"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT"
An International Newsletter
In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis, and Commentary
"The Art of Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion,
Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World"
"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT" - Number 451
E. Morgan Williams, Publisher and Editor
morganw@patriot.net, ArtUkraine.com@starpower.net
Washington, D.C. and Kyiv, Ukraine, MONDAY, March 28,2005
-----INDEX OF ARTICLES-----
"Major International News Headlines and Articles"
1. UKRAINE PRESIDENT VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO PLANS TO SPEAK
IN WASHINGTON, CHICAGO AND BOSTON DURING VISIT TO USA
Kateryna Yushchenko To Speak at University of Chicago
E. Morgan Williams, Publisher and Editor
THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT
Washington, D.C., Monday, March 28, 2005
2. PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE TO SPEAK AT GEORGETOWN UNIV.
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., March, 2005
3. PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO WILL SPEAK
TO THE CHICAGO COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
Chicago, Illinois, March, 2005
4. "UKRAINE: NEW WAVE OF DEMOCRACY"
Speech by Viktor Yushchenko, President of Ukraine, at Harvard
April 5, 2005, Institute of Politics
The Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts, March 23, 2005
5. LEADER OF ORANGE REVOLUTION COMING TO WASHINGTON
Orange Revolution Rally, Shevchenko Monument &
Banquet in Washington, D.C. on Wed, April 6, 2005
THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT
Washington, D.C., Monday, March 28, 2005
6. "UKRAINE'S ORANGE OUTLOOK"
By Jaroslawa Zelinsky Johnson
National Strategy Forum Review
A quarterly publication of the National Strategy Forum
Chicago, Illinois, Volume 15, Issue 2, Spring 2005
7. UKRAINE LEADER TO STAY AWAY FROM MOSCOW WAR EVENTS
Reuters, Kiev, Ukraine, Sat, March 26, 2005
8. UKRAINE PRESSED TO REOPEN 'ACCIDENT' CASE
Death of charismatic opposition leader Vyacheslav Chornovil
By Mara D. Bellaby, Associated Press Writer
AP - Europe, Friday, March 25, 2005
9. UKRAINIAN FOREIGN MINISTER BORYS TARASYUK SAYS
CIS HAS NO FUTURE IN PRESENT FORM
TV 5 Kanal, Kiev, in Ukrainian 2100 gmt 24 Mar 05
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Thu, March 24, 2005
10. MASTER CARD CAUGHT FRAUD PERPETRATORS IN UKRAINE
By Kirill Yacheistov, Kommersant,
Moscow, Russia, Monday, March 28, 2005
11. THE POLITICS OF POP
Andrew Mueller can see a better Eurovision Song Contest
By Andrew Mueller, The Guardian
London, UK, Saturday, March 26, 2005
12. UKRAINE KICKS OFF CORRUPTION CLEAN-UP --
WITH A BAN ON BATHS
By Andrew Osborn in Moscow, Independent
London, UK, Sunday, 27 March 2005
13. WRITING ON THE WALL FOR SOVIET-ERA LEADERS
By Stefan Wagstyl, Financial Times
London, UK, Friday, March 25 2005
14. BUSH RISKS PUTIN'S IRE WITH VISIT TO TWO
FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS, LATVIA AND GEORGIA
By Peter Baker, Washington Post Staff Writer
The Washington Post, Washington, D.C.
Friday, March 25, 2005; Page A16
15. RUSSIA FUMBLES, FORMER SPHERE OF INFLUENCE DEFLATES
Moscow has all but lost a hold on ex-Soviet states by
underestimating the populace, analysts say.
By Kim Murphy, Times Staff Writer
Los Angeles Times, Los Angeles, CA, Sat, March 26, 2005
16. UKRAINIAN CHURCH LEADERS DIFFER OVER MOSCOW
PATRIARCH'S JURISDICTION OVER UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH
TV 5 Kanal, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1700 gmt 27 Mar 05
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Sun, March 27, 2005
17. YUSHCHENKO APPOINTS VOLODYMYR HORBULIN AND
LEONID KOZACHENKO AS HIS ADVISORS
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Sat, March 5, 2005
===============================================================
1. UKRAINE PRESIDENT VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO PLANS TO SPEAK
IN WASHINGTON, CHICAGO AND BOSTON DURING VISIT TO USA
Kateryna Yushchenko To Speak at University of Chicago
E. Morgan Williams, Publisher and Editor
THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT
Washington, D.C., Monday, March 28, 2005
WASHINGTON - Viktor Yushchenko, leader of the Orange Revolution
and now President of Ukraine, is planning several speeches during
his first 'official' visit to the United States since becoming president
of Ukraine. The first lady of Ukraine, Kateryna Chumachenko
Yushchenko, will also make a 'public' presentation.
The latest reports indicate President Yushchenko will speak in Wash-
ington, Chicago and Boston. Mrs. Yushchenko will speak in Chicago.
According to the most reliable information now available the President
of Ukraine and Mrs. Yushchenko, will make the following appearances:
(1) Speech by Viktor Yushchenko, Georgetown University,
Washington, D.C., Monday afternoon, April 4, 2005. [see article
number TWO below for details]
(2) Speech by Viktor Yushchenko, Chicago Council on Foreign
Relations, Chicago, Illinois, Monday evening, April 4, 2005. [See
article number THREE below for details]
(3) Speech by Kateryna Chumachenko Yushchenko, University
of Chicago, Chicago, Tuesday morning, April 5, 2005. Kateryna
Yushchenko has a business degree from the University of
Chicago] [If any one has the details about this speech please
send them to us]
(4) Speech by Viktor Yushchenko, Harvard University, Boston,
Massachusetts, Tuesday afternoon, April 5, 2005. [See article
number FOUR below for details]
(5) Orange Revolution Rally, Shevchenko Monument in Washington
Washington, D.C., Wednesday noon, April 6, 2005. [see article
number FIVE below for details]
(6) Banquet in Honor Of President Viktor Yushchenko -- Washington,
D.C. Wednesday evening, April 6, 2005. [see article number FIVE
below for details.]
There is also the possibility Viktor Yushchenko will address a joint
session of the U.S. Congress while in Washington on Wednesday,
April 6, No official announcement has been made by either the
Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives or by the Office of
the President of Ukraine. Several Washington and Kyiv insiders
say they believe the address before Congess will take place. -30-
============================================================
2. PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE TO SPEAK AT GEORGETOWN UNIV.
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., March, 2005
WASHINGTON - Dr. John J. DeGioia, President of Georgetown
University and His Excellency Mykhailo Reznik, Ambassador of Ukraine
to the United States invite you to an address by His Excellency Victor
Yushchenko, President of Ukraine, Monday, the Fourth of April, two
Thousand Five, Four O'clock in the Afternoon, Gaston Hall, Georgetown
University, Washington, D.C.
Register at http://president.georgetown.edu/news.html. [Your editor
tried this link and did not find any place where one can register]
Guests are reminded that no bags or backpacks will be permitted
inside Gaston Hall. Check-in will begin at 3:00 p.m. and be held
in the Healy Foyer. Guests must be seated by 3:45 p.m. A valid
G.U. Photo I.D. will be required. -30-
============================================================
3. PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO WILL SPEAK
TO THE CHICAGO COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
Chicago, Illinois, March, 2005
CHICAGO - The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations is pleased that
Victor Yushchenko will join us to address his election as president of
Ukraine on December 26, 2004, after weeks of turmoil following the
November runoff election.
The world watched in amazement as hundreds of thousands of
Yushchenko's supporters took to the streets of the capital and other
cities in protest in what became known as the Orange Revolution named
after Yushchenko's signature campaign color.
The address by His Excellency Victor Yushchenko, President of Ukraine,
will be held Monday, April 4, 2005, at The Palmer House Hilton, Grand/
State Ballroom, 4th Floor, 17 East Monroe, Chicago. The doors will open
at 6:30 p.m. and the Keynote lecture will be at 7:30 p.m. The cost for
Members is $20, and for Nonmembers $25.
Reservations are MANDATORY. They should be made by mail, fax or
online by noon, Friday, April 1, and are taken on a first-come, first-served
basis. Sorry, no phone reservations. Reservations not cancelled by noon
on Friday, April 1, will be charged. Please check the Council's website:
http://www.ccfr.org/events/eventall2.asp?id=403
For security purposes, plan to arrive early and bring photo identification.
No tickets will be sold at the door.
Victor A. Yushchenko was born on February 23, 1954 in Khoruzhivka, Sumy
Oblast, Ukraine into a family of teachers. In 1975, Mr. Yushchenko graduated
from the Ternopil Finance and Economics Institute and returned in 1976 to
Sumy, where he worked as an economist and department chief at the regional
affiliate of the USSR State Bank.
