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Action Ukraine Report

"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT - AUR"
An International Newsletter
The Latest, Up-To-Date
In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis, and Commentary

"Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion,
Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World"

"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT - AUR" - Number 562
Mr. E. Morgan Williams, Publisher and Editor
Washington, D.C., Kyiv, Ukraine, SATURDAY, September 17, 2005

NOTE: Due to the unusually large number of special articles about
Ukraine because of the situation there including op-ed's, editorials,
analytical, and commentary material I have temporarily increased
the number of AUR's being distributed. EDITOR

--------INDEX OF ARTICLES--------
"Major International News Headlines and Articles"

1. HUED BE RIGHT TO SAY THE CITY'S MAKING A FUSS
OVER YUSHCHENKO
By Ronnie Polaneczky, Philly.com
Philadelphia Daily News, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Friday, September 16, 2005

2. AMERICAN JOURNALIST ATTACKED IN UKRAINE
The Associated Press (AP), Kyiv, Ukraine, Sep 15, 2005

3. SPEAKER OF UKRAINE'S PARLIAMENT VOLODYMYR LYTVYN SAYS
PRESIDENT VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO NEEDS AN ENTIRELY NEW
TEAM OF TECHNOCRATS NOT POLITICIANS
By MARA D. BELLABY, Associated Press Writer
AP, Kiev, Ukraine, Friday, September 16, 2005

4. UKRAINIAN ODESSA-BRODY PIPELINE TO CARRY CASPIAN OIL
TOWARDS EUROPE NEXT YEAR
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in Eng - United Kingdom; Sep 12, 2005

5. "UKRAINE MY UKRAINE" PLENAIR IN KIEV FOR UKRAINIAN ARTISTS
October 10th - 23rd, 2005
The Action Ukraine Report (AUR), No 562, Article
Kyiv, Ukraine, Friday, September 15, 2004

6. GENOCIDE, ONE YEAR ON
First time since adoption of the U.N. Genocide Convention in 1948
that a government has accused a sitting counterpart of this worst of
all humanitarian crimes.
EDITORIAL, The Washington Post
Washington, D.C., Wed, Sep 14, 2005; Page A30

7. MAJOR CONFERENCE ON UKRAINE BEING HELD IN WASHINGTON
UKRAINE'S QUEST FOR MATURE NATION STATEHOOD ROUNDTABLE VI
WASHINGTON, D.C, SEPTEMBER 27 & 28
"Ukraine's Transition To An Established National Identity"

8. POSITION OPEN IN ECONOMICS IN CANADA
The Action Ukraine Report (AUR), No. 562, Article 8
Washington, D.C., Friday, September 15, 2005

9. UKRAINE: THE VIEW AFTER THE BATTLE
Split in Orange Leadership May Put Changes on Hold
ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY: By Gennady Petrov
Special to Russia Profile, RussiaProfile.org
Unwrapping the mysteries inside the Enigma
Published by Independent Media For RIA Novosti
Moscow, Russia, Friday, September 16, 2005

10. OSCE CHOOSES KHARKIV FOR ITS PILOT PROJECT "ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT FOR UKRAINIAN ORPHANED CHILDREN"
Volodymyr Fomenko, Ukrinform, Kharkiv, Ukraine, Fri, Sep 2, 2005

11. A FAIRYTALE BORN, A MYTH DESTROYED
President Yushchenko lost control of the situation
within his team and should have intervened much earlier.
COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS:
By Tatiana Silina, Serhii Rakhmanin,
Julia Mostovaya, & Olga Dmitricheva
Zerkalo Nedeli, Mirror-Weekly, 35 (563)
International Social Political Weekly
Kyiv, Ukraine, Saturday, 10-16 September 2005

12. THE UNDYING RESOLVE TO LIVE
Natalia was taken from her Ukrainian home and imprisoned
By Jessica Hawley - Lifestyles Editor
The Bandera Bulletin, Bandera, Texas, Sat, Sep 3, 2005
=============================================================
1. HUED BE RIGHT TO SAY THE CITY'S MAKING A FUSS
OVER YUSHCHENKO

By Ronnie Polaneczky, Philly.com
Philadelphia Daily News, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Friday, September 16, 2005

WE'RE PAINTING Some of the Town Orange!

Okay, so it's a step back from the full-blown, pumpkin-like glow I'd hoped
would suffuse Center City this weekend, when Ukrainian President Viktor
Yushchenko visits Philly to accept the Liberty Medal.

But orange, I've learned, isn't in the normal palette of colors available to
ornamentally light downtown structures for good causes.

That's why City Hall won't be lit orange. Nor will other Center City towers
go orange for Yushchenko the way they routinely go pink for breast-cancer
awareness, flag-like for July 4th madness and green for Eagles fever.

But not to worry!

The fountain in Love Park will gush as orange as a shaken can of Crush.
Barring unforseen glitches, the clock tower of this newspaper will throw a
campfire glow into the sky. The roadway lights on the Ben Franklin Bridge
will flutter from white to orange every 10 minutes. And Peco will trumpet a
welcome message to the Ukrainian president throughout the weekend.

Not in orange, alas, but a fuss is a fuss in any color, I say.

If anyone deserves a fuss, it's Yushchenko. At least, that's what I argued
in this column in August, when I recommended that we "Paint the Town
Orange!" in his honor this weekend.

This is a man who overcame poison-laced soup, political treachery and a
rigged election to become Ukraine's president last winter.
He so inspired supporters that hundreds of thousands of them kept vigil for
weeks, in Kiev's frozen Independence Square, until he triumphed over
Moscow puppet Viktor Yanukovych.

Orange, of course, was the color worn by Yushchenko's supporters during his
long, tense campaign. Their orange scarves, hats and flags defined what
came to be known around the world as the Orange Revolution - a movement
characterized by raw courage, peaceful protest and whatever-it-takes
determination that democracy triumph over corruption.

To me, this weekend's Liberty Medal is as much a recognition of their
passion as it is the principles of freedom upon which Yushchenko
campaigned and which the annual medal recognizes with a cash award
of $100,000.

Tomorrow, members of the vast East Coast Ukrainian Diaspora - many of
whom cast absentee ballots for him last winter - will crowd the 2 p.m.
Liberty Medal ceremony on the grounds of the National Constitution Center
at 6th and Arch.

All reserved seats and standing-room places have sold out, as have the
$250 tickets to the 8 p.m. gala that evening in Yushchenko's honor.

"The response has been huge," says Ulana Mazurkevich, head of the Liberty
Medal welcoming committee. "Yushchenko is so respected by our community."

So much so, it's doubtful anyone on her committee will ask the Ukrainian
president about his recent troubles. Last week, he dismissed his former
prime minister and her Cabinet, charging abuse of office. Which is just the
sort of thing he'd accused former president Viktor Yanukovych's
administration of doing.

So it's a tricky time back home for Yushchenko.
Or, as the Ukies would say, a "hordievyi vuzol rozviazat!"
But not here, and not this weekend.

After the Liberty Medal ceremony tomorrow (which will be broadcast live
on WPVI-TV), Yushchenko will attend a prayer service at the Immaculate
Conception Ukrainian Cathedral in Northern Liberties. Its Franklin Street
neighborhood will be fittingly adorned with orange ribbons, and local
Ukrainian violinist Solomiya Ivakhiv, who plays like a dream, will perform.

After the evening gala, Yushchenko will board a flight for home, $100,000
richer, which ought to ease the sting of his administration's embarrassing
growing pains.

Here's hoping, on his way to the airport, he sees a sky glowing orange in
his honor. Just so he knows he didn't drink that poison soup in vain.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
E-mail: polaner@phillynews.com
LINK: http://www.philly.com/mld/dailynews/news/local/12659475.htm
=============================================================
Send in names and e-mail addresses for the AUR distribution list.
=============================================================
2. AMERICAN JOURNALIST ATTACKED IN UKRAINE

The Associated Press (AP), Kyiv, Ukraine, Sep 15, 2005

KIEV, Ukraine -- A U.S. journalist was attacked inside her apartment in the
Ukrainian capital Kiev, police said Thursday.

Mary Mycio was in her apartment Monday when an unidentified man knocked
on the door and when she answered, he struck her several times on the head
with a granite stone, Interior Ministry spokesman Volodymyr Mulko said.

Mycio fought back and the man fled, the spokesman said. She was
hospitalized, and currently is listed in a stable condition, he said.

Police said that they had no information about a possible motive.

Mycio heads a journalist protection program run by IREX, an international
nonprofit group that specializes in developing an independent media, the
Ukraine-Interfax news agency reported. She also works as a freelance
journalist, the news agency said. Mycio also wrote a book about the
long-term effects of the Chernobyl disaster.

No one at IREX could be reached to comment Thursday evening.

President Viktor Yushchenko has pledged to guarantee the freedom of
the press in Ukraine. Yushchenko's predecessor, Leonid Kuchma, was
severely criticized for muzzling journalists. -30-
=============================================================
3. SPEAKER OF UKRAINE'S PARLIAMENT VOLODYMYR LYTVYN SAYS
PRESIDENT VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO NEEDS AN ENTIRELY NEW
TEAM OF TECHNOCRATS NOT POLITICIANS

By MARA D. BELLABY, Associated Press Writer
AP, Kiev, Ukraine, Friday, September 16, 2005

KIEV, Ukraine - The speaker of Ukraine's parliament said Friday that
President Viktor Yushchenko should turn to an entirely new team of
technocrats, not politicians, to form the next government after the ouster
of his "Orange Revolution" allies.

Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn also warned that the opposition - bolstered by the
addition of some of Yushchenko's former comrades - will look for ways to
undermine and perhaps even remove the president. "These attempts are
only beginning," Lytvyn told The Associated Press in an interview.

Amid a turbulent political crisis fueled by corruption allegations six
months before parliamentary elections, Yushchenko dismissed the government
of his Orange Revolution ally Yulia Tymoshenko last week and accepted the
resignation of ally Petro Poroshenko from the powerful Security and Defense
Council.

Yushchenko accused Tymoshenko of abusing her office, prompting a war of
words between the country's two most popular political figures. He has
tapped a Russian-born technocrat, Yuriy Yekhanurov, as acting prime
minister, and his confirmation vote in parliament is expected next week.

But Lytvyn, who is widely respected in Ukraine for his mediation efforts in
last year's election crisis, forecast a tough battle for Yekhanurov to win
the necessary 226 votes. He said Yekhanurov stood no chance of coming close
to Tymoshenko's record-breaking 373 votes, suggesting Yushchenko's choice
might have only a handful of votes to spare "at a maximum."

Lytvyn continues to back Yushchenko, saying the president must appoint
professionals who put public service above their own political ambitions. As
for the former ministers, Lytvyn suggested it would be better if they bow
out - and he called for all new appointees to pledge not to participate in
the March elections.

"If they return, their definition of 'new power' will go away," he said.
"They will be 'old power.' And just as before, when they strongly criticized
the previous power, the next generation of politicians will have all grounds
to criticize the 'new-old ministers.'"

Lytvyn said government work will be paralyzed if its leaders are focused on
the upcoming election. "I would propose that those who will be recommended
to enter the new government pledge not to take part in the election
campaign," he said. "It would allow them to concentrate on practical work.
Otherwise, no work will be done, and ministers will serve political
interests and political structures and not Ukrainian society."

He acknowledged, however, that such an idea was unrealistic. Lytvyn
suggested the opposition would redouble its efforts to get rid of
Yushchenko, but he predicted none would succeed.

Former President Leonid Kravchuk, an opposition leader, has accused
Yushchenko's campaign team of having accepted $15 million from Russian
oligarch Boris Berezovsky and suggested that, if proven, impeachment
proceedings could be launched. Yushchenko's top aides strongly denied it.
Yushchenko told Ukrainian media in the United States that his campaign
finances had been scrutinized repeatedly.

Lytvyn, a one-time chief of staff to former President Leonid Kuchma, said
he would try to ensure parliament played the role of the "guarantor of
stability" and hoped to return to the speaker's seat after the March
elections.

His People's Party boasts 44 lawmakers, which would make a coalition with
either Yushchenko's Our Ukraine or Tymoshenko's bloc a necessity if he
hoped to win back the parliamentary speaker's post. Lytvyn was careful
Friday to avoid directly criticizing either Tymoshenko or Yushchenko
personally.

But he said he was disappointed that this latest crisis erupted just as
Ukraine's image was starting to change. "Political forces have damaged
Ukraine," he said. "We were just starting to be understood, starting to be
respected." -30-
===============================================================
4. UKRAINIAN ODESS-BRODY PIPELINE TO CARRY CASPIAN OIL
TOWARDS EUROPE NEXT YEAR

BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in Eng - United Kingdom; Sep 12, 2005

Kiev, 12 September: The Odessa-Brody pipeline will start carrying oil in the
originally planned direction [from the Black Sea port of Odessa to Brody in
western Ukraine] in 2006, the head of the state oil and gas company Naftohaz
Ukrayiny and first deputy fuel and energy minister, Oleksiy Ivchenko, has
said.

"From next year, the pipeline will operate in the originally planned
direction," he said at a news conference in Hrubieszow (Poland) on Saturday
[10 September]. He said that at the initial stage 4m tonnes of oil a year
will be transported from Odessa to Brody.

Ivchenko is convinced that available volumes of Caspian oil are now
"sufficient for filling the Odessa-Brody pipeline". Ivchenko also said that
the extension from Brody to Gdansk (Poland) may be constructed and put into
use "within five years".

Oil is currently being transported through the Odessa-Brody pipeline in the
reverse direction - namely, from Brody to Odessa.

[Completed in May 2002, the Odessa-Brody pipeline was originally intended to
pump Caspian oil to Europe. But after it had stood idle for two years, the
Ukrainian government in July 2004 agreed to use the pipeline in the reverse
direction to pump Russian oil to the Black Sea.]
Source: Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian 0735 gmt 12 Sep 05
=============================================================
5. "UKRAINE MY UKRAINE" PLENAIR IN KIEV FOR UKRAINIAN ARTISTS
October 10th - 23rd, 2005

The Action Ukraine Report (AUR), No 562, Article
Kyiv, Ukraine, Friday, September 15, 2004

KYIV - The Ministry of Culture of Ukraine, the National Union of Artist, The
Ukrainian Centre "Drushba" together with the International Foundation
"Eidos" is organising a Plenair from the 10th to the 23rd of October 2005.
The title of the event is "Ukraine, my Ukraine".

The programme is designed for artists of Ukrainian origin who live abroad.
It is a very good opportunity to work and paint in Ukraine, to meet fellow
countrymen and get in touch with modern life in Ukraine.

In Kiev everything is provided for by the Ministry. Participants have to pay
the travel to Kiev. For more details please write to Kathrin Singer, Kyiv,
Ukraine, kathrinsinger@yahoo.co.uk. -30-
=============================================================
6. GENOCIDE, ONE YEAR ON
First time since adoption of the U.N. Genocide Convention in 1948
that a government has accused a sitting counterpart of this worst of
all humanitarian crimes.

EDITORIAL, The Washington Post
Washington, D.C., Wed, Sep 14, 2005; Page A30

A YEAR AGO, then-Secretary of State Colin L. Powell declared that the
violence in the Darfur region of Sudan justified the term "genocide."

That was the first time since the adoption of the U.N. Genocide Convention
in 1948 that a government had accused a sitting counterpart of this worst of
all humanitarian crimes, and Mr. Powell chose his words carefully.

His language was based on a survey of Darfurian refugees commissioned
by the State Department: Of 1,136 civilians interviewed, a third had heard
racial epithets while being attacked, suggesting that the mass killings and
evictions in Darfur constituted genocide.

The survey also found that three in four refugees had seen government
insignia on the uniforms of their attackers, leaving no doubt as to the
guilt of Sudan's government.

Since that finding, the United States has led an international effort to end
the genocide. The effort has not been as quick or decisive as the genocide
finding warranted: The Bush administration's attempt to pressure Sudan's
government with U.N. sanctions was feckless, and it made no effort to deploy
a robust NATO peacekeeping force. But, little by little, American diplomacy
has made headway. For now, the horror has abated.

The first success of Western diplomacy was to improve access to Darfur for
humanitarian workers and supplies, ending the government's policy of
systematically denying visas to aid officials and bottling up their
equipment in customs.

Next, Sudan's rulers were persuaded to accept the deployment of 7,700
African Union troops in Darfur, up from the handful who were there a year
ago. Partly thanks to the presence of these troops, violence between
government forces and rebels, and between government and civilians, has
greatly diminished.

But the progress is incomplete and reversible. Fully 3.2 million people have
been affected by the war, half of Darfur's population. Many of these subsist
in crowded camps for displaced people, where they depend on Western
charity.

Although humanitarian access has improved since last year, it remains
imperfect. In the Kalma camp, which is home to something like 160,000
displaced people, the government has refused to extend a Norwegian
group's authority to coordinate the distribution of relief supplies and has
imposed an economic blockade.

Meanwhile low-level violence continues. Although the government has
authorized the deployment of 7,700 A.U. troops, only 5,800 are in place so
far -- a failure both of the African governments that had promised troops
and of the Western governments that promised to support them logistically.

The progress over the past year demonstrates that the United States and its
allies do have the power to save lives by the tens of thousands. It also
suggests that, if the Bush administration had pushed harder and earlier, it
could have saved many more people. This lesson must be remembered over
the coming weeks and months.

Outsiders need to persist in their efforts to broker peace negotiations
between Sudan's government and Darfur's rebels; they must complete the
deployment of the African Union force and continue to pressure the
government for humanitarian access. The past year demonstrates that, if the
United States and its allies pursue these goals with determination, they can
get what they want.

But if they lose interest in Darfur, violence may resume and humanitarian
access may dry up. With so much of the population already displaced and
weakened, Darfur's death rate could easily return to the horrific levels of
a year ago. -30-
===============================================================
7. MAJOR CONFERENCE ON UKRAINE BEING HELD IN WASHINGTON
UKRAINE'S QUEST FOR MATURE NATION STATEHOOD ROUNDTABLE VI
WASHINGTON, D.C, SEPTEMBER 27 & 28
"Ukraine's Transition To An Established National Identity"

The Action Ukraine Report (AUR), No 562, Article 3
Washington, D.C., Friday, September 16, 2005

WASHINGTON, D.C. - The sixth conference in the Ukraine's Quest for
Mature Nation Statehood Roundtable Series will be held in Washington,
D.C., September 27-29, 2005, under the title 'Ukraine's Transition To An
Established National Identity' according to an announcement by the
chairman of the conference's steering committee, Michael Sawkiw,
Jr., President of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA).

The two-day conference, during the course of four regular sessions, will
feature twelve topical panels, four focus sessions, two working lunches and
a Conference reception. The conference will be held at Washington's
Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center in the Pavilion
Room.

The gathering will bring together key government and non-government
representatives of Ukraine, the United States and several of Ukraine's
neighbors as well as experts from academia to evaluate Ukraine's ability to
develop a "firm center of gravity as a nation/state" and to define Ukraine's
"distinct sense of place in global affairs", particularly in the aftermath
of the historic Orange Revolution which took place in the fall of 2004,
resulting in the election of Viktor Yushchenko as president of Ukraine.

CONFERENCE FEATURES OVER SEVENTY SPEAKERS
Over 70 speakers, a veritable Who's Who from the American, Ukrainian
and European governmental, NGO and private sectors, have been invited
to provide their insights regarding the domestic and foreign policies of
Ukraine's current government and their impact on the development of a
new global face for Ukraine.

The Roundtable series began when a number of Ukrainian and American
organizations convened in April of 2000 to consider ways of encouraging a
more engaged level of dialogue between the United States and Ukraine,
according to the program coordinator for the Roundtable series, Walter
Zaryckyj, Executive Director/Center for US-Ukrainian Relations/Associate
Professor of Social Sciences/New York University.

These deliberations led to a commitment to convene an annual conference
to monitor Ukraine's progress towards fuller integration into the Euro-
Atlantic community and assist in developing stronger bilateral relations
with the U.S, according to Zaryckyj (waz1@nyu.edu).

Such conferences are vital for and have proven extremely successful in
opening up lines of communication and strengthening bilateral relations
between the United States and Ukraine.

CONFERENCE FEES AND PATRONSHIPS
Conference executive coordinator, Tamara Gallo, UCCA executive
director, in information received by The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) said
the fee for the entire two-day conference, including lunches and the
reception is $250. The fee for attending the first day only is $125 and for
attending the second day only is $150.

Gallo explained such a modest fee is possible because over the past half
decade, the financial support of leading Fortune 500 companies and
prominent US foundations, as well as the patronage of Ukrainian American
financial institutions [including Credit Unions] and, increasingly,
businesses in Ukraine, has been an essential element in assuring the
financial success of the Roundtable Series.

Executive coordinator Gallo said Conference Patronship's are still available
and needed for the upcoming event, "Becoming a patron will identify a
company or organization as a key contributor to the general reform efforts
in Ukraine, a worthy cause given Ukraine's critical role in ensuring the
stability and security of an expanding Euro Atlantic community.

All Patron contributions are fully tax deductible under the 501(c)(3)
provisions of the U.S. tax code. For more information on becoming a
Roundtable Patron, please contact Tamara Gallo, Executive Coordinator,
(212) 228-6840, fax: (212) 254-4721, or e-mail: ucca@ucca.org.

HOTEL RESERVATIONS
Information sent by the executive coordinator to The Action Ukraine Report
stated a block of rooms have been reserved for the conference at The
Churchill Hotel, 1914 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Washington, at a
discounted rate. For information about hotel reservations please contact
Ms. Daria Tomashosky, Hamalia Travel at: hamaliasouth@aol.com or
(941) 426 2542.

CONFERENCE STEERING COMMITTEE
CHAIRMAN: Michael Sawkiw, Jr,
VICE CHAIRS: William Miller, Bob Schaffer

COORDINATORS: Tamara Gallo, Mykola Hryckowian,
Mark Olexy, Vika Hubska, Marko Suprun, Walter Zaryckyj

MEMBERS: Vera Andrushkiw, Nadia Diuk, Katie Fox, Adrian
Karatnycky, Tom Keaney, Nadia Komarnycky McConnell, Serhiy
Konoplyov, John Micgiel, Richard Murphy, Steven Nix, Kyle Parker,
Herman Pirchner, John Van Oudenaren, Morgan Williams

SPONSORS: Congressional Ukrainian Caucus, US Library of
Congress, Embassy of Ukraine to the United States, American
Foreign Policy Council, Center For US-Ukrainian Relations,
International Republican Institute (IRI), National Democratic Institute
(NDI), Freedom House, Johns Hopkins University/SAIS, Columbia
University/ISE, Harvard University/BSSP, New York University/
LAP, Ukraine-United States Business Council, U.S.-Ukraine
Foundation (USUF), Ukrainian Congress Committee of America,
(UCCA), UKR American Civil Liberties Association.

For more information about participating in the Ukraine's Quest
for Mature Nation Statehood Roundtable VI conference please contact
the UCCA National Office, 203 Second Avenue, New York, NY 10003,
Tel: (212) 228-6840, fax: (212) 254-4721 or email ucca@ucca.org. In
Ukraine contact: Vika Hubska, area coordinator, ucca@i.kiev.ua.

The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service will be publishing
additional information next week about Roundtable VI. -30-
=============================================================
8. POSITION OPEN IN ECONOMICS IN CANADA

The Action Ukraine Report (AUR), No. 562, Article 8
Washington, D.C., Friday, September 15, 2005

SASKATOON - The Department of Economics at St. Thomas More College,
a Catholic college federated with the University of Saskatchewan, invites
applications for a tenure-stream position in Economics at the level of
Assistant/Associate Professor, commencing July 1, 2006.

The STM Economics Department collaborates directly with and is integral
to the scholarly work of the Economics Department at the University of
Saskatchewan.

The successful candidate will have a PHD in Economics and an interest in
social justice with special application in transitional economics and
economic development with specific reference to Eastern Europe and
Ukraine in particular. The candidate should be prepared to teach courses
in introductory economics, transition and economic development.

Candidates will be expected to develop an active, externally funded program
of research and to help facilitate collaborative research in an
interdisciplinary environment.

Applicants are asked to send a letter describing research and teaching
strengths, a curriculum vitae, the names of three referees, documentation of
teaching ability, including teaching evaluations, as well as copies of
written work and/or publications to: Dr. Bohdan Kordan, Chairperson,
Economics Search Committee, St. Thomas More College, 1437 College
Drive, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, S7N 0W6.

The process of a candidate search will conclude December 15, 2005. The
salary will be commensurate with qualifications and experience.
In accordance with Canadian immigration requirements, this advertisement is
directed in the first instance to Canadian citizens and permanent residents.
St. Thomas More College is committed to diversity within its faculty.

Women, Aboriginal people, people with disabilities, visible minorities, and
members of other designated groups are encouraged to self-identify on their
application.

For more information on the Economics Department at St. Thomas More
College, visit http://www.usask.ca/stm; or contact Dr. Kordan by telephone
at (306) 966-8915; fax at (306) 966-8904; email at kordan@usask.ca.
============================================================
9. UKRAINE: THE VIEW AFTER THE BATTLE
Split in Orange Leadership May Put Changes on Hold

ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY: By Gennady Petrov
Special to Russia Profile, RussiaProfile.org
Unwrapping the mysteries inside the Enigma
Published by Independent Media For RIA Novosti
Moscow, Russia, Friday, September 16, 2005

KIEV - The resignation of high-placed officials in the Ukrainian government
plunged the country's political elite into a state of shock. "If this is not
a political crisis and the collapse of the 'orange project,' I don't know
what else would represent a similar collapse," said Petro Simonenko, the
leader of Ukraine's Communist party.

Meanwhile, the main strike was evidently carried out against the former
Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. Her allies are unlikely to be included in
the makeup of the new government. Alexander Turchinov, her most dedicated
supporter, the head of the Ukrainian Security Service, and formerly the
leader of the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko parliamentary faction, was not simply
dismissed by Yushchenko but also accused of incompetence.

At the same time, the followers of Petro Poroshenko, Tymoshenko's main
rival, who relinquished his post as head of the Security and Defense Council
during the crisis, will probably retain their positions in the future
administration. Rumors surfaced soon after Tymoshenko's resignation that
Poroshenko will in time be appointed to replace her.

The breakup of the "orange" coalition can hardly be called an accident.
Several scandals served as a prelude to Tymoshenko's resignation. The first
concerned Andriy Yushchenko, the president's son. This scandal was set off
by a journalistic investigation carried out by Ukrainskaya Pravda newspaper,
a publication known for its links to Tymoshenko.

Its journalists established as early as July that Yushchenko's 19-year old
son, still a university student, owns an extremely expensive cell phone and
a car estimated to be worth 120 000 euros, in addition to an apartment in
one of Kiev's most prestigious districts. Nikolai Katerinchuk, the deputy
director of Ukraine's tax inspectorate, announced that Andriy got hold of
the money from the royalty proceeds of the brands of the "orange
revolution," such as the "Yushchenko - tak" (Yushchenko - yes) slogan.

The president was forced to admit that copyrights to the brands were
registered to the names of his family members. This significantly damaged
his reputation as head of state.

Another scandal was connected to the Nikopol ferroalloy plant (NFP) which,
according to Yushchenko himself, was unlawfully privatized by Viktor
Pinchuk, the son-in-law of former president Leonid Kuchma. Tymoshenko
spoke out in favor of returning NFP to state ownership. Poroshenko, however,
advocated reprivatization, leading Tymoshenko to accuse him of an attempt to
get his hands on this property. So the conflict between Poroshenko and
Tymoshenko featured a clash of economic interests.

On Thursday, in an interview to the Associated Press, Yushchenko in fact
accused Tymoshenko of having lobbied the interests of "Privat" company, a
rival of Pinchuk's holding, which is reported to have the intention to get
NFP into its own hands. According to Yushchenko, "a lot of things which the
prime minister did were done backstage and were aimed at solving her own
problems.

" Yushchenko said he was "relieved" to come to work without fearing that
"some other scandal like NFP or Krivorizhstal would erupt." Krivorizhstal is
another metallurgical company which had been privatized by Pinchuk and his
partner, Ukrainian businessman Rinat Akhmetov, in the summer of 2004. In the
first days of her premiership, Tymoshenko said the plant was privatized
"unfairly" and included it in her "reprivatization" list of plants to be
returned to the state or sold to other businessmen.

Tymoshenko was quick to respond in an interview to the Associated Press on
the same day. "The president's accusations are untrue and they were a shock
to me. The president is trying to reestablish the repressive machine which
[former Ukrainian president Leonid] Kuchma used against me and my family,"
Tymoshenko was quoted as saying.

Tymoshenko was briefly put in jail on corruption charges in 2001 after
having served in the government of president Kuchma, who accused her of
embezzlement. She was set free after a massive protest campaign.

Nikolay Tomenko, the former vice-premier in Tymoshenko's cabinet, openly
warned Yushchenko against initiating criminal proceeding on corruption
charges against Tymoshenko. "In this case, I would not exclude that the next
stage of the orange revolution will begin today and not during the
parliamentary elections, as we had planned before," Tomenko was quoted by
Nezavisimaya Gazeta as saying.

On the whole, the outcome of the dispute between the two politicians will be
determined in the parliamentary elections scheduled for March 2006. The
earlier assumption was that People's Power, the faction of Yushchenko's
supporters, and the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko will enter the electoral
contest as a coalition. Now this option appears highly improbable.

"The problem is that the Upper Rada is made up of delegates elected under
President Kuchma," said Vladimir Malinkovich, the director of the Ukrainian
branch of the International Institute of Social and Political Studies. "It
would have been possible to create a pro-presidential majority in the
parliament, which was Yushchenko's plan, if his team remained united and
proved that it intended to stay in power for a long time. The president's
team has been unable to prove that for now."

The disintegration of the "orange" coalition puts a huge question mark over
the planned constitutional reform, which was supposed to strengthen the
power of the Ukrainian parliament by putting the Rada, and not the
president, in charge of forming the government.

The reform was part of the deal between Yushchenko and former president
Leonid Kuchma, and was aimed at lessening divisions in the country, where
Yushchenko won the presidential election only by a small margin. Kuchma gave
his agreement to the replay of the contested second round of elections only
in exchange for Yushchenko's assurances that the parliament and the
president would proceed with the reform.

Now that he is less and less likely to have the support of the Rada,
Yushchenko started voicing doubts about the timeliness of the reform.
"Changes to the Constitution of Ukraine were agreed upon in the dramatic
situation of December 2004," he was quoted as saying on Wednesday.

"The political reform should be put in place when people have a clear idea
about it. There should be no place for intimidation. This is a specific
measure which will work for millions of people."

Dragging his feet on reform may further decrease Yushchenko's popularity.

"With the kind of presidential powers we have now, any president turns into
another Kuchma sooner or later," said Aleksadr Moroz, leader of the
opposition Socialist party.

The unfolding crisis will change the arrangement of political forces in
Ukraine, giving a new chance to the representatives of the eastern regions,
whom Yushchenko pushed to the sidelines last winter. "For the first time,
the events in Ukraine have not proceeded according to the American
scenario," said Kirill Frolov, head of the Ukraine department in Moscow's
Institute of CIS Countries - an institution known for its unsympathetic
attitude to the "orange revolution." "If 'orange' politicians exhaust each
other in a mutual struggle, their opponents will have a chance."

The possibility of a union between Tymoshenko and her one-time adversaries
is now actively discussed in Ukraine. In her television appearance, she did
not exclude the option of such an alliance. Viktor Yanukovych, the leader of
the Regions Party and Yushchenko's rival during the last presidential
elections, made clear that he would not automatically turn down this
proposition.

However, Ukrainian political commentators maintain that more likely is an
alliance between Tymoshenko and another opposition movement forming
around Viktor Medvedchuk's Social-Democratic Party (United). Medvedchuk
is the former head of President Kuchma's administration. Another former
Ukrainian president, Leonid Kravchuk, is now emerging as a leading member
of this coalition.

On Thursday, Kravchuk accused Yushchenko of getting financing from the
anti-Kremlin Russian oligarch Boris Berezovsky. Kravchuk said Berezovsky
confirmed in a conversation with him that his companies transferred $15
million to the bank accounts of some members of Yushchenko's team.

Berezovsky did not deny or confirm this in an interview to the Moscow
Kommersant daily, a newspaper he is reported to control financially. "I only
found out that these payments were made by companies under my control,"
Berezovsky was quoted by Kommersant as saying.

Should the events in Ukraine be perceived as the final defeat of the
"orange" project? Now is too early to draw such conclusions.
"People were disappointed with the old government, now they are start to
become disappointed with the new one," said Vadim Karasyov, an expert
from the Institute of Global Strategies in Kiev. "It remains to be seen
which 'third force' will profit from it."

It is worth remembering that other countries which experienced their own
color revolutions went through outright assassinations of prime ministers or
saw them perish under mysterious circumstances. Zoran Djindjic, the Serbian
prime minister, was killed with a sniper shot, while Zurab Zhvaniya of
Georgia was found dead in the home of a friend, a 25-year old regional
governor. The official cause of death was given as asphyxiation by carbon
dioxide fumes.

"One could say that Tymoshenko repeated the fate of her Yugoslav and
Georgian colleagues with one difference - she remained alive," Frolov said.
"Tymoshenko was lucky largely because she turned out to be a stronger
politician, more skilled at intrigues, than Zhvaniya and Djindjic."

Whatever the consequences of the conflict between Tymoshenko and
Yushchenko's allies, in the course of 9 months of rule, the tandem managed
to construct a system where journalists are not afraid to discuss the car of
the president's son and fear to lose a job or be murdered like Heorhy
Honhadze, whose death was attributed by some to President Kuchma's
circles. And that is not an insignificant feat. - 30 -
=============================================================
10. OSCE CHOOSES KHARKIV FOR ITS PILOT PROJECT "ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT FOR UKRAINIAN ORPHANED CHILDREN"

Volodymyr Fomenko, Ukrinform, Kharkiv, Ukraine, Fri, Sep 2, 2005

KHARKIV - The OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe]
has chosen Kharkiv the venue of its pilot project "Economic Development for
Ukrainian Orphaned Children", the OSCE's representative, project coordinator
Taras Bryzhovaty told Kharkiv Deputy Governor Vasyl Tretetsky during their
Thursday meeting.

The project is aimed at providing orphaned children with an opportunity to
fulfill their economic rights after graduating state educational
institutions. The project concerns orphaned children, graduates of state
professional schools, where they are usually being educated after boarding
schools.

According to Taras Bryzhovaty, the project is directed to providing orphaned
children with additional professional and social skills for their better
employment. As many as 30 children have been chosen for the project.

Vasyl Tretetsky expressed the Kharkiv Regional Administration's
comprehensive support for the project. -30-
=============================================================
11. A FAIRYTALE BORN, A MYTH DESTROYED
President Yushchenko lost control of the situation within
his team and should have intervened much earlier.

COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS:
By Tatiana Silina, Serhii Rakhmanin,
Julia Mostovaya, & Olga Dmitricheva
Zerkalo Nedeli, Mirror-Weekly, 35 (563)
International Social Political Weekly
Kyiv, Ukraine, Saturday, 10-16 September 2005

These days, as during the Orange Revolution, the entire nation is riveted to
the TV screen. The TV kept silent for so long just to explode with answers
leaving ordinary people fully confused yet clarified everything at the upper
stratum of the political establishment. "Is that what we fought for?"
inquire those who keep wornout strips of orange as a reminder of the days
and nights spent on the Maidan.

They fought for the right of TV channels, regardless of their owners, to
report the news with truth and honor. They fought for the right of
politicians such as Oleksandr Zinchenko to be courageous enough to go
public with accusations of corruption among the presidential associates.

They fought for the right to know why the president makes the decisions
he does. They fought for their right to choose their leaders. Their only
mistake was to expect the leaders they chose to satisfy the bulk of their
desires---and quickly.

We, Ukraine's journalists, realized that miracles never happen. Yet still we
believed. We hoped that the responsibilities assumed by Yushchenko and
Tymoshenko would prevail over their personal ambitions. We hoped that
cravings for power would not trump efforts to meet the people's needs.

We hoped that big business representatives from the Our Ukraine party bloc
were sincere in declaring the establishment of common rules of play as their
primary goal.

What we did not expect was that so soon and bitter would be the
disappointment. We did not expect that so frequently would analogies be
drawn between this and the previous administration. Despite our knowledge,
experience, and the cynicism so characteristic of the journalistic
profession, we believed that this would not be the case.

We still believe, but this time in ourselves---and in you. It was your eyes
we saw so clearly during the first days on the Maidan. It was you who fought
not for an extra slice of bread, but rather for the right to be treated as
human beings. In you, who are doing a real business, who have had success
in life and wanted this success to come to the entire nation, we believe.

Orange Revolutions do not happen every day. Most likely, what we saw on the
Maidan will never repeat. But those who are beginning to lose faith in the
authorities must not lose faith in themselves. These are the authorities who
cannot do without us. But we can do without them---and without vain hopes
also. We are proving this---hour-by-hour, day-by-day.

If it had not been for you, the authorities would do what they do without
looking at anybody or anything. Let us recall how a fairytale was born, a
myth destroyed.

CASE HISTORY IN BRIEF
Since 1999, their paths have been interwoven as tightly as a plait. Leonid
Kuchma and his associates made regular attempts to oust Yulia Tymoshenko
since her first days as deputy prime minister in Yushchenko's cabinet. Prime
Minister Yushchenko held out for a year (never before had anyone withstood
pressure from president Kuchma for so long) before requesting her dismissal
from office.

Then followed the Ukraine Without Kuchma campaign, with Tymoshenko on the
barricades. Kuchma, Pliushch, and Yushchenko issued a joint statement
branding the movement as 'fascist'.

Next were Yushchenko's dismissal as prime minister and his long hesitation
as to whether to transfer to the opposition. Tymoshenko---being entirely
confident that the Ukraine, Rise Up! campaign and popular pressure on
president Kuchma would bear fruit---does everything in her power to get the
ex-premier involved in the fighting.

Viktor Andriyovych Yushchenko defies all appeals, effectively choosing for
himself an 'observer status.' He does not participate in campaign
preparations, yet rises to speak on European Square during a nation-wide
day of action.

His signature under a strong-worded, Tymoshenko-authored, anti-Kuchma
statement triggered a repression campaign against the businesses of
Yushchenko's associates. The Yushchenko-Tymoshenko relationships had
fully shaped by the start of the presidential campaign 2004. Though allies,
he cannot accept her adventurism and radicalism, while she disdains his
wavering and conciliation.

It is evident by now how different these two are from one another.
Yushchenko is a right-wing liberal, whereas Tymoshenko's inclinations are
entirely leftist. Yushchenko draws to himself as many people as possible to
which he may delegate powers and disburden himself.

Tymoshenko's team has remained virtually intact over all the years of her
career as a politician, and her firm-handed approach waned only in recent
months due to fatigue and confusion. The only thing that tied the two
together was ... Leonid Kuchma. This is what underlay their election
alliance. Having soberly evaluated her chances of winning the presidential
race as poor, Tymoshenko signs a pact on a joint election front with
Yushchenko.

A secret protocol to the pact contains provisions obliging Yushchenko to
appoint her prime minister if the victory will be his. Tymoshenko's work for
Yushchenko's campaign was fair and effective. Had Kuchma's strategy to get
Tymoshenko's energy and stamina spearheaded against Yushchenko during
the campaign been a success, never would the latter have won the presidency.

This is what is evident to all except his associates. If Yushchenko had not
won, Tymoshenko would not have taken the premier's office. This is quite
evident also. And so they met their 'bills of exchange'.

True enough, the account settlement process was not easy: despite the
agreement reached, it was Petro Poroshenko whom Viktor Andriyovych on New
Year's Eve assigned the job of forming a new Cabinet of Ministers. "I want
you to understand that it would be more comfortable for me to work with
Poroshenko as premier, not you.

Instead, I would offer you the office of the NSDC (National Security and
Defense Council) chief with an enlarged set of powers, and request that you
quit your claims to the premier's office." This is how Tymoshenko recalled
in conversations with allies her discussions with the then president elect.
"OK, it's your privilege to nominate the prime minister. But I am not going
to quit that office on my own will. If you consider it possible, then go and
violate your own obligations," she retorted.

By virtue of cumulative factors---the Maidan's demand, "Yulia is Premier;"
all the eminent complexities faced by the first post-Kuchma administration;
and the presence of the written obligation---Yushchenko, before his first
trip to Moscow as president, made up his mind: "I decided, you are the
Premier." This is how this unnatural alliance was prolonged for another
eight months. And for all that time, the key word that could describe the
status of the Yushchenko-Tymoshenko relationship was 'distrust.'

This well explains why:

1. Yushchenko forms the cabinet on his own, while only one senior position,
that of the SBU (Ukrainian Security Service) chief (Oleksandr Turchynov) had
passed to Tymoshenko's men.

2. The president denies Tymoshenko as prime minister her constitutional
right to make other nominations. According to ex-deputy Prime Minister
Mykola Tomenko, the president nominated over 50 officials on his own, in
violation of the established procedure that gives this authority to the
premier.

3. presidential support for cabinet-proposed legislation in parliament was
barely palpable. His appearance in the Rada on the voting day for WTO
entry legislation is no indication that Yushchenko's support of the
cabinet's strategic initiatives was well-focused or consistent.

4. The prime minister is strictly recommended to keep away from Naftogaz
Ukrainy [oil and natural gas state export/import company].

5. The president gives the office of NSDC chief, with an enlarged set of
powers, to Petro Poroshenko. His mission is to counterbalance Tymoshenko,
monitor her performance, and create an alternative decision-making center to
divide between the cabinet and the NSDC the flow of those seeking
support---either political or commercial---from the authorities. president

ZINCHENKO'S ROTATIONS IN POLITICS
For those who forgot, it was Petro Poroshenko and Mykola Martynenko who
suggested that Yushchenko appoint Oleksandr Zinchenko in place of Roman
Bezsmertny as his campaign manager. With Martynenko now accusing the
ex-state secretary of 'being ungrateful,' one can assume that the duet was
guided by reasons outside the scope of Yushchenko's team.

As is well known, they expected Zinchenko to contribute a certain amount of
organizational and intellectual expertise to the campaign, together with a
strengthening of relations with representatives of the Russian
establishment.

At least, these were the official reasons for the incorporation of Oleksandr
Oleksiyovych Zinchenko into Yushchenko's team. But there were covert reasons
as well. By that time, Bezsmertny's cross-grained, intractable temper was
becoming increasingly evident.

And the above-mentioned big business representatives from Yushchenko's
inner circle (not only these, though) realized what they would be in for if
Bezsmertny moved on from Yushchenko's campaign headquarters right into
the office of the state secretary. By godfathering and 'taming' Zinchenko,
the two intended to have "their own man" in the president's office after
Yushchenko's win.

The complaints about ungratefulness being leveled against Zinchenko by
ex-allies have much likeliness with the reproaches hurled at Oleksandr
Oleksiyovych during his 'divorce' from the Social-Democratic Party (united).
But this is only one reason why Poroshenko and Martynenko do not command
sympathy.

Another is that Zinchenko's adoption as member of Yushchenko's team was
not an act of charity, but rather the purchase of a controlling stake in a
potentially profitable enterprise. Now these hopes for high dividends have
failed.

At the very beginning, nothing augured such an end to the whole story.
Zinchenko, despite largely negative assessments of his performance as head
of Yushchenko's campaign, harbored serious ambitions to the prime minister's
office, about which he told Viktor Andriyovych.

Zinchenko, true, was considered among contenders to the post, but only as a
third-in-line candidate. These thirds-in-liners are often preferred as
'compromise figures' to the battle of giants. Yushchenko seemed to have
looked at such a scenario at some point, but Tymoshenko's stubborn
unwillingness to retract from formal agreements had eventually prevailed.

As for Zinchenko, he was quite satisfied to take revenge by moving into the
office of his former boss [Viktor Medvedchuk] and changing the official
title of his position from 'Head of the presidential Administration' to
'State Secretary of Ukraine,' which left many eyebrows raised.

This innovation by the chief of the presidential chancellery was followed by
others. Roman Bezsmertny once tabled before Yushchenko (then presidential
candidate) as many as three concepts for reorganizing and restructuring the
presidential administration. One of these (incidentally, chosen as basic)
provided for liquidating the presidential administration as such and
replacing it with a new entity, the 'Office of the president.'

This called for reducing the president's staff by almost two-thirds,
abolishing the institution of presidential aides, and scrapping legal
provisions allowing officials at the office to independently issue orders or
decrees. But these all have been effectively ignored by Zinchenko.

According to the Provisions of the Presidential Secretariat (which, as
hearsay has it, Zinchenko drew up with assistance from Oleksandr Turchynov),
the powers of that institution were not reduced, but even further expanded.
Yushchenko---who during his campaign promised to downgrade the
presidential Administration to just an 'office for supporting presidential
activities'---did not object.

He only insisted that the Secretariat's structure incorporate the
presidential office (room), which Oleksandr Tretyakov, the president's
first aide, was appointed to head. Over time, this quasi-organ became
overgrown with bureaucrats who eventually outnumbered the staff of the
entire Secretariat.

Basically, by doing so alone, the president doomed his associates to
conflicts and clashes, particularly considering the touchy nature of
Zinchenko the ex-state secretary, who had to live with such an evident
disregard for his own ambitions.

Over time, Viktor Yushchenko gave more and more powers to his first aide,
taking these away from other key figures in his office. Yushchenko has been
tied by age-old and very close relationships with Tretyakov, who sheltered
the president's family in his villa during the most dangerous period of the
election campaign.

Yushchenko put more and more trust in Tretyakov, who becomes the chief
sponsor of the presidential family, maintaining their living standards at
the level matching Yushchenko's new status. These are subjective reasons for
a cooling in relations between the president and the head of his office.

Objective reasons lie in Zinchenko's work style, which can be described as
the simulation of heavy activity with the minimum possible effect. Sound
reason emerges for Yushchenko to become discontented with Zinchenko's
performance as state secretary, and also to suspect him of an abuse of the
presidential facsimile.

Zinchenko's managerial capabilities---in the majority opinion of those who
worked with him during the presidential campaign---are less than desirable.
He has never managed to create a team capable of generating high-quality
intellectual products. Pledges by Zinchenko to tap 24-year-old Harvard
University graduates for Secretariat jobs only shrugged many shoulders.

This would look plausible, indeed, if the president himself were a Harvard
University professor. He did not expect out of his office more than just
concepts and development strategies for the country, not only the aviation
industry. Rumors have it that positions at the Secretariat were not
uncommonly given to people who had been either dismissed from their jobs
in Kuchma's office or denied employment for incompetentence.

Yushchenko was barking up the wrong tree when accusing Tymoshenko's
cabinet of attributing to themselves the authorities' most sound
initiatives. He should have addressed this rebuke to Zinchenko.

Neither did Zinchenko manage to organize an effective circulation of
documents. Not infrequently, official letters from the Secretariat reached
their designations too late, which prohibited ministries and government
agencies from reacting to these as appropriate. Inefficient and poor
analytical and reference materials compiled for all kinds of meetings,
conferences, and negotiations as well gave rise to unfavorable criticism.

Zinchenko tried to handle aircraft building, Ukrainian-Russian relations,
national television, and so forth. As a result, he succeeded nowhere, having
lost his influence on the president and failing to become a major player in
the country's political arena. True enough, it was well within his
capabilities to hold back one or another decree, or lobby for some or other
appointment.

There are rumors flying that the state secretary did a lot to ensure that
the top position at Naftogaz Ukrainy be given to Oleksandr Ivchenko, and
also to bar the prime minister from influencing that company. But this took
place in the early days of Zinchenko's tenure. As time passed, he was
gradually losing his authority on staffing-related issues. One example is
the story of a deputy head of the Customs Service, Salagor, who came into
conflict with his immediate boss, Skomarovski.

As word has it, Skomarovski was Poroshenko's man, while Salagor was
Zinchenko's. Therefore, in Salagor's dismissal, many viewed Zinchenko's
defeat in a battle with the NSDC chief.

For that matter, it should be pointed out that the concept of "Poroshenko's
man" and "Zinchenko's man" implies different things. If for the former the
country's chief customs officer was a weapon against the Contraband, Stop!
campaign, then for Zinchenko the chief customs officer's deputy was an
instrument to sap the NSDC chief's unharnessed energy and to right
injustice.

True enough, the state secretary, too, was reportedly abusing office by, for
example, attempting to "correct" the performance of law enforcement
agencies. Kyiv City Organized Crime Department (KCOCD)---which provided
operational support for a criminal investigation against a firm that
allegedly defrauded people of large sums---carried out this summer a number
of searches on the firm's premises.

As is obvious from a report addressed to the Minister of Home Affairs by the
KCOCD acting chief, Police Colonel Geletey, a few days following the
operation he received a call from State Secretary Oleksandr Zinchenko. The
latter, whom Geletey recognized by voice (he often heard him speaking on the
TV and also on the Maidan), began accusing, "loudly and in very strong
words," the police colonel and his subordinates of 'zakaznyak' (Russian
slang for "acting on somebody's order, usually unlawful").

Asked what he meant, Zinchenko, Geletey claims, mentioned the same firm
where the recent search took place, and strongly advised him "to get his
hooks off the honest businessmen and forget them forever."

By giving the details of that incident, we do not mean to put the finishing
touch on the state secretary's unfavorable portrait. Zinchenko is just a
minor offender compared to other members of the presidential team, or (it
must be confessed) even the president himself.

It is rumored that, when an owner of a mountainous hotel in one of Ukraine's
western regions, was arrested on smuggling charges, a deputy chief officer
at the local SBU division received on his cellular phone a call from a man
who, having named himself the president of Ukraine, demanded that the
arrested be released from custody.

Being mentally sane and in his right mind, the officer told him where to get
off, because even in his most dreadful dreams he could not imagine this
happening. When the president called again, the officer, after realizing WHO
was speaking and what may happen to him after what he told the president,
fell with a heart attack.

At that, Zinchenko is far from unique. No more than a handful of
Yushchenko's
associates can boast of any sizeable achievements reached in the areas
assigned to them. Still fewer are the bureaucrats who never resorted to
so-called "right to rule by telephone" (this implies giving instructions,
especially unlawful ones, by telephone, for example to influence court
decisions etc). This is primarily true for Zinchenko's opponents.

On the other side of the spectrum is what makes Oleksandr Oleksiyovych
really unique: Zinchenko, as was already proved several times, cannot accept
what goes against his perception of morals and justice. He, who has never
been tied up by any business interests, did not take advantage of his job to
avail himself of the opportunity to acquire some.

Also noteworthy is the fact that the ex-state secretary, unlike many of his
fellow deputies who quit their Rada seats to take government positions,
complied with the conflict-of-interest legislation, having abnegated his
powers as people's deputy immediately after transfer to the Presidential
Secretariat. His attempt to optimize the organization of the body assigned
to him has never ended up with the approval of the above-mentioned
Provisions of the Secretariat.

Vladislav Kaskiv, who was recruited by Yushchenko to help draw up a reform
concept for the presidential office, describes Zinchenko as a man capable of
constructive dialogue and cooperation. The Pora (It's time!) party leader
recalls meeting Zinchenko some day in mid-summer to tell him about his ideas
as to restructuring the Secretariat. Zinchenko was anything but pleased by
the scheme that did not provide for a weighty enough influence on state
policies on the part of the state secretary. But some time later, Zinchenko
telephoned Vladislav to tell him that he had "killed the beast in himself."
Public interests have prevailed over private ones.

It took Zinchenko several weeks to finally resign. The big hand he got from
journalists at his press conference on Monday was the best proof that his
decision was correct. Many more people in this country must have applauded
his courageous move while watching the press conference on TV.

According to an opinion poll conducted by the Kyiv International Institute
of Sociology, almost 45 percent of Kyiv residents are sure that, by his
resignation, Zinchenko wanted to draw the president's and the general
public's attention to dangerous phenomena and tendencies within the
political leadership. Twenty-three percent of respondents believe that
Zinchenko
wanted to square accounts with Poroshenko. Notably, only 19 percent of
respondents regard Zinchenko's move as an attempt to draw attention to his
person on the eve of the election race.

The reason why Zinchenko made his revelatory statements about Petro
Poroshenko, Alexander Tretyakov, and Mykola Martynenko (which infuriated
Viktor Yushchenko) was the president's unwillingness to heed his arguments
and warnings. Yushchenko either would not believe Zinchenko or did not
expect him to be so outspoken.

But most Ukrainians did believe what Zinchenko said. In reply to the
question: "Which side of the conflict do you trust more?" 51.3 percent of
Kyiv residents said, "Zinchenko." Only 2.5 percent trusted his opponents.
Nearly 1.5 percent said they had no complete information about the matter in
question and some 7 percent were undecided. Then 37.7 percent of
respondents said they trusted neither side.

Only 23.5 percent of Kyiv residents are certain that the Prosecutor General
Office and the Interior Ministry are able to objectively investigate the
accusations leveled by Zinchenko, 8.1 percent had no answer, and over 68
percent do not believe that an objective investigation is possible because
the law enforcement bodies are under pressure.

A total of 73.1 percent of respondents are positive that corruption still
persists after the change of power in Ukraine, while 20.4 percent note a
positive trend toward its reduction. Of course, the predominantly
pessimistic public opinion in the capital city may not reflect the general
picture in the entire country; Kyiv residents are better informed and are
closer (in terms of distance) to the central bodies of government.

The same concerns their opinion about the judiciary: 26.9 percent of
respondents expect an unbiased trial, should Martynenko and Poroshenko
sue Zinchenko for slander. And 45.1 percent of respondents are sure that
the verdict would be in favor of the plaintiffs regardless of any
argumentations.

As far as trust in the president is concerned, 63.3 percent of Kyiv
residents have not changed their attitude to him and every tenth respondent
said that their attitude even "changed for the better." Yushchenko ought to
be happy, but for another figure: 27 percent of respondents are deeply
disillusioned with him and their attitude to him has changed for the worse.

As to Zinchenko, the rouser of this storm in the presidential domain, an
impressive majority of respondents (46.6 percent) praise him for saying
aloud what has been known and discussed "in kitchens" for months. Only 4.3
percent called him a traitor who dealt the president a severe blow. Another
6.7 percent called him a windbag who did not present any convincing proofs.

There are few courageous people like Zinchenko among Ukrainian politicians.
Having slammed the door now, he has ensured his bright political future. And
as for those who stay "indoors," almost 36 percent of Kyiv residents are
sick and tired of incessant conflicts among them. Evidently, such sentiments
are typical of the rest of the country.

NO BARGAINING
After the "staff revolution," which was catalyzed by Zinchenko's
resignation, two groups are taking shape. The FIRST group, led by
Poroshenko, includes Tretyakov, [x-Emergencies Minister] David Zhvania,
[ex-Transport Minister] Yevhen Chervonenko, and [Our Ukraine parliamentary
faction leader] Mykola Martynenko.

The SECOND group, led by Yulia Tymoshenko, includes [ex-SBU Chief]
Alexander Turchinov, [ex-Vice Prime Minister] Mykola Tomenko, [ex-Minister
of Economy] Sergey Teryokhin, and MP Mikhail Brodsky. It is clear which
group the president favors.

The controversies between the presidential staff and the government, which
were caused by and expressed in conflicts between Poroshenko and
Tymoshenko, swelled from day to day until peaceful negotiations became
impossible because of their long-standing mutual distrust, coupled with
plenty of clever "advice." Yushchenko trusted his "well-wishers."
Tymoshenko trusted hers.

Yushchenko was told, "She decided to resign two months before the [2006
parliamentary] elections and throw you over. You shouldn't trust a single
word she says." Tymoshenko was advised, "He won't nominate you for
premiership, no way. If you align with all that company of his, you'll kill
your popularity rating for good."

Yushchenko was told, "She was the one who orchestrated that scandal
around your son through an order to the Ukrainska Pravda, and this is only
the beginning. She wants to have you totally discredited by next April."

Tymoshenko was told, "He turns a blind eye to all facts of Tretyakov's,
Poroshenko's, or Chervonenko's misdeeds. Even if documented proofs lie
on his table, he keeps demanding that we stop squaring accounts with our
political opponents and stop shadowing his men."

Yushchenko was told, "Look how she is advertising herself. The Russian and
Byelorussian prime ministers don't thrust themselves forward. They give
press conferences twice a year. And she never disappears from TV screens."

Tymoshenko was told, "You can't tolerate it! They plundered the Naftogaz
Ukrainy, they want to buy a majority interest in Rosukrenergo, they stole
the Illichivsk port. All this is going to crop up some day. Do you want to
get associated with all this?"

Yushchenko is told, "She is in cahoots with Privat [financial-industrial
group controlled by billionaire Igor Kolomoisky]. They have returned debts
to her, and now they're buying 40 percent of shares in the 1+1 TV channel
for the offshore company they and she are running together."

Tymoshenko is told, "You have an illusion that you are fighting against
Poroshenko and Pinchuk. You are fighting against him."

Some of those words were absolutely true, some not. And some arguments
were deliberately aimed at misinforming and misleading both Yushchenko and
Tymoshenko. For three days and nights, the sides bandied their rebukes and
tried to find a way out of the deadlock.

The consultations, negotiations, phone talks, and meetings finally resulted
in an option that Yushchenko later called "mild."

FIRSTLY, the president, for his part, would sack NSDC Secretary Petro
Poroshenko, presidential First Aide Alexander Tretyakov, and State Custom
Service Chief Mykola Skomarovsky. Tymoshenko, for her part, would sacrifice
Vice Prime Minister Mykola Tomenko and Economy Minister Sergey Teryokhin.
Besides, the president would sack Tymoshenko's right-hand-man Alexander
Turchinov and find a trustworthy substitute for Prosecutor General
Svyatoslav Piskun (who is believed to be loyal to Tymoshenko).

SECONDLY, Yushchenko would top his party's election roll and get a 66%
representation quota in it. Tymoshenko would get 33% and would have no right
to include in it any members of the Reforms and Order Party, the Rukh, Pora,
Alexander Zinchenko, Mikhail Brodsky, Alexander Turchinov, or High Court
judges. The president would also have the right to veto any candidature
included by Tymoshenko in her part of the roll. (Tymoshenko would not have
this right). Besides, Tymoshenko would not demand guarantees of her
nomination for premiership after the parliamentary elections.

THIRDLY, Tymoshenko would hold a joint press conference with Yushchenko
and hold Alexander Zinchenko up to shame as a "liar."

According to Yushchenko's side, Tymoshenko gave her consent on Wednesday
evening, so the president told a press conference that they had "agreed on
everything." But next morning, she changed her mind and broke the agreement.
And Tymoshenko, in an interview with The ZN, denied her consent, saying that
she was supposed to give her final answer by 9 a.m. Thursday.

According to her, she called the president at 8 a.m. and said that she could
not accept this option and proposed another. The president chose the "zero
option": he sacked all. As a result, Tymoshenko and her team lost their
powers de jure and de facto while Poroshenko and Tretyakov lost theirs de
jure only.

Yushchenko's counselors were for the zero option. Tymoshenko and her
counselors were against. The president wavered, feeling that further
developments were unpredictable and being aware of his responsibility.

It was a hard choice for him and Tymoshenko: they were both concerned about
the nation's fate and their own political future. Now both sides must feel
relieved: neither has to pretend or wait for a stab in the back anymore.
After all, certainty is always better than uncertainty.

WHY KILL THE HORSE THAT LOST A SHOE?
So, the president sacked the Cabinet of Ministers in a body, dismissed Petro
Poroshenko from the post of National Security and Defense Council secretary,
and suspended his first aide Alexander Tretyakov. He also dismissed Security
Service Chief Alexander Turchinov, State Custom Service Chief Volodymyr
Skomarovsky, and National TV Company president Taras Stetskiv, accepting
the latter's resignation. Prosecutor General Svyatoslav Piskun's dismissal
was supposed to be the next step.

But the president, remembering the scandalous story of Piskun's
reinstatement, ordered his lawyers to develop a legally impeccable scheme
of dismissal.

It would not be an exaggeration to call this the biggest "staff cleanup" in
Ukraine's modern history. Was Yushchenko's decision correct? Was it
morally responsible, politically well weighed, and technically effective?

What does the president of a democratic country do if a high official
accuses other high officials, who are close to the president, of corruption?
He removes the suspects from office and calls for a comprehensive,
independent, and objective investigation. Importantly, the head of state
assumes all or some part of personal responsibility.

Yushchenko responded in a different way. He actually fired the whole
political elite. Explaining the reasons at a press conference on September
8, Yushchenko said, "Let's be frank. Neither I nor the other 48 million
Ukrainians have been satisfied with these relationships over the past eight
months. We must stop this disappointment. We don't want the ideals of the
Orange Revolution to be called into question."

Let us consider the facts.

FIRSTLY, the president admits that for as long as eight months (since
Yushchenko took office) relationships among the top leaders have
disappointed him and the other 48 million Ukrainians. He calls these people
his friends and admits that he brought them to the top and "vested them with
enormous powers," but they did not justify his trust. It would be logical if
Yushchenko apologized to voters and said something like "Sorry, I appointed
these people and I bear the responsibility for their failure to justify your
trust."

But Yushchenko did not say a word about his blame. Very regrettably, he did
not look like the guarantor of his own promises and the constitutional
rights vested in him. He looked like a child complaining that other kids
have been throwing sand at one another. "The president is not a nursemaid to
patch up their quarrels." He is absolutely right: the president has more
important things to do. And if he has to reconcile the people he himself
selected, he is a bad president.

SECONDLY, judging from the president's words "eight months of conflicts,"
these conflicts were nothing new to him. Does it mean that for eight months
he had been watching his friends and colleagues flounder in squabbles? Does
it mean that he wasted his precious time on the pointless peacemaking
mission while disappointment among his voters was growing? Hence, a question
arises: why did he have to wait? And when did the president lie: two weeks
ago when he sang the praises of his team, or two days ago when he called it
"a team of disillusionment"?

THIRDLY, Yushchenko may have put up with those conflicts for eight months,
hoping that they would settle somehow and thus conserving the problem. But
how much longer would he have tolerated it? The formal pretext for the
cabinet's "demolition" was Zinchenko's revelations. But what if Zinchenko
had kept silent? How much longer would Yushchenko have kept playing possum
in spite of his and the people's growing disappointment?

FOURTHLY, judging from what Yushchenko told the press conference, he does
not believe that the people in his entourage are corrupt; he admits to acute
and insoluble conflicts within his team; he believes that the accusations of
corruption stem from these conflicts; he regards the total replacement of
the leadership as the only solution. Does the government's resignation mean
that he places the blame on it for the accusations of corruption? A strange
logic, indeed.

Zinchenko, the chief of the presidential chancellery, accused Poroshenko and
Tretyakov, the chiefs of the bodies under the president, of abuse of
authority, financial machinations, and other misdeeds. If Yushchenko was
deeply convinced that his henchmen were innocent, he might as well have
stated his conviction and kept them in office. It would have contradicted
the philosophy of democracy, but at least it would have made sense.

If Yushchenko had reason to believe that the accusations were not
groundless, he should have fired Poroshenko and Tretyakov. Instead,
Yushchenko accepted Poroshenko's resignation, suspended (not dismissed)
Tretyakov, and sacked the Cabinet of Ministers in a body. Perhaps, this
strange move was meant to expose "the real culprits, not the young people
under 40, who chose politics as their vocation, hoping to work for the good
of the people for decades."

And FIFTHLY, the president publicly promised an objective investigation of
all facts revealed by Zinchenko. What he did immediately afterwards gave
rise to serious doubts. Not a single member of the sacked government was
ever alleged as "corrupt," but all the ministers got their walking papers
without much ado. Tretyakov, one of the "prime suspects," was only suspended
"for the period of the investigation." Thus Yushchenko showed everyone
(including the investigators) how much he trusted this man.

The president said, "Yesterday I appointed a commission. It will collect and
analyze all available facts and say whether a person is corrupt or not. I am
convinced that it will not find such facts." So the commission has not
started working yet, but the president already knows the result of its work!
This is anything but an unbiased statement. Moreover, he called the scandal
around the Nikopol Ferroalloy Plant an attempt "to hand the enterprise from
one gang over to another." He did so even without a commission to level such
an accusation.

Earlier, the newly inaugurated president declared the arrested suspects the
murderers of opposition journalist Georgiy Gongadze, forgetting that he was
not a judge. Such peremptory statements cannot be explained by the absence
of legal culture. The true reason is the absence of democratic culture.

Even those who were skeptical about Yushchenko as a political leader before
last year's presidential race did not notice this vice in him. In spring it
became too conspicuous. This is not just regrettable. This is dangerous.

In early 2005, the newly elected popular president promised to separate
authority from business once and for all. He promised to track the genealogy
of every candidate for a top executive position down to the tenth
generation. Eight months later he said, "The man who has run some business
before. must draw a line between his official functions and the business run
by. his wife or son."

We made such a detailed analysis of everything that the president did or
said to try to find his true motives behind this wholesale personnel
discharge. We cannot call the mere fact of discharge incorrect. If
Yushchenko were right and the governmental bodies were stuck in conflicts,
such a purge would be the only way out.

However, we doubt that this was the actual reason, since Yushchenko started
speaking about discontent and disappointment with the cabinet's work after
Zinchenko's statements. Since Yushchenko made it clear what his attitude to
every participant of this story was. Since according to the information
about the negotiations that Yushchenko had with the cabinet, he would have
forgiven the cabinet and never remembered "the disappointment of 48 million"
had Tymoshenko not disappointed him and accepted all his conditions.

Should this be true, it would mean the following. Yushchenko's only motive
was an ordinary political benefit but not the ideals of the Maidan (which
he, and not he alone, interpreted at his own discretion). Yushchenko never
kept it secret from his close circle that he was irritated with the
"political chains" received in addition to the victory: constitutional
reform and Prime Minister Tymoshenko.

Yushchenko and Tymoshenko have never been and will never be
brothers-in-arms. They were political allies during the revolution and they
became political rivals after it.

Yushchenko gave the impression that he was painfully selecting the lesser
of the two evils---Tymoshenko in power or Tymoshenko in the opposition.
Zinchenko's statements (which the president directly related to the
political intrigues of the prime minister) speeded up his decision.

Yushchenko let Tymoshenko make a choice. If she accepted the president's
conditions, she would cease to exist as an independent and promising
political player. If not, the president would realize his long-standing wish
to kick Tymoshenko out of power.

What happened revealed Yushchenko's true wish to create a government of his
own liking without burdening himself with democratic conventionalities and
political commitments. In these terms, the scandal kicked up by Brodsky and
Zinchenko was just to the purpose.

It untied Yushchenko's hands. Thus he made gains from this situation: from
now on, he will be able to fill the corridors of the government with his
people and eliminate the other's rules of the game, which was even more
important.

The reaction of the head of state, his milieu, and some of the
pro-presidential media was surprising: the crisis was preplanned and
made-up, Yushchenko was struck a blow, the attempts are made to weaken
the country, and democracy is in jeopardy. Let us disagree with this.

Strange as it may seem, such scandals are a feature of a democratic society,
since they never arise in an undemocratic society in principle.

The last ten years are a convincing proof of it. Corruption scandals in
Italy, France, Great Britain, Germany, or Israel never gave rise to a doubt
about the adherence of these states to the principles of democracy, because
they were investigated; those guilty were brought to responsibility and
their actions were given an appropriate assessment. In Ukraine, though, the
situation may be different.

Cabinet dismissals do not always signify crisis; sometimes they mean the
beginning of the settlement of a crisis if the country's leadership has a
clear vision of what is going to be after: catharsis of the government or
its apocalypse.

THE CONSEQUENCES
Did Ukrainian society win in this situation? We don't have an answer to
that question. If the corruption charges are investigated fairly and in an
unbiased way, we may speak about a new era of citizens' fight with
corruption.

If the investigation is carried out formally (which we cannot rule out since
Prosecutor General Sviatoslav Piskun is sitting in a shaky seat, the SBU is
headed by a man close to Martynenko and Poroshenko, and Internal Minister
Yuriy Lutsenko---whose paper Grani Plus published an incriminating article
about the activities of Poroshenko in Moldova---nevertheless says that he
does not have any evidence of violations), hardly there will be a person in
village, town, or city with courage enough to call the helpline to report a
case of corruption in the governmental bodies (as in the TV commercial).

On the whole, the political situation has become clearer and the political
forces on the verge of parliamentary elections have become obvious. Now
everyone can choose their political path with a clear idea of the
distribution of power in the presidential team, the team of the former prime
minister, the team of the speaker, etc.

That part of society, which was irritated by Yulia Tymoshenko, has also won.
Many small and medium businesses will sigh with relief. Numerous economists,
who could not put up with Tymoshenko's populism, will relax. Many oligarchs
will catch their breath since Tymoshenko was the main promoter of
re-privatization. Now the rules of the game between business and government
will be more predictable, clearer, and possibly tried.

Yet there is another part of society that will never say "our Yuriy" when
speaking of Prime Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov, because after Maidan they said
"our Yulia." For them the government has lost its orange color. For them it
will be simply a government with its functions but without a soul. For them
the government has become distant and technical.

Today, nobody can say for sure what the future development and the
consequences of the president's decision will be. Our sources in Bankova
Street (the presidential administration) say that, during all these days,
Viktor Yushchenko has been deep in thought. They say that the president is
ready for a change and that he has reformulated his requirements to the
people at the key posts.

Former Vice Prime Minister for European Integration Oleh Rybachuk is an
illustrative example for that. He was fruitless at his previous post without
a committee, without a ministry, without real authority, and the deep
understanding by the state apparatus of the need for European integration.

Now he takes root at Bankova, which means that the president is not planning
to turn the state secretariat into his election headquarters to concentrate
the administrative levers of influence. Yushchenko knows that bureaucratic
qualities of Rybachuk leave much to be desired: he does not feel right at
paperwork and he will probably take a strong deputy to win over the chaos of
the presidential office.

But Rybachuk is capable of many other things.

FIRST, he can resist useless intrigues.
SECOND, he can significantly broaden the sources of presidential
information.
THIRD, he can adequately represent the president in confidential
negotiations with foreign partners.
FOURTH, he can ensure intellectual "replenishment" of the president's
decisions by attracting a broad circle of experts and specialists.
FIFTH, Rybachuk can carry on negotiations with absolutely all political
forces having no previous relations, offenses, common earnings, and
treacheries.

For some reason, we believe that Oleksandr Tretiakiv will remain at his
post. Possibly there will be redistribution of functions between the cabinet
and the secretariat of the president. The functions will be distributed,
however, not by means of war but through a consensus, because Rybachuk
and Tretiakov have a good relationship.

In Rybachuk can tell unpleasant things to the president if there is such a
need, and he does not belong to any of the political or economic clans. He
is the president's man, who for eight months has stayed in the shadows and
who is now in demand again.

Anatoliy Kinakh will possibly become the secretary of the National Security
and Defense Council, but it is not yet clear if he will have those broad
authorities with which the president empowered Poroshenko.

FIRST, does Yushchenko want to assign those responsibilities to Kinakh?

The answer to this question will indicate the degree of sincerity with which
Yushchenko spoke against several centers of influence in the government.
After all, current confrontation was caused not only by personalities but by
functional-institutional aspect as well.

SECOND, we remember that, in a week, the Constitutional Court will decide
the future of the decree and possibly reduce authorities of the future NSDC
secretary. Kinakh is not the worst option for this post: he is well
organized, specific, has a good idea of the various spheres of the NSDC
work. Kinakh is able to organize the work and to staff the NSDC.

However, the membership of the NSDC is quite another matter. It currently
includes only Piskun, Maliarenko, Litvyn, and Yushchenko. It is not yet
clear whether there will be place for discussion there or whether the NSDC
will become a place for "personnel executions."

Yuriy Yekhanurov, who is nominated for premiership is also a comfortable
person. He is well versed in economics, he has not been at conflict with
anyone, and he does not have any special political ambitions that could
irritate the president. Yekhanurov is not an innovator or generator of
ideas, but he is a responsible and careful implementer. Most likely he will
have a stable relationship with Yushchenko. President will report the
progress of the government; prime minister will take upon himself the
failures.

Yekhanurov stands a good chance of parliament's approval for the prime
minister's post. This will naturally affect the membership of the new
cabinet. The president will nominate all the ministers and Yekhanurov will
not object to this. Yekhanurov does not have influential foes, but he does
not have influential friends either.

He has a sober judgment of the tasks he will face, including the adoption of
the budget, generating budget revenues and their optimal allocation with the
account of the forthcoming parliamentary elections, systematization of
governmental programs, creation of four governmental committees headed
by vice prime ministers with actual power. He is against active
re-privatization and any drastic moves.

In theory, we can hope that the government will work more effectively:
Rybachuk will make Yushchenko interested in the work of ministries,
intelligence service, and SBU; Kinakh will finally organize the work of the
NSDC; and Yekhanurov will work on the economic field. All of the above is
only possible if the president made his own conclusions about his own work
and his sphere of responsibilities. He does not have to tell about his
conclusions, but it soon will be obvious if he made them or not.

If there is an informed opposition, it soon will be known which of the
criteria, personal loyalty or professionalism, the president will use to
appoint the members of the new government.

Will Poroshenko have influence on the president and in which areas?
What projects does the president patronize? What criteria does he use
when choosing enterprises for re-privatization?

Does he still concern himself with the need to control electronic media? How
will the budget for the People's Union Our Ukraine (PUOU) election campaign
be formed? Will the party use administrative levers of influence to achieve
a better result during the elections?

Under certain conditions and lack of odious actions of Yushchenko's team,
this "zero option" can produce a positive result. However, there is an
option in which the country may loose, because the "zero option" chosen by
Yushchenko on the verge of the parliamentary elections may mean, in fact,
the beginning of an open war between the political groups.

Fortunately, this war does not necessarily have to begin, but if it does
many and much will be affected. Possible sensational exposures can only
undermine this country's reputation and make the West revise its
well-disposed attitude to Ukraine and put a cross through its European
aspirations.

Moreover, the success of many political and economic initiatives such as
budgeting, privatization, and adjustment of the laws to WTO requirements
may appear in jeopardy. It is quite possible that an aggressive
anti-presidential majority is formed in the Rada, which will not do this
country any good either. And finally, the 2006 parliamentary election
campaign may turn into the dirtiest parliamentary campaign in the history
of Ukraine.

Was the president aware of those threats? He could not but be. Is he ready
to undertake the responsibility for the possible outcomes? It is rather
doubtful, judging by the way he commented on his latest political moves.

IRON FATIGUE
The exact reaction of Yulia Tymoshenko to the presidential decision is not
known. Yet one does not have to be a prophet to guess that she was not happy
to learn about her dismissal. She spared no effort to remain at the head of
the cabinet as long as possible. She repeatedly stated her loyalty to the
president during the last months and many say that she overdid it.

The outsiders were surprised at the obedience and submissiveness of this
proud woman, who is also a pronounced fighter. We believe there was nothing
surprising in this since she learned a common truth that, in politics, a bow
can often be a first step toward a rise.

Her supporters thought of Tymoshenko's obedience differently. Some
believed that she was loosing her authority. Others praised her wisdom.
Almost everyone believed her political divorce with the president to be
inevitable. Yet her admirers believed that Tymoshenko would only win if
Yushchenko initiated it.

The unbiased observers found her wish to seize the leader's seat at any
price somewhat irrational and did not agree with the pragmatic nature of
yesterday's (and possibly tomorrow's) oppositionist.

It is very difficult to make an objective judgment of Tymoshenko's
activities as the prime minister, since she had to work with the people
appointed by the president and fulfill his promises. The prime minister's
initiatives received rather controversial expert assessments. We can make
only two conclusions after a superficial analysis of the first
post-revolutionary cabinet.

We must admit one obvious achievement of Tymoshenko: in a very short
term, she managed to turn a group of randomly chosen people into a team.
The cabinet never became a single whole and it could not, yet in critical
situations a significant part of its members acted as a team.

Many of the ministers dismissed their prejudice against Tymoshenko and
many of them became her reliable allies. She was a workaholic and
"infected" almost all of her subordinates with her energy.

In short, the cabinet turned out to be much more independent than pessimists
predicted. At the same time, Tymoshenko was not the ideal prime minister
that optimists expected. Of course, she was entrapped in the president's
promises, dislikes, and his staff, but she consciously took this risk. Was
this risk justified in terms of the interests of the state?

It is a good question, the answer to which cannot be given in haste. But the
fact remains that, in February, many perceived "iron Yulia" as an ideal
candidate for the role of the cleaner of Augean stables, but in September
their number has significantly decreased.

What course of action will Tymoshenko choose? We are sure that she doesn't
have a clear answer to this question herself. Her behavior will depend on
the intensity of further opposition between her and the president. Contrary
to what many think of her, Tymoshenko is not a machine; she is a living
person, who is rather tired.

Strange as it may seem, she is very tired of the opposition and she would
gladly avoid the role of a staunch fighter with the regime. If the regime
does not make her its target, her relations with Yushchenko may possibly
remain in the "cold war" mode in the near future. But Tymoshenko herself
does not seem to believe in this.

She knows that the representatives of the new government have consciously
left "hooks" in her criminal cases remaining from the old regime. She is
aware that these "hooks" may well transform into new criminal cases in the
future. She is sure that many in the new government team would like to give
her over to the Russian investigators. She doubts that her former
brother-in-arms from Maidan, Yuriy Lutsenko, will hesitate to sanction her
hand over.

It is likely that she will agree to remain a demonstrative supporter of the
president and even join the pro-governmental election bloc in exchange for
a pact of "non-aggression". This will be in case Yushchenko agrees to a
coalition not only with Tymoshnko's Batkivshchyna, but also with Pora,
Ukrainian Nationalist Party, National Rukh of Ukraine, and Party Reforms
and Order that are also unloved by the president.

Such a development is possible but unlikely. Remaining in the presidential
election bloc, she runs a risk of loosing her political identity. If the
administration leaves her alone for some time, neither foisting friendship
on her nor threatening her with war, Tymoshenko will retreat into the
shadows and brace up for the election campaign.

In the early winter, she could gradually transform from a mild alternative
to Yushchenko into a tough, albeit not ruthless, oppositionist to the
administration. The former allies could never go to war with each other if
both realize their responsibility to the Ukrainian people. Thus they would
save the nation from a brutal internecine war with no rules, POWs, and
winners.

Presumably, if the authorities start maltreating Tymoshenko, it will
infuriate her and boost her remarkable fearlessness. Yet it is not only the
pressure from the president's office in Bankova Street that could goad her
into joining the radical opposition. Many in her entourage prod her into
doing so.

According to them, the implementation of a political project "Yulia
Tymoshenko as a regime fighter" will guarantee her team a success in the
parliamentary elections. As for the team, Tymoshenko is hardly capable of
controlling it. More than that, it is unclear what Tymoshenko's team is like
and whether it exists at all.

On the one hand, a lot of those who hastened to pledge their allegiance to
her yesterday will rush to disengage themselves from her today, and if
pressure is brought to bear on the ex-premier they will not hesitate to
betray her. On the other, some of those who were generally viewed as her
temporary sympathizers could prove devoted allies because of their
disillusionment. Not with the Maidan ideals. Not even with Yushchenko
himself, but with the way he interprets the Maidan ideals.

As the elections approach, many will see a need for an alternative, for a
political haven, and for a leader with charisma, strong will, and
perseverance. Tymoshenko will have to reckon with those wishing to or
having to stand by her. Yet whether she will be able to bring all those
diverse politicians into a cohesive team is still a tossup. It is clear now
that she did not encourage Brodsky to make his statement 10 days ago.

On the contrary, she tried to dissuade him from it. That he ultimately
decided to go ahead and make it testifies that Brosdsky's respect of
Tymoshenko does not mean Tymoshenko's control of Brodsky, even though
the latter has been and still is her team's player. This is not the case
with Olexander Zinchenko whom some reporters have hurriedly ranked
among Tymoshenko's satellites.

The same applies to a dozen of ex-ministers who used to side with Tymoshenko
when she headed the government. Few will keep supporting her, while most of
them openly admit that they no longer believe in Yushchenko though they do
not yet trust Tymoshenko enough. Nor do they know which is better for the
country, dogmatic Yushchenko or authoritative Tymoshenko.

Tymoshenko's key objective for today should be restoring her parliamentary
faction's efficiency. While its leader was away heading the cabinet, the
faction grew in numbers but lost alertness and combat capacity. Tymoshenko
had neither time nor opportunity to manage her MP squad personally. She will
have to work hard to reverse the situation.

For one thing, the faction will inevitably lose people now that the bloc
leader is not at the top of the state power hierarchy. For another, the
situation in the Rada has changed. In 2004, the faction of the Yulia
Tymoshenko Bloc (YTB) was one of the recognized centers of parliamentary
influence.

Now it has ceased to be the one. Tymoshenko will have to put in a lot of
effort to re-establish her faction's past authority. It would be a
particularly trying task for an outsider to parliament, which she now is.

The faction needs allies. Those could be party groups volunteering to run
the elections together with Tymoshenko's bloc, first and foremost, Ukrainian
Popular Party and Reforms and Order Party. These two forces, alongside the
Pora Party, could partner with the YTB for the 2006 elections. Relevant
consultations are underway. The outcomes are yet to be seen, but the former
prime minister announced her decision to wage an election campaign
independently from the pro-presidential forces.

The YTB faction in the Supreme Rada is likely to launch a campaign for
political reform. The president, reportedly, wants to have the
constitutional amendments repealed, and Tymoshenko is not going to let it
happen. Formerly one of the most ardent opponents to the reduction of
presidential powers, she is said to have changed her mind about Ukraine's
future political arrangement.

Perhaps her last few months in the cabinet were a revelation, an eye-opening
experience urging her to believe the country would benefit from political
reform. Perhaps she has come to understand that there can be no fair
presidents with such powers, and there can be no unanimity in
administrations where everyone strives for spheres of influence.

Perhaps, the reason is different. Tymoshenko could have decided to run
for the top position in state power in six months rather than in four years.
After all, the post-reform premier's purview is quite comparable with the
pre-reform president's.

Should any attempts be made to pull back the political reform, they would
seriously aggravate the political situation in the country. They would bring
about an open confrontation between the president and the Rada. In this
case, nothing could be excluded.

The response could range from forming a wide platform for an
anti-presidential majority in parliament to building an ad hoc coalition of
such divergent politicians as Lytvyn, Moroz, Kravchuk, Symonenko, and
Tymoshenko, each of them having their own reasons to promote the
political reform.

At the moment, a political project of this kind (something like Rise,
Ukraine! 2) looks unrealistic but it is not impossible. Neither is an
institution of impeachment procedures, especially if some of the
compromising materials, bound to be made public soon, concern the
president directly.

"Zero option" has facilitated the structuring of the new political elite. A
probable battle over the political reform will finalize the process. The
choices made by the potential sides to the battle will be indicative of
which force stands for what and with whom it allies; who is for the
president, who is for Yulia, and who is for Ukraine.

AN ONLOOKER'S PERSPECTIVE
Ukraine's three strategic partners---USA, Russia, and the EU---have reacted
to the latest political developments here promptly but with reserve.

Washington, Moscow, and Brussels publicized their respective statements on
the day of the Tymoshenko cabinet's dismissal, which is as good as evidence
of the attention the world's largest powers pay to Ukraine.

Sean McCormack, official representative of the US State Department, said on
Thursday that the US was closely following the political events in Ukraine.
"Young democracies sometimes change their governments. If such changes
are constitutional and peaceful, they are part of the democratic political
process.

We firmly believe that the Ukrainian people will emerge from these changes
ever stronger. This is a process of building a stronger democracy,"
commented the State Department representative, emphasizing that the
Ukrainian people and their elected leaders should decide what the next
Ukrainian government will be like.

At a press conference with German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder in Berlin,
Vladimir Putin---wearing his hat of a democrat that he never forgets to put
on for a meeting with his Western colleagues---stated, in compliance with
political correctness and in accord with the chancellor's comment: "We think
Ukraine is fully entitled to its own choice," that he was sure the
"Ukrainian people and leaders would find a way to stabilize the situation."

The Russian president said Viktor Yushchenko was in control. Viktor
Chernomyrdin, Russian ambassador to Ukraine, approved of the latter's
decisive steps: "The president of Ukraine acted in the best possible way
under the circumstances. Viktor Yushchenko showed courage and concern
for his country, rather than for several individuals."

Brussels commented on the Ukrainian situation twice over the last week. On
the day following the scandalous press conference by the former state
secretary of Ukraine, a European Commission (EC) representative told the
Interfax-Ukraine News Agency that the EU trusted the recent events in
Ukraine relating to corruption allegations against some officials would not
be allowed to disrupt the close cooperation that they enjoy with Ukrainians.

The EU expressed hope that "nothing would affect the government's effort to
implement the Action Plan.". On Thursday, a few hours after the Tymoshenko
cabinet was discharged, Emma Udwin, official EC spokesperson, underscored
the EU hope that President Viktor Yushchenko would shortly take measures to
resolve the governmental crisis.

"We hope that he will take rapid action to ensure continuity and to maintain
stability," said the EC spokesperson, stressing that President Yushchenko
"won the elections on a platform of commitments to reform, commitments to
rooting out corruption, and a clean hands policy. We are confident that
these remain the guiding principles of his administration." .

Our key partners' comments, no matter how similarly tolerant and untroubled
they might sound, could have been made on quite different underlying
assumptions. Washington would never sharply criticize Viktor Yushchenko
given the wide international media coverage of happy George Bush
embracing the heroic leader of the Orange Revolution.

So often have top US officials cited Ukraine as a case of "victorious
democracy" that it has become a banner under which America fights for the
"global triumph of democracy." It is critical for the US, therefore, that
the "Orange Ukraine" succeeds in its reform effort. Many interest groups
(both inside and outside the USA) will perceive the new Ukraine's failure as
a chink in the armor of the US foreign policy.

Now that the White House ratings are on a decline for its floundering in the
face of Hurricane Katrina, the Bush Administration cannot possibly afford
any major disappointment in the international arena. Therefore, there are no
problems in Ukraine. The new democracy is evolving and building up.

"We will focus on the long-term perspective and won't pay attention to
adjustments along the way," said Kurt Volker, one of the State Department's
high-ranking diplomats, on Thursday. Moreover, he made it clear that given
successful democratic and economic transformations, Ukraine would have a
chance to access to NATO as soon as 2008, "notwithstanding the current
situation."

Americans seem genuinely unperturbed by last week's events in Ukraine. They
might be content with Petro Poroshenko's firing as numerous US officials and
businesspersons have always complained, in private conversations, about his
being uncooperative in addressing imperative issues of bilateral relations,
Ukraine's partnership with NATO, reforming the law enforcement etc, etc,
etc.

They should not grieve over Tymoshenko's dismissal, either, since they did
not always regard her initiatives as reformist and her management as
market-driven. They were worried about the deteriorating investment climate
and plummeting economic growth rates in Ukraine. It was one of the messages
of Deputy State Secretary D. Freed's report at the July Congressional
hearings on US-Ukrainian relations; it was highlighted in the reports by
prominent American think tanks.

America should, rather, be apprehensive of Tymoshenko's possible opposition
to President Yushchenko. In one of his interviews, US Ambassador to Ukraine
John Herbst voiced concern about a potential rip between Yushchenko's and
Tymoshenko's teams. Yet the American diplomat also said he was sure no such
scenario would come to pass.

Americans avail themselves of every opportunity to underline that Ukraine's
experiences of the last few weeks are inherent to democratic development.
However, they will probably give the Ukrainian leaders a piece of their mind
on the matter (behind closed doors, no doubt), first during Foreign Minister
Borys Tarasiuk's and, later, President Viktor Yushchenko's visits to the
USA.

As for the Russians, they should have different expectations. The Kremlin
wishes the "orange and all other colored experiments" to fail as much as the
White House wants the democratic reforms in Ukraine to succeed. It was in
Berlin that Putin spoke composedly and good-naturedly about Ukraine.

Yet right after Zinchenko's revelatory press conference, he did not miss his
chance to gloat in front of the Western media over the corruption and
political in-fighting that reign in Ukraine as in any other post-Soviet
state. We told you the new Ukraine was no better than the old one, didn't
we?

Why do you think there is more democracy in Ukraine than in Russia? What
is all this fuss about? Putin has always done his best to disparage the new
Ukrainian administration in Western leaders' eyes (suffice it to mention the
last G-8 meeting). Now he has a wonderful pretext for continuing to do so:
not only does Ukraine "pilfer" Russian gas, but it is also riddled with
corruption, especially in the midst of the "orange" top officials squabbling
over material wealth with the same bitterness and frantic zeal as Kuchma's
cronies did.

Three need be no doubt that Russians will willingly point to this corruption
scandal in Ukraine every time our country announces its new foreign policy
priorities, comes up with democratic initiatives, or sets up democratic
alliances. Just think of all the lies and slander that the Russian media,
politicians, and political analysts have disseminated and are disseminating
about Georgia and its President Saakashvili.

The Kremlin has another occasion to celebrate: Tymoshenko is no longer prime
minister, Turchynov is no longer SBU chief. There is hope that Russian
business in Ukraine will feel comfortable again, that the investigation of
ROSUKRENERGO Company's dubious activities will never be completed and
its findings will never be made public.

Russians do not seem anxious about Poroshenko's and Tretiakov's dismissals,
even though both were most responsive to Moscow's requests and interests:
President Yushchenko declared he believed those men, had never questioned
their integrity, and would remain their friend. Our Eastern neighbors could
interpret this declaration as an assurance that the two former top officials
would continue to have the president's ear and have a say in vital
decision-making.

Beside, Yuriy Yekhanurov as prime minister and Anatoly Kinakh as secretary
of the National Security and Defense Council suit Russians perfectly. Before
and during his nine-month engagement with Tymoshenko's cabinet as the first
vice prime minister, Kinakh has repeatedly stated his readiness to
"cooperate constructively with the Russian Federation"; he has always
advocated Ukraine's participation in the CES.

Yekhanurov has gained with the Russians a reputation of a moderate and
reasonable politician, prepared to negotiate and meet counterparts halfway.
At the same time, Borys Tarasiuk is expected to retain his position of
foreign minister, and that could make Russians wince.

Tarasiuk has already promised that Ukraine's course toward European
integration would be unswerving and expressed hope that the new government
would have an even better capacity for accelerating the integration
processes, in particular the implementation of the Ukraine-EU Action Plan.
Tarasiuk discussed the above in a telephone conversation with High
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana.

According to our sources, Brussels was deeply troubled with the allegations
of corruption in the new Ukrainian administration. Their concern grew by day
exasperated with Viktor Yushchenko's silence. The Europeans wondered why
the officials publicly accused of corrupt practices had not resigned of
their own free will to avoid discrediting the head of state. European
politicians would certainly do so.

They referred to the story of incumbent EC Trade Commissioner Mendelssohn,
British Prime Minister Tony Blair's close ally, who was implicated in a
scandal several years ago. Unwilling to compromise his national leader's
reputation, he had tendered his resignation before any official
investigation results were announced. When the inquiry failed to establish
his guilt, Mendelssohn returned to politics and to his EU office.

Therefore Brussels welcomed Yushchenko's decision to fire high-ranking
officials involved in the corruption scandal. The EC official representative
Emma Udwin listed the Ukrainian president's election commitments to
extirpating corruption on purpose: the European Union does care about the
administration's anti-corruption effort and watches closely to see if
Ukrainian officials' hands are clean.

Combating corruption is a core element of the Ukraine-EU Action Plan. The
preliminary assessment of its implementation results will hinge, inter alia,
on a thorough investigation of allegations aired by former State Secretary
Olexander Zinchenko and on Ukraine top leaders' further steps.

UKRAINE'S WTO PROSPECTS CONCERN BRUSSELS
Brussels is also concerned about Ukraine's WTO prospects. They know only
too well how difficult it was for the government to get the Supreme Rada to
adopt even part of the required WTO legislation. Now our European partners
are afraid lest MPs, already preoccupied more with the upcoming elections
than with the WTO accession, will be further distracted by the governmental
crisis.

Thus Ukraine might fail to meet the deadline (the end of the year) and,
thus, might have to abandon hopes of starting negotiations with the EU on
a free trade zone.

Europeans' opinions about the Tymoshenko government's discharge vary.
Speaking as private individuals, some of them challenge the practicality of
sacking the entire cabinet; they think the firings should have been
targeted.

Others are aligned with President Yushchenko, arguing Tymoshenko
had no clear economic program; they blame the dismissed government for
populist decisions that caused a slow-down in the country's economic
growth and investments, sent inflation soaring, and stirred the population's
discontent.

Some fear that Tymoshenko's joining the opposition could step up the
political crisis, diverting the nation from the necessary reforms. Others,
on the contrary, believe Tymoshenko could at last create in Ukraine a true
opposition that any democracy requires for development.

There is one thing, however, about which all our interviewees concurred: at
some stage, President Yushchenko lost control of the situation within his
team and should have intervened much earlier. -30-
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LINK: http://www.mirror-weekly.com/ie/index/563/
[Article formats by The Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
=============================================================
12. THE UNDYING RESOLVE TO LIVE
Natalia was taken from her Ukrainian home and imprisoned

By Jessica Hawley - Lifestyles Editor
The Bandera Bulletin, Bandera, Texas, Sat, Sep 3, 2005

Indomitable is the human spirit. After being beaten, starved, devoid of
humane treatment and threatened with death almost daily, hope continues
to miraculously live on, somehow. Find hope and find survival. Find survival
and find love. Find love and renew hope.

Sitting in his living room while a grandfather clock gently ticks the
passing minutes, Alexander Bunegin recalls a dark existence far from his
Pipe Creek home. He spoke of the Komitet Gosudarstvenoi Bezopasnosti
(Russian KGB), his family's exile to Siberia, being held a prisoner of war
in a German labor camp and finding his soul-mate while there.

Once an officer in the Russian Army, Alexander was captured by the German
Nazis during World War II and imprisoned from 1941 to 1942. After his
release, he went to Ukraine but was arrested again when Hitler's forces
swept through the country. Alexander was sent to a labor camp in Munich,
where he would remain until the war was over.

"It's a slave camp. You have no rights," Alexander said. "The food is
horrible. We were not allowed to go in public places. We walked three
kilometers on Sunday in restricted areas. That's the way we lived until the
end of war."

Every person was tagged to identify his or her nationality and camp
placement. The Russians wore a blue and white patch with OST printed on it.
The abbreviation stood for Ostlager, the eastern section of the camp that
housed the Russians and Poles.

In a neighboring camp just over a mile away, lived Natalia. Natalia was
taken from her Ukrainian home alongside her mother and father and
imprisoned in 1943. During a Sunday visit with Alexander's friend, Natalia
saw a photograph of Alexander and asked about him. The friend swiftly
reported back to him that a girl showed interest in him.

"Next Sunday, I go to the camp, I meet her and that was it," Alexander said.
"We stick together until today." Their courtship was anything but fanciful.
When their romance was discovered, Natalia's lagerfuhrer, or camp
commandant, threatened to send Alexander to a concentration camp if he
continued to visit her.

"I told director of my camp what he said, so he called him and gave him a
couple of words," Alexander said. "I asked my camp director for a permit to
marry her. He said yes, hers said no."

So, like any young couple in love would do when denied forever, they ran
away. Because of their unmistakably Russian dialect and eastern order
patches, all doors shut on them. They slept in the woods overnight and, with
nowhere else to go and nobody willing to help, they snuck back into camp.
Over the next two months, the devoted couple diligently worked to get the
commandant's approval for their marriage permit.

After they finally married, Munich was bombed. Alexander and his bride hid
in a small corner of a building in the camp. Natalia described the deafening
noise as dust settled upon them from the ceiling. Following their instincts,
the newlyweds ran out of the building for other shelter.

"When we came out, the bomb exploded on the building we were in," Natalia
said. "It was our wedding present."

The Bunegins lived apart for four to six months, until they were able to
share one room with three other families in her camp. Soon, Natalia became
pregnant. As her belly grew, so did the director's contempt. "The
lagerfuhrer threatened to throw the baby out of the window if I woke him
when I gave birth," Natalia said. "I was scared to death."

When she went into labor, Alexander said that she didn't make a sound. The
following morning, overcome with uncharacteristic guilt for his cruelty to
Natalia, the director brought 1/2 liter of fresh cow's milk for the newborn.

He continued to bring the baby boy milk every morning, yet despite his
efforts, the Bunegin's first son died. "He was nine months and 10 days old,"
Natalia said. "I remember it."

When the war was over, many camp directors suffered the turned table,
enduring torture and death at the hands of their captives. Remembering the
brief and shining act of kindness, Alexander alone spoke out against killing
his director.

"He helped my baby," Alexander said. "For this, I said, he should live. And
he did."

Many people prepared to return to their countries and villages, but going
home was not an option for the Bunegins. As an Army officer, Alexander
would have been executed for surviving his initial capture in 1941.

"The last bullet in your gun, you save for yourself," he said. "If you don't
kill yourself, you're a traitor against your country."

Life, however, had not provided Alexander much opportunity for free choice.
In an historical meeting on Feb. 11, 1945, U.S. President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill signed the infamous
Yalta Agreement with Soviet Union Marshal Joseph Stalin mandating the
forcible repatriation of all Soviet-born refugees back to the USSR.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower helped carry out the orders. Between 1945
and 1948, two million Russians were returned to the Soviet Union to face
imprisonment, exile and execution. An international organization formed in
protest of the act, which included the Bunegins.

"We wrote a letter to Mrs. Roosevelt telling her what her husband had
signed," Natalia said. "Mrs. Roosevelt called President Truman and he said,
'Stop.' He said if people don't want to go, let them stay."

In 1949, the Bunegins emigrated to the United States. "We didn't believe how
much freedom was in America," Natalia said. "In Russia, every you go, you
carry passport. If you don't have passport, they arrest you," Alexander
said. "We live in Russia under Communist system. We live in Germany under
Nazi system. We never lived in a Democratic system."

They immediately got jobs in a butcher shop. The pay was below minimum,
but they didn't care. "We have a job," Alexander said. "We have money like
everyone else. As soon as possible, we get citizenship."

In 1950, their second son was born. In 1952, their daughter was born. "I got
the family," he said.

Still, thoughts of his family in the Ural Mountains of Russia often occupied
the back of Alexander's mind. He had not seen his mother, father or sisters
since he was drafted into the Russian Army in 1938. He wrote a letter to his
oldest sister in 1960 stating simply, "I'm alive."

Soon, her response arrived. She explained that their mother died of a heart
attack in 1943, immediately after receiving the dreaded letter from Russian
officials that he was missing in action. Their father lived for 15 more
years, all the while believing that his son had survived the war. He
counseled his daughters to never forget Alexander, that he was still alive.

Alexander returned to Russia in 1988. He had not seen his sisters for 50
years. "They were school girls when I left," he said.

The family was tucked away and remote enough that they were spared the
horrors of Hitler's Third Reich, but life in Russia had its own unique
atrocities. "It was hell," Natalia said. "It was just hell."

BEFORE THE WAR
On Feb. 3, 1932, when Alexander was nearly 17 years old, the Russian
government withdrew him from school and seized his father's farm. They were
accused of socialism and capitalism. As punishment, they were exiled for
five years to a labor camp in Siberia. There, they joined approximately 250
other families, some with two-month-old infants, others with 80-year-old
seniors.

Right away, the men built a snow wall as shelter for the young and old from
the 50-degrees-below-zero temperatures. Everyone else dug holes as shelter
in the frozen ground. "It was terrible," Alexander said. "Our job was to cut
trees. Old women and children, everybody worked."

In May of 1933, with his parents' blessing, Alexander escaped the labor camp
and headed toward Tashkent, the capital city of Uzbekistan. There, he had a
trusted friend. He carried with him a knife, a piece of steel, one stone and
a tree pod to make fire. He walked for 29 days in the woods, eating whatever
he found and sleeping in the trees to protect himself from wolves and bears.

He carried two sticks. One was his gun and the other was his calendar. He
made hash marks with each rising sun to document the number of days he
traveled. A farmer and his wife took him in, providing shelter, food and
clothing.

"I'm skin and bone when they see me. I'm tall and skinny," Alexander said.
"The first thing the wife said to her husband was, 'feed him.' They kept me
for almost two weeks. I asked them where they got the clothes they gave me.
They said their teenage son was arrested and they hadn't seen him anymore.
They gave me his clothes."

After sneaking him in the back of a wagon full of hay to the train station,
the farmer bought Alexander a ticket to Tashkent. There, he found his
friend's family and remained with them for two months. Once he had regained
his health and strength, Alexander was given falsified, stamped papers that
said he had completed his sentence in Siberia.

He again boarded the train, this time with bread, butter and sausage, and
went back to the labor camp from which he escaped over three months prior.

Under the cloak of night, he snuck back into camp and reunited with his
family. The next day, Alexander presented the papers to the Russian
officials, and his family was released. With train tickets purchased by his
friend, they traveled back to Tashkent together.

"Life was rough in Soviet Union," Natalia said. "The children couldn't talk
in school. If their parents said anything against the government, the
teachers would tell the KGB and the father would disappear."

As a young girl, Natalia survived the famine that killed her two younger
sisters. "I was nine years old. I ate in school. The teachers would say,
'Come, eat the food that came from America.'"

After their emigration, the Bunegins stayed in Philadelphia. They provided
both of their children a college education and watched them grow into
successful careers. "They fly away, like birds," Alexander said.

Now, the proud grandparents of three live in the Texas Hill Country near
their son, a researcher and associate professor at the University of Texas
San Antonio Health Science Center. Their lives are markedly better now
than 60 years ago, but the memories are still vivid and clear.

"When we come here, it was Heaven," Natalia said. "We always dream
about America." -30-
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://banderabulletin.com/articles/2005/09/03/news/lifestyles/life66.txt
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