"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT"
An International Newsletter
In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis, and Commentary
"The Art of Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion,
Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World"
"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT" - Number 405
morganw@patriot.net, ArtUkraine.com@starpower.net
FROM: KYIV, UKRAINE, FRIDAY, JANUARY 7, 2005
-----INDEX OF ARTICLES-----
"Major International News Headlines and Articles"
1. UKRAINE MARKS ORTHODOX CHRISTMAS WITH
ELECTION SAGA END IN SIGHT
Agence France Presse (AFP), Kiev, Ukraine, Friday, Jan 7, 2005
2. NEW YORK STATE: LOCAL UKRAINE NATIVE ANDRIJ BARAN
GREETS ORTHODOX HOLIDAY WITH OPTIMISM
Kevin Goodwin, The Saratogian, Saratoga Springs, New York, Jan 7, 2005
3. PATRIARCH SENDS ORTHODOX CHRISTMAS GREETINGS
Interfax, Moscow, Russia, Thursday, January 6, 2005
4. CANADA: UKRAINIAN CHRISTMAS CELEBRATED:
TRADITION HONOURS ROOTS
Elizabeth Soto, The Sun, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada, Thu, Jan 6, 2005
5. BUSH, GEORGIAN PRESIDENT DISCUSS UKRAINE
AP, Washington, D.C., Thu, January 6, 2005
6. SAAKASHVILI, YUSHCHENKO SIGN JOINT DECLARATION
Civil Georgia, Tbilisi, Georgia, Wed, January 5, 2005
7. UKRAINE'S SPEAKER ASKS U.S. CONGRESS TO REPEAL MEASURE
By Peter Savodnik, The Hill newspaper
Washington, D.C., December 15, 2004
8. "DOWNFALL AND DISCREDITING OF LEONID KRAWCHUK"
OP-ED: By Taras Kuzio
The Ukrainian Weekly, The Ukrainian National Association
Parsippany, New Jersey, December 26, 2004
9. DETAILS EMERGE OF SECOND RUSSIAN PLOT TO ASSASSINATE
UKRAINE"S VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO
By Taras Kuzio, Eurasia Daily Monitor
Volume 2, Issue 3, The Jamestown Foundation
Washington, D.C., Wednesday, January 5, 2005
10. "YUSHCHENKO'S WRONG MOVE"
OUTSIDE VIEW: by Ira Straus, Outside View Commentator
United Press International, Washington, D.C., Wed, January 5, 2005
11. A DOOR OPENED TO 'CIVILIZATION'
After his victory in Ukraine's presidential
elections comes the hard part for Viktor Yushchenko.
OP-ED: By Ivan Lozowy, Transitions OnLine
Prague, Czech Republic, Thursday, January 6, 2005
12. "AMERICA'S UKRAINE FOLLY"
OUTSIDE VIEW: by William S. Lind, Outside View Contributor
United Press International, Washington, D.C, Wed, Jan 5, 2005
========================================================
1. UKRAINE MARKS ORTHODOX CHRISTMAS WITH
ELECTION SAGA END IN SIGHT
Agence France Presse (AFP), Kiev, Ukraine, Friday, Jan 7, 2005
KIEV (AFP) - Ukraine celebrates Orthodox Christmas with the end of its
election saga finally in sight, after a supreme court ruling paved the way
for pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko to be inaugurated president of the
ex-Soviet nation.
Hundreds of people were due to attend a Christmas concert on Kiev's
central Independence Square, from where Yushchenko led the "orange
revolution" that swept him to power and chased out the decade-old,
Soviet-era regime of his predecessor Leonid Kuchma.
The majority of Ukrainians practise the Orthodox faith that uses the old
Julian calendar in which Christmas falls 13 days after its more widespread
Gregorian calendar counterpart on December 25.
This year's celebration comes a day after the supreme court threw out an
appeal by defeated presidential candidate and former prime minister Viktor
Yanukovich after Yushchenko won the historic December 26 rerun vote
by more than 2.2 million votes.
"The court has decided to reject the appeal," chief presiding justice Andriy
Hnatenko said in announcing the ruling. "The court decision is final and
cannot be appealed," he said.
The ruling cleared the way for the central election commission to publish
the final, official results of the December 26 rerun vote and officially
declare Yushchenko the winner -- a declaration that the pro-Moscow
Yanukovich has vowed to challenge.
But the speed with which the court handed its ruling -- it deliberated for
about an hour after a four-hour hearing -- has led to speculation that it
may not even accept for consideration a second appeal from Yanukovich.
That means that Yushchenko could be inaugurated as the third president of
an independent Ukraine as early as next week, with most expecting the
ceremony to take place on January 14, which is New Year's Day according
to the Julian calendar.
Parliament speaker Volodymyr Litvin this week repeated his assertion that
he expected Yushchenko to be inaugurated by January 14.
The 50-year-old opposition leader can't be sworn in as president until the
high court rules on all of Yanukovich's appeals over their December 26
rematch.
While admitting that his appeals are unlikely to be granted, Yanukovich has
vowed to exhaust them all, in what many observers say is an attempt to
boost his image as a Yushchenko adversary ahead of next year's crucial
parliamentary elections.
Election officials are expected to announce the final results of the repeat
election early next week. "We expect to announce the results next week,"
said Marina Stavnichyuk, the deputy commission chief. "Everybody is
exhausted and commission employees should have a chance to relax at
Christmas."
According to preliminary results, Yushchenko won the December 26 election
with 52 percent of the vote compared with Yanukovich's 41 percent, a
difference of more than 2.2 million ballots on a turnout of 77 percent.
The historic December 26 rematch between Yushchenko and Yanukovich
was held after an earlier November 21 runoff was annulled by the supreme
court because of massive fraud.
That ruling came amid massive "orange revolution" protests organized by the
opposition, which saw hundreds of thousands of people clad in the orange
color of Yushchenko's campaign bring Kiev to a virtual halt as they blocked
government buildings in the capital. -30-
=========================================================
2. NEW YORK STATE: LOCAL UKRAINE NATIVE ANDRIJ BARAN
GREETS ORTHODOX HOLIDAY WITH OPTIMISM
Kevin Goodwin, The Saratogian, Saratoga Springs, New York, Jan 7, 2005
SARATOGA SPRINGS -- Ukrainians are celebrating their first free Christmas
in 350 years. Saratoga Springs physician Andrij Baran said his relatives in
Kiev are very happy as they celebrate the holiday today. In Ukraine, an
Orthodox Christian country, they celebrate Christmas on Jan. 7. Baran's
parents came to the United States in 1949 to escape communism in Ukraine.
Both Baran and his wife have relatives living there.
