"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT - AUR"
An International Newsletter
The Latest, Up-To-Date
In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis, and Commentary
"Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion,
Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World"
"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT - AUR" - Number 598
Mr. E. Morgan Williams, Publisher and Editor
Washington, D.C., Kyiv, Ukraine, WEDNESDAY, November 9, 2005
--------INDEX OF ARTICLES--------
"Major International News Headlines and Articles"
1. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS -
CHAMBER JUDGMENT GONGADZE v. UKRAINE
Registrar, European Court of Human Rights
Council of Europe Press, Strasbourg, France, Tuesday, Nov 8, 2005
2. EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS COURT CONDEMNS UKRAINE
OVER JOURNALIST DEATH, ORDERS PAYMENT TO WIFE
Associated Press (AP), Strasbourg, France, Tue, November 8, 2005
3. COURT DECISION: PAYOUT OVER KIEV REPORTER'S DEATH
Most important thing was to have set a precedent for Ukrainian citizens.
"From today, anyone who wants to defend their rights can use this
experience to struggle better for themselves," Ms. Gongadze said.
BBC NEWS, United Kingdom, Tuesday, November 8, 20005
4. UKRAINE'S YUSHCHENKO ACCUSES PROSECUTORS OF
GOING EASY ON POLITICAL FIGURES
AP Worldstream, Kiev, Ukraine, Tue, Nov 08, 2005
5. UKRAINE: "BIRTH OF A PROSECUTOR-GENERAL"
New chief prosecutor appointed in Ukraine without President's involvement
ANALYSIS: By Oleksandra Prymachenko
Zerkalo Nedeli, Mirror-Weekly, Kiev, in Russian 5 Nov 05; p 1, 6
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Monday, Nov 07, 2005
6. UKRAINE: PROCURATOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW
ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY: by Bohdan A. Futey
Zerkalo Nedeli (Mirror-Weekly) No. 43 (571) in Ukrainian
Kyiv, Ukraine, Saturday, November 5-11, 2005
7. GEORGE SOROS SAYS UKRAINE'S BIG TASK IS TO REFORM
THE LEGAL SYSTEM TO FIGHT PERVASIVE CORRUPTION
"Transition from robber capitalism to legitimate capitalism"
Associated Press (AP), Kiev, Ukraine, November 8, 2005 .
8. NATIONAL SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA OF UKRAINE TO PERFORM
ROZHKO'S WORKS IN ROYAL CONSERVATORY IN BRUSSELS
New Europe, Athens, Greece, Monday, November 7, 2005
9. DEAD AND BURIED WAR HERO CLAIMS MEDAL 60 YEARS ON
For liberating Ukraine from Nazi occupation during WWII
Tom Parfitt in Moscow, The Observer
London, UK, Sunday November 6, 2005
10. UKRAINAIN SOCIETY "PROSVITA" TO LAUNCH NEW PROJECT,
AIMED AT DEVELOPING UKRAINIAN NATIONAL CULTURE
Yaroslav Dovhopol, Ukrinform, Kyiv, Ukraine, Tue, November 8, 2005
11. WINNERS AND LOSERS IN KREMLIN'S GRAB FOR OIL
COMMENT & ANALYSIS: By Arkady Ostrovsky
Financial Times, London, UK, Sunday, November 6 2005
12. UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT APPROVES MAKEUP OF
JOINT COMMISSION WITH PUTIN
Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian 1227 gmt 5 Nov 05
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Sat, November 5, 2005
========================================================
1. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS -
CHAMBER JUDGMENT GONGADZE v. UKRAINE
Registrar, European Court of Human Rights
Council of Europe Press, Strasbourg, France, Tuesday, Nov 8, 2005
CHAMBER JUDGMENT GONGADZE v. UKRAINE
The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing a
judgment1 in the case of Gongadze v. Ukraine (application no. 34056/02).
The Court held, unanimously, that there had been:
[1] a violation of Article 2 (right to life) of the European Convention on
Human Rights, concerning the Ukrainian authorities' failure to protect
the life of the applicant's husband, Georgiy Gongadze;
[2] a violation of Article 2, concerning the inadequate investigation into
Mr Gongadze's death;
[3] a violation of Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading
treatment) of the Convention concerning the applicant;
[4] a violation of Article 13 (right to an effective remedy).