In 1984, Mr. Yushchenko obtained his graduate degree in finance and credit
from the Ukrainian Institute of Economics and Agricultural Management.
Shortly thereafter, he moved to Kyiv and was appointed deputy director for
agricultural crediting at the Ukrainian Republican Office of the USSR State
Bank, a position he held from 1985-1987.
Moving to the Ukrainian Agro-Industrial Bank, Mr. Yushchenko served first as
department director (1987-1991), and later as deputy chairman of the board
of directors (1991-1993). At that time, he was also first deputy chairman of
the board at Bank Ukrayina. In 1993-1999, Mr. Yushchenko was Governor
of the National Bank of Ukraine.
Victor Yushchenko is married to Kateryna Yushchenko, a native of Chicago,
who as an American of Ukrainian descent previously served as an official for
the U.S. State Department. The president has three daughters and two sons
and two grandchildren. -30- [Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
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The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
332 South Michigan Avenue, Suite 1100
Chicago, Illinois 60604-4434
Phone: (312) 726-3860, Fax: (312) 821-7555
LINK: http://www.ccfr.org/events/eventall2.asp?id=403
============================================================
4. UKRAINE: NEW WAVE OF DEMOCRACY
Speech by Viktor Yushchenko, President of Ukraine, at Harvard
April 5, 2005, Institute of Politics
The Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts, March 23, 2005
HARVARD - The Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University
is pleased to inform you of the following special forum event:
The John F. Kennedy, Jr Forum
Ukraine: New Wave of Democracy
Viktor Yushchenko, President of Ukraine
April 5, 2005, 3:00 to 4:30 PM
Institute of Politics, Harvard Kennedy School of Government
79 John F. Kennedy Street, Cambridge, MA
President Yushchenko's visit to Harvard University is co-hosted by
the Ukrainian Research Institute, The Kennedy School of Govern-
ment, and the Harvard Business School.
Tickets to the Forum will be determined by lottery. To register for
the lottery, please go to http://www.iop.harvard.edu/. Click on the
Yushchenko Forum announcement to be brought to the ticket
registration page.
Registration for tickets will take place between March 23 and March
30. All registrants will be informed about ticket availability on April
1 and will be provided with instructions for ticket pick up.
For further information on HURI events, please contact HURI at:
Phone: 617/ 495-4053; Fax: 617/ 495-8097
E-mail: huri@fas.harvard.edu; http://www.iop.harvard.edu/
http://www.iop.harvard.edu/lottery.php?lottery=ukrainepres
============================================================
5. LEADER OF ORANGE REVOLUTION COMING TO WASHINGTON
Orange Revolution Rally, Shevchenko Monument
Banquet in Washington, D.C. on April 6, 2005
THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT
Washington, D.C., Monday, March 28, 2005
WASHINGTON - Tickets to the banquet being held in honor of
Viktor Yushchenko, the new President of Ukraine, on Wednesday
evening, April 6, in Washington, D.C, can now be purchased
on-line through the website of the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation,
www.usukraine.org or http://www.usukraine.org./banquet.shtml.
The large banquet will be held in the Omni Shoreham Hotel
ballroom in Washington. A reception will begin at 6:30 p.m
and the banquet will be held at 7:30 p.m. on April 6. Tickets
are available to the public for the banquet. President Yushchenko
will speak at the banquet. The first lady of Ukraine, Kateryna
Chumachenko Yushchenko, will be with the President at
the banquet. Details for the banquet as follows:
Where: Omni Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D.C.
2500 Calvert Street, N.W. (at Connecticut Ave)
When: Wednesday, April 6, 2005
Reception: 6:30 p.m.; Dinner: 7:30 p.m.
Dress: Black Tie Optional
Attendance: Tickets for the banquet are now on sale to the
public for $200.00 each. One can purchase a ticket by check
or on-line at http://www.usukraine.org. Seating is limited and
the space available will be sold on the basis of the time
tickets were purchased. The banquet is expected to be sold
out in a very short period of time.
Checks should be made out to the 'Yushchenko Banquet
Committee' and mailed [with complete contact information]
immediately to the: Ukrainian Washington Credit Union,
P.O. Box 19228, Alexandria, Virginia 22320-1228.
Financial sponsors are needed for the two events. Special
sponsor tables (seating ten people) are available for the
Yushchenko banquet for $2,500.00 each.
Sponsor tables have already been purchased by Coca-Cola,
Deere & Co, SIgmaBleyzer Investment Banking Group, PBN
Company, Eurasia Foundation, Alex & Helen Woskob, Zenia
Chernyk, Ukrainian Federation of America, Ukrainian Self
Reliance Federal Credit Union, and many other organizations,
companies and individuals.
INSTRUCTIONS TO PURCHASE TICKETS ON-LINE
STEP 1. Go to the US-Ukraine Foundation (USUF) Website:
Click On: http://www.usukraine.org or click on the link directly
to the exact page: http://www.usukraine.org./banquet.shtml
STEP 2. Then click on the following message in the lower
left part of the home page:
"BUY TICKETS to Yushchenko banquet."
STEP 3. Then Scroll down the page that gives information about
the visit of President Yushchenko to Washington and find where
it says: To Pay By Credit Card and click on the button below
that says: ADD TO CART.
STEP 4. Then fill out completely all of the information required
to purchase the Yushchenko banquet tickets. This service is
open to everyone through PAYPAL and one does NOT have
to be have a PAYPAL account to purchase tickets.
A purchaser has the choice of using their PAYPAL account
or not doing this. All persons can use this process. You do
not need to have a PAYPAL account to purchase tickets.
Because of the short time remaining before the Banquet there
will not tickets. The Committee will keep track of all those
who have paid and will have the complete list at the door
the evening of the banquet, Wednesday, April 6, 2005.
All tickets purchased on-line will be confirmed by e-mail.
ORANGE REVOLUTION RALLY IN WASHINGTON
There will also be a rally in celebration of the victory of the
Orange Revolution at the Taras Shevchenko Monument in
Washington, D.C. beginning at NOON on Wednesday,
April 6. President Yushchenko will lay a wreath at the
monument to the most famous Ukrainian, Taras Shevchenko
(1814-1861), an honored poet, writer, artist and fighter for
personal liberty and national independence. The Ukrainian
president will also speak at the rally.
Several thousand people are expected at this event. Plans
are being made for people to come to Washington in special
buses from such places as New York City, Philadelphia and
other cities.
The monument to Taras Shevchenko in Washington was
unveiled on June 27, 1964 by President Dwight D. Eisenhower.
(http://www.artukraine.com/taras/monumentp2.htm)
The two events in Washington during President Yushchenko's
first 'official' visit to Washington since becoming president are
being sponsored by President Yushchenko's Welcome Committee.
For additional information about the events call :
1. U.S.-Ukraine Foundation, 202 347 4264
2. Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, 202 547 0018
3. Ukrainian American Coordinating Council,
Ihor Gawdiak, President, 410 884 9025
4. The Washington Group,
Ihor Kotlarchuk, President, 703 548 8534
5. Ukrainian National Women's League of America
Motria Slonewska, 703 536 7795
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NOTE: Your editor is a member of the finance committee of
President Yushchenko's Welcome Committee. If you need
further information please send an e-mail at morganw@patriot.net
or call me at 202 437 4707.
=========================================================
6. "UKRAINE'S ORANGE OUTLOOK"
By Jaroslawa Zelinsky Johnson
National Strategy Forum Review
A quarterly publication of the National Strategy Forum
Chicago, Illinois, Volume 15, Issue 2, Spring 2005
Last fall's Orange Revolution on the streets of Kiev and other Ukrainian
cities was a thunderous appeal for political change. That massive but
peaceful rebellion against decades of kleptocratic-oligarchic rule expressed
populist momentum for the country's democratic evolution. Surviving
assassination attempts and a plot to steal his election, Ukrainian President
Viktor A. Yushchenko now faces his greatest challenge: fulfilling his
promise and popular mandate to unite a divided, poor country and lead
it into Europe's democratic mainstream with aggressive administrative,
economic, and legal reforms.
UKRAINE'S OBJECTIVES AND OBSTACLES
The Yushchenko government's strategic objectives, endorsed by both the
EU and the US, are well known: to transform a corrupt and totalitarian
post-soviet state into a law-based European democracy with a genuine
market economy and media freedom. Expectations are high, perhaps too
high given the obstacles: the deposed ruling elite leaves in its wake
powerful oligarchs and businessmen (who amassed extraordinary wealth
through rigged privatizations of state properties) in control of the economy
and a significant block of votes in parliament expected to resist change.
But Yushchenko's most difficult obstacle may be the ticking clock. Ukraine
will become a parliamentary-presidential republic by the end of Yushchenko's
first year in office. Thereafter, Yushchenko's powers as a strong president
will be limited to control over the military, internal security, and foreign
policy, and much executive power will be transferred to parliament. At that
point, Ukraine's oligarch-controlled parliament will vote either to retain
the cabinet appointed by reformist Yushchenko or replace it with one more
to its liking.
THE RACE TO REFORM
Yushchenko first needs to bridge the political divide created by campaign
disinformation and reassure supporters of his opponent Viktor Yanukovych
that he intends to advance the wellbeing of all Ukrainians, regardless of
language, creed, or region of residence. His promise to recognize political
opposition by honoring its right to be heard and assemble with free access
to print and electronic media (rights denied Yushchenko's own opposition
movement) will strengthen Ukraine's shared vision of its political and
economic future.
Second, Yushchenko must act quickly while still holding strong presidential
power and enthusiastic Western support to take swift control of his
country's most urgently needed reforms. Given his nine to twelve month
window of opportunity, Yushchenko's new government, with solicited
assistance from Poland and Georgia, the EU, and a UN-drafted action
plan, must prioritize its reform agenda and focus immediately on three
interrelated areas of structural change -- administrative reform,
disassembling the shadow economy and legal reform to get Ukraine's
house in order, all of which are conditions precedent to WTO, EU, and
NATO memberships.
CONTOURS OF US-UKRAINE RELATIONS
Yushchenko's election is regarded as a foreign policy victory by a
number of governments, including Washington, but it is difficult to see how
the US could take much credit for it. Although former Ukrainian President
Leonid Kuchma and Russian President Vladimir Putin (and the unlikely
pairing of Katrina vanden Heuvel and Pat Buchanan) complained about
US "meddling" in Ukraine's electoral process - that the Orange Revolution
was "Made in America" - the facts are a lot less conspiratorial.
While Washington spent about $58 million over the last 14 years supporting
various NGOs to provide training for pro-democracy citizen groups,
journalists, judges, and election monitors, US policy toward Ukraine changed
dramatically during the first four years of George W. Bush's administration.
When Bush was locating a soul in Vladimir Putin's eyes, the US was backing
away from continuing the Clinton administration's strategic interests in
Ukraine -- fostering democracy, media freedom, market economy, and
Ukraine's integration with Europe.
The Clinton administration, coming to office shortly after the USSR's
dissolution, focused on the "geopolitical pluralism" of Ukraine and other
Newly Independent States (NIS). Building on the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative
Threat Reduction Act of 1991, the Clinton administration persuaded Ukraine
to give up its nuclear warheads and took other concrete steps to promote
Ukraine's Western integration and embrace of democratic and economic
reforms.
Clinton pursued direct engagement with the Ukrainian leadership, hosting
Ukraine's first two presidents during state visits to Washington, making
three visits to Ukraine during his presidency, and establishing the
Kuchma-Gore Commission, which regularly addressed bilateral matters
of concern.
By 1996, US-Ukrainian relations were formally upgraded to "strategic
partnership," and Ukraine became the third-largest recipient of US foreign
aid (surpassed only by Israel and Egypt); substantial USAID funds were
targeted for developing NGOs to organize pro-democracy training programs,
and US funding for VOA/Radio Liberty and Muskie Fellowships (bringing
Ukrainians to the US for post-graduate study) were at high levels, ending
almost eight decades of isolation for thousands of Ukrainians. Taken
together, the Clinton administration's policies and programs advanced
Ukraine's engagement with the West and encouraged its internal
development of a civil society.
US-UKRAINE POLICY SHIFTS
By contrast, the current Bush administration's first term took an
alternative approach to Ukraine. After Bush's initial meeting with Russian
President Putin, Washington pursued a Russia-centered policy which
implicitly acknowledged Ukraine's location in a Russian sphere of influence.
This shift in the US strategic viewpoint coincided with Kuchma's second
term as Ukrainian president, a period during which Kuchma's corrupt
arrogance of power exploded publicly in several scandals including the
discovery of the beheaded corpse of an opposition journalist, with
surreptitious tape-recordings subsequently documenting Kuchma's
involvement in the journalist's assassination plot as well as pervasive
official corruption – an event that drove tens of thousands of Ukrainians
to Kiev streets, demanding Kuchma's ouster.
Kuchma survived months of angry protests, but then another scandal
alleged Kuchma's involvement in the sale of Kolchuga radar systems
to Saddam Hussein's Iraq, provoking persona non grata rebuke in the
larger international community and providing Washington with additional
reasons to steer clear of Ukraine.
At about this time, as Washington focused on the aftermath of 9-11 and
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Bush administration took its eyes off
Ukraine. Washington's distancing itself from Ukraine came at an ultimate
cost: it emboldened an already isolated Kuchma to clamp down on the
nation's mass media, shutting off opposing voices and disenfranchising
the opposition by issuing temnyky (instructions) to radio and TV stations
which identified suitable and banned topics, yanking the broadcasting
license of an independent TV station, and forcing Radio Liberty, BBC,
and Deutsche Welle off the air.
During this time, Kuchma expedited rigged privatizations of the jewels
of Ukraine's industry to pals and relatives, and he gave away by decree
large parcels of land to loyal political cronies.
Facing international opprobrium, Kuchma bought moral and political sanctuary
from Washington's condemnation and sanctions by sending about 1,800
Ukrainian troops to Iraq; as expected, Bush celebrated Ukraine's partnership
in his "coalition of the willing," shelving an ongoing US-UK investigation
of Ukraine's illegal arms trade with Iraq and Macedonia.
Concurrently, Kuchma shored up Moscow's political support by redirecting
much of Ukraine's foreign trade toward Russia, accelerating Russian
investment in Ukraine and culminating in Kuchma's decision to reverse the
Odessa-Brody pipeline west to east. Kuchma was rewarded with Putin's
personal support in Ukraine's presidential election campaign last fall,
although Moscow's endorsement of Kuchma's hand-picked successor
failed to dprevent Yushchenko's election - or the Orange Revolution.
WASHINGTON'S FUTURE ROLE IN UKRAINE'S
INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION
Now that the Bush administration's second term has placed spreading
democracy at the rhetorical center of American foreign policy, Ukraine is a
good place to convert words into action. Ukraine already has a democracy
movement which has considerable European approval. Ukraine may be a
better test than Iraq for Washington's "forward strategy of freedom." With
Yushchenko's election, Washington must decide how to encourage
Ukraine's political, economic and legal reforms and its march toward
international integration.
Ukraine is pursuing simultaneously three pathways to international
integration: WTO membership, EU membership, and NATO membership,
the principal obstacles to which are Ukraine's own failures to get its civil
society in order. But continued isolation from the West is not an option
for Ukraine, and it is now time for the US to join with the EU in engaging
more broadly and directly with all levels of the Ukrainian government.
In doing so, the West must recognize Ukraine's interest in maintaining its
"permanent strategic partnership" with Russia, which provides much of
Ukraine's foreign trade and all of its oil and gas (and much of Europe's,
through Ukrainian pipelines). But, as Yushchenko told Putin at the start of
his presidency, Ukraine's new foreign policies toward its NIS neighbors
will be arm's-length, guided primarily by two principles: they must serve
Ukraine's national interests and they must not impede or block Ukraine's
access to other markets.
Washington can facilitate Ukraine's global integration by formally
recognizing its "market economy," which will expedite its admission to WTO,
pending since 1993. WTO membership will enhance Ukraine's global trade
opportunities and attract direct foreign investment. Ukraine's Orange
Revolution significantly enhanced Ukraine's acceptance as a trading partner,
as evidenced by the quick introduction of legislation to remove Ukraine from
Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions with the US - an important opening move by
Washington.
Washington could also enthusiastically promote Ukraine's much desired EU
membership. The Orange Revolution proved Ukraine's commitment to
democratic elections, but EU entrance requirements also include a strong
track record of honoring democratic freedoms and civil rights. Washington
should increase USAID funding for media freedom and civil society projects
undertaken by NGOs.
In particular, Ukraine needs assistance harmonizing its laws and policies
with EU norms and conventions regarding intellectual property, duties and
tariffs, VAT, bankruptcy law, pipeline and port management, demilitarization
of science and research, border control of illegal migrants and human
trafficking, and withdrawal of state interference in pricing.
Finally, Ukraine's security cooperation with NATO, previously promoted by
the US, continues to be more advanced than other institutional integrations,
although Ukraine's full NATO membership also awaits more progress in
political and economic reforms and internal restructuring of its military.
For now, Ukraine's Partnership for Peace status with NATO permits
collaboration in combating terrorism and countering proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction and other threats to regional stability and security.
Washington should continue its cooperative training missions with Ukrainian
troops, and assist the Ukrainian military in developing upgraded systems of
military communication.
Ukraine's ultimate international integration will depend mainly upon the
Ukrainian government's political will to translate the country's reform
objectives into reality. But Ukraine's successful transformation into a
law-based European democracy is in the strategic interests of both Europe
and the United States, and the success of that transformation will depend
on their continuing support and encouragement. -30-
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Jaroslawa Zelinsky Johnson is an international corporate attorney, is
managing partner of Chadbourne & Parke LLP’s Kiev, Ukraine office.
Since 1992, she has represented many Western multinational corporations
conducting business in Ukraine, and has witnessed first-hand Ukraine’s
slow transition from command to market economy. Contact:
jzjohnson@chadbourne.com
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LINK: http://www.nationalstrategy.com/index_files/Page673.html
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NOTE: Our thanks to Natalie Jaresko, President and CEO, of the Western
NIS Enterprise Fund (WNISEF), Kyiv, for sending us information about the
article by Jaroslawa Zelinsky Johnson. Johnson is a member of the board
of directors of WNISEF.
============================================================
7. UKRAINE LEADER TO STAY AWAY FROM MOSCOW WAR EVENTS
REUTERS, Kiev, Ukraine, Sat, March 26, 2005
KIEV - Ukraine's president said on Saturday he would not attend Moscow
events to mark the 60th anniversary of victory over the Nazis, a move that
may add to Russian irritation over a boycott by some east European
leaders.
President Viktor Yushchenko said he could not fly to the Russian capital
when similar ceremonies marking the defeat of Nazi Germany were
scheduled to take place in Kiev.
"As we cannot postpone commemorations which will take place in Ukraine
on May 9, including a parade and other events, I would feel most
uncomfortable if war veterans are gathering here and I am on a reviewing
stand elsewhere," he told reporters.
"I think the Russian president, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, and our other
colleagues can easily understand that."
The May 9 commemorations have already opened up a split among east
European nations, reflecting Cold War legacies.
The presidents of Baltic nations Estonia and Lithuania have said they will
stay away on grounds that the end of the war marked the start of five
decades of Soviet occupation.
The president of Latvia, the third Baltic state, is attending as is
Poland's president, Aleksander Kwasniewski, despite the misgivings
of the Polish media and some politicians.
Ukrainian officials have said Yushchenko will attend a summit in Moscow
on May 8 of the Commonwealth of Independent Nations, which will bring
together leaders of 12 ex-Soviet states.
World War Two commemorations honouring more than 20 million Soviet
war dead are a major event in Russia, one of the few events able to unite
people of all political persuasions. Ukraine lost up to 8 million people in
what is known in ex-Soviet states as the Great Patriotic War.
But commemorations there invariably cause splits, as thousands, mainly
in western Ukraine, joined the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) which
fought both German and Soviet troops. Others donned Nazi uniforms in
a unit known as the SS Galicina.
Post-Soviet Ukraine leaders have tried unsuccessfully to persuade
Soviet war veterans and UPA fighters to attend war commemorations
together. -30- [The Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
============================================================
8. UKRAINE PRESSED TO REOPEN 'ACCIDENT' CASE
Death of charismatic opposition leader Vyacheslav Chornovil
By Mara D. Bellaby, Associated Press Writer
AP - Europe, Friday, March 25, 2005
KIEV, Ukraine - On a night six years ago Friday, a car carrying a
charismatic opposition politician slammed into the side of a truck,
instantly killing him. Despite what the authorities called it, most
Ukrainians suspected the death of Vyacheslav Chornovil was anything
but an accident.
Doubts grew when the government refused to investigate any other possibility
and quickly granted amnesty to the truck driver, dashing the opposition's
hopes for an open trial. A video confession of alleged police involvement
surfaced but was mysteriously misplaced.
Now, pressure is building on President Viktor Yushchenko to order a new
investigation into Chornovil's death on March 25, 1999, a case that - like
the 2000 abduction and beheading of opposition journalist Heorhiy
Gongadze - could lead to the very top of Ukraine's former government.
"The previous regime left numerous scars," said Foreign Minister Borys
Tarasiuk. "The death of Vyacheslav Chornovil is one of the most painful
wounds. We won't keep silent."
Former President Leonid Kuchma's government had long dismissed
allegations that Chornovil's death was a political killing, aimed at
removing a potential contender on the eve of the 1999 presidential
campaign. Kuchma, who earlier this month faced prosecutors' questioning
in the Gongadze case, could not be reached for comment.
But Chornovil's colleagues and his son, Taras, insist they have computer
mock-ups of the accident, expert testimony and enough discrepancies in the
crash report to suggest foul play. Taras Chornovil also noted that staging
car accidents "is an old Soviet method."
"The security services are conservative," he said. "If something works they
stick with it." At least five high-profile Ukrainians have died in car
crashes in the last decade.
Mykola Stepanenko, head of a commission set up by Rukh, Chornovil's party,
to investigate the death, said there is an abundance of evidence indicating
the crash was orchestrated.
"We have been collecting material on (Chornovil's) death for six years, and
our party investigation, which never stopped, found a dozen and a half
confirmations of the fact that it was not just a road accident," said
Stepanenko.
Tarasiuk personally appealed not only to the president but also his Cabinet
colleagues, Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko and Prosecutor General
Svyatoslav Piskun, to reopen the long dormant case. Taras Chornovil met
with his old opposition ally, Oleksandr Turchinov, to ask that his agency,
the State Security Service, get involved. Marina Ostapenko, spokes-
woman for the security service, said the request was under consideration.
The crash occurred as Chornovil was returning to Kiev from a campaign
trip. The ex-Soviet dissident was being coy about his intentions to run for
president, but his son said, "realistically, everyone knew that he would."
It's unknown how much of a threat Chornovil would have posed: Rukh had
fractured and Chornovil lacked financial support. But he had proven he could
win more than 20 percent of the vote, a potential obstacle to Kuchma's goal
of facing Communist Party candidate Petro Symonenko in the run-off - a
showdown lawmakers said Kuchma was sure to win because of residual
fears over electing a Communist.
As the car carrying Chornovil sped down the Boryspil-Zolotonosha highway
outside of Kiev, a heavy Kamaz truck carrying grain seed apparently missed
its turnoff and began making a slow U-turn across the dimly lit road.
Chornovil's car barreled into the side of the truck; the top of the car was
sheared off, killing the politician and his driver. A third person in the
car survived.
Almost immediately, then-Interior Minister Yuriy Kravchenko called it an
accident and dismissed suggestions of foul play. Kravchenko was found dead
from an apparent suicide earlier this month, on the day he was supposed to
testify about the Gongadze case.
The truck driver was granted amnesty - before being convicted of anything,
Taras Chornovil said. Then, a videotaped confession made by an unidentified
special forces colonel was found by powerful Ukrainian politician, Yevhen
Marchuk, Stepanenko said. In the video, the colonel allegedly "tells how the
murder was planned, organized and performed," Stepanenko said.
Then the video disappeared, and Marchuk was named to head the State Security
Service under Kuchma, Taras Chornovil said. Marchuk could not be reached for
comment, but at the time, he defended his inattention to the video, saying
it was clearly a fake.
Just this month, someone allegedly broke into Stepanenko's car and stole a
briefcase containing materials related to the case. The papers were mostly
just copies, but lawmaker Heorhiy Manchulenko believes the message was
clear.
"The goal wasn't to steal something, but to apply pressure, psychological
pressure on those attempting to investigate Vyacheslav Chornovil's death,"
he said.
Tarasiuk acknowledged that Chornovil's case hasn't captured the same
attention that Gongadze's did. However, Chornovil's portrait still hangs
reverently on bus dashboards and in homes in western Ukraine - one of
Yushchenko's main support bases. "We will do our best so that the case is
not forgotten," Tarasiuk said. -30-
============================================================
9. UKRAINIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SAYS CIS HAS NO
FUTURE IN PRESENT FORM
TV 5 Kanal, Kiev, in Ukrainian 2100 gmt 24 Mar 05
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, March 24, 2005
KYIV - Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk has said that the CIS needs serious
modification if it is to have a future. Speaking during a live interview on
Ukrainian TV on 24 March, Tarasyuk suggested that an incident in which a
ship from Russia's Black Sea Fleet landed troops on the Ukrainian shore on
23 March was an attempt to test Ukraine's reaction to a "blatant case of
violating Ukraine's territorial integrity".
He also noted that Russia has changed its position on the delimitation of
its marine border with Ukraine in the Kerch Strait and now wants the border
to follow the shoreline on both sides of the strait. Tarasyuk also
congratulated the Kyrgyz opposition on attaining power.
The following is an excerpt from Tarasyuk's interview with TV 5 Kanal on
24 March:
[Presenter] Our guest is none other than Ukrainian Foreign Minister Borys
Tarasyuk. Good evening, Mr Tarasyuk. It is not by chance that you appeared
in this studio tonight. The Foreign Ministry issued a rather important
statement that it is ready to become involved in settling the Kyrgyz crisis.
Don't you think the statement came too late, after [Kyrgyz President] Askar
Akayev had been toppled?
[Tarasyuk] First, the statement was made when he was still president.
Second, this was our second statement. The first statement was issued on
Sunday [20 March]. In it, the Foreign Ministry expressed our country's
position of principle regarding respect for human rights and the expression
of the people's will and regarding the non-use of force against the
protesters.
[Presenter] What steps will the Foreign Ministry take? Is there any contact
with the opposition which has seized power?
[Tarasyuk] Basically, I am not aware of any contact with the opposition. I
can only say that I am acquainted with an opposition leader, Roza
Otunbayeva. She is a former diplomat.
[Presenter] A former foreign minister.
[Tarasyuk] A former foreign minister. However, we have not been in touch
with each other for a long time. So, we can only congratulate the Kyrgyz
opposition on their victory.
[Presenter] Does the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry draw any parallels between
the events which took place in Georgia, then Ukraine and now in Kyrgyzstan?
Is there an external factor which, you know [changes tack] a force which
prompted the former Soviet republics to change the existing regimes?
[Tarasyuk] Naturally, the regimes in Georgia, Ukraine or Kyrgyzstan were
always looking for scapegoats, trying to lay blame on someone abroad. As it
were, their modes of behaviour were the same. At the same time, if we speak
about revolutions or events that led to popular protests, they were
different in each country. When I was asked if events similar to Georgia's
Rose Revolution were possible in Ukraine, I said they were not, because the
way the situation exacerbated in Georgia and the way it was solved were
different from Ukraine's path. If we compare the three revolutions, I think
the distinguishing feature of the Ukrainian revolution was that, first, the
protests went on for a long time, they were large-scale and they were not
violent. The Ukrainian example showed to the whole world and to the whole
of Europe that there is a civil society in Ukraine which is capable of
organizing itself and non-violent protests. I'd say it all happened in a
purely European manner.
[Presenter] Following this logic, can we say there is a civil society in
Kyrgyzstan?
[Tarasyuk] There is no doubt that it is difficult to imagine such processes
taking place without a well-organized opposition and popular support - which
is achieved through political parties and NGOs. [Passage omitted: too early
to give a final analysis to events in Kyrgyzstan]
At any rate, this shows that none of the former Soviet republics can stay
uninvolved in the general processes of democratization. It is a different
issue that these processes of democratization in the former Soviet Union lag
10-15 years behind similar processes in central and eastern Europe. However,
this shows that these processes are irreversible. [Passage omitted: video
report about events in Kyrgyzstan, discussion of looting in Bishkek]
CIS NEEDS REFORM
[Presenter] How should we talk about the CIS now? How alive is it for
Ukraine? How important is it given that lots of people have said that if
there is another revolution in the former Soviet Union, the CIS, then it can
be buried.
[Tarasyuk] That is a very important theme and an important question. The
latest meeting of the council of CIS foreign ministers took place in Minsk
on 18 March. In principle, at the meeting it was said that the CIS is very
ineffective, that many documents are adopted, but there are few real
actions. I'll give one specific example. When we discussed the situation
with joint action of CIS countries in fighting terrorism, the Azerbaijan
delegation, speaking also on behalf of the Ukrainian and Moldovan
delegations, proposed condemning separatism as well. Unfortunately, this
proposal was not supported by the CIS ministers, which shows that not
everything is in order and there are a lot of differences in views. I think
that the CIS, and this is a diagnosis made by the heads of state and
government some seven years ago, requires serious modification. I do not
think it has a future in the form in which it currently exists.
[Passage omitted: report on an incident in which a ship of the Russian Black
Sea Fleet attempted to land troops and equipment on the shore of Crimea on
23 March]
BLACK SEA FLEET INCIDENT
[Presenter] This has happened against the background of the Kyrgyz events.
We know of the difficult relations between Russia and Ukraine, the likely
irritation in Moscow over the Kyrgyz events and the statement of the Foreign
Ministry over the settlement of the Kyrgyz crisis. And now this incident?
[Tarasyuk] I would not connect the events in Kyrgyzstan and the attempt to
violate the sovereignty -
[Presenter] At least, this incident happened against the background -
[Tarasyuk] At the same time, I think that this shows either that the Russian
authorities do not control the actions of the Black Sea Fleet or that this
was a deliberate attempt to test the reaction of the Ukrainian authorities
to such a blatant case of violating Ukraine's territorial integrity and
ignoring bilateral agreements.
[Presenter] Surely this has happened before? The Russian Black Sea Fleet
went ahead and conducted exercises in Crimea as it wished?
[Tarasyuk] It has happened. I remember there was an incident when the
Russian fleet, marines in fact, conducted a military exercise in Crimea
without consultation with the Defence Ministry -
[Presenter] Maybe what happened today [as heard] was the result of an old
habit?
[Tarasyuk] Or with the local authorities. So I am surprised by this,
especially after the recent meeting of the two presidents, when it seemed
that there was agreement that it was necessary to settle all the problem
issues arising from the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine.
And this situation confirms the correctness of the Ukrainian position,
because the Ukrainian side has repeatedly insisted that agreements should
be concluded forbidding the use of Russian Black Sea Fleet personnel and
military equipment based in Ukraine for military actions or operations
outside their bases. Of course, this should draw the attention of the
bilateral commission on the Black Sea Fleet to the need to settle this
issue - the issue of the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in
Ukraine - as quickly as possible.
[Passage omitted: comparison with Russian bases in Georgia]
KERCH STRAIT
[Presenter] The presidents discussed the Kerch Strait during Putin's visit
to Kiev, but what they said was not very easy to understand. Is there an
agreement on drawing the border and on the status of the Black Sea Fleet.
[Tarasyuk] As for the Kerch Strait, the positions of Russia and Ukraine are
almost opposite, as the talks of our expert delegations have shown. The
thing is that Ukraine insists - and President Yushchenko insisted on this -
that the border in the Kerch Strait should coincide with the line of the
administrative border between the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and
the Russian Federative Soviet Socialist Republic, as it existed from the
1940s. Unfortunately, the Russian side has begun to move away from this
position and is proposing a completely different border line, one which
would coincide with the shoreline. Of course, this does not meet with the
standards of international law nor existing agreements.
[Presenter] They're proposing to bring the border right up to Tuzla
[disputed island in the Kerch Strait]?
[Tarasyuk] Not even to Tuzla, but for the border to follow the shore line.
So that Tuzla would be in neutral waters. Of course, this is something the
Ukrainian side cannot accept. So there are difficult negotiations ahead.
============================================================
10. MASTER CARD CAUGHT FRAUD PERPETRATORS IN UKRAINE
By Kirill Yacheistov, Kommersant,
Moscow, Russia, Monday, March 28, 2005
Friday night Master Card Europe distributed a press release saying that in
Ukraine officials had stopped activity of a criminal group accused of
committing fraud with credit cards. Master Card of Europe made this step to
calm bankers and their clients because early Friday two Russian banks
reported fraud through bank machines in Ukraine.
Two weeks ago, Raiffaizenbank (Moscow) stopped accepting its cards
through bank machines in Ukraine. At that time, a member of the board of
Raiffaizenbank, Alexander Koloshenko stated that recently "the cards that
were used in the territory of Ukraine more than anywhere else were objects
of schemes and frauds including compromising of the PIN code." (See
Kommersant on March 16).
Last Friday two more Russian banks - Slavyaski Bank and Master Bank -
shared the fears of Raiffaizenbank. They put on their web sites warning
for clients about the high risk of fraud with the plastic cards in Ukraine.
For instance, the Department of Plastic Cards of Slavyaski Bank says in its
warning "we ask that unless you have an urgent needs, do not use your bank
cards to receive cash in the bank machine located in the territory of the
Republic of Ukraine until the current situation is resolved." The vice
president of Slavyaski Bank Maxim Belov explained to Kommersant the
appearance of such warnings was made after reading of the Kommersant
article of March 15.
The other reason, according to his words, was "we had two cases of fraud
in ATM transactions in Ukraine this year. However, with only two cases from
100,000 (that's how many cards the bank issued-K) we cannot make straight
conclusions. In Southeast Asia at the same time there were many more
frauds." Belov thinks "it's always better to overreact and warn the clients
in the form of recommendation."
Master Bank also warned its clients practically the same way. "Because of
a large number of frauds with plastic cards in Russian banks in Ukraine,
Master Bank does not recommend that use your cards in the territory of this
state." The bank also reminded clients that if they want to check all the
operations done with cards they can join a free system of personal control.
In other words, they can receive information on any transactions on the
account online and through the cell phone as SMS message.
The head of the payment transactions department of Master Bank, Oleg
Safonov, explained to Kommersant "Our recommendation to the clients
is based on the analysis of the developing situation in order to forecast
and prohibit in the future possible increases in the number of fraud
operations."
The level of increased fraud among the Ukrainian bank machines from the
fall of last year has become a hot topic among participants in the plastic
card markets. The participants of this market noticed that percentage of
compromised plastic cards in Ukraine was quite high, and that shows that
the problem has a wide-spread character. The fraud of the PIN codes can
be evidence of the existence of criminal groups which act from some
processing center.
Raiffaizenbank was worried about the existing situation and early this month
asked Master Card and Visa to "find the root of the crime." So far Visa did
not react on the request of Raiffaizenbank. But Master Card of Europe, to
calm down the Russian bankers and their clients, distributed an official
press release last Friday.
"In August of last year, Master Card of Europe discovered fraud operations
that were committed with Master Cards in ATM machines in Ukraine, says
the press release. In order to prevent losses for card holders, Master Card,
together with Ukrainian law enforcement, took measures for fast and
effective resolution of this situation. The result of this active
cooperation was halting fraud operations and arrest of culprits."
However the names of those arrested or the volume of the fraud, Master
Card did not publish in its press release. "Master Card officially did not
let us know about its actions and for that matter I think it would be not
correct to comment on the situation right now," said Koloshenko to
Kommersant on Friday. Kommersant will be following the development
of the events. [Russian Article as of Mar. 28, 2005] -30-
============================================================
11. THE POLITICS OF POP
Andrew Mueller can see a better Eurovision Song Contest
By Andrew Mueller, The Guardian
London, UK, Saturday March 26, 2005
Svante Stockselius is not a name likely to endure in infamy. This is because
few will remember it, and fewer still be able to pronounce it. However, Mr
Stockselius deserves all the opprobrium that can be heaped upon him. It was
he, as executive of this year's Eurovision Song Contest, who decreed that
Ukraine's entry, Greenjolly, had to rewrite their song, or face expulsion.
Mr Stockselius, it may reasonably be concluded, is a pompous, humourless
jobsworth. He has also fumbled a glorious opportunity to render the wretched
spectacle watchable.
Last December, Greenjolly's song, Razom Nas Bagato! (Together We Are
Many!) was the anthem of Ukraine's revolution. Given that this year's
Eurovision is being held in Kiev - following 2004's victory by leatherclad
thunder goddess Ruslana - it would have made a rousing addition to an
otherwise routinely dismal lineup. However, Mr Stockselius took exception
to the song's lyrics, which big up Viktor Yushchenko, the mottled survivor
of a poisoning attempt who is now Ukraine's president.
Eurovision, declared Mr Stockselius, is "non-political". Maybe Mr
Stockselius has never watched Eurovision, but "non-political" does not
figure among the many names that the contest can rightly be called.
Eurovision is legendary as an arena for settling diplomatic scores, venting
ethnic grievance, baiting national rivals and undermining governments -
and, what's more, these moments are almost always the highlights.
Portugal's 1974 entry - Paulo De Carvalho's execrable After Goodbye - was
used as the signal to launch the coup that unloaded a decades-old
dictatorship. Throughout Franco's rule, Spain's entries were often
thinly-veiled paeans to freedom ("I'm changing tomorrow, there's no turning
back," warbled Karina in 1971's Tomorrow I'm Coming Your Way). In April
1982, to demonstrate that democracy had not dampened their sense of
humour, Spain's Lucia came to the contest, held in a Britain at war with
Argentina, and performed a tango.
The dismemberment of Yugoslavia was reflected in Bosnia-Herzegovina's
first entry, in 1993: an appropriately shell-shocked and reproachful ditty
called The Whole World's Pain. Even the Middle East imbroglio had a turn -
in a gesture demonstrating commendably rock'n'roll disregard for career
prospects and personal safety, 2000's Israeli entrant, Ping Pong, rounded
off their number by waving Syrian flags and demanding peace.
More of this sort of thing should be encouraged, not less. It's these
cultural and political subtexts - as well as the ludicrous hair, cretinous
hosts, painful scripted banter and sensationally dreadful clothes - that
make Eurovision worth enduring.
Greenjolly are themselves splendidly dubious ring-ins: at the prompting of
Ukraine's new government, they and their rabble-rousing tune were ushered
past Ukraine's national heats straight into the final run-off, where there
were mutterings that the phone-vote was as rigged as the election which
prompted Ukraine's revolution in the first place. Or does Mr Stockselius
seriously think we're tuning in for the music? -30-
===============================================================
12. UKRAINE KICKS OFF CORRUPTION CLEAN-UP --
WITH A BAN ON BATHS
By Andrew Osborn in Moscow
Independent, London, UK, Sunday, 27 March 2005
Only in Ukraine would you think that the way to start a clean-up campaign is
with a ban on baths. But the country's new leaders believe they can stamp
out sharp practice by discouraging their underlings to steer clear of a
centuries-old Slavic pastime, the banya or bath house.
It may be the place where Ukrainians, and indeed Russians, go every week to
wash away their sins and grime but Ukraine's new "Orange" government thinks
it is also the place where many an official is "nobbled" by corrupt
businessmen. Viktor Yushchenko, the country's crusading President, has
therefore informally banned regional governors and other officials from
going to the banya - traditionally a sacred part of Ukrainian and Russian
culture.
"It's all about showing the new face of Ukraine," Irina Geraschenko, Mr
Yushchenko's spokeswoman, told The Independent on Sunday. "It's no secret
that you get all kinds of unsavoury types there, and they are not the people
with whom government officials should be mixing." Though she conceded that
there was no way Mr Yushchenko could physically prevent his officials from
frequenting banyas, she said that he had made it clear that banya-goers will
be frowned upon.
In neighbouring Russia, banyas remain a staple of business culture - often
replacing a business dinner or a boardroom meeting. Indeed, many legitimate
business transactions are concluded amid the hot steam and beery atmosphere,
where men traditionally wash themselves once a week.
However, stamping out corruption is Mr Yushchenko's No 1 priority. He has
banned officials from accepting gifts worth more than £12 and from having
any business interests, and has ordered them regularly to declare their
outgoings as well as their income. Cronyism, fraud and corruption are
Ukraine's biggest ills, he has declared, a legacy he blames on his
predecessor, Leonid Kuchma.
Mr Yushchenko has pledged that things will be different now. His task is
Herculean. According to Transparency International's latest ranking of
corrupt nations, Ukraine came 128th out of 146 - nestling between Sudan
and Cameroon.
Mr Yushchenko's government has already started the process of reversing the
privatisation of Ukraine's biggest steel producer on the grounds that it was
"bare-faced robbery". A further 3,000 privatisations are set to be reviewed,
and there have been flamboyant gestures. Yevhen Chervonenko, the new
Transport Minister, promised to auction off a luxury Maybach limo worth
£250,000 bought by the former head of the country's cash-starved railways.
However, there are signs that the corruption drive will not be plain
sailing. At least one prominent government minister responsible for the
campaign has complained of coming under "undue pressure" from outside
interests. -30- [The Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://news.independent.co.uk/europe/story.jsp?story=624024
===============================================================
13. WRITING ON THE WALL FOR SOVIET-ERA LEADERS
By Stefan Wagstyl, Financial Times
London, UK, Friday, March 25 2005
The overthrow of Kyrgyzstan's authoritarian president Askar Akayev raises
serious questions about the stability of central Asia and the role of the
three big powers in the region Russia, the US and China.
Few observers forecast that after 14 years Mr Akayev would be ousted in
less than a week. The upheaval has left diplomats wondering whether other
ex-Soviet central Asian republics might face similar challenges. While the
region is remote from the world's power centres, it plays a big role as an
energy supplier, is a major drug smuggling route, and its Muslim population
has, in places, shown sympathy to Islamic fundamentalism.
There is certainly a domino effect at work. Supporters of the US's democracy
campaign have been quick to cast Kyrgyzstan as the latest state to join "the
global march of freedom led by President Bush", as the conservative Wall
Street Journal said on Friday, praising Washington's policies in Afghanistan
and Iraq.
However, of more relevance to Kyrgyzstan have been the peaceful revolts
against authoritarian leaders in the former Soviet Union, in Georgia and
Ukraine. Television and the internet has spread the message. The common
element has been a drive to get rid of self-serving corrupt cliques which
have often been in power, as in Kyrgyzstan, since Soviet times. These
cliques have generally been supported by Moscow, but the revolts against
them have not been principally anti-Russian or pro-western. Domestic issues
have mattered most.
On this basis, central Asia's leaders have reason to be afraid. Not for
nothing have officials in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan reinforced
border controls. Further afield in oil-rich Azerbaijan, Isa Gambar, head of
the opposition Musavat party, on Friday praised the Kyrgyz revolt: "This is
yet another warning bell for authoritarian regimes."
The region's leaders have all ruled since before the collapse of the Soviet
Union except for Tajikistan's Emomali Rahmonov, who became president in
1992, and Azerbaijan's Ilham Aliyev, who succeeded his late father, Heydar
Aliyev, the communist era strongman, in 2003. Presidents Nursultan
Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, Saparmurat Niyazov of Turkmenistan and Islam
Karimov of Uzbekistan are all former communist party chiefs.
All have forced compliant parliaments to amend laws to extend their years
in office, in Mr Niyazov's case for life, and most have shown dynastic
ambitions by promoting children as potential successors.
Energy-rich Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have generally enjoyed
strong economic growth, compounded in Kazakhstan's case by liberal
economic policies. Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have remained
poor, with their farmers often lacking even sufficient water.
The Kazakh authorities, like the Kyrgyz, have tolerated a significant
opposition and some media and civil society freedoms. So, to a lesser
extent, has the Azeri government. But Mr Niyazov of Turkmenistan, who has
erected gold statues of himself, brooks no dissent, nor does Mr Karimov,
the Uzbek leader.
If Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan are a guide, elections could be the
triggers for potential revolts. The next poll will be a parliamentary vote
in November in Azerbaijan, followed by presidential contests next year in
Kazakhstan and Tajikistan and in Uzbekistan in 2007. Eric Rudenshiold, a
regional specialist at Ifes, a US-funded pro-democracy agency, says:
"They will all be quaking in their boots after Kyrgyzstan."
As in Georgia, Ukraine and, now, Kyrgyzstan, the Organisation for Security
and Co-operation in Europe, which organises election monitors, could play
a key role. Its criticisms of polls have given anti-government forces vital
ammunition.
For Russia, which has mostly regarded the post-Soviet leaders as personal
allies, these are difficult times. The failure to secure the election of its
favoured presidential candidate in Ukraine was a bitter blow to its
ex-imperial pride. In Kyrgyzstan it kept a low profile, even though Mr
Akayev was seen as a loyal friend. On Friday Russian president Vladimir
Putin condemned the uprising as "illegitimate" but said Moscow would
co-operate with the new team in Bishkek.
Mr Putin's remarks may indicate a new policy with less emphasis attached
to treating ex-Soviet leaders as personal clients. But it is early days.
Nationalist politicians in Moscow still tend to see popular revolts against
the established order as threats, especially if the opposition can be
portrayed as pro-west.
While some US commentators have already welcomed the changes in
Kyrgyzstan, the administration has reacted cautiously. Like Russia, the
US is interested above all in maintaining regional stability to hinder the
spread of drugs and Islamic fundamentalism. The dangers of violent
Islamic groups are particularly evident in Takjikistan, southern Uzbekistan
and southern Kyrgyzstan, notably in the Fergana Valley, which is shared
by the three countries, populated by a volatile mix of ethnic Uzbeks,
Tajiks and Kyrgyz, and has suffered political violence including terrorism.
If the US and Russia are worried about aspects of the Kyrgyz popular revolt,
so is China, which shares a border with Kyrgyzstan and has a large Muslim
Uighur population that shares a common culture with the Kyrgyz. Beijing
would hate to see the Uighurs, who have demanded greater autonomy,
regard the Kyrgyz uprising as any kind of precedent.
Much depends on how events in Kyrgyzstan develop. If the revolt ends with
the peaceful establishment of democracy, it will inspire local opposition
movements and give comfort to those in Washington and elsewhere
campaigning for political freedom. But if Kyrgyzstan sinks into violence,
it will be cited by those who would block democratic change, including
many in Beijing and more than a few in Moscow. -30-
============================================================
14. BUSH RISKS PUTIN'S IRE WITH VISIT TO TWO
FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS, LATVIA AND GEORGIA
By Peter Baker, Washington Post Staff Writer
The Washington Post, Washington, D.C.
Friday, March 25, 2005; Page A16
WACO, Tex., March 24 -- President Bush expanded his planned May trip to
Moscow by adding stops in two former Soviet republics that have resisted
Russian influence, an itinerary seen as a pointed message to President
Vladimir Putin.
Bush will visit the Baltic republic of Latvia and the southern Caucasus
nation of Georgia during a trip centered on a Moscow celebration of the 60th
anniversary of the victory in World War II, the White House announced
Thursday. He will also stop in the Netherlands to mark the anniversary at
the Netherlands American Cemetery and Memorial in Margraten near
Maastricht.
The addition of Latvia and Georgia to the trip is likely to irritate the
Russians, while demonstrating U.S. concern over Moscow's attempts to
exercise sway over parts of its former empire, analysts said. In Riga, Bush
will meet with the leaders of Latvia and two other Baltic states, Lithuania
and Estonia, which have been most hostile to Moscow and recently joined
NATO. The visit could also inflame Russians who accuse the Baltic republics
of Nazi sympathies.
In Tbilisi, Georgia, Bush will celebrate the bloodless Rose Revolution of
November 2003 that overthrew a corrupt government and encouraged a
series of popular movements around the former Soviet Union that have
rattled Putin's Kremlin, most recently in the Central Asian nation of
Kyrgyzstan. The White House said in a statement that Bush hopes the
Georgia stop will "underscore his support for democracy, historic reform,
and peaceful conflict resolution."
The trip will follow an April 4 meeting at the White House in which Bush
will host Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, leader of last year's
Orange Revolution that followed Georgia's uprising.
"It's a very symbolic and important trip," said Sarah E. Mendelson, a
senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Putin's government has grown increasingly "paranoid, insular, and it
is not inconceivable that they will view this with a lot of distaste." -30-
=============================================================
15. RUSSIA FUMBLES, FORMER SPHERE OF INFLUENCE DEFLATES
Moscow has all but lost a hold on ex-Soviet states by
underestimating the populace, analysts say.
By Kim Murphy, Times Staff Writer
Los Angeles Times, Los Angeles, CA, Sat, March 26, 2005
MOSCOW The revolt in Kyrgyzstan that toppled Russia's strongest ally
in Central Asia was the result of the latest in what analysts say is an
astonishing and painful series of diplomatic missteps by Moscow.
Three largely nonviolent revolutions over the last 16 months have all but
eliminated Moscow's attempt to dominate the former Soviet states that
were once part of its unquestioned empire.
The sudden collapse of Kyrgyz President Askar A. Akayev's regime, after
the overthrow of governments in Georgia and Ukraine, highlights the
fundamental frailty of corrupt, unpopular post-Soviet regimes across the
region most seriously, potentially, in Russia itself.
As a result, the once-formidable power wielded by the Kremlin in the
three former Soviet capitals has given way to an increasingly influential
diplomatic role for the United States and Europe in part, analysts say,
because of Russia's failure to successfully manage foreign policy in a
region it has declared vital to its own strategic interests.
"The entire world has now seen that Russia is powerless and incapable of
doing anything. And next time, no one will even think about resorting to
Russia's mediation services and patronage," said Stanislav Belkovsky, a
political analyst with close ties to the Kremlin. "Everyone understands
that the big lion is dead, and should not be feared."
Georgia's state minister for Euro-Atlantic integration, Giorgi Baramidze,
said Russia was locked in the imperial policies of the 19th century czarist
era, and had been unable to adapt to the economic, democratic and
pragmatic alliances that now characterize state-to-state relations.
"Over all these years, Russia has failed to realize that all the empires
collapsed in the last century, while Russia stubbornly continues to pretend
that its empire is still alive," he said. "Russia is isolating itself from
its own neighbors, and it is doing this with its own hands."
There is wide agreement that Russia could have prevented the sudden and
chaotic disintegration of Akayev's government, either by stepping forward
to support him or by brokering an orderly transition of power. But it did
neither, apparently believing Akayev's assurances that the situation was
under control.
"The only possible explanation for what happened is the gross, systemic
miscalculation of the situation.. All of us have erred in believing in the
general passiveness of the masses . and that authoritarianism will continue
to prevail on the territory of the former USSR, no matter what," said
Alexei Malashenko, an analyst with the Carnegie Moscow Center.
"The developments in Kyrgyzstan vividly demonstrate how wrong we were.
They also demonstrate how rotten, unviable and brittle these regimes are,"
Malashenko said. "What happened in Bishkek shows that all the post-Soviet
regimes are literally colossi with feet of clay the slightest turmoil in
their societies is enough to make these regimes crumble."
Suddenly, governments from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in Central Asia to
Belarus and Moldova on Europe's borders appear vulnerable to public rage,
which has fueled increasingly muscular movements that have overturned
questionable election results in Georgia, Ukraine and now Kyrgyzstan.
Even Russia, where there has been talk of amending the constitution to
extend Russian President Vladimir V. Putin's control past its legal mandate
ending in 2008, seems suddenly vulnerable, although it has a massive
security apparatus and broad new controls on democratic structures
designed in part to prevent such a scenario.
"There is no doubt that as a result of all the latest revolutions around
Russia, a transition of power in Russia is starting to look more and more
probable," said former democratic legislator Irina Khakamada, who
unsuccessfully ran against Putin in 2004.
"The Russian people have already seen that it is possible to fight the
government, and win," she said.
The resonance of the ebullient protesters in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan's capital,
was apparent Friday in Belarus, where nearly 1,000 pro-democracy
demonstrators marched near the palace of President Alexander Lukashenko,
a tough, Soviet-style ruler who last year sponsored what observers termed
a falsified referendum to extend his stay in office.
Police quickly cracked down on the protest and arrested the leaders,
threatening them with up to three years in prison.
"Needless to say, the latest developments in Kyrgyzstan have strongly
influenced public sentiments in Belarus," Vladimir Kobets, a coordinator
of the Zubr opposition youth group, said in a telephone interview.
"Demonstrators thought: 'Well, maybe our day will come too, maybe it has
already come?' You could read this hope in many people's eyes today."
Russia's former partner states in the Soviet Union have in many cases clung
to power with the aid of Kremlin formulas of limits on opposition parties,
controls on mass media and manipulation of elections, managing public
dissent through the powerful security organizations that succeeded the
Soviet KGB.
The Bush administration and private U.S. foundations have funded dozens
of pro-democracy organizations across the former Soviet Union, groups
that many post-Soviet leaders see as a threat. Such groups have helped
catalyze activism in populations that no longer are willing to tolerate the
increasing poverty and corruption that have plagued most of the republics
that succeeded the Soviet Union.
After being caught off guard by the "Rose Revolution" that toppled former
Georgian president Eduard A. Shevardnadze in November 2003, Russia
actively promoted Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma's chosen successor
in last year's presidential elections there.
The strategy backfired when hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians
protested allegedly falsified election results and swept the opposition
into power. Stung by the international condemnation for what was seen
as Russia's improper and ultimately counterproductive interference in
Ukraine, the Kremlin apparently was determined to lie low this month
during Kyrgyz parliament elections.
The Kremlin even invited Kyrgyz opposition leaders to Moscow before
the first round of balloting in February, countering previous criticism that
it had failed to forge alliances among opposition leaders in Georgia and
Ukraine.
But as protests over the allegedly skewed balloting mounted and the
opposition took control of most of southern Kyrgyzstan last week,
Russia failed to recognize the threat to stability and act accordingly,
critics said.
The result, they said, was that Russia allowed Kyrgyzstan to become
dangerously unstable, and lost any chance of assuring that opposition
leaders friendly to Russia would dominate the contest for power after
the transition.
Nikolay Bordyuzha, secretary-general of the regional military alliance
Russia shares with Kyrgyzstan, said Akayev had assured Russia, even
when half his country was under the control of protesters, that "the
situation was not acute enough" to warrant military help.
"He felt strong enough himself, and thought his team was strong enough,
too, to keep the situation within the constitutional domain," Bordyuzha
told Russian state television.
"Three days ago, Moscow was quite capable of saving the Akayev regime,
it was quite capable of mediating the intra-Kyrgyz negotiations, given the
fact that the opposition was ready to negotiate, and did not have any
anti-Russian sentiments. Today, it is too late," said Malashenko of the
Carnegie Moscow Center.
"Moscow displayed fantastic and unimaginable unprofessionalism."
"Putin could have visited Kyrgyzstan in the midst of the events, he could
have addressed both sides and called upon them to sit down at the
negotiating table with Moscow," said Belkovsky, the analyst with Kremlin
ties. "But Russia never used these powerful weapons."
Russian diplomats appear to be unconvinced that it is too late. Russian
parliamentarians, perhaps accompanied by national security director Igor
Ivanov, are scheduled to go to Kyrgyzstan within a few days to try to
broker an agreement on an interim government and new elections.
"There is a threat that if Russia doesn't take a proactive stance, the
Americans could well snatch the political initiative out of Russia's
hands," said Alexander Khinshtein, a parliament Security Committee
member who left for Bishkek on Friday.
"And it is absolutely clear that once the U.S. manages to establish control
in this Central Asian republic and turns it into a U.S. protectorate,
Russia will immediately find that the gate to Central Asia is locked for
Russia," he said. [Alexei V. Kuznetsov of The Times' Moscow Bureau
contributed to this report.] -30- [Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
===============================================================
16. UKRAINIAN CHURCH LEADERS DIFFER OVER MOSCOW
PATRIARCH'S JURISDICTION OVER UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH
TV 5 Kanal, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1700 gmt 27 Mar 05
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Sun, March 27, 2005
KYIV - [Presenter] We will now speak in more detail about one of the most
significant events of the week - namely, the fact that the possibility was
raised of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church becoming independent from the
Moscow Patriarchate. This reportedly originated from the mouth of the
Ecumenical Patriarchate [of Constantinople].
The leading figures of the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches have reacted to the
announcement of the Ecumenical Patriarchate that the Kiev Metropoly is not
the canonical territory of the Moscow Patriarchate - the announcement
reportedly appeared in Constantinople this week. However, Metropolitan
Volodymyr of Kiev and All-Ukraine [the head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church
of the Moscow Patriarchate] has told 5 Kanal that this was just talk and no
decision has been taken. Meanwhile, the Kiev Patriarchate does not see
grounds for refusing to acknowledge this announcement from Constantinople.
[Volodymyr] This was a conversation at the reception of two Constantinople
bishops with our president. There was a conversation recently, at which it
was said that the Constantinople patriarch [Bartholomew] had reportedly
decided it, but it was not decided by the synod.
[Patriarch Filaret, head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev
Patriarchate] There are no grounds for not believing these announcements.
This is not the first time that the Constantinople Church has announced that
it recognizes the canonical territory of the Moscow Patriarchate within
bounds.
[It was reported that the head of an official delegation from the
Constantinople Patriarchate, Archbishop Vsevolod Skopelsky (Majdanski),
told President Viktor Yushchenko during a meeting on 25 March that the
Constantinople Patriarchate recognizes the territory of the Moscow
Patriarchate only within the bounds that existed in 1686 and does not
recognize the subordination of the Kiev Metropoly to the Moscow
Patriarchate - see UNIAN news agency, Kiev, in Ukrainian 2200 gmt 25
Mar 05.] -30- [The Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
============================================================
17. YUSHCHENKO APPOINTS VOLODYMYR HORBULIN AND
LEONID KOZACHENKO AS HIS ADVISORS
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Sat, March 5, 2005
KYIV - President Viktor Yuschenko has appointed director of the Institute
of problems of national security Volodymyr Horbulin, president of the
Ukrainian Agrarian Confederation Leonid Kozachenko, as his advisors.
Yushchenko also appointed boxer Vitalii Klychko, Okean Elzy band's
soloist Sviatoslav Vakarchuk and the Verkhovna Rada's deputy of the
Our Ukraine Coalition Borys Bespalyi as his non-staff advisors.
Yuschenko's press service informed about this with reference to
presidential decree of March 5.
Horbulin, 66, was aide of former President Leonid Kuchma for questions
of national security from December 2002 to January 20, 2005. He worked
as the secretary of National Security and Defense Council from August
1996 to November 1999, then until July 2000 he was Kuchma's advisor,
and after that chair of the State Commission for Defense Industrial
Complex until December 2002.
As Ukrainian News earlier reported, Yuschenko appointed Oleksandr
Ischenko, Volodymyr Hryshko, soloist of the National Opera and Ballet
Theater, as his advisors, and he named Oleksandr Paskhaver, who heads
the Center for Economic Development, and Mykhailo Doroshenko, editor
of the Ukraina Moloda newspaper, his advisors on non-staff basis in
February-March.
Yuschenko also appointed Boris Nemtsov, a member of the federal political
council of Russia's Union of Right-Wing Forces party, as a presidential
adviser on a voluntary basis. Yuschenko appointed Vakarchuk his advisor on
issues of youth policy while being presidential candidate in November 2004.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FOOTNOTE: Leonid Kozachenko is one of the top agri-business leaders
in Ukraine. He is a strong advocate of a market-driven private agriculture.
He is a former deputy prime minister of the agro-industrial complex and
while in this position he implemented market reforms which moved grain
into the private markets and thus income into the pockets of farmers.
President Yushchenko is to be congratulated on his appointment of
Leonid Kozachenko as one of his staff advisors. [Editor]
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