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Action Ukraine Report

                              "THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT - AUR"
                                            An International Newsletter
                                              The Latest, Up-To-Date
                     In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis, and Commentary

                      "Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion,
         Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World"

"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT - AUR" - Number 576
Mr. E. Morgan Williams, Publisher and Editor
Washington, D.C., Kyiv, Ukraine, TUESDAY, October 4, 2005

                                  --------INDEX OF ARTICLES--------
                    "Major International News Headlines and Articles"

1.       THE ORANGE REVOLUTION WAS A REVOLUTION OF HOPE
              It was a serious commitment, it wasn't just a fleeting moment
SPEECH: By Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security
Advisor to U.S. President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981),
Trustee and Counselor at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS),
Ukraine's Quest for Mature Nation Statehood: Roundtable VI
Ukraine's Transition to an Established National Identity
and the Orange Revolution
Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center
Washington, D.C., Wednesday, September 28, 2005
Ukrainian National Information Service (UNIS)
Center for US-Ukrainian Relations (CUSUR)
The Action Ukraine Report (AUR), Number 576, Article 1
Washington, D.C., Tuesday, October 4, 2005

2.                         UKRAINE: "IN THE SECOND ROUND"
                What can be expected from a responsible head of state
           What the country really needs is a breakthrough, not stability,
COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS: By Yulia Mostovaya
Zerkalo Nedeli, Mirror-Weekly
International Social Political Weekly, #38 (566)
Kyiv, Ukraine, Saturday, 1-7 October 2005
(Subheadings inserted by The Action Ukraine Report, AUR)

3.                               THE MAIDAN MEMORANDUM
                        The Next Objectives of the Orange Revolution
Maidan & Maidan International
Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, October 3, 2005
=============================================================
1.        THE ORANGE REVOLUTION WAS A REVOLUTION OF HOPE
              It was a serious commitment, it wasn't just a fleeting moment

SPEECH: By Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security
Advisor to U.S. President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981),
Trustee and Counselor at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS),
Ukraine's Quest for Mature Nation Statehood: Roundtable VI
Ukraine's Transition to an Established National Identity
and the Orange Revolution
Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center
Washington, D.C., Wednesday, September 28, 2005
Ukrainian National Information Service (UNIS)
Center for US-Ukrainian Relations (CUSUR)
The Action Ukraine Report (AUR), Number 575, Article 1
Washington, D.C., Tuesday, October 4, 2005

Thank you very much, Adrian. Ladies and Gentlemen, as always I find it
heart warming, gratifying to speak before a Ukrainian audience.

I have done this over many years and it has been a source of genuine
historical satisfaction for me to see what has happened to the Ukrainian
reality, what it was some 30, 40 years ago, and what it is today.

So from that perspective, it is really a "hopeful friend" line. Indeed we
have reason to celebrate. Ten months ago, the Orange Revolution
prevailed and that was a moment of genuine satisfaction.

One could sense among the Ukrainian people, a true, ecstatic
emancipation. So, it is a moment to take satisfaction, to reflect on the
success.

But, it is also a moment for reflection, for in any historical process,
there are vicissitudes, there are turns, there are roadblocks, there are
reversals and one has to be conscious of the inherent unpredictability or
uncertainty of history. And that is certainly true in the Ukrainian context
as well.

The Orange Revolution was a revolution of hope, of genuine hope, and of,
in many respects, also abstract hope. It reflected a certain emotion, a
certain desire.

Perhaps for many people, it wasn't even precisely formalized, but it
reflected some genuine feeling of true national identity that had now
surfaced and which was defining itself in a democratic fashion.

It was in a sense a moment in which a transcendent shared sense of
national identity, defined in democratic content, became a common
property of the Ukrainian people.

It involved, in that context, also a great deal of idealism, a hope for the
better, a desire to cleanse the past and to cleanse it thoroughly.

It was a mood, it was a faith, it was an aspiration, it was a desire and it
was also very much a determination, which the people showed, by standing,
day after day, in the cold nights on the Maydan.

So, it was a real commitment, a serious commitment. It wasn't just a
fleeting moment, not just some casual political gathering.

 It was a life long commitment for many, a sincere commitment for many,
and one has to appreciate that, because it tells you what was involved,
and it tells you also what is at stake, a national commitment to something
transcendental.

In many respects ephemeral and yet vital, it is something that has to be
honored treasured and respected.

Ten months afterwards, we have reason to be gratified in noting that
Ukrainian mass media are free, which they were not before, that the
political discourse is lively and open, that Ukraine's foreign policy, in
the hands of experienced and committed individuals, is pointed in a clear,
strategic direction, that Ukraine sees itself as a member of a much larger
European community, of which historically it has always been, at heart, even
when separated.

And it is enough to read European historical chronicles to realize what an
important place Kyivan Rus has been in the emergence of a Europe that is
yet to be politically and geographically defined as the real Europe. And
Ukraine, in aspiration, in that direction therefore reflects a larger
European mission, a larger European trajectory, and that is all to the good.

