"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT"
An International Newsletter
In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis, and Commentary
"The Art of Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion,
Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World"
"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT" - Number 427
morganw@patriot.net, ArtUkraine.com@starpower.net
Washington, D.C. and Kyiv, Ukraine, WEDNESDAY, February 9, 2005
-----INDEX OF ARTICLES-----
"Major International News Headlines and Articles"
1. PRESIDENT YUSHCHENKO CALLS ON DIPLOMATS TO
WORK ON UKRAINE'S EU INTEGRATION
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Thu, February 8, 2005
2. PRESIDENT YUSHCHENKO URGES DIPLOMATS TO IMPROVE
UKRAINE'S INTERNATIONAL IMAGE
New foreign minister is honest, professional and my personal friend
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Tue, February 8, 2005
3. UKRAINE SHOULD BECOME A REGIONAL LEADER SAYS
NEW FOREIGN MINISTER BORYS TARASYUK
Associated Press, Kiev, Ukraine, Tue, February 8, 2005 .
4. TARASIUK EXPECTS EU TO REVIEW ITS POLICY ON UKRAINE
IN THE SECOND HALF OF 2005
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Tue, February 8, 2005
5. YUSHCHENKO ORDERS FOREIGN MINISTRY TO CONSIDER
PROSPECTS FOR LIBERALIZING VISA REGULATIONS
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Tue, February 8, 2005
6. US SECRETARY OF STATE RICE CONGRATULATES TARASIUK
ON HIS APPOINTMENT AS UKRAINIAN FOREIGN MINISTER
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Mon, February 7, 2005
7. NEW GOVERNMENT BEGINS TO ASSUME POWER IN UKRAINE
Yushchenko's Loyalists Succeed Heads of Regions; Premier Wins Solid Support
By Yaroslav Trofimov, Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal
The Wall Street Journal, NY, NY, February 7, 2005; Page A16
8. UKRAINE CASTS RUSSIA ASIDE ON WAY TO EUROPE AND USA
The new Ukrainian administration is persistently advancing towards Europe
By Aleksei Kovalev, Pravda.ru
Moscow, Russia, Monday, February 7, 2005
9. FAREWELL TO POST-SOVIET TERRITORY
The failure of Russia's final attempts to retain control over the CIS
Fedor Lukianov, chief editor of "Russia in Global Politics" magazine
Profil, No. 3, Moscow, Russia, January 31, 2005
10. "IMAGINE"
COMMENTARY: By Michael Emerson
The Wall Street Journal, NY, NY, Tue, February 8, 2005
11. "THE POST-BATTLE LANDSCAPE"
COMMENTARY: By Yuri Scherbak,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine
[Former Ukraine Ambassador to the U.S., Mexico, Israel, and Canada]
The Day Weekly Digest in English, #2,
Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, 25 January 2005
12. ECHOES OF YALTA'S FAILURE TODAY
OPINION: By Christianane Hoffman
Deutsche Welle, Friday, February 4, 2005
13. TYMOSHENKO AND POLAND'S PRIME MINISTER MAREK
BELKA DISCUSS ODESA-BRODY OIL PIPE LINE
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Tue, February 8, 2005
14. PUTIN TO VISIT UKRAINE IN LATE FEBRUARY OR EARLY MARCH
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Tue, February 8, 2005
=========================================================
1. PRESIDENT YUSHCHENKO CALLS ON DIPLOMATS TO
WORK ON UKRAINE'S EU INTEGRATION
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Thu, February 8, 2005
KYIV - President Viktor Yuschenko calls on diplomats to work on
Ukraine's integration to the European Union. The President said this
while presenting new Foreign Minister Borys Tarasiuk.
He said that Ukraine is not a neighbor of Europe, but the center of Europe,
but so far Ukraine is a neighbor of the European Union. "Changing this
policy is a diplomatic task," Yuschenko said. He said that EU integration
is a strategic task of Ukraine. "I would like to put this in bold," the
president emphasized.
He said that he is not a romantic and knows that this task would take more
than one year. He emphasized that Ukraine is heading towards the EU
because standards of life and democracy there are higher than anywhere
in the world.
At the same time, according to the President, Ukraine should not take the
role of suppliant. The president highlighted that it is necessary to change
a significant part of legislation, as well as economic relations inside the
country.
"This road is not covered with roses," the president highlighted. He said
that rhetoric would not open the door to Europe for Ukraine. This requires
clearly coordinated work on formalization of all norms and standards.
Yuschenko called on diplomats to keep with understandable, consistent and
public foreign policy. He said that this is necessary to win respect for
Ukraine both in Moscow and Brussels. -30-
==========================================================
2. PRESIDENT YUSHCHENKO URGES DIPLOMATS TO IMPROVE
UKRAINE'S INTERNATIONAL IMAGE
New foreign minister is honest, professional and my personal friend
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Tue, February 8, 2005
KYIV - President Viktor Yuschenko is calling on diplomats for creating
more positive atmosphere of Ukraine's apprehension the world over.
Yuschenko expressed this call while representing at the Foreign Ministry
the new minister, Borys Tarasiuk.
"The atmosphere thanks to which we would be able to effectively dissociate
ourselves from what discredits the idea of Ukraine," Yuschenko said.
According to him, in the first place he dislikes Ukraine's image of a
corrupt state.
The Tarasiuk presentation ceremony was attended by all heads of the Foreign
Ministry, as well as ex-foreign minister Kostiantyn Hryschenko, Deputy Prime
Minister for European Integration Oleh Rybachuk, State Secretary Oleksandr
Zinchenko and National Security and Defense Council Secretary Petro
Poroshenko.
While introducing Tarasiuk, Yuschenko said that the new Minister is honest,
professional and his personal friend. Yuschenko said he is ready to support
the candidacy of Volodymyr Ohryzko to the post of first deputy foreign
minister. Now Ohryzko is working at the Foreign Ministry as ambassador
at large.
Tarasiuk expressed gratitude for the confidence in him. He also thanked his
predecessor Hryschenko for his work. Yuschenko and the new minister thanked
the diplomats who demonstrated their civil stands and joined the people
during the 'orange revolution.'
As Ukrainian News reported, a number of countries already voiced hope in
a strengthening of their relations with Ukraine in connection with the
appointment of Borys Tarasiuk to the post of Foreign Minister.
Yuschenko named Tarasiuk as Ukraine's Foreign Minister on February 4.
==========================================================
3. UKRAINE SHOULD BECOME A REGIONAL LEADER SAYS
NEW FOREIGN MINISTER BORYS TARASYUK
Associated Press, Kiev, Ukraine, Tue, February 8, 2005 .
KIEV (AP)--Ukraine should use its strategic position between the expanding
European Union and a resurgent Russia to become a regional leader, the
country's top diplomat said Tuesday.
Newly appointed Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk told journalists that all of
Ukraine 's foreign policy steps should be "not pro-Western, not pro-Eastern
only pro-Ukrainian."
He said that the Foreign Ministry's main task will be to pursue good
neighborly relations, first of all with Russia, but also with its European
Union neighbors.
"I don't see another alternative other than good neighborly, constructive
and partnership relations with Russia," said Tarasyuk, who was introduced
by President Viktor Yushchenko Tuesday as foreign minister.
European and Euro-Atlantic integration are also priorities for Ukraine ,
which will try to move "from words to actions," he said.
Yushchenko has made eventual membership in the E.U. a top goal of his
presidency, saying he hopes to start membership talks by 2007. The E.U. has
pledged to tighten cooperation with Ukraine but stopped short of offering
the prospect of membership.
If Ukraine makes progress on Yushchenko's ambitious program to introduce
European standards by the end of the year, Tarasyuk said, "The E.U. might
change its policy regarding Ukraine and consider the possibility of
Ukraine's membership in the institution."
He also said that Ukraine hoped to "renew the trust" in relations between
Ukraine and the U.S. Relations cooled under ex-President Leonid Kuchma,
who was accused by Washington of selling a sophisticated radar system to
Iraq despite U.N. sanctions against Saddam Hussein's regime. Kuchma
denied the allegations.
"For more than four years, our relations were almost at a standstill, and
there was no trust in these relations," Tarasyuk said, blaming also a shift
in U.S. foreign policy priorities at the time.
In what was widely seen as an effort to improve relations with Washington,
Kuchma sent Ukrainian troops to serve in the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq
after the war. The deployment has been deeply unpopular, however, and
Ukrainian officials have vowed to bring the troops home this year.
Tarasyuk said that Yushchenko has asked him and new Defense Minster
Anatoliy Gritsenko to give concrete proposals about withdrawing the
1,650-soldier contingent.
He also said the withdrawal wouldn't affect Ukraine 's relations with its
partners, adding that Ukraine is in regular consultation with other members
of the U.S.-led coalition and would not do anything to upset security in the
volatile country.
"To gradually change Ukraine 's presence in Iraq from a military presence to
instructors, diplomats and businessmen is the task that President Yushchenko
set," Tarasyuk said.
Yushchenko is expected to visit the U.S. this spring, he said, and new U.S.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is also expected in Ukraine this year.
==========================================================
4. TARASIUK EXPECTS EU TO REVIEW ITS POLICY ON UKRAINE
IN THE SECOND HALF OF 2005
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Tue, February 8, 2005
KYIV - Foreign Minister Borys Tarasiuk believes that the European Union
may review its policy in relation to Ukraine in the second half of this
year. He made this statement to the press. Today Ukraine must agree to the
existing Ukraine-EU Action Plan that is expected to take effect after the
meeting of the Ukraine-EU Cooperation Council, slated for February 21.
"We have no other choice but to agree to implementation of those provisions
[of the Action Plan] that meet national interests," the minister remarked.
Meanwhile, Ukraine must create a critical mass of changes that will make the
EU to review its relations with Ukraine. In this way, the EU may acknowledge
that Ukraine's membership is possible in the future.
Tarasiuk went on saying that this year Ukraine must solve all issues that
impede its relations with the EU. In particular, it must achieve the status
of market economy country, join the World Trade Organization, and push for
the start of negotiations on creation of a free trade zone with the EU and
liberalization of visa regime.
As Ukrainian News earlier reported, Tarasiuk said Ukraine's way to the
European Union through NATO is inevitable.
A meeting of the Ukraine-NATO Commission will be held at the level of heads
of states and governments in Brussels, Belgium, on February 22. A meeting of
the Ukraine-EU Cooperation Council will be also held in Brussels on February
21 to approve the Ukraine-EU Action Plan. -30-
==========================================================
5. YUSHCHENKO ORDERS FOREIGN MINISTRY TO CONSIDER
PROSPECTS FOR LIBERALIZING VISA REGULATIONS
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Tue, February 8, 2005
KYIV - Ukrainian President Viktor Yuschenko ordered the Foreign Ministry
to consider prospects for liberalization of visa regulations concerning
foreign citizens.
The President said this, while introducing at the Foreign Ministry its new
head, Borys Tarasiuk. "I am ready to seriously liberalize visa
regulations," Yuschenko said.
He asked the Foreign Ministry to examine this question at a meeting of its
board, and submit specific proposals. Yuschenko emphasized that he would
consider some of those proposals as temporary.
The President said he realizes that there are also security considerations
and the problem of illegal migrants, as well as a certain risk of terrorism,
to which attention must be paid. That is why the Foreign Ministry's
specific proposals on liberalization of visa regulations must include that
all. The President also pointed to the need of attracting tourists.
In his words, Ukraine's complicated visa regime was taken as one of the key
problems, including during decision-making on holding the Eurovision song
contest in Ukraine in 2005. As Ukrainian News reported, in August 2004,
the Cabinet of Ministers introduced free multiple visas for entry of foreign
Ukrainians in this country. The 50th Eurovision song competition will take
place in Kyiv in May 2005. -30-
==========================================================
6. US SECRETARY OF STATE RICE CONGRATULATES TARASIUK
ON HIS APPOINTMENT AS UKRAINIAN FOREIGN MINISTER
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Mon, February 7, 2005
KYIV - The United States' Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has
congratulated Borys Tarasiuk on his appointment as Ukraine's foreign affairs
minister. The press service of the Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Ministry
disclosed this to Ukrainian News, citing a February 6 telephone conversation
between Rice and Tarasiuk.
Rice assures Tarasiuk of her commitment to close cooperation and expressed
hope for development of such cooperation. Rice and Tarasiuk discussed
contacts between the presidents of Ukraine and the United States as well
as between Rice and Tarasiuk in the near future.
Yuschenko intends to meet with United States' President George Bush on
February 22 during a visit to Brussels (Belgium) to attend a high-level
meeting of the Ukrainian-NATO Commission. -30-
==========================================================
7. NEW GOVERNMENT BEGINS TO ASSUME POWER IN UKRAINE
Yushchenko's Loyalists Succeed Heads of Regions; Premier Wins Solid Support
By Yaroslav Trofimov, Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal
The Wall Street Journal, NY, NY, February 7, 2005; Page A16
KIEV, Ukraine -- Ukraine's new government assumed power during the weekend,
signaling a clean break with the past and launching an assault on corruption
and the oligarch businessmen affiliated with the previous administration.
In a measure of just how solid the authority of President Viktor Yushchenko
has become, 373 of Parliament's 450 members endorsed his candidate for prime
minister, Yulia Tymoshenko. Not a single lawmaker voted against her.
Ms. Tymoshenko, a former billionaire who spent time behind bars on
corruption charges that ultimately were dismissed, was a deputy prime
minister when Mr. Yushchenko was prime minister in 1999-2001. A pivotal
figure in last year's election protests known as the "Orange Revolution,"
she will preside over a cabinet packed with other street-protest organizers
and pro-democracy leaders. Mr. Yushchenko was elected in December after
massive demonstrations over government attempts to falsify the vote.
Mr. Yushchenko also used his vast executive powers to replace with loyalists
the heads of all of Ukraine's 27 regional administrations except for the
governor of Kiev, who already is an ally.
"The expectations are colossal," Mr. Yushchenko told Parliament as he
presented the new government, which promised to seek rapid integration with
the European Union, dismantle the country's ossified bureaucracy, stamp out
endemic graft and ensure the country's economic recovery speeds up.
In a separate vote, Parliament approved the government's program of
action -- a legal step that gives Ms. Tymoshenko's cabinet immunity from
no-confidence motions for a year; Parliament is up for re-election in the
spring of 2006.
The turnaround in the legislature surprised many Ukrainians. A few months
ago, most lawmakers were loyal to former President Leonid Kuchma and backed
Mr. Yushchenko's pro-Russian opponent in the election, Viktor Yanukovych.
Last year's election standoff, which nearly brought an armed clash, had
prompted warnings from Mr. Yanukovych and his supporters in Parliament that
they never would accept a Yushchenko presidency and that Russian-speaking
parts of Ukraine might seek autonomy or even secession should the Orange
Revolution succeed.
Yet, just two weeks after Mr. Yushchenko's inauguration, almost all
Parliament members from Mr. Yanukovych's party, the Regions of Ukraine ,
chose to endorse Ms. Tymoshenko's government.
"With every day, the opposition is vanishing in front of our eyes. All these
parties have always been pro-government. They just don't have any idea of
how to live in opposition," said Ihor Zhdanov, a political analyst at the
Razumkov Center in Kiev.
Russia, too, sent congratulations to Ms. Tymoshenko -- even though Russia's
attorney general still is seeking to arrest her on corruption charges she
says are bogus.
In Kiev, Ms. Tymoshenko offered an olive branch to last year's opponents,
naming a prominent lawmaker from the Regions of Ukraine as her adviser.
However, the cabinet itself includes no survivors from the prior
administration, and several important posts were taken by the Orange
Revolution's field commanders.
In probably the most radical break with Soviet tradition, the "power
ministries" that oversee security and law enforcement -- and that often were
used to intimidate opponents -- went to civilians rather than uniformed
insiders. Anatoly Gritsenko, a think-tank chairman who served as deputy of
Mr. Yushchenko's election campaign, became minister of defense. A lawmaker
close to Ms. Tymoshenko, Oleksandr Turchinov, became head of the Security
Service of Ukraine , the successor agency to the Soviet KGB.
As it gathered for the first time, the new cabinet reversed one of the most
controversial decisions of its predecessor -- the privatization of the
highly profitable Kryvorizhstal steel conglomerate. The conglomerate, which
the government intends to auction off again, was sold for $800 million last
year to a consortium led by Mr. Kuchma's son-in-law, Viktor Pinchuk, and by
Rinat Akhmetov, a Donetsk tycoon close to Mr. Yanukovych. -30-
[Write to Yaroslav Trofimov at yaroslav.trofimov@wsj.com]
==========================================================
8. UKRAINE CASTS RUSSIA ASIDE ON WAY TO EUROPE AND USA
The new Ukrainian administration is persistently advancing towards Europe
By Aleksei Kovalev, Pravda.ru
Moscow, Russia, Monday, February 7, 2005
It seems that most pessimistic forecasts about the essence of the new power
in Ukraine are coming true. Several key issues of the new Ukrainian stance
about Russia have recently surfaced: it is already possible to analyze
Ukrainian officials' views about Russia.
Ukraine's new President has already dropped a hint about new relations
between Kiev and Moscow. Viktor Yushchenko, however, was rather vague
in his statements on the matter, so the question remained open.
Oleg Ribachuk, the vice premier for European integration issues, was rather
explicit in his description of Ukrainian government's nearest plans.
According to the minister, the capacity of Ukraine's participation in the
joint European space is permissible to the maximum. A deeper level of
economic integration - Ukraine's participation in the customs union, not
to mention the introduction of the joint currency - is harmful and
unacceptable for Kiev.
It is worth mentioning that the new elite is quite happy with the free
trade zone. It allows Ukraine to receive Russian energy carriers at fair
prices and to access Russian, Belarussian and Kazakh sales markets.
Another statement from the vice premier was devoted to Ukraine's
forthcoming membership in the WTO. The incorporation is supposed to
happen until the end of the current year. It is not ruled out that the new
Ukrainian government considers the variant of joining the World Trade
Organization "at all costs." Oleg Ribachuk described Ukraine's advantages
as a WTO member too: a WTO member can dictate certain conditions to
another country, which has not become a member yet.
Boris Tarasyuk, the former chairman of the parliamentary committee for
European integration, expressed his opinion about the presence of the
Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine's Sevaspotol. The official said that the
Russian Black Fleet should be based in Russia, not on the territory of
Ukraine. It brings up the idea that the new Ukrainian government is ready
to denounce previously concluded agreements. Tarasyuk used to be the head
of the Foreign Affairs Ministry in Ukraine, although he was dismissed from
the position on account of Moscow's pressure, as he believes so himself.
Now Boris Tarasyuk takes the post of the Foreign Minister in the new
Ukrainian government.
The above-mentioned details are enough to come to certain conclusions. Kiev
is obviously not intended to stick to its national interests in the future.
The new Ukrainian administration is persistently advancing towards Europe.
However, it is rather difficult for Ukraine to impress Western Europe with
such actions. It would be logic to presume that Yushchenko's team is
intended to take Ukraine to the USA. Ukraine's political course is clear at
least for one year ahead, when the parliamentary election takes place in
the country. The strategy and tactics of Yushchenko's team is obvious.
==========================================================
9. FAREWELL TO POST-SOVIET TERRITORY
The failure of Russia's final attempts to retain control over the CIS
Fedor Lukianov, chief editor of "Russia in Global Politics" magazine
Profil, No. 3, Moscow, Russia, January 31, 2005
[The transition period which dragged on for over a decade, a time
when the former Soviet states were of practically no interest to
the major players in geopolitics, is now over. For Russia, this
means that a fundamental revision of its CIS strategy is
required.]
When asked what kind of policy the European Union intends to
pursue on post-Soviet territory, a senior European Commission
official shrugged irritably and replied as follows: "It's the 21st
Century, and there's no longer any such thing as post-Soviet
policy! How long do you intend to keep thinking of all these
different countries as a single entity, just because they used to
be part of the USSR? For the next twenty years? Fifty years?"
It's a comprehensive answer. The transition period which
dragged on for over a decade, a time when the former Soviet states
were of practically no interest to the major players in
geopolitics, is now over. The process of global restructuring that
began with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 has
reached the expanses of Eurasia. For Russia, this means that a
fundamental revision of its strategy is required.
The outside world's attitude to post-Soviet territory has
changed, under the influence of three factors.
FIRSTLY, following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the
United States, the White House started focusing serious, long-term
attention on the Middle East and Central Asia. Certain states
which until then had only been mentioned in various "non-free"
rankings (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan) became urgently
necessary for the Pentagon as military springboards. In search of
suitable territory for a stopover point en route from Europe to
the new theater of military operations in the Persian Gulf region,
the United States turned its gaze to Ukraine. There was growing
interest in alternative sources of oil and gas; the "market value"
of Kazakhstan increased.
SECONDLY, the European Union is completing the expansion
process which has led to Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and the South
Caucasus becoming its direct neighbors.
Ensuring stable and predictable conditions along its borders
is one of the EU's basic priorities, which it pursues via its own
"mild" methods. The EU's new neighbors will soon be enmeshed in a
web of cooperation programs, and a "road-map" will be designed for
each one of them - with the nebulous prospect of EU membership
glimmering at the end of the tunnel, if all terms and regulations
are unconditionally fulfilled. That prospect will serve as an
incentive for transformations based on the European model.
THIRDLY, the Soviet-era nomenklatura, the ruling elites who
have run the post-Soviet states for over a decade, are now leaving
the arena. The Aliyev dynasty in Azerbaijan, which managed to
ensure a transfer of power from father to son, is an exception
rather than the rule thus far.
In the wake of recent developments in Georgia and Ukraine,
"designating" a successor will become more difficult even in the
most authoritarian states. In countries where elections are even
relatively free, any "heir" will have doubtful chances of success.
After all, existing regimes have been discredited almost very-
where, while more progressive alternatives are guaranteed to
receive at least moral support from the West.
The collapse of the USSR caught the West unawares, but it
seems that Moscow is unprepared for the changes currently under
way. Alas, Russia only showed some real interest in other CIS
countries after its "window of opportunity" started closing
rapidly. Throughout the first post-Soviet decade, Moscow could
have done almost anything it pleased in its neighbor-states: they
were experiencing profound social upheavals as their political
systems took shape, while the outside world showed no particular
wish to get involved in largely-incomprehensible post-Soviet
politics and feudal clan-based ethics.
During this favorable period, however, Russia was immersed in
its own problems. Although it had generally coped with its duties
as "crisis manager" in the "civilized divorce" era and when the
newly-independent states were first established, Russia later
showed that it wasn't up to the role of "research and development
manager": it failed to offer its partners any attractive
cooperation prospects. Instead, all its efforts went into
conservation. Firstly, Russia relied on supporting regimes already
in power (that is, the decreasingly popular Soviet-type
nomenklatura); secondly, it relied on maintaining the status quo
in local conflict zones. In practice, this meant freezing a dead-
end situation: the existence of quasi-state formations, dependent
on Russia, with no chance of political regulation.
The illusion of Russia's influence crumbled when Moscow,
abandoning the legacy of the 1990s, appeared to start really
believing that its "positions in the international arena had
become markedly stronger." Between November 2003 and
December 2004, Russia suffered a series of painful defeats. These
are certain to continue.
Scare-mongering about a revival of Russia's imperial
ambitions is popular in the West; traces of such ambitions are
discerned everywhere - from Moscow's rhetoric to efforts by
Russian companies to expand their presence in the markets of
Central Europe or the CIS.
In reality, what we are witnessing is the failure of Russia's
final attempts to retain control over its sphere of influence, as
well as its inability to come up with any kind of effective
policy.
The Kremlin's nervous reaction to these events is evidence
that the people in the Kremlin are aware of the scale of the
difficulties. All the same, as yet it doesn't appear that anyone
in the Kremlin has any idea of what to do. While certain bright
sparks among the Kremlin's political consultants have come up with
the idea of forming a "holy alliance" of conservative CIS regimes,
to fight the "revolution virus," this would only lead to problems
being greatly exacerbated: going against the current of historical
development is a thankless task, and a dangerous one. (Besides,
existing regimes in the CIS will now think twice about relying on
Moscow's support; it has ceased to be a guarantee of retaining
power.) At the other extreme, there is some behind-the-scenes talk
to the effect that the CIS is too costly, so perhaps Russia should
just wind up everything it has tried to build over the past 13
years; if the other CIS countries are parting company with us,
let's go all the way.
Russia is faced with a difficult task: it needs to take an
entirely new look at the so-called "near abroad." During these
years of independent development, the countries that used to make
up "the Soviet people" have moved away from both the Soviet Union
and Russia, further than we prefer to imagine. A post-Soviet
territory - united by common nostalgia, similar mindsets, and
matching goals - no longer exists. Any attempts to impose Russia's
perceptions of political order, based on "our common origins,"
only have the opposite effect.
Drawing parallels between the Soviet Union and the empires of
the West is a dubious exercise; the differences are many and
obvious. In terms of post-imperial behavior, however, Russia could
learn something from them.
Perhaps Russia need not get so agitated at the sight of
familiar regimes disappearing and new governments turning to new
patrons. It's a natural process. All we have to do is wait for the
pendulum to swing the other way, as it has in many post-colonial
states which turned back to the former metropolis after an initial
period of euphoria. After all, there won't be many takers in the
United States and Europe for the substantial task of solving the
complex problems of the post-Soviet states, shouldering the burden
of foreign territorial conflicts or devastated economies. In the
end, a metropolis still has some responsibility for the situation
in its former colonies, even in the modern world. The key word
here is "responsibility": that is, a sincere wish to solve a
problem for another country, as opposed to a disguised attempt to
grab an advantage.
It's no coincidence that such political maestros as former
German chancellors Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl take a very
cautious view of Ukraine's EU membership prospects. Indeed, our
neighbor-states will hardly be able to resist Russia's
gravitational pull if Russia continues to develop, becoming a
powerful, modern, necessarily democratic state. That's when the
cultural and historical momentum built up over centuries of co-
existence will start to have an effect.
Otherwise - that is, if Russia does not develop along the
lines described above - we shall have to console ourselves with
19th Century geopolitical structures and the perennial platitudes
about Russia having only two allies: its Army and its Navy. That's
assuming we still have an Army and Navy in more or less functional
condition. -30- [Translated by Pavel Pushkin]
=====================================================
10. IMAGINE
COMMENTARY: By Michael Emerson
The Wall Street Journal, NY, NY, Tue, February 8, 2005
When asked what he had been most concerned with in his long political
career, Harold Macmillan, the British prime minister of half a century ago,
replied: "Events, dear boy, events." Macmillan was certainly well-read
enough to have known Tolstoy's argument in War and Peace about the
flood-tides in the ocean of history. "Though the surface seemed motionless,
the movement of humanity continued as uninterrupted as the flow of time,"
Tolstoy wrote. "Coalitions of men came together and separated again; the
causes that would bring about the formation and the dissolution of empires
and the displacement of peoples were in course of preparation."
* * *
Our dear leaders of Europe are still having trouble keeping up with events,
especially regarding the political structure and geography of Europe. But
what are events telling us these days about the flood-tides in the ocean of
contemporary European history?
Principally the story is this. The EU has created a system of institutions
and values that have become the dominant gravitational force in the whole of
the European continent. Yet EU leaders find themselves confronted with a
strategic dilemma. On the one hand they would like to keep the EU reasonably
compact in number of member states; on the other, the high principle of
their system is to be open to all European democracies. As a result they
have created, although to their own surprise and not by strategic design,
the world's most powerful magnet, whose strict conditions for membership
transform the periphery in line with the model of the center.
This great conditionality machine is simple in essence, while hugely complex
in implementation. If you sincerely want to join the club, here are the
rules you have to respect, namely the infamous 30,000 pages of EU
legislation. But the leaders of the former communist states of Central and
Eastern Europe have discovered that this is the fastest and surest way of
achieving the transition into the modern world of liberal democracy and the
open society.
The EU has been trying for 20 years to persuade its neighbors to be
satisfied with close association arrangements, rather than full membership.
First there were the Nordic countries, who were offered full integration
within the EU's single market without political membership. Sweden and
Finland only took a few years before deciding that this was politically
unacceptable -- to be policy takers without a voice in policy making.
Then when the Berlin Wall fell it was thought that just the four Visegrad
states of Central Europe would be serious candidates, and the former Soviet
Baltic states were expected not to follow suit. But that did not work
either. Then it was supposed that Romania was incapable of making the grade,
but that seems to have been wrong again. And so here we are now with EU 25,
about to become EU 28 (with Bulgaria, Romania and soon after Croatia). As
for the rest of the Balkans, our leaders again found themselves unable to
stop the flood-tide of history, and have accepted that all of the region
should one day accede to what then would be EU of 33. By this time Norway
and Iceland would decide that it was time to join in, making EU 35.
Now the Turkey question is serious. Turkey is led by a formerly Islamist
party, which a few years ago was viewed with relief as proof of Turkey's
unsuitability for accession to the EU. Surprise event! The party says it has
converted itself into a Muslim equivalent of Germany's Christian Democratic
Party, and demonstrates that Islam is compatible with secular democracy
following exactly EU norms -- at a time when Europe's existential priority
is to avoid the clash of civilizations. So Turkey cannot be ignored any
longer.
But the floodtide does not stop there. Ukraine suddenly produces its orange
revolution, which no one thought its society was capable of. President
Viktor Yushchenko seems to know what he wants and how to get it. The way
into the EU is not through delivering speeches in Brussels but with concrete
deeds in Kiev, so he says, and that is exactly right. He now locks his
country into the great conditionality machine. Georgia and Armenia have also
been making explicit their objectives to achieve full membership, even
citing target dates. If they mean it, they too will have to lock into the
great conditionality machine. Of course when Romania accedes Moldova
will want to follow fast, especially if Ukraine is moving fast.
Maybe we can stop there, say EU 40 by the year 2025, with a population of
640 million. That leaves Russia and Switzerland as the only outsiders,
although Switzerland becomes a virtual member, already now joining the
Schengen area.
* * *
But could this extrapolation of the apparent flood of history really work? A
recent report by the CIA's National Intelligence Council, not so far
renowned for its EU expertise, informs us that the EU could collapse by
2020. Why should this speculation be taken seriously, when the main
functions of the EU have been quite solidly constructed? The single market
is virtually completed, and the idea of undoing it has no contact with
reality.
To be sure, national economic policy in the core of old Europe needs serious
reform to restore adequate growth, which is a slow process but not an
impossible one. The euro currency exists, its institutional guarantees of
sound money are very strong, and its gravitational power will see the zone
progressively extend. The freedom of movement for people across the union
is the achievement that people cherish most. The mechanisms of collective
foreign and security policies to guard against criminality, terrorism and
the disorders of failed states of the periphery are being built up, and
public opinion is close to unanimous in wanting to solidify this more. There
is the difficult issue of adapting the EU budget's redistributive function
as new and poor member states are admitted, but when it comes to money,
all compromises are in the end negotiable.
There is finally the most difficult constitutional issue, that of adapting
the decision-making institutions to function adequately with so many seats
at the table of the councils of ministers. The U.S. can function with 50
states, but could the less federal EU function with almost as many? The
Constitution currently awaiting ratification will be a move along the road,
but is certainly not the end of the road. Or is this constitution too much
for some (the U.K.), while not enough for others? The EU demos is not
mature enough to legitimize a much more federal system.
But these things change with the tides of history. How far has Europe come
in the last 50 years? Why not travel as far again in the next 25 to 50
years? The EU has certainly shown an extraordinary capacity to grow
incrementally and sustainably over its first 50 years, and huge advances in
trust, common understanding and in construction of institutions and a common
body of law have occurred.
* * *
The main variant or refinement to this EU-40 scenario concerns whether this
continuously enlarging EU would tend toward a unitary or increasingly
differentiated structure; or between what some have called a United States
of Europe (USE) versus a New Medieval Empire (NME). The point of the USE
is that the jurisdiction of the union would apply equally to all member
states, and the frontier between in and out would be well defined. The point
of
the NME is that beyond the core power structure there would be graduated
degrees of inclusion for a variety of associated states of the periphery,
and the
frontiers between in and out would be fuzzy.
The status quo is already core and periphery up to a point, given the
restricted membership of the euro and Schengen zones. Moreover the NME
model is now being enhanced in the EU's present attempt to design a European
Neighborhood Policy for Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean neighbors.
Yet all the pressures from the new member states are for completing their
accession into the euro and Schengen zones in only a matter of years. Old
Europe will not be able to keep these internal doors closed for long, even
if it wants to.
On the other hand there is the scheduled referendum that Tony Blair has
decided to hold in the U.K. over the European Constitution. If the U.K.
alone fails to ratify, as seems today to be a quite likely scenario, then
the U.K. may be obliged politically to secede from the EU as a full member
state, while no doubt seeking to remain integrated within the single market.
This would greatly boost the NME model. Later will come Turkey. Here Jacques
Chirac has pledged a referendum in France, which today would also fail. If
both these referendums were to fail, Europe would indeed be set on a NME
course, adding momentum to the idea that Ukraine and the Caucasus states
also, and maybe even some of the Balkan states, would have to put up with
various types of deep association rather than full EU membership. But that
would contradict the very principle of democratic equality, which is the
main point of converging on Europe in the first place.
The only certainty is that this dialectic -- the competition between the USE
and NME models -- will run on and on, and the result will be some kind of
evolving compromise between the two. While the U.S. constitution is set in
stone, that of the EU is going to remain a hot, fluid, plastic mold for
another 50 years. -30- [The Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Emerson is senior research fellow at the Center for European Policy
Studies in Brussels
==========================================================
11. UKRAINE: "THE POST-BATTLE LANDSCAPE"
COMMENTARY: By Yuri Scherbak,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine
[Former Ukraine Ambassador to the U.S., Mexico, Israel, and Canada]
The Day Weekly Digest in English, #2,
Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, 25 January 2005
[PART] 1
When I was working on my book Ukrayina: Vyklyk i Vybir (Ukraine: Challenge
and Choice], published by Dukh i Litera in Kyiv in 2003) on long winter
evenings in 2001-2002, I never expected that my prophecy would come true
so quickly, even miraculously. Allow me to quote: "In the near future
(before 2005) certain political and cadre changes will take place in the
upper
echelons of the government... a purifying process will commence; the people,
exhausted by corruption in high offices, will come close to understanding
that they can no longer live like that; young people (the new generation),
after ridding themselves of the last fears inherited from the Soviet period
will refuse to put up with the secretiveness, opacity, and clannishness of
governmental decision-making, especially since Ukrainian society will be
influenced by the examples of neighboring democracies, by the logic of
integration into the EU."
After returning to Ukraine in 2003, after almost a decade of ambassadorship,
and becoming immersed in the Ukrainian political reality, I was horrified by
the debased status of the nation-state and society. Living in Kyiv in 2003,
I was constantly aware of Ukraine returning to the Soviet past, as though it
were being carried there by a time machine; quite a few of my friends
admitted that they were secretly scared. They were afraid to voice their
opinions in the office and speak frankly on the phone. I was amazed by
certain media; having grown accustomed to CNN and CBC practices, I now
felt impotent in an atmosphere of rampant, shameless lies, hypocrisy, and
dirty campaigning. Bitterly I recalled my naive prophecies in Canada; the
Ukrainian reality boded nothing good and this awareness grew even
stronger after the 2004 presidential campaign began.
A geopolitical competition for Ukraine's destiny was in the making, without
a single guarantee of fair play. Law-abiding citizens and MPs who had the
nerve to join the opposition became enemies of the people; they were
subjected to ruthless criticism and ostracism, and no one even bothered to
consider the possibility of the opposition eventually coming to power. I
thought of Canada, of course, where the opposition leader has an official
residence slightly smaller than the prime minister's and where the
opposition is a respected and integral part of public life.
And then, suddenly purification began, like a burst of youthful, orange
flame, the early arrival of spring, like a miraculous revelation.
[PART] 2
The events in November-December 2004, referred to as the Orange Revolution,
marked a turning point in our national history; for the first time in the
thirteen years of the Ukrainian state's existence a determined effort was
made to alter the dangerous trajectory of its development, which had become
disastrous in 2000-2004, with a semi-feudal, semi-monarchical,
autocratic-clannish state forming in Europe, where under the guise of
virtual European integration slogans a post-Soviet model was being asserted,
accompanied by the exploitation of both power structures and criminal
elements. All that was missing was the addition of another color to the
blue-and-yellow colors of Ukraine's flag-red, the color of death squads. The
result would be the Colombian national flag.
Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, as the government-nominated presidential
candidate, brought with him specific methods of state administration, ones
that had been tested in the Donetsk region, namely, a total amalgamation of
political, administrative, and economic power in manual control mode, total
disregard of democratic procedures, social demagoguery, populist rhetoric,
and utter incomprehension of Ukraine as a singular spiritual, historical,
cultural, and national phenomenon.
Ukrainian society did not become aware of the threat quickly enough. Even
worse, a large part of the political community (the so-called in-power
coalition) welcomed Yanukovych's presidential candidacy, regarding him as
someone who would continue the "rebuilding" of a type of state popular on
the territory of the CIS, in which life is good only for those who are close
to the monarch.
The Orange Revolution began with fatally dangerous tardiness, for Viktor
Yanukovych had been proclaimed the next president of Ukraine. It was a
desperate effort on the part of millions who saw the light and realized what
was coming in the next couple of days; who could now see what they could
expect from the new government. Mass protest actions swept over the western
and central (the most European-minded) territories of Ukraine. Such dramatic
actions could not but give birth to fresh myths, legends, and simplified
populist notions about exceptionally complex sociopolitical processes that
were unfolding in Ukraine.
Thus, a number of Ukrainian and Western media alleged that:
A new Ukrainian nation-state had been born and a civil society established
in the course of the Orange Revolution;
A truly independent Ukrainian judiciary system had been formed and that the
media had miraculously turned free and independent.
To this thesis, formulated on the wave of public euphoria, Russian and
Donetsk-based pro-Russian propagandists added an antithesis borrowed from
the Cold War arsenal, namely, that a coup d'tat had occurred in Ukraine, an
unconstitutional act, as a result of the direct interference of the US and
EU in sovereign Ukraine's internal affairs.
These and other allegations and campaign stunts have nothing to do with
realities in Ukraine, although some of them look and sound convincing. They
must be refuted.
1. The events that took place between November 22 and December 26, 2004,
did not signify a revolution in the true sense of the word (if one
understands revolution as a substantial change in the existing political
order,
ruling elite, and social relations).
What happened then was the promising beginning of a long-awaited
revolutionary process aimed at bringing about revolutionizing changes within
Ukrainian society (personally, I prefer to describe it as a cleansing
process). Such a process is likely to take between five and ten years and
will be a complicated and painful one, complete with counterrevolutionary
revanchist attempts, considering that the existing confrontation involves
the European and Soviet parts of Ukraine.
2. A new political nation is being born in Ukraine; this process is belated,
compared to other countries, such as Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic,
Italy, et al. - this process should have started 100 or even 200 years
earlier. The previous Ukrainian state did not pay enough attention to the
nation-building process in the European sense of the word. What happened on
the Maidan in Kyiv made changes in terms of the Ukrainian population and
social situation more apparent and better defined, as a new generation had
appeared in the arena of life: European-minded Ukrainians aged between 25
and 35, resolved to push to the margins of political life the generation of
Red- time managers and administrators, Soviet Communist bureaucrats and
aging romantics of the early 1990s. Such is the ruthless law of renewal. The
ruling clans, while engaged in pitched battles to expand their spheres of
political, business, and media influence, failed to notice the emergence of
a new middle class in Ukraine, mostly young and energetic people who opposed
the state's arbitrary rule and were determined to protect their civil
rights. The events of 2004 are reminiscent of the bourgeois democratic
revolutions of the 17th- 19th centuries in Europe, which were aimed at
toppling feudal and monarchic regimes.
3. A civil society is in the making in Ukraine. It's hardly proper to
describe those 150-200 more or less influential nongovernmental
organizations and funds (known collectively as NGOs) as hallmarks of a civil
society, considering that they are kept afloat by grants from the West. Such
NGOs can only be considered as a catalyst spurring civil society into
existence, and as its harbingers. Only the introduction of strong local
self-government and the emergence of such powerful NGOs (specializing in
the protection of human/civil rights, protection of the environment,
consumer
protection, etc.), forcing the government and political parties to heed
their voices, will mean that a genuine civil society has been formed in
Ukraine.
4. The courageous and unprecedented ruling of the Supreme Court of Ukraine,
which annulled the rigged results of the November 21 runoff election, did
not mean that Ukraine was now a state ruled by law. The struggle against
corruption and lawlessness in the law enforcement and judiciary domains will
be a long and complicated process.
5. Setting up a system of independent mass media in Ukraine is in the
embryonic phase. There will always exist a group of influential politicians,
magnates who own and run the media, as well as those journalists who serve
them, who will be tempted by huge sums of money and great power to
manipulate information and distort it in the service of the noblest causes
(strengthening the national spirit, upholding public morals, combating
internal and external enemies, etc.).
6. The most serious challenge facing newly elected President Viktor
Yushchenko and his team is the multitude of inflated hopes for a miracle to
be worked in Ukraine, harbored by all those ordinary people who expect
speedy changes for the better in all spheres of life. The next couple of
years will very quickly show how justified these inflated expectations are.
The new government will have to pay a dear price for this trust.
One of the main, and perhaps insoluble, problems is the controversy between
the radical, democratically-minded elemental force on the Maidan and the
politicking that is inherent in the upper echelons of government, the
tendency of leaders to compromise and engage in backroom wheeling and
dealing.
How are we to preserve the priceless revolutionary energy of the masses
(their orientation toward decisive changes) and, at the same time, to help
the new political leadership retain the ability to carry out subtle
political maneuvers in order to reach a number of vitally important
compromises - e.g., between political parties at the Verkhovna Rada, between
the government, the regional elites, and big business, between the new
Orange revolutionary generation and professional diplomats loyally serving
the new regime, the military, special services, and other power structures?
Poland's cadre experience after Solidarity's victory may come in handy here,
considering that not only the revolutionary wing but also liberal-minded
communists got a chance to create a third Rzeczpospolita. In the end, only
the most odious figures, who were tarnished by their participation in the
crimes of the previous regime, were removed from the chessboard.
[PART] 3
One should expect the following priority moves from the new Ukrainian
government:
Economic/business freedoms to be conferred on the broadest strata of society
by decisively deregulating and de-bureaucratizing excessively complex
bureaucratic procedures (the possibility of registering a business within
five days), along with a sharp decrease in inspections by regulatory
authorities, the elimination by the state of preferential treatment for
individual representatives of business, including tax concessions, and so
on);
Basic law enforcement reform in order to secure the rule of law; the
separation of the executive from the judiciary branch; the creation of a
special agency in the Presidential Administration to monitor observance of
citizens' constitutional rights and liberties;
Initiation of a strategic dialogue between the regions of Ukraine in order
to overcome existing controversies and to develop a program to decentralize
central power, while authorizing the regions to exercise maximum economic
and social rights, along with retaining Ukraine's unitary status;
Preparations for an actual political reform, with an eye to the European
experience;
Rendering maximum assistance to foreign investors by liberalizing customs
clearance and official registration procedures, while waging a resolute
struggle against corruption in these domains;
Implementation of several programs aimed at increasing the employment rate
(e.g., inexpensive housing construction programs, with construction costs
payable in 20-25-year installments; setting up a modern transportation
infrastructure, like in the US, organizing technoparks, reviving Ukrainian
towns and townships, and developing tourism);
Ensuring the reliability of social programs-e.g., implementing a realistic
health care reform.
Without a doubt, the main criterion by which people will consider whether
their dreams are coming true will be the overall domestic atmosphere rather
than external attributes; they will pass judgment proceeding from whether
the life of an individual has become easier, whether the Ukrainian living
standard has improved; whether the gap between the state and the people has
been bridged; whether people are no longer afraid to voice their opinions;
whether talented young people want to live and work in Ukraine.
PART 4 --
The Yanukovych phenomenon, including the twelve million voters who support
him, deserves serious attention. On December 26, 2004, Viktor Yushchenko's
campaign analysts said their candidate would win the campaign with a larger
margin (e.g., 60/40). A complete, unbiased analysis of the campaign turnout
will not be helped by talk about treacherous regional authorities and
turning people into zombies through disinformation. Even if several million
voters cast their ballots for Yanukovych out of "regional patriotism" - or
owing to the absence of any moral criteria ("OK, he is a con, but he's our
man!") - the problem cannot be reduced to schematic, superficial
explanations.
It is true that the idea that Viktor Yushchenko is an embodiment of evil,
that he will persecute all Russian-speaking citizens and will ban Pushkin
and Leo Tolstoy in Ukraine, was pounded into the heads of millions of
people. What is tragic is that millions of people believed or were prepared
to believe this propaganda.
Here one has a vast opportunity for research in the spheres of psychology
and social studies. Despite decades of official propaganda about the
fraternity of all peoples (Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, etc.) that
formed the great Soviet nation, we are now faced with the phenomenon of
mistrust, dislike, and even hatred for all things Ukrainian. The bitter
truth is that some Ukrainian nationals despise Ukraine and Ukrainians, so
they could only reject a candidate who was sincerely devoted to his native
land. I was shocked to read statistics revealing that most electorate in
regions with a Russian population of over 13% voted for Viktor Yanukovych.
Convincing these Yanukovych supporters to support the Ukrainian choice is
only possible by providing tangible economic arguments, never by way of
forceful Ukrainization. One is reminded of Canada and the Quebec challenge,
when that French-speaking province was on the verge of withdrawing from the
country of the maple leaf. The fleure-de-lys [floral emblem of Quebec]
hotheads sobered up only when they realized that this would mean an exodus
of English-speaking capital and business and a sharp decline in the local
economy.
As for Viktor Yanukovych, his future political career looks highly
questionable. Is he really capable of heading a strong opposition faction or
party? Mr. Yanukovych has demonstrated that he is a far cry from Richard
Nixon; he can't face up to a real challenge, as evidenced by his lapse into
the characteristic language of threats and insults. Viktor Yanukovych has
demonstrated his political impotence, and it is also true that champions of
destruction and losers are not popular in Ukraine, not even in the Donbas.
The Donbas coal and steel cartels should think about obtaining EU and US
export quotas rather than risking their revenues and business stability by
supporting a frustrated political outsider.
[PART] 5
The presidential campaign took place in the context of important
geopolitical changes in the world political arena, connected with the
intensification of globalization. The United States has entered a new phase
of the pitched battle for energy resources, setting up a supranational
mega-coalition and reinforcing its positions in geostrategic regions of the
world, focusing on the Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea. Ukraine's importance,
as a country situated close to these regions, is increasing. The United
States cannot reconcile itself with the loss of Ukraine and its absorption
by the "liberal" Russian empire, most convincingly evidenced by the events
of November-December 2004. Prior to the Orange Revolution, Washington
issued firm, unequivocal statements to the effect that Ukraine must remain
an independent and democratic country, one that is integrated in the
Euro-Atlantic structure, while retaining neighborly relations with Russia.
At the same time, the United States, making no secret of its geopolitical
interests, acted correctly during the presidential campaign in Ukraine,
without meddling in its internal affairs or openly supporting either of the
presidential candidates. Russia did the exact opposite; Russian spin doctors
acted so brazenly as to cause a massive response of popular protest, which
increased the number of Yushchenko voters by at least several million. One
should not forget President Putin's unprecedented meddling in the Ukrainian
information space during his interactive interview given in the offices of
Leonid Kuchma's Presidential Administration. Can you picture a Mexican
president, urging the US electorate to vote for a candidate favorable to
Mexico, speaking from the White House, because that candidate will
introduce Spanish as another official language in the States for the benefit
of 30 million Mexican Americans?
Among the reasons behind Russia's fiasco in Ukraine is the Russian elite's
disastrous misconception of the nature of relations between the two peoples,
of the great distinctions historically formed under Russian imperial rule,
which deepened in the years of Ukrainian independence.
The results of the presidential election are proof that Ukraine (at least
two-thirds of the electorate) has chosen to embark on a European democratic
and separate, independent road of progress, where individual human liberties
are really appreciated, where the state-for-man rather than
man-for-the-state principle is predominant.
Regrettably, it is safe to assume that Russia is adopting a different
centralist-imperial paradigm in its evolution, a model that I regard as
totally ineffective and archaic in both domestic and foreign political
terms.
President Viktor Yushchenko will be faced with fundamental foreign political
problems, namely:
Normalizing relations with Russia based not on subservient obedience to the
Kremlin ruler, but on cooperating on truly equal partnership terms;
Dealing with the Single Economic Space;
Figuring out how politely to call it quits with the CIS nomenklatura-type
assemblage of former first secretaries and pull out of this totally
ineffective prosthesis of the USSR, and replacing it with a less pompous but
more effective mechanism of bilateral and multilateral cooperation;
Deciding how to invigorate the GUUAM as a geopolitical energy-transportation
alliance of countries in the Caspian Sea region and Eastern Europe;
Coming to a decision on how to expedite Ukraine's NATO membership, thus
ending Ukraine's existence in that gray security area; to this end, it would
be important to have a NATO base deployed in Ukraine to counterbalance
the Sevastopol Russian naval base;
Adopting priority measures for resuming a fully developed Ukrainian-US
strategic partnership.
And last but not least:
Deciding how united Europe is to be convinced that Ukraine means business;
how the Ukrainian people are to be convinced that the chosen geopolitical
course is vitally important for the nation.
I would like to point out that Ukraine badly needs its own analytical and
forecasting think tanks, something along the lines of the US Rand
Corporation, ones that would be independent of the government's whims and
work not to satisfy a leader's or structure's interests but to establish the
lasting truth, which is often a bitter pill for a government to swallow.
[PART] 6
Few generations have experienced such historically significant events as the
end of the Cold War, the fall of the Soviet empire, the emergence of the
Ukrainian nation-state, and finally its revival and fresh hopes for a truly
free and democratic Ukraine.
Our generation is one of those privileged few.
Let us be worthy of this historical choice. We must measure up.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
LINK: http://day.kiev.ua/131102/
==========================================================
12. ECHOES OF YALTA'S FAILURE TODAY
OPINION: By Christianane Hoffman
Deutsche Welle, Friday, February 4, 2005
Sixty years ago on Feb. 4, Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt and Josef
Stalin gathered in Ukraine to map out the postwar world. DW's Christiane
Hoffmann sees echoes of Stalin's power grab today.
In the agreement at the end of the Yalta Conference, the Big Three swore to
bring freedom and democracy into the new world order. They planned,
according to the Atlantic Charter to guarantee "the right of all people to
choose the form of government under which they will live."
How much this sentence was really worth was revealed very quickly after the
Yalta conference, held from Feb. 4 to Feb. 10. It became true for only one
half of Europe, while the other spent the next few decades under further
dictatorship. It was a bad omen both for the recently-founded United
Nations and for the assertiveness of international agreements.
Stalin held all the cards
Stalin signed the agreement only because he was sure that neither the US
nor Britain would seriously demand democracy and freedom in the
Soviet-occupied territories -- whether in the form of free elections and a
democratically-elected government in Poland, nor in other central European
countries.
The Red Army had by that time already advanced too far, and the British and
Americans were too weak in comparison and still occupied with the war
against Japan. In fact, the Allies were worried that the Soviets would try
and occupy all of Europe. At Yalta, Great Britain and America were able to
secure the territories they had already gained.
They would continue to cooperate with the Soviets in Germany, but it was
soon clear that a long-term division of Germany, and the rest of Europe,
was already in the works. In Soviet-occupied zones in Germany, as well as
in other countries, they began rebuilding administrative structures along
their own designs.
Jotting down spheres of influence
British Premier Churchill and Stalin showed how practical power politics
could cancel out noble principles as early as October 1944, when they met
in Moscow. On little pieces of paper, they jotted down their ideas of
Western and Soviet influence in the new Europe.
Their plan: Romania would have 90 percent Soviet influence and Bulgaria, 75
percent. Greece would have 90 percent Western influence and Yugoslavia, 50
percent.
They never got to Poland and the other countries, which quickly fell victim
to the Soviet Union's power grab after the Yalta conference. As a result,
more than 100 million people went from living under a National Socialist
regime to a Stalinist regime.
West never thought to question postwar order
It wasn't the West's commitment to its principles that brought the
suppressed populations democracy and freedom, but the implosion of Soviet
power that could no longer stand the pressure of its freedom-hungry
citizens.
The dissolution of the postwar order agreed on in Yalta surprised not only
those in power in central and eastern Europe, but Western leaders as well,
who never really tried to question that order.
Russia's new power grab
The postwar division on the European continent appeared to be overcome with
the entry of central European countries into the European Union nine months
ago. But a new dividing line has already taken its place.
This one is further east, along the border separating the Commonwealth of
Independent States countries and Russia, which is turning further away from
democratic principles and towards centralized power. Old imperial
tendencies are trendy once again in Putin's Russia.
And how is the West reacting today? Not much differently than in Yalta.
Looking the other way
Criticism of Russia is taboo because it is needed as a strategic partner --
democracy, freedom of the press or human rights in Chechnya can be
threatened as much as they like and where they like.
And the populations of the countries that Russia includes in its sphere of
interest -- such as Belarus or Ukraine -- have not been able to count on
the support of the West. Otherwise, Belarus would have been hit with harder
sanctions and Ukraine given a long-term perspective of joining the European
Union.
But don't bother about all of that. Politics is still politics, just as it
was 60 years ago in Yalta. -30-
==========================================================
13. TYMOSHENKO AND POLAND'S PRIME MINISTER MAREK
BELKA DISCUSS ODESA-BRODY OIL PIPE LINE
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Tue, February 8, 2005
KYIV - Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and Poland's Prime Minister
Marek Belka have discussed the use of the Odesa-Brody oil pipeline and
organization of the Year of Ukraine in Poland in 2005.
The press service of the Polish Council of Ministers announced this in a
statement, citing a February 7 telephone conversation between the two
prime ministers.
"The issue of the Odesa-Brody oil pipeline also found a place among the
other issues that were raised during the telephone conversation," the
statement said. Tymoshenko said that a meeting on the pipeline would
take place on February 9.
"We also spoke ... about commemoration of the Year of Ukraine in Poland in
2005: last year was the Year of Poland in Ukraine," the press service of the
Polish Council of Ministers said.
Tymoshenko and Marek also discussed Ukraine's negotiations with the European
Union on approval of the Ukrainian-European Union action plan that is
scheduled for Brussels (Belgium) on February 21.
Marek again gave assurance of his country's support for the deepening of
Ukraine's relations with the European Union and NATO.
Tymoshenko thanked Poland for its participation in the resolution of the
conflict that erupted in Ukraine after the second round of the 2004
presidential elections.
"Ukraine's were convinced of how good friends the Poles are," the press
service of the Polish Council of Ministers quoted Tymoshenko as saying.
Marek said he attached huge importance to his visit to Ukraine that is
scheduled for between late February and early March.
"The head of the Polish government will pay a visit to Ukraine at the
juncture of February and March," the statement said.
As Ukrainian News earlier reported, Belka plans to focus particular
attention to the issue of the Odesa-Brody oil pipeline during his visit.
The Year of Poland in Ukraine opened on March 30, 2004.
The Year of Georgia in Ukraine will open in March 2005. -30-
==========================================================
14. PUTIN TO VISIT UKRAINE IN LATE FEBRUARY OR EARLY MARCH
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Tue, February 8, 2005
KYIV - President of Russia Vladimir Putin plans to visit Ukraine in late
February or early March. Foreign Minister Borys Tarasiuk made this
statement to the press.
He said his ministry is making preparations for the visit at the instruction
of President Viktor Yuschenko. 'The visit will take place within a month,'
Tarasiuk added.
He also reminded that he agreed with United States' Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice to make mutual visits and that Yuschenko will meet with
US President George Bush on February 22 at a meeting of the Ukraine-
NATO Commission. Tarasiuk further said that his ministry is preparing a
visit of Yuschenko to the US, but refused to give the dates.
As Ukrainian News earlier reported, Yuschenko called on Ukrainian diplomats
to develop relations with Russia. The President said on January 26 that he
considered it is necessary to work out a package of documents aimed at
improving relations between Ukraine and Russia in 2005. -30-
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SIGMABLEYZER MONTHLY MACROECONOMIC REPORTS
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1. UKRAINE -- Macroeconomic Situation - December 2004
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http://www.sigmableyzer.com/files/ROM_Ec_Situation_12_04.pdf
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