"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT"
An International Newsletter
In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis, and Commentary
"The Art of Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion,
Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World"
GREETINGS FROM KYIV, UKRAINE
The glorious city is smiling and holding her head high and proud
KYIV IS THE PLACE TO BE THIS WEEK!
Get your tickets and suitcase and leave for Kyiv now.
PARTICIPATE IN THE INAUGURAL AND CELEBRATIONS
Most Likely Saturday, January 22 and Sunday, January 23
DON'T MISS THIS HISTORIC AND PROUD MOMENT IN HISTORY
WHEN VIKTOR ANDRIYOVICH YUSHCHENKO BECOMES PRESIDENT
KATERYNA CHUMACHENKO YUSHCHENKO BECOMES FIRST LADY
DROP EVERYTHING AND COME TO KYIV!
"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT" - Number 410
morganw@patriot.net, ArtUkraine.com@starpower.net
FROM: KYIV, UKRAINE, MONDAY, JANUARY 17, 2005
-----INDEX OF ARTICLES-----
"Major International News Headlines and Articles"
1. KATERYNA YUSHCHENKO - A BRIDGE TO THE WEST
By Askold Krushelnycky, Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)
Prague, Czech Republic, Friday, January 14, 2005
2. UKRAINE: CAPITAL ON THE CUSP
In Kiev, city of constant change, Soviet grey has been eclipsed by
revolutionary orange. Now's the time to go, says Andrew Evans.
By Andrew Evans, Telegraph, London, UK, Saturday, Jan 15, 2005
3. UKRAINE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION SAGA TO END AMID
DEJA VU, OPPOSITION TENSIONS
Agency France Presse (AFP), Kiev, Ukraine, Sunday, Jan 16, 2005
4. EU MAY SOON ANNOUNCE UKRAINE A MARKET
ECONOMY COUNTRY
Itar-Tass, Paris, France, Sunday, January 16, 2005
5. CHARISMATIC TYMOSHENKO SAYS SHE WILL BE UKRAINE PM
By Ron Popeski, Reuters, Kiev, Ukraine, Sat, January 15, 2005
6. "TYMOSHENKO FOR PRIME MINISTER"
COMMENTARY: By Bishop Paul Peter Jesep
The Action Ukraine Report, Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, Jan 17, 2005
7. UKRAINE'S SUPREME COURT SAID TO REJECT MOST OF
EX-PREMIER'S COMPLAINT
One Plus One TV, Kiev, in Ukrainian 15 Jan 05
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Sat, January 15, 2005
8. RUSSIA BREAKS ICE WITH RELUCTANT OLIVE BRANCH
TO UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT
Daniel McLaughlin in Budapest, Irish Times, Ireland, Friday, Jan 14, 2005
9. PUTIN TIGHTENS SCREWS AS, IN UKRAINE, EX-SOVIETS BOLT
COMMENTARY: By Sabra Ayres, Atlanta Journal-Constitution
Atlanta, Georgia, Sunday, January 16, 2005
10. RUSSIAN MP DEFENDS UKRAINE "REVOLUTION"
Ekho Moskvy radio, Moscow, in Russian, 14 Jan 05
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Friday, January 14, 2005
11. UKRAINE -- BETWEEN REGIMES: THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN INTERNAL & EXTERNAL FACTORS
By James Sherr, Fellow, Conflict Studies Research Centre,
Defence Academy of the United Kingdom
Zerkalo Nedeli, Kyiv, Ukraine, Sat., 15 January, 2005
12. WAS THE GAME WORTH THE COST?
It's Hard To Pick a Clean Winner in Ukraine
Gennady Petrov, Russia Profile, Moscow, Russia, Fri, Jan 14, 2005
==========================================================
1. UKRAINE: KATERYNA YUSHCHENKO - A BRIDGE TO THE WEST
By Askold Krushelnycky, Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)
Prague, Czech Republic, Friday, January 14, 2005
Ukraine looks set to turn its gaze westward under new President-elect Viktor
Yushchenko. But few people appear more capable of bridging Ukraine's
cultural and geographic divide than Yushchenko's wife, Kateryna. The
daughter of a Ukrainian emigre family, she was brought up in the bustling
city of Chicago in the heart of the American Midwest. Ukraine's future first
lady recently sat down for an interview with RFE/RL in a Kyiv restaurant
where staff had prepared free meals for some of the thousands of
participants in the recent "Orange Revolution."
KYIV, 14 January 2005 (RFE/RL) -- The past year has been a mix of nightmare
and dream-come-true for Kateryna Yushchenko, the U.S.-born wife of the man
set to become president of Ukraine.
Yushchenko watched as her husband Viktor was poisoned and disfigured --
allegedly by his political enemies. But in 2004, she also gave birth to her
third child and saw Ukraine -- the country her emigre parents taught her to
love -- toss out an unwanted regime.
Kateryna Chumachenko was born in 1961 in Chicago. Nazis had snatched her
parents in Ukraine during World War II and sent them to Germany to work as
slave laborers. Her father, an electrician, and her seamstress mother
married in Germany and stayed until emigrating to America in 1956.
Like hundreds of thousands of other Ukrainians forced from their families
and homes by the war and prevented from returning by the Cold War,
Yushchenko's parents longed for Ukraine's independence and wanted their
children to know about their native land.
"I had to blend two lives: American schools and American education and many
American friends; and at the same time, at home, we spoke Ukrainian, we held
to many Ukrainian traditions. I attended a Ukrainian Saturday school with
Ukrainian language. I would go to Ukrainian churches. I attended Ukrainian
dance classes."
"I was a child typical of one of the diaspora," Kateryna Yushchenko told
RFE/RL. "I had to blend two lives: American schools and American education
and many American friends; and at the same time, at home, we spoke
Ukrainian, we held to many Ukrainian traditions. I attended a Ukrainian
Saturday school with Ukrainian language. I would go to Ukrainian churches. I
attended Ukrainian dance classes."
She went to school in the Chicago area and on to Georgetown University in
Washington.
From 1982 to 1986, Yushchenko did lobbying for a Ukrainian diaspora
organization in Washington and returned to college to earn a master's degree
in business administration from the University of Chicago.
During former U.S. President Ronald Reagan's second term, she worked on
Eastern European ethnic affairs in the White House as well as at the human
rights office of the State Department.
Along the way, Yushchenko dreamed of going to Ukraine.
That finally happened in 1991, when she began to work for a U.S. aid group
in Ukraine. And in 1993, she accompanied a group of Ukrainian bankers to
America to learn about Western financial systems. A man named Viktor
Yushchenko, at the time the head of the Ukrainian national bank, headed that
delegation.
"Viktor says he always remembers that first conversation because he called
me prickly as a porcupine," she recalled. "I did not know much about him at
the time and I assumed that if he was a banker in the Soviet system that he
must not be very free-market oriented, and so I decided I was going to teach
him what free markets are all about. And after I realized he knew much more
than I expected, and that he was indeed very free-market oriented and
open-minded about western economies, very interested in learning about
western economies."
They kept in contact, she said, but romance did not begin until years later.
In 1998, they finally married and now have three children -- two girls, and
a boy born last spring. She said they share interests including the theater,
movies, museums, and a fascination with Ukraine's culture and history.
Political opponents have accused her of being an agent for the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), and influencing her husband. Yushchenko has
dismissed the allegations as ridiculous and said her husband hates to talk
about politics at home.
"I've understood that my role as the keeper of the family and the keeper of
peace at home and a warm family environment is very important to him being
a strong political leader, because he is the type of person who needs that
home atmosphere, that peace at home, to keep strong at work," she said.
In September, Viktor Yushchenko nearly died after being poisoned with a
chemical Austrian doctors identified as dioxin. The poisoning kept him in
hospital for nearly a month and badly disfigured his face.
Yushchenko said her husband's recovery was helped by the hundreds of
thousands of people who rallied to his support in the streets of Kyiv.
She also said that when what was supposed to have been the decisive round
of elections on 21 November proved fraudulent, her husband never doubted
Ukrainians would refuse to accept the result.
"He said, 'I am absolutely sure. I know that people have had enough and
they're going to demand change and they're not going to stand for what
happened.' And I wasn't sure if he was right. And then when hundreds of
thousands of people came out, I realized he was right and he just smiled and
said, 'I told you the people were ready,'" she said.