But the question also lingers, and increasingly so. And it is an important
question.

What is the relationship in all that is now happening between principle and
opportunism?

What is the relationship between hope in its vague and defined fashion and
the necessities of political life? How does one strike a realistic balance
between the two?

One has to be conscious of the need for balance, because one cannot live
forever on hope. But one can get indigestion from too much opportunism and
therefore there has to be a balance between the two.

The public, at some point, is going to ask: Were there crimes committed in
the earlier era? And if there were crimes, those responsible for them be
brought to account. Or are they now to be forgotten?

The public is bound to ask if it has a memory, and it certainly does,
because it was there at Maydan making its commitment, a vow to a
Ukrainian future that is better.

Was there corruption, and if there was corruption, who were the corruptors?
And who were the beneficiaries of the corruption, and what about their
future?

The public is bound to ask: Was there nepotism and if there was nepotism,
who was the beneficiary of the nepotism? And, further, is now that to be
swept under the rug? The public is bound to ask: Was there misuse of public
office for personal gain, and if there was, is it going to be tolerated in
the future?

That agenda cannot be ignored, particularly after the dramatic intense
nationwide political awakening, after the marriage between independence
and democracy, after the commitment to principle.

That agenda cannot be ignored, and striking a balance, therefore, between
hope  and realism is a complicated and difficult task.

It is certainly easy for me to orate about it, and I realize that it is much
more difficult to be dealing with the situation in practice. One has to
respect both the hope and the imperatives of reality.

But in respecting both, one has to be very careful to maintain a balance
between the two and not to skew that balance excessively in one direction.

I have recently read the statement entitled: Unity [or Unification..I know
this has be translated in different ways in different translations].."Unity
and Collaboration for the Sake of the Future". That document was just
signed the other day.

It is rather interesting incidentally that the original version of that
document, submitted by President Yushchenko, simply emphasized
mutual understanding for the sake of the future.

In its final agreed form, it came out as "Unity [or Unification] and
Collaboration for the Sake of the Future". The change in the title is a
nuance, but nuances in politics are important.

The original version was a commitment to a mutual understanding. The
accepted final version implies two sides agreeing to unity or unification on
behalf of a common understanding.

There is a difference between the two, and of course, that may be
necessary in the political context.

But the question does arise whether some of the 'agenda of hope' implicit in
Maydan is not going to be obscured by the imperatives of political realism,
which exists and which has to be recognized, as I repeat.

But when for example the document promises that political repression is
inadmissible and bringing pressure to bear on political opponents is
inadmissible, is that an affirmation of a commitment to democracy and to
cleansing? Or is that an implicit guarantee of amnesty? Which is it? It has
a bearing on how the public will interpret the document.

The importance to stress here is that in the difficult and complicated
Ukrainian reality, one has to be very careful not to engage in unrealistic
idealism, which eventually creates ferment and confusion, but not to lean
also the other way, in order to be realistic and generate thereby a degree
of opportunism which then leads to public disillusionment, disappointment,
apathy and loss of hope.

That to me is the central issue and that also means to me that it is
particularly important that those who where genuinely and sincerely
committed to the agenda of Maydan, irrespective of their personal and
political differences, still remain committed to that agenda.

Because it was that agenda that mobilized, energized Ukrainian people
and really gave them for the first time in fifteen years an opportunity to
demonstrate their commitment to independence.

Those of you who are Ukrainian Americans know very well that independence
came to Ukraine very quietly, very peacefully, very bureaucratically. It was
only on the Maydan that the Ukrainian people demonstrated their
determination to be free on a collective, national basis and that is an
important historical moment.

It is also a fact that those who wish Ukraine ill would like to see the
Orange Revolution discredited and the Orange Coalition permanently
destroyed. They didn't like it when it appeared, they opposed it when it
struggled, they have watched suspiciously its entrenchment in power and
they have been delighted to see it fragment.

I found it amazing that a foreign ambassador, I emphasize, foreign
ambassador, could hold a press conference in Ukraine, in order to applaud
Ukrainian decisions regarding Ukrainian changes of government, as if it
was his business to determine what is right and wrong for the Ukrainian
government to do.

I know some neighboring countries of Ukraine.I won't tell you which, but you
can probably guess.in which, if a Russian Ambassador made such a move,
the next day he would be packing his bags or perhaps waiting for them to be
delivered at the airport in Moscow, having arrived there the night before.

That is food for thought, because it suggests that there are major interests
interested in fragmenting the new spirit of hope in Ukraine, disintegrating
it, reducing it to the level of banality, inducing cynicism and
disappointment.

Many of you perhaps know that a movie is being prepared for release in a
neighboring country, one might say a very interesting movie. It is going to
be a movie that is, in effect, a pornographic film, but with a political
content.

It is going to star a lady with rather unusual hairdo who is going to appear
in the nude..I am talking seriously.and she will be shown engaging in a
rather affectionate relationship with another individual who bares a
striking similarity to a president of a certain Caucasian country.