Under Article 41 (just satisfaction), the Court awarded the applicant
100,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary
damages. (The judgment is available only in English.)
1. Principal facts
The applicant, Myroslava Gongadze, is a Ukrainian national, who
was born in 1972 and lives in Arlington (United States of America).
Her late husband, Georgiy Gongadze, was a political journalist and
editor-in-chief of the "Ukrainskaya Pravda" Internet journal. He was
actively involved, both nationally and internationally, in raising
awareness about the lack of freedom of speech in Ukraine. He reported
on, for example, corruption among high-level State officials.
For months prior to his disappearance, Mr Gongadze had complained about
receiving threats and being under surveillance. On 14 July 2000 he wrote
an open letter to the Prosecutor General complaining that his relatives,
friends and colleagues were being questioned about him by law enforcement
officers concerning an incident he knew nothing about and that he was
being followed by people who had not been identified driving a car with
the number plate 07309 KB. He asked the Prosecutor General to protect him
and to find and punish those involved.
Mr Gongadze disappeared on 16 September 2000 and, the following day,
the applicant notified the Moskovskiy District Police Department of Kyiv.
On 2 November 2000 the decapitated body of an unknown person was
discovered in the vicinity of the town of Tarashcha, in the Kyiv Region.
On 15 November 2000 relatives examining the body found jewellery
belonging to Mr Gongadze and marks of an old injury.
On 28 November 2000 the Chairman of the Ukrainian Socialist Party, Mr
Moroz, publicly announced the existence of audiotapes (the "Melnychenko
tapes"), secretly made in the office of the President, implicating
President Kuchma and other high-level State officials in the
disappearance of Mr Gongadze. In one of the recorded conversations,
allegedly between the President and Minister of the Interior Yuriy
Kravchenko, the President asked that Mr Gongadze be threatened. The
Minister had then proposed certain people whom he called "real eagles",
capable of anything, to do the job.
In December 2000 the Prosecutor General announced that the Tarashcha
corpse was not Mr Gongadze. Then, on 10 January 2001, he publicly
announced that it was highly probable that the corpse was Mr Gongadze
while, at the same time, announcing that there were witnesses who had
seen Mr Gongadze alive after his disappearance. Three days later, the
General Prosecutor's Office (GPO) informed the applicant that there was
no evidence that the corpse was Mr Gongadze. A fortnight later, the
applicant was recognised as an aggrieved party because there was enough
evidence to believe that the corpse was her late husband.
On 15 January 2001, the editor-in-chief of the Grani newspaper made
public the names of four police officers who had allegedly been involved
in the surveillance of Mr Gongadze.
On 11 March 2003 Reporters Sans Frontières announced that, following a
DNA test, the body had been identified as Mr Gongadze.
On 22 October 2003 Lieutenant-General Pukach, an official of the Ministry
of the Interior, was arrested on suspicion of involvement in the
disappearance of Mr Gongadze. He was accused of ordering the destruction
of important documents in the case. On 29 October 2003 the Prosecutor
General, Mr Piskun, was dismissed by the President. On 6 November 2003
Kyiv City Court released Mr Pukach on his undertaking not to abscond.
After Viktor Yushchenko was elected President of Ukraine on 26 December
2004, he promised to re-open the investigation into the Gongadze case. It
was reported in the press on 2 March 2005 that the Prosecutor General had
announced the arrest of three police officers in connection with the
applicant's case before the European Court of Human Rights. On 4 March
2005, the death by purported suicide of Yuriy Kravchenko was announced.
He had been due to be interviewed by the GPO that morning.
In August 2005 the applicant was allowed access to the file. In September
2005 the GPO announced that the latest DNA test conducted in Germany
proved that the body found in Tarashcha was Mr Gongadze.
On 15 September 2005 Mr Turchinov, dismissed from his post as Head
of the Security Service, informed journalists, among other things, that the
interim results of the laboratory examination of the "Melnychenko tapes"
had not established any sign of tampering, and had identified voices
recorded on the tapes.
