"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT"
An International Newsletter
In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis, and Commentary
"The Art of Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion,
Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World"
MORE DELAY TACTICS FROM THE YANUKOVYCH CAMP
No delay tactics will dampen the spirit found in Ukraine these days.
Heard everywhere around Kyiv now:
"We do not have to serve someone anymore."
"We now have a moral leader."
"Yushchenko is the first President worth supporting."
"Never seen so many people engaged, so many smiles."
"My business now has a real future, I can look forward now."
"Never thought I would get involved in politics."
"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT" - Number 408
morganw@patriot.net, ArtUkraine.com@starpower.net
FROM: KYIV, UKRAINE, WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 12, 2005
-----INDEX OF ARTICLES-----
"Major International News Headlines and Articles"
1. "REFORM IN UKRAINE MUST BE SWIFT AND SWEEPING"
OP-ED: by Anders Aslund and Kalman Mizsei
Financial Times, London, UK, Wed, January 12 2005
2. YUSHCHENKO WILL IMPLEMENT RADICAL REFORMS
Oxford Analytica, UK, Tuesday, January 11, 2005
3. YANUKOVYCH HQ PUTS OFF APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT
OVER CEC DECISION TO NAME YUSHCHENKO THE WINNER
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wed, January 12, 2005
4. U.S. WELCOMES CEC CERTIFICATION OF YUSHCHENKO AS
WINNER OF UKRAINE'S DECEMBER 26 REVOTE
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wed, January 12, 2005
5. U.S. HOPING NEW UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT WILL MAKE
MEASURED DECISION ON WITHDRAWAL OF
PEACEKEEPERS FROM IRAQ
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wed, January 12, 2005
6. CAR SALES UP 37 PER CENT IN UKRAINE IN 2004
UNIAN news agency, Kiev, in Ukrainian 0856 gmt 12 Jan 05
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Wed, January 12, 2005
7. BEST FOR PUTIN TO SAY AWAY FROM INAUGURATION
Ekho Moskvy news agency, Moscow, in Russian 1220 gmt 11 Jan 05
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English. Tue, Jan 11, 2005
8. METROPOLITAN OF UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH (MOSCOW
PATRIARCHY) CONGRATULATES YUSHCHENKO ON VICTORY
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wed, January 12, 2005
9. UKRAINIAN MP SAYS TOP OFFICIALS SOLD ARMS TO IRAN
UNIAN news agency, Kiev, in Ukrainian 0844 gmt 12 Jan 05
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Wed, January 12, 2005
10. RUSSIAN PATRIARCH SETS CRITERIA FOR POPE'S VISIT
Brian Murphy, AP Religion Writer, Athens, Greece, Tue Jan 11, 2004
11. PUTIN'S CLAIMS STRAIN ISRAELI-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
By Jerusalem Post Staff, Jerusalem Post, Jerusalem, Israel, Jan 11, 2005
12. "DEMOCRACY IN THE CIS"
OP-ED: By Christopher H. Smith
The Washington Times, Washington, D.C., Wed, Jan 12, 2005
13. STANDING WITH UKRAINE THE SUPPORT OF AMERICANS AT
EVERY LEVEL WILL HELP THE ORANGE REVOLUTION BLOSSOM
EDITORIAL: by Melanne Verveer
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Pittsburgh, PA, Wed, 12 Jan 2005
14. "UKRAINE, RUSSIA START ANEW"
ANALYSIS: By Peter Lavelle
United Press International, Moscow, Russia, Tue, Jan 11, 2005
15. "VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO'S AGENDA"
ANALYSIS: By Peter Lavelle
United Press International, Moscow, Russia, Tue, Jan 11, 2005
16. WILL MP VIKTOR KOROL BECOME A MINISTER?
Ukrainian paper looks at possible law-enforcement appointments
By Oleksandr Korchynskyy
Segodnya newspaper, Kiev, Ukraine, in Russian 12 Jan 05; p 4
BBC Monitoring, UK, in English, Wed, January 12, 2005
17. CLUB OF ETHNIC MUSIC IN KYIV
A Project: Moya Ukrayina. Bervy
Club Of Ethnic Music in Kyiv, Kyiv, Ukraine, January, 2005
==========================================================
1. "REFORM IN UKRAINE MUST BE SWIFT AND SWEEPING"
OP-ED: by Anders Aslund and Kalman Mizsei
Financial Times, London, UK, Wed, January 12, 2005
Ukraine's democratic revolution has brought Viktor Yushchenko a convincing
victory. But President Yushchenko will have only a brief honeymoon. The
Ukrainian state is pervasively corrupt and a few privileged businessmen and
bureaucrats benefit richly. He has a fleeting opportunity to end their
domination and at last put the state at the service of the public.
The political system that takes root in Ukraine and the country's economic
prosperity are crucial to Europe's stability. Ukraine is bigger in land mass
than Germany and the UK combined, with 47m people. It is the state with the
longest shared border with the EU.
The Orange Revolution showed a society united in demanding democracy,
freedom, law and order, and an end to corruption. Mr Yushchenko must meet
these demands swiftly and comprehensively. He has a strong popular mandate;
hundreds of good draft laws are ready for adoption; and a wealth of
transition expertise gleaned from the experience of neighbouring countries
is within reach.
But Mr Yushchenko will have to work fast. December's political compromise
will shift many presidential powers to the parliament by September. Although
he has a majority there, parliament is dominated by wealthy businessmen with
their own narrow interests, and their support may be fleeting.
The United Nations Development Programme last summer asked a commission to
draft a reform programme for Ukraine's next president. We served as members,
and are now presenting dozens of recommendations in Proposals to the
President: A New Wave of Reform.
First, political reform must make democracy and freedom a reality. Second,
judicial reform must provide a firm foundation for the rule of law. Third,
the state must be deprived of arbitrary powers of ownership, taxation,
regulation and inspection because these inhibit commerce and breed
corruption. Fourth, the state must cater better to social needs. Finally,
Ukraine must be allowed to transform its "European choice" from a political
slogan into a geopolitical reality.
Reforming the state is at the heart of our policy recommendations. Rapid
private sector growth is the engine behind Ukraine's recent successes, but
the state remains a failure. Political reform is the remedy. A consensus
calls for a transition from presidential power to parliamentary rule, but
the current proposals leave too much power with the parliamentary speaker
and the prosecutor-general. A clear division of powers is needed, and
decision makers must be made accountable.
A public administration worthy of a democracy must be created, staffed
by civil servants rather than cronies. They should receive decent salaries
rather than living off bribes. The rights of ordinary citizens in their
dealings with the state should be protected. This includes the right to
information. The parliament should adopt quickly a public information act,
opening all public documents to scrutiny, with exceptions only for national
security and individual privacy.
Massive corruption is likely to persist until civil servants no longer have
so much to sell. One solution is to complete privatisation processes that
have stalled. Another is to eliminate the plethora of inspections and
permits required to conduct business. A modern tax code should be adopted,
reducing the number of taxes and their rates, while eliminating loopholes.
Proper corporate and financial legislation should be enacted to counteract
the excessive concentration of Ukrainian big business and ensure protection
of minority shareholders. The dozens of financial acts that have been
drafted should be promulgated.
