanistan. And I still notice that people want to come to America. We
don't have an emigration problem, we have an immigration problem. That
tells you something.
Who are these people who want to come to America all the time? Why do they
want to go to this evil empire, if it is so evil? I wouldn't be surprised
if the person who wrote me this note had some relatives in America. Did
they go to an evil country because they are evil? I think America is a very
interesting country, a very open country. It is not an infallible country,
and we don't claim that we are infallible, that we are always right, that we
are riding the wave of history, that the future is inevitably ours, but we
have been very successful in building a very modern, a very dynamic country,
to which more people want to go than to any other country in the world. By
the time Russia, or I hope earlier, Ukraine becomes equally attractive, the
person who wrote me this note will be in a better position to say what was
said about America, but at this stage it's a little premature.
QUESTION:
What is the image of Ukraine among the geopolitical leaders of the U.S. and
what is the image of Ukraine among the political establishment of the United
States?
DR. BRZEZINSKI:
Well, to some extent I tried to answer that question at the beginning of my
speech when I spoke about the importance of Ukraine in terms of global
geopolitics, but if you are specifically asking about the image of Ukraine
currently, then I have to say it has somewhat deteriorated over the years.
At first there was a great deal of ignorance in America or in the West about
Ukraine. In fact, 25 years ago most people in the West thought that the
Soviet Union was Russia and that Russia was the Soviet Union. There was
very little understanding that the non-Russian nations amounted to about
half of the population of the Soviet Union.
Then there was a period of what we might call high expectations about
Ukraine's transformation-some hope that it still be as extensive and as
rapid as that, for example, of Poland. And then more lately there has been
a tendency to emphasize more the shortcomings and the difficulties of
Ukraine. There's not enough awareness right now, for example, that your
economic growth is very impressive. There is some skepticism about the
extent and durability of democratic institutions in Ukraine and this is why
the presidential elections are so important. They can affect your image.
But if your presidential elections are really fair and legitimate, then that
plus the effects of good economic growth, I think within a year or so will
begin to transform in a very positive way Ukraine's image.
QUESTION:
Audience member: Ok, I'll speak Ukrainian because its my mother tongue.
Dr. Brzezinski, do you think that some of the recent statements made by
several European politicians that Ukraine has no prospects, are they not
remindful of the U.S. isolationism earlier in the 20th century that actually
then led to world wars that split Europe in effect?
DR. BRZEZINSKI:
I already mentioned earlier that I thought these views showed lack of
political imagination, that they are the inevitable consequence of
preoccupation with immediate problems. And I think that will change if
Ukraine is successful politically and economically. However, I would not
compare the consequences of such negative views to perhaps the connection
between American isolationism and World War II. I do not see a cataclysm
developing on that scale, but certainly if the changes in Ukraine are not
sufficiently attractive and impressive to prompt the European Union and
NATO to welcome Ukraine, then the consequences in this part of the world
will be negative. They will be negative for Ukraine.
I happen to think they will also be negative for Russia because they will
perpetuate then the new but existing border between the European Union
and everything east of the European Union, and what would be east of the
European Union would probably less stable, less modern, less democratic.
QUESTION:
I've got a question, a speculation of a kind if I may. Recently on the
Internet they posted an article that reflected the CIA analysis of Russia's
future developments. Well, it boiled down to the prediction that Russia may
split into eight or nine smaller states further down the road. Do you think
this article had some rational, what do you think?
DR. BRZEZINSKI:
Basically, no. I don't think Russia is going to split into eight parts or
five parts or whatever. I do think, however, that after the present
leadership in Russia has been changed and people with more experience in
the West, more Western education, more awareness of the necessity of
Russia becoming closer to the Atlantic community, the effect will be some
significant decentralization of Russia. I do think that a highly
centralized system of government makes Moscow essentially a somewhat
parasitic center of power that drains too much of foreign investment to
Moscow itself to the detriment of Russia's provinces.
Life elsewhere outside of Moscow, outside of Saint Petersburg is not
changing as much as it should and largely because the system prevents
regional initiatives from taking advantage of regional opportunities whether
in the Primorsky Krai in the far East vis-à-vis Korea, Japan, China, or
whether in St. Petersburg vis-à-vis Scandinavia and the Baltic republics,
etc. I think a centralized system stifles initiative. America wouldn't be
today what it is if everything was decided in Washington.
COMMENT:
There is no rational behind the statement that it can split.
DR. BRZEZINSKI:
Well, I don't think it's going to split, but I think decentralization will