Viktor Yushchenko's defeat of former Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych in
a Dec. 26 presidential revote has given Ukrainians high expectations, Baran
said. He doesn't want them to set their expectations too high too soon,
though, because change will take time.
In the first election on Nov. 21, Yanukovych was the winner, but the
election was overturned because of fraud. Before the revote, Yanukovych
proposed that whoever won, the losing candidate should accept the results.
Now, Yanukovych is trying to appeal his defeat.
'He is trying to exhaust any means he can to retain power,' Baran said.
'It's unfortunate that some people don't know when to quit. He is afraid to
lose power and is doing anything to keep it.' Baran thinks a lot of evil
doings will be uncovered now that the election is over. He said many people
are applying for visas to get out of the country before Yushchenko is
inaugurated later this month.
Baran doesn't think it makes any sense for Yanukovych to appeal the decision
because of the overwhelming people's choice of Yushchenko. 'The people are
ecstatic,' Baran said. 'The election confirmed what the people wanted.'
Baran said a few Yushchenko supporters are still in the central plaza in
Kiev, but most have gone home to be with their families. Yushchenko
supporters gathered in the plaza to protest the Nov. 21 election, forcing
the revote. 'It's been a long month and a half,' he said. 'I hope other
countries in the area take the step Ukraine has, creating a domino effect,
especially into Russia. A democratic Russia is safer not only to Ukraine,
but to the whole world.' -30-
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Baran is the local president of the Ukraine Congress Committee. In addition
to raising money for humanitarian relief, members of the committee also have
made orange ribbons, Yushchenko's campaign color, to remind people of
what is going on in Ukraine. For more information on the Ukraine Congress
Committee of America Inc., see www.ucca.org.
=========================================================
3. PATRIARCH SENDS ORTHODOX CHRISTMAS GREETINGS
Interfax, Moscow, Russia, Thursday, January 6, 2005
MOSCOW - Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow and All Russia has sent
greetings to all Orthodox believers on the upcoming Orthodox Christmas.
"May God send peace and joy, brotherhood and virtue, wisdom and hope
to all the people," the patriarch said in his address.
Talking about 2004, Alexy recalled that it was a difficult year for Russia.
"Flouting everything that is holy in their impious madness, terrorists
raised their hands against children. The deaths of innocent victims has
become our common grief and filled our hearts with pain and sorrow," he
said.
"But at the same time, the horrible tragedy has shown that moral ideals are
alive in the people: facing death, many people manifested high examples of
sacrificial love for their neighbors, laying down their lives for their
friends, as the Holy Scripture says," the patriarch said.
Alexy also addressed all of the world's Christians, as well as people of
different faiths and beliefs. "Let us work together for the sake of peace
and the prosperity of our peoples. Let us remember the words that St. Paul
the Apostle said: 'Tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that
doeth evil But glory, honor, and peace to every man that worketh good',"
the patriarch said. -30- [Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
==========================================================
4. CANADA: UKRAINIAN CHRISTMAS CELEBRATED:
TRADITION HONOURS ROOTS
Elizabeth Soto, For The Sun, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada, Thu, Jan 6, 2005
Six-year-old Andrew Mayba will be peering out into the night sky from
the window of his grandparents' home tonight. It's Ukrainian Christmas
Eve and it is Andrew's job to look for the first star in the dark sky which
will mark the start of the holiday. "My favourite part is being with my
family," said Andrew. "Oh, and the borscht."
Ukrainian Christmas in Manitoba has been celebrated since the first
homesteaders came to this country close to 100 years ago with hopes
for a new life, farmland and religious freedom.
Dr. Ihor Mayba, Andrew's grandfather, was born in Canada after his
parents emigrated from Ukraine in 1925. He has made it a priority to
pass on his Ukrainian heritage and traditions to his family.
THREE GENERATIONS
"Ukrainian Christmas is very important," Mayba said. "It's a time of
celebration. It's for the meeting of family and friends with lots of talk of
hopes and aspirations for the new year."
Once Andrew spots the first star, three generations of the Mayba family
will come to the table to enjoy "sviata vechera" or the holy supper.
The table will be beautifully adorned with symbolic items such as a braided,
circular bread to symbolize the bread of life and an extra place setting to
honour those that have passed on and are still with the family in spirit.
The supper itself will consist of 12 meatless and dairy-free dishes to
symbolize the 12 apostles and contains items such as fish, potato perogies,
cabbage rolls, puddings, beans and dried fruits.
As the family settles in for the holy supper, Dr. Mayba will greet them with
the traditional Ukrainian Christmas greeting, "Khristos rodvysya" which
translates to "Christ is born." His family will respond "slavite yoho,"
which means "let us glorify him."
The reason Ukrainian Christmas is celebrated in January goes back to the
change of calendar from the Julian to the Gregorian calendar used now.
Orthodox Ukrainians kept the Julian Calendar and the date of Jan 6. for
the celebration of Christmas Eve.
Dr. Mayba's daughter-in-law, Natalie, has also helped in keeping the
tradition of Ukrainian Christmas alive with her four children, Julia,
Katherine, Andrew and Alexander. "There's something very special
about Ukrainian Christmas. That's why we've kept it, you keep things
that are special." -30- [Action Ukraine Monitoring Service]
=======================================================
5. BUSH, GEORGIAN PRESIDENT DISCUSS UKRAINE
AP, Washington, D.C., Thu, January 6, 2005
WASHINGTON - President Bush and Georgian President Mikhail
Saakashvili agreed Thursday that democracies in the former Soviet
republics need to be bolstered.
Specifically, they discussed the case of Ukraine, where a hotly disputed
runoff election led to a second vote on Dec. 26. Saakashvili vacationed
in the western Carpathian mountains this week with winning presidential
candidate in Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko.
In a phone call Thursday, Bush and Saakashvili agreed on "the need to
strengthen democratic institutions and strengthen democracy," White
House spokesman Scott McClellan said. "They agreed on the importance
of working together, including with Russia, to find peaceful political
solutions to political conflicts in the region." -30-
========================================================
6. SAAKASHVILI, YUSHCHENKO SIGN JOINT DECLARATION
Civil Georgia, Tbilisi, Georgia, Wed, January 5, 2005
TBILISI - Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and Ukrainian President-
elect Victor Yushchenko signed on January 5 a joint declaration reiterating
two nation's European aspirations and further democratic development,
Interfax news agency reported.
The declaration, which was signed in the western Ukrainian ski resort of
Tisovets, reads that Georgian and Ukrainian people "have demonstrated to
the world that freedom and democracy, the people's will and fair elections
are much more powerful, than the state machine."