Ukraine's Orange Revolution was an eloquent appeal for inclusion in the
world community. A first step would be Ukraine's accession to the World
Trade Organisation in 2005. But the Ukrainians' great dream is membership of
the EU. The EU should keep open this prospect. In the short term, it should
draft a more generous action plan, with better access for both Ukrainian
exports and Ukrainian citizens eager to travel and study abroad. Ukrainians
stood up for European values with courage and dignity in the icy days of
November and December. Europe should return the compliment and enable this
new wave of reforms to succeed by offering Ukraine the prospect of its own
rightful place in the common European home. -30-
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kalman Mizsei is assistant administrator of the United Nations Development
Programme. Anders Aslund is director of the Russian and Eurasian programme
at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
==========================================================
2. UKRAINE: YUSHCHENKO WILL IMPLEMENT RADICAL REFORMS
Oxford Analytica, UK, Tuesday, January 11, 2005
EVENT: The Central Election Commission yesterday announced final results of
the presidential election, showing Viktor Yushchenko the winner with 52% of
the vote.
SIGNIFICANCE: A final appeal by Viktor Yanukovych to the Supreme
Court over voting violations seems unlikely to succeed, clearing the way for
Yushchenko's inauguration. Yushchenko faces formidable challenges in
fulfilling domestic and international expectations for radical
politico-economic reform.
ANALYSIS: President-elect Viktor Yushchenko's positive international
reputation stems from his time as central bank governor in the 1990s and
prime minister in 1999-2001. He is now backed by an ideologically diverse
alliance that includes both radical and moderate elements:
Moderates, alongside Yushchenko himself within Our Ukraine, include
business ally Petro Poroshenko, and campaign manager Oleksandr Zinchenko.
In addition, Yushchenko will be supported by moderate former pro-Kuchma
centrists.
Ukraine's radicalised participants in the 'Orange Revolution',
especially among young people, are closer in spirit to the radical wings of
Yushchenko's alliance. These include Yulia Tymoshenko on the Right and
Socialist leader Oleksandr Moroz on the Left.
Keeping this ideologically diverse alliance together will be a key challenge
-- beginning with the choice of a government this month and regional
governors in February -- but it should hold until parliamentary elections
due in March 2006.
Reform rush. Yushchenko also faces constitutional reforms that will curb
the extensive powers he has inherited from Leonid Kuchma in 9-12 months
time (see UKRAINE: Constitutional changes will weaken Yushchenko -
January 5, 2005). He will therefore seek rapidly to implement a radical
reform agenda (see UKRAINE: Yushchenko rule holds out hopes for
change. - December 29, 2004):
1. CORRUPTION: Corruption permeates all levels of government, finance and
business, and is hindering Ukraine's economic progress. Yushchenko sees
combating corruption as his most urgent task:
This will be more achievable at higher levels. Eradicating corruption at
the grassroots level among bureaucrats and policemen will take far longer.
Combating corruption will include bringing the grey economy (an
estimated 55% of GDP) into the open. Kuchma's failure to reduce the large
shadow economy during his decade in office suggests high-level interests in
keeping these activities beyond the reach of the tax authorities.
2. RULE OF LAW: A priority will be to show that the routine violations of
the rule of law that were widespread under Kuchma have now ended. This will
help to encourage Western investors, who were dissuaded from investing in
Ukraine not only by high levels of corruption, but also by lack of adherence
to contractual obligations and an inability to seek legal recourse.
3. CRIMINAL CASES: Although key Kuchma appointees will have to be
dismissed from the ministries and security services under the reform drive,
widespread prosecution of Yushchenko's opponents is unlikely. However,
the radicals will insist that those who organised election fraud and tried
to poison Yushchenko be brought to trial.
A related area will be dealing with the Kuchma legacy, including the still
unsolved murder of opposition journalist Giorgii Gongadze in 2000. It
remains unclear whether Yushchenko and his allies have offered Kuchma
immunity from prosecution -- certainly parliament has not yet passed the
necessary legislation. In any case, further revelations about his presidency
will foreclose Kuchma's hope of taking on the role of elder statesman.
4. MEDIA: Media censorship, which grew towards the end of the Kuchma era,
came to an abrupt end during the 'Orange Revolution'. Yushchenko will seek a
more open relationship with the media.
5. PRIVATISATION: Yushchenko will probably go through with his promise
to renationalise the Kryvorizhstal metals plant, sold for a knockdown 800
million dollars in June 2004 to oligarchs Viktor Pinchuk and Renat Akhmetov.
A fresh tender, with a level playing field for foreign firms, including
Russian, would symbolise Ukraine's new openness to foreign capital. (A
possible alternative would be for Pinchuk and Akhmetov to pay the balance of
the 1.5-2.0 billion dollar market price.)
Yushchenko has consistently ruled out opening up other privatisations from
the 1990s. Nevertheless, some redistribution will be inevitable,
particularly in such areas as regional electricity distributors, where
businessmen will seek legal redress to regain companies appropriated by
Kuchma's allies. This will particularly affect the Kyiv clan.
6. OLIGARCHS: Two of Ukraine's three oligarchic clans (see UKRAINE:
Regional clans hold key to succession - February 23, 2004) should provide
relatively little challenge:
The Kyiv clan and its United Social Democratic Party will decline, due
to loss of access to state financial resources and the dismantling of its
business empire. The Dnipropetrovsk clan is likely to seek an accommodation
with Yushchenko, 'going legitimate' and backing him in parliament.
7. REGIONALISM: The most difficult challenge facing Yushchenko will be
dealing with Viktor Yanukovych's home base of Donetsk and its powerful clan.
The Donetsk region resembles a 'state within a state' with one political
party (Regions of Ukraine) and a dominant oligarch (Akhmetov) enforcing
control through a corrupt nexus between business, the authorities, politics,
organised crime and law enforcement (see UKRAINE: Yanukovych brings
Donbas resources to bear - April 27, 2004).
Yushchenko is probably not yet in a position to tackle the clan head on.
However, he may seek to weaken the Donetsk nexus with the support of an
alternative business group closer ideologically to himself -- the Industrial
Union of the Donbas (ISD), which is in competition with Akhmetov's Systems
Capital Management. He will also make conciliatory gestures towards the
Donetsk public. During the repeat vote on December 26, Yushchenko did
relatively well in many eastern and southern Ukrainian regions, providing a
basis for future growth in his support in such key areas as Kharkiv.
Foreign policy. Given the need for swift reform, the Yushchenko presidency
will be preoccupied with domestic issues for at least its first year --
although the reforms introduced will themselves bring Ukraine closer to
Euro-Atlantic integration. Yushchenko will push for the EU to change its
closed-door policy, although more progress is likely with NATO (see
UKRAINE: Long-term direction remains uncertain - June 4, 2004).
Ukraine may be upgraded at NATO's November summit from its current
Action Plan status to Membership Action Plan status, a stepping-stone to
membership later in the decade.
Yushchenko's election could create a problem for the EU, which has been
reluctant to extend the prospect of membership to Ukraine. Engagement by
Brussels is likely to remain lukewarm, despite lobbying for Ukraine by
Poland and other East European members.
However, two early steps in the direction of European integration will
be the granting of market economy status by the United States, and WTO
membership, perhaps by late 2005.