be a necessity and democratization of Russia's leadership will make those
people in the political leadership in Moscow less fearful and more tolerant
of decentralization. There is no national ethnic basis for a split into
eight parts, but I think there is a great deal of socioeconomic need for
decentralization.
QUESTION:
Dr. Brzezinski, who in your view of Ukrainian politicians should the
European future of Ukraine be associated with?
DR. BRZEZINSKI:
Well, I know a great many Ukraine political leaders and the one that I
strongly favor in the future is the one that in free elections gets the most
votes.
DR. BRIUKHOVETSKY:
Thank you students, now we have time for 2 questions from the press.
QUESTION:
Thank you very much, now you give me the chance to ask a question, thank
you very much. Mr. Brzezinski, I am happy to welcome you here as the most
influential and the most ardent advocate of independent Ukraine in the
United States and even here in this country. I completely share your view
that America is an interesting, open, and lets say almost infallible
country. I have never been in America.I have never been on alumnus exchange
programs in America, but I have worked for several years as an ITAR
correspondent in Washington D.C. and your presence here reminds me of our
meeting over there. I 'd like to hand over to you my latest item, a
politician who changed the world. I explain to your students, to Ukrainians
and your students, including your students, that Mr. Brzezinski belongs to
those politicians who really change the contemporary world.
DR. BRZEZINSKI:
Thank you very much for your kind comments about me and my importance
and I am particularly pleased that my wife is here so she can hear that.
DR. BRIUKHOVETSKY:
We have time for one more question.
QUESTION:
I would like to say that next week it seems to me George Bush will come to
Kyiv, I mean the older one, ex-president. Is there any question you would
like to ask him being a journalist, and if there is such a question so what
is it?
DR. BRZEZINSKI:
I have no question to ask George Bush Sr., but I think that the fact that he
is coming here and he will speak here is symbolically important because he
has spoken here before.
DR. BRIUKHOVETSKY:
I would like to thank Professor Brzezinski and thank all of you for being
here and for listening to such an interesting speech and answers to the
questions. Please don't rush to the stage because Mr. Brzezinski has got to
write some words in the book of our honorary guests and we hope that the
forecasts of Dr. Brzezinski will come true and we would like to wish all the
best to Mr. Brzezinski and we hope one day people will have a chance to
read.. (inaudible) (END)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Zbigniew Brzezinski is a trustee and counselor at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies and cochairs the CSIS Advisory Board with Carla
Hills. He is a professor of American foreign policy at the School of
Advanced International Studies, the Johns Hopkins University, Washington,
D.C. He is cochair of the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya.
Earlier, he was a member of the Policy Planning Council of the Department of
State from 1966 to 1968; chairman of the Humphrey Foreign Policy Task Force
in the 1968 presidential campaign; director of the Trilateral Commission
from 1973 to 1976; and principal foreign policy adviser to Jimmy Carter in
the 1976 presidential campaign.
>From 1977 to 1981, Dr. Brzezinski was national security adviser to President
Carter. In 1981 he was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom for his
role in the normalization of U.S.-Chinese relations and for his
contributions to the human rights and national security policies of the
United States. He was also a member of the President's Chemical Warfare
Commission (1985); member of the NSC-Defense Department Commission on
Integrated Long-Term Strategy (1987-1988); and member of the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (1987-1989). In 1988, he was cochairman
of the Bush National Security Advisory Task Force.
Dr. Brzezinski received a B.A. and M.A. from McGill University (1949, 1950)
and Ph.D. from Harvard University (1953). He has been a member of the
faculty of Columbia University (1960-1989) and Harvard University
(1953-1960). Dr. Brzezinski holds honorary degrees from Georgetown
University, Williams College, Fordham University, College of the Holy Cross,
Alliance College, the Catholic University of Lublin, Warsaw University, and
Vilnius University. Dr. Brzezinski is the recipient of numerous honors and
awards.
His many books include The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership
(Basic, 2004), The Geostrategic Triad: Living with China, Europe, and Russia
(CSIS, 2001), The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic
Imperatives (Basic, 1997), and The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of
Communism in the 20th Century (Scribner, 1989).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Action Ukraine Report thanks Richard W. Murphy, Senior Associate,
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, D.C.,
http://www.csis.org, for making a copy of Dr. Brzezinski's speech available.
=========================================================
THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No. 91: ARTICLE NUMBER TWO
Current Events Gallery: http://www.artukraine.com/events/index.htm
=========================================================
2. A NOTE TO SCHOLARS, ANALYSTS, AND JOURNALISTS
COVERING UKRAINE
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski's Visit to Kyiv in May