The both leaders also rejected allegations, that "peaceful, democratic
revolution can be triggered artificially, through the involvement of
external forces."
"Our countries will continue moving towards the building of united
democratic Europe and development of good relationship with the
neighboring countries," the joint declaration of Mikheil Saakashvili
and Victor Yushchenko reads.
The Georgian President left for Ukraine on December 31 and intends to
welcome the Orthodox Christmas on January 7 with Ukrainian President-
elect Victor Yushchenko. -30- [Action Ukraine Monitoring Service]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
LINK: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=8724
=========================================================
7. UKRAINE'S SPEAKER ASKS U.S. CONGRESS TO REPEAL MEASURE
By Peter Savodnik, The Hill newspaper
Washington, D.C., December 15, 2004
KIEV—The speaker of Ukraine’s parliament, Vladimir Lytvyn, is calling on
Congress to repeal a cold-war-era measure targeting Soviet restrictions on
Jewish emigration that, he says, is stymieing his country’s democratic,
free-market development.
Lytvyn, widely regarded by western diplomats and Ukrainian officials as one
of the two or three most powerful political leaders in the former Soviet
republic, suggested the measure, known as the Jackson-Vanick Amendment,
was particularly unhelpful at a time when Ukraine was on the verge of
electing democratic reformer Viktor Yuschenko president.
The Jackson-Vanick Amendment was adopted in the 1970s to protest the
Kremlin's handling of Soviet Jews who wished to leave the country for the
United States and Israel. It prohibited Washington from granting good tariff
status to the Soviet Union -- and, in the post-cold-war era, to the
now-independent countries of the former Soviet Union. Russians, Ukrainians
and officials in other post-Soviet republics consider the measure a relic
that hinders relations and impedes growth.
Yuschenko defeated Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich Sunday in a second
run-off election. The election came three weeks after the country’s Supreme
Court ruled the first run-off, on Nov. 21, invalid due to fraud. Yanukovich
is asking for a recount. “I very much hope that we’ll have good relations
with the United States, that we’ll be able to turn a new page,” Lytvyn said
in an interview with The Hill.
U.S.-Ukrainian relations have suffered in recent years due to Ukrainian
President Leonid Kuchma’s authoritarian, decade-long rule, during which the
government has curbed independent media; doled out formerly state-owned
properties to Kuchma allies; and used the Security Services (SBU), the
successor to the KGB, to monitor Ukrainians, frighten and harass political
enemies and maintain a Soviet-style regime.
During the interview, Lytvyn also called for greater privation of Ukraine’s
economy coupled with greater enforcement of the law. Referring to the recent
political crisis, Lytvyn said: “I would like to think that recent events
have taught us to stick to the rule of law.”
One American source who has worked closely with democratic activists in the
country estimated that as much as 70 percent of Ukraine’s gross domestic
product comes from a “shadow economy” — a gray zone in which legal goods
such as blue jeans, chickens and automobiles are bought and sold outside the
tightly regulated, state-sanctioned marketplace. Lytvyn’s comments coincided
with a congressional delegation, led by Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-Calif.),
that traveled to Ukraine to lend greater support for a free and fair
election.
The Russian news agency Pravda quoted Rohrabacher, who briefly fought with
the mujahadeen anti-Soviet rebels in Afghanistan in the late 1980s before
coming to Congress, as saying that the “people of the United States of
America are always on the side of nations struggling for their right to live
in a democratic society.” Rohrabacher was also quoted as saying that he had
discussed the elections with Kuchma, the outgoing president during his trip.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
E-mail: psavodnik@thehill.com; Web: www.thehill.com
=========================================================
8. "DOWNFALL AND DISCREDITING OF LEONID KRAWCHUK"
OP-ED: By Taras Kuzio
The Ukrainian Weekly, The Ukrainian National Association
Parsippany, New Jersey, December 26, 2004
Ukraine's first elected president, Leonid Krawchuk, has always had a
romantic following in the Ukrainian diaspora. Many, particularly from the
older generation, credit him with Ukraine achieving independent statehood,
something they never expected to see in their lifetime.
Krawchuk spoke at a conference I organised at the University of Birmingham
in 1996 and afterwards attended an event in my home organised by the
Professional and Business Persons Association. Then he still held on to his
derzhavnyk reputation. Times have though moved on and it is time we
undertook a re-assessment of Krawchuk.
If Krawchuk had become an elder statesman when he left office in Summer
1994 his reputation would have remained intact. Instead, he helped to build
up one of three oligarchic clans centered on Kyiv. This clan's political
roof became the Social Democratic united Party (SDPUo) led by Viktor
Medvedchuk, who competes with Leonid Kuchma today as to the status
of the most loathed politician in Ukraine.
The degree to which Krawchuk's reputation has collapsed could be seen by the
decision of the prestigious Kyiv Mohyla Academy to withdraw its honorary
doctorate given to Krawchuk when he was president. The decision was in
response to the mass fraud carried out by the pro-presidential camp during
round two of the elections. Medvedchuk and the SDPUo, and therefore
implictly Krawchuk, were intricately involved in this fraud.
Krawchuk's career and personality reflects a very wily and cynical
politician, giving him the reputation of a sly fox. These traits are very
common within the centrist political camp in Ukraine which is ideologically
amorphous. The former ruling nomenklatura of Soviet Ukraine have long been
good at survival. They jumped ship in 1990-1991 as national communists. In
the 1990s they cooperated with the national democrats as they were still
politically and economically weak.
With the entry of oligarchs in 1998-1999 into politics the centrist camp
felt strong enough to go it alone. Kuchma's second term in office saw them
attempt to monopolise politics and create an authoritarian regime. This
would have been achieved if Viktor Yanukovych had succeeded Leonid Kuchma
as Ukraine's president. During Kuchma's second term in office the national
democrats, led by Viktor Yushchenko, went into opposition. The centrists
shifted to cooperating with their former enemy, the Communists (KPU). This
was clearly seen in the April 2001 parliamentary vote of no confidence in
the Yushchenko government by the KPU and centrists.
The KPU-centrist alliance has grown in strength ever since. With Yushchenko
elected president the new opposition in parliament will consist of the KPU,
the SDPUo and Yanukovych's Regions of Ukraine. Medvedchuk-Krawchuk's
SDPUo attack Yushchenko's Our Ukraine as "Nashists", a play on the name
Nasha Ukraina to sound like "Nazis". Krawchuk has returned to the lexicon
used when he was in charge of ideology in the Soviet Ukrainian Communist
Party. The KPU have also adopted the derogatory term "Nashists".