This again tells you how some of those others feel about what has been
happening in Ukraine and that makes it all the more important that those
who have been in the Orange Coalition, in spite of specific tactical or
bureaucratic differences, do not translate them into permanent hostility,
mutual accusations, escalating antagonism, self destructive conflict.

I noticed that the former Prime Minister has recently given an interview in
the Moscow Echo newspaper, in which is deplorable language is used,
and that's not helpful.

I have noticed that the new Vice Premier in the new government, who to my
knowledge was not part of the Orange Coalition, has now given an interview
attaching the former Prime Minister of to financial malfeasance, to paying
bribes.

One could go on and on about the issue of inciting mutual accusations.
These, I repeat, are self destructive. They contribute to the discrediting
of Ukrainian political leadership. They demoralize the public. They undo
what has been accomplished so dramatically in the course of recent times.

Now, it is quite natural for democratic coalitions at some point to
dissolve.  There is nothing unique about that and nothing particularly
shocking about that either. Think back to a neighboring country, namely
Poland, which, after the Solidarity coalition came to power, saw a rapid
split up.

There was a so called "war of the top" between Walesa and Mazowiecki, in
particular. They even directly competed. But, please note, they remained
united on fundamentals, totally united on fundamentals, even though
occasionally embittered, occasionally quite angry. Again, I repeat, they
remained united.

That is why recently, in Gdansk, we have the celebration. Yushchenko was
there and others .. Americans, Europeans, Poles, Ukrainians..celebrating the
25th anniversary of the revolution that was and is successful, genuinely
successful and secure. This is something that Ukrainians have to keep
uppermost in their mind.

That is the duty, in my view, of the Ukrainian leadership.

It is the duty of the Ukrainian people to communicate to their leadership
their expectations and it is the duty of the leadership, and particularly
evocative leadership, leadership that has a personal dimension to it, to
reach out to the people, to address the people, and to speak to their
hopes..and not simply sign pacts of unity and collaboration which provides
assurances that some of the hopes will not be fulfilled. That is important!

Many of you here today represent the Ukrainian Diaspora, the Ukrainian
Diaspora of the United States and Canada. I know many of you and you
have always stood for Ukrainian independence, you have always been
committed to it, even when it looked remote.

I think you have a particular responsibility today to monitor very closely
what is happening in Ukraine, and to be very clear in communicating to the
leaders you respect, and whom we all wish well, what their duty is and what
their larger perspective ought to be. And it is important for the leaders
there to communicate with you, but also to communicate with the people.

The future of Ukraine should not be shaped on the basis of agreements
reached by seemingly irreconcilable groups, concluded in closed rooms, but
without the Ukrainian people being addressed or engaged in the process.

If they could freeze for 21 days in the Maydan in order to have freedom,
they should be consulted and engaged. It is as simple, as basis, as
fundamental, as that.

[Sustained Applause...]

I also think it is important for the Diaspora, and those of us in America
who wish Ukraine the best, to monitor closely what Ukraine actually is doing
on some of the concrete issues.

Has the voting agenda for Ukraine membership in WTO been passed? Has
it been passed in total? It is very important that Ukraine be in WTO this
year.
There are good reasons for it to be there this year and not next year.

I'd be remiss not to point out how much more difficult for Ukraine it would
be to get in next year. also for very good reasons, and if you don't know
what those reasons are, you would do well to ask and find out, because it is
in Ukraine's interest that you know. Is that being done?

If the political conflict between the different groups becomes too
antagonistic, that shared objective could be forgotten, and that is no good.
Is Ukraine really moving forward as fast as it can towards European Union.
The Ukrainian EU action plan is to be evaluated in the first quarter of next
year.

To my understanding, not all of its goals have been met. Will they be met?
They had better be met, if Ukraine plans to move towards Europe.

The Rada is still looking to pass some 23 laws pertaining to NATO and
Ukraine's prospects for NATO; it may not be a prospect in the very immediate
future, but it is, nonetheless, a prospect of importance to Ukraine's
future.

Is progress on this going to move forward, especially on the basis of that
agreement regarding Ukraine's future reached between different and
often irreconcilable political parties?

The Diaspora can be important in monitoring this progress or noting the lack
of progress.  And, we in America who were sympathetic to Ukraine should
continue to strive to remind all that Ukraine's future is important to the
future of Europe, and that Ukraine, if it becomes indeed a successful member
of the European community, predetermines the future of Russia, in the sense
that Russia then has no choice but also to be a member of that community.

We have a stake in all that has been pointed out; we really do. However, we
also have to be realistic in saying to the Ukrainians that as much as we
would like Ukraine to be a success, we can go on without Ukraine.

But Ukraine cannot go on as Ukraine without success, and that is really
up to the Ukrainians.

It is not to be decided by foreigners; it is certainly not to be decided by
actions which are then applauded, or not applauded, by a foreign
Ambassador from a neighboring country.

It is something that the Ukrainians have to determine to do on their own,
because this is what they want as a people.

They proved ten months ago that they are a people, that is, a nation, and I
think particularly now they have to remind their leaders that it is they who
will decide the future of Ukraine.   -30-
==============================================================
NOTE:  The above text was transcribed from a recording of the speech
by Zbigniew Brzezinski.  The text was transcribed by the Ukrainian
National Information Service (UNIS); Ukrainian Congress Committee
of America (UCCA), Michael Sawkiw, President, Washington, D.C. and
the Center for US-Ukrainian Relations (CUSUR), Walter Zaryckyj,
Director, in New York City. Text published by The Action Ukraine Report
(AUR), Number 576, Article 1, Tuesday, October 4, 2005.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOTE: Zbigniew Brzezinski is a trustee and counselor at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies and cochairs the CSIS Advisory Board
with Carla Hills. He is a professor of American foreign policy at the School
of Advanced International Studies, the Johns Hopkins University,
Washington, D.C.

He is cochair of the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya. Earlier, he
was a member of the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State from
1966 to 1968; chairman of the Humphrey Foreign Policy Task Force in the
1968 presidential campaign; director of the Trilateral Commission from 1973
to 1976; and principal foreign policy adviser to Jimmy Carter in the 1976
presidential campaign. From 1977 to 1981, Dr. Brzezinski was national
security adviser to President Carter.

In 1981 he was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom for his role in
the normalization of U.S.-Chinese relations and for his contributions to the
human rights and national security policies of the United States.

Dr. Brzezinski received a B.A. and M.A. from McGill University (1949, 1950)
and Ph.D. from Harvard University (1953). He has been a member of the
faculty of Columbia University (1960-1989) and Harvard University
(1953-1960).

Dr. Brzezinski is the recipient of numerous honors and awards. His many
books include The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership (Basic,
2004), The Geostrategic Triad: Living with China, Europe, and Russia (CSIS,
2001), The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic
Imperatives (Basic, 1997), and The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of
Communism in the 20th Century (Scribner, 1989).
===============================================================
2.                                 UKRAINE: "IN THE SECOND ROUND"
What can be expected from a responsible head of state
What the country really needs is a breakthrough, not stability.

COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS: By Yulia Mostovaya
Zerkalo Nedeli, Mirror-Weekly
International Social Political Weekly, #38 (566)
Kyiv, Ukraine, Saturday, 1 - 7 October 2005
(Subheadings inserted by The Action Ukraine Report, AUR)

There are good grounds to assume that an end to the reshuffle of the
Presidential team and the formation of a new Cabinet of Ministers are being
considered by Viktor Yushchenko as a jumpstart to implement a second
chance for him.

The President, according to some of his associates, is set to vigorously
move ahead. SUPPOSE this is the case. Let's try and speculate what could
be expected from a RESPONSIBLE head of state in such a situation.

                                           EIGHT EXPECTATIONS

FIRST, Yushchenko is fixing inadequacies, first and foremost these he
himself allowed. The record low levels of popular trust in Yushchenko's
career as a politician suggest a third chance may never arrive.

SECONDLY, the President has really begun to manage the country,
specifically by holding meetings with Cabinet members on a regular basis,
monitoring the premier's day-to-day performance, receiving reports from the
State Secret Services and intelligence, making domestic tours and bringing
back from foreign tours not only awards of honor but also loans and
investments.

THIRDLY, the President has made a clear-cut decision on constitutional
reform. In formal terms, Yushchenko did this several times. This time
around, he honestly declared to himself: "Reform is inevitable, and I have
no power to halt it.

Instead, I have the power to draw up and propose legislation intended, on
the one hand, for the future parliament to update the system of the
parliamentary-Presidential republic, to optimize it, make it more civilized,
and, in addition, to reinforce institutions and increase the extent of my
influence within the limits provided in the new constitution. This issue
ought to be addressed even today".

FOURTHLY, it recurs to the President that the Verkhovna Rada is there and
that he has the power to propose bills. He has begun working vigorously in
law-making, realizing that -- in terms of proposing strategically important
legislation to parliament -- eight months of his tenure has been lost.

As early as next week, the President will be given a chance to display his
ability to push state decisions through parliament. This is about the
legislation needed for Ukraine's adoption to the WTO. Next year's budget
may become a second trial for the President, but this is not the issue now.

The issue is whether Viktor Yushchenko is capable of taking the lead in the
process of drawing up legislation to ensure reforms in crucial areas. This
will depend on whether or not Yushchenko manages to gather around himself
people competent enough to generate breakthrough products - in this case,
draft laws.

FIFTH, the President has to make up his mind on priorities: will he work for
the benefit of the nation, or the [parliamentary] election campaign? If
preference is given to the latter, one cannot expect any serious reform
after the election, since the next six months are going to be lost, and the
saying "responsibility for the state" will not be associated with the leader
of one of the country's political parties.