Celeste A. Wallander, Director
Russia and Eurasia Program and Trustee Fellow
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Washington, D.C., Tuesday, 1 June 2004

WASHINGTON, D.C. - I have been disturbed by the number of erroneous
press, analytical, and other reports and articles about Zbigniew
Brzezinski's visit to Kyiv, May 13-17. Dr. Brzezinski visited Kyiv as part
of a CSIS project on Ukraine's western integration, democracy, and the
2004 presidential elections. The trip was initiated and conducted by the
CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program.

Dr. Brzezinski was accompanied by Richard Murphy, CSIS Senior Associate,
and myself. The project is funded by generous grants from the Charles
Stewart Mott Foundation and the Smith-Richardson Foundation.

Numerous stories have erroneously reported the Dr. Brzezinski visited Kyiv
at the invitation of Viktor Pinchuk, and some that the trip was financed by
him. This is incorrect. Dr. Brzezinski did meet with Mr. Pinchuk, was
joined by him in a commemoration of the victims of communism at Bykivnia,
and appeared on an interview show on a television channel owned by Mr.
Pinchuk.

Dr. Brzezinski had numerous meetings with Ukrainian government officials,
politicians, members of civil society organizations, as well as scholars and
students. Many people were generous in helping us to arrange the visit, but
the visit was a private, CSIS project.

If anyone has any further questions, I would be happy to do my best to
answer them.

Celeste A. Wallander, Director,
Russia and Eurasia Program and Trustee Fellow
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
1800 K St. NW, Washington DC 20006
Tel: (202)775-3233, Fax: (202)775-3199, Email: cwalland@csis.org
=========================================================
THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No. 91: ARTICLE NUMBER THREE
The Story of Ukraine's Long and Rich Culture
Ukrainian Culture Gallery: http://www.ArtUkraine.com/cultgallery.htm
=========================================================
3. BOEING SEES POTENTIAL FOR MORE SALES IN UKRAINE

REUTERS, Kiev, Ukraine, Tuesday, June 1, 2004

KIEV - U.S. aerospace giant Boeing hopes that Ukraine's growing economy and
robust demand for flights could mean more aircraft sales, senior company
officials said on Tuesday.

"The world transportation industry is improving from a low after September
11. We see some very positive recovery in terms of traffic flows," Craig
Jones, Boeing vice president for Russia and CIS (Commonwealth of Independent
States), told Reuters. "The impact of that is certainly very positive for
Ukrainian airlines. The market is developing. Potential for new aircraft is
here," Jones said.

Ukraine's two leading air carriers -- Aerosvit and Ukrainian Airlines
International -- operate mostly Boeing planes. The two firms have grown over
the last two years due to a recovering economy and greater purchasing power
in the country of 48 million people bordering the European Union.

Aerosvit, which increased its passenger turnover by 75 percent in the first
quarter, operates eight Boeing aircraft and has said it plans to lease one
more later in the year, when it launches new regular flights to China, Egypt
and Russia.

"The market is growing fast here. The country is big. The market for
passenger flights is growing. Our 767 long-range (Boeing aircraft) is very
popular in Ukraine," said Sergey Kravchenko, president for Boeing in Russia
and CIS.

Kravchenko said Boeing was happy with Sea Launch, an ocean-based satellite
launch venture run jointly with Russia's RSC Energia, Norway's Kvaerner
Group and Ukraine's Yuzhnoe rocket booster design bureau, despite sluggish
demand for satellite launches. Boeing said Sea Launch planned four more
launches later this year and had orders for a total of 15.

Partners in Russia were now investigating whether to start a new project --
Landlaunch -- to launch satellites from Baikonur in Kazakhstan using
similiar technologies, Kravchenko said. Boeing was also in talks with
several Ukrainian scientific institutes on welding technologies for its new
7E7 aircraft, he said. (END)
=========================================================
THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No. 91: ARTICLE NUMBER FOUR
Major Articles About What is Going on in Ukraine
Current Events Gallery: http://www.artukraine.com/events/index.htm
=========================================================
4. IN BATTLE BETWEEN UKRAINE AND EU STEEL SECTORS,
POLAND MAY BE THE LOSER
"Yet further proof Ukraine is turning away from Europe"

Polish News Bulletin, Warsaw, Poland, Tuesday, Jun 01, 2004

WARSAW - In April, Ukraine's authorities decided to introduce licenses for
the export of iron ore as well as its concentrates. Each year Poland imports
from Ukraine mineral resources worth about $160m, as well as 15 percent of
Ukraine's total iron ore exports.

However, the impact of Ukraine's decision on the Polish steel industry is
still unclear. According to Andrzej Ciepiela, director of the Polish Union
of Steel Distributors (PUDS), the licenses will pave the way to imposing
limits on steel sales. For the Polish steel sector this could be troublesome
as it might be very difficult to find a new supplier during a steel boom.