Krawchuk left the KPU only at the last minute after the hard line putsch
collapsed in Moscow in August 1991. As leader of the SDPUo's parliamentary
faction he will now be working closely with Petro Symonenko's hard-line
Communists against the Yushchenko presidency.
In the past Krawchuk has repeatedly ruled out cooperating with the KPU. This
though, was obviously deceitful as Krawchuk is willing to cooperate with
anybody if that means his survival. Krawchuk will be unable to explain his
continued support for Ukraine's EU and NATO membership while belonging to
the SDPUo that has aligned itself with the pro-Russian KPU and Regions of
Ukraine.
As Oleksandr Zinchenko, a former leading SDPUo member and head of the
Yushchenko campaign, the SDPUo has become a staunch advocate of pro-Russian
policies in Ukraine. Medvedchuk is instrumental in having encouraged Russia'
s wholesale interference in Ukraine's elections in support of Yanukovych.
Russian "political technologists" working for Yanukovych were behind most of
the dirty tricks in Ukraine's election, making it the dirtiest election
ever.
Vladimir Putin took a personal interest n the outcome after lobbying by
Medvedchuk who looked upon him as an external guarantor of the oligarchic
status quo. Kuchma;s role of a neutral umpire presiding over oligarchic
clans would be upset by a Yanukovych victory as he heads one of the clans.
Medvedchuk-Krawchuk's SDPUo therefore sought to return Ukraine to its status
in the eighteenth century when it was an autonomous Hetmanate in the Tsarust
empire. This Little Russianism, coupled with a willingness to cooperate with
the neo-Stalinist KPU against Yushchenko, shows the degree to which Krawchuk
has discredited his reputation -30- (www.ukrweekly.com) (t.kuzio@gwu.edu)
=========================================================
9. DETAILS EMERGE OF SECOND RUSSIAN PLOT TO ASSASSINATE
UKRAINE"S VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO
By Taras Kuzio, Eurasia Daily Monitor
Volume 2, Issue 3, The Jamestown Foundation
Washington, D.C., Wednesday, January 5, 2005
As Viktor Yushchenko prepares for his inauguration as Ukraine's third
president, he knows that Ukraine-Russia relations will be one of the most
difficult issues he faces. The Economist (December 29) advised Yushchenko,
"to kiss and make up with Russia and Vladimir Putin, who backed Mr.
Yanukovych and has thus been humiliated by his defeat." Such reconciliation
will be far easier said than done.
Russia is reportedly behind two attempts on Yushchenko's life, one through
poisoning and a second with a bomb. Yushchenko alluded to the latter plot
when he said, "Those who wanted to blow myself up did not undertake it,
because they came too close and could have blown themselves up" (Ukrayinska
pravda, December 16).
While details of the poisoning are better known, evidence of the bomb threat
has only just come to light in a documentary on Channel Five, a Ukrainian
television station sympathetic to Yushchenko. Details aired in the weekly
"Zakryta Zona" (Closed Zone) documentary, under the suitable title
"Terrorists" (www.5tv.com.ua/pr_archiv/136/0/265/).
During last year's election campaign a still-unexplained bomb detonated in
Kyiv, killing one person and injuring dozens more. The Kuchma government
blamed the Ukrainian People's Party (UNP), a member of Yushchenko's Our
Ukraine bloc, for the attack. Explosives were also planted during searches
of the offices of opposition youth groups. The Security Service (SBU) and
Interior Ministry (MVS) have now admitted that charges of "terrorism"
against the UNP and youth groups were false (Ukrayinska pravda, December
16; www.razom.org.ua, December 23).
According to Channel Five, the real terrorists were the authorities,
conspiring with the Russian security services (FSB). It would be naive to
believe that Russian President Vladimir Putin was unaware of the plot. An
illicitly transcribed telephone conversation, cited at length in the
"Zakryta Zona" documentary, between a Ukrainian informant and an FSB officer
showed how the Russian authorities were fully aware of the dirty tricks
being used by Russian political advisors working for Ukrainian Prime
Minister Viktor Yanukovych.
The "advisors," such as Gleb Pavlovsky and Marat Gelman, worked with
Yanukovych's shadow campaign headquarters, headed by Deputy Prime Minister
Andriy Kluyev. Presidential administration head and Social Democratic United
Party (SDPUo) leader Viktor Medvedchuk served as Gelman and Pavlovsky's
principal contact. The taped conversation reveals that Gelman and Pavlovsky
considered assassination to be a legitimate campaign strategy. The FSB
officer on the tape specifically discusses the poisoning of Yushchenko.
The bomb attempt may have been conceived after the poison failed to kill
Yushchenko before election day. Plans for the bomb attack were discovered
when a spetsnaz unit of the State Defense Service (DSO) was sent to
investigate a burglar alarm. The alarm went off near one of the three
offices used by the Yushchenko campaign. The DSO noticed a car with Russian
license plates and asked the two occupants for their documents. After a
check of their Russian and Ukrainian passports revealed them to be false, a
search of the car's trunk found three kilos of plastic explosives, enough to
destroy everything within a 500-meter radius.
Both passengers were arrested and a subsequent investigation unmasked them
as Mikhail M. Shugay and Marat B. Moskvitin, Russian citizens from the
Moscow region. Their only contact in Moscow had been a certain "Surguchov"
who had hired them in September for the bombing operation against Yushchenko
and his ally, Yulia Tymoshenko. The terrorists were to receive $50,000 after
the bomb plot was completed. After smuggling the explosives through the
Russian-Ukrainian border, both FSB operatives set up a safe house in the
village of Dudarkiv, 15 kilometers from Kyiv. A search of these premises
found pistols, radio equipment, and bomb-making instructions.
The plot thickens with additional taped telephone conversations played in
the "Zakryta Zona" documentary. These conversations were made by the SBU
during the elections and handed over to Yushchenko after round two. Kluyev
is heard discussing with unknown individuals the whereabouts of Yushchenko's
office and where the leadership of the Yushchenko camp meets. The
documentary's producers believe that Kluyev sought this intelligence to pass
on to the Russian assassination team, so that bombs could be placed to
murder not only Yushchenko, but also other members of his team, such as
Tymoshenko.
Increasing evidence points to Russian involvement in Yushchenko's poisoning.
In December Yushchenko's doctors in Vienna concluded that he had, in fact,
been poisoned by TCDD, the most toxic form of dioxin. His dioxin level was
6,000 times higher than normal and the second highest recorded in history.
Alexander V. Litvinenko, who served in the KGB and the FSB before defecting
to the United Kingdom, has revealed that the FSB has a secret laboratory in
Moscow that specializes in poisons.
A former dissident scientist now living in the United States, Vil S.
