"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT"
An International Newsletter
In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis, and Commentary

"The Art of Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion,
Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World"

PRESIDENT YUSHCHENKO ARRIVES IN THE UNITED STATES

"President Yushchenko's election is inspiring the spread of democracy
throughout the world, in spite of threats and intimidation. We welcome
him to this cathedral of democracy and look forward to hearing from
him," U.S. Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist and U.S. House Speaker
Dennis Hastert said in a joint statement.

"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT" - Number 455
E. Morgan Williams, Publisher and Editor
morganw@patriot.net, ArtUkraine.com@starpower.net
Washington, D.C. and Kyiv, Ukraine, MONDAY, April 4, 2005

-----INDEX OF ARTICLES-----
"Major International News Headlines and Articles"

1. UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT YUSHCHENKO ARRIVES IN USA
The Action Ukraine Report, Washington, D.C. , Sun, April 3, 2004

2. YUSHCHENKO VISIT SHOWS THAW IN UKRAINE-US RELATIONS
By Aleksandar Vasovic, Associated Press Writer
Associated Press, Kiev, Ukraine, Sun, Apr 3, 2005

3. UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT YUSHCHENKO WILL GET A HERO'S
WELCOME IN CHICAGO
Agence France Presse (AFP), Chicago, Illinois, Sun, April 4, 2005

4. EVALUATION CRITERIA FOR THE FORTHCOMING VISIT
OF PRESIDENT YUSHCHENKO TO THE USA
By Olexandr Potiekhin, Political Counselor of Embassy of Ukraine
in the USA in 2000 through January 2005
Center for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine
POLICY PAPER # 3, Kyiv, Ukraine, March 2005

5. UKRAINE VISIT HIGHLIGHTS HOPE FOR DEMOCRACY
Spreading liberty tops Bush's agenda,
but the effort comes with risks as well as rewards.
By Howard LaFranchi, Staff writer, The Christian Science Monitor
Boston, Massachusetts, Mon, April 4, 2005

6. UKRAINE IS A 'STRATEGIC PARTNER," WHITE HOUSE SAYS
United Press Int, Washington, D.C., Saturday, April 2, 2005

7. EUROPEAN UNION HELPS UKRAINE TOWARDS DEMOCRACY
New Europe, Athens, Greece, Monday, April 4, 2005

8. COULD I HAVE STOPPED THIS?
Security chief Yevhen Chervonenko still worries that he
ould have done more to prevent the attempted assassination
of Ukraine's new President, Viktor Yushchenko
By Jeremy Page, The Times, London, UK, Friday, April 01, 2005

9. "THE STEPPES OF DEMOCRACY"
COMMENTARY: By Zeyno Baran
The Wall Street Journal, Tuesday, March 29, 2005

10. THE MYTHOLOGY OF PEOPLE POWER
The glamour of street protests should not blind us to
the reality of US-backed coups in the former USSR
COMMENTARY: By John Laughland, Guardian
London, UK, Friday April 1, 2005

11. RUSSIA ON DEFENSIVE IN CIS
ANALYSIS: Jane's Intelligence Digest, UK, Friday, April 1, 2005

12. WHAT COMES AFTER ROSE, ORANGE AND TULIP?
By Susan B. Glasser and Peter Baker
OUTLOOK: The Washington Post
Washington, D.C., Sunday, April 3, 2005; Page B03

13. IS NEWLY LIBERATED KIEV THE NEXT PRAGUE?
TRAVEL: by Steven Lee Myers, The New York Times
New York, NY, Sunday, April 3, 2005

14 RUSSIAN, UKRAINIAN, ARMENIAN CATHOLICS
MOURN POPE'S DEATH
"The tragic news of the end of the terrestrial life of Pope John Paul II
filled with profound grief the hearts of Ukrainians who prayed for his
health," says a letter by Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko to
Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, the dean of the College of Cardinals.
ITAR-TASS, Moscow, Russia, Sunday, April 3, 2005

15. THE POPE AND THE END OF EUROPEAN COMMUNISM
By Tom Hundley, Tribune staff reporter
Chicago Tribune, Chicago, Illinois, Sat, April 2, 2005
============================================================
1. UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT YUSHCHENKO ARRIVES IN USA

The Action Ukraine Report, Washington, D.C. , Sunday, April 3, 2004

WASHINGTON - Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko arrived in the
USA on Sunday evening.

The Ukrainian delegation led by Yushchenko includes the president's
wife Kateryna Chumachenko Yushchenko, State Secretary Oleksandr
Zinchenko, Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk, the secretary of the
National Security and Defence Council, Petro Poroshenko, Defence
Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko, Economics Minister Serhiy Teryokhin and
Minister of Transport and Communications Yevhen Chervonenko.

President Yushchenko will meet with President George Bush on Monday.
He will then address a meeting business leaders at the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce and give a lecture at Georgetown University before heading
off to Chicago. Yushchenko will address a joint meeting of the U.S.
Congress on Wednesday morning. -30-
=============================================================
2. YUSHCHENKO VISIT SHOWS THAW IN UKRAINE-US RELATIONS

By Aleksandar Vasovic, Associated Press Writer
Associated Press, Kiev, Ukraine, Sun Apr 3, 2005

KIEV - Before Viktor Yushchenko was swept to power, Ukraine's ties with
the United States had gotten so frosty that seating arrangements at a NATO
summit had to be changed so President Bush wouldn't be placed next to
Yushchenko's predecessor.

The new Ukrainian president visits Washington this week to cement a new
chapter in relations shaken by allegations that Ukraine sold radar equipment
to Saddam Hussein's Iraq. While Yushchenko's people-power credentials
and reformist bent are sure to win him a sympathetic ear, he also faces a
delicate balancing act: to move closer to the U.S. without alienating
Russia, Ukraine's massive neighbor and one-time master.

The three-day trip, beginning Monday in Washington, comes a little more
than two months after Yushchenko took office following a dramatic popular
uprising in which masses of supporters camped out in Kiev's bitter cold to
protest that he was robbed of an election victory over a Kremlin-favored
candidate.

Yushchenko's "Orange Revolution" - after his campaign color - was widely
portrayed by his opponents as a U.S.-backed power grab, and welcomed in
Washington as a spontaneous outpouring of popular sentiment peacefully
bringing about democratic change.

Yushchenko moved quickly to try to allay the suspicions by meeting Russian
President Vladimir Putin the day after he was inaugurated on Jan. 23. But
that trip to Russia was only a few hours long, compared with the three days
Yushchenko will spend in the United States.

Yushchenko is here to lobby for aid and investment, win Washington's support
for joining NATO, and greet Ukrainian-Americans on an itinerary that takes
him to New York, Chicago and Boston, accompanied by his wife Kateryna, an
American-born Ukrainian.

Yet his main challenge may be to show he's serious about uncovering the
truth about the alleged military sales to Iraq. Ukrainian officials have
released information about an array of shady weapons deals under former
President Leonid Kuchma, including cruise missile sales to Iran and China.

"It was not easy for me and my government to publicly announce facts about
such dealings shortly before the trip to the U.S.," Yushchenko said in an
interview with The Associated Press. He said he and Bush will "review all
the steps aimed at ending such practices."

At a 2002 NATO summit that Kuchma attended as a guest, the friction was
such that organizers changed the alphabetical seating order from English to
French so that "Etats-Unis" - the United States - would be a healthy
distance away from Ukraine.

In an apparent bid to smooth ties, Ukraine sent some 1,650 troops to Iraq
under the U.S.-led coalition. However, their deployment was widely unpopular
at home and Ukraine began withdrawing them in March - a move Washington
has indicated won't count against Yushchenko during this week's talks. "I
see no problems in the withdrawal of the Ukrainian troops," U.S. Ambassador
John Herbst said recently.

A surge of investment into Ukraine would bolster the image of a country long
seen as corrupt and capricious, and could help achieve the most ambitious of
Yushchenko's campaign promises: the creation of 5 million new jobs in the
country of 50 million over the next half-decade.

But to woo American money, he must offer assurances that his anti-corruption
efforts won't end up hurting innocent investors. One of his government's
earliest initiatives was to announce deals in which the previous regime sold
state enterprises to politically connected businessmen at well below market
value. Invalidating a large number of such deals could raise concern about
investors' and stockholders' rights. Yushchenko says the investigation will
focus only on enterprises where "serious violations."

Yushchenko is eager for Ukraine to join NATO, but prospects of Washington's
support for quick membership appear dim. Ukraine's military is underfunded
and has been prone to calamity, including the accidental shooting down of a
Russian airliner over the Black Sea in 2001. Ukraine has tried to bolster
its military prestige by participating in an array of peacekeeping missions,
including the Iraq deployment. -30- [Action Ukraine Monitoring Service]
=============================================================
3. UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT YUSHCHENKO WILL GET A HERO'S
WELCOME IN CHICAGO

Agence France Presse (AFP), Chicago, Illinois, Sun, April 4, 2005

CHICAGO - Orange ribbons are wrapped around trees in this Mid-
western city in preparation for a hero's welcome Ukrainian President Viktor
Yushchenko will receive when he arrives. The man who led the democratic
movement that is transforming the former Soviet state is seen by many in
Chicago's Ukrainian community as "the great white hope," said Orest
Baranyk, president of the Illinois division of the Ukrainian Congress
Committee of America.

"Ukraine, after centuries of occupation, finally broke away from the Soviet
Union in 1991, but in reality it wasn't free. The people that controlled it
were the oligarchs from the old regime. It was only with Yushchenko that
the Ukraine really declared its freedom," he said. "Finally, the president
is a patriot instead of someone who's leading the country for himself
and his buddies."

Tickets to the lavish banquet being held in Yushchenko's honor sold out
weeks ago and Baranyk said there are thousands of people who had to be
turned away. There are around 150,000 people of Ukrainian descent in
Chicago, about half of whom immigrated in the past 10 to 15 years.

Thousands took to the street last winter to demonstrate in support of
Yushchenko's "orange revolution" and he won support from 99.8 percent of
the 4,500 who voted in Chicago during the December election, Baranyk said.
Many here feel a personal connection to Yushchenko because his wife,
Kateryna Chumachenko, was born and raised in Chicago.

While Chumachenko hasn't visited the city since her parents moved to
Florida about seven years ago, she is still considered one of the
community's favorite daughters. Many here hope she will be of great service
to her husband and the Ukraine. "She is a very intelligent, smart young
woman and she has a better understanding of what democracy is out of
her own experience," said Daria Markus, associate editor of the
Encyclopedia of the Ukrainian Diaspora.

Markus said that political wives in the former Soviet states are often still
expected to stay in the shadows. She expects that Chumachenko will be
different. "Kateryna is very independent," she said. On Tuesday,
Chumachenko will speak at the University of Chicago where she obtained
a graduate degree in business. She gained her Ukrainian citizenship on
Friday.

This is Yushchenko's first visit to the United States since he took office
in January. He will arrive on Sunday and be welcomed by President George
W. Bush to the White House the following day. Yushchenko is scheduled to
address a joint session of Congress on Wednesday, a rare honor.

"President Yushchenko's election is inspiring the spread of democracy
throughout the world, in spite of threats and intimidation. We welcome him
to this cathedral of democracy and look forward to hearing from him,"
Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist and House Speaker Dennis Hastert said
in a joint statement. Yushchenko is also scheduled to meet Vice President
Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld. -30- [The Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
=============================================================
4. EVALUATION CRITERIA FOR THE FORTHCOMING VISIT
OF PRESIDENT YUSHCHENKO TO THE USA

By Olexandr Potiekhin, Political Counselor of Embassy of
Ukraine in the USA in 2000 through January 2005
Center for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine
POLICY PAPER # 3, Kyiv, Ukraine, March 2005

SUMMARY:
Visit of Victor Yushchenko to the USA starting on 3 March 2005 is
doomed to succeed. In fact, this visit launches a new stage in the
relationships between Ukraine and the USA. It is meanwhile not hard
to predict critical and skeptical feedback from some media and political
environment during the stay of the Ukrainian guest in the United States
and after conducting a summery of the visit.

The reason for this would be a foreseen lack of formalized decisions
(agreements, protocols) and of large-scale 'grants' from the American
side. However, such gifts expectation is a consequence of certain
confusion presently existing in the Ukrainian audience.

ANALYSIS: By Olexandr Potiekhin

The actual discussion over the contents of the Yushchenko's visit to the
USA started long while in advance. Regarding to the prior presumptions,
the visit might be futile unless Ukraine will obtain a market status for
anti-dumping investigations, the Jackson-Vanick amendment will be finally
cancelled and the bilateral protocol on the accession to the WTO (protocol
on the mutual market accession) will be signed. Nevertheless, this approach
is rather perfunctory. So, let's try to define the criteria worth of taking
into the account when we regard this visit as the one that either can or can
not contribute to the Ukrainian-American relations.

Let's start moving not from 'America's opening of Ukraine' after the Orange
Revolution but from the situation in the bilateral relations at the times of
the presidency of Leonid Kuchma. It was 1997-1998, according to the experts
from Washington, when the USA became 'tired of Ukraine' that was caused by
a huge gap between the declarative and actual performance of official Kyiv,
authoritarian trends in the country's political course implemented by the
authorities, opposition's incapacity to somehow resist, formation of
completely corrupted oligarchy system of economy, clumsy multi-vectorial
foreign policy addressing in a servant's manner 'what would you wish'
depending on the current situation.

Crises of trust to Ukraine went beyond the limit after the involvement of
Ukrainian top officials to the 'tape scandal', incident with the Ukrainian
missile hijacking a Russian 'Siberia' airlines jet, 'Kolchuga radars
scandal' with the peculiarities that deserve a special consideration,
apparently in terms of smuggling missiles to Iran and China (it could
hardly be done without sanction from some of the top officials).

Interesting fact is that Kyiv was expecting the shift to warmer welcome of
the relations with Ukraine on the eve of the Presidential elections 2000 in
the USA due to those 'pragmatic realists' republicans that will be taking
the power from now - the democrats were too annoying with their claims on
maintaining the human rights, freedom of press, etc. Such expectations
were not fulfilled, however, and the second part of 2000 launches an
unprecedented coolness within the bilateral relations.

On its side Kyiv was referring to the doctrine of Victor Medvedchuk-Anatoly
Orel with the certain versions (particularities) though. Its idea has been
outlined by three theses. The FIRST was that the USA respects the force
only, therefore it requires confident attitude, unprejudiced lies, blackmail
(which, however, didn't work), ignoring statements on violations during the
election campaign.

The SECOND completely considered the worsening of the relations
with the USA as such that lead to the improvements with Moscow,
which is by all means closer and more important, so we have got
profits anyway. The third - there is nobody for USA to deal with in
Ukraine but Kuchma, so Washington might be upset with Kyiv ignoring
its advised but then it will totally agree in a while.

It was the priority to the third task that has made the doctrine's authors
in the certain moment to send the radioactive-chemical defense battalion
to Kuwait (not without the resistance) soon followed by the Ukrainian
peace-keepers to Iraq. Through its emissary Washington was continuously
delivering the message that 'the Ukrainian presence in Iraq does not
necessarily grant the pardon for the violations during the election
campaign', however, seems like Bankova Street did not hear it. Undoubtedly
the Medvedchuk-Orel doctrine had grounds for appearance due to the dual
manner of the US foreign policy, but it was considered in a too simplified
and disfigured manner.

On the international scene George Bush's administration is motivated by
the ideological approaches claimed by the President of the USA in the
inauguration speech 2004 and the foreign policy of the country is now the
most ideological ever. In a meantime, aiming to achieve actual results,
like in fighting terrorism for example, Washington has to compromise from
time to time by collaborating with the regimes sometimes not meeting the
criteria of democracy, maintenance of human rights and rule of law. Even so,
the inspirers of this course are not bothered by the usual controversies and
do not tolerate other countries, even the allies, to point such up.

The present moment and the prospects of the Ukrainian-American relations
can be defined by the following range of factors:

· Firstly, extremely high credit of trust to the new power in Ukraine
granted due to the manner it has been achieved.
· Secondly, concurrence of the stated goals and values in Ukraine
and the United States (ideological similarity).
· Third, intention of the new Ukrainian authorities to work for the
sake of demolishing barriers preventing from cooperation that has been
an issue during the last five years of Kuchma's presidency.

Supporting the project 'Successful Democratic Ukraine' corresponds with
the strategic interests of the USA. The value of the influence of Ukraine's
positive experience as well as the volume of loss if our country fails to
carry out the reforms is difficult to underestimate. The support from the
United States will be provided. However, it would be wrong to outline it in
the concrete steps that do not foresee the fact of Ukraine responding to the
appropriate requirements of the USA (for example, in the field intellectual
property rights). It will be crucial to create a favorable investment
climate, and this is when it primarily depends on Ukraine and then secondly
on official Washington.

During the press-conference on 29 March 2005 in Kyiv, Victor Yushchenko
spoke about abolishing the obstacles within the bilateral relations,
referring to settling of the so-called problematic issues, preventing from
practical implementation of what is called 'looking into each others eyes'
by Yushchenko and the majority of the prominent political establishment of
Washington.

In a capacity of test for Kyiv to pass on the performance of power branches
and performance inside of those branches would be if Kyiv could time-wisely
unblock the US embassy's cars purchase. With regards to this, the necessary
law amendment has already been adopted by Verkhovna Rada, but there is
still obstruction by employing some sort of instructions without any
rational motivation brought up. It was beyond the power of Victor Yanukovych
as well as the Foreign Minister Kostyantyn Hryshchenko failed to succeed.
But it is now, when Medvedchuk - Orel doctrine is not pressing any more,
the readiness of Kyiv to step forward towards the USA should be proved
in deeds but not in words only.

It is easy to foresee that the evaluation of Yushchenko's visit to the
United States will be more inclined to prove that it was not a new stage for
the both countries' opportunities to build the mutual relationships but that
it is the so-called actual result (obtaining of the normal system for trade
relationships on permanent and unconditional bases, status of the market
economy country for anti-dumping investigations, promotion towards
accession to the WTO, etc). Certainly, those problems must be solved.

Ideally, the Ukrainian President and the government, taking into the account
perspective of the visit, in advance should have taken care of a necessity
to submit to the Parliament (and adopt) a not very long list of measures
in order to essentially stimulate the USA stepping towards Ukraine (for
example, concerning a long-lasting problem of laser disks production).

Then we could expect more efficient performance from the bureaucratic
machine in Washington. This has not been done in time, so to intend to
substantiate technical issues now by applying to the results of the Orange
Revolution (instead of implementing the legislation) is hardly possible.

But by no means the technical issues could replace the fundamental ones
such as the Ukrainian course towards the European and above all the Euro-
Atlantic (NATO) integration is impossible without the USA dynamically
assisting it. So obtaining of the guarantees of such assistance, for
granting it either today or in a while, is to be considered as the most
important. [The author was a Political Counselor of Embassy of Ukraine
in the USA in 2000-2005] -30-
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CENTER FOR PEACE, CONVERSION AND FOREIGN POLICY
OF UKRAINE; e-mail: sushko@cpcfpu.org.ua (Oleksandr Sushko)
monitoring@cpcfpu.org.ua (Volodymyr Nahirny)
http://www.foreignpolicy.org.ua; Tel/fax: (38 044) 2386843
=============================================================
5. UKRAINE VISIT HIGHLIGHTS HOPE FOR DEMOCRACY
Spreading liberty tops Bush's agenda,
but the effort comes with risks as well as rewards.

By Howard LaFranchi, Staff writer
The Christian Science Monitor
Boston, Massachusetts, Mon, April 4, 2005

WASHINGTON - Democracy's global march will take the Washington
spotlight this week as Viktor Yushchenko - who rode a wave of people
power and braved a near-fatal poisoning to become Ukraine's president
in January - makes calls on the White House and the US Congress.

Mr. Yushchenko, who visits President Bush Monday and speaks to a
joint session of Congress on Wednesday, will discuss matters ranging
from economic ties to prospects for NATO membership.

But symbolically he comes as a poster boy for democracy's spread to
new corners of the globe, as the Bush administration settles on
democratization - especially of the Arab and Muslim worlds - as its
principal foreign-policy goal. Indeed, the parade of new democrats,
including leaders who came to power in high-profile elections, will probably
maintain a brisk pace. Palestine's Mahmoud Abbas will be greeted at the
White House later this spring.

Yet for all the basking in democratic progress, the Yushchenko visit also
provides a setting for gauging the US role in democracy promotion. In
particular, questions are being asked from Latin America to Eastern Europe
and beyond about whether the US and American prodemocracy groups are
promoting universal values - or siding with favored leaders and furthering
national interests.

At the same time, questions are likely to intensify over intervention in
nations' internal affairs at a time when much of the "low fruit" - the
easier cases for democratization - is already picked. This will be
especially true as pressures for change mount in countries that may not
have a robust civil society to cushion the turmoil that accompanies
political change. One example is Zimbabwe, where the regime of Robert
Mugabe last week tightened its grip in what are widely viewed as fraudulent
parliamentary elections.

"We're at a crucial moment that calls for being especially careful about
supporting certain universal values and not political tendencies," says
Thomas Carothers, a democratization expert at the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace in Washington. After a post-cold-war decade of
democratic advancement, he adds, "barriers may be rising again as regimes
recognize how involvement from outside [of prodemocracy forces] may hurt
them."

President Yushchenko's own political opponents in the authoritarian regime
he battled portrayed his struggle and ultimate victory as an American- and
Western-engineered power play. The thousands of Ukrainians who kept a
frigid vigil over the elections, and the judiciary that stood firm against
the pressures of the ruling powers, belied such claims.

But the more recent case of Kyrgyzstan, the former Soviet republic where
protests over fraudulent parliamentary elections led to the president's
flight to Russian refuge last month, offers a different picture.

There, more than a decade of US funding for prodemocracy groups and
civil-society development in a particularly poor country has been judged as
critical to the departure of President Askar Akayev and the rise of new
Prime Minister Kurmanbek Bakiyev. The new leader had visited America on
a US government grant to study democracy development. The political
opposition was nourished by US and European funding. And the population
had expanding access to newspapers and electronic media funded by
Western sources.

Some experts see a fine line between encouraging democratic reforms and
provoking instability, and argue that the US must take care not to appear to
be crossing over to the latter - particularly for the chilling effect it
could have on long-term reform efforts.

"We want reform, but we don't want governments to think we are funding
their overthrow," says Nikolas Gvosdev, editor of the National Interest, a
Washington-based foreign policy review. Leaders in other Central Asian
countries no doubt took note of events in Kyrgyzstan and could become
more skeptical of Western prodemocracy influences, experts say.

Even such neutral endeavors as civil-society development and judiciary
strengthening can slip into activities with the appearance of supporting
particular politicians rather than broad principles.

Jeswald Salacuse, an expert in international dispute settlement, says a lot
of good work was accomplished by US efforts in good governance, but that
the nonpartisan nature of that work got trickier. "You began having many
more groups struggling to be elected, challenging the dominant powers,
and the work became more intertwined with the battle for power," says Mr.
Salacuse, a professor at Tufts University's Fletcher School.

In Kyrgyzstan, for example, the US-based Freedom House ended up offering
use of a printing press to opposition publications after the government
denied them access to government-owned presses. "We don't as a matter
of policy work with any political party," says Arch Puddington, director of
research with Freedom House in New York.

In Ukraine, he says, Freedom House worked for more than a decade on
developing the rule of law, media expansion, and building civil society,
"but our intent was not to build towards elections," he says. Still, during
the election, "the results of these efforts could be seen from the courts to
the demonstrations."

Venezuela is a case where US involvement with prodemocracy groups
was quickly characterized by the government as interference and aimed at
toppling the government - especially after the US appeared supportive of
an abortive 2002 coup against President Hugo Chavez.

The Venezuelan government and its supporters have been especially
critical of the independent but congressionally funded National Endowment
for Democracy (NED). It has spent about $1 million annually supporting
prodemocracy groups in Venezuela. That support increased when anti-
Chavez factions forced a referendum on his presidency. But NED officials
maintain the increased support was to encourage public education on the
referendum process.

Latin America is a particularly sensitive venue for US-sponsored
democratization efforts because of a history of American intervention,
experts say.

"Venezuela plays out against a backdrop of the old feeling of Yankee
imperialism," says Mr. Salacuse. "Right away, part of the population will
think any work is being done on behalf of the opposition, especially in a
case where the president has a bad relationship with the US, as in
Venezuela," he says. "I don't think that argument holds water, but you
do have to be careful."

But Venezuela is also a case where the presence of huge oil fields
(which are crucial to US supplies) provides the regime with the resources
to stand up both to the US and to opposition forces.

Carnegie's Mr. Carothers says a similar resilience is at play in the former
Soviet republics, with the more economically stable countries resisting what
he calls the "contagious effect" of the revolutions in Georgia or Ukraine.
"Some regimes are stronger than others, and it's the weak ones that are
dropping now." -30- [The Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LINK: http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0404/p03s01-usfp.html
=============================================================
6. UKRAINE IS A 'STRATEGIC PARTNER," WHITE HOUSE SAYS

United Press Int, Washington, D.C., Saturday, April 2, 2005

WASHINGTON - Counter-proliferation efforts and Ukraine WTO
membership will feature in talks between Presidents Bush and Viktor
Yuschenko, the White House said Friday. "Ukraine is a strategic partner
of the United States, in our view. And I suspect that they'll talk about the
importance of supporting the advance of freedom and democracy in
Eastern Europe and the broader Middle East region," spokesman
Scott McClellan added.

Yuschenko, supported by Washington in a successful bid to overturn
fraudulent elections, meets with Bush Monday at the start of a four-day
visit to Washington that will feature an address to Congress. His taking
of office in January, following massive street demonstrations that helped
overturn machinations by his pro-Russian rival, has been heralded by the
Bush administration as a symbol of spreading democracy.

Yuschenko is seeking his country's membership in the World Trade
Organization as part of his bid for closer economic ties to the West.
Ukraine is a former Soviet state and has contributed troops to U.S.-led
stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. -30-
=============================================================
7. EUROPEAN UNION HELPS UKRAINE TOWARDS DEMOCRACY

New Europe, Athens, Greece, Monday, April 4, 2005

The European Union is responding to the changed political reality in Ukraine
with concrete steps to strengthen the EU-Ukraine relationship. The EU
supports the new leadership's own ambitious programme of political and
economic reforms with a substantial and realistic package, designed to
answer Ukraine's wish for increased integration with Europe. The EU has
spent for Ukraine 1,016.1 million Euro over the last seven and 128 million
Euro only in 2004.

Last December the whole world saw how swiftly the European Union
handled the last political crisis in Kiev, the final outcome of which was in
favour of Europe. Even the Americans were impressed over this affair,
seeing Europe winning the hearts and minds of the majority of Ukrainians
without the use of bombs.

Now the European Union sees Ukraine as its protege and continuous to
support the country. On February 21 the EU-Ukraine Action Plan under the
European Neighbourhood Policy was formally endorsed by the EU-Ukraine
Cooperation Council, signalling a significant intensification of the
EU-Ukraine relationship.

To further strengthen and enrich the Action Plan, the General Affairs
External Relations Council (GAERC) agreed on further measures in
support of Ukraine's reform efforts.

It is a powerful signal that as Ukraine makes genuine progress in carrying
out internal reforms and adopting European standards, relations between
the EU and Ukraine will become deeper and stronger.

The EU-Ukraine ENP Action Plan supports Ukraine's political and economic
reforms and includes elements to strengthen democracy and help prepare
Ukraine for membership of the WTO, a key condition for a possible free
trade area.

Additional proposals for closer cooperation were conceived following last
December's election, demonstrating the EU's willingness to go substantially
beyond what was originally on offer. There is no doubt that Ukraine is being
guided by the EU on a road path that will lead to full membership one day.
=============================================================
8. COULD I HAVE STOPPED THIS?
Security chief Yevhen Chervonenko still worries that he
could have done more to prevent the attempted assassination
of Ukraine's new President, Viktor Yushchenko

By Jeremy Page, The Times, London, UK, Friday, April 01, 2005

YEVHEN CHERVONENKO'S instincts told him something was wrong as
soon as he saw the two black Mercedes-Benz 4WDs waiting in Podil, the
old quarter of Kiev.

He could tell by the number plates that the cars were from the SBU,
Ukrainian state security. Moments later, a senior SBU officer climbed out
of one of the 4WDs and told him to call off his team of bodyguards.

It was September 5 - less than two months to go until Ukraine's presidential
election - and Chervonenko was working as security chief for the 51-year-old
liberal opposition candidate, Viktor Yushchenko.

Chervonenko says: "I twice checked the order to remove the guards, so my
conscience is clear. But if I had known then whom he was going to meet, I
would have disobeyed the order; even if it cost me my job."

What Yushchenko had not told him was that he was going to have a secret
dinner with the head of the SBU, Igor Smeshko, at the dacha of the deputy
chief, Volodymyr Satsyuk, outside Kiev.

Chervonenko, 45, called off his security team, and Yushchenko drove off
with the SBU officers and his campaign manager, David Zhvania.

The meal that night, according to both men, consisted of boiled crayfish, a
salad of tomatoes, cucumbers and corn, and some beer, followed by cold
meats, and vodka and cognac.

According to some of the world's top toxicologists, it also contained a huge
dose of TCDD, the highly toxic dioxin that was a component of the US's
Vietnam War defoliant, Agent Orange.

Yushchenko's wife was the first to notice that all was not well when she
tasted something metallic on her husband's lips as she kissed him that
night. He brushed aside her concerns.

The next morning, however, Yushchenko started complaining, after taking
a sauna, of nausea and severe head and stomach pains. Within hours, he
was doubled up with pain.

As the poison spread over the next few days, lesions and cysts erupted on
his face and back - even along the lining of his intestines. When he was
rushed to the exclusive Rudolfinerhaus clinic in Vienna on the night of
September 10, doctors said that he was suffering from multiple organ
failure and had barely 12 hours to live.

Six months on, Yushchenko's symptoms are clearing, but the poison that
almost killed him remains shrouded in mystery. Such are the sensitivities of
the case that Chervonenko refused to say who he thought was behind the
poisoning. Nevertheless, his story provides an insight into the silent war
still being waged behind the scenes of Ukraine's "Orange revolution", as it
became known. It also reveals the personal anguish of a man who probably
saved Yushchenko's life, yet still blames himself for failing to protect
him.

"This is a pain that I have to live with," Chervonenko says, at his desk in
the Ministry of Transport, which he now runs.

Chervonenko had known better than almost anyone that there was a real risk
of assassination in a country where critics of the Government had a habit of
dying in road accidents. Some supporters of the pro-Russian Prime Minister,
Viktor Yanukovych, had used everything during the campaign, from flyers
portraying Yushchenko as Hitler to telephone death threats to prevent him
from winning. Even the two state-security agents assigned to protect
Yushchenko could not be trusted.

So Chervonenko built up his own security team of 55 guards - all former
intelligence, special forces and police officers. He devised an elaborate
system of reconnaissance, intelligence and physical protection, even
testing Yushchenko's food and drink before the politician touched it.

Only on the evening of September 5 he let his guard down, a decision
he says he will regret for the rest of his life. He called off his security
team and Yushchenko drove to the dinner with the SBU officers.

The importance of his role in the Orange revolution has come to light
only since he resigned as Yushchenko's security chief on the day of his
inauguration, January 23.

It was he who had first decided, during a rally in Donetsk, the home town of
Yanukovych, that Yushchenko needed professional protection. "I was the one
and only man who could argue with Yushchenko and convince him. Now that
he's President, I can't," Chervonenko says, jokingly. "The hardest thing was
persuading him to be driven in a bullet-proof car. It was a war. But our
weapons were information and bravery. My security system was based on
aikido (a Japanese self-defence method). I tried to provoke them to take
the first step then I'd take counter-measures."

Altogether, he estimates that his security team foiled at least two
assassination attempts, including one when a powerful bomb was found
outside campaign headquarters on November 21, the day of the second
round of the election. But his successes will for ever be overshadowed by
the fateful security breach on September 5.

Ukrainian newspapers have quoted Smeshko, the SBU chief, as saying that
Yushchenko felt ill before the dinner and had postponed the meeting at least
once because of his health. But Chervonenko says that his boss had been
in good shape before the dinner.

Yushchenko had been supposed to go to a buffet dinner in Chernigov, where
all the food had been tested. Instead, he decided to go and visit an artist
friend whose wife had just died, and then a local businessman who was
funding the opposition. Yushchenko drank some homemade liquor with the
artist and had some fish and vodka with the businessman. Chervonenko
tasted both. "If Yushchenko took a piece of tuna sushi," says the former
guard, "I would try it first. He'd make sure that I tasted it first."

Then they drove to Podil, where they met the SBU officers. By the time
he saw Yushchenko the next day, the poison was already taking effect.

For five days, Ukrainian doctors were nonplussed. They wanted him to
check in to a state hospital for closer examination. Chervonenko refused.
"I knew that in communist times and after independence, some generals
and politicians went in there and came out feet-first," he says. "I listened
to the doctors in Ukraine and understood that we had to leave. We were
being bullshitted."

On the night of September 10, he chartered a private plane to fly
Yushchenko to Vienna. Only on the plane did Yushchenko tell his security
chief where he had been on the evening of September 5. Over the next
few weeks, Chervonenko rarely left Yushchenko's side. Twice, he and
Yushchenko's wife authorised doctors to operate on him in intensive care.

"I didn't have time for feelings," Chervonenko recalls. "I had to analyse
the information from the doctors. To begin with, they didn't all have the
same opinion. We had to decide what to do to save his life."

But even the former rally driver's nerves almost cracked after he gave
permission for doctors to insert a catheter in Yushchenko's spinal column
to allow them to inject more painkillers.

"All my life I never kneeled," he says, " but I was on my knees in the
intensive-care unit, because no one knew what was going to happen. I
felt the weight of responsibility of 48 million people."

Chervonenko's loyalty was not lost on the new Ukrainian President. When a
Cabinet was selected after his inauguration, Chervonenko was appointed
Minister of Transport, and now he is the target of death threats. He has
retained four of the security team who guarded Yushchenko and now, for
the first time, also has to use a bullet-proof car himself.

Yet even in his new role as Transport Minister, with his own life under
threat, he cannot quite let go of his sense of responsibility for
Yushchenko's safety. Taking a drag on his cigarette, he pauses, then
says: "I will be like an eagle which flies above and sees all possible
risks for Yushchenko, because Ukraine needs him." -30-
=============================================================
9. "THE STEPPES OF DEMOCRACY"

COMMENTARY: By Zeyno Baran
The Wall Street Journal, Tuesday, March 29, 2005

Inspired by the 2003 Georgian Rose Revolution and the Ukrainian Orange
Revolution four months ago, the people of Kyrgyzstan last week rose against
their corrupt government to demand justice, good governance and respect
for their democratic rights. It is yet to be seen, however, whether the new
leadership of this post-Soviet country of five million shares the same
democratic and reformist ideals as its Georgian and Ukrainian counterparts,
or simply wanted to take power.

The outcome is critically important for people living in the Central
Eurasian region ranging from Belarus to Uzbekistan who hope for a democratic
future. Moreover, if the new Kyrgyz leadership fails to address the poverty,
corruption and repression that led to the mass anger in this mostly Muslim
nation, radical Islamists may reap the benefits domestically -- and use this
strategically located country as a base for expansion internationally.

The outcome is also critical to the United States, both because of President
George W. Bush's push to expand democratic reform, and also because
Kyrgyzstan hosts a U.S. military base that provides crucial support to
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Russia has also established a
base in Kyrgyzstan, located just a few miles from the U.S. facility outside
the capital of Bishkek.

Kyrgyzstan, which neighbors China, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan,
was for many years considered the "poster child of democracy" in Central
Asia under President Askar Akayev. Following a promising start on economic
and political reforms, over the course of 15 years in power, Mr. Akayev lost
popularity when he couldn't tackle the country's poverty while his family
members amassed political and financial power, and last week lost power.

Bye, bye Lenin: The Kyrgyz people assert themselves, but their revolution
isn't yet complete.

The fraudulent parliamentary elections of Feb. 27 provided the spark. Unlike
in Georgia and Ukraine , however, the opposition in Kyrgyzstan was not
united in a common vision for the country's future. Although the death toll
is very low, its use of violence and failure to control looting also
distinguished it from the leaders of the Rose and Orange revolutions. While
pent-up anger was sufficient to bring about the downfall of the government
in only a few days, so far the Kyrgyzstani opposition has merely shown that
they can gather a big, mob-like crowd.

The rapid pace of developments has left behind many unresolved
constitutional questions. Leading opposition member and former Prime
Minister Kurmanbek Bakiyev was reappointed prime minister and acting
president, but his powers are far from clear -- not least because, while Mr.
Akayev has fled the country, he has yet to resign. A few days after the
Supreme Court recognized the old parliament as legitimate, the Bakiyev team
over the weekend sent very confusing signals by recognizing the new one.

Mr. Bakiyev was appointed by the "old" parliament, so his push to recognize
the "new" one calls into question his own legitimacy. Reports also indicate
that Mr. Bakiyev may not hold presidential elections in June, as he
initially had promised, and may try to consolidate his power instead.

It is not certain whether democracy can succeed in today's Kyrgyzstan. It
certainly will have less of a chance unless the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe remains actively engaged and helps revolve the
current impasse. The OSCE's assistance in preparing the country for the
next elections would also be critical for success.

Whether Russia will support democracy in Kyrgyzstan will also be important.
Russia considers America's promotion of democracy in its neighborhood as a
ploy to weaken its own regional influence. The new leaderships of Georgia
and Ukraine have already made clear their future lies in Europe and will
consider cooperation with Moscow only within this framework. The Kremlin
does not want to "lose" Kyrgyzstan, and seems to have learned that the
heavy-handed approach it used in Ukraine does not work. In this case, Moscow
has maintained ties to both Mr. Akayev and the opposition. Moscow also
announced a new "hearts and minds" propaganda strategy but that's unlikely
to promote democratic and reformist change.

Kyrgyzstan's other neighbors are closely watching these latest developments,
since they are wrestling with similar social tensions of their own. In
Uzbekistan, opposition leaders have issued a joint statement in support of
their Kyrgyz counterparts. Given the Uzbek government's tight control over
civil society, the chances for a peaceful change in power are rather slim.

Unlike Mr. Akayev, President Islam Karimov would use force against his
people. Radical Islamist networks are also much stronger in this country
of 26 million. With no elections likely in the short-term future, one can
expect further clampdowns in Uzbekistan.

In neighboring Tajikistan, while the opposition expressed significant
disapproval of the fraudulent parliamentary elections in February, it did
not push to oust the government. Following the events in Kyrgyzstan,
however, the Tajikistani opposition is likely to try to use the fall
presidential elections as their country's turning point.

Belarus may also be ripe for a change. Following Mr. Akayev's fall, last
Friday demonstrators in Belarus clashed with police as they called for the
resignation of their president, Alexander Lukashenko, who is widely known
as the "last dictator of Europe." With no peaceful, legal possibility of
ousting him from office, the Belarusian opposition believes that the only
way Mr. Lukashenko would leave power is via the same route involuntarily
followed by Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania. In the short term, however,
such a violent end is unlikely, as last week's protests drew only a thousand
people to the streets of Minsk.

Unlike their Belarusian, Turkmen or Uzbek counterparts, Presidents Ilham
Aliyev of Azerbaijan and Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan have seemed
more willing to consider pre-empting the opposition by opening up their
country's political system. While the leaders of these two oil-rich
countries with close ties to the U.S. have made relative progress in
economic reform, they have so far failed to implement significant political
reforms. Both leaders are frightened by what happened in Georgia, Ukraine
and Kyrgyzstan, the three most open and democratic countries of the region.

Following the fall of the Akayev regime, some advisers to Presidents Aliyev
and Nazarbayev will urge a clampdown so that both avoid the same fate. Yet,
as the Akayev example proved, repression only worsens the situation once
the popular desire for democracy, justice, and good governance reaches a
critical momentum. If Messrs. Aliyev and Nazarbayev become responsive to
such desires, and hold free and fair elections, they are more likely to
avoid a Kyrgyz-style revolution in their countries.

Admittedly, this is a tough call; another lesson to be drawn from Georgia,
Ukraine and now Kyrgyzstan is that the granting of any concessions to the
opposition will make leaders vulnerable. Leaders such as Messrs. Karimov
and Lukashenko, and the despotic leader of Turkmenistan, Saparmurat
Niyazov, however, are in less of a danger of a peaceful overthrow due
to the total repression in their countries.

Now the Bakiyev administration has to decide which way to go as well, and
the stakes are higher than before. If the post-revolution democracy does not
succeed in Kyrgyzstan, Islamists may be the next ones to take power. Over
the last two years the radical Islamist movement Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) has
significantly increased its following in Kyrgyzstan. After the crackdowns in
the neighboring Uzbekistan, many HT members moved to this relatively
more open country to create a new base for an eventual takeover.

It may be true that, compared to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Central Asian
countries are less prone to radicalism. Yet the prevailing poverty and
injustice in the region has provided HT a perfect breeding ground. Its
campaign in Kyrgyzstan emphasizes that the only way there will be an end to
all that misery is by the overthrow of the secular democratic system and the
establishment of the Islamic rule. If the Bakiyev administration fails to
quickly establish democratic order and prove that it can deliver justice and
good governance, there may not be any other secular alternative left, and
this viciously anti-Semitic and anti-American ideology may fill the vacuum.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ms. Baran is director of international security and energy programs
at the Nixon Center in Washington.
=============================================================
10. THE MYTHOLOGY OF PEOPLE POWER
The glamour of street protests should not blind us to
the reality of US-backed coups in the former USSR

COMMENTARY: By John Laughland, Guardian
London, UK, Friday April 1, 2005

Before his denunciation yesterday of the "prevailing influence" of the US in
the "anti-constitutional coup" which overthrew him last week, President
Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan had used an interesting phrase to attack those
who were stirring up trouble in the drug-ridden Ferghana Valley. A criminal
"third force", linked to the drug mafia, was struggling to gain power.

Originally used as a label for covert operatives shoring up apartheid in
South Africa, before being adopted by the US-backed "pro-democracy"
movement in Iran in November 2001, the third force is also the title of a
book published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which
details how western-backed non-governmental organisations (NGOs) can
promote regime and policy change all over the world.

The formulaic repetition of a third "people power" revolution in the former
Soviet Union in just over one year - after the similar events in Georgia in
November 2003 and in Ukraine last Christmas - means that the post-Soviet
space now resembles Central America in the 1970s and 1980s, when a
series of US-backed coups consolidated that country's control over the
western hemisphere.

Many of the same US government operatives in Latin America have plied
their trade in eastern Europe under George Bush, most notably Michael
Kozak, former US ambassador to Belarus, who boasted in these pages
in 2001 that he was doing in Belarus exactly what he had been doing in
Nicaragua: "supporting democracy".

But for some reason, many on the left seem not to have noticed this
continuity. Perhaps this is because these events are being energetically
presented as radical and leftwing even by commentators and political
activists on the right, for whom revolutionary violence is now cool.

As protesters ransacked the presidential palace in Bishkek last week
(unimpeded by the police who were under strict instructions not to use
violence), a Times correspondent enthused about how the scenes
reminded him of Bolshevik propaganda films about the 1917 revolution.
The Daily Telegraph extolled "power to the people", while the Financial
Times welcomed Kyrgyzstan's "long march" to freedom.

This myth of the masses spontaneously rising up against an authoritarian
regime now exerts such a grip over the collective imagination that it
persists despite being obviously false: try to imagine the American police
allowing demonstrators to ransack the White House, and you will immediately
understand that these "dictatorships" in the former USSR are in reality
among the most fragile, indulgent and weak regimes in the world.

The US ambassador in Bishkek, Stephen Young, has spent recent months
strenuously denying government claims that the US was interfering in
Kyrgyzstan's internal affairs. But with anti-Akayev demonstrators telling
western journalists that they want Kyrgyzstan to become "the 51st state",
this official line is wearing a little thin.

Even Young admits that Kyrgyzstan is the largest recipient of US aid in
central Asia: the US has spent $746m there since 1992, in a country with
fewer than 5 million inhabitants, and $31m was pumped in in 2004 alone
under the terms of the Freedom Support Act. As a result, the place is
crawling with what the ambassador rightly calls "American-sponsored
NGOs".

The case of Freedom House is particularly arresting. Chaired by the former
CIA director James Woolsey, Freedom House was a major sponsor of the
orange revolution in Ukraine. It set up a printing press in Bishkek in
November 2003, which prints 60 opposition journals. Although it is described
as an "independent" press, the body that officially owns it is chaired by
the bellicose Republican senator John McCain, while the former national
security adviser Anthony Lake sits on the board. The US also supports
opposition radio and TV.

Many of the recipients of this aid are open about their political aims: the
head of the US-funded Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society, Edil
Baisalov, told the New York Times that the overthrow of Akayev would have
been "absolutely impossible" without American help. In Kyrgyzstan as in
Ukraine, a key element in regime change was played by the elements in
the local secret services, whose loyalty is easily bought.

Perhaps the most intriguing question is why? Bill Clinton's assistant
secretary of state called Akayev "a Jeffersonian democrat" in 1994, and the
Kyrgyz ex-president won kudos for welcoming US-backed NGOs and the
American military. But the ditching of old friends has become something
of a habit: both Edward Shevardnadze of Georgia and Leonid Kuchma
of Ukraine were portrayed as great reformers for most of their time in
office.

To be sure, the US has well-known strategic interests in central Asia,
especially in Kyrgyzstan. Freedom House's friendliness to the Islamist
fundamentalist movement Hizb ut-Tahrir will certainly unsettle a Beijing
concerned about Muslim unrest in its western provinces. But perhaps the
clearest message sent by Akayev's overthrow is this: in the new world
order the sudden replacement of party cadres hangs as a permanent
threat - or incentive - over even the most compliant apparatchik. -30-
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Laughland is a trustee of www.oscewatch.org and an associate
of www.sandersresearch.com
=============================================================
11. RUSSIA ON DEFENSIVE IN CIS

Jane's Intelligence Digest, UK, Friday, April 1, 2005

Following recent revolutions in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, Russia is
increasingly being forced on the defensive in the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS). JID's regional correspondent predicts that
Moscow's influence will continue to weaken, with potentially serious
implications for the Kremlin's foreign policy towards the states of the
so-called 'near abroad'.

According to reliable US intelligence sources, Russia used every means
at its disposal, short of actually invading Ukraine militarily, in a
desperate bid to thwart the election of the pro-Western President Viktor
Yushchenko. Despite a huge commitment of resources - and the personal
intervention of Russian President Vladimir Putin on behalf of former premier
Viktor Yanukovych in both the first and second rounds of voting - Moscow's
policy failed disastrously.

A recently launched judicial investigation in Ukraine has indicated that
Russia was the source of the dioxin used in an attempt to poison Yushchenko
in September. Then there is the question of two Russian citizens still being
held in Ukrainian custody. They are alleged to have planned to bomb
Yushchenko's election headquarters on the eve of the second round of the
poll in November 2004.

Audio tapes, made covertly by the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), have
been released and appear to implicate Russians in the alleged poisoning
plot. Yushchenko's bodyguard also revealed this month that an assassination
squad had plotted to kill the president-to-be during the popular 'Orange
Revolution' that followed round two of the elections. It is claimed that
this conspiracy was foiled by SBU officers loyal to him.

After Moscow's blatant intervention in the Ukrainian elections, relations
between Ukraine and Russia are unlikely to improve quickly. Yushchenko
visited Russia shortly after his inauguration as president on 23 January,
while Putin made a return trip to Ukraine in March. However, insiders report
that little progress was made on either occasion.

Meanwhile, Yushchenko's election victory was welcomed in Moldova, where an
elected communist government and president appear to have turned away from
Moscow. It was also welcomed in Georgia, where a revolution similar to that
in the Ukraine took place in 2003. Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili
joined Yushchenko for a New Year holiday and they have since appeared
together on a number of occasions.

Even worse for Putin is the re-emergence of a Ukraine-led axis within the
Eurasian CIS. The alliance, known as GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan,
Azerbaijan and Moldova), first emerged in the late 1990s. But it faded from
view during former president Leonid Kuchma's second term in office (1999 to
2004), after he re-oriented Ukraine towards Russia. Georgia and Ukraine are
now revitalising GUUAM as a counter-weight to the Russian Federation within
the CIS. An early indication of the alliance's resurrection came during the
recent Kyrgyz crisis. Yushchenko and Saakashvili offered their joint
services as mediators, a role that is traditionally reserved within the CIS
for Moscow.

Ukraine is also challenging Russia's influence in five other ways. First,
Kiev is planning to pull out of the CIS Single Economic Space (CIS SES),
which Kuchma supported in 2002 and 2003. Yushchenko is only interested in
plans within the CIS SES to create a free trade zone. However, Moscow will
not press ahead without further concessions from Ukraine. The two steps that
Kuchma was willing to back, but Yushchenko is not, include a customs union
and a joint currency.

Second, Ukraine - like Moldova and Georgia - has pulled out of CIS Election
Observation Missions (CIS EOM), which have regularly declared rigged
elections throughout the CIS to be 'free and fair'. Kiev has stated that it
will uphold Organisation for Security and Co-operation (OSCE) norms with
respect to human rights and election standards within CIS member states. The
Ukrainian foreign ministry has already slammed the CIS EOM for declaring
that the second round of the Ukrainian elections were 'free and fair',
supporting Yanukovych's 'victory'. Widespread fraud during the second round
of the poll was condemned by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation,
the Council of Europe and Washington.

Third, Ukraine is no longer backing Putin's policies for Moldova's
separatist Transdniestr enclave. Kiev is now seeking greater European Union
(EU) involvement in re-integrating Moldova and the Transdniestr - and the
removal of Russian military bases. At a 1999 OSCE summit, Russia had agreed
to remove the bases by 2002, a deadline that was subsequently extended to
2003. As in Georgia, Russian bases still remain in Moldova well beyond the
agreed date for withdrawal.

Fourth, Ukraine is re-routing the new Odessa-Brody pipeline to bring Azeri
oil through Georgia, across the Black Sea via Ukraine and into Europe. This
plan - the original route - is backed by the US, the EU and Poland. However,
Kuchma had reversed this decision to bring Russian oil from the north to the
south.

Lastly, Yushchenko is following the lead of the three Baltic states in not
attending events organised to mark the 60th anniversary of the end of Second
World War in Moscow. Putin has already criticised the Baltic states for
refusing to attend. Instead, Yushchenko will preside over Ukrainian
ceremonies in Kiev.

Of even greater concern to the Kremlin is that Ukraine may, unwittingly,
become a staging point for the future export of a popular democratic
revolution to Russia. Next week's JID contains additional analysis of the
impact of these events. -30- [Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
=============================================================
12. WHAT COMES AFTER ROSE, ORANGE AND TULIP?

By Susan B. Glasser and Peter Baker
OUTLOOK: The Washington Post
Washington, D.C., Sunday, April 3, 2005; Page B03

Shortly after the so-called Rose Revolution in the tiny republic of Georgia,
the leaders of the other nations that once made up the Soviet Union gathered
in the Caspian Sea oil town of Baku for the funeral of Azerbaijan's longtime
strongman president. There the heads of state of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus
and the Central Asian republics paid their respects to their fellow
authoritarian even as they nervously eyed the instigators of the democratic
uprising in their midst.

It naturally fell to Russia's President Vladimir Putin, who in private and
sometimes in public has demonstrated a taste for earthy, even crude
language, to sum up the jittery mood. He walked over to one of the leaders
of the Georgian revolution, two Georgian officials later told us, and
declared pungently that all of the heads of state in the room were
"[messing] in their pants."

As it turned out, those presidents were right to worry. Since that day in
December 2003, two more of the men who belonged to that exclusive club
have been unceremoniously pushed out of office by popular street revolts,
first in Ukraine's Orange Revolution last December and now in the March
Tulip Revolution in the nomadic mountain state of Kyrgyzstan, hard up
against the Chinese border.

The swift spread of the revolutions has unsettled tyrants and inspired
democrats throughout the vast reaches of Moscow's former empire, generating
excited, if overheated, discussion of what some analysts over the last week
were quick to dub "the second breakup of the Soviet Union." Some were even
daring to ask the ultimate question: Could Russia itself be next?

After four years as The Washington Post's bureau chiefs in a country where
even the past, as the old Soviet joke goes, is unpredictable, we learned
that just about anything is possible. But we also spent our entire tour
watching Putin's Kremlin systematically embark on a project to avoid any
threat to its rule, methodically neutralizing alternative power centers that
one day might conceivably challenge the former KGB colonel's grip on power.
And the lesson he seems likely to learn from Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan
is not to open up the political process but to crack down even harder.

The results of the Kremlin campaign that began with Putin's election five
years ago last week are evident today -- no independent television to serve
as a bullhorn for revolution, as it did in Georgia; a divided, weak and
unpopular reformist opposition unable to unite around a single leader,
unlike the broad coalition that formed in Ukraine; and cowed businessmen
unable or unwilling to finance rival political efforts after watching the
Kremlin jail Russia's richest man and confiscate his oil company.

Even in the early days of Putin's presidency, when it was still unclear to
many where he intended to take the country, his advisers were plenty clear
about the project. "Putin has said he wants to end the revolution," his
political consultant, Gleb Pavlovsky, told us at the time, "not to start a
new one." And so there was Pavlovsky last week, telling a Moscow news
conference confidently, "There is no threat that what happened in Georgia
and Ukraine may happen in Russia."

Unlike the fading, aging leaders there and in Kyrgyzstan, Putin, he
intimated, would not hesitate to stop any such uprising by force. "Weapons
should be used against rebel groups and criminals who actually stormed the
parliament building in Bishkek," he said, referring to the Kyrgyz capital.
"If the authorities fail to perform their institutional duties in those
cases, they give away power. . . . In all cases where organized citizens
promote this revolution scenario, they should be suppressed."

When he came to power, Putin was determined to end a revolution -- Boris
Yeltsin's. Even though Yeltsin had handpicked him as his successor, Putin
saw the 1990s not as the heady if flawed start of a new democracy but as a
period of roiling instability, economic dislocation and crumbling state
power.

"If by democracy one means the dissolution of the state," he once told a
group of American correspondents when we asked him about his rollback of
democratic institutions, "then we do not need any such democracy."

Elections were part and parcel of what Putin considered the unseemly mess of
democracy and his counter-revolution was all about making sure they did not
become the trigger for revolution as elsewhere in the former Soviet Union.

At first, his Kremlin tried to control them, coming up with the idea of
"managed" elections, whose outcomes could be manipulated by authorities.
When that proved troublesome, Putin decided simply to cancel gubernatorial
elections in Russia's 89 regions altogether.

We got an indication of this attitude toward elections early in our tour
when we went to the next-door republic of Belarus for the balloting that
would hand a second term to Alexander Lukashenko, often called Europe's
last dictator. While Western election observers trooped around polling
places amassing evidence of manipulation, we found the head of the
Russian monitoring team at a medieval castle outside the capital being
feted at a private lunch before touring the countryside.

The official was so confident in the election's outcome that he had no
apparent need to actually monitor it -- having already told the press that
it was being conducted in a free and fair manner. Appropriately enough, the
official was Alexander Veshnyakov, head of the Russian Central Election
Commission.

In the various corners of the old Soviet empire, we met hundreds of
activists over the last few years from political parties, human rights
groups and media organizations who dreamed of toppling the repressive
regimes that had emerged from the ashes of communism. In Belarus, we
watched burly police beat young boys on a Minsk street for daring to hold an
unauthorized protest. In Uzbekistan, we visited an aging Soviet-era
dissident who had taken up the cause of persecuted Muslims imprisoned
merely for wearing beards as a sign of faith. He interrupted the interview
to show us his bloodstained shirt from the day police stormed into his
apartment.

Nowhere was the discontent stronger than in Georgia, Ukraine and
Kyrgyzstan. From the moment we set down in Tbilisi, Georgia's capital, for
instance, we could find not one person outside government who still
supported then-President Eduard Shevardnadze. In a market one day, vendors
we interviewed grew so agitated that one woman began gesturing with a butter
knife and vowing that she would kill Shevardnadze if she had the chance.

Some of the preconditions of revolution were similar in all three countries:
long-standing grievances over poverty; corruption; and a distant, calcified
government that had long since overstayed its welcome. In each case, the
ruler had evolved from an ostensible democratic reformer to a dynastic ruler
guarding his own family's interests -- Shevardnadze's son-in-law made
millions in Georgia, Leonid Kuchma's son-in-law became one of Ukraine's
biggest tycoons and Askar Akayev's son and daughter have just been
installed in the Kyrgyz parliament.

Perhaps most important, though, was that in each country there was just
enough political space for the opposition to operate, making for noticeably
more open environments compared with neighboring countries.

By contrast, in Azerbaijan, a tough-minded new president -- son of the old
KGB general at whose funeral Putin made his comment to the Georgians --
quickly quashed street protests by the opposition after his election,
determined not to follow the revolutionary script. It worked, and we watched
as Baku's Freedom Square turned into a battlefield, with hundreds of
baton-wielding police beating demonstrators, many of them women and
unarmed men. Opposition leaders were then rounded up and jailed. No
one thinks Azerbaijan is on the brink of revolution today.

In a joint message to the Kyrgyz people last week, the leaders of the
Georgian and Ukrainian revolutions, Mikheil Saakashvili and Viktor
Yushchenko, hailed the developments in Bishkek. "These events showed that
in our three countries the elections were just one of the reasons, the last
straw that broke the people's patience and moved them towards the uprising."

But they also added an important caveat; for all the buzz about democratic
upheaval sweeping the former Soviet Union, such revolutions can happen only
when they are fueled by local conditions and people. "Revolutions cannot be
exported," they wrote. "They happen only where there are objective grounds
in place."

While many call this the second wave of democratization across the Soviet
Union, that may misjudge the nature of the regimes that took hold when the
union fell apart in 1991. In many of the newly independent states, the old
communist boss simply became the new "democratic" president, and
others who later took over, like Lukashenko, were simply old apparatchiks.

"There wasn't really a democratization wave 15 years ago," a senior Bush
administration official told us the other day. "The old regime crumbled, and
it was replaced by local authorities. This is really the first wave. It's a
delayed thing. These countries came out blinking and confused into the light
of sovereignty, not democracy, and they were taken over by local strongmen.
These strongmen sometimes paid lip service to democracy, but the people
knew the difference."

Alexei Mitrofanov, a member of the Russian State Duma, the lower house of
parliament, is one of the most outlandish nationalist politicians in Russia,
but he put his finger on it when he told the newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta
that the revolutions around the perimeter of the old empire mirrored
Yeltsin's revolt against Soviet power. "They're the equivalent of August
1991 with a 14-year delay," he said, not meaning it as a compliment.

If that's the case, then, Russia may not feel the need to head down the same
road. To many Russians, revolution and democracy have become tainted terms,
equated with chaos and hardship, not freedom. Unlike what we saw in Georgia,
Belarus or Ukraine, we rarely encountered deep-seated grass-roots discontent
with Putin when we traveled the Russian countryside. Outside the narrow
circle of intelligentsia in Moscow and St. Petersburg, many Russians agreed
with Putin that a little autocracy was a good thing, and they handed him a
second term in last year's flawed but probably representative election.

But many uncertainties remain as Russia heads toward the crucial year of
2008, when Putin's second and final term under the constitution expires.
Many in Moscow believe he will try to find a way to hold onto power, and the
city is abuzz with various schemes he could use to remain in control. "Well,
who could stop them?" Olga Kryshtanovskaya, a sociologist who studies the
Russian elite, said in Profil magazine. "The opposition? We don't really
have an opposition at all."

Putin's former prime minister, Mikhail Kasyanov, recently broke a year-long
silence to criticize his ex-boss and seems to be positioning himself to be a
Russian Yushchenko. But many say they doubt he could pull it off, especially
given his own unpopularity with the masses, who blamed him for anything
they did not like in Putin's first term.

And so, if there were a revolution in Russia, many worry that it would not
happen peacefully. The color of revolution in Moscow, then, might be red
for blood. -30- [The Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authors' e-mail: bakerp@washpost.com; glassers@washpost.com
Susan Glasser and Peter Baker, who finished a four-year tour as The
Post's Moscow bureau chiefs in November, are authors of "Kremlin
Rising: Vladimir Putin's Russia and the End of Revolution," to be
published by Scribner in June.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A20448-2005Apr2.html
=============================================================
13. IS NEWLY LIBERATED KIEV THE NEXT PRAGUE?

By Steven Lee Myers, The New York Times
New York, NY, Sunday, April 3, 2005

Twas only a few months ago that the extraordinary political upheaval in
Ukraine unfolded on television screens around the world against the back-
drop of a capital, Kiev, that many viewers had never seen before. The
images were compelling: glittering church domes, forested riverbanks,
the grandiose post-World War II architecture of Kreshchatik Street and
Independence Square, where thousands of Ukrainians massed in protest,
and then, finally, in ebullient celebration as a new Western-minded
president, Viktor A. Yushchenko, was ushered in.

The upheaval has ended, but the backdrop is still there, as is a sense of
optimism that Ukraine may yet shake off the post-Soviet funk that left the
country mired in economic chaos and political intrigue even as other former
Soviet republics and satellites - the Baltics, Poland, the Czech Republic -
opened up to the West. In Kiev, especially, the ramifications of political
change are enticing, not just for residents but for foreign visitors intent
on exploring a city that has all the makings of a new Prague.

Mr. Yushchenko's government is promising to lure investors and tourists -
one of its first steps was to ease visa restrictions for those attending the
annual pop music competition, Eurovision, in May. This year's event, the
50th, will include performers from 40 countries and be televised to millions
across the Continent.

But perhaps what will most encourage tourists to explore this graceful city
on the banks of the Dnieper River are the images that were televised in
December. Those who come will find a rich historical and cultural heritage
and a vibrant urban spirit.

Kiev, as guidebooks will tell you, is ancient, its "modern" founding dating
from the 10th century. It was from Kiev that the Orthodox Church spread
its influence through Russia.

Nowhere is the city's spiritual and historical significance more apparent
than at the Holy Assumption Kiev-Pechersk Lavra, on a hill overlooking the
river south of the city center. Founded in the 11th century, it is the
oldest Orthodox monastery of Old Rus and Ukraine. Its domes and Great
Bell Tower, just under 317 feet high, compete with the slightly taller
Rodina Mat, or Motherland, the steel-covered monument to the Soviet
Union's victory over the Nazis, as the most distinctive feature of the
city's landscape.

The monastery is one of the most venerated sites in Russian Orthodoxy,
drawing millions of pilgrims from across Europe. Inside the monastery,
divided into upper and lower sections, are two dozen churches, towers and
museums (most from the 17th and 18th centuries). The Ukrainian Museum
of Historical Treasures has a spectacular collection of Scythian gold,
including an intricate fourth-century necklace that depicts, among other
things, two men fighting over a golden fleece. Even more fascinating is what
gave the monastery its name: peshchery, or caves. Beneath the grounds are
hundreds of yards of narrow, winding passages, where monks lived,
worshiped and died.

Their mummified relics remain there, placed in narrow notches carved out of
the stone. One enters the Near Caves from the Krestovozdvizhenskaya
Church (Church of the Elevation of the Cross), where visitors can buy
candles, the only source of light inside. From 15 to 65 feet underground
are three churches, as well as the tomb of St. Anthony, the ascetic who
moved into a cave nearby in the 11th century. A darkened, otherworldly
silence is interrupted only occasionally by prayerful chants of worshipers.

Centuries of war and occupation - most recently by Nazi Germany, followed
by what the most ardent nationalists here consider renewed occupation by
the Soviet Union - destroyed much of the city's most venerable architecture,
including the monastery's principal church, the Uspensky (Assumption)
Cathedral. An explosion demolished it in 1941 in circumstances that are
still disputed; it has since been rebuilt.

Other landmarks remain largely untouched. The most impressive is St. Sofia's
Cathedral, an architectural masterpiece, with its 13 blue and gold domes. It
was erected in the first half of the 11th century in what is now called the
Upper City. Although its Baroque exterior is the result of a 17th-century
reconstruction, its interior still has partly preserved Byzantine frescoes a
thousand years old. The cathedral also houses the centuries-old tombs of the
Kievan princes, including Yaroslav the Wise, who commissioned the church
after his victory in the 11th century over the nomadic Pecheneg tribe.

The National Reserve of St. Sofia's Cathedral, as it is now called, is open
to the public, though the day I visited it was closed in the morning because
Mr. Yushchenko, newly inaugurated, was praying there. It was gloriously
sunny, with the light glinting off the cathedral's domes, and when I finally
entered the grounds, a man with a bandura, a lutelike instrument, sang
melodic folksongs on a bench.

Not far from here, a funicular descends to the banks of the Dnieper and a
gentrifying, middle-class neighborhood called Podil, where I stayed in a
simple, but comfortable hotel, the Domus. A longer, but far more pleasant
route is Andriyivsky Uzviz, or St. Andrew's Descent. Cobblestoned and
mostly pedestrian, the winding, sloping street is Kiev's Montmartre, lined
with galleries, antiques stores and artist studios in late 19th-century
brick buildings.

Here, artists sell their paintings and sculptures. Other vendors, among them
impoverished pensioners, sell jewelry, linens, T-shirts and souvenirs.
Farther along is a museum in the home where Mikhail Bulgakov, the Russian
writer, lived from 1906 to the early years of the Soviet Union before moving
to Moscow and inviting persecution for his scathingly satirical novels and
plays, including "The Master and Margarita."

It is on Andriyivsky Uzviz that visitors will also encounter the vibrancy of
postelection Kiev. On a recent evening the L-Art gallery, at No. 2-B, which
usually specializes in Socialist Realism paintings of the 50's, 60's and
70's, was displaying raw, graffitilike paintings by Volodymyr Kuznetsov, a
young artist whose inspiration lay in the political upheaval that came to be
called the Orange Revolution. Mr. Kuznetsov's works reflect what Lyudmyla
Berenznitska, the owner of the gallery, calls "the birth of a new Ukraine."

"We are a young nation," she explained on the night of the opening when the
gallery was packed with journalists, graying intellectuals, young people and
two television crews, one from a station that only weeks before would not
have dared show anti-government sentiments. "We are in the process of
self-recognition."

That might seem an odd thing to say about a country with a deep, rich
history. But here on Andriyivsky Uzviz, which binds the past and the future,
the process of self-recognition is very much in evidence, as illustrated not
just by the avant-garde art Ms. Berenznitska is showing in her gallery, but
in the new bar and restaurant, Prêt-à-Café, that she has recently opened in
a gallery annex at 10 Andriyivsky Uzviz. The cafe is sleekly modern, with a
sound system pulsing with European pop.

A profusion of new cafes, bars and restaurants are opening elsewhere in the
city. Some, like Decadence House, at 16 Shota Rustaveli Street, became
late-night hangouts during the election, when the aides for the bitterly
divided presidential campaigns gathered and, by all accounts, set aside
their disputes. On my last evening in Kiev I found my way to Art Club 44, a
crowded and smoky underground bar and club in a difficult-to-find courtyard
off the city's main street, Kreshchatik.

That night a band called Yaka Isnue from the western city of Lviv appeared
onstage and played grinding, grungelike rock. The band's name means,
roughly, "the one who exists," and its singer playfully dedicated a song to
the "crocodile tears" of Mr. Yushchenko's defeated opponent, Viktor F.
Yanukovich. The crowd laughed and hooted through the din; many swayed
or danced in what seemed like elation.

It seemed that, for Kiev, there was no turning back. -30-

IF YOU GO: GETTING THERE
U.S. citizens traveling to Ukraine must have a visa, which can be obtained
from the Consular Office of the Embassy of Ukraine in Washington, or the
consulates general in Chicago, San Francisco or in New York at 240 East
49th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017; (212) 371-5690. Online visit
www.ukraineinfo.us. A single-entry visa is $100, by money order.
AeroSvit Airlines offers nonstop service from New York to Kiev (Kennedy
Airport) three times a week (five times weekly beginning in mid-May); (212)
661-1620; www.aerosvit.us; from about $520 round trip.

LODGING AND DINING
Hotel Domus, 19 Yaroslavskaya Street, (38-044) 490-9009, fax (38-044)
462-5145, www.domus-hotel.kiev.ua, is a small business-class hotel with 29
rooms. A double room costs $190, breakfast not included.
In keeping with the fad for sushi that has spread across many restaurants in
the former Soviet Union, Decadence House, 16 Shota Rustaveli, (38-044)
206-4920, serves sushi in addition to European dishes in lush décor meant
to evoke France; $40 to $60 with a glass of wine, at 5.4 hryvnia to $1.
Lunch only.

A better place for sushi is Nobu, 12 Shota Rustaveli, (38-044) 246-7734, a
minimalist Japanese restaurant less than a block away that is often so
crowded it turns people away. Open daily noon to midnight. Dinner costs
$20 to $50.

My favorite place, both for atmosphere and convenience, is Shato, a brewpub
and restaurant at 24 Kreshchatik, (38-44) 229-3704, with broad second-floor
windows overlooking Independence Square. The restaurant served as the
headquarters for Pora, the youth group that provided the uprising with much
of its organization and zeal. The beer, brewed on site, is great; the food,
not bad. Open daily around the clock. Dinner costs less than $20 with
dessert. A half-liter glass of beer brewed here costs $3.25.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PHOTOS: (1) The sun sets behind St. Sofia's; (2) In St. Sofia's, an
11th-century cathedral with Byzantine frescoes and 13 blue and gold
domes. (3) Supporters of Viktor Yushchenko celebrate in Independence
Square. James Hill for The New York Times
http://travel2.nytimes.com/2005/04/03/travel/03kiev.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1112536969-gmhbcrbB7KU+HgzXfdNXFw
============================================================
14. RUSSIAN, UKRAINIAN, ARMENIAN CATHOLICS
MOURN POPE'S DEATH
"The tragic news of the end of the terrestrial life of Pope John Paul II
filled with profound grief the hearts of Ukrainians who prayed for his
health," says a letter by Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko to
Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, the dean of the College of Cardinals.
"The bright image of the holy Father will remain for good in the memory
of Ukrainian citizens, Orthodox and Catholic parishioners as well as
believers of other confessions and all who share Christian values."

ITAR-TASS, Moscow, Russia, Sunday, April 3, 2005

MOSCOW - Catholics of Russia, Ukraine and Armenia mourn the decease
of Pope John Paul II. Believers of the easternmost Catholic eparchy - St.
Joseph with the center in Irkutsk - also mourn the death of the Pontiff. The
eparchy unites more than 40 parishes over the territory between the Yenisei
River and the Chukchi Peninsula as well as Sakhalin Island. All parishes
performed offices for the dead in the mooring.

The head of the eparchy, Bishop Kirill Klimovich, addressed a message to
Catholics of Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East, saying as follows:
"We are amazed at courage, with which the Pontiff bore sufferings from the
serious ailment and at bright calm with which he met his last hour. We
deeply mourn this event. The grief of the loss is heavy. But death loses its
macabre and frightening image for people in whose hearts Christ lives."

A mass for the rest of the soul of Pope John Paul II was performed at the
Assumption of the Holy Virgin Church in the city of Kursk. It was conducted
by Reverend Andzhei. The divine service was attended not only by Catholics
from Kursk and nearby villages, but also by foreign students, studying at
Kursk higher educational establishments.

Students from Cameroon, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Nigeria, Lebanon and India
come for the mass every Sunday. The present mass for the Pontiff's rest will
unite all Catholics of the world and will confirm again love and respect for
this man.

Russian author Alexander Solzhenitsin, although not a Catholic, said that
"Pope John Paul II was a great man. In the centuries-long line of Roman
popes, he stands out markedly. He influenced the course of world history;
and, on his tireless pastoral visits across the world, he carried the warmth
of Christianity to all".

The toll of Rome-Catholic and Greek-Catholic churches in Ukraine notified
of the Pontiff's decease. Nearly six million Ukrainian Catholics pray for
the rest of the Pope's soul. Memorial services are conducted also at
Ukrainian orthodox churches.

"The tragic news of the end of the terrestrial life of Pope John Paul II
filled with profound grief the hearts of Ukrainians who prayed for his
health," says a letter by Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko to Cardinal
Joseph Ratzinger, the dean of the College of Cardinals. "The bright image
of the holy Father will remain for good in the memory of Ukrainian citizens,
Orthodox and Catholic parishioners as well as believers of other
confessions and all who share Christian values."

The Armenian Catholic church in Yerevan held a mass for the rest of the
Pope's soul. Around 100 people who gathered at the small church, listened
to Suffragan Bishop Vartan Keshishyan. The church, located in Kanaker,
the northern suburb of Yerevan, was sanctified by Pope John Paul II on
September 27, 2001 who came there to mark the 1700th anniversary of
proclaiming Christianity as Armenia's state religion.

The Armenia Catholic Church is one of 21 Eastern Catholic churches,
existing in Catholicism. According to the church, there are 150,000
Armenian Catholics in the republic. However, in the opinion of analysts,
the figure is ten times higher than the real number of believers. -30-
=============================================================
15. THE POPE AND THE END OF EUROPEAN COMMUNISM

By Tom Hundley, Tribune staff reporter
Chicago Tribune, Chicago, Illinois, Sat, April 2, 2005

WARSAW -- Poland in the late 1970s was a grim and isolated place. The
economy was a shambles. The shelves of shops were empty, and consumers
waited in long lines. The Communist regime went almost unchallenged.

But spirits rose in October 1979, when Karol Wojtyla, archbishop of Krakow,
was elected pope. Poles suddenly had a link to the outside world- Wojtyla
would be their voice. And Wojtyla was determined to help his homeland.

When the Vatican first proposed a visit in early 1979, Leonid Brezhnev, the
Soviet leader, recommended that the pope's trip should be postponed "due
to illness." A homecoming for a Polish pope would only bring trouble, he
warned.

The Polish government believed it could stage-manage a harmless religious
event. But the Communists had little inkling of the power wielded by Pope
John Paul II. Some 300,000 Poles filled Warsaw's vast Victory Square for
the first papal mass on June 2, 1979. Nearly a million more jammed the
surrounding streets.

"There can be no just Europe without the independence of Poland marked
on its map," the pope told them. The response swelled like a vast tidal
wave: "We want God, we want God."

Over the course of the nine-day pilgrimage, the pope altered the
psychological landscape of his homeland, instilling a sense of dignity and
courage. His theme, repeated over and over at every stop, was
solidarnosz-the solidarity of the Polish people. Fourteen months after the
papal visit, those ideas bore fruit.

Government-imposed price increases triggered a wave of strikes culminating
in the takeover of the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk by 17,000 workers. They were
led by a feisty electrician with a drooping mustache named Lech Walesa, who
knelt at the barricades armed only with images of the Black Madonna,
Poland's most cherished religious symbol.

Timid church leaders in Poland were slow to grasp the meaning of what was
taking place and urged the strikers to show restraint. But in Rome, Pope
John Paul II understood immediately the importance of the strikers' demands
and sent a message of support.

The strikers refused to buckle, and in August 1980 a revolution was born. It
called itself Solidarity. Within three weeks of its founding, more than 3
million workers from 3,500 factories had declared their allegiance to
Solidarity. Within months the number would balloon to 10 million-more than
one-quarter of the population.

In 1981, under mounting pressure from Moscow, Poland's leaders imposed
martial law. A few minutes before midnight on Dec. 12, telephones across
Poland went dead, and tanks rumbled through the capital. Four thousand
Solidarity leaders, including Walesa, were rounded up and arrested.

The pope, still recovering from the gunshot wound inflicted by a would-be
assassin seven months earlier, prayed for his compatriots. That Christmas
Eve, he lit a single candle in the window of his Vatican apartment-a symbol
of "solidarity with suffering nations."

But he was determined to do more than that. In 1983, after months of
negotiations with the Communist leaders of Poland, the pope returned. That
second pilgrimage would turn out to be one of the crowning achievements of
his papacy and an unmitigated disaster for the regime.

Despite warnings from the government to stay home, 3 million people turned
out for three open-air masses in Czestochowa. They heard the pope preach
a gospel of dignity, human rights and solidarity. Despite tanks in the
streets and the menacing presence of security police everywhere, 300,000
gathered for a mass at a Warsaw stadium meant to hold 100,000.

Bronislaw Geremek, a professor of medieval history and key adviser to
Walesa, would later serve as democratic Poland's foreign minister. But on
June 17, the day of the pope's open air mass at the football stadium,
Geremek was in Warsaw's Rakowiecka Prison. He recalls the extraordinary
silence that descended upon the city as the pope began to speak.

By the time the pope left Poland, the regime was more afraid of its own
people and the Polish pope than it was of Moscow's hollow threats of
invasion. A month after the papal visit, martial law was lifted.

The road to freedom and democracy would not be easy for the Poles. As their
economy continued its slow motion free-fall, the country's rulers stubbornly
clung to power, harassed Solidarity activists and curtailed human rights.

But the Solidarity movement-officially non-existent-had regained the
initiative, and, with constant reinforcement from the Vatican, it would hold
fast until the regime finally gave way.

At the beginning of 1987, a full two years before the beginning of the talks
that would mark the formal dismantling of communism in Poland, Gen.
Wojciech Jaruzelski traveled to Rome for a meeting with the pope. At
this point, writes papal historian George Weigel, "Both men knew who
had won."

And with the ascent to Soviet leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, who signaled
that he would not continue to use military might to suppress Eastern Europe,
the only real issue was to secure a peaceful transition.

In January 1989, Jaruzelski announced he would recognize Solidarity and
meet with Walesa for a series of talks on the future of Poland. The talks
began in February. Two months later the regime agreed to semi-free
elections: Jaruzelski would remain as president and the Communists
would be guaranteed 65 percent of the seats in parliament. The remaining
35 percent could be contested.

The election was held June 4, and Solidarity won all of the 192 contested
seats. There also was an election for the newly created Polish Senate.
Solidarity swept 99 out of 100 seats. Historians estimated that 80 percent
of the Communist Party's membership must have voted for Solidarity.

A humiliated Jaruzelski took office as president, but he bowed to the
inevitable by naming Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a leading Catholic intellectual
with close ties to the pope, as prime minister. Mazowiecki was the first
non-Communist to head a government in Eastern Europe since World
War II.

In short order, the communist regimes of neighboring countries began to
crumble. Hungary, East Germany and Czechoslovakia saw peaceful
revolutions. Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia and Albania followed, though
not always gently. Although the CIA and the rest of Washington failed
to see it coming, the collapse of the Soviet Union was only a matter time.

Gorbachev's perestroika reforms were too little, too late. The Baltic
republics-Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia-had been agitating for greater
freedoms since 1987. With the dramatic collapse of communism in the
Soviet satellite states, the Baltic peoples stepped up their demands.
Nationalist movements were on the rise in the Ukraine, Armenia and
Georgia as well.

From his earliest days in power, Gorbachev was deeply curious about the
Slavic pope. A decade later, Gorbachev would write, "Everything that has
happened in Eastern Europe in recent years would have been impossible
without the pope's efforts and the enormous role, including the political
role, he has played in the world arena."

The pontiff takes a more modest view of his role. "I didn't cause this to
happen," he told an interviewer. "The tree was already rotten. I just gave
it a good shake, and the rotten apples fell."

For a thousand years, the Catholic Church has been the guardian and
repository of the Polish national identity. Nowhere in Europe is a nation so
closely tied to its faith.

The Polish pope also saw his homeland as a living bridge between the two
Europes, East and West. And it was his hope-his expectation-that Poland
would not only regain its freedom, but would lead the rest of Europe back to
Christianity.

In the immediate aftermath of the regime's collapse, the Polish church
claimedvictory for itself and demanded its say in the new nation. Poland's
liberal abortion laws were abolished, and the Catholic catechism was taught
in state schools. Many cities and towns renamed streets in honor of Pope
John Paul II. From the pulpit, bishops instructed the faithful for whom they
should vote.

Most Poles saw things differently. The church, of course, had aided the
people, but that did not mean the church owned the victory. The last thing
Poles wanted was to replace the "red" tyranny of communism with the
"black" tyranny of clerical rule.

Instead, Poles embraced Western-style capitalism and consumerism with
astonishing speed. Almost overnight, it seemed, the drab gray of Warsaw
was transformed by colorful billboards of Western companies advertising
their wares.

Poles also began to adopt the social norms of Western Europe. Ignoring
the church's teaching on birth control, they had fewer babies. While tough
anti-abortion laws remain on the books, an illegal abortion underground
advertises openly in newspapers. In recent years, the divorce rate has
soared; church attendance has declined.

On the occasion of Pope John Paul II's first visit to his homeland after the
fall of communism, Poles were expecting a celebration. Instead, they got
a scolding.

The pope took in the all the changes, and, like an angry Moses, he lashed
out at the "whole civilization of desire and pleasure which is now lording
it over us, profiting from various means of seduction. Is this civilization
or is it anti-civilization?" "And what should be the criteria for
Europeanism? Freedom? What kind of freedom? The freedom to take
the life of an unborn child?" he demanded.

The visit stunned Poles and left the pope feeling betrayed by his
compatriots. For the first time, the international media began to paint a
picture of the pope as an angry old man, out of touch with the times. The
years took their toll on the pontiff, but he hadn't changed his message. He
never did. His most recent visits to Poland have been occasions for great
outpourings of national pride. Last year, an estimated 2.5 million turned
out for an open-air mass in Krakow.

Among them was a 46-year-old steelworker named Henryk Otlinger. With tears
streaming down his face, he hoisted his 10-year-old daughter, Natalia, onto
his shoulders so that she might catch a glimpse of the man her father said
"was the most important person in the world, in the country and privately
for us, in our family."

In Krakow that day, there was little evidence of the "new evangelization"
the pope has yearned for. But the Poles came-young and old-to honor the man
that many of them consider to be the greatest Pole who ever lived, a man of
awesome spiritual power who gave his nation the strength to liberate itself.
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Senior Advisor; Ukrainian Federation of America (UFA)
Coordinator, Action Ukraine Coalition (AUC)
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