Moreover, buying iron ore from distant countries like Brazil will result in
additional costs. "This is a political issue and yet further proof that
Ukraine is turning away from Europe," argues Marek Lesniak, president of
the Huta Szczecin steel mill.
=========================================================
THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No. 91: ARTICLE NUMBER FIVE
Check Out the News Media for the Latest News From and About Ukraine
Daily News Gallery: http://www.artukraine.com/newsgallery.htm
=========================================================
5. HE'S A SOLDIER, HE'S A POLITICIAN, HE'S VISITING KYIV
Four-star general Wesley Clark in Ukraine

Willard News Service (WNS), Kyiv, Ukraine, Wednesday, June 2, 2004

KYIV - An ex-presidential candidate for the Democrats in this year's
US elections, four-star general Wesley Clark is coming to Kyiv today.
Viktor Pinchuk, one of Ukraine's richest men and President Leonid Kuchma's
son in law, invited him.

Clark will deliver a speech about Ukraine-NATO relations to security and
defense officials. A joint press conference with Foreign Minister Kostyantyn
Hryshchenko is also on the general's agenda.

Clark first came to public attention as the supreme allied commander of NATO
during the US war on Serbia in 1999, and was until recently a CNN military
analyst. He is also the author of "Waging the Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and
the Future of Combat."

He stepped down from the presidential race after losing his primaries in
Virginia and Tennessee to Sen. John Kerry of Massachusetts, and Sen. John
Edwards of North Carolina.

Viktor Pinchuk and Wesley Clark (along with George Soros and Zbigniew
Brzesinski, who also paid visits to Ukraine last month), are members of the
International Crisis Group (ICG) - a non-profit, multinational organization
working to prevent and resolve deadly conflict. (END)
--------------------------------------------------------------------
LINK: http://www.wns.kiev.ua
=========================================================
THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No. 91: ARTICLE NUMBER SIX
The Genocidal Famine in Ukraine 1932-1933, HOLODOMOR
Genocide Gallery: http://www.artukraine.com/famineart/index.htm
=========================================================
6. UKRAINE: "UNDERPAID, UNDERQUALIFIED, AND UNDER THE GUN"
A PROFESSION WITHOUT HONOR
Ukraine's judiciary faces mounting obstacles as corruption worsens,
political influence becomes inescapable, and professional standards plummet.