If the President opts for work on long-term prospects, fixes the power
mechanism and comes to the new parliament and government with a
package of well-considered, understandable and interesting strategic
proposals, there will be no 'slippage' in the work of all authorities, since
the President himself will ensure this by proposing appropriate legislation.

But for this, however, the President needs a brain-storming team capable
not only of preparing him for regular addresses to the nation and the
long-pending state-of-the-nation address to parliament, but - after
analyzing the domestic situation, available resources and priorities --for
generating strategically important decisions.

The President must clearly understand the plans proposed for reforms in
numerous areas: taxation, health care, public education, homeland defense,
foreign trade et cetera. But his first concern should be restructuring the
system of power.

Adoption of the laws entitled "On the President" and "On Federal Executive
Authorities", adjustment of the political reform adopted, and revising the
center-regions' relationships should be top priorities for the country's
leader, who himself declared that the success of a state depends on how
viable and transparent the system of power is.

SIXTH, the President should learn by word of action, not by word of mouth,
how to honor the Constitution and the law. If the President starts to comply
strictly with all legal requirements, making bureaucrats of all levels do
the same, not only will his actions become logical in legal terms but in
policy terms as well.

Because an unlawful state cannot be democratic - a goal declared a
number-one priority by Yushchenko as a Presidential candidate. Yushchenko
badly needs a team of highly professional legal experts to trim, using
'legal scissors,' his numerous instructions, orders and decrees that not
uncommonly exceed the limits of his authority.

SEVENTH, the President should alter his attitude to the opposition. There
should be no privilege there. In any critical statement by his opponents, he
should hear not only criticism but a grain of common sense as well. A new
Yushchenko should act as an honest man would.

For example, if accusations are leveled against his new associates, he
should not shield himself behind statements like "No proved corruption
cases - no talk".

A new Yushchenko would respond otherwise: "No signs of corruption have
been found out. That's true. But instead they found out a number of abuses
of power and ethical misbehavior, which worry me as much as corruption.
Phenomena like these, likewise corruption, should never be admitted by
representatives of our authorities".

EIGHTH, one should expect that Viktor Andriyovych has cleansed his team.
But we want to know if the 'house-cleaning' was intended for the guests or
for himself. After all, it is up to the President to choose with whom (apart
from professionals) to consult in making decisions.

The problem is that in the aftermath of the latest personnel changes, many
of Yushchenko's closest allies during the Presidential campaign and the
post-revolution period have found themselves ousted from their government
positions.

Does this mean that the corridors of power are no longer the center of
decision-making, and that those left on the scene will only implement the
initiatives of the former owners of those corridors?

Who is on Yushchenko's team now? Who is going to join it? What kind of
tasks, objectives and resources will be assigned to them? So far, there are
no answers to those questions. Rybachuk, Ulyanchenko and Herashchenko
are the only ones to have retained, at least for the time being, their seats
on the 'Presidential ark'. Where is the rest of the once-trusted crew?

               A BRIEF INVENTORY OF 'HIS MAJESTY'S VEHICLES'
The cabinet, the governors, the secretariat, experts, think-tanks

So, the President has finished the first round with substantial losses, and
begun moving toward the second round. Here it would be pertinent to take a
brief inventory of 'his majesty's' vehicles.

For the time being, these are like an automobile with a disintegrating
engine, without a roadmap. Under the 'engine' we imply the State machinery,
with some of its components destroyed and others still consuming a great
deal of gasoline and emitting much smoke.

                                                THE CABINET

The Cabinet is the only  component to continue a relatively smooth
performance. Basically, the President can, to a certain degree, rely for
support on the Cabinet, which currently is behaving like a glove that does
the same as the hand it wears. However, it will take quite some time for the
new Cabinet to get into the work, given all the complexities associated with
the forthcoming parliamentary campaign.

The situation with governors is a bit more complicated. The need for
numerous replacements in this field was evident even before nominations
for respective positions were signed by the President.

This time around, the nominees for governors of particular regions will be
judged not only by their competence but also political affiliation. Now
there is a good reason to predict that slated for dismissal are the
governors who are: incompetent, notorious, Poroshenko's creatures,
supporters of Yuliya Tymoshenko.

These will be replaced with personalities with yet-unknown qualities.
Suppose these are competent, highly professional people, concerned about
popular and regional interests. This does not mean the governors will
immediately form a unified state machinery. For the time being, the 27
governors carry out 27 different policies - each doing so according to their
abilities and available resources.

The blame for this lies entirely on the federal authorities, who, on the one
hand, have not identified their priorities to date, and, on the other hand,
have not even tried to develop a system of notification and priority-setting
for tactical or strategic prospects.

                                               HIS SECRETARIAT

The development and partial implementation of Presidential policy is
supposed to be the task of his secretariat. For the time being, this task
has remained unresolved. Today, half a year ahead of the forthcoming
parliamentary election, only two political figures (from the author's
viewpoint) - Yushchenko and Tymoshenko - truly realize that key roles on
their election teams should be given not to campaign designers or PR
experts but rather to 'headhunters'.

The country is starved of intellectuals, while the population wants to
understand its politicians' plans. The electorate no longer wants charisma,
demanding instead a clear-cut action program. As of today, the Ukrainian
political spectrum only features figures with a mixed experience of being in
the opposition and working for the powers that be.

All of them - Yushchenko, Tymoshenko, Yanukovych, Moroz and even Lytvyn -
have adequately demonstrated how they can work on either side of the fence
of power. Today, as the author sees it, the public demands a product that
can be evaluated rationally rather than by the heart.

Therefore, eligible for evaluation will only be realistic programs where
ambitions balance out the country's resources, priorities, and the popular
needs, and where qualified officials are assigned to the task.

Failing the concentration, rejuvenation or solicitation of the required
intellectual potential, none of the political forces will be able to cope
with the task.

The problem of 'giving a new look to the old situation' and 'generating new
ideas' can only be coped with by injecting fresh intellectual blood into the
veins of both the powers that be and the opposition.

                              A THIRD FORCE MAY BE REQUIRED

If this requires a third force, this should to be called into the effort.
Foreign advisers should not be afraid of either (one example is performance
by such a team at the Russian Finance Ministry, led by [the German] Gref,
who convinced even the most orthodox hardliners).

As far as the authorities are concerned, work by carefully selected
intellectuals should be supported by proper organization. This is one thing.

[2] For another thing, this intellectual work should not be intended for the
waste-paper basket or a thesis but should be given a chance of being
translated into reality.

Thirdly, after a decision is made on some or other idea, work to translate
this into reality should proceed under the President's supervision.

                     THINK-TANKS SET UP AT THE SECRETARIAT

In the case of the President and his staff, a number of think-tanks on
selected issues could be officially set up at the Secretariat. This work is
currently being done by State Secretary Oleh Rybachuk. Drawing up
interesting breakthrough decisions should be assigned to a team of
advisers.

But these should not include the figures who have secured for themselves
an adviser's status just out of a desire to have a 'ksiva' (a Russian slang
for an 'official document') that opens the door for them to all government
institutions or businesses.

It is my belief that the introduction of the 'President's friend' ksiva
would release at the Secretariat a living space for qualitatively new
professionals capable of fixing the engine in the Presidential vehicle
rather than adjusting the tachometer.

In sum, the Presidential vehicle under repair will be given a second chance
of winning the state race if its engine - the State machinery - begins
working smoothly and effectively. But this requires an intense effort, and
not only by the boys with Harvard or Oxford University degrees.

This effort should probably engage old professionals, while selected areas
of work should be assigned to those who have been fixing the bureaucratic
State machinery since 1917, so to speak.

Yet it remains to be seen whether the old professionals, given the [highly
critical] assessment of their performance, would come back to share their
wisdom with the neophytes.

The more so because the 'cathedral' on Bankova has been desecrated by an
irresponsible and incompetent performance by the majority of office holders
there. 'Low company' - this is how these were described by a pre-revolution
minister, and he is almost right.

The country's current leaders seem to have realized that subjecting the
bureaucracy to a cavalry-sword-style attack was a mistake, and this mistake
might be fixed by compounding in a reasonable proportion the classic and
modernist styles.

                                     WHERE IS THE 'ROADMAP'?
                        Presidential vehicle does not know where to go

Suppose the engine is repaired enough to operate well at idling speeds. But
the vehicle cannot move since it does not know where to go. The President,
speaking about possible directions, has more than once mentioned the word
'roadmap'.

The result: the country is fully confused, having lost its way altogether.

Confused not only with regard to started, then abandoned reforms, or
relationships within the Presidential team, but also the definitions. Who
can help the public discriminate between transparency of performance and
PR ploys?

Do the prime minister's weekly news briefings stand for transparency or a PR
scheme? Contrary to his pledges of transparent staffing policies, why does
the President appoint ministers without a single word of explanation as to
why these are selected for the job? Is this a violation of his election
pledges, or an unwillingness to get unnecessary publicity?

I would appreciate someone explaining to me why Tomenko keeping a high
profile is part of a PR ploy, while the same done by Rybachuk is nothing
less than just compliance with the transparency-of-power principle.

Here we turn to the concepts of clean authorities and incriminating
material. During a televised interview, Tymoshenko, asked by journalists
whether she was going to end the war of compromising files, began
mumbling some excuses, instead of simply saying: "Okay, comrade.

Suppose you obtain information that someone is misappropriating public
funds, or abusing his (or her) office, or pressuring some office holders or
judges for his (or her) benefit, or lobbying for a foreign state's interests
to the detriment of Ukraine's. Will you keep silence?"

Our answers to this question will determine which party we are affiliated
with - the party of those opposing the war of compromising files, or the
party advocating 'clean' authorities and lawful behavior of average members
of the public.

A different question is under what circumstances might some incriminating
facts compromising some or other politician come to light? What prevented
Yuliya Tymoshenko from openly accusing President Yushchenko of violating
the Constitution by nominating senior officials without first asking her
consent, as required by law?