The protests turned into the "Orange Revolution." A repeat of the second
round polls was held and Yushchenko defeated his rival, former Prime
Minister Viktor Yanukovych, on 26 December.
Yushchenko said she is hoping her sister and mother, who live in the United
States, will attend her husband's inauguration. She also said she wants to
encourage people from the diaspora to return to Ukraine and help develop
the country with their skills and investment.
On 10 January, Viktor Yushchenko was officially declared the winner of the
presidential runoff vote. But cannot be inaugurated until Yanukovych's
appeals to the Supreme Court for the election result to be thrown out have
been exhausted.
Yanukovych, whose previous appeals have been rejected, filed another
appeal today. -30- [The Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
==========================================================
2. UKRAINE: CAPITAL ON THE CUSP
In Kiev, city of constant change, Soviet grey has been eclipsed by
revolutionary orange. Now's the time to go, says Andrew Evans.
By Andrew Evans, Telegraph, London, UK, Saturday, Jan 15, 2005
The Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in Kiev has the air of a
ballroom the morning after New Year's Eve. Remnants of orange banners still
flutter from the surrounding buildings and the protesters turned partygoers
turn back and forth across the square, savouring the moment that's just
passed and looking forward to what's to come.
In Soviet times, the Maidan - known as the Square of the October
Revolution - was a public space of Stalinist proportions. These days it's
full of chic clothes shops and backlit advertisements reminiscent of those
in Times Square or Piccadilly Circus. It's also the place where, last
November, a million Ukrainians gathered to protest over the falsified
results of the country's presidential elections - a massive show of people
power that forced a new vote and resulted in the election of the progressive
politician Viktor Yushchenko as president.
Mr Yushchenko's victory heralds a new chapter in Ukrainian history. Just as
Berlin and Prague were the places to visit in the wake of the momentous
events of 1989, so Kiev offers something special this year: a genuine taste
of transformation.
And how things have changed. When I first visited a decade ago, my first
impressions were stark: everything was broken and the shattered streetlights
left the city in total darkness by 4 pm. The only foreign travellers were
missionaries, nostalgic émigrés and men who had come to collect their
mail-order Ukrainian brides.
Years later I returned as a NATO consultant and discovered the world's
slowest customs line had grown longer with greenhorn journalists, a few NGO
types and a corps of fatigued diplomats. They grew to love Ukraine but to
hate the frustration that came from life in a capital that was then ruled by
corruption and inefficiency.
More recently in Kiev - this time as a guidebook writer - I follow a sleek
and just-paved motorway from the shiny new airport into a city transformed.
And this time I encounter an advance guard of adventurous tourists.
In the early-morning winter fog, the Kiev skyline remains bleak: a sea of
undefined grey shapes. The silhouettes only come to life when I venture
outside to discover a wildly eclectic urban landscape. I parade alone down
the city's main street, the Khreschatyk, slightly intimidated by the
Stalinist tower blocks on either side, but intrigued by tantalising glimpses
of hidden treasures from narrow side streets. A wander unveils colourful
Tsarist palaces and ancient Byzantine chapels next to glass-sided banks and
magnificent concrete shopping malls. Kiev's landmark cathedrals punctuate
the sky with golden domes.
Two of the finest are St Sophia's, built in 1037, and the Monastery of St
Mikhayil, rebuilt in 2001 following its demolition in the 1930s under the
orders of Stalin. But the city's number one attraction is the Caves
Monastery. Ten years ago it was a pile of frescoed rubble: today it is an
exquisite compound on the steep bank of the Dnepr that beckons Orthodox
pilgrims and tourists to its underground labyrinths and glorious baroque
churches.
Resurrection is no new concept for Ukraine. In the 16 centuries since it was
founded, Kiev has been blown up, ransacked, burnt down, flooded, shelled and
occupied so many times that historians have lost count. Street names change
so frequently that Kievans are known to keep their old street signs in case
the new names don't stick. Political upheaval may come and go, but Kiev
thrives on change.
I wander past the city's most ancient ruins and come to Andriyivsky Uzviz, a
winding cobblestone street descending a hill where, according to legend, St
Andrew the apostle fixed a cross in the ground. Kiev's citizens waited
until the 10th century to adopt Christianity, then rid themselves of the old
guard by dragging their pagan idols down the hill and tossing them into
the Dnepr.
Once I've pushed past the gaudy souvenir stalls stocked with phoney Soviet
paraphernalia, I find myself in the heart of Kiev's flourishing art scene,
where a penchant for the avant-garde keeps upmarket galleries in business
and experimental theatres full. I stop to admire the works of a homesick
Ukrainian painter who recently moved back to Kiev from London and am
tempted to part with all the money I have.
Right next door is the childhood home of Mikhail Bulgakov, author of The
Master and Margarita. And at the bottom of Andriyivsky Uzviz there is an
impromptu antique market where 19th-century treasures are sold amid
wooden icons and oil paintings of Soviet generals. Here, the upper city
meets Podil - once the quarter for poor merchants and Jews, but currently
undergoing a facelift as Kiev's trendiest neighbourhood.
The clang of Kiev's construction sites adds a beat to the post-revolution
noise that plays across the city round the clock. Even when it's well past
midnight and well below zero outside, I find myself being dragged to Moda
Bar - an old Soviet river barge that has morphed into an outlandish
four-storey, floating nightclub. Expert bartenders juggle giant bottles of
vodka while a British DJ mixes brain-thumping tracks. My path towards
morning takes me to similar clubs with names such as Opium, and basement
bars hosting improvised jazz sessions. The writhing crowds are more
Ukrainian than expat - an uninhibited generation of revolutionaries that
suddenly feel it's cool to be Ukrainian.
Maybe it is cool. The Beatles thought so years ago: "The Ukraine girls
really knock me out...". All around me I see posters of Ruslana Lyzhichko,
the singer who gained top spot for the country in the 2004 Eurovision Song
Contest in Istanbul.
Thanks to Ruslana's wild dancing, Kiev will stage this year's Eurovision
Song Contest, an event that will be remembered as the city's coming-out
party (wear orange). Kievans are eager to impress the rest of Europe:
they've switched to a more pro-Europe government and planned the party for
the end of May, when the chestnut trees explode into white blossoms and the
capital looks angelic.
Some Ukrainians fear Kiev will not survive the transition, but they're
handling commercialism with aplomb. Kiev's dozen or so McDonald's are
packed, but a competing chain sells great Ukrainian fast food in just as
many locations.
The country is changing faster than I can keep up with. As a traveller, I'm
grateful for each new moment I experience in this city - it feels like an
altered place every time I come. I know few destinations that match Kiev's
uncontrived spirit or offer the thrill one feels now in this unfettered
European capital. You may have missed the revolution, but the celebration is
just getting started.
KIEV BASICS:
GETTING THERE
British Airways (0870 850 9850, www.ba.com) flies daily from Heathrow to
Kiev (Borispol) from £228 return, including taxes and internet discount.
Regent Holidays (0117 921 1711, www.regent-holidays.co.uk) offers a
three-night break in Kiev with return flight from Gatwick from £299 per
person, based on two sharing.
WHERE TO STAY
Forget the Soviet legacy of poor hospitality: Kiev’s most recently
refurbished hotels continue to outdo one another in luxury and extravagance.
Don’t expect a cheap night’s rest, either. As in many other places in
Europe, good taste does not come cheap in Kiev. Prices below are for one
night in a double room. £225 Premier Palace (00380 44 244 1200,
www.premier-palace.com). Kiev’s very best has a flair for sophisticated
service reminiscent of the Tsarist era. Popular with diplomats and business
travellers. £145 Dnipro Hotel (00380 44 254 6777, www.dniprohotel.kiev.ua).
A fanciful reincarnation of 1960s Socialist magnificence with smallish
rooms, a great view of the Left Bank, and a garish nightclub open all night,
every night. £140 Domus (00380 44 490 9008, www.domus-hotel.kiev.ua).