COMMENTARY by Ivan Lozowy, Transitions Online (TOL)
Prague, Czech Republic, Thursday, 27 May 2004
.
KIEV, Ukraine - In the litany of reasons for talk of "Ukraine fatigue" in
both Europe and the United States, the lack of progress in establishing rule
of law just might top the list. Whereas in developed Western democracies the
rule of law - particularly the judicial system - serves as a foundation for
securing the advantages and privileges of freedom and fairness for citizens,
in Ukraine, the trappings of the rule of law serve only the whims of a small
ruling clique.
But political influence is only one of the troubles facing a judicial system
in crisis. Corruption is endemic, standards are low and falling, and trust
in the system is almost nonexistent.
Accusations about the sorry state of the Ukrainian judiciary go as high (and
as low) as they can. Hundreds of hours of audio recordings by a former
bodyguard of President Leonid Kuchma captured the president saying, "Take
that judge, hang him up by his balls, let him hang that way for one night."
Kuchma and his team have denied the contents of the tapes. Authorities in
the United States, where the bodyguard, Mykola Melnychenko, fled in 2001,
have so far publicly acknowledged the veracity of only one tape, containing
evidence of illegal arms deals involving the president.
But whatever the truth of those particular accusations, the tribulations and
(literal) trials of Yulia Tymoshenko - a former deputy prime minister and
businesswoman who now heads up the opposition in parliament - provide an
illustration of Ukraine's many problems. In particular, the experiences of
Tymoshenko, a politician whose strength and maverick qualities have won her
the moniker "the iron princess," demonstrate how the Ukrainian judiciary can
be held hostage to the political will of the country's rulers.
UKRAINE'S "IRON PRINCESS"
In the 1990s, Tymoshenko became a close business associate of former
Ukrainian prime minister Pavlo Lazarenko, who is now on trial in the United
States on charges of laundering $114 million. After Kuchma appointed him to
the post of prime minister in July 1996, Lazarenko quickly consolidated
Ukraine's fragmented oil and gas energy market in the hands of one company,
United Energy Systems, run by Tymoshenko. In 1996 alone, UES was reported
to have earned more than $1 billion by importing and reselling oil and gas.
Rumors were rife that UES was the principal pipeline for massive bribes to
government officials - including Lazarenko himself and officials close to
Kuchma.
Within a year, however, Lazarenko was removed from office. He formed an
opposition party and declared that he would run for president in the
elections due in 1999. Soon after, the general prosecutor opened a criminal
case against Lazarenko, and in February 1999, he fled the country only to be
arrested upon arriving in New York.
Within two years it was Tymoshenko's turn. In early 2001, General Prosecutor
Mykhailo Potebenko accused Tymoshenko of bribery and dealing in contraband
natural gas. In February of that year, she was arrested and imprisoned. She
was tried in the Pechersk regional court, whose chief justice, Mykola
Zamkovenko, dismissed the accusations and canceled her arrest warrant.
Prosecutors, however, appealed the decision.
Within a week, another local court ordered Tymoshenko's arrest, and she was
again jailed. By April 2001 Ukraine's Supreme Court had suspended the lower
court's decision pending a full review of the case and ordered Tymoshenko's
release. By May 2001, the Supreme Court had finally decided to dismiss the
accusations against her.
Undeterred, in September of that year the Prosecutor's Office issued another
arrest warrant for Tymoshenko, which was then annulled - again by the
Pechersk court. Two months later, an appellate court rescinded this
decision. In February 2002, the Supreme Court restored the Pechersk court
decision, and in April of that year, another local court issued a decision
closing all criminal proceedings against Tymoshenko.
The Prosecutor's Office then asked Ukraine's parliament for permission to
continue a criminal investigation into charges of corruption against
Tymoshenko, but Parliamentary Chairman Wolodymyr Lytvyn rejected the
prosecutor's appeal in June 2002. By that August, a new general prosecutor,
Sviatoslav Piskun, had taken office, and his first act was to initiate a
criminal case against the businesswoman-turned-opposition leader, accusing
her of embezzling funds while head of UES, essentially the same accusations
that had formed the basis of her imprisonment a year earlier.
A month later, Piskun's office followed up with a separate criminal case
against Tymoshenko for calling for Kuchma's ouster. In April 2003, however,
the Kiev Appellate Court repealed all outstanding criminal cases against
Tymoshenko.
As a significant footnote, the chief justice of the Pechersk court who twice
absolved Tymoshenko of wrongdoing, Mykola Zamkovenko, was removed
from his position soon after making his rulings. In March 2003, Zamkovenko
was found guilty of "exceeding his official authority" and sentenced to two
years in prison.
SINGLED OUT
Tymoshenko's experience demonstrates the principal deficiency in Ukraine's
legal system: the lack of fair and even-handed application of the law. While
by all accounts Ukraine's government bureaucracy is indeed rife with
corruption, the only criminal corruption cases opened against a high
government official between 2001 and 2003 have been against Tymoshenko, a
leading and particularly radical member of the opposition. The single-minded
efforts by the Prosecutor's Office, which functions as the government's
lawyers, to pursue Tymoshenko represents a clear symptom of the absence of
the rule of law.
If hundreds of potential corruption cases are ignored while one particular
politician is pursued, Ukraine's Law on the Fight Against Corruption can be
said to have effectively ceased to function. The law might well be renamed
"Ukraine's Law on the Fight Against Corruption by Yulia Tymoshenko."
In October 2002, an appellate court judge in the city of Kiev, Yuriy
Vasylenko, ruled that a criminal case should be initiated against the
Ukrainian president in relation to the Kuchmagate scandal that linked the
president to the killing of opposition journalist Georgy Gongadze in 2000.
Supreme Court Chief Justice Vasyl Maliarenko hurriedly convened a
multichamber session repealing Vasylenko's decision. Maliarenko, a Kuchma
appointee, could not count on a majority of judges in the civil chamber to
support the motion, so he included judges from the Supreme Court's military
chamber in the session.
The selective application of the law is only one of a number of serious
deficiencies leading to the absence of the rule of law in Ukraine. The
regime's use of the courts as a political instrument, combined with
corruption, degrades the professional level of judges to a standard far
below the worst instances of judicial incompetence found in the West.
THE THEORY: PARITY WITH THE WEST
The Ukrainian judiciary is formally divided into four levels: local (or
trial) courts, appellate courts, higher specialized courts (though, in
practice, the only specialized courts are municipal and regional Economic
Courts), and the Supreme Court. In addition, the Constitutional Court has
jurisdiction over issues pertaining to the interpretation of the
constitution.
Judges are initially appointed by the president to five-year terms based on
a recommendation by the Higher Council of Justice, which is composed of 20
members, most of whom are - directly or indirectly - also appointed by the
president. After a five-year term, judges may be nominated for approval by
parliament to a life term. Since no system of independent review exists, all
nominees put forth are, in practice, automatically approved.
Once approved, judges have powers comparable to those of their counterparts
in the West. Those powers are formidable when abused: as well as resolving
disputes between individuals and organizations, judges can limit the right
to free assembly, close down nongovernmental organizations, declare a person
mentally unsound, imprison suspects for longer than 72 hours, eavesdrop on
telephone conversations, force entry by government representatives into
private premises, and allow searches and seizures of property.
THE PRACTICE: JUSTICE IN AN ENVELOPE
That's the theory, but the reality is based instead on a steady stream of
money, which is related to perhaps the most basic organizational defect in
Ukraine's court system - low judicial wages. Local court judges receive an
average monthly salary of $100 to $200 - not much above the general
Ukrainian average of $60 to $80 a month - judges in appellate courts receive
several hundred dollars, and Supreme Court justices over $1,000.
Since judges regularly review cases involving huge sums of money and given
post-Soviet Ukraine's culture of gifting and bribery, both parties in a suit
and the judges presiding have strong reasons to arrive at an "agreement."
Most lawyers are skilled in the art of approaching a judge to propose a
bribe, and many have established relationships that help ensure that the
bribe will work. Cash changes hands in envelopes.
In one case, when a client seemed not to understand the way the judicial
system really works, the client's lawyer, a former prosecutor who regularly
defends members of the opposition, asked his client if he was "prepared to
fulfill his civic duty." Asked what that meant, the lawyer responded by
rubbing his thumb against his index finger in the universal sign for
"money."
Another form of corruption takes place without money changing hands, when,
for instance, personal relationships and influence are sufficient to assure
a judge's deciding a case as required.
Corruption among judges extends to the criminal justice system as well.
Under the standard rate, roughly $1,000 will reduce a prison term by a year.
Variations abound, however. One businessman told about being able to use
contraband goods to pay off both the judge and the local prosecutor to
escape a prison term.
Already present at the beginnings of the formation of independent Ukraine's
judicial system, corruption has expanded and diversified. According to
Andriy Fedur - an attorney who represented the mother of the slain
journalist Georgy Gongadze and the former head of the Sloviansky Bank, Boris
Feldman - Ukrainian judges cooperate with the tax service, the Prosecutor's
Office, and other enforcement organs to conduct a continuous, illegal
"reprivatization" process. For example, an independent enterprise
unaffiliated with any powerful politicians can be subjected to tax
investigations that uncover alleged large amounts of unpaid taxes.
The Prosecutor's Office supports these allegations, and corrupt judges make
questionable rulings in order either to jail the company's owners (critics
point to the sentences meted out to the owners of the Soyuz Viktan trading
concern as a case in point) or to drive them to sell the firm at a nominal
price. The sale's proceeds can then be divided up among the judges, the tax
service, and the Prosecutor's Office.
Wolodymyr Boyko, a journalist who writes on legal issues, said in an article
on the Internet site Ukraina Kriminalna that such activities are par for the
course. "Over the past several years in this country, under the cover of
justice, a vertical structure of illegitimate judges who are prepared to
issue any decision in order to continue to remain in their 'bready posts'
[slang for a position with the potential for intake of hefty bribes] has
been formed."
PLAYING A LITTLE FOOTIE
The priorities of political interference and corruption among Ukraine's
judges at times lead to an impasse. For example, a senior government
official might support the claimant in a case in which the respondent is
pushing a sizable bribe in the judge's direction. The solution often reached
is referred to in slang as the "footballing" of the case - kicking it high
and far away from the parties so that no one is either entirely satisfied or
mortally offended. In such instances, it is not unusual to see higher courts
repeatedly introduce minor alterations to lower court judgments, remanding
the case back for review. The process can drag out a case for many years
and through many cycles.
In at least two cases, international courts have ruled that this process
violates fundamental human rights. In Sovtransavto Holding vs. Ukraine,
the European Court of Human Rights found that:
"[I]n view of their content and the manner in which they were made, the
various interventions by the Ukrainian authorities acting at the highest
level were incompatible with the notion of an 'independent and impartial
tribunal.' . The applicant company's concerns as to the independence and
impartiality of the tribunals were legitimate. Coming, as they did, from the
executive authorities of the State, such interventions revealed a lack of
respect for judicial office itself."
In addition, the court decried the "footballing" procedure, judging the very
possibility of repeatedly referring judgments back and forth between lower
and higher courts as incompatible with the European Convention on Human
Rights.
But in an environment where corruption is endemic, the professionalism of
judges is not, to put it mildly, a high priority. Corruption and
influence-peddling at universities is rampant, compounding the faults of a
system in which a vast number of law professors spent their careers a
Marxist-Leninist view of the law. It's not hard to figure out why so many of
the final products - the judges - are often professionally unqualified or do
not care about their profession.
Take the example of the publishing house Taki Spravy, which had printed a
booklet for Tymoshenko and had then been subjected to multiple
investigations, searches, and seizures. One local judge stated, in a
decision refusing to review Taki Spravy's complaint, that the post office's
original stamp on an envelope could not serve as evidence that the envelope
had been mailed. And in attempting to explain the Constitutional Court
decision handed down in December 2003 to allow Kuchma to run for a third
term in plain violation of Article 103 of the constitution, a Constitutional
Court judge stated publicly that in his first term, Kuchma had been only
"acting president."
Such blatantly false assertions by judges are compounded by the continuation
of the Soviet tradition, in which the state was given the complete benefit
of the doubt, not the individual, as is the case in Western systems of law.
This, and legal deficiencies, leave individuals and companies very
vulnerable. Take the requirement (in Article 793 of the Civil Code) that "an
agreement on the rental of a building or other capital structure (or its
separate component) for a period of one year and more is subject to
certification by a notary." The law itself is deficient - neither the Civil
Code nor any other legal act sets out the consequences of noncompliance
with this provision - and, in practice, any Ukrainian court will rule that
an unnotarized agreement for more than a year can be deprived of any
legal force or validity.
In addition, according to experts working for IREX Pro-Media, a nonprofit
group promoting civil society institutions and freedom of the press, judges
across Ukraine routinely ignore the provisions of international agreements
to which Ukraine is a signatory. Article 10 of the European Convention on
Human Rights, ratified by Ukraine in 1997, guarantees freedom of expression.
As a member of the Council of Europe, Ukraine is bound by decisions of the
European Court of Human Rights regarding the interpretation and application
of Article 10. Yet reference to the European Court before a Ukrainian judge
is likely to call forth only a puzzled expression. According to IREX
Pro-Media, only one of Ukraine's 26 regional appellate-level courts
regularly applies precedents established by the European Court of Human
Rights.
A PROFESSION WITHOUT HONOR
Political interference unthinkable in the West, widespread corruption, and
systemic incompetence plague Ukraine's judicial system. The three principal
deficiencies reinforce each other, and, as a result, the legal system cannot
serve its critical function as a branch of government providing for basic
justice for the individual and balancing the other branches. Over the years
since Ukraine gained its independence in 1991, far from improving, the
situation has degraded and become entrenched.
For a young attorney aspiring to become a judge, prestige is not the
slightest consideration. Even while practicing law, a typical attorney will
find that consideration, much less knowledge, of the law is a tertiary
factor in achieving success. Clients will expect the attorney to be able to
"fit in" to the existing system: most importantly, to be able to
successfully carry bribes to judges. The negative spiral only picks up force
as times goes by.
The negative consequences of this parlous justice system are difficult to
overestimate. In Western democracies, judicial review exercises a constant,
strong, and limiting effect by constraining the options that face
politicians, businesspeople, and individuals. Lawlessness begets lawlessness
and the average Ukrainian is many times forced to take the law into his or
her own hands or to appeal to a local organized crime boss. In time - and
some would argue that Ukraine has already reached and passed this point -
the country's rulers may become indistinguishable from the rulers of the
criminal underworld. (END)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ivan Lozowy is a TOL correspondent and runs an Internet newsletter, The
Ukraine Insider. Transitions Online: http://www.tol.cz
=========================================================
THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No. 91: ARTICLE NUMBER SEVEN
Ukraine's History and the Long Struggle for Independence
Historical Gallery: http://www.artukraine.com/histgallery.htm
=========================================================
7. "YANUKOVYCH TRIES TO CLEAN UP HIS IMAGE"

COMMENTARY, by Taras Kuzio, Eurasian Daily Monitor
Volume 1, Issue 21, The Jamestown Foundation
Washington, D.C., Tuesday, 1 June 2004

Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych was nominated on April 14 as the candidate
of the pro-presidential camp for the October 31 presidential election in
Ukraine. The nomination came six days after a parliamentary vote on
constitutional changes failed. Opinion polls show Yanukovych to have
overtaken Communist Party leader Petro Symonenko as the second-most popular
candidate. Therefore, he is likely to go to the second round, where he will
face Viktor Yushchenko, leader of the Our Ukraine bloc. Yanukovych has two
drawbacks as a candidate: his own criminal background and his association
with the Donbas region.
Yanukovych heads the Party of Regions, the Donbas "party of power." From
1997 to 2002, Yanukovych was Donetsk governor and has close links to Renat
Akhmetov, one of Ukraine's wealthiest oligarchs, who is chief executive of
Donetsk-based Systems Capital Management. Until Yanukovych was nominated as
prime minister in November 2002, he never included information concerning
his two prison terms in any of his biographies. The two prison terms are
still ignored in many Yanukovych biographies (www.yanukovich.openua.net ).
Yanukovych was sentenced to three years imprisonment, from 1967 to 1970, for
theft. But he was released early. He was again imprisoned from 1970 to 1972
for violence. In 1978, the Donetsk oblast court annulled both convictions.
Hanna Herman, Yanukovych's new press spokeswoman, complained that, "Someone
is very eager to discredit the leading aspirant to the top post in our
state" (Ukrayinska Pravda, May 13). President Kuchma added that it is, "a
bit laughable when this factor is used" (Ukrayinska Pravda, April 28). A
Cabinet of Ministers press release, dated May 13, also linked the public
airing of Yanukovych's prison terms to the election campaign.
The issue will not go away. Even within the pro-presidential camp not
everybody is convinced that it was a right choice to put forward a candidate
with two criminal convictions. Members of the Lviv branch of the
pro-presidential Labor Party refused to back Yanukovych because he had been
twice imprisoned and they believe he would, "transform Ukraine into a
Donetsk gubernia" (Ukrayinska Pravda, May 25).
Not surprisingly, the opposition has raised the issue. Our Ukraine Deputy
Mykola Tomenko posed a question in Parliament to Interior Minister Mykola
Bilokin, in which he asked for details relating to both convictions.
Answering the question has proven difficult for Bilokin, as the original
documents in Donetsk oblast courts pertaining to Yanukovych between 1960 and
1970 have disappeared. A similar cleansing of official documents pertaining
to the past of Viktor Medvedchuk, head of the presidential administration,
took place after the publication in 2001 of an unflattering biography
entitled Narcissist by Our Ukraine Deputy Dmytro Chobit.
Oleksandr Kondratyev, chairman of the Donetsk appeals court, attempted to
clear up Yanukovych's criminal background at a news conference during which
he outlined the convictions. Kondrateyev explained how former cosmonaut and
USSR Supreme Soviet Deputy Georgiy Beregoviy interceded on Yanukovych's
behalf to help overturn both convictions (Interfax-Ukraine, May 26). After
the press conference, Donetsk media publicised a claim that the 1978
overturning of the two convictions was legitimate as Yanukovych had been
charged on "false testimony" (Ukrayina TV, May 26). It was offered as
further proof of his innocence that Yanukovych was permitted to join the
Communist Party in 1970.
In 1973, Medvedchuk was also sentenced to two years imprisonment for
violence. But he, like Yanukovych, did not serve his full sentence. Quashing
of Medvedchuk's conviction may have been based on an illicitly taped
conversion by presidential guard Mykola Melnychenko. On the recording,
Kuchma is told by then-Chairman of the Security Service Leonid Derkach that
Medvedchuk and his long-time oligarch ally, Grygoriy Surkis, had been KGB
agents (New York Times, December 19, 2003).
Yanukovych's image has also been damaged by his association with the Donbas,
a Ukrainian region well-known as politically akin to Belarus -- and one of
Ukraine's most corrupt regions. Donbas is considered domestically and abroad
as a region with very close ties joining local political and business
interests with organised crime elites. Yanukovych and his allies do not seem
to understand those links. But in February, the Industrial Union of the
Donbas (ISD) failed to win a tender in the privatisation of the Polish
steelworks Huta Czestochowa. The ISD tender was turned down on the advice of
the Polish Internal Security Agency (ABW), which alleged that the ISD
possessed an "unfathomable source of capital, unknown business structure,
and was possibly involved in money laundering" (Rzezcpospolita, March 4).
Yanukovych is hampered in improving his image by his ties to the
pro-presidential camp. His ratings have declined because of his refusal to
condemn election malpractice in the April Mukachevo mayoral elections. His
support for media freedom sits uneasily with his history of affiliation with
pro-Kuchma allies and his own record as governor in the Donbas, which
developed as the Ukrainian region with the worst record on media freedom.
Yanukovych has attempted to improve this image by hiring Herman, head of
Ukraine's Radio Liberty office. Yanukovych claims that she would assist him,
if he won the election, in developing media freedom in Ukraine (Ukrayinska
Pravda, May 6).
Yanukovych is also saddled with the inability of Ukraine's authorities to
resolve the fall 2000 murder of opposition journalist Heorhiy Gongadze,
editor of the Internet Ukrayinska Pravda newspaper. During Yanukovych's
visit to Brussels to attend a meeting with the EU, the International Union
of Journalists (IUJ) gave him a letter which was critical of the way the
Gongadze case was handled. Yanukovych told the IUJ that he would make
"strengthening media freedom one of the priorities of his election campaign"
(Ukrayinska Pravda, May 19).
Ukraine's oligarchs have long sought scholarly links and academic doctorates
as a means to improve their status. In May, Yanukovych was elected to the
Presidium of the Academy of Sciences. Finally, Yanukovych was quick to
appoint as his adviser Ruslana Lyzhychko, the Ukrainian entrant who won the
49th Eurovision contest held last month in Istanbul. As a result of the
Ukrainian win, next year's contest will be hosted in Kyiv by the victor in
this year's presidential election. (END)
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