Yushchenko will seek to maintain 'virtual' good relations with Russia to
appease east Ukrainian sentiment and prevent difficulties in the economic
domain. However, there is a serious legacy of mistrust between the new
administration and Moscow, and Yushchenko's policy will clash with Putin's
in key areas:
Yushchenko will have no interest in the 'Common Economic Space'.
Yushchenko can be expected to reverse various agreements in the energy
sphere between Kyiv and Moscow towards the end of the Kuchma presidency that
have increased Ukraine's energy dependence on Russia (see UKRAINE/RUSSIA:
Transit deals give Moscow upper hand - September 16, 2004). Notably, he is
likely to return to the original aim of pumping Caspian oil from south to
north through the Odessa-Brody pipeline.
CONCLUSION: Yushchenko has the support of a broad swathe of Ukraine's
elite, which recognises the need for democratisation and curbing corruption
if Ukraine is to move forward. He seems likely to make considerable progress
with a reform drive which will dramatically improve Ukraine's international
image and prospects for Euro-Atlantic integration. -30-
==========================================================
3. YANUKOVYCH HQ PUTS OFF APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT
OVER CEC DECISION TO NAME YUSHCHENKO THE WINNER
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wed, January 12, 2005
KYIV - The headquarters of presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovych
decided to postpone to a later date the submission to the Supreme Court
of an appeal against the decision of the Central Electoral Commission to
recognize presidential candidate, Our Ukraine coalition leader Viktor
Yuschenko the winner of the presidential elections, which was initially
scheduled for January 12. Taras Chornovil, chief of the Yanukovych
central electoral headquarters, announced this at a press conference.
Chornovil noted that the Supreme Court had forbidden to publish in
newspapers Voice of Ukraine and Governmental Courier the CEC decision to
recognize Yuschenko the election winner at the request of Yanukovych. That
is why the headquarters has the chance to challenge the decision not later
than next Tuesday.
Yet, Chornovil said, the headquarters is not out to drag feet on challenging
the CEC ruling until the deadline. The suit may be filed on Thursday or
another day before the end of this week.
Chornovil attributed the headquarters decision to put off the submission of
the complaint to the fact that, after the Supreme Court prohibited the
publication of the CEC ruling, and the Yanukovych headquarters announced
in the mass media its intention to contest the ruling, the number of
materials provided by voters about election violations largely increased,
and the headquarters believes it necessary to apply them to its appeal.
As Ukrainian News reported earlier, the CEC declared Yuschenko winner of
the presidential elections at its meeting on January 10. However on January
11, the Supreme Court forbade publishing the CEC decision in the Voice of
Ukraine and Governmental Courier newspapers, without which it cannot take
effect. -30- [The Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
==========================================================
4. U.S. WELCOMES CEC CERTIFICATION OF YUSHCHENKO AS
WINNER OF UKRAINE'S DECEMBER 26 REVOTE
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wed, January 12, 2005
KYIV - The US welcomes the Central Election Commission (CEC) certification
of Yuschenko as the winner of the December 26 presidential election revote.
Spokesman for the US Department of State Richard Boucher made the statement,
the copy of which was delivered to Ukrainian News.
"We welcome the certification by the Central Election Commission of Viktor
Yuschenko as the winner of the December 26 revote," Boucher said.
At the same time, the US will so far refrain from congratulating Yuschenko,
because his opponent presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovych can submit an
appeal to the Supreme Court.
"So we don't plan on congratulating a winner until all the legal challenges
have been resolved and the [Central] Election Commission has published its
final results," Boucher stressed.
He noted that "most observers, both Ukrainian and international observers,
have concluded there were no systemic violations and that any violations
that did occur were - did not affect the outcome of the December 26 vote."
The US, in his words, is confident that the Supreme Court will deal with the
matter promptly, fairly and in a transparent manner. The Department of State
Spokesman refused to make any assumptions on possible Supreme Court
decision.
"And I'm sure the United States in whatever appropriate fashion will
continue to support the - a government that's brought to power by a free
vote of the Ukrainian people," Boucher concluded. -30-
==========================================================
5. U.S. HOPING NEW UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT WILL MAKE
MEASURED DECISION ON WITHDRAWAL OF
PEACEKEEPERS FROM IRAQ
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wed, January 12, 2005
KYIV - The United States is hoping that the new Ukrainian government will
make a measured decision regarding withdrawal of Ukrainian peacekeepers from
Iraq. Richard Boucher, the spokesman for the United States' Department of
State, announced this in a statement, a text of which Ukrainian News
obtained.
"We trust that Ukraine's new government, when it takes office, will look at
this issue carefully and discuss it as appropriate with us and the Iraqis,"
Boucher said.
He stressed that Ukraine has been and remains a very important partner of
the US in Iraq and that Ukraine takes its international responsibilities
seriously.
He also noted that Ukraine has already said that changes in the Ukrainian
contingent will be made in full consultation with the multinational forces
and with the Iraqi government and that it will be done in a responsible and
measured way.
He also noted that Ukraine has not yet made a concrete decision on
withdrawal of Ukrainian peacekeepers from Iraq, that only contingency plans
have been ordered to be drawn up, and that the relevant parliamentary
resolution is non-binding.
As Ukrainian News earlier reported, President Leonid Kuchma has directed
acting Defense Minister Oleksandr Kuzmuk and acting Foreign Affairs Minister
Kostiantyn Hryschenko to withdraw Ukrainian peacekeepers from Iraq in the
first half of 2005.
According to the acting defense minister, the Ukrainian peacekeepers in Iraq
could be withdrawn in the March-April period. Kuzmuk said in late December
that the Defense Ministry was planning to withdraw Ukrainian peacekeepers
from Iraq before the end of 2005 and that the Defense Ministry only planned
to reduce the size of the Ukrainian peacekeeping contingent in Iraq from a
brigade to a battalion during a troop rotation in April 2005.
An explosion killed eight Ukrainian peacekeepers from the 72nd detached
mechanized battalion and injured six near Es Suveira on January 9. Ukraine
presently has about 1,600 peacekeepers in Iraq. They are stationed in the
province of Wasit, 120-140 kilometers southeast of Baghdad, which is in
Poland's zone of command.
The Ukrainian peacekeepers started their peacekeeping mission in August 28,
2003. Seventeen Ukrainian peacekeepers have now died during the course of
service in Iraq. -30- [The Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
==========================================================
6. CAR SALES UP 37 PER CENT IN UKRAINE IN 2004
UNIAN news agency, Kiev, in Ukrainian 0856 gmt 12 Jan 05
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Wed, January 12, 2005
KIEV - New passenger car sales grew by 37 per cent year on year in Ukraine
in 2004, up to 211,000 cars, the UNIAN news agency reported on 12 January,
quoting the Auto-Consulting analytical group.
Russia's AvtoVAZ was the leader of the market, with 35 per cent of sales in
December, the agency added. -30-
==========================================================
7. BEST FOR PUTIN TO SAY AWAY FROM INAUGURATION
Ekho Moskvy news agency, Moscow, in Russian, 11 Jan 05
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English. Tue, Jan 11, 2005
MOSCOW - "[Russian President Vladimir] Putin will hardly be right to go
to the inauguration ceremony" of Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko,
Konstantin Zatulin, director of the Institute of CIS Countries and a State
Duma member from the One Russia faction, has told Ekho Moskvy radio.
If complaints by [presidential candidate Viktor] Yanukovych's supporters
are dismissed, Putin "will have to congratulate Yushchenko formally and to
grant the new Ukrainian leaders the opportunity to formulate their proposals
to the Russian side," Zatulin believes.
In his view, Putin "must draw conclusions concerning the Ukrainian
direction", of which the most important is "the need to work in a modern
manner with the Ukrainian people and with the Ukrainian political forces,
the need to help our supporters in eastern and southern Ukraine, wherever
Russia has influence". Russia must support those who "stand for special
relations with Russia and for the countries' economic and political
cooperation," he said.
"We must act in Ukraine. Ukraine is an extremely important issue for us.
Today many people will try to position Ukraine as a bastion against Russia's
influence in the post-Soviet space," Zatulin said.
At the same time, Zatulin stressed that such work with the Ukrainian people
will not mean stepping up separatist sentiments in Ukraine. Ukraine has no
other choice, but a compromise between the west and the east, he believes.
Ukraine is currently split into two parts and the split is deep. The basic
issues in relations between the west and the east [of Ukraine] have not been
resolved, Zatulin said. In his view, many problems could be resolved, if the
mechanism of federalism were applied in Ukraine. -30-
==========================================================
8. METROPOLITAN OF UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH (MOSCOW
PATRIARCHY) CONGRATULATES YUSHCHENKO ON VICTORY
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wed, January 12, 2005
KYIV - Head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchy,
Metropolitan Volodymyr congratulated Our Ukraine coalition leader Viktor
Yuschenko on his victory in the presidential election. This was announced
in a report of the Church, whose text Ukrainian News has.
"Dear Viktor Andriyovych! On behalf of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, let
me congratulate you on election to the top post in our state: the President
of Ukraine," the message of greetings says. Volodymyr noted that the Church
voices hope that the government policy on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church will
remain unchanged.
He also expressed hope that, over the period of Yuschenko's presidency, the
questions of church land tenure, return to churches of their property, which
is being used for wrong purposes, will be settled.
Volodymyr also expresses hope that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church will be
able to get a legal entity status it lacks now. He also expressed an acute
need for introducing the teaching of the fundamentals of Christianity at all
of Ukraine's educational establishments, which, in his opinion, will speed
up the solution of problems involved in drug addiction, AIDS spread and
dissoluteness among youth.
"With belief, hope and love we are asking God to bless your work for the
sake of wellbeing of god-loving Ukrainian people, our state and church," the
message of congratulations reads. -30-
==========================================================
9. UKRAINIAN MP SAYS TOP OFFICIALS SOLD ARMS TO IRAN
UNIAN news agency, Kiev, in Ukrainian, 12 Jan 05
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Wed, January 12, 2005
KIEV - MP Hryhoriy Omelchenko has sent an inquiry to Prosecutor-
General Svyatoslav Piskun and Security Service of Ukraine [SBU]
chairman Ihor Smeshko asking them to provide full information to
parliament regarding the illegal export of military hardware and cruise
missiles in 1999-2001 by officials at Ukrspetseksport [Ukraine's state
arms exporter] and the SBU. The text of the inquiry was read out
at parliament's plenary meeting by speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn.
The inquiry, which Omelchenko also forwarded to UNIAN, says that the
SBU has completed a pre-trial investigation of a criminal case against
former SBU employee V. Yevdokymov, who is accused of smuggling
weapons to Iran in 1999-2001.
High-ranking Ukrspetseksport and SBU officials were involved in the illegal
arms sales. President Leonid Kuchma was aware of the arms sales, which were
sanctioned by him [the inquiry says]. The criminal case is being heard at a
closed meeting of the Kiev Region Court of Appeal. -30-
==========================================================
10. RUSSIAN PATRIARCH SETS CRITERIA FOR POPE'S VISIT
Brian Murphy, AP Religion Writer, Athens, Greece, Tue, Jan 11, 2004
ATHENS, Greece - A long-desired trip by Pope John Paul II to Russia
could only occur if the Vatican renounces efforts to expand Rome-
affiliated churches in traditional Christian orthodox areas, the head of the
Russian Orthodox Church said.
The condition set by Patriarch Alexy II - contained Tuesday in a reply to
questions from The Associated Press - reinforces previous statements and
suggests Russian Orthodox leaders have not been swayed by recent Vatican
overtures that have included the return of an important icon and the
relics of two Orthodox saints.
Before a papal visit to Russia can be considered, "it is essential to
renounce the proselytism which is being carried out ... by numerous
representatives of the Catholic clergy," Alexy wrote in response to the
AP's questions.
Eastern Rite churches - which retain Orthodox traditions but are loyal to
the Vatican - are one of the thorniest issues blocking attempts to heal
the nearly 1,000-year-old division between the world's 1 billion Roman
Catholics and more than 200 million Orthodox.
The churches have grown since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and
many senior Orthodox clergy accuse the Vatican of trying to encroach on
historic Orthodox lands. Alexy said the Eastern Rite churches "only deepen
the divisions between Orthodox and Catholics."
But the pope has pushed ahead with attempts to reach out to Orthodox. He
has made a series of history-making trips into mostly Orthodox nations
since the late 1990s and conducted joint worship with the world's Orthodox
spiritual leader, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I.
Yet Russia, the most populous Orthodox nation, has remained closed to
the ailing, 84-year-old pontiff, who has sharply cut back on his travels in
recent years. Alexy offered little hope the door could open. Beside a
demand for a Vatican declaration on its Eastern Rite policies, Alexy
stressed the importance to "normalize" the church disputes in Ukraine,
where the pope visited in 2001.
The Russian Orthodox Church is angered by possible moves by the Vatican
to give patriarchate status to Greek Catholics, an Eastern Rite church that
has expanded into traditionally Orthodox eastern and southern Ukraine.
Alexy called it part of "unfriendly activities toward the Russian Orthodox
Church." "The concrete problems which stand between us and complicate
the Orthodox-Catholic dialogue ought to be discussed and resolved in
practice," he wrote. But he welcomed the latest Vatican acts as a
possible "sign of readiness" to advance discussions.
In August, the Vatican sent back to Moscow an 18th-century replica of the
Mother of God of Kazan icon, a work that first appeared in the Volga River
city of Kazan in 1579 and is revered by many Russian believers. The copy
of the icon was smuggled to the West after the 1917 Russian Revolution and
had hung in the pope's private chapel.
In November, the Vatican returned the relics of two 4th-century Orthodox
saints to Istanbul, the former Byzantine capital, then called
Constantinople, and the seat of the Orthodox ecumenical patriarch. -30-
==========================================================
11. PUTIN'S CLAIMS STRAIN ISRAELI-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
Jerusalem Post Staff, Jerusalem Post, Jerusalem, Israel, Jan 11, 2005
JERUSALEM - Russian President Vladimir Putin's claim that Israeli officials
aided Ukrainian opposition candidate Viktor Yuschenko on the campaign trail
has led to a serious break in Russian-Israeli relations, Channel 2 TV
reported Tuesday evening. Putin further accused Israel of financing
Yuschenko in the presidential race against Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor
Yanukovych, the candidate he preferred.
The Russian president claimed that the Israeli government could have
prevented the financial sponsorship of Yuschenko. Putin's close associates
additionally charged Israel of supporting the Russian opposition. Israel
denies the charges, the Channel 2 report noted. -30-
==========================================================
12. "DEMOCRACY IN THE CIS"
OP-ED: By Christopher H. Smith
The Washington Times, Washington, D.C., Wed, Jan12, 2005
In the last year, a political earthquake has struck the countries of the
former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Georgia's 2003 Rose Revolution
and the ongoing Orange Revolution in Ukraine are a direct challenge to
ruling elites in Russia and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union. They also
threaten to derail Russian President Vladimir Putin's policy of retaining as
much control as possible over the former Soviet empire.
Throughout this region, ex-communist rulers allied with oligarchic groups
have, to varying degrees, seized control of their countries' economies and
political arenas. While claiming to observe the democracy commitments
voluntarily accepted when their countries joined the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1992, these leaders have remained in
power by rigging elections and excluding potential rivals, sometimes using
any means necessary. Executive control of the legislative and judicial
branches of power, as well as the state's coercive apparatus, has made it
possible to largely intimidate the public out of politics, which has
remained an "insider's-only" game.
This arrangement has served the Kremlin well. Building alliances with
leaders of dubious legitimacy seemed an ideal way to stem the "invasion of
Western influence" and its annoying imperative of free and fair elections.
Since the late 1990s, Russian-led observer delegations from the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) routinely approved of elections in CIS countries
which OSCE monitors criticized or damned with faint praise. In this way and
others, Moscow showed other CIS capitals that, unlike the United States,
Russia would not question their right to rule by hook or by crook and was a
reliable bulwark, unlike the preachy West.
Consequently, the democratic revolution which swept Georgia last year
horrified the leaders of other former Soviet republics. For the first time
in ex-Soviet space, opposition leaders united to mobilize a broad-based
protest movement that overturned the results of a rigged election. The
emergence of Mikheil Saakashvili, who led Georgia's Rose Revolution and was
subsequently elected president in a landslide, signaled more than the end of
Eduard Shevardnadze's corrupt, moribund regime: Mr. Saakashvili symbolized
the first popular revolt against the system of pseudo-democracy prevalent on
post-Soviet soil. What is now transpiring in Ukraine is the logical
continuation of what began last year in the Caucasus. And every successful
precedent emboldens opposition movements in other CIS
countries and gives hope to impoverished, frustrated and seemingly apathetic
publics, proving that real change is possible.
The picture of a victorious Viktor Yushchenko and Mikheil Saakashvili
ushering in a New Year in Kiev's Independence Square no doubt causes
angst in other CIS leaders, even as it inspires those living under
repressive regimes elsewhere in the region. In a telling twist, CIS election
observers for the first time criticized an election held in the former
Soviet Union, decrying the conduct of Ukraine's Dec. 26 repeat runoff
and questioning the legitimacy of the poll.
For the Kremlin, Georgia's Rose Revolution was bad enough; the Orange
Revolution in Ukraine is a nightmare. Apart from the stunning loss of face
suffered by Mr. Putin, who openly campaigned for pro-Russian candidate
Viktor Yanukovich, "People power" can no longer be dismissed as an anomaly
or a deviation possible only in small, unstable, atypical Georgia in the
wild Caucasus. Now, "fraternal" Slavs in large, European Ukraine also
insisted that elections be fair and reflect the voters' will. The
handwriting on the Kremlin wall is clear: Peaceful popular protests backed
by OSCE standards on elections can bring down entrenched corrupt regimes
that rely on vote fraud to remain in power.
Where will this contagion stop? A worried Moscow has responded by attacking
the OSCE. Russia, the other former Soviet states and all OSCE countries have
formally agreed that democracy, based on the will of the people expressed
regularly through free and fair elections, is the only acceptable form of
government for our nations. But with its alliance system in jeopardy, Russia
last July orchestrated a CIS assault on OSCE's "imbalanced" stress on
democracy and human rights, followed by a broadside in September against,
among other things, allegedly skewed OSCE standards on elections. (In
response, 106 human-rights advocates, mostly from CIS countries, issued a
sharp rebuttal to these attacks at the OSCE's main human- rights meeting of
the year held in October.)
Moscow is now threatening to paralyze the consensus-based OSCE if the
organization does not effectively revisit and dilute longstanding election
commitments, under the pretext of setting "minimum standards" by which to
judge whether elections are indeed free and fair. The Russians are also
pushing to de-emphasize human rights and democracy in the work of OSCE's
field missions in CIS states. Recognizing the power of the ideals behind
OSCE commitments that it signed up to, Russia appears determined to dilute
the democracy commitments that are at the very heart of the OSCE.
It is essential that the United States respond resolutely to this challenge,
insisting that there be no retreat from OSCE commitments and principles to
placate Mr. Putin, the patron saint of post-Soviet "managed" democracy.
Moscow may be intent on precipitating a crisis in the OSCE, or even
threatening its very existence. Nevertheless, having stood firm against
rigged elections in Ukraine, the United States and its democratic OSCE
partners should not be bullied into concessions. Watering down the
democracy content of the OSCE would not only undermine the organization's
raison d'etre, but undercut the very people struggling to be free. -30-
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rep. Christopher H. Smith, New Jersey Republican is chairman of
the U.S. Helsinki Commission.
==========================================================
13. STANDING WITH UKRAINE THE SUPPORT OF AMERICANS AT
EVERY LEVEL WILL HELP THE ORANGE REVOLUTION BLOSSOM
EDITORIAL: by Melanne Verveer
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Pittsburgh, PA, Wed, 12 Jan 2005
This week, as most Ukrainians celebrate the Christmas holidays according to
the Julian calendar, a traditional carol, "Nova Radist Stala" ("New Joy Has
Come"), will take on additional meaning. Its lyrics speak to the country's
long struggle for liberty: "God grant our motherland, Ukraine, freedom,
happiness and good fortune."
Those lyrics will be particularly meaningful this Christmastime as
Ukrainians chart their destiny as a free and democratic nation. Their recent
achievement was due to the courage, solidarity and spontaneous ingenuity of
the Ukrainian people in demanding and defending their rights. Whether the
Orange Revolution will succeed, depends primarily on the Ukrainian people
and their new government. The support of Americans remains critical.
About a year ago, a group of young Ukrainian women who were active in
nongovernmental organizations was in Washington through a program supported
by the U.S. government and sponsored by Open World and the Vital Voices
Global Partnership. They were eager to sharpen their leadership skills to
support their country's nascent democracy and to tackle some of its tough
challenges, like the HIV/AIDS epidemic and human trafficking. One evening
the women gathered in my home and in the spirit of the season sang Ukrainian
carols, including "Nova Radist Stala."
They could not have imagined that a year later many of them would be in the
frozen streets around Independence Square in Kiev, joined by tens of
thousands of their fellow citizens to protest massive voter fraud and to
reclaim their own votes and their country. One of the women, Elena, wrote in
an e-mail after the election that "the Ukrainian nation was born in these
days when the best national traits of the people shone through."
The United States stood with Ukraine through its 13 years of independence,
when its government was often hostile to reform and its civil society seemed
hopelessly feeble. Journalists were murdered; the opposition was threatened
and corruption and cronyism seemed to rule in place of the rule of law.
Lyudmila, one of the other women in the group, wrote: "In the past many in
power have done much to destroy the possibility of true democracy ... many
Ukrainians have been placed on the edge of survival, and in such situations,
politics is the last thing on people's minds. Yet the response to the
election demonstrates that in Ukraine, a healthy moral spirit and pursuit of
freedom dominate." The civil society that manifested itself in Independence
Square will be as important to fulfill the aspirations of the people for
their new government as it was in bringing a new government to power.
For our part, the United States needs to help Ukraine to consolidate its
democratic and economic reforms. The U.S. government at the highest levels
should establish good relations with Ukraine's new leaders. U.S. assistance
has been declining in recent years from the highs of the 1990s. When the
Ukrainian people have staked their hopes on a new democratic government to
improve their lives, we must not let them down by doing less than we did
when their political leaders were less committed to democratic and economic
reforms.
Although Ukraine's economy has improved in recent years, many live on the
margins of society. Ukraine has one of the worst human trafficking problems
of any country in Europe. Desperate for jobs and enticed by the prospect of
work in the West, thousands of Ukrainians find themselves instead trafficked
into sexual exploitation and other forced labor by organized criminals, who
are often abetted by corrupt government officials. Instead of procuring good
jobs, Ukrainians are trafficked into modern-day slavery.
It will be imperative for the new government to promote business
development. Investment in Ukraine has too often been impeded by suffocating
regulations and corrupt practices, like bribery. A strong market economy
will be one of the surest ways to grow a middle class in Ukraine. The United
States can help the new government to establish the rules and practices to
attract greater investment to Ukraine.
The United States must -- where appropriate -- continue to help Ukrainians
move their democracy forward. Making their government more democratic,
professional and honest will not be easy. Nor will progress toward a true
market economy. The U.S. government and nongovernmental organizations
should respond energetically to requests for training in the skills that
will continue to be required.
If we do, we will help the citizens of Ukraine realize the fullness of "the
new joy" that "has come." -30-
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Melanne Verveer, a second-generation Ukrainian American, is chair of the
Vital Voices Global Partnership (melanneverveer@VitalVoices.org). She
served in the White House as chief of staff to first lady Hillary Clinton.
==========================================================
14. "UKRAINE, RUSSIA START ANEW"
ANALYSIS: By Peter Lavelle
United Press International, Moscow, Russia, Tue, Jan 11, 2005
MOSCOW - The official announcement of Viktor Yushchenko's victory in
Ukraine's protracted presidential elections on Tuesday is set to transform
not only Ukraine's foreign policy, but also that of Russia's. Far from the
Cold War rhetoric describing Ukraine's desire to break from Russia's
"neo-imperialist grip," both Russia and Ukraine stand to gain from a new,
pragmatic and modern relationship.
Yushchenko is often described as "pro-western, pro-European, and a
reformist" politician. Indeed, all of these appellations maybe appropriate,
but more than anything else he is "pro-Ukraine." Being interested in his own
country's fate first and foremost and representing the democratic hopes
expressed by the majority of Ukraine's voters, Yushchenko has an
unprecedented opportunity to finally establish Ukraine's rightful place
between Europe and the post-Soviet space. Hence forth, Ukraine will not be
ignored by Europe or be a client state of Russia. Yushchenko's victory has
fundamentally changed Ukraine, Russia and Europe. It is also a change that
benefits all three.
Ukraine's protracted political crisis -- ending on Tuesday with Yushchenko's
victory -- has always been about the choice of either continuing the corrupt
regime of outgoing President Leonid Kuchma, through his handpicked successor
Viktor Yanukovych, or the hope of change. This hope for change not only
included a demand for greater economic opportunities and transparent and
accountable government institutions, but also a call for Ukraine to find its
rightful place in the world.
For the past two months, Ukraine's political crisis was been described as a
disaster for Russia and Russian President Vladimir Putin. From a public
relations vantage point, the Kremlin found itself scrambling after its
candidate Yanukovych faltered. During and after Ukraine's elections, both
the West and Russia entered into a senseless war of words as to who
"meddled" more in Ukraine's domestic affairs. During all the squabbling, it
has been overlooked that the Ukrainians have been less interested in
outside interference than they have been in a Ukraine that determines
its own foreign policy.
Yushchenko's victory is not a disaster for Russia or Putin -- it's an
opportunity. The error the Kremlin made in Ukraine's elections was to
support a candidate and not the democratic process. By supporting
Yanukovych, the Kremlin backed much of which it is against at home --
corrupt oligarchic capitalism able to purchase the powers of the state.
Yanukovych ran in a platform orientated to what he claimed was in the
Kremlin's interests. However, his platform would have most likely kept
Ukraine corrupt, weak and divided and a geopolitical non-entity. The Kremlin
most likely would have found a close ally in Yanukovych. However, would
such an ally running a corrupt regime be a reliable partner? Considering
Yanukovych's very close association with Ukraine's oligarchs in the
country's south and east, the answer to this question is self-evident.
Yushchenko's victory is an opportunity in many ways for Russia. Instead of
granting special economic favors to Ukraine to secure a political outcome,
as was the case of promising Yanukovych a cheap supply of natural gas,
negotiating bilateral economic relations on the basis of mutual
self-interest is far more efficient and reliable. This kind of negotiation
would create a modern and reliable partner Russia needs on its border.
Fighting oligarchic capitalism is an issue that Putin and Yushchenko have in
common. When Yushchenko starts taking on Ukraine's oligarchs, there is
little doubt he will receive much criticism from Putin. Much of Ukraine's
trade with Russia is in the hands of oligarchs on the Ukrainian side. Both
Putin and Yushchenko have an interest in seeing inefficient and corrupt
control of bilateral trade come to an end. Taming these oligarchs will bring
Ukraine and Russia closer together -- not the divorce so many in the West
hope for.
Yushchenko's desire to integrate Ukraine into European institutions and
organizations is also an opportunity for Russia. With so much of Ukraine's
economy and energy needs intermingled with Russia's, Ukraine's engagement
of the West simply cannot be a rejection of Russia. Of necessity, Ukraine
and Russia together will have to engage the West.
Russia and Ukraine have a long history together. Both peoples have close
cultural and traditional bonds. However, calling Russia "big brother" and
Ukraine "little brother" no longer has any meaning (if it ever had). Russia
and Ukraine are not in need of "brothers" when democratic institutions and
mutually advantageous trade relations are available.
As the post-Soviet space continues to change and evolve and in light of
Ukraine's recent transition, the Kremlin may now shake up its foreign policy
establishment and reconsider how Russia should define its geopolitical
interests. A lot should be learned from Ukraine's recent political crisis.
Russia has not lost Ukraine, though it is poised to get a partner the
Kremlin can count on. -30-
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Peter Lavelle is an independent Moscow-based analyst and the author
of Untimely Thoughts, an electronic newsletter on Russia at
www.untimely-thoughts.com.
==========================================================
15. "VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO'S AGENDA"
ANALYSIS: By Peter Lavelle
United Press International, Moscow, Russia, Tue, Jan 11, 2005
MOSCOW - It took three elections, weeks of street demonstrations in Kiev,
a war of words traded by the West and Russia claiming outside "meddling" in
Ukraine's internal affairs, and a still unexplained case of poisoning to
have Viktor Yushchenko finally declared president-elect of Ukraine Tuesday.
However, Yushchenko's quest to change Ukraine has only just begun. He has
roughly 14 months before Ukraine's next parliamentary elections to complete
the "Orange Revolution."
Ukraine's election commission, after reviewing voting complaints from
regime-supported candidate Viktor Yanukovych, ruled Tuesday that Viktor
Yushchenko the winner of the extraordinary third presidential election of
Dec. 26. Ukraine's two-month political crisis has come to end with a
dramatic democratic advance for the "Orange Revolution." Having attained the
presidency, Yushchenko now faces a number of challenges to institutionalize
the "people's revolution."
The next 14 months will determine if the "Orange Revolution" is only a
reshuffle of oligarchic elites or a fundamental change how Ukraine is ruled.
Being only able to count on a highly fissiparous coalition of political
forces and inheriting a weakened presidency, Yushchenko will have to embark
on a set of serious economic reforms, appeal to the eastern and southern
regions that overwhelmingly voted for his opponent as well as re-engage
Russia in a way that recasts Kiev-Moscow relations. This agenda is not a
mission impossible, but the forces of "reaction" still have opportunities to
challenge Yushchenko on many fronts.
Ukraine will hold parliamentary elections in March 2006 and Yushchenko has
already promised Ukrainians change for the better before then. In the
meantime, Yushchenko will see much of the power his presidency passed to an
empowered Parliament, with Parliament determining who will hold the powerful
and independent post of prime minister. For the opposition to get the
presidency in a fair and honest vote, it had to compromise with out-going
President Leonid Kuchma. It was this compromise that will make Yushchenko's
first year in office his most difficult and define the rest of his term.
Yushchenko will assume office in a country controlled by oligarchic
capitalism. Not only do a small number of extraordinarily wealthy business
clans control most of Ukraine's economy, but they grew accustomed to
tremendous access to political power under Kuchma. As unpopular as Russian
President Vladimir Putin has become in the West for his assault against
Russia's oligarchs, Yushchenko has little choice but to do the same against
Ukraine's oligarchs.
No one should be surprised if Yushchenko very soon singles out one oligarch
to reverse a number of illegal privatizations under Kuchma as an example for
other oligarchs of what is to come. Yushchenko's drive against the oligarchs
will surely be tested when he eventually has to deal with one of his key
supporters -- billionaire oligarch Yulia Timoshenko.
Yushchenko's drive to expel oligarchs from direct influence in politics will
be harder than what Putin has had to face. Most of Ukraine's oligarchic
clans hail from the country's more prosperous (with large Russian ethnic
minorities) east and south, where Yanukovych, now in political opposition,
continues to be very popular.
Ukraine's east and south to date has shown little interest in Yushchenko or
the "Orange Revolution." This is probably Yushchenko's great challenge and
dilemma. He needs to tame oligarchs who are not unpopular in the country's
regions where he has the least appeal. However, as unlikely as it may appear
at first blush, his counterpart in the Kremlin may become a helpful
Yushchenko ally when approaching this dilemma.
The success of Yushchenko's first year in office and before the next
parliamentary election will most likely hinge on how well Yushchenko and
Putin can recast Ukrainian-Russian relations. Both have much to gain, if
both have the political will to make this happen. Yushchenko has already
taken the first step -- he has announced his first state visit will be to
Russia. Putin has pragmatically responded to this overture, claiming he is
willing to work with whoever is Ukraine's president.
Both Yushchenko and Putin have legitimate interests in eastern and southern
Ukraine. These are the regions that make up the Ukraine's industrial base
and at the center of country's all-important trading ties with Russia. These
are also regions where many ethnic Russians live and work. Ukraine's eastern
and southern oligarchs are far more dependent on Moscow than they are on
Kiev. This is where Putin and Yushchenko can find common cause.
Yushchenko needs a unified country with a dynamic economy no longer
controlled by oligarchs to fulfill the promise of the "Orange Revolution."
Russia needs a stable Ukraine and a reliable trading partner. For this
"win-win" relationship to become a reality, Yushchenko and Putin need to
help each other.
Yushchenko must assure Putin that Ukraine's relationship with Russia is
special, but pragmatic. Ukraine's interest in entering Western organizations
and structures should complement Ukraine's relationship with Russia -- not
work against it.
Putin's part of this bargain is to inform Ukraine's eastern and western
oligarchs that economic engagement with Russia will hence forth be
transparent and for the benefit of both Ukraine and Russia -- and not for
personal aggrandizement of a small group of clans. Putin's treatment of
Ukraine's oligarchs should be no different from his handling of Russia's
oligarchs.
Over the next 14 months, Yushchenko has to produce a "New Deal" for
all Ukrainians and elect a solid majority in Parliament to institutionalize
the "Orange Revolution." To do this, he has to remain focused on what ails
Ukraine the most -- oligarchic capitalism. If Yushchenko can do this, he
just might find a friend in Vladimir Putin. -30-
==========================================================
16. WILL MP VIKTOR KOROL BECOME A MINISTER?
Ukrainian paper looks at possible law-enforcement appointments
By Oleksandr Korchynskyy
Segodnya newspaper, Kiev, Ukraine, in Russian 12 Jan 05; p 4
BBC Monitoring, UK, in English, Wed, January 12, 2005
Acting Prime Minister Mykola Azarov is likely to preserve some of his
clout after opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko takes power following his
presidential election victory, a progovernment daily has said. According to
it, MP Viktor Korol, who was Azarov's deputy when he headed the State Tax
Administration, is likely to become interior minister, and another former
deputy, Svyatoslav Piskun, is likely to remain prosecutor-general. The paper
added that Security Service head Ihor Smeshko may keep his post or be
replaced by his adviser Oleksandr Skybynetskyy.
The following is the text of the article by Oleksandr Korchynskyy, published
in the Ukrainian newspaper Segodnya on 12 January under the title "Will
Korol become a minister?"; subheadings have been inserted editorially:
Both supporters and opponents of Mykola Bilokon agree that the probability
of his returning from leave to the post of interior minister is nearly nil.
But, if not Bilokon, who [will become the next interior minister]? Many
experts say it will be Viktor Korol.
Mr Korol is currently an MP in [key ally of winning presidential candidate
Viktor Yushchenko] Petro Poroshenko's Solidarity group, which is part of
[Yushchenko-led bloc] Our Ukraine. He spent many years in police service.
As the country's criminal investigations chief, he presided over the
crushing of the infamous White Brotherhood sect. He found and detained
[Yuriy] Kryvonohov, an associate of Mariya Devi Khristos [White
Brotherhood leader].
Later, he became deputy minister for field operations and successfully
headed the investigation of the crimes committed by manic serial killer
Anatoliy Onopriyenko, as well as his capture. However, soon afterwards he
quit the post and left the Interior Ministry altogether.
POSSIBLE FUTURE INTERIOR MINISTER'S TIES WITH ACTING
PRIME MINISTER, OPPOSITION MP
Starting from 1996, Viktor Korol and Mykola Azarov [currently acting prime
minister] created from scratch the tax administration and its enforcement
division, the tax police. From the very start, Korol was Azarov's first
deputy and head of the tax police.
After promotion to the rank of lieutenant-general, he unexpectedly decided
to alter his life drastically and become an MP. Rumours had it that he
remained on good terms with Mykola Azarov.
As far as his relations with Petro Poroshenko are concerned, it seems they
were only getting better as time went by. At any rate, they have been seen
together for a long time since Korol worked at the tax administration.
PROSECUTOR-GENERAL'S OFFICE
About the Prosecutor-General's Office. Experts say that [Prosecutor-General]
Svyatoslav Piskun's team stand a fairly good chance of staying in the high
office in Reznytska Street. They say the future authorities gave a green
light for this when Mr Piskun was reinstated to the post [in December 2004].
Some steps by Piskun's team are evidence of this too: the seeming warming of
relations with [prominent opposition MP] Yuliya Tymoshenko, the opening of
hundreds of criminal investigations into election fraud, etc.
It is interesting to note that Piskun, like Korol, started out at the tax
administration (tax police) when it was headed by Azarov. For several years,
he headed the investigations directorate of the State Tax Administration of
Ukraine. Then, in May-July 2002, he became deputy State Tax Administration
chief, keeping the post of investigations directorate head. And - became
prosecutor-general.
If we imagine that Petro Poroshenko is prime minister, Piskun is
prosecutor-general and Korol is interior minister, two things emerge which
all these individuals have in common. First, they all are very decent people
who do not forget those who did them favours. Second, Mykola Azarov has
done them a lot of favours.
SECURITY SERVICE
As regards the Security Service of Ukraine, experts name two people who may
become its head: its current chairman Ihor Smeshko and his nonpaid adviser,
the head of the fund for supporting Ukraine's national security, Oleksandr
Skybynetskyy.
Smeshko's chances are boosted by the Security Service's position during the
orange revolution, when it said it would counter any unlawful actions,
including those by the authorities. Against him are rumours - which have not
been dispelled yet - that Yushchenko was poisoned at a meeting with Smeshko
and his (then) first deputy, Volodymyr Satsyuk.
Lt-Gen Oleksandr Skybynetskyy also used to be the first deputy of a Security
Service head (Volodymyr Radchenko). It should be recalled that it was
Skybynetskyy who on behalf of the Security Service of Ukraine read out a
statement on its position [at an opposition rally] in Independence Square
[in Kiev]. -30- [The Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
==========================================================
17. CLUB OF ETHNIC MUSIC IN KYIV
A Project: Moya Ukrayina. Bervy
Club Of Ethnic Music in Kyiv, Kyiv, Ukraine, January, 2005
KYIV - The Club of Ethnic Music unites like-minded people,
enthusiasts and cognoscenti of Ukrainian tradition culture which
is thousands of years old and which now should become the basis
for the Ukrainian culture of our times.
We believe that traditional folk music is a key to understanding
Ukrainian folk art, folk architecture, pottery, embroidery and
poetry; within it, we can find the primordial meta-tounge which
our ancestors used to talk to Nature and to the world around
them.
Members of the Club of Ethnic Music are entitled to ordering
CDs from the Club catalogue at special Club prices; being
updated on all Moya Ukrayina. Bervy events and new releases;
being invited to all the Moya Ukrayina. Bervy functions and
presentations; and taking part in folklore-collection expeditions
organized within the Moya Ukrayina. Bervy project.
Among the CDs already released you can find:
1. BERVY - Ukrainian traditional folklore
2. NAD RICHKOYU KARAYTSEM - (At the River Karayets) -
Ukrainian traditional folklore from the Land of Podillya
3. HEY, NA CHORNOMY MORI - (Hey, on the Black Sea) -
music of Kobzar-lyrical tradition. Mykola Budnyk plays the bandura.
4. ZELENY shum POLISSYA - (The Green Noise of the Land of
Polissya) -- Ukrainian traditional folklore form the Land of Polissya.
5. TARAS KOMPANICHENKO. Narodna bandura, lira - Taras
Kompanichenko plays the folk instruments - bandura and lira in the
Kobzar-lyrical tradition.
6. UKRAYINSKA epichna tradytsiya - Heroic epos of the Ukrainian
people.
CDs soon to be released are:
1. KARPATY - traditional folklore of the Carpathians
2. UKRAYINSKE vesillya - Ukrainian Wedding
3. KOLYSKOVI - Lullabies
Visit our website, www.ukrfolk.kiev.ua for more information. -30-
==========================================================
"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT"
ARTICLES ARE FOR PERSONAL AND ACADEMIC USE ONLY
Articles are Distributed For Information, Research, Education
Discussion and Personal Purposes Only
=========================================================
Ukraine Information Website: http://www.ArtUkraine.com
=========================================================
"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT" - SPONSORS
"Working to Secure Ukraine's Future"
1. THE BLEYZER FOUNDATION, Dr. Edilberto Segura, Chairman;
Victor Gekker, Executive Director, Kyiv, Ukraine; Washington, D.C.,
http://www.bleyzerfoundation.com.
2. BAHRIANY FOUNDATION, INC., Dr. Anatol Lysyj, Chairman,
Minneapolis, Minnesota,
3. KIEV-ATLANTIC GROUP, David and Tamara Sweere, Daniel
Sweere, Kyiv and Myronivka, Ukraine, 380 44 295 7275 in Kyiv.
4. ODUM- Association of American Youth of Ukrainian Descent,
Minnesota Chapter, Natalia Yarr, Chairperson.
5. ACTION UKRAINE COALITION: Washington, D.C.,
A. UKRAINIAN FEDERATION OF AMERICA (UFA),
Zenia Chernyk, Chairperson; Vera M. Andryczyk, President;
Huntingdon Valley, Pennsylvania.
B. UKRAINIAN AMERICAN COORDINATING COUNCIL,
(UACC), Ihor Gawdiak, President, Washington, D.C., New York, NY
C. U.S.-UKRAINE FOUNDATION (USUF), Nadia Komarnyckyj
McConnell, President, Washington, D.C., Kyiv, Ukraine.
6. UKRAINE-U.S. BUSINESS COUNCIL, Kempton Jenkins,
President, Washington, D.C.
========================================================
"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT" is an in-depth news and
analysis international newsletter, produced as a public service by the
www.ArtUkraine.com Information Service and The Action Ukraine
Report Monitoring Service The report is distributed around the world
FREE of charge using the e-mail address: ArtUkraine.com@starpower.net.
If you would like to read "THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT" please
send your name, country of residence, and e-mail contact information to
morganw@patriot.net. Additional names are welcome. If you do not wish to
read "THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT" around five times per
week, let us know by e-mail to morganw@patriot.net.
========================================================
PUBLISHER AND EDITOR
Mr. E. Morgan Williams, Director, Government Affairs
Washington Office, SigmaBleyzer Investment Banking Group
P.O. Box 2607, Washington, D.C. 20013, morganw@patriot.net
Mobile in Kyiv: (3) 8 050 689 2874; www.SigmaBleyzer.com
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senior Advisor; Ukrainian Federation of America (UFA)
Coordinator, Action Ukraine Coalition (AUC)
Senior Advisor, U.S.-Ukraine Foundation (USUF)
Advisor, Ukraine-U.S. Business Council, Washington, D.C.
Publisher, Ukraine Information Website, www.ArtUkraine.com
========================================================