On 20 September 2005 the Parliament of Ukraine heard the report of the
chairman of its ad hoc investigating committee on the murder of Mr
Gongadze, which concluded that the kidnap and murder of Mr Gongadze had
been organised by former President Kuchma and Mr Kravchenko and that the
current speaker of Parliament, Mr V. Lytvyn, and a member of parliament,
Mr L. Derkach, were involved in the crimes. The report finally noted that
the GPO had failed to take any action or to react to the conclusions of
the ad hoc committee.
The GPO has recently announced that the criminal investigation concerning
the offenders is complete and that it will be sent to the Court.
2. Procedure and composition of the Court
The application was lodged on 16 September 2002 and declared admissible
on 22 March 2005.
Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:
Jean-Paul Costa (French), President,
András Baka (Hungarian),
Ireneu Cabral Barreto (Portuguese),
Karel Jungwiert (Czech),
Volodymyr Butkevych (Ukrainian),
Antonella Mularoni (San Marinese),
Danute Jociene (Lithuanian), judges,
and also Sally Dollé, Section Registrar.
3. Summary of the judgment2
Complaints
The applicant complained that the State authorities failed to protect the
life of her husband and to investigate his disappearance and death, which
caused her serious moral suffering. She relied on Articles 2, 3 and 13.
She also submitted that the latest information provided by the Ukrainian
Government confirmed the direct involvement of State agents in the murder
of her husband, but that the investigation seemed to limit the case to
the prosecution of direct offenders, and not those who ordered and
organised it.
Decision of the Court
Article 2
Alleged failure to protect right to life
The Court noted that recent developments in the applicant's case
demonstrated with a high degree of probability that police officers were
involved in the disappearance and murder of Mr. Gongadze. The question to
be determined was whether the authorities failed to comply with their
positive obligation to protect Mr Gongadze from a known risk to his life.
The Court first noted that the applicant's husband, in his open letter of
14 July 2000, had provided the GPO with information both about the
interrogation of his relatives and colleagues by police officers and his
surveillance. He had also called for an investigation to be undertaken
and for measures be taken for his protection.
Secondly, the authorities, primarily prosecutors, ought to have been
aware of the vulnerable position of a journalist who covered politically-
sensitive topics; at that time, 18 journalists had been killed in Ukraine
since 1991.
Thirdly, the GPO was entitled and obliged to supervise the activities
of the police and investigate the lawfulness of any action taken by them.
Despite clear indications in the letter of Mr Gongadze about the
inexplicable interest in him shown by law-enforcement officers, the
response of the GPO was not only formalistic, but also blatantly
negligent. A fortnight later Mr Gongadze had disappeared.
The Court found that the complaints from the late Mr. Gongadze and
subsequent events, revealing the possible involvement of State officials
in his disappearance and death, were neglected or simply denied without
proper investigation for a considerable period of time. There was no
reaction to the alleged involvement of the police in his disappearance,
when information about such a possibility was disseminated publicly, by
the editor-in-chief of the Grani newspaper. The fact that the alleged
offenders, two of them active police officers, were identified and
charged with the kidnap and murder of the journalist just a few days
after the change in the country's leadership, raised serious doubts as to
the genuine wish of the authorities under the previous Government to
investigate the case thoroughly.
The Court therefore found that there had been a violation of Article 2
concerning the authorities' failure to protect the life of the applicant's
husband.
Failure to investigate the case
The Court considered that, during the investigation, until December 2004,
the State authorities were more preoccupied with proving the lack of
involvement of high-level State officials in the case than discovering
the truth about the circumstances of the disappearance and death of the
applicant's husband. The Court therefore concluded that there had been a
violation of Article 2 concerning the failure to conduct an effective
investigation into the case.
Article 3
The Court noted that the applicant's husband disappeared in September
2000 but that, according to the applicant, only in March 2003 did she
receive convincing information that the decapitated body, which had been
found in Tarashcha in November 2000, was that of her husband. In the
meantime, she had received numerous contradictory statements from the
authorities about his fate. That uncertain situation continued so that,
having raised doubts as to the identity of the Tarashcha corpse, and
therefore the fate of her husband, the State authorities, at the same
time, constantly refused to grant her full access to the relevant
materials in the case file. Only in August 2005 was she allowed access to
the file. In September 2005 the GPO announced that the latest DNA test
conducted in Germany proved that the body found in Tarashcha was that
of the applicant's husband.