A quieter and more intimate alternative in the historic neighbourhood of
Podil. £90 Rus (00380 44 256 4000, www.hotelrus.kiev.ua). Kiev’s most
user-friendly hotel, with hundreds of clean and orderly rooms. Good for
groups. £75 Lybid (00380 44 236 0063, www.hotellybid.com.ua).
Tourist-friendly.
WHERE TO EAT
Lypsky Osobnyak (00380 44 254 0090). This gourmet establisment takes
Ukraine’s native fare to baroque levels. Beautiful 19th-century interior,
first-class service and an extensive wine list. Tsarskoe Selo (00380 44 573
9775). Hearty, authentic Ukrainian cuisine served by costumed waiters
against a Disneyesque pastoral backdrop. Mimino (00380 44 417 3545).
Celebrate the fare of Ukraine’s closest ally — spicy Georgian food .
Myslyvets (00380 44 236 3735). Traditional Carpathian cooking (wild game,
berries and cream). Pervak (00 380 44 235 0952). An over-the-top tribute
to Kiev’s pre-revolution days (the Russian revolution), serving colourful
Russian and Ukrainian dishes. -30- http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Evans is the author of the Bradt Guide to Ukraine (£13.95) and the
Bradt Guide to Kiev (£7.95) and now works in Washington, D.C.
==========================================================
3. UKRAINE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION SAGA TO END AMID
DEJA VU, OPPOSITION TENSIONS
Agency France Presse, Kiev, Ukraine, Sunday, January 16, 2005
KIEV : The curtain is set to finally fall on Ukraine's election saga
this week with a deja vu closing act, as cracks appear in the eclectic
"orange revolution" coalition that helped bring Viktor Yushchenko to
power.
The turmoil in this strategic ex-Soviet nation flared eight weeks ago
with a runoff presidential vote that election officials said had been
won by a Russia-friendly prime minister, Viktor Yanukovich, over his
pro-Western opposition rival Yushchenko.
This week it will end, according to all indications, with a high court
ruling that will confirm Yushchenko as the nation's new president and
perhaps lead to his inauguration by next weekend.
"We have to endure for just a little while longer," an elderly woman
and Yushchenko supporter said in Kiev last week in what could well
have passed as grandmotherly advice for the exhausted nation.
The final act of a political crisis that roiled the country and echoed
on the world stage will unfold in the chamber of its supreme court,
which on Monday will begin hearing an appeal over a December 26 rerun
vote by defeated candidate Yanukovich.
Yanukovich, who has since resigned as prime minister, charges that the
historic election was riddled with irregularities and is asking the
court to annul it and set a new round.
The justices have heard it all before -- exactly seven weeks prior
they began hearing Yushchenko's arguments that a November 21 runoff
had been rigged in favor of ruling regime's Yanukovich.
Back then, the court issued an earthquake of a ruling after five days,
backing Yushchenko's claims of fraud, throwing out the vote and
ordering a new round.
This time observers expect the procedure to last up to three days and
end with a ruling that will echo conclusions by international
observers -- that while irregularities were present in the voting on
December 26, they were not enough to affect the final outcome.
"I don't have one cell in my body that has any doubts about these
elections," Yushchenko told reporters last week.
The court's ruling will finally enable parliament to set a date for
Yushchenko to be sworn in as the third president of an independent
Ukraine and start instituting promised policies that would bring the
nation out from Russia's shadow for the first time in hundreds of
years and turn it towards the West.
The 50-year-old opposition leader will undertake the mammoth task
under enormous time pressure -- he has eight to 11 months before a
constitutional amendment kicks in and transfers many of his powers to
parliament, which voters will choose anew next March.
Yushchenko has stayed out of the public eye for the most part since
New Year, as he reportedly conducted furious negotiations over who
will make up his team once he assumes power.
"I am holding dozens of consultations," he said. "The squares are
filled in, edited, erased."
It is a tricky task -- Yushchenko cobbled together an eclectic
coalition for the "orange revolution" protests over the November vote
and, with euphoria of his victory in the rerun vote over, cracks have
begun appearing in the team as its personalities battle each other for
power.
The most visible fight so far is for the post of the prime minister,
with four very different players considered to be the top contenders
-- pragmatic Socialist Party leader Oleksander Moroz, technocratic
leader of a business party Anatoly Kinah, energetic owner of a
television station that helped bring Yushchenko to power Petro
Poroshenko and the fiery chief of a small parliament bloc with
nationalist leanings Yulia Timoshenko.
The latter, during a press conference on Saturday, made it clear that
all was not well with Yushchenko's crew now that its common enemy had
been defeated.
The woman who fired up the crowds during the "orange" protests said
that Yushchenko had promised her the premier's post when they signed a
coalition agreement back in June and that she expected him to make
good on the commitment.
"I do not know of a case in European practice when coalition accords
were violated," she said, in an apparent reference to Yushchenko's
Eurocentric ambitions.
When asked why Yushchenko had not yet included her in his
consultations, Timoshenko said icily: "Ask him. I am not going to
initiate such an encounter." -30-
==========================================================
4. EU MAY SOON ANNOUNCE UKRAINE A MARKET
ECONOMY COUNTRY
Itar-Tass, Paris, France, Sunday, January 16, 2005
PARIS, January 16 (Itar-Tass) -- The European Union (EU) may soon
announce Ukraine a market economy country, Itar-Tass learned from
European sources.
That may happen at the February 21 session of the EU-Ukraine
Cooperation Council. The step will display the EU support to changes,
which have taken place in Ukraine in the past two months.
The market economy status will help Ukraine to supply its commodities
to markets of 25 EU member countries. -30-
==========================================================
5. CHARISMATIC TYMOSHENKO SAYS SHE WILL BE UKRAINE PM
By Ron Popeski, Reuters, Kiev, Ukraine, Sat, January 15, 2005
KIEV (Reuters) - Opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko, who roused vast
crowds during protests against election fraud, said on Saturday she believed
she would be named prime minister once Viktor Yushchenko is finally
inaugurated as president.
Yushchenko, winner of last month's re-run of November's rigged presidential
election, must weather a last legal challenge from loser Viktor Yanukovich
before taking office. The Supreme Court is to examine Yanukovich's case on
Monday, but the ex-premier said he has little chance of overturning the
result.
Tymoshenko, 44, is seen as one of several possible candidates to take over
government and begin implementing Yushchenko's agenda of cleaning up the
ex-Soviet state's business affairs and moving closer to the West. She said
she believed her candidature would be put forward under an election pact
she and Yushchenko struck last June.
"We concluded a formal agreement when we created our coalition, setting
down our relations if we took power jointly," Tymoshenko, her blonde hair
tied in a traditional Ukrainian braid, told a news conference.
"There is no ambiguity in this. It is all clearly written down in terms of
the job of prime minister." Asked whose name appeared in the accord,
which reporters said they had notseen, she said: "I'll give you three
guesses.
"I believe Viktor Andriyevich Yushchenko is an honest, moral politician and
do not believe he will start by breaking a coalition agreement.
GAS PRINCESS
Known as the "gas princess" for her good looks and success in the energy
business, she said her chances of being approved by parliament if nominated
were "100 percent".
Yushchenko, a former prime minister, has accused Yanukovich of "torturing
the nation" by persistently challenging the Dec. 26 vote. His staff hope to
stage a grand inauguration which Tymoshenko said was likely to take place
next Wednesday.
Yushchenko told an interviewer last month the coalition deal called for
Tymoshenko's name to be put forward, but said a decision was subject to
negotiation.
Hugely popular among nationalists, Tymoshenko is viewed with distrust by
neighbouring Russia and it is uncertain she could muster sufficient support
in parliament. Her group controls 20 seats compared to about 100 for
Yushchenko's Our Ukraine group.
Also viewed as a strong candidate is businessman Petro Poroshenko, a close
aide of Yushchenko in Our Ukraine and head of parliament's budget
committee. Others include two of the president-elect's campaign allies,
Socialist Party leader Oleksander Moroz and technocrat Anatoly Kinakh.
Tymoshenko served as deputy prime minister while Yushchenko was head of
government but was fired by President Leonid Kuchma, now leaving office
after 10 years in power.
Charges of forgery and smuggling gas were brought against her in connection
with her activities at the head of a private gas trading firm in the
mid-1990s and an arrest warrant has been issued for her in Russia. She
denounces the probes as baseless. -30-
==========================================================
6. "TYMOSHENKO FOR PRIME MINISTER"
COMMENTARY: By Bishop Paul Peter Jesep
The Action Ukraine Report, Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, Jan 17, 2005
Yulia Tymoshenko, parliamentarian head of Batkivshchyna (Motherland),
deserves to be Ukraine's next prime minister. Her leadership, deft
political skill, loyalty to Viktor Yushchenko and unquestioned commitment to
the country's emerging national consciousness makes Yulia the logical
choice. She is also one of the best safeguards against a Moscow backed plot
should Yushchenko's health falter. No one should think that the Kremlin has
given up looking for opportunities to orchestrate another political coup.
Ukraine must not only plan for the present, but even more important, it must
strategize for the long-term. Vladimir Putin's apparent willingness to work
with President-elect Yushchenko means little. This may be nothing more than
a Kremlin wait and see ploy hoping for political vulnerability. Putin's
patience is not an indication that Moscow has accepted a sovereign "Little
Russia." Yulia has been one of the most spirited Ukrainian patriots who has
no illusions about the political mentality of the northern neighbor.
Tymoshenko, educated as an economist-cyberneticist, has the tigress
intellect to manage any potential threat. As a business leader she has been
lauded as one of Eastern Europe's best crisis managers. In a January 2005
commentary in the Moscow Times, Yulia made it very clear that there is a
difference between the Russian people and the bureaucrats, political spin
doctors and entrepreneurial oligarchs to the north who would suffocate the
Ukrainian soul.
She wants to foster a relationship with the Russian people. No one can
dispute that Ukraine is linked with Russia, albeit a distinct and separate
member of the Eastern Slavic family. Exploring this relationship with a
cousin also means that she is attempting to foster liberty to family members
who are slowly losing it. A democratic Russia benefits Ukraine. Currently,
some Kremlin politicians and elements within Christian Orthodoxy are
embracing anti-democratic tendencies that will ultimately hurt the Russian
people.
No one should forget Yulia's fiery eloquence that rallied tens of thousands
of demonstrators in Kyiv which maintained populist pressure on the corrupt
Kuchma regime and the Moscow backed presidential candidate. Without such
massive round the clock rallies for democracy there would be no President
Yushchenko. Tymoshenko has the moxie, grace and determination not to
allow the Orange Revolution from becoming compromised.
There will be enormous pressure on President Yushchenko to make deals,
but with Prime Minister Tymoshenko at his side Ukraine's sovereignty is not
likely to be jeopardized. It must be underscored that President Yushchenko'
s health has suffered. There still could be future consequences. Ukraine
must be prepared for all possibilities.
Perhaps a leader's possible frail health will give the Kremlin an upper hand
to influence Ukraine. It is imperative that Ukraine has in place a strong
political infrastructure based on liberty no matter the individual in
office. Politicians come and go, but freedom should be lasting. There can
be no democracy if a nation's future rests with one or even a handful of
individuals. Democracy requires that men and women be nurtured and work
their way up the ranks to meet the challenges of their generation and those
that follow. An independent free press will be vital in this regard.
Tymoshenko is impressive for many reasons. Her intuition, business prowess,
ability to command an audience and sincere love of the Motherland are
extraordinary. Most important, however, she is a democrat who understands
the most basic needs of safeguarding freedom.
Korrespondent Magazine quoted her saying that "it's necessary to start not
with economic or social reforms, but with securing a free mass media.
Otherwise, no reform is going to get results." She is one of the few in
Ukraine who grasps this critical concept.
Democracy cannot exist without a press that is unencumbered by politics or
economic gain. The vitality, strength and success of every democracy and
totalitarian regime is measured by the independence of its media. A free
press will out live elected officials, presidential administrations and
safeguard the future of a democratic Ukraine. Yulia Tymoshenko supports
and understands this basic component of liberty.
There is no guarantee that Tymoshenko will be named the next prime minister.
On Saturday, January 15th, she expressed certainty that the incoming
president would advance her candidacy based on a prior agreement. So far
Yushchenko has not publicly expressed a preference for her. Clearly, there
is political-jockeying going on. Should Yushchenko choose someone other
than Tymoshenko then it is a decision that must be respected so that the
nation may heal.
While Yushchenko's pick of anyone other than Tymoshenko would be a
disappointment, Yulia can take comfort knowing that she has all the skills,
abilities and the strength of character to become a great future president.
Her leadership is needed now and in the future. Hopefully, President-elect
Yushchenko will agree. -30- [Action Ukraine Report Monitoring]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bishop Paul Peter Jesep is Chancellor of the Archeparchy and Vicar General
of Public Affairs and Government Relations for the Ukrainian Autocephalous
Orthodox Church of North and South America Sobornopravna (UAOC-S).
In the past, His Grace also a lawyer and political scientist by training,
served on the staff of U.S. Senator Susan Collins (R-ME). Bishop Jesep
may be reached at VladykaPaulPeter@aol.com. The views expressed here
are strictly personal.
==========================================================
7. UKRAINE'S SUPREME COURT SAID TO REJECT MOST OF
EX-PREMIER'S COMPLAINT
One Plus One TV, Kiev, in Ukrainian 15 Jan 05
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Sat, January 15, 2005
The date of the handover of power [from outgoing President Kuchma to
presidential election winner Viktor Yushchenko] is still unknown. Everything
depends on how soon the Supreme Court adopts a ruling on the complaint filed
by presidential candidate [and former prime minister] Viktor Yanukovych.
The Central Electoral Commission [CEC] today said that the Supreme Court
had dismissed the complaint's items that had been dealt with previously [on
6 and 10 January], in particular, the demand to find illegal the inaction of
the CEC, which [allegedly] failed to take action on numerous violations
during the election, the claim that [alleged] massive vote-rigging does not
allow the outcome of the election to be established, and the demand to
recognize the fact that invalids' right to vote was violated.
Yushchenko's proxy said that Yanukovych's complaint was not prepared
professionally. The major part of the documents in more than 600 volumes of
evidence submitted by Yanukovych's team to the Supreme Court yesterday
are photocopies [of documents], not even signed by observers, Mykola
Katerynchuk [chief lawyer in Yushchenko's HQ] has said.
The press service of Our Ukraine [bloc of parties led by Yushchenko] said
that Yushchenko's HQ had familiarized itself with part of the evidence
submitted together with the appeal against the CEC's decision [to declare
Viktor Yushchenko the winner] by Yanukovych's team.
Let me recall that the Supreme Court will begin considering the complaint
on Monday [17 January at 0900 gmt].
The Foreign Ministry of Ukraine has already said it hopes that the foreign
guests invited to the inauguration of the president-elect will take the
open-date invitations with understanding because the Ukrainian side wanted
to act in line with the law, clearly following national legislation. -30-
==========================================================
8. RUSSIA BREAKS ICE WITH RELUCTANT OLIVE BRANCH
TO UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT
Daniel McLaughlin in Budapest, Irish Times, Ireland, Friday, Jan 14, 2005
UKRAINE: Russia extended a reluctant olive branch yesterday to Ukraine's new
president, Mr Viktor Yushchenko, whose contentious election victory over
Moscow's preferred candidate has chilled relations between the two former
Soviet allies. The conciliatory comments from Mr Sergei Ivanov, Russia's
defence minister, came as Mr Yushchenko again had to postpone his
inauguration because of last-ditch legal appeals from his defeated opponent.
"The Russian Federation is ready for co-operation with the newly-appointed
leadership of Ukraine," Mr Ivanov said during a visit to Washington, which
staunchly supported Mr Yushchenko and the huge street protests that helped
propel him to power. "Now the election is already a thing of the past . . .
I believe that the Russian government will establish the kind of normal
working relations that it had with the previous government of Ukraine."
Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly backed Mr Yushchenko's election
rival, Mr Viktor Yanukovich, and quickly congratulated him on winning a free
and fair vote; the results were later annulled for mass fraud and Mr
Yushchenko won a re-run.
Mr Putin's displeasure was compounded by Mr Yushchenko's determination
to loosen Russia's traditional grip on Ukraine and guide it towards the
West, with the ultimate goal of joining the EU and NATO. "For 14 years we
have been independent, but now we are free," Mr Yushchenko said during the
unprecedented election re-run, which saw him take 52 per cent of the vote
against Mr Yanukovich's 44 per cent.
"A new political era has begun in Ukraine." And Mr Yushchenko's enthusiasm
for stronger ties with the West is far from unrequited. The US State
Department called his triumph "a momentous step in the Ukrainian people's
struggle for democracy", while EU foreign policy chief Mr Javier Solana said
his "wisdom in working for all Ukrainians and for good relations with all
Ukraine's neighbours will prove to be a sound investment for future
prosperity".
New EU member Poland has shown the most interest in recent events in
Ukraine, and is keen to bring the country of 50 million into the Western
fold as quickly as possible, to give Warsaw a solid buffer against
traditional foe Russia.
"Ukraine should be given a chance to join the [ European] Union, and it's up
to Ukrainians to say if they want to or not, and decide to meet EU entry
criteria or not," the Polish President, Mr Alexander Kwasniewski, said this
week. Kiev, however, knows better than anyone that Russia is still Ukraine's
most important neighbour, and has the greatest influence over its short- and
mid-term prosperity.
Ukraine's Soviet-era industry is almost wholly powered by Russian oil and
gas, and most of Moscow's multi-billion-dollar energy exports travel west
through Ukraine. Russia's powerful Black Sea fleet is also based in
Ukraine's Crimean peninsula.
Just as in nearby Georgia, where mass protests swept a West-leaning
president to power a year ago, economic and military ties still bind Ukraine
to its old Soviet master, and it is more prudent to gradually loosen them
than to try and rip them asunder.
Recognition of this reality came from an unexpected quarter in the
Yushchenko camp this week. Ms Yulia Timoshenko is the nemesis of Ukraine's
outgoing president, Mr Leonid Kuchma, and is usually as outspoken as she is
controversial, having survived numerous corruption charges related to her
accumulation of huge wealth in the murky gas industry.
Many Russians see an icy, ruthlessly ambitious Ukrainian nationalist beneath
her tailored suits, blonde plaits and democratic rhetoric, and so remain
unconvinced by the overtures she made to the Kremlin in an article for the
business newspaper Vedomosti.
"With Viktor Yushchenko as president of Ukraine, [ Russia's] fundamental
interests will not suffer," she wrote, in what many saw as an attempt to
prove that she had the diplomatic qualities needed to fulfil her desired
role of prime minister. "On the contrary, there will be new opportunities to
promote [ those interests]," she continued. "As for the economy, Ukraine
and Russia are destined to be partners of the first order for the next few
decades."
As Kiev and Moscow edge towards reconciliation, Mr Yushchenko's supporters
suspect that Mr Yanukovich's allies are stalling while incriminating
documents are destroyed, assets are secreted abroad, and deals are struck on
immunity from prosecution. -30- [Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
==========================================================
9. PUTIN TIGHTENS SCREWS AS, IN UKRAINE, EX-SOVIETS BOLT
COMMENTARY: By Sabra Ayres, Atlanta Journal-Constitution,
Atlanta, Georgia, Sunday, January 16, 2005
MOSCOW The flight from Kiev, Ukraine, to Moscow takes just over
an hour and a half, but the countries' two airports are decades apart.
The lines for passport control in Moscow's dilapidated Sheremetevo Airport
are long and unorganized. Dim lights barely offer enough illumination to
allow arriving passengers to sort through their documents before unfriendly
border guards scrutinize them.
In Russia, documents are still worth their weight in gold. Not just in the
airport, but on the streets of central Moscow and elsewhere. Without them,
you are subjected to fines and possible jail time, especially if you are
from one of Russia's ethnic regions of the North Caucuses.
In Kiev, 13 years of independence from the former Soviet Union and the
oppressive grip of Russification has brought small improvements to this
country of 48 million as it tries to join the ranks of its nearby Eastern
European neighbors such as Slovakia, Poland and Hungary.
Kiev's Borispil Airport has been remodeled into a modern, efficient
operation. International passengers stand in a bright open room where the
administration has taken down the Russian signs and replaced them with
Ukrainian and English directions.
There are few signs in this small airport that this was once the Soviet
Union. It's a friendly greeting compared with the one awaiting visitors to
Moscow.
Ukrainians pursue change
No wonder that Ukrainians, given the choice between a presidential
candidate promising European integration and a Kremlin-backed
establishment figure, voted for change.
No wonder when they looked at the prospect of falling into Russian
President Vladimir Putin's increasingly authoritarian net, Ukrainians took
to the streets by the hundreds of thousands bearing the campaign's colors
to protest a fraudulent election.
No wonder there was an Orange Revolution.
Though Ukraine has its fair share of problems, including widespread
corruption and poverty, the election has brought something that Russia's
opposition lacks: momentum for change. In Russia, only 1 percent of
citizens said they thought vote-rigging and civil rights abuse were reasons
to stand up for themselves, a recent poll found.
Losing Ukraine to the influence of the West was a huge blow for Putin, who
openly supported Prime Minister Victor Yanukovych to become Moscow's
man in Kiev. But most observers say we shouldn't expect this revolution
to spread to Putin's Russia.
Russians face isolation
Putin has steadily tightened his grip on independent media and
nongovernmental groups in recent years. This year the former KGB officer
effectively eliminated the election of regional governors and individual
seats in the lower house of parliament. Voters in the next round of
elections will choose lawmakers from party lists, presumably Putin's United
Russia party.
No one would be surprised if he next succeeds in changing the constitution
to permit a third re-election in a rubber-stamp parliament he already
controls. Putin doesn't seem ready to relax his grip on the power structure
over the next year or so, and he will remain hugely popular at home.
International relations, however, may not be as smooth in 2005.
The United States and Russia exchanged shots at each other over the
Ukrainian elections, with each side accusing the other of meddling.
Increasingly, Putin seems to be isolating Russia. Soon he may find himself
standing alone with the likes of Belarus' Alexander Lukashenka, also
known as Europe's last dictator. -30-
==========================================================
10. RUSSIAN MP DEFENDS UKRAINE "REVOLUTION"
Ekho Moskvy radio, Moscow, in Russian, 14 Jan 05
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Friday, January 14, 2005
Russian MP Aleksandr Lebedev, deputy head of the Duma CIS committee
and co-chairman of the Russo-Ukrainian interparliamentary commission, has
defended the rerun of the Ukrainian presidential election and the protests
that accompanied it against accusations of orchestration from abroad or by
means of "political spin". The indisputable fact, he said, was that it was
a popular movement.
"In the final analysis, it was not the administrative levers and not
interference in Ukraine's affairs by one state or another, or for that
matter by any other forces, that was crucial there," he told Russian Ekho
Moskvy radio in an interview on 14 January. "It was the fact that three
million people took to the streets in Kiev that was, in my view, the more
important development."
"Indeed, one would be hard pressed to imagine that three million people
could by means of some sort of political spin be induced to take to the
streets in temperatures that were as low as minus 12 Centigrade and stay
there for weeks on end," Lebedev said. "It was an expression of the will of
Kievans and Ukrainians who had flocked to Kiev."
What is more, he went on to say, many Russian businesses - wary of the fate
that has befallen Yukos for example - have begun to look towards Ukraine.
"In fact, from now on Russian developments, Russian processes and the
Russian state's policy towards business will be compared to Ukraine. For
example, this is what the attitude to business is in Ukraine and this is
what it is in Russia. All TV in Russia is controlled by the state, but not
so in Ukraine. There is an opposition in Ukraine, but there is none in
Russia."
He dismissed the possibility of such a "revolution" taking place in Russia,
where the necessary preconditions such as an effective opposition, free
media and civil society were absent. The latter aspect in particular, he
said, is "to put it mildly very different to that in Ukraine". "You mean
it's in a sorry state," prompted the presenter. "Without a doubt," Lebedev
concurred.
He criticized Russian state TV coverage of the Ukraine election. "What
would we say if Ukraine's media, be it TV or radio, were all of a sudden
to make calls, say, for the return of the Kurils by Russia to Japan?"
Quizzed about Yushchenko's perceived anti-Russian leanings, Lebedev
said: "I think that this is precisely one of those myths that one of our
main federal [television] channels has for some reason been hard at work to
cultivate." "I should know because, number one, I have known Yushchenko
for many years and, second, I read very carefully his every interview,
statement and newspaper article."
On the subject of Ukraine's NATO and EU aspirations, Lebedev was not
inclined to overdramatize the situation. In fact, he thought it was perhaps
time for Russia itself to reconsider its attitude to the transatlantic
alliance. He went on to comment on the interdependence of Russia's and
Ukraine's economies.
"Ukraine today has very good prospects for it to become a developed and
democratic European nation," Lebedev summed up. -30-
==========================================================
11.UKRAINE - BETWEEN REGIMES: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
INTERNAL & EXTERNAL FACTORS
By James Sherr, Fellow, Conflict Studies Research Centre,
Defence Academy of the United Kingdom [1]
Camberly, Surrey, England
Zerkalo Nedeli, Kyiv, Ukraine, Sat, 15 January, 2005
The most dangerous period in any revolution usually comes immediately after
it takes place. Even if Viktor Yushchenko emerges as Ukraine's new
president without further legal machinations and trauma, there will be no
exaggeration in describing his victory as a revolution. And the victory
will still be revolutionary even if Yushchenko's instincts for compromise,
harmony and national unity establish the tone of his presidency. The events
of the past two months have transformed the 'art of the possible' in Europe
and Eurasia. Nevertheless, Yushchenko's success will stand or fall on his
ability to change the nature and not simply the image of the system that has
governed Ukraine for the past fourteen years.
Changing it will entail a contest with powers that are formidable,
resourceful and in no small degree malevolent. It remains to be seen which
of these powers evolve and accommodate to this new dispensation, which of
them try to infiltrate and capture it and which of them try to confront and
destroy it. Much depends on how shrewdly Yushchenko evaluates and reacts
to these different protagonists. Much also depends on the wisdom of powers
outside Ukraine and on the relationship between them.
Let us assume that sanity will prevail in quarters where it has been
congenitally absent and Viktor Yushchenko is inaugurated as Ukraine's third
president in January 2005. Even in these happy circumstances, he will hold
office, but he will not yet hold power. Those who pragmatically accept his
tenure in office may conclude with equal pragmatism that they can deny him
power. This would be a dangerous and destructive expectation, and the new
president may have precious little time to change it. In a far more benign
political setting, several American presidents concluded that they had 100
days to change expectations.
Within their first 100 days, Yushchenko and his government must prove that
they are committed to fundamental change, and they must prove that they are
capable of it. No political compromise, no matter how urgent, should be
undertaken if it leads the electorate to question that commitment. No
policy aim, no matter how desirable or principled, should be pursued until
the capability exists to pursue it.
The first 100 days will have an equal significance abroad. The West's image
of Ukraine has been transformed. But the West remains the West. Its core
institutions, NATO and the EU, are now fragmented. Yet they continue to
make decisions by consensus. A consensus might have emerged to enhance
the quality of relations with Ukraine, but that does not mean that a
consensus exists to provide early membership (in the case of NATO) or even
to contemplate membership (in the case of the EU). These realities will
affect the morale and cohesion of Yushchenko's expectant supporters
inside Ukraine, and they will also influence his opponents' evaluation of
his cohesion and power.
These opponents include the governing establishment of Russia. Russia, too,
is a reality. So long as Russia's paradigm about Ukraine stays in place -
so long as key players believe that samostoyatelnoy Ukrainiy nikodga ne
budet [Ukraine will never be able to stand alone] - these players will be
convinced that Yushchenko can be undermined or crippled, and they will
utilise every safe and realistic opportunity to weaken, suborn or sabotage
him. Although Russia's standing has been deeply damaged in Ukraine, its
presence in Ukraine's economy and inside its clannish, untransparent
networks of power remains. Failures in commitment and capability will
therefore damage Yushchenko twice: in interstate relations with his most
important neighbour and internally with respect to his most supple and
menacing opponents.
What is to be done? Yushchenko might not have the luxury of answering this
question on his own, because he will have come to power with the help of
influential figures who have a questionable commitment to many of his goals.
The constitutional reform approved by the Rada on 8 December compounds
these uncertainties. Will the reform (and the timing of its implementation)
broaden the base of support for change, or will it bind the proponents of
change hand and foot? In the mid term, the answer will depend on the
democratisation of the electoral system - on measures which transform the
Rada from a club of the Fortune 500 into a genuinely representative body.
In the short term, the answer will depend on the president's ability to keep
most people on his side most of the time. To do this, he will need to
distinguish between the urgent, the important and the desirable. He will
need to choose his ground in such a way as to solidify supporters and smoke
out antagonists masquerading as friends. In this initial period,
opportunities will be wasted if time is spent arguing about land ownership,
lustration and NATO membership. The critical issues will be:
Territorial Integrity and Sovereignty. Although he was resoundingly
defeated in Massachusetts, George Bush is President in Massachusetts no
less than he is in Texas. If Viktor Yushchenko is not accorded the full
authority of a president in Donetsk or Luhansk, Ukraine will cease to be an
integral state. The issue in question is not de jure separatism - a phantom
rather than a danger - but de facto resistance to constitutional authority.
On this point, no negotiation is morally or legally necessary. Beginning
with regional governors, the MVS and the procuracy, those disposed to defy
constitutional authority should be replaced by those determined to enforce
it. The danger needs to be nipped in the bud.
Procrastination will allow the bud to become a plant. Procrastination on
this point, where issues are so clear, will also persuade opponents,
opportunists and a good many supporters that Yushchenko is not capable of
decisive action. It will also pander to the dangerous Russian fantasy that
eastern Ukraine is not Ukraine at all.
But once illegal and unconstitutional actions are thwarted, real divisions
in the country need to be respected and regional interests conciliated.
After the third round of elections, Ukraine's divisions cannot be denied. To
be sure, the country was divided under Kuchma, but Kuchma was no democrat,
and Yushchenko cannot imitate Kuchma. To be sure, there are regional
divisions in many soundly functioning democracies, such as the United
States. But the United States is a democracy, and one of its cardinal
features is a well articulated separation of powers between local and
central government. The features of the political order that Yushchenko
inherits are manifestly different. Establishing trust, authority and a just
division of powers in these conditions will be an exceedingly difficult
task.
Breaking with the Old Regime. This is not difficult. Finding a just way of
breaking with it is difficult. Justice means a uniform standard: not
charging an opponent for crimes of which some of your own supporters
are guilty. It also means acting on the basis of principles that are
explicit and legitimate.
The core principle must be to end the criminality of the state. It is a
principle that unites all of Yushchenko's supporters and probably a majority
of those who voted against him. Over time, the principle is also
realisable. But '?nding corruption' is not a realisable principle in
Ukraine or anywhere else in Europe. It is also beside the point. Ukraine
desperately needs to become a 'normal' country in which corruption is a
matter of choice rather than survival. This will only happen when it is no
longer a curse to live on a state salary, when the tax system makes it
sensible to pay taxes and when the judicial system provides protection for
legal businesses. This will not happen tomorrow. But the government can
take steps tomorrow which demonstrate that it is possible to live
differently. What the government must not do is create a climate of
retribution and fear.
To strike this balance, the state will have to show that it understands the
difference between cheating and organised crime. It can dismiss from state
service those who have abused their power. It can put on trial those who
have conducted business by means of thuggery and extortion. Beyond this,
it will have to govern by rules rather than by purge.
Force Structures and Law Enforcement. Their transformation is pre-requisite
to success in any other activity. So long as those these forces remain
underfinanced, miserably trained and cynically manipulated by the state,
those who serve in them will continue to be tools of 'subjective'
interests, and those who command them will find their professionalism
undermined and subverted. Until the deficiencies of these structures are
addressed, the connection between politics, business and crime will be very
difficult to break. Breaking this connection requires money. But money is
scarce, and even vast sums of money will not correct bad policy.
What is urgent, and what is merely important? Dissolution of redundant,
shadowy para-military forces is urgent. The overhaul of the militsia and
MVS is urgent. Publicity, transparency and accountability are urgent. By
comparison, increases in the defence budget are merely important (though it
is vital that this budget not fall). None of these things will be
accomplished without professionalism and respect for professionals.
Ukraine's new government will need to come to terms with the fact that the
country's professionals served a now reviled authority. Those who served it
lawfully, competently and to a high standard must be listened to, whether
they favoured regime change or not.
Those whose standards of professionalism are outmoded need a dignified path
to retirement. Those who betrayed professional standards need to be removed
as quickly as possible. In the early-to-mid 1990s, governments of former
dissidents in Central Europe were obsessed with democratic control, but
neglected professionalism. As a result, they prolonged the democratic
deficit in their countries. Their mistakes should not be repeated by
Yushchenko's government.
Preparing to Meet Russia. Russia will present problems for Ukraine in the
short-term, the mid-term and, barring a revolution in thinking, the
long-term. The West at worst will offer Ukraine insufficient support.
Policy towards the West is therefore important - of seminal importance,
because Ukraine seeks to join it. But it is not urgent.
If President Putin's definition of pragmatism were the same as President
Yushchenko's, he would have welcomed Yushchenko's victory. He did not,
because it is not. Today, his definition of pragmatism is skewed by an
unhealthy geopolitical logic. Since December 1999, Putin has employed
Russian power, both hard and soft, to secure dominance in the CIS and a
congenial backdrop to the construction of the 'administrative vertical' in
Russia. In both domains this system has been undemocratic: exploitative
of the interests and vulnerabilities of elites and, by turns, dismissive and
distrustful of civil society. Towards the West, Putin has sought to advance
Russia's security on the basis of mutual security. Towards the 'near
abroad', his scheme of security is still inconsistent with the aspirations
and security of others. Yushchenko's victory threatens this paradigm,
but it is not enough to make a commanding body of Russians question it.
Only his success will do that.
The problem is that Yushchenko will be visiting Russia at a time when his
success is still very much in doubt. He can expect to be welcomed not by
congenial interlocutors, but by a well prepared negotiating team. They are
unlikely to afford him an opportunity to discuss visions and principles.
They are more likely to confront him with direct and specific questions. Is
Ukraine prepared to honour its commitments to the Single Economic Space
(SES)? Will it respect the agreements and subsidiary agreements (several of
them unpublished) governing the operation of the Black Sea Fleet?
Will it honour cooperation agreements (also unpublished) between armed
forces, security and intelligence services and other bodies of power? Will
it honour agreements (many unpublished) regarding the two defence industrial
complexes, gas transit and other components of the energy sector? Will it
respect privatisation agreements involving Russian interests? He can
expect, like an American defendant, that any answers he gives 'can and will
be used against him'.
In response, he might pose some questions of his own. Will Russia
facilitate Ukraine's participation in the SES by revising mechanisms and
provisions incompatible with EU standards, Ukraine's sovereignty and the
principle of consensus? Will Russia facilitate the long-term deployment of
the Black Sea Fleet by transforming the accords into a status of forces
agreement meeting proper standards of transparency? Will it respect the
right of parliament in a democracy to discuss the content of agreements
governing national security, economic cooperation and the ownership of the
country's assets? At the end of this meeting, he will have much to think
about. He should give his interlocutors much to think about as well.
Steps Towards the West. Ukraine's status in the Euro-Atlantic community has
been unsatisfactory and yet richly deserved. That this status should now
change goes without saying. Yet Ukraine will not impress the West by saying
it. It will make far more of an impression by placing its priority on
internal policy and by playing the Western game of pragmatic incrementalism.
It also needs to focus on what is urgent.
Yushchenko's government will urgently need well targeted support: first to
change perceptions and the balance of incentives at home; second to offset
vulnerabilities which Ukraine's great neighbour might exploit. It is
finally time for ordinary citizens to see that NATO, the EU, the World Bank
and leading Western programmes and foundations can contribute to their
security and welfare. In this intensely practical exercise, issues of
status and roadmaps to membership are irrelevant. Ukrainians will also have
to educate Westerners about the realities of living in Russia's 'near abroad
'. Within recent years, Ukraine's official representatives largely failed
to do this, to some degree out of timidity, to a greater degree because of
dependency.
Nevertheless, they expected the West to respond to the pressures and
intrusions which they refused to acknowledge. Today, preaching about Russia
is not needed in the West, and cold war language is, with good reason,
unwelcome. What is needed is an exchange of information: a calm, concrete
and developing consultation about areas of vulnerability, points of pressure
and ways to offset them. The United States and other Western countries
will, in turn, will need to inform a wider circle of Ukrainians about the
nature (and firmness) of its private diplomacy with Russia; they will need
to explain why a solid relationship with Russia is in everyone's interests
and, most difficult of all, they will need to demonstrate that this
relationship does not exist at Ukraine's expense.
Today, some Western governments will find it very difficult to demonstrate
this. This unpalatable reality sheds light on that which is less than
urgent, but profoundly important: NATO membership. The Kuchma regime
not only kept the issue of Ukraine's membership off the agenda but, for a
silent majority of NATO members, made it unthinkable. Once the members
of NATO begin to think, what are we likely to find? First, we will find a
minority who believe that Ukraine should not become a member without
Russian consent.
This position is not only unsound in principle; it is a dead end in
practice. Russia will not give such consent until NATO becomes as mutable
to Russian interests (and vetoes) as the OSCE. Yet this minority will not
easily be moved.
Second, we will find a still smaller minority who believe that Ukraine
should be brought into the Alliance quickly, not only in the face of Russian
objections, but despite the deficiencies that plague its own force
structures and the lack of consensus for NATO membership in Ukrainian
society. Like it or not, this minority is doomed to remain a minority. Yet
alongside these two groups, we are also likely to find a majority of
visionary pragmatists who believe that, with the right sequence of steps and
a measured timescale, Ukraine will pass the tests of membership, Russia will
acquiesce to membership (whilst still opposing it) and the internal
opponents of membership will reconcile themselves to it. If this NATO
majority is to become the NATO consensus, then Ukraine, too, needs a policy
of visionary pragmatism. It goes without saying that the same policy is
needed towards the EU.
Ukraine can no longer be part of Russia's near abroad or the EU's 'New
Neighbourhood'. Yet as Frederick the Great once remarked about an earlier
'eminently sensible principle', 'all that is needed for its implementation
is the consent of Europe and a few similar trifles'. Today for once, 'the
consent of Europe' is a realistic prospect. But that prospect hinges on
whether Yushchenko can transform electoral victory into political success.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] Disclaimer: The views expressed are the author's and not necessarily
those of the UK Ministry of Defence.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
James Sherr, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Defence Academy of
the United Kingdom, Camberly, Surrey, England; e-mail:
james.sherr@lincoln.oxford.ac.uk
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
James Sherr has worked on Ukrainian issues for many years especially
in the defence area, including NATO. He is an outstanding analyst and
speaker. He is in much demand as a speaker on issues related to Ukraine.
The Action Ukraine Report appreciates the assistance received from
James Sherr regarding the publication of his articles.
==========================================================
12. WAS THE GAME WORTH THE COST?
It's Hard To Pick a Clean Winner in Ukraine
By Gennady Petrov, Russia Profile, Moscow, Russia, Fri, Jan 14, 2005
KIEV - As Russia, the European Union and the United States continued to
accuse each other of interfering in the first running of the second round
of Ukraine's presidential election, it was becoming increasingly clear
ahead of the second holding of the vote that the interference is
detrimental not only to the interests of Ukraine itself, but also to those
of all the other players involved. Meanwhile, outgoing Ukrainian President
Leonid Kuchma seems to have played a canny game that allowed him and
his entourage to come out as the greatest beneficiaries of the confusion and
conflicts surrounding the vote.
On Dec. 8, Kuchma signed into law a "package agreement" that effectively
shifts Ukraine from its present presidential form into a parliamentary
republic. The changes are to take effect in September. Under the new
system, whoever is elected president will only be able to appoint only the
prime minister and the heads of the police and army ministries
independently. All other nominations will have to be approved by the
Ukrainian parliament, the Rada, which will also exercise oversight of the
government. Through various alignments, the factions that support Kuchma
are generally able to form a majority in the chamber. In negotiations with
Kuchma, opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko, the favorite going into the
Dec. 26 rerun of the second round, had been pushing for the new system not
to come into effect until 2006, after the next elections to the Rada,
hoping that a presidential win would give him the political capital to help
shape the balance in the legislature.
"I have no doubt that [Kuchma's] majority will remain in place, regardless
of who eventually becomes the new president," said Kost Bondarenko, a
political analyst at Zerkalo Nedeli newspaper in Kiev. "Those oligarchs who
support Kuchma understand that a total victory for [Viktor] Yushchenko or
[Prime Minister Viktor] Yanukovich would mean a redistribution of property.
Their property."
Each candidate is backed by a definite set of business interests, which
mobilized behind their respective favorites in the standoff that followed
the first running of the second round. Yanukovich is considered the
representative of the "Donetsk clan," a group of industrial oligarchs from
the capital of the coal-mining region in Russian-dominated eastern Ukraine
where Yanukovich had been governor before being appointed prime minister
by Kuchma in 2002. Yushchenko, on the other hand, has the backing of a
disparate group of oligarchic outsiders. The highest profile member of this
group in the protests after the second round was Yulia Timoshenko,
nicknamed the "gas princess," who remained at Yushchenko's shoulder
throughout the post-vote protests and negotiations. The support of Pyotr
Poroshenko, the owner of Mriya Bank and Channel 5 television, was also
instrumental in providing media coverage that clearly favored the
opposition candidate. State television showed a clear bias toward
Yanukovich, who had been anointed by Kuchma as his successor.
Interestingly, none of the backers of the two candidates are seen as close
to the gas and steel magnates portrayed as providing Kuchma's power base
during his reign.
"Kuchma may have pulled off a very cunning maneuver," said Vladimir
Polokhalo of the Ukrainska Dumka Foundation. "Knowing that Yanukovich
is unacceptable to a considerable portion of the population of Ukraine, he
staged a spat between Yushchenko and the Donetsk clan. Yushchenko has
turned out to be a tougher fighter than Yanukovich, and so Kuchma decided
to strike a deal with him."
PART OF THE DEAL
In return for the changes strengthening the position of the Rada - and thus
his own- Kuchma promised to change the personnel of the Central Election
Commission, where Yushchenko's supporters will now outnumber Yanukovich's.
The role of the Central Election Commission was a major bone of contention
in the second round of voting, with the Yushchenko camp accusing it of
widespread fraud, especially in eastern Ukraine, to get Yanukovich elected.
Another major concession for the rerun of the second round was a change to
the rules on absentee ballots, which Yushchenko's team alleged were used
for ballot-stuffing in Yanukovich's favor.
"According to the information we have, people in Donetsk and Lukhansk [both
of which voted for Yanukovich] got about six or seven absentee ballots per
person," said Yury Klyuchkovsky, a Yushchenko representative on the Central
Electoral Commission. "They were then put on trains and taken to other
regions, especially in the center of Ukraine. They descended on every
station and voted."
In the rerun, these ballots were to be reduced from 4 percent to 0.5
percent of the total number, and stricter control over their use will be
introduced. Local electoral commissions, meanwhile, will be made up of
Yushchenko and Yanukovich supporters in equal numbers. Yushchenko's
supporters claimed that electoral commissions in the east of the country
were made up largely of Yanukovich supporters, while Yanukovich supporters
made similar accusations about the dominance of Yushchenko supporters on
electoral commissions in the west.
Yushchenko's campaign manager, Alexander Zinchenko, was jubilant at the
outcome of the reform package. "This guarantees fair elections, which means
victory for our candidate," he said. But not all of those involved in the
"orange revolution" were so happy. Timoshenko, a bitter enemy of Kuchma
and the most vocal opposition leader during the street protests, was one of
those disappointed that Yushchenko ultimately made the deal.
"I think Kuchma and Yushchenko struck a behind-the-scenes deal," she said
in an interview. "I don't know the details." She called the deal an
"unacceptable compromise." Yanukovich's campaign manager, Taras Chornovil
was even more blunt, accusing Kuchma of "treason" in choosing to negotiate
with Yushchenko.
NOT PLEASED
Many experts backed Timoshenko's reading of the events. "Kuchma and
Yushchenko could easily strike a deal on power sharing," said Roman
Manekin, the press secretary of the Donetsk community in Moscow and a
scholar at the Institute of the Balkan and Slavic Studies.
"Yushchenko realized that the street protests alone could not force Kuchma
into submission, so he agreed to a smaller share of power," said Vladimir
Malinkovich, the director of the Ukrainian branch of the International
Institute of Humanitarian and Political Studies and a former commentator
for Radio Liberty. "Kuchma lost a lot, but he negotiated certain guarantees
for his own future," said Zerkalo Nedeli's Kost Bondarenko.
In the aftermath of the second round of voting both sides had also made
allegations about persecution of their supporters in areas that voted
largely for the other candidate. Yanukovich campaigners noted what they
called instances of "persecution" of their supporters in Western Ukraine.
"This is some kind of mass psychosis," said Chornovil, who campaigned in
the western region of Lvov before the second round. "Our supporters were
harassed every day. What kind of freedom is it if the people suspected of
sympathizing with Yanukovich had the words "traitor to Ukraine" written on
their doors, if their children were harassed at school?"
Accusations of the same kind were made during the first round, although
neither side filed to have the vote invalidated. "The elections were
unfair, but we will use all possible legal means in order to win the second
round," Taras Stetskiv, the organizer of the "orange" protests in Kiev,
said after the first round of voting.
But allegations of foul play were not limited to the actual voting. Perhaps
the most bizarre subplot to the whole affair centered around the poisoning
of Yushchenko, which the candidate alleged was a government-orchestrated
plot carried out at a Sept. 5 dinner with the head of the Ukrainian
Security Service, Ihor Smeshko, and his deputy, Volodymyr Satsyuk.
Yushchenko disappeared from public life for a while following the dinner,
and re-emerged with his face heavily disfigured and blistered. A Rada probe
into the affair initially concluded that he had simply contracted a viral
infection, despite an initial - and contested - diagnosis by a Vienna
clinic that he had in fact been poisoned.
Yushchenko pushed for further analyses, and on Dec. 17 Prof. Abraham
Brouwer of the Free University in Amsterdam announced that the candidate
had been poisoned. Moreover, it was established that the poison used was
pure TCDD, an active ingredient in Agent Orange reckoned to be the most
harmful dioxin known.
WHODUNNIT?
The issue of who poisoned Yushchenko, and when, remained unresolved as
Russia Profile was going to press, as did a number of other issues. But if
the whole fight inside Ukraine ended in a compromise that largely suited
the interests of the oligarchs, then the political fireworks outside the
country were, at once, more pointed and pointless. Both sides - the EU and
United States on one hand, Russia on the other - accused the other of
interfering in Ukraine's internal affairs to suit their own interests. The
only results thus far seem to be twofold: First, relations between Russia
and the United States and EU have soured; second, Ukrainian democracy
has come off worse, as trust in the electoral process dwindles.
President Vladimir Putin openly campaigned for Yanukovich, visiting Ukraine
before both rounds in support of the former prime minister, and hosting a
meeting with Kuchma and Yanukovich in Moscow. The West made little
secret of its sympathy for Yushchenko, with the EU's external relations
commissioner, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, promising to do "everything in my
powers to keep Ukraine on our side at least."
Posters backing Yanukovich went up around Moscow, while Russia accused
the United States of trying to instigate a repeat of last year's "Rose
Revolution" in Georgia by funding anti-Russian groups in Ukraine. America
denied the charges, saying it had only funded pro-democracy groups and had
not, unlike Russia, given any money or support directly to either
candidate. Moscow commentators said a Yushchenko win would mean a final
break in Ukraine's ties to Russia, while Western commentators said that a
Yanukovich victory would mean the end of Ukraine's path toward integration
into Europe and an ultimate return to Russia's sphere of influence.
In any case, it seems as though the effects of the fallout over the
elections will be felt outside the country as well.
"A lot of people in Russia will support a tightening of the screws
[domestically] in order to exclude the repetition of the Kiev scenario in
Moscow," former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov said in an interview with
RIA Novosti in December. "At the same time, disagreements between Russia
and the West are becoming more bitter. Who needs this?" -30-
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