Mirzayanov, reported that this institute studied dioxins while developing
defoliants for the military. (TCDD was a component of Agent Orange.) SBU
defector Valeriy Krawchenko also pointed to this FSB laboratory as the
likely source of the dioxin that poisoned Yushchenko (New York Times,
December 15).
Yushchenko has alleged that the poisoning took place during a September 5,
2004, dinner at the home of then-deputy SBU chairman Volodymyr Satsyuk, a
member of the SDPUo. This again reveals the involvement of Medvedchuk and
Russian political advisors working for Yanukovych. Not surprisingly, Satsyuk
and Kluyev have hurriedly abandoned their government positions to return to
parliament, where they enjoy immunity.
Russia's involvement in two terrorist attacks in Ukraine, a poisoning and
bombing, make a mockery of Putin's alleged commitment to work alongside
the United States in the international war on terrorism. -30-
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E-mail: t.kuzio@gwu.edu
=========================================================
10. "YUSHCHENKO'S WRONG MOVE"
OUTSIDE VIEW: by Ira Straus, Outside View Commentator
United Press International, Washington, D.C., Wed, January 5, 2005
Washington, DC - Mixed in with the enormously hopeful changes in Ukraine,
inevitably there are also some worrisome matters. President-elect Viktor
Yushchenko has pledged friendly relations with Russia and with the
Russian-speaking east and south of Ukraine. Despite the temptation to punish
Russia at this time, he needs to follow through on his promise.
A dangerous sign instead is his sharing of the New Year's podium with
Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, the leader of Georgia's "Revolution
of Roses" in November 2003. It is like waving a red flag in front of the
Russians.
Saakashvili came to Kiev to enjoy the revolutionary atmosphere and to talk
with the new and old leaders. This is his right. However, it was unnecessary
to have him standing alongside Yushchenko as they delivered addresses to the
revolutionary crowd in Independence Square. It is the kind of symbolism that
could damage Yushchenko's prospects of conciliation with Russia -- and with
the 40 percent of his own people who voted for a more pro-Russian candidate.
To be sure, Yushchenko said in his campaign that he would strive for good
relations with Russia; but then, so did Saakashvili before coming to power.
What Yushchenko needs to show, to Russians and Eastern Ukrainians who have
been massively propagandized to view him as an anti-Russian bigot, is that
he, unlike Saakashvili, will keep his campaign promises about conciliation.
To this end, Yushchenko needs to distance himself from Saakashvili. The
latter, after coming to power, proceeded quickly along a confrontational
path toward Russia. He was uncompromising in his pursuit of Georgian claims
to regain sovereignty over Abkhazia and Ossetia. Their separation was the
frozen product of the initial independence regime in Georgia of the
ultra-nationalist Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who rejected the Russian-led
Commonwealth of Independent States, cut off normal relations with Russia,
and provoked conflicts with practically every national minority extant in
the country. Georgia and Russia jointly created the Abkhaz and Osset
secessions.
Gamsakhurdia's successor, President Eduard Shevardnadze, later restored
normal relations with Russia and left the problem areas quiet. However,
after coming to power, Saakashvili not only pressed the Georgian national
claims; he quickly got into skirmishes with Russia over the two areas, and
made threats of escalation that raised fears of war. He was energetic in
pressing his arguments to the West; reports speculated that he hoped to get
the West to blame Russia for any fighting and to support Georgia in war.
Fortunately, he was restrained, not least by cautions coming from the United
States that it would not back him if he got into a conflict with Russia.
Saakashvili still shows little awareness that there are legitimate historic
Russian interests at stake, in addition to the interests of Georgia and of
the national minorities. He makes no suggestions of compromise with Russian
interests, despite Russia's continuing deep involvement in the realities on
the ground. And there is no guarantee that the restraints will hold him back
very long.
Yushchenko has every right to maintain expectations of doing much better
than Saakashvili with Russia. It would be foolish to squander this right. By
his actions in this period, Yushchenko will either confirm or confute the
campaign propaganda in the eyes of Eastern Ukrainians and Russians. Now is
when he will make the impression that will endure.
If, during the Ukrainian election campaign, the Yushchenko-Saakashvili
equation had stuck, and if Saakashvili had proceeded with further fighting
with Russia, the Ukrainian people would have likely voted against
Yushchenko: Very few Ukrainians would want to elect someone who might lead
their country into war with Russia.
As president-elect, Yushchenko should be looking for specific ways to follow
a different, conciliatory path. He should be attentive to legitimate Russian
interests and seek out ways to make constructive compromises with them.
The United states, NATO and the 25-nation European Union should let it be
known in the event Ukraine were to drift toward a confrontational approach,
they would push Yushchenko back toward compromise and cooperation, as they
did with Saakashvili. This would be a helpful reassurance to Russia.
What the West needs to show above all is that it will not push Yushchenko
into damaging Russian interests in his pursuit of integration with the West.
It is not just a matter of deliberate damage; the main problem is that it
could happen entirely inadvertently. If the West integrates Ukraine along a
line of least resistance, without creative effort in reconciling the
Ukraine-West integration with Ukraine-Russia interrelations, legitimate
Russian interests could suffer grievous damage.
The solution to the danger is -- tautologically -- to make the necessary
creative effort to reconcile the two different integration equations. This
sounds obvious and simple enough, but it would in fact require a major
exercise of willpower on the part of the NATO and EU bureaucracies. Once
they made it through the difficult processes of lining themselves up in the
1990s to agree on how to proceed on expansion, they tended to become
reluctant to reopen the issue: It could mean going through the whole process
all over again, with no guarantee of arriving at a consensus again.
Fortunately, in the case of NATO and EU expansion, there is no need to
revise the formal path to membership laid out in the 1990s, namely, the
standards elaborated then for new members to meet. Instead, there is simply
a need to apply more seriously the criteria of good relations with
neighboring states and good treatment of ethnic minorities.
These criteria were half-waived for the three Baltic states of Lithuania,
Latvia and Estonia when it came to relations with Russia and with
Russian-speaking minorities. They will need to be applied more actively in
Ukraine, so as to achieve genuine reconciliation with the ethnic Russian
minority and genuine conciliation with the external Russian state. This is
where creative effort will be required, and willpower inside NATO and the
EU.
For example, Yushchenko has indicated a willingness to consider state status
for the Russian language; the West should encourage it. The benefits would
be enormous in terms of Russian sentiments toward the West; the costs are
harder to see, even if there will be well-entrenched interest groups, in the
West as much as in Ukraine, that will be heatedly against it.
Making these efforts would be worth the trouble for the West, and indeed
for Ukraine as well. It is important for the future of Ukraine as a unified
country and for the future of the West's relations with Russia.
Unfortunately, recent habits and current trends give little reason to think
that the trouble will be taken. -30-
-------------------------------------------------------------
(Ira Straus is U.S. coordinator for the Committee on Eastern Europe
and Russia in NATO)(irastraus@aol.com)
---------------------------------------------------------------
(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by
outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The
views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press
International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original
submissions are invited.)
=========================================================
11. A DOOR OPENED TO 'CIVILIZATION'
After his victory in Ukraine's presidential
elections comes the hard part for Viktor Yushchenko.
OP-ED: By Ivan Lozowy, Transitions OnLine
Prague, Czech Republic, Thursday, January 6, 2005
In the past, Ukrainians often referred to Western democracies as
"civilized," with the inherent implication that post-Soviet Ukraine was
not. The "Orange Revolution," which led, on 26 December, to the victory of
the opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko in rerun elections has opened
the door for Ukrainians to a new, "civilized" future.
The results suggested, though, that many Ukrainians do not accept either
that the West is civilized or that the Ukraine of President Leonid Kuchma
was uncivilized (or both). The preliminary results in the final round showed
Ukraine almost as deeply divided as the fraud-marred earlier rounds had
suggested. Yushchenko won 51.99 percent of the vote compared with 44.19
percent for Viktor Yanukovych, the serving prime minister and Kuchma's
hand-picked successor.
Still, the divide is significantly narrower than it appeared after the
second round. With a new election law in place, Yushchenko made gains in
practically every deep eastern and southern region, areas that had in
previous rounds looked deep blue, the campaign color of his rival, Viktor
Yanukovych. (The exception was the Sumy oblast, Yushchenko's home region,
which he won in both the second round and the rerun.) These gains may not
have been dramatic (ranging from 0.4 percentage points in Zaporizhiya to
more than two points in Dnipropetrovsk) but they alone were large enough to
overturn Yanukovych's second-round "victory." They were especially
significant given that there was little time to enact the amendments to the
electoral law and that other aspects of the regional structures of power and
influence remained unaffected.
In only two regions was Yushchenko trounced: in Donetsk, where he won a mere
4.21 percent, and in the neighboring region of Luhansk, where his return was
just 6.21 percent. Both are areas where political, economic, and media life
is dominated by Yanukovych and Renat Akhmetov, the businessman who
did most to bankroll Yanukovych's presidential bid.
Yushchenko is, then, the president of a Ukraine that is less divided than
many thought. He is also the convincing victor. Compare, for example, his
results with those of Kuchma in 1999. In 1999, Kuchma's lowest vote counts
were 17.11 percent (in Vinnytsia) and 19.57 percent (in Poltava). But he won
50 percent in only six of Ukraine's 27 regions, even through he faced a much
weaker challenge. By contrast, Yushchenko won over 50 percent in 18 oblasts
and over 60 percent in 17. (Exit polls were higher than the actual results,
indicating Yushchenko leading by 15 to 20 percent.)
Still, that these elections have polarized the country is hardly surprising,
given Yushchenko's pro-reform and pro-Western agenda and Yanukovych's
pro-status quo and overtly pro-Russian agenda. The elections have emphasized
almost exactly, in votes cast, the extent to which Ukraine is still not sure
about which course to follow.
Yushchenko now enters a murky period of uncertainty, knowing that he carries
the burden of huge expectations from the majority of the population, that he
must neutralize the suspicion and anxieties of many in the east, and-since
this was a revolution and therefore a challenge to the established
order-that he needs to break the old system.
A STUBBORN, AND LONELY, LOSER
Divisive the elections may have been, but Yushchenko's victory and the old
system's defeat could, at first glance, look decisive. Though not
overwhelming, Yushchenko's margin of victory is large. He has won
legitimacy, as international observers have recognized the 26 December vote
as legitimate (or, in the words of the 1,370-member OSCE observer team, it
brought "Ukraine substantially closer to meeting international standards").
With one exception, no major politician in Ukraine has disputed the election
results in public. Parliamentary speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn, a former close
aide to Kuchma, congratulated Yushchenko on his win. Supporters of
Yanukovych are now trying to accommodate themselves to the new realities
of power.
Several pillars of the Kuchma establishment have committed "suicide."
(On 27 December, Transport Minister Heorhiy Kirpa was found dead at his
country house. Kirpa, who was at one time viewed as a presidential
contender, had been suspected of siphoning off hundreds of millions of
dollars from the state. Three weeks earlier, Yuriy Liakh, the chairman of
the Ukrainian Credit Bank, apparently cut his own throat with a letter
opener, leaving a suicide note. Liakh was a close business partner of
Kuchma's right-hand man, Viktor Medvedchuk.)
The one exception is, of course, Viktor Yanukovych himself. Yanukovych has
refused to accept the decision overturning his second-round "victory" by
2.85 percentage points, alleging that the greatest day of fraud in the
elections was not in the second round on 21 November but in the third round
on 26 December. Yanukovych has not only refused to recognize the election
results; for a time, he also tried to hold on to his seat as prime minister
and call cabinet meetings. He failed. Opposition supporters blockaded the
government building, and even erstwhile supporters such as Lytvyn spoke out
against him. He resigned two days later, on 31 December (though Kuchma
accepted his resignation only on 5 January).
But the real worry is that Ukraine's institutions will not be transformed
but simply change their coats. Disturbing signs of that can be seen in the
manner in which the Central Election Commission and the Supreme Court
rejected the 14 complaints filed by Yanukovych. Most were denied on
technical grounds because the complaints were filed too late. One
complaint-that residents of the "tent city" erected by opposition supporters
in central Kyiv engaged in illegal campaign activity on election day since
pro-Yushchenko slogans were prominent in the area-was rejected, in some-
what sophistic fashion, because there was a lack of evidence that these
slogans were distributed on election day, as opposed to merely being in
place. (The practice in previous rounds and elections had been to bring down
placards and banners, and the presence of hundreds of tent-city dwellers in
central Kyiv could be viewed as a rally.) In addition, Ukraine's supreme
court refused to review four complaints because of procedural defects,
such as unclear demands and late submission.
Questions should be asked about the judge's motivations. They may have been
loath to anger the demonstrators; the judges may have felt that the people's
demands should be met or at least very seriously considered. They may also
have been loath to offer any help to Yanukovych, a man with the reputation
of a gangster (he served two terms in prison as a youngster) and well-known
for not being gentle, to put it mildly, in his treatment of judges in the
Donetsk region. (Tapes secretly recorded by a former Kuchma bodyguard,
Mykola Melnychenko, capture Yanukovych threatening, for instance, to "hang
up for a night, by his balls" Oleksandr Tupytskiy, a judge in the Donetsk
region.)
Yanukovych's reputation on this front has not improved since 26 December.
According to Yushchenko representatives, Yanukovych supporters reportedly
approached several judges, threatening them or offering them bribes. Some
judges have also apparently asked for visas for family members, fearing for
their safety.
WHAT TO DO WITH THE OLD GUARD?
The alleged bribes and threats are symptomatic of a broader attempt by
members of the old system to protect themselves from possible prosecution.
There are suggestions, for example, that the "suicides" of Kirpa and Liakh
were attempts to remove witnesses to corruption. Some are making conspicuous
attempts to jump ship and fly under Yushchenko's flag or to put themselves
in a stronger bargaining position. Acting Prime Minister Mykola Azarov, the
deputy chairman of the Party of Regions, the political front for the Donetsk
clan, has said he is not sure that he will oppose Yushchenko and seemed to
hint at his readiness to stay in government. Azarov even appeared on
Independence Square, known nationwide simply as " the Maidan" (The Square)
since the Orange Revolution, on New Year's Eve with Yushchenko, Georgian
President Mikhail Saakashvili, key Yushchenko ally Yulia Tymoshenko, and
several leaders of Yushchenko's Our Ukraine faction.
Even in Donetsk, Ukraine's new leaders are getting air time. On 30 December,
Tymoshenko appeared on the television channel Ukrayina, the only TV outlet
that had, until then, refused to show any opposition representatives.
Ukrayina is owned by Akhmetov, Yanukovych's key business ally. Akhmetov
himself met with Tymoshenko.
The hope of the old guard is clear: to retain as much power, money, and
influence as possible. But will Yushchenko allow them to? Though the
figurehead for reform and a new Ukraine, Yushchenko's campaign platform
was largely limited to very general slogans such as "providing everyone with
a high standard of living" or "It will be comfortable and peaceful for
everyone." Yushchenko's action plan, Ten Steps Toward the People, is
barely more specific, including general promises to create 5 million new
jobs, boost social programs, lower taxes, fight corruption, and so on.
On the critical questions of corruption and privatization, it is unclear
whether Yushchenko, like his Georgian colleague and friend, Saakashvili,
will go after those who became filthy rich thanks to their connections with
the old regime. Yushchenko has largely limited himself to unclear statements
such as "some pages will be turned," which seems to suggest that some
questionable privatization deals will be reviewed and others not.
One deal that Yushchenko has repeatedly mentioned specifically is the
privatization of Kryvorizhstal, which produces 20 percent of all metal
manufactured in Ukraine. It was sold just three months before the
presidential elections to a consortium, the Investment Metallurgical Union,
owned jointly by Akhmetov and Viktor Pinchuk, Kuchma's son-in-law. The
winning bid ($800 million) was only slightly higher than the starting price
and much lower than the several-billion-dollar sale-price estimate made by
experts. Potential international investors, which included U.S. Steel,
India's Tata Steel, and U.K.-registered LNM Group--which said it was
ready to pay $3 billion--cried foul when the tender rules were changed to
effectively exclude foreign investors.
Though a reforming prime minister in 2000 and the leader of a revolution
now, Yushchenko comes to the presidency with a political history largely
characterized by indecisiveness. And, though he clearly inspired the fear
and loathing of many in the pro-Kuchma camp during the presidential
elections, that may have been partly because Yushchenko-- indecisive, mild,
religious, and honest--appealed to a wide range of Ukrainians. After the
elections, this selling point could turn into a liability. In short,
paradoxical as it may seem in the wake of such a titanic election battle,
doubts persist about Yushchenko's resolve. But tough choices await him,
and no decision will amount to a choice.
How resolute Yushchenko is may depend on who joins his new government.
Some among his supporters, such as the crime-fighting MP Heorhiy Omelchenko,
would like to pursue the oligarchs, the tycoons with close connections to
the outgoing government. Tymoshenko has said publicly that all privatization
deals are potentially subject to review. But there are also those, like
former prime minister Anatoly Kinakh, who may favor a "live and let live"
philosophy.
The key political leaders who backed Yushchenko are now trying to form a
majority government. Tymoshenko and Petro Poroshenko, one of the leaders
of Our Ukraine, are the prime contenders to become prime minister, but both
will have difficulty winning the support of more than 225 members in the
450-seat parliament. If they are unsuccessful, Kinakh stands a good chance
of returning to a post he has already held because, as a former member of
the pro-Kuchma majority, he is not viewed with the level of distrust
generated by Tymoshenko.
A TIME FOR DECISIVENESS
Yushchenko may not fully comprehend the force of the expectations that he
has helped bring to the fore. The Orange Revolution, in which hundreds of
thousands of Ukrainians braved the cold and even risked violent
confrontation with the authorities, swept like a wildfire through the tinder
bush of a society tired of watching the games politicians play and tired of
bearing the brunt of an inefficient and corrupt economy. Ukrainians became
politicized as never before. Now they expect change for the better, real
change that they can recognize with their five senses. Yushchenko will find
himself under immense public pressure to deliver more change. One of the
key mobilizing forces in the Orange Revolution, the youth movement Pora
("Enough" in Ukrainian and Russian), has intimated that it expects
Yushchenko's government to act against the former regime's members and
supporters. Otherwise, says one of Pora's leaders, Mykhaylo Svystovych,
the organization may go into opposition to Yushchenko himself.
He will also have to act, lest some of Ukraine's problems so visible in this
election re-emerge. The threat of separatism that emerged during the weeks
of turmoil was never a serious possibility. It was, instead, a desperate
response to the Orange Revolution by local satraps, enmeshed in a closed and
highly lucrative system of corruption. Ultimately, the tactic backfired. The
calls lacked public support; there were no demonstrations to back them.
Polls indicated that over 85 percent of the population opposed any change
to Ukraine's unitary structure. And, in response, as local authorities, the
media, and intellectuals across the country were brought together in the
face of a largely imaginary threat of secession, the Orange Revolution was
strengthened. Even the regional leaders who pushed the issue onto the
national agenda backed down within days.
But a precedent has been set. However brief, transient, and self-serving,
separatist calls--for autonomy, a federation, or even outright
secession--were heard on the national stage for the first time since the
mid-1990s, when the president of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Yuriy
Meshkov, set about trying to unite the peninsula with Russia. (He rapidly
lost popular support and was removed from office, and the post of president
of the Crimea was abolished.) If things go badly in a Yushchenko presidency,
separatist calls may again be heard.
Yushchenko's ability to convey his message to eastern Ukraine will be
critical. The campaign proved a landmark, with journalists effectively
overturning the editorial policy of their owners in state and pro-government
media. Since then, most radio and TV, including that in the hands of the
oligarchs, has remained relatively objective. But, like that of the courts,
the media's newly discovered independence is relative and fragile. Most
newspapers remain political servants of their owners. (Perhaps the most
extreme turnaround was at Era TV, which switched sides to support Yushchenko
because of an apparent conflict of interest between the company's owner,
oligarch Andriy Derkach, and Yanukovych. It switched sides so swiftly that
it did not find time to present a line of thinking other than that of the
opposition.)
When the next political crisis occurs, the media may revert to old form and
take sides without any regard for even formal impartiality. This is all the
more disturbing given the ownership structure of the Ukrainian media. Just
one man, Viktor Pinchuk, who supported Yanukovych, controls three national
TV channels, and two others are controlled by Viktor Medvedchuk's Social
Democrats. The notion of public-service broadcasting has been discussed for
at least four years but is far from reality. To entrench press freedom,
Yushchenko must reform existing legislation and restructure media holdings.
This highlights a third reason for decisive action: although the former
government's leaders and backers are in a state of shock and disarray today,
they will not remain so for long. Though Yushchenko overcame a united front
of Ukraine's richest oligarchs, including Akhmetov, Pinchuk, and the clan
around Medvedchuk and businessman and football federation chief Hryhoriy
Surkis, the media, money, and power wielded by these groups remain largely
in place. Replacing regional and local government officials will not make a
big dent in the power and wealth of the clans; it will merely stall their
expansion. If they are to survive and continue to support the vast pyramid
of people who serve their needs, they need to expand their business
interests; whatever Yushchenko does, these powerful forces will come back
to haunt him. Strong, impartial measures will probably be needed to ensure
respect for the law and for Yushchenko.
AN UNCHANGED SOCIETY, READY FOR CHANGE
But while the battle between Yushchenko and the oligarchs may be replayed,
a new actor has emerged on the scene: the Ukrainian public.
Arguably the best feature of this extraordinary time was the good humor
among the nearly 1 million Ukrainians who came out onto the streets to
demonstrate, often not understood and thereby often disregarded by Western
observers. And there was good reason for that: for ordinary Ukrainians,
mistrustful of everyone yet easy prey for government machinations, the
revolution proved an exciting, uplifting, and transforming time that showed
them that ordinary people can change the political scene or, as the
revolutionary refrain went, "We are together, there are many of us and we
will not be overcome!"
From this new determination springs the hope that Yushchenko realizes that
Ukrainians now expect their politicians not to rule, but to serve. If
Yushchenko forgets this, he would do well to remember one joke heard these
days in Kyiv: "What is the difference between Yushchenko and God?' "God
doesn't think he's Yushchenko." -30-
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ivan Lozowy is a TOL correspondent and runs an Internet newsletter,
the Ukraine Insider. (E-mail: lozowy@voliacable.com)(www.tol.cz)
=========================================================
12. "AMERICA'S UKRAINE FOLLY"
OUTSIDE VIEW: by William S. Lind, Outside View Contributor
United Press International, Washington, D.C, Wed, Jan 5, 2005
WASHINGTON, DC - Was Ukraine's Nov. 21 presidential election stolen?
Probably. Was President-elect Viktor Yushchenko legitimately elected as the
country's next leader in the Dec. 26 rerun of the vote? Certainly. Would it
be nice if Ukraine were a democracy? Sure. Are those the considerations that
should drive American policy in the region? No.
The most important factor in U.S. policy toward the countries of the former
Soviet Union ought to be our need for a strategic alliance with Russia.
Geo-politically, Russia holds Christendom's vast eastern flank, which
stretches all the way from the Black Sea to Vladivostok. As the remnants of
the Christian world begin to wake up to the reality that Islam has resumed
the strategic offensive, that flank takes on renewed importance. It is
already under pressure, as events in Chechnya show all too clearly. If it
collapses, Christendom will have suffered an epic defeat.
Not surprisingly, the Bush administration, the scope of whose strategic
vision is measured in microns, gets none of this. In its continuing march of
folly, it has dismissed Russia's vital interests in its "near abroad," which
includes Ukraine. Washington did everything in its power to secure the
election to Ukraine's presidency of Yushchenko, the anti-Russian candidate.
When the pro-Russian candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, who resigned as prime
minister Dec. 31, won instead (illustrating Stalin's maxim that what is
important is not who votes, but who counts the votes), Secretary of State
Colin Powell said the United States would not recognize the result. Now,
Yushchenko is victorious at last. The result has been a heavy defeat for our
vital ally, Russia.
Russia is already reacting as it must. The Dec. 4, 2004, The Washington Post
reported Russian President Vladimir Putin as saying that Washington wants a
"dictatorship of international affairs. Even if dictatorship is wrapped up
in a beautiful package of pseudo-democratic phraseology, it will not be in a
position to solve systemic problems."
If anything, Putin put the case too mildly. The Bush administration believes
it already has a dictatorship of international affairs, and everybody else,
including Russia, is an American satellite. Washington need not take account
of anyone's interests.
The folly of ignoring Russia's vital interests may lead to a worst possible
outcome - namely, a renewed civil war within Christendom. Three previous
such civil wars in the 20th century -- World War I, World War II, and the
Cold War -- have left our culture merely one contender among many, whereas
a century ago it dominated the world. A fourth such conflict, in the form of
a revived cold war, would truly be a gift from Allah to the warriors of the
Prophet. Christendom would spend what little energy it has left fighting
itself.
Continued American meddling in Ukraine may have equally dire consequences
for that unhappy country, which both America and Russia should want to see
prosperous and stable. Eastern Ukraine, which is heavily populated by
Russians, is making noises about seceding following Yushchenko's victory. If
Russia feels humiliated by Washington in a Yushchenko victory, it might
think it has no way to recoup but by supporting such secession movements.
That could lead to civil war in Ukraine, a breakup of the country and a
direct confrontation between Washington and Moscow. As a Russian general
said a few years ago, it is true that most of Russia's nuclear weapons are
old and rusty, but a good number probably still work.
It is to such consequences that the march of folly inevitably leads.
Regrettably, that march is what marked President George W. Bush's first
term. Now, with dissenting voices in the administration being purged, it
seems the march tempo will quicken, and not only in the Middle East. Is
there anyone left in Washington who can think strategically? If there is, it
seems their voices go unheard. -30-
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
(William S. Lind is expressing his own opinion. He is director for the
Center for Cultural Conservatism for the Free Congress Foundation.)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by
outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The
views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press
International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original
submissions are invited.)
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