The Court therefore found that the attitude of the investigation
authorities to the applicant and her family clearly caused her serious
suffering which amounted to degrading treatment, in violation of Article 3.
Article 13
The Court recalled that it was not in dispute that the authorities had an
obligation to carry out an effective investigation into the circumstances
of the killing of the applicant's husband. However, for more than four
years, no effective criminal investigation could be considered to have
been conducted in accordance with Article 13. The Court therefore found
that the applicant was denied an effective remedy in respect of the death
of her husband.
Furthermore, the absence of any outcome concerning the main criminal
proceedings also prevented the applicant from receiving compensation,
since in practice a civil claim for compensation would not be examined
prior to a final determination of the facts in pending criminal
proceedings. There had therefore also been a violation of Article 13.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Court's judgments are accessible on its Internet site
(http://www.echr.coe.int).
Registry of the European Court of Human Rights
F - 67075 Strasbourg Cedex
Press contacts: Roderick Liddell (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 24 92)
Emma Hellyer (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15)
Stéphanie Klein (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54)
Beverley Jacobs (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 90 21 54 21)
Fax: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 27 91
The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the
Council of Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations
of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. Since 1 November
1998 it has sat as a full-time Court composed of an equal number of judges
to that of the States party to the Convention. The Court examines the
admissibility and merits of applications submitted to it. It sits in
Chambers of seven judges or, in exceptional cases, as a Grand Chamber of
17 judges. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe supervises
the execution of the Court's judgments.
1 Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within
three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case
may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the
17-member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five
judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the
interpretation or application of the Convention or its protocols, or a
serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber
will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel
will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final.
Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-
month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to
make a request to refer.
2 This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
Press Release-Council of Europe Press Division, Ref: 599a05
Tel: +33 (0)3 88 41 25 60; Fax:+33 (0)3 88 41 39 11
pressunit@coe.int; internet: www.coe.int/press
To receive our press releases by e-mail, contact:
Council.of.Europe.Press@coe.int
A political organisation set up in 1949, the Council of Europe works to
promote democracy and human rights continent-wide. It also develops
common responses to social, cultural and legal challenges in its 46
member states. -30-
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
2. EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS COURT CONDEMNS UKRAINE
OVER JOURNALIST DEATH, ORDERS PAYMENT TO WIFE
Associated Press (AP), Strasbourg, France, Tue, November 8, 2005
STRASBOURG - The European Court of Human Rights Tuesday ruled
that Ukrainian authorities failed to protect the life of journalist Heorhiy
Gongadze and mishandled the politically charged investigation into his
kidnapping and killing five years ago.
The court ordered Ukraine to pay Gongadze's wife Myroslava EUR100,000
in damages, saying that for three years after Gongadze's disappearance the
authorities kept her in the dark over his fate and refused to grant her full
access to relevant materials in the case file.
For more than four years after Gongadze's death, no criminal investigation
had been conducted, preventing Gongadze's wife from getting compensation
from domestic courts, the human rights court ruled.
Gongadze was a political journalist and editor-in-chief of the "Ukrainskaya
Pravda" Internet journal. He tried to raise awareness about the lack of
freedom of speech in Ukraine under former President Leonid Kuchma and
reported on issues such as corruption among high-level State officials.
Gongadze was kidnapped and killed in September, 2000. His decapitated
body was found in a forest outside Kiev. For months prior to his
disappearance, Gongadze had complained about receiving threats and being
under surveillance. He asked the Prosecutor General to protect him and to
find and punish those involved, but received no response.
"The court found that the complaints from Gongadze and subsequent events,
revealing the possible involvement of state officials in his disappearance
and death, were neglected or simply denied without proper investigation for
a considerable period of time," the human rights court said in a statement.