These are just her considerations of the moment. What prevented Yushchenko
from raising the issue of writing off Integrated Energy Systems of Ukraine's
(IESU) debts in February, or at least in March? The same: political
considerations of the moment.

Taking all this into account, I consider a 'compromising fact' to be a
wrongdoing, well known by somebody yet kept in secret, to be disclosed at
an opportune moment.

In such a situation, the information carrier loses the right to moralize.
But this, however, does not eliminate the need for the fact to be publicized
and evaluated in legal terms. There is nothing bad involved in an expose of
corruption among top officials - here in Ukraine, or in Poland or Belarus.

This simply implies the right to pronounce accusations loudly and openly,
and in due time - once information about the wrongdoing becomes available.

However, we have deviated from the subject of the 'Presidential vehicle',
for which a roadmap should have been drawn up not by Ivan Vasyniuk, who
failed to do so during the two-year Presidential campaign, but rather by the
best intellectuals from this country and the rest of the civilized world
that is still supportive of Ukraine.

  WHAT THE COUNTRY NEEDS IS A BREAKTHROUGH, NOT STABILITY
                                 No money or effort should be spared

No money or effort should be spared, for Ukraine badly needs a breakthrough,
in the right direction. Honestly speaking, many of us are unconsciously
playing at give-away with the President: "Yes, some problems are there
indeed. But during Kuchma's tenure journalists were found beheaded, while
the businesses of members of the opposition were frustrated.

Yes, the country is in chaos, indeed, but with Yanukovych as President there
would be cemetery-style order." Comparisons like these are often referred to
as 'underscore'. Because Ukrainian society compares itself not with Belarus
or Turkmenistan but rather with Poland, the Czech Republic or Lithuania.

Our people have ranked themselves among the civilized world. Why then do we
evaluate our leaders by comparing them with uncivilized ones as a standard?

Why, on some occurrences, does that standard coincide with the current
original, or even surpass it in some professional characteristics?

But this does not mean to say that the tall should hunch down, and society
should barter its high expectations and demands for the pleasure of not
seeing the situation get even worse.

Highly remarkably, it is precisely Lytvyn and Poroshenko who are trying to
convince the whole country of the value of stability. Excuse me, but what
kind of stability do they mean? Seventy-one percent of the population at the
end of Kuchma's tenure wanted the county's course changed.

Today, two-thirds of the population, again, believe the country is moving in
the wrong direction. Does this situation need to be preserved? Stability
means stagnation. There was stability under Kuchma, and even greater
stability under Brezhnev.

What do we need to stabilize and preserve? The lack of a development
strategy for the state? Stalled economic reforms? The situation with the
customs, or healthcare, or public education? Dependence of judges? The
taxation system?

What the country really needs is a breakthrough, not stability. And working
towards such a breakthrough should be all people of honor and conscience.

Working towards a breakthrough should be the authorities, who should
concentrate to that end their intellectual resources and what has remained
of their will and popular confidence.

And also the opposition, who should compete with the authorities not with
individuals but rather with ideas. And the entire society. Incidentally, to
prepare for a breakthrough, society does not need to be fed by lofty
promises, but needs to be spoken to with honestly, as adults would.

This work is highly ambitious and difficult. We all have a chance of getting
involved in this effort.

I don't believe it is possible right now. But I do believe that it is
necessary.

Therefore, let's SUPPOSE, once again.   -30-

(Subheadings inserted by The Action Ukraine Report, AUR)
LINK: http://www.mirror-weekly.com/ie/show/566/51415/
================================================================
3.                                      THE MAIDAN MEMORANDUM
                             The Next Objectives of the Orange Revolution

Maidan & Maidan International
Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, October 3, 2005

                                                THE NEW ROADMAP

The Orange Revolution and the election of Viktor Yuschenko as the President
provided a significant mandate for the new agenda that is based on
principles of democracy, individual freedom, free enterprise, and
traditional Ukrainian values.

The Maidan community is calling for a beginning of a large-scale dialog to
form THE MAIDAN MEMORANDUM, which would serve as a roadmap to
responsible lawmakers and the Government to implement those principles,
and which could serve for citizens as an indicator for a progress in doing
so,
over the next half a decade.

THE MAIDAN MEMORANDUM includes solutions in such areas as civil rights,
the judicial system, public affairs, national and local governance, national
defense, and public finance. Each of the tasks is composed in a manner that
allows for verification whether the task is accomplished or not.

The Maidan community is calling upon everyone to join in the discussion of
THE MAIDAN MEMORANDUM: to itemize the tasks and to create programs
of their realization. It is open to amendments and additions.

The full text of THE MAIDAN MEMORANDUM is available for viewing and
discussion at http://maidan.org.ua/go/memo . A final version of the document
will be available during the next couple of months, followed by an
implementation stage.

A realistic program of practical objectives to accomplish a transition to a
Government that is accountable to the public and to confirm political and
civil achievements of the Orange Revolution is out next challenge.

1. CIVIL RIGHTS

1.1.        Legislative consolidation of the right of the people to free
assembly and protest
1.2.        The introduction of a system of direct legislative initiatives
from the Citizens
1.3.        The implementation of a system of a human rights
ombudspersons for each oblast

2. THE JUSTICE SYSTEM

2.1.        The abolition of the practice by the Government of seizing
property without a sanction of the court.
2.2.        The introduction of an effective system of direct appeals from
Citizens to the Constitutional Court
2.3.        The creation of effective organizational and legal mechanisms
for Citizens to gain access to the justice system
2.4.        Ensuring compulsory record-keeping of all court hearings using
technical tools.
2.5.        The implementation of a Jury System
2.6.        Introducing elements of Precedent-Based Law
2.7.        Ensuring administrative and financial independence of the Courts
2.8.        The introduction of self-administration of the Courts

3. THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS

3.1.        Ensuring guarantees of academic freedom in higher educational
institutions
3.2.        The removal of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. The creation
of a State Committee for Supporting Museums, Libraries and National Arts
and Crafts. The creation of a State Agency of Tourism and Promotion.
3.3.        The liquidation of the Ministry of Transport and Communications.
The creation of a Ministry of Transport. The creation of a State
Communications Committee.
3.4.        The liquidation of the State Committee on Television and Radio
Broadcasting of Ukraine
3.5.        The creation of a public system for disclosing a full chain of
ownership of print and electronic media
3.6.        The liquidation of government-administered condominiums. The
introduction of community administered condominiums
3.7.        Ensuring equal operating conditions for governmental and
non-governmental schools.
3.8.        The introduction of a viable national health insurance system.

4. LOCAL GOVERNANCE

4.1.        The introduction of referendums on the early removal of local
officials.
4.2.        The creation of an effective mechanism for the early removal of
mayors and elected heads of communities.
4.3.        The creation of a system ensuring mandatory disclosure of all
construction and zoning documents on the territory of communities and
applications for allocation of land and tenders.
4.4.        The creation of an effective mechanism for public debate on
issues material to local communities.
4.5.        The creation of a system for disclosure of normative legal acts
on budgets, staff schedules, and government employee salary schedules
at all Local Governments, as well as of financial reports of all municipal
companies.

5. ECONOMY & FINANCE

5.1.        The liquidation of Economic Courts.
5.2.        The elimination of the Tax Police.
5.3.        The elimination of the Value Added Tax, and its substitution
with a national sales tax.
5.4.        The introduction of a single social tax
5.5.        The introduction of a mechanism for tax deductibility on
donations for nonprofit activities related to culture, the arts, science,
education, and religion.
5.6.        Legislative consolidation of the right to minimize tax
liability.
5.7.        The introduction of a single registration "port of call" and one
single liquidation "port of call" for businesses.

6. NATIONAL GOVERNANCE

6.1.        The introduction of mandatory public and open competition when
hiring civil servants and public administration employees.
6.2.        The creation of a national system for disclosing legal acts of
budgets, staff lists and salary breakdowns of all national public
institutions.
6.3.        The creation of a national system for disclosure of property and
property rights owned by civil servants.
6.4.        Making civil servants officials responsible for actions or
inaction when handling information.

7. NATIONAL SECURITY & DEFENSE

7.5.        Ensuring access to all archives of the Soviet secret services
(those of the Cheka, the OGPU, the NKVD, the MGB and the KGB)
7.6.        The transformation of the SBU (Security Service of Ukraine) into
an accountable specialized security service, designed using European
models.
7.7.        The liquidation of the Office of the Prosecutor General. The
functions of supporting prosecutions and representation of national
interests in court to be passed to the Ministry of Justice.
7.8.        The liquidation of the Militia and the creation of the Police,
based on a Euro-Atlantic model.
7.9.        The creation of a National Bureau for Criminal Investigations.
7.10.    The abolition of military draft. The creation of a professional
Army, based on a Euro-Atlantic model.

                                  JOIN A LIVE DISCUSSION TODAY!
                          GO TO HTTP://MAIDAN.ORG.UA/GO/MEMO
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        MAIDAN
NOTE: Since December of 2000, the community of readers and participants
of the website MAIDAN, www.Maidan.org.ua, have continued a discussion
about the future of Ukraine.  During the past five years this website served
as an open tool for public communication for citizens, where any one could
discuss political and societal issues, and where any one could make his
or her voice heard.

Maidan.org.ua
3 Hayday Vol. 176
Kyiv 04212, Ukraine
380 50 352 5815
E-mail: admin@maidan.org.ua

                                             MAIDAN INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Maidan International's mission is to support those who advance participatory
democracy, promoting civil freedom and liberties, developing open society,
increasing prosperity, and contributing to peace in Central Eastern Europe.

Andriy Ihnatov, Director
Maidan International, Inc.
104-G University Village
Ames, IA 50010, USA
Tel: 312 239 0612
office@maidan-int.org
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