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Action Ukraine Report

"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT"
An International Newsletter
In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis, and Commentary

"The Art of Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion,
Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World"

"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT" - Number 404
morganw@patriot.net, ArtUkraine.com@starpower.net
FROM: KYIV, UKRAINE, THURSDAY, JANUARY 6, 2005

-----INDEX OF ARTICLES-----
"Major International News Headlines and Articles"

1. KUCHMA ACCEPTS RESIGNATION OF PM YANUKOVYCH
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wed, January 5, 2005

2. OSCE CHIEF PRAISES DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES IN UKRAINE
Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian, 5 Jan 05
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Wed, Jan 05, 2005

3. YULIA TYMOSHENKO CALLS ON OSCE TO KEEP ITS MISSION
IN UKRAINE UNTIL PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION IN 2006
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wed, January 5, 2005

4. UKRAINE-MACROECONOMIC SITUATION-DECEMBER 2004
REPORT: By Iryna Piontkivska, Edilberto L. Segura
SigmaBleyzer Investment Banking Group
Kyiv, Ukraine, Wednesday, January 5, 2005

5. ORANGE CHALLENGE FOR CIS COUNTRIES
OPINION: The Messenger, Georgia's English Language Daily
Tbilisi, Georgia, Wednesday, January 5, 2005

6. "EYE ON EURASIA: DROPPING BIG BROTHER"
Ukrainians are looking at Russia and Russians in a new way
By Paul Goble, for United Press International (UPI)
Tartu, Estonia, Tuesday, January 4, 2005

7. "RUSSIA'S MOUTH PIECE"
OP-ED: By Bishop Paul Peter Jesep
The Action Ukraine Report, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wed, Jan 5, 2005

8. "POLITICAL REALIGNMENT BEGINS IN UKRAINE"
By Taras Kuzio, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 2 Issue 1
The Jamestown Foundation, Washington, D.C., Mon, Jan 03, 2005

9. UKRAINIAN PRESIDENTIAL ANALYST HREBENYUK
CONFIRMS ELECTION FRAUD IN SECOND ROUND
Interview with Lyudmyla Hrebenyuk
By Yuriy Butusov and Vasyl Koval
Zerkalo Nedeli, Kiev, Ukraine, in Russian 25 Dec 04
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Fri, Dec 31, 2004

10. "A CONTRACT SUICIDE"
Ukraine minister's death could have been murder disguised as suicide
By Oleksandra Prymachenko
Zerkalo Nedeli, Kiev, Ukraine, in Russian 30 Dec 04, p 4
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Tue, Jan 04, 2005
=========================================================
1. KUCHMA ACCEPTS RESIGNATION OF PM YANUKOVYCH

Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wed, January 5, 2005

KYIV - President Leonid Kuchma accepted resignation of Prime Minister
Viktor Yanukovych. This was disclosed to Ukrainian News by press service
of the President. According to the press service, Kuchma appointed deputy
PM Mykola Azarov as acting Prime Minister.

As Ukrainian News earlier reported, on December 31 the Party of the Regions'
leader and presidential candidate Yanukovych announced his resignation from
the post of Prime Minister on the Ukraina television channel. At the same
time, Yanukovych stated his intention to remain in politics.

The parliament passed a no-confidence vote in the Yanukovych-led Cabinet
of Ministers in late November. However, Yanukovych said he considered the
parliament's decision political and that he did not intend to abide by it
despite President Leonid Kuchma's demand that he resign. Voting in the
repeat of the second round of the presidential elections took place on
December 26.

With all the ballots counted by the Central Electoral Commission, the Our
Ukraine coalition's leader Viktor Yuschenko won 52.00% while Yanukovych
won 44.19%. In the November 21 second round of the presidential elections,
the CEC said that Yanukovych won 49.46% of the votes cast while Yuschenko
won 46.61%. Kuchma appointed Yanukovych as prime minister in November
2002. -30- [Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
=========================================================
2. OSCE CHIEF PRAISES DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES IN UKRAINE

Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian, 5 Jan 05
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Wed, Jan 05, 2005

KIEV - Stability in Ukraine is important for stability in Europe, the OSCE
chairman, Dimitrij Rupel, has said. Stability in Ukraine is important for
stability in Europe and entire OSCE territory," said Dimitrij Rupel after a
meeting with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kostyantyn Hryshchenko in Kiev
today.

He said he came to Ukraine to express his delight and to congratulate
[Ukraine] on the democratic processes that are taking place in the country
now. Rupel said that the democratic processes are proceeding successfully
and he hopes that they would continue in the same manner in the future.

"I have discovered many things in Ukraine. And I hope to hear even more
during a meeting with the newly elected president, Viktor Yushchenko. I am
glad that my career as the OSCE chief begins in Ukraine," he was quoted as
saying.

Rupel said he made the conclusion that Ukraine is an important member of the
OSCE and that in the future the OSCE has to adapt to the needs of Ukraine.
He added that during his visit to Ukraine he is going to discuss the
creation of a model of cooperation between Ukraine and the OSCE for 2005.

Kostyantyn Hryshchenko, for his part, said that during the meeting with
Dimitrij Rupel the issue of Ukraine's participation in the OSCE was
discussed, and the sides agreed that this organization is an important
factor of promoting democracy and security in Europe.

The minister also said that the OSCE played an important role during the
presidential election in Ukraine. He said that establishing uniform
standards was a crucial mission of the OSCE observers. "But it's important
to ensure that these standards remain the same for all countries,"
Hryshchenko said. -30- [Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
=========================================================
3. YULIA TYMOSHENKO CALLS ON OSCE TO KEEP ITS MISSION
IN UKRAINE UNTIL PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION IN 2006

Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wed, January 5, 2005

KYIV - Leader of the namesake coalition, member of the National Salvation
Committee, Yulia Tymoshenko has called on the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe not to reduce the number of its mission members in
Ukraine until election to the Verkhovna Rada in March 2006. She informed
journalists about this after the end of her meeting with the current OSCE
Chairman-in-Office, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Slovenia Dimitrij Rupel.

According to Tymoshenko's words, OSCE played a very important role in
the last presidential election. She said that position of OSCE observers was
unbiased.

Tymoshenko said that presence of OSCE in Ukraine should not be reduced,
as parliamentary election campaign will start almost immediately after the
end of presidential election.

Tymoshenko believes that those political forces that lost presidential
election will try to take revenge on parliamentary election. She told that
parliamentary election campaign on their part will be as dirty as the one
for presidential election. In this connection, YTC leader calls on OSCE to
keep its mission in Ukraine and take an active part in monitoring
parliamentary election. "We should preserve rather powerful representative
office of OSCE in Ukraine," she said.

As Ukrainian News earlier reported, Rupel met Speaker of the Verkhovna
Rada Volodymyr Lytvyn earlier. OSCE increased the numbest of its observers
from 600, who monitored the first two rounds of presidential election, to
1,000 by revote in the second round. Voting in the repeat of the second
round of the presidential elections took place on December 26. -30-
=========================================================
4. UKRAINE-MACROECONOMIC SITUATION-DECEMBER 2004

REPORT: By Iryna Piontkivska, Edilberto L. Segura
SigmaBleyzer Investment Banking Group
Kyiv, Ukraine, Wednesday, January 5, 2005

- SUMMARY -
The second round of presidential elections held on November 21st was the
dominant event of the month. Election results announced by the Central
Election Committee (CEC) stated that Prime Minister (PM) Yanukovich was
the winner with 49.46% of the votes, while opposition leader Yuschenko had
received 46.61%. A huge number of protesters on the streets and opposition
claims of election fraud led to a political crisis in the country and the
Supreme Court of Ukraine postponed the official publication of election
results. The Yanukovich and Yuschenko camps attempted to negotiate with
the help of international mediators, but the talks did not bring a
compromise.

The opposition appealed to the Supreme Court, accusing the executive
authorities of widespread fraud in the second round of the presidential
election. On December 3rd, the Supreme Court declared the second round
results invalid and called for a new run-off vote hold on December 26th.
However, the Supreme Court decision did not resolve the political crisis in
the country. On the 8th of December, Ukraine's parliament approved a
compromise package of laws calling for changes to the Constitution and
special provisions to the election law, which were immediately signed by
President Kuchma. The constitutional reform turned Ukraine into a
parliamentary-presidential republic, reducing presidential power and giving
more authority to the Parliament. By having a fair democratic re-run of the
presidential elections, Ukraine has a chance to improve its international
reputation, taking into account the positive macroeconomic development.

Meanwhile, Ukraine's real sector continued to demonstrate impressive
performance in November despite the political uncertainties. Real GDP grew
by 12.4% year-over-year (yoy). This is one of the best GDP growth rates
among all transition economies. Broad-based economic growth was supported by
impressive export performance (43.3% yoy growth in ten months) and booming
domestic demand (income growth reached 24% yoy). Unexpectedly, industrial
performance improved significantly during the politically turbulent November
following a deceleration in pre-election months. Industrial production
accelerated to 11.3% yoy growth in November from 6.4% yoy in October.
The outlook for Ukraine's economic development remains positive in 2004,
although fiscal performance and inflationary pressures raise concerns.

The pre-election fiscal ease, which the IMF considers inappropriate, may
result in a fiscal deficit of 4% of GDP in 2004 compared to the previously
planned 1.75%. This level is unsustainable, and could have a negative impact
on the economy's stability unless proper policy adjustments are implemented.
The 2005 budget assumes a fiscal deficit of 2.1% of GDP. However, this is
based on optimistic assumptions about revenue growth. Inflationary pressures
have also increased as consumer price growth reached 11.3% yoy in November.
Inflationary expectations and political uncertainty led to a surge in demand
for cash foreign exchange, when people started converting their hryvnia
holdings into foreign currencies.

As a result, monetary aggregates growth decelerated in November. In an
attempt to restrain large fluctuations in the cash foreign exchange rate and
restore public confidence in the hryvnia, the National Bank of Ukraine
(NBU) introduced a 2% fluctuation band for cash foreign exchange rates.
Despite this, net purchase of cash foreign exchange by the population
reached $1.9 billion over October-November. As a result, the NBU's
gross international reserves dropped to $9.9 billion at the end of
November from a record high of $12.1 billion in September.

At the same time, a favorable external environment and a competitive
exchange rate continued to drive foreign trade. In January-October, the
trade of goods surplus reached $3.21 billion, more than eight times higher
than over the same period last year. Despite some political uncertainties
associated with the presidential election, the impressive macroeconomic
performance in the country is sending positive signals to the international
investment community. Net FDI inflow into Ukraine constituted $1.0 billion
in January-September. However, the sustainability of Ukraine's superb
macroeconomic fundamentals is dependent on the further improvement of
the investment climate. -30-

NOTE: TO READ THE ENTIRE REPORT: UKRAINE MACROECONOMIC
SITUATION - DECEMBER 2004 CLICK ON THE FOLLOWING LINK:

http://www.sigmableyzer.com/files/Ukraine_Ec_Situation_12_04fin.pdf

You will need an Adobe Reader on your computer. If you do not
have one you can go to the following link and download one for free:
http://www.adobe.com/products/acrobat/readstep2.html.
==========================================================
5. "ORANGE CHALLENGE FOR CIS COUNTRIES"

OPINION: The Messenger, Georgia's English Language Daily
Tbilisi, Georgia, Wednesday, January 5, 2005

President Mikheil Saakashvili made the unexpected move on the last day
of 2004 of leaving for Ukraine to ring in the New Year with Ukrainian
President-elect Viktor Yushchenko. Despite opposition criticism,
Saakashvili did not back down and spent the first few days of 2005 in
Ukraine.

The two presidents held several informal meetings, discussing mutual
problems and prospects for the development of their countries. One major
challenge for the two post-revolutionary states in 2005 is integration into
the European Union. Both countries have declared EU membership as an
official priority, though both have a long way to go in order to achieve
this goal.

Before his departure, Saakashvili again underscored the importance of the
Orange opposition victory in Ukraine and named this event as the most
significant of 2004. In an interview with Kviris Palitra, the president
mentioned that he had predicted such developments long ago. "I know
Ukraine very well and although many people insisted that no parallels could
be drawn between Georgia and Ukraine, I saw it differently and stated at all
official meetings that it is impossible to stop democracy."

Georgia's Rose Revolution was the most important event in the former Soviet
Union in 2003, and many considered it a fluke and thought it impossible
that such events could be repeated elsewhere in the CIS. But the Orange
opposition's victory at the end of 2004 proved that Georgia's peaceful
revolution was not an isolated event.

After coming to power, Saakashvili visited Ukraine almost immediately where
he openly supported the local opposition. Many criticized him and accused
him of having "Che Guevara syndrome," in trying to export revolution to
Ukraine. At the time, critics warned that this could undermine
Georgian-Ukrainian relations. The rule of President Leonid Kuchma seemed
strong at the time and at first glance a pro-western opposition victory in
Ukraine seemed unimaginable.

It can be said that the velvet revolutions in Eastern Europe have featured
opposition forces with liberal values overcoming undemocratic regimes
composed largely of former communists. However attitudes towards the
Georgia and Ukraine revolutions are not uniform. Some see at the heart of
theses revolutions American dirty tricks aimed at bringing forces loyal to
their interests into power in the former Soviet Union.

Indeed, foreign influence on local elections has played a significant role
in both countries - both the West and Russia were active in the Ukrainian
elections. But no outside involvement can be decisive: in the end it is the
will of the people themselves and the overall situation in the country that
matters.

The failure of the pro-Russian Ukrainian presidential candidate Yanukovich
and his forces has dealt a serious blow to Russia and its position in post
Soviet space. Several analysts now predict that the Ukrainian example could
prove significant for neighboring Moldova and Belarus. The leaders of the
Central Asian republics are also seriously concerned. The Russian newspaper
Nezavisimaya Gazeta wrote that "the events in Georgia and especially
Ukraine have caused the leadership of these countries to lose their fearful
respect of Moscow. It makes no difference to these countries why Russia
lost - due to a lack of wise strategy or to poor political technologies."

In any case, the success of the Ukrainian revolution is of greatest
importance to Georgian geopolitical strategy. Georgia now has a partner
with very similar domestic and foreign policy challenges aimed in the long
run at integration into NATO and the European Union.

This could well be the groundwork for very close cooperation between the
two countries. Their collaboration is very important, for the velvet
revolutions are only the beginning and both states have major challenges
ahead. In Ukraine, in particular, the strongly pro-Russian sentiment that
exists in the eastern part of the country will mean the new president, who
will face a strong opposition in the local parliament, the Rada, will have
to work hard to keep the unity of the nation and proceed with democratic
changes.

For Georgia, too, many challenges lie ahead. Closer ties with a supportive,
like-minded Ukraine will make overcoming these challenges easier. -30-
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://www.messenger.com.ge/issues/0775_january_5,2005/opinion_0775.htm
==========================================================
6. "EYE ON EURASIA: DROPPING BIG BROTHER"
Ukrainians are looking at Russia and Russians in a new way

By Paul Goble, for United Press International (UPI)
Tartu, Estonia, Tuesday, January 4, 2005

TARTU, Estonia, -- Recent statements by Ukrainians and even
by ethnic Russians living in Ukraine cast doubt on suggestions by senior
Russian Federation officials that ever more non-Russians in the post-Soviet
states are again looking to the Russians as their "elder brother" as Moscow
commentators routinely claimed in the past.

Instead, these comments from Ukraine suggest that Russian actions there
have so alienated the citizens of non-Russian countries that Moscow will
not be able to draw on the kind of residual loyalty it had felt it had in
the decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union and may be driven either
to cede its interests in other former Soviet republics or employ other
means to advance them.

The statements of Ukrainians and ethnic Russians living in Ukraine were
posted on a Russian nationalist website last week and do not even purport
to be a representative sample.
(http://www.apn.ru/?chapter_name=print_advert&data_id=321&do=view_single)
But their observations are not inconsistent with other reporting and thus
merit close attention.

One Ukrainian said that earlier Russia had been for him a "brother,"
even if not "an elder one." But because of Moscow's intervention in the
Ukrainian elections, he said he wanted to say that he no longer liked
Russia or Russians, something for which the Russians had only themselves
to blame.

Another Ukrainian said that "the revolution in Ukraine had revealed the
real attitude of Russians to Ukrainians" and that as a result, most of his
"Russian friends had passed into the camp of enemies." Russians, he added,
do not want to understand that "before God, all are equal" and that "sooner
or later all empires, however great, collapse."

A third said that she had always written "Russian" on the nationality
line of various forms, but now "when remembering that, [she] felt a sense
of shame." And she added that while she had never had any illusions about
the attitudes of the Russian state toward non-Russians, she had been
shocked in recent weeks by the "aggressive" attitudes of ordinary Russians
toward Ukrainians.

Yet a fourth said that relations between Ukraine and Russia "will never
be the same." Rather, he suggested, Ukrainians in the future will look on
Russians in the same way Russians have looked on Ukrainians. That marks
a big change. Earlier, he said, he had wished Russia and its people well
because he felt "they were ours." Now, he said, they are "simply ,they.'"

A fifth added that there was a clear analogy in this case with
situations in some families. A brother who insults and belittles you is
still a brother, and you love him. But if at some point, he takes out a
knife and kills your favorite cat, "he remains [your] brother. [But only]
technically."

Other observers of the Ukrainian scene have reported similar comments,
and at least one has pointedly noted that even "the majority of Russians in
Ukraine have long ago become Russian-speaking Ukrainians." As a result, the
differences between them and Russian-speaking Ukrainians is not terribly
important. (http://www.rustrana.ru/print.php?nid=4985)

These comments are especially interesting because they contradict
arguments even now being made in Moscow by Russian analysts and officials.
In the current issue of "VVP," an analytic monthly close to the Russian
government and the Orthodox Church, one writer suggests that ever more
non-Russians are again coming to view Russia as "an elder brother," albeit
one less dominant than in Soviet times. (http://2vp.ru/print.php?id=287)

That author, Sergei Il'in, adds that this shift reflects both growing
economic integration in the post-Soviet region and the need to cooperate in
the struggle with international terrorism. That counter-terrorism plays
that role was stressed by several senior Russian Interior Ministry
officials last month. (http://mvdinform.ru/index.php?newsid=4820)

The comments of Ukrainian citizens cited above, however, suggest that
any broader cooperation, any return to a time in which non-Russians will
look up to the Russians as their specially beloved "elder brother" is
probably not in the cards -- if indeed most non-Russians ever really felt
the way that Russians and the Soviet government typically claimed.

Political changes in Georgia and Ukraine have transformed the political
landscape not only in the non-Russian countries but in the Russian
Federation as well -- even if many Russians and especially Russian
officials are not yet prepared to acknowledge the extent of that tectonic
shift.

But both officials and ordinary Russians are likely to have at least one
additional reason in the next few months to recognize that their status in
the post-Soviet states has changed and that the post-Soviet states are in
fact foreign countries.

On Dec. 30, the Russian Foreign Ministry reminded the citizens of the
Russian Federation that in the near future, they will need foreign
passports to travel to all Commonwealth of Independent States countries,
something they have not always needed in the first 13 years since the
collapse of the Soviet Union. (Interfax news agency as cited at
http://www.strana.ru/print/237130.html) -30-
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Paul Goble teaches at the Euro-college of the University of Tartu
in Estonia.
=========================================================
7. "RUSSIA'S MOUTH PIECE"

OP-ED: By Bishop Paul Peter Jesep
The Action Ukraine Report, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wed, Jan 5, 2005

"Believe me not, and yet I lie not;
I confess nothing, nor I deny nothing."
Shakespeare

Ukrainians will find dark humor in the English or Russian edition of Pravda
as it attempts to marginalize blossoming liberty in the ancestral
Motherland. Comic relief, however, isn't why patriots in Ukraine or the
Diaspora should regularly monitor the tabloid's contents or other Russian
media outlets.

Rather than promote democracy the former Communist mouth piece is furthering
the authoritarianism of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The newspaper
provides insight into the mindset of Moscow's political power brokers that
may foretell of the challenges Ukraine faces. Pravda is another reason why
the Diaspora must marshal resources to maintain a first rate communications
strategy to keep average citizens in the West apprised of events as they
unfold in Eastern Europe.

On December 9th Pravda ran a piece noting that "it is up to the Ukrainians
to decide whether they opt for the western stooge, Yushchenko, who will try
to install NATO bases on his soil in return for billionaire contracts, who
will represent the rural, poorer Western Ukrainians and who will alienate
the more prosperous and developed Eastern Ukrainians, whose industrial
development is second to none in the region and who might very well decide
to relocate in Russia, should the conditions be created."

Calling Yushchenko a "western stooge" is indicative of Russia's historic
xenophobia which also fuels its hubris to influence Ukraine. Such yellow
journalism may cause a chuckle, but make no mistake it reveals an ingrained,
hostile attitude toward Europe's second largest nation. Pravda is an
important tool to manipulate the views of the average Russian about Ukraine.
In doing so it lays out the justification for future overt or covert
government action.

Twelve days later the newspaper contended that the "The loss of Ukraine
will virtually mean that Russia's existence as a superpower is over. It
will only prove that Russia is unable to do anything in the country
[Ukraine], where the majority of people speak Russian and where many
think of themselves as Russians." Whether Russia remains a superpower
isn't Ukraine's problem. Kyiv should hardly be expected to surrender
sovereignty to address its northern neighbor's insecurities. But let's be
realistic. Russia is not likely to understand that position any time soon.

It should be clear that Moscow will never leave Ukraine alone. Pravda's
sensational political spin that Ukraine is a primarily Russian speaking
nation suggests a misguided justification that Moscow has some claim to
protect these people. It also implies that a Russian province has engaged
in a political aberration needing correction.

Don't forget Adolf Hitler's occupation of the Sudatenland to protect German
speaking citizens of Czechoslovakia. Nor did the Kremlin hold back on using
troops to quell unrest in the former East Bloc. This is not to suggest
Russia has the ability or resources to send tanks into Ukraine. Whether
that happens is not the issue. There are political and economic pressures
that can be employed to better position Moscow to manipulate Ukraine.

Pravda has accused the incoming president of planning to "take the office
and obtain the powers of a king." After ten years of Moscow puppet Leonid
Kuchma this remark is as funny as the notion that the "Ukrainian policy will
not depend much on Yushchenko - the USA will have the total control over
Ukraine's strategic line." Yet as ridiculous as all of this is something
said often enough becomes believable. The Kremlin can justify intervention
based on national security.

By the way, it was the complacency of the United States that played a role
in the second fraudulent election. American foreign policy enabled Putin a
heavy hand in Ukraine over the last four years. It should also be
remembered that America lagged behind Canada, Australia and European
democracies in protesting the second election. If Ukraine has learned
anything from recent events, the Motherland knows that it's on its own.
The Orange Revolution came from the people and it is from them that the
integrity of Ukraine's political, economic and cultural sovereignty will be
preserved.

Putin's mouthpiece also contends that "Pro-Americans took active measures
to seize the central power in Ukraine after the second round of the
presidential election was over with Yanukovich's victory . . . Pro-Russians
in their turn tried to prove that the actions of the opposition, which they
characterized as a coup, were illegal . . . Pro-Russians' attempts to come
to agreement with revolutionaries and illusions to avoid serious conflicts
eventually resulted in the lost of initiative."

Why is the spin pro-American versus pro-Russian? Why can't this be an
expression of the will of a free people deciding their own destiny? There
needs to be a rapid response to such statements from the Diaspora
leadership.

Ukraine has won an important political victory, but a fragile one. The
propaganda war is far from over. Russia must not be allowed to create
Ukraine's image to the outside world. We often see the damage that can be
done to Ukraine when good intentioned Western scholars offer commentary
through a Russian lens. -30-
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bishop Paul Peter Jesep is Chancellor of the Archeparchy and Vicar General
of Public Affairs and Government Relations for the Ukrainian Autocephalous
Orthodox Church-Sobornopravna (UAOC-S) based in Cleveland, Ohio. In
the past, His Grace, a lawyer and political scientist by training, served on
the staff of U.S. Senator Susan Collins (R-ME). Bishop Jesep may be reached
at VladykaPaulPeter@aol.com. The views expressed here are strictly
personal and do not reflect the official position of the UAOC-S. -30-
=========================================================
8. "POLITICAL REALIGNMENT BEGINS IN UKRAINE"

By Taras Kuzio, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 2 Issue 1
The Jamestown Foundation, Washington, D.C., Mon, Jan 03, 2005

The ruling centrist and oligarchic elites that supported President Leonid
Kuchma over the last decade are now rushing to adapt to the reality that
Viktor Yushchenko is Ukraine's new president. The Supreme Court and Central
Election Commission threw out complaints by his opponent, former prime
minister Viktor Yanukovych, paving the way for Yushchenko's unofficial
inauguration before his Orange Revolution supporters in Kyiv on December
31 and then officially in parliament in mid-January.

Kuchma's allies have five techniques to regroup following their failed
efforts to install Yanukovych as president.

FIRST, they could go into "stern opposition." Yanukovych's anger is directed
at both Yushchenko and at the Kyiv elites who failed to secure his victory
in round two. Yanukovych's threat to join the opposition will only be
possible in alliance with presidential administration head Viktor
Medvedchuk's Social Democratic United Party (SDPUo) and the Communists.
Yet such an alliance is unnatural, as it is not based on any ideological
unity.

Yanukovych's Regions of Ukraine and the SDPUo were created as "parties
of power" and will find it very difficult to act as oppositionists.
Yanukovych's confusion can be seen from his declaration of being in
opposition while still prime minister.

SECOND, Kuchma-era elites could defect to the Yushchenko camp. At the
victory rally after the December 26 election, Yushchenko appeared on stage
with former oligarch Andrei Derkach, who had been a high-profile member of
the Dnipropetrovsk Labor Ukraine clan before defecting to Yushchenko in the
spring. His ERA TV station, which rents airtime on state channel 1, favored
Yushchenko in the elections.

Other defectors include former Kuchma adviser Oleksandr Volkov, who played
a central role in Kuchma's re-election in 1999. Volkov accompanied Yulia
Tymoshenko to Donetsk to calm regional leaders. Kyiv Mayor Oleksandr
Omelchenko remained neutral in the elections, though he feared a Yanukovych
victory because of the highly negative business reputation of the Donetsk
clan. During the Orange Revolution Omelchenko provided crucial logistical
support to help hundreds of thousands of protesters to remain on Kyiv's
streets for weeks on end.

Some defectors are treated with more suspicion. For example Vasyl Baziv,
the former deputy head of the presidential administration, has claimed that
he was always a Yushchenko supporter, and that the majority of his
colleagues voted for Yushchenko in the repeat election. In reality Baziv
told this author in summer 2003 that "Yushchenko was finished."

THIRD, former elites might opt for suicide, either voluntarily or after
pressure. Yuriy Liakh, a high-ranking SDPUo member and chairman of the
Ukrainian Credit Bank, committed suicide after round two of the elections.
The Ukrainian Credit Bank was used to launder funds for Yanukovych's
shadow election campaign, which reportedly spent $600 million.

Minister of Transportation Heorhiy Kirpa committed suicide on December 27,
following a visit from Andriy Kluyev, head of Yanukovych's shadow campaign
headquarters. Kirpa had been heavily involved in organizing transportation
for Yanukovych supporters who voted with multiple absentee ballots in the
November 21 runoff. Kirpa's refusal to undertake this operation in round
three (December 26) led to a violent fight between Yanukovych and Kirpa; the
latter was hospitalized with severe injuries. According to well-informed
Kyiv sources, upon release from the hospital Kirpa condemned Yanukovych
as a "bandit" and admitted that his Ministry had been paid to transport
Yanukovych's supporters in November. Kirpa offered to provide evidence
to the Security Service (SBU).

FOURTH, outgoing elites could try and save themselves by either fleeing
Ukraine or uniting with others in the same boat. Yuriy Boyko, former
chairman of the state Naftohaz Ukrainy company, which was heavily involved
in funding Kuchma's 1999 re-election, has fled Ukraine. Boyko was put in
charge of the state body that oversees supplies to the presidential
administration on the eve of the elections. The buildings it controls were
used to store illegal anti-Yushchenko posters and leaflets.

Former interior minister Yuriy Kravchenko fled to Russia last summer.
Kravchenko had been dismissed during the Kuchmagate crisis because of his
involvement in the murder of opposition journalist Heorhiy Gongadze.

After round two, Serhiy Tyhipko resigned as chairman of the National Bank
and head of the Yanukovych campaign. His Labor Ukraine parliamentary faction
disintegrated, forcing it to unite with Valeriy Pustovoitenko's crumbling
People's Democratic Party faction. Both parties suffered from supporting
Yanukovych.

Kharkiv governor Yevhen Kushnariov, who was also involved in widespread
election fraud, has sought to create a new political party that would back
Yanukovych. Whether this will save Kushnariov is doubtful. Besides fraud, he
has been questioned by the prosecutor's office over his support for
separatism.

FIFTH, Kuchma-era elites could return to parliament or obtain a new
government position; either post would guarantee immunity. Deputy chairman
of the SBU Volodymyr Satsyuk and Andriy Kluyev both illegally held
government positions while remaining parliamentary deputies. Both are
implicated in election fraud and attempts on Yushchenko's life. Kluyev
figures prominently on the audio tapes illicitly made by the SBU in
Yanukovych's shadow campaign headquarters.

Kuchma has attempted to save Stepan Havrysh, who has been implicated in
election fraud. Havrysh was Yanukovych's representative to the Central
Election Commission in rounds one and two. Despite his involvement in
election fraud, Kuchma proposed Havrysh as a judge to sit on the
Constitutional Court, a fitting confirmation of Kuchma's view of the rule of
law. -30- [Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(maidan.org.ua, December 30; Ukrayinska pravda, December 28, 29;
Zerkalo nedeli, December 30, 2004 - January 2005).
=========================================================
9. UKRAINIAN PRESIDENTIAL ANALYST LYUDMYLA HREBENYUK
CONFIRMS ELECTION FRAUD IN SECOND ROUND

Interview with Lyudmyla Hrebenyuk
By Yuriy Butusov and Vasyl Koval
Zerkalo Nedeli, Kiev, in Russian 25 Dec 04
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Fri, Dec 31, 2004

Opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko led all the way in both the first and
the second round of the Ukrainian presidential elections, Lyudmyla
Hrebenyuk, the presidential administration's main consultant has told a
Ukrainian weekly. She said that voter turnout had artificially been
increased by 1.1m in the second round, and Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych
had been declared the winner.

Hrebenyuk told the Supreme Court that massive vote rigging had taken place
during the runoff on 21 November. In an interview featured in an article by
Yuriy Butusov and Vasyl Koval of the Ukrainian weekly Zerkalo Nedeli,
Hrebenyuk revealed that the presidential administration had its own
vote-count computer system which worked faster than that of the Central
Electoral Commission.

The following is the text of the article, published on 25 December under the
title "Presidential administration consultant Lyudmyla Hrebenyuk: 'According
to our data, Yushchenko was in the lead throughout the vote counting'";
subheadings have been inserted editorially:

Lyudmyla Hrebenyuk, chief consultant of the Ukrainian presidential
administration, was one of the most important witnesses whose evidence was
considered by the Supreme Court when reaching its judgment on ballot rigging
in the second round of the presidential elections. Ms Hrebenyuk fell ill
shortly after the second round and is still in hospital, where she had an
operation. However, she forwarded her evidence to the court - evidence that
amounted to a sensation in the hearing. Ms Hrebenyuk helped to devise the
rapid voting survey and analysis system that supplied the presidential
administration with information before it reached the Central Electoral
Commission [CEC].

Lyudmyla Hrebenyuk presented facts that amounted to irrefutable proof in the
Supreme Court that the voting results in the second round of the elections
had been falsified. As soon as her health permitted it, Ms Hrebenyuk agreed
to meet a Zerkalo Nedeli correspondent and to answer questions that the
Supreme Court was unable to ask her. We are sure that this information will
give rise to the appropriate reaction from the law-enforcement agencies.
PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION COUNTED VOTES
FASTER THAN THE CEC
On the basis of information obtained from competent sources and also from a
number of persons who feature directly in the recordings of conversations
allegedly conducted at Yanukovych's election headquarters, as published by
MP Oleh Rybachuk, there are now grounds for maintaining that the Ukrainian
presidential administration had a complex system for gathering information
about the progress of the voting, working in parallel with the Central
Electoral Commission's system, but acquiring the data faster than the CEC.
The turnout figures and the divisional commissions' returns were collected
by deploying the wide-ranging facilities of the machinery of state at each
of the 33,000 polling stations in Ukraine. This required vast expenditure,
as well as material and human resources, that the opposition did not
possess. Mykola Katerynchuk, head of the legal department of Viktor
Yushchenko's headquarters, takes the view that the presidential
administration had no legitimate power to organize and get the [state]
budget to fund such a system - especially since there are substantial
grounds for supposing that the system operated for the benefit of the
election headquarters of the establishment candidate.

CEC members Andriy Mahera and Roman Knyazevych have stated that the
number of ballot papers issued and used throughout the country exceeds
the number of ballot papers issued by 1.1m.

Zerkalo Nedeli has already presented readers with the evidence of Halyna
Mandrusova, who helped to develop the [CEC's] "Elections" system and gave a
detailed account of who could organize the penetration of the CEC's database
and how.

But today we present a sensational item - an interview with Lyudmyla
Hrebenyuk, a member of the presidential administration staff, who has dealt
with matters relating to the supply of information to the Ukrainian
president over the past 11 years. During this [election] campaign, she
worked in the main directorate for organizational and staffing policy and
liaison with the regions, where a system providing a preliminary count of
the votes cast in the presidential elections was organized under the
direction of Oleksiy Ishchenko, a deputy head of the presidential
administration (and one of the leaders of the USDPU [United Social
Democratic Party of Ukraine, led by Viktor Medvedchuk, head of the
presidential administration]). The system functioned without any delays.

Ms Hrebenyuk's testimony, attached to the vote-rigging case, has clarified
what is for the opposition the main issue: who organized and directed the
preliminary vote count, who may be involved in rigging the voting results,
and what was the real outcome of the second round?

[Interviewer] Ms Hrebenyuk, first of all, could you tell us about the
vote-counting system organized by the presidential administration?
[Hrebenyuk] I think our vote-counting system was, in fact, the main one,
since we worked far more quickly than the CEC and were no worse equipped.
The information was collected by specially authorized presidential
administration representatives, the officials in charge of each region.
Together with members of the local authorities, they quickly obtained
information about voter turnout from the divisional commissions and about
the results of the vote counting. The information was conveyed to us within
the shortest possible time. Vast attention was paid to the operation of our
system. We were monitored by the whole of the administration's leadership,
and chiefs, large and small, made constant visits. The leadership maintained
that "the result of the elections is 50 per cent dependent on our
directorate".
[Interviewer] Do you know of the existence of a separate fibreoptic link
line giving access to the CEC's database?
[Hrebenyuk] I don't know about the existence of any separate line linking up

with the CEC. We had general access to the CEC web site.
[Interviewer] Did you realize that a vote-counting system that outstrips the
work of the CEC doesn't feature in a single law?
[Hrebenyuk] The system was a development of projects that already existed to
ensure that the Ukrainian president has up-to-date information. A similar
system was in operation during previous election campaigns. Our directorate
is tasked with supplying the president with information.
"INEXPLICABLE" TURNOUT SURGE
[Interviewer] How did the vote counting take place during the first and
second rounds of the elections? How did your data differ from the CEC's
figures?
[Hrebenyuk] In the first round, the bosses were very nervous and worried
when, after the first returns had come in, we forecast that Viktor
Yushchenko would win. I want to point out the main difference from the CEC.
According to our data, Viktor Yushchenko was in the lead throughout the
counting. It was already clear at five o'clock in the morning that
Yushchenko had won. In the final CEC data, Yushchenko's victory was declared
only 10 days later, and the voting figures had changed somewhat. After the
first round, the officials in charge of four regions in which Yanukovych
lost were fired.
In the second round, the bosses were perfectly calm. Again Yushchenko led
right from the start. When we asked senior people why there was such a huge
gap, they replied calmly: don't worry, Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk regions
will come up soon, and the situation will change. We were struck by their
confidence, since we calculated from the first-round figures that Yushchenko
was winning once again. But then inexplicable things happened to the voter
turnout. The official CEC data showed that the turnout had suddenly,
according to their data, increased! In other words, we recorded one set of
figures, but the final results showed a drastic surge in the turnout - by
that same figure of 1.1m votes. There was no logical explanation for it.
[Interviewer] What prompted you to forward your statement to the Supreme
Court?
[Hrebenyuk] Speaking on television on 29 November, the Ukrainian president
stressed that the executive bodies had not in any way intervened in the
election process. Our figures, however, indicated blatant ballot rigging. So
I decided to forward my statement to the court. I was told on the following
day that the administration wanted to fire me. Since I had worked with
information throughout the campaign, it was obvious to me that Yanukovych's
campaign had been largely a virtual one. We were sceptical over the
fantastic figures that had been published about the Tavriya cars given away
by the prime minister. I remember that, after I had added up the number of
citizens whom Yanukovych was reported to have met, it turned out to be far
larger than Ukraine's total population. I only wanted the court to reach a
well-founded decision - a decision not in favour of either of the
candidates, but in favour of the law.
[Interviewer] Why do you, as a specialist in the provision of information,
think that the penetration of the CEC's transit database was organized, and
why did unknown persons completely destroy that database?
[Hrebenyuk] I think the main aim was to conceal any information about the
real turnout, the pattern of voting and the figures recorded by the CEC. The
real voter turnout was 1.1m votes less. Let the court establish who
benefited from those votes.
[Interviewer] Will you be able to act as a witness at the court proceedings
on the vote rigging and to substantiate your testimony?
[Hrebenyuk] Of course. It's my civic duty. What's more, there are dozens of
witnesses, and they won't stay silent. [End of interview]

DONETSK REGION TURNOUT JUMPED BY 0.5 M OVERNIGHT
Zerkalo Nedeli has managed, through informed sources, to study material from
the Ukrainian presidential administration about the voting results from the
first and second rounds of the presidential elections. As we understand it,
these data originated from the famous lorry that was stopped by
demonstrators as it was leaving the presidential administration. Leaders of
the orange revolution captured an invaluable prize: beneath a layer of
rubbish, exclusive data were found about the progress of the election
campaign right up to polling day. Study of the material is continuing. It is
emerging that the presidential administration's data probably formed the
basis for the CEC's adoption of its resolution on the voting results.
At 0235 on 22 November, when not all of the returns had reached the CEC's
central server, the presidential administration, where the communications
worked impeccably, had already added up the voter turnout figures.
At that moment, the number of voters as of 2000 on 21 November totalled
29,291,744, or 78.7 per cent of those who voted.
However, at 1221 on 22 November, the administration issued new figures for
the ballot paper count, and these were almost precisely repeated, several
days later, by CEC chief Serhiy Kivalov as being the official data of his
department. It transpired that 80.66 per cent, or 30,412,994 people, had
voted (with returns still to come in from 101 polling stations). In other
words, for unknown reasons and to the amazement of the administration's
staff, some unknown well-wisher had written a new figure for them during the
10 hours of overnight operation. As morning dawned, nearly 1.2m voters who
had been kicking their heels were found. They had been roaming somewhere
through the systems and had suddenly come to light!
We are unable, at the moment, to reproduce in full the appearance of the
tables with the first and second vote counts. The largest number of "people
from nowhere" was seen in Donetsk Region. According to the first count of
voters, at 0235 there were 3,199,983 of them (83.67 per cent of the
electoral roll). But, at 1221, the turnout had grown to 96.58 per cent,
amounting to 3,711,763 people.
EVIDENCE ACCUMULATES, ACCUSED KEEP QUIET
Full audio recordings of the conversations held by the (so far) unknown
ballot riggers, with voices very reminiscent of certain people, may appear
soon.
On the basis of the audio recordings and other material indicating vote
rigging in the second round of the presidential elections, MPs Hryhoriy
Omelchenko and Volodymyr Yavorivskyy have drawn up MPs' requests to the
Prosecutor-General's Office and the Security Service of Ukraine, demanding
immediate consideration of this criminal case and a legal assessment for all
those involved in the electronic election scandal. Nearly every day, the
large-scale investigation being conducted by the SBU [Security Service of
Ukraine] gathers evidence from more and more witnesses. The MPs are
demanding the criminal prosecution of people on whom power rested during the
presidential campaign - Viktor Medvedchuk, [Deputy Prime Minister] Andriy
Klyuyev, Serhiy Kivalov and other, less well-known persons.
The accused are behaving confidently. They are keeping quiet. Only their
voices give them away slightly. -30-
=========================================================
10. "A CONTRACT SUICIDE"
Ukraine minister's death could have been murder disguised as suicide

By Oleksandra Prymachenko
Zerkalo Nedeli, Kiev, in Russian 30 Dec 04, p 4
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Tue, Jan 04, 2005

Whether the death of Ukrainian Transport Minister Heorhiy Kyrpa on 27
December was suicide or murder disguised as suicide is less important than
the reasons behind it, according to an article by Oleksandra Prymachenko in
the Ukrainian weekly Zerkalo Nedeli. Just like the banker Yuriy Lyakh, who
was found dead in suspicious circumstances last month, Kyrpa knew a lot
about the criminal activities in which many leaders of the outgoing
administration reportedly engaged. This made him a liability to outgoing
President Leonid Kuchma and his other close associates and a potential key
witness in any prosecutions to be initiated by the new president's team.

Prymachenko said that there were plenty of dubious activities in Kyrpa's own
career, including his involvement in vote-rigging schemes in the first and
second rounds of the recent presidential election. The article mentioned a
number of business projects in which Kyrpa was involved, and named companies
that supposedly belonged to him or his family. The outgoing Ukrainian
authorities could never have imagined that Viktor Yushchenko would win the
election, and they are now completely unprepared for the nemesis ahead. This
could explain Kyrpa's death, the journalist suggested.

The following is the text of the article, published on 30 December 2004
under the title "A contract suicide"; subheadings are as published:

A criminal case in connection with the death of Transport Minister Heorhiy
Kyrpa has been opened in keeping with Article 120 of the Criminal Code,
which provides for liability for driving a person to suicide. The
preciseness of the description attracted attention immediately given the
preferred practice of the law-enforcement agencies opening a file on some
occurrence rather than against someone, even if the guilty party is known to
the overwhelming majority of the public. In other words, they usually do
their utmost to avoid being at all specific.
But in this case, even though the deceased left no note explaining his
reasons, there is this unshakable certainty. As far as it is known, it rests
on the fact that traces of powder were found on Kyrpa's hand. It has to be
said that this is not the hardest trick for a professional killer to pull
off. So, if that is the only argument behind the theory that he was driven
to suicide, our investigative bodies are in a bad way. Not that that is
anything new, though.
It remains to be hoped that the prosecutor's office has solid reasons for
backing the suicide theory. There are alternatives. For example, according
to information that, for obvious reasons, has not been checked, there are
recordings of conversations that Kyrpa had with [Donetsk magnate and
president of the Shakhtar Donetsk football club] Rinat Akhmetov and [MP,
businessman and head of the Ukrainian Football Federation] Hryhoriy Surkis
on the day preceding his death. If that is so, it may well be that the
recorded information will assist the rapid conclusion of the investigation,
which promises otherwise to be extremely difficult.
Here, admittedly, there are several finer points that have to be mentioned,
in all fairness. People in the know maintain that the most run-of-the-mill
working conversation, as pursued by one of the gentlemen named above,
may well sound to an outsider like a murder threat. In the present
situation, that feature of his "figures of speech" may play a nasty trick on
him - if, of course, these recordings actually exist and they were made
for legitimate reasons, which is most unlikely.
Otherwise the thorny path of the Melnychenko tapes [compromising tapes
recorded in Kuchma's office by a former security officer] lies ahead of
them.
Apart from that, it is evident that many of those who talked to Kyrpa on the
day before he died certainly did not ring to wish him a happy new year. If
recordings really were made of Kyrpa's conversations, we shall probably
again all be listening to the voices that are so familiar to the whole
country.
The news agencies reported that, not long before Kyrpa's death, he had a
conversation with a "superior". Bearing in mind the minister's own rank, the
"superior" could only have belonged to a very restricted circle of people -
the president, the parliamentary speaker, the prime minister or the
"relevant" deputy prime minister in charge of the fuel and energy sector and
transport, i.e. Mr [Andriy] Klyuyev (who is also an MP and the power behind
the throne at [Prime Minister] Viktor Yanukovych's election headquarters).
In view of the extremely contradictory nature of the information trickling
from the prosecutor's office, one cannot be sure that Kyrpa settled his
accounts with life with his own hand. If, though, we do not take as our
starting point the postulates of Christian morality, which regards suicide
as a mortal sin, forbids burial services for suicides and does not allow
them to be buried on consecrated ground, yet writes off a great deal from
the accounts of "slaughtered innocents", whoever they may have been in life,
the essential point of whether it was suicide or not is unimportant in this
particular case, paradoxical though it may sound. After all, whether Kyrpa
was killed or forced to take his own life, whether it was a "heart-to-heart
talk" or a straightforward bullet, both the causes and the "inspirers" are,
in any case, identical.
NO WAY OUT
So, what might Kyrpa have really feared? To be perfectly honest, an
incalculable number of factors might have given him sleepless nights.
To start with the theory of the law-enforcement agencies, which are
insisting on suicide, it amounts to [Kyrpa's] thoughts about [his] looming
accountability to the so-called new authorities, which could not be staved
off any longer. There was food for thought here, and not only in the context
of his feverish activities in his recent posts - activities of which a
considerable proportion have to be carefully scrutinized for corruption and
abuse of power that led to serious consequences. Kyrpa was also perfectly
well aware that his belated flirting with the orange revolution did not
guarantee him any "amnesty" for his tireless, diametrically opposed
activities over the previous months, which were also directly connected with
the presidential election.
Kyrpa had reason to think that he would not see eye to eye with the new
authorities. Specifically, that is what V. Stretovych of [Yushchenko's bloc]
Our Ukraine, who heads the parliamentary Committee for Organized Crime and
Corruption, seems to have been hinting at in an interview with Novyy Kanal.
Stretovych supposed that the reason for Kyrpa's death was the fact that
there were in the former parliamentary majority people who had already made
overtures to the new president because they aspired to the post of minister
of transport and communications.
As far as is known, MP Oleksandr Yedin (of the United Ukraine party faction)
has publicly stated his ambitions along these lines. It is ironical that
Yedin and Kyrpa have a relationship with a very long and highly intriguing
history. The successor would, undoubtedly, turn out to be perfectly worthy,
at least in terms of his competence. As far as is known, he is up to speed
regarding both Interkontrakt and the universally known Ekspres Bank, as well

as the Interpolis insurance company, whose interests have been taken into
account in every railway ticket sold, and Kyrpa's many other rip-offs.
Kyrpa, a minister surplus to the requirements of the new authorities, would
have had to face dozens of searching questions. In particular, what was to
be done about the state money that was actually spent on Yanukovych's
election campaign and written off for that purpose, and about other such
operations? Once out of the post that enabled him to be near the
inexhaustible flow of finance, Kyrpa would seem to have had no answers.
At the same time, for the new authorities, Kyrpa was an extremely convenient
target for the tone-setting fight against corruption in which they should,
logically, become actively involved in the very near future. He was capable
on his own of providing the law-enforcement agencies with a highly detailed
and largely documented "breakdown" of the profitable activities of virtually
all of the main players who are close to the outgoing administration and
bound to it, quite sufficient not only for the instituting of criminal
proceedings, but also for the passing of sentences.
WHOEVER DOESN'T BENEFIT?
It is obvious that the hardest theory to work on will be that of Kyrpa's
death as resulting from an urge to "take him out", since, by the nature of
his varied activities, the deceased was simply brimming over with
information that was potentially dangerous to his health. It will not be
easy to determine which particular piece of knowledge proved "incompatible
with life". If, as is normal in such cases, we begin the search for an
answer to the mystery of Kyrpa's death by asking the basic question "cui
bono", the circle of suspects will be not only very extensive, but also
quite well heeled.
Bearing all of the foregoing in mind, the statement by MP Nestor Shufrych
[of presidential chief of staff Viktor Medvedchuk's United Social Democratic
Party of Ukraine], who called angrily for all insinuations about the
possibility of accusing anyone in Yanukovych's team of causing Kyrpa's death
(which amounted to "Yanukovych and Kyrpa are both in the same team") to
be dropped, does not sound at all like a convincing alibi. In this case,
suspicion may fall first of all on the "people in the team" - particularly
those whose hopes the deceased failed to justify.
Heorhiy Kyrpa was Leonid Kuchma's man, and he was called "the servant of one
man". Kuchma would give Kyrpa a helping hand during one of life's difficult
moments, and he was seen as a likely successor to the president. Kyrpa could
have revealed no fewer intriguing facts about the still incumbent president
than the "prisoner of conscience", Pavlo Lazarenko [prime minister 1996-97,
now in the USA], could. Through the nature of his activities, Kyrpa also
possessed a considerable amount of specific information about
Surkis-Medvedchuk, about the president's son-in-law, [Viktor] Pinchuk, and
Rinat Akhmetov (particularly regarding the activities of the major transport
bodies of [Pinchuk's] Interpipe [Group] and [Akhmetov's company] SCM
[System Capital Management]) and, naturally, about [former prime minister
and presidential candidate] Viktor Yanukovych.
In addition, not long before the [presidential] election, Kyrpa was put in
charge of the State Committee for Communications and Information Technology.
As far as is known, the investigation into the unsanctioned access to the
CEC [Central Electoral Commission] server has pointed the finger at people
answerable to Kyrpa (as minister of transport and communications).
While talking about what else Kyrpa may have feared, we ought to specify a
further, very curious aspect, although it is one that it is very hard for a
journalist to prove. It may well be that the law-enforcement agencies will
not follow up this aspect, deliberately regarding it as a malicious
fabrication by spiteful people, not least because money is usually hard to
come by in our country for trips abroad to conduct inquiries.
Mudslingers claim that Mr Kyrpa had very good "connections" in Italy and
that there were firms there that did not, of course, have any documented
link with Kyrpa, but which efficiently transferred money to Deutsche Bank.
This is the bank that used to provide generous credit, under state
guarantees from the Ukrainian government, for construction projects in which
Kyrpa was engaged.
Some information suggests that a certain Haim Bashich (Bashich Group), an
Israeli citizen, used to assist Kyrpa. If we assume that his assistance
consisted of signing documents that Kyrpa could not, for obvious reasons,
sign himself, this could also be of interest to the inquiry - especially
regarding whether Kyrpa took credit from himself.
Incidentally, as far as is known, foreign embassies have not, over the past
few months, been as generous as usual in granting visas to persons belonging
to the highest echelons of power in our state and to members of their
families. It is rumoured that the omnipotent Kyrpa tried unsuccessfully for
a month to obtain a Schengen visa. He managed it in the end, the visa being
issued by the Italian embassy.
In fact, virtually every stage in Kyrpa's career ought to have been duly
recorded by the competent bodies in criminal or, at least, operational
files. There were features of the expenditure of money during the building
of the Kiev-Odessa highway; the tight control over the freight-forwarding
market; the manipulation of transport rates and the existence of the
"Donetsk economic miracle" - the transport company Lemtrans, which, together
with Ukrmetalurhtrans [Ukrainian Metals Transportation company], is said to
enjoy a 50-per-cent discount on the rates. Then there is the construction of
the bridge over the Dnieper river [in Kiev]; aspects of the erection of the
new Transport Ministry building regarding the use of manpower and the huge
sums spent on decorating it; and the "progressive methods" for using special
trains, whereby transport orders were, for some reason, handled through
Department No 1, the so-called mobilization department, which is permissible
in wartime or emergencies, but presidential elections do not, in theory,
count as such [Kyrpa is said to have arranged special trains to carry
multiple voters around the country through state rail operator
Ukrzaliznytsya].
Information to the effect that about 70 per cent of the freight passing
through Ukraine was carried by firms having a direct connection with Kyrpa
should also be studied to see whether this is true. How do firms that,
according to some information, actually belong to members of his family
connected with the insurance of passengers, staff and pensioners, medical
provision and banking? What is the real history of the Transforwarding
Limited AG closed joint-stock company, the Fiakr company, the
InterTransPolis insurance company and the Real Estate AG limited liability
company?
Can at least part of all this be offset by the just as financially flawed
erection of a church in honour of his patron (not Kuchma, but St George the
Victorious) and the generous "development" of the village where he was born?
From the point of view of the Criminal Code, the answer is a definite no.
But there is another side. Kyrpa's negative activities, which had nothing in
common with the law, were on a large scale. However, this extremely
energetic man left behind quite a few fond recollections about him. The
numerous results of his work will forever remain a solid and visible
monument to him. A vast number of people who worked under him have
retained the fondest memories of him. Many will never forget his charitable
activities and other good deeds. Above all, perhaps, his family are well
aware of that today.
The organizers of Yanukovych's election campaign, led by Viktor Medvedchuk,
totally rejected any outcome of the elections other than their candidate's
victory. Consequently, nobody was particularly worried about how reputable
the ways and means were. It simply did not occur to them that things might
turn out differently, and, as a result, the high and mighty are absolutely
unprepared for any review of their activities by the new authorities. To
some extent, Kyrpa fell victim to precisely that fact.
Over the past few days, a vast quantity of documents has migrated from the
Transport Ministry (among others) to the headquarters of Our Ukraine. This
does not, of course, mean that the new authorities will have sufficient
resources to expose everything and everyone. It is quite important to ensure
that Kyrpa's death is the last to be linked directly with the old
authorities' fear of the new ones, since there are many people who, by
virtue of their posts and posts, were at the interface of others' secrets -
like the banker [Yuriy] Lyakh, who died recently [on 3 December] in equally
strange circumstances [he died from paper-knife wounds to his throat]. The
most important thing today is to stop this unnatural phenomenon that
threatens to develop into a psychosis, as is shown by the most improbable
rumours that have been spreading in recent days about the deaths of other
people who were privy to the secrets of the great and good.

Very many people have been at the epicentre of dubious operations. The
main thing is that nobody today should forget that life is more precious
than liability. -30- [Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
=========================================================
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"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT" - SPONSORS
"Working to Secure Ukraine's Future"

1. THE BLEYZER FOUNDATION, Dr. Edilberto Segura, Chairman;
Victor Gekker, Executive Director, Kyiv, Ukraine; Washington, D.C.,
http://www.bleyzerfoundation.com.
2. BAHRIANY FOUNDATION, INC., Dr. Anatol Lysyj, Chairman,
Minneapolis, Minnesota,
3. KIEV-ATLANTIC GROUP, David and Tamara Sweere, Daniel
Sweere, Kyiv and Myronivka, Ukraine, 380 44 295 7275 in Kyiv.
4. ODUM- Association of American Youth of Ukrainian Descent,
Minnesota Chapter, Natalia Yarr, Chairperson.
5. ACTION UKRAINE COALITION: Washington, D.C.,
A. UKRAINIAN FEDERATION OF AMERICA (UFA),
Zenia Chernyk, Chairperson; Vera M. Andryczyk, President;
Huntingdon Valley, Pennsylvania.
B. UKRAINIAN AMERICAN COORDINATING COUNCIL,
(UACC), Ihor Gawdiak, President, Washington, D.C., New York, NY
C. U.S.-UKRAINE FOUNDATION (USUF), Nadia Komarnyckyj
McConnell, President, Washington, D.C., Kyiv, Ukraine.
6. UKRAINE-U.S. BUSINESS COUNCIL, Kempton Jenkins,
President, Washington, D.C.
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PUBLISHER AND EDITOR
Mr. E. Morgan Williams, Director, Government Affairs
Washington Office, SigmaBleyzer Investment Banking Group
P.O. Box 2607, Washington, D.C. 20013, morganw@patriot.net
Mobile in Kyiv: (3) 8 050 689 2874; www.SigmaBleyzer.com
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Senior Advisor; Ukrainian Federation of America (UFA)
Coordinator, Action Ukraine Coalition (AUC)
Senior Advisor, U.S.-Ukraine Foundation (USUF)
Advisor, Ukraine-U.S. Business Council, Washington, D.C.
Publisher, Ukraine Information Website, www.ArtUkraine.com
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