In September, a Ukrainian parliamentary commission concluded that
Parliament Speaker Volodymyr Lytyvn, Kuchma's chief-of-staff at the time,
instigated the killing. Lytvyn has repeatedly denied all allegations.
Ukrainian prosecutors have opened a criminal case against unidentified
officials in Kuchma's administration, accusing them of hampering the
investigation into Gongadze's killing.
A month after the inauguration of President Viktor Yushchenko in January,
prosecutors indicted three former policemen for Gongadze's death. A
fourth suspect is at large and being sought on an international warrant.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
Send in names and e-mail addresses for the AUR distribution list.
========================================================
3. COURT DECISION: PAYOUT OVER KIEV REPORTER'S DEATH
Most important thing was to have set a precedent for Ukrainian citizens.
"From today, anyone who wants to defend their rights can use this
experience to struggle better for themselves," Ms. Gongadze said.
BBC NEWS, United Kingdom, Tuesday, November 8, 20005
The widow of a murdered Ukrainian journalist has been awarded 100,000
euros (£68,000) in damages by the European Court of Human Rights. The
headless body of the journalist, Georgiy Gongadze, was found in woods
near Kiev in November 2000.
The court ruled that the Ukrainian authorities had not done enough to
protect Gongadze's life, or to investigate his death. It also concluded that
police officers were probably involved in his murder.
Events revealing the possible involvement of state officials in Gongadze's
disappearance and death were neglected or simply denied without proper
investigation for a considerable period of time
COURT RULING
"The court noted that recent developments in the applicant's case
demonstrated with a high degree of probability that police officers were
involved in the disappearance and murder of Mr Gongadze," the judgement
said.
It also said his widow, Myroslava, had been subjected to degrading treatment
by being deprived of information for years - including confirmation that the
body was her husband's, and access to his file.
'PRECEDENT'
It said her right to effective remedy had been violated, because "for more
than four years, no effective criminal investigation could be considered to
have been conducted".
Ms Gongadze told the BBC Ukrainian Service that for her, the most
important thing was to have set a precedent for Ukrainian citizens.
"From today, anyone who wants to defend their rights can use this
experience to struggle better for themselves," she said.
In their account of the case, the seven judges pointed out:
[1] The voice of the then Interior Minister Yuri Kravchenko is heard in
recordings allegedly made in 2000 in the office of the then President,
Leonid Kuchma, saying that he knows certain people capable of
threatening Gongadze.
[2] A newspaper in January 2001 made public the names of four police
officers allegedly involved in the surveillance of Gongadze.
[3] A lieutenant-general of the interior ministry was arrested on suspicion
of involvement in Gongadze's disappearance in October 2003, only to be
released two weeks later
[4] Three police officers were arrested shortly after President Viktor
Yushchenko came to power, in early 2005
Yuri Kravchenko's "death by purported suicide" was announced in
March 2005 on the day prosecutors were due to question him
The judges ruled that events "revealing the possible involvement of state
officials" in Gongadze's disappearance and death were "neglected or simply
denied without proper investigation for a considerable period of time".
They added: "The fact that the alleged offenders, two of them active police
officers, were identified and charged with the kidnap and murder of the
journalist just a few days after the change in the country's leadership,
raised serious doubts as to the genuine wish of the authorities under the
previous government to investigate the case thoroughly."
However, prosecutors have been widely criticised for allegedly failing to
make progress with the case since the arrest of the suspects in March.
In October, President Yushchenko sacked the prosecutor general, Svyatoslav
Piskun. On Tuesday, he accused Mr Piskun of working badly, and said he
had failed to deliver results in the Gongadze case and other high-profile cases.
The men arrested in March have not yet been handed over to the courts for
trial. -30- LINK: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4419180.stm
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
=======================================================
Send in names and e-mail addresses for the AUR distribution list.
=======================================================
4. UKRAINE'S YUSHCHENKO ACCUSES PROSECUTORS OF
GOING EASY ON POLITICAL FIGURES
AP Worldstream, Kiev, Ukraine, Tue, Nov 08, 2005
KIEV - President Viktor Yushchenko said Tuesday that top Ukrainian
prosecutors have been more interested in helping politicians avoid
prosecution rather than in investigating crimes.
"Here we have a center of political amnesty, but not the rule of law,"
Yushchenko told prosecutors as he introduced their new boss, Prosecutor
General Oleksandr Medvedko, whom Yushchenko charged with ushering in
sweeping changes to the powerful Prosecutor General's Office.
Yushchenko said that for the last ten months, no criminal cases in which
political figures from ex-President Leonid Kuchma's decade in office are
suspects have been solved, and he called on Medvedko to steer clear of
politics.
Last month, Yushchenko sacked former Prosecutor General Svyatoslav
Piskun, and Yushchenko's office later accused the prosecutor of dragging
out important investigations. "Piskun was fired for ineffective work, it is the
only reason," Yushchenko said.
He has complained that many criminal cases remain unsolved, including his
poisoning, the 2000 killing of investigative journalist Heorhiy Gongadze and
fraud and regional calls for separatism during last year's divisive
presidential election.
Piskun, who has challenged his dismissal, complained he was sacked
because he opened a criminal investigation into a close Yushchenko ally -
an investigation that was closed immediately after Piskun's sacking. Also
Tuesday, a Kiev local court started considering Piskun's appeal against
his firing. -30-
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
=======================================================
5. UKRAINE: "BIRTH OF A PROSECUTOR-GENERAL"
New chief prosecutor appointed in Ukraine without President's involvement
ANALYSIS: By Oleksandra Prymachenko
Zerkalo Nedeli, Mirror-Weekly, Kiev, in Russian 5 Nov 05; p 1, 6
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Monday, Nov 07, 2005
President Viktor Yushchenko did not interview any of the candidates for the
post of prosecutor-general, a serious Ukrainian weekly has said. It seems
likely that Oleksandr Medvedko's appointment to the job was decided by
Yushchenko's advisers.
Medvedko was probably the least bad choice, despite his known failings, the
paper said. The following is the text of the report by Oleksandra
Prymachenko entitled "Birth of a prosecutor-general" published in the
Ukrainian weekly Zerkalo Nedeli on 5 November; subheadings have been
inserted editorially:
In recent days the country has been observing with interest the ordeals, the
distressing heart-searching and doubts out of which the new Ukrainian
prosecutor-general appeared. The political scene, in turn, was sincerely
enjoying itself with the latest twist of the "considered, balanced and
consistent" personnel strategy of the head of state [President Viktor
Yushchenko].
Most of them did not suspect that the president had had second thoughts not
only about the candidacy of the capital's prosecutor, Vasyl Prysyazhnyuk,
for the post of prosecutor-general. Apart from the nomination of him, sent
and recalled, another one was formulated.
As far as is known, on the Friday before last [28 October] a nomination to
parliament had been drawn up of prosecutor-general candidate Volodymyr
Moysyk (the head of the Supreme Council [parliament] Committee for Legal
Provision of Law Enforcement and member of the Ukrainian People's Party
faction).
What could have made the president reconsider his so meticulously developed
decision, if one takes into account how much time has passed since the
dismissal of [former Prosecutor-General Svyatoslav] Piskun? Malicious
tongues assert that the reason was intrigues by Moysyk's former
comrades-in-arms in [pro-presidential party] Our Ukraine.
And the reason for the opposition, of course, is not at all that someone
took seriously the slanders of enemies about the grain and spirit "business"
of the candidate, incompatible with high office.
The reason is far more indicative of our harsh political reality. And it
lies in the contacts of Moysyk, who has long wanted to occupy the
prosecutor-general's chair, with [Yuliya] Tymoshenko during her premiership.
Times change, and today it is far more useful for one's career to be a
Donetsk person [Donetsk is the power-base of opposition leader Viktor
Yanukovych who recently signed a pact with Yushchenko] rather than having
relations with Tymoshenko.
In general, the Kostenko people [members of the Ukrainian People's Party led
by Yuriy Kostenko] were seriously offended because of their candidate and
did not vote for Oleksandr Medvedko as prosecutor-general. Moysyk alone
voted for his lucky rival.
PRESIDENT LEAVES PERSONNEL DECISIONS TO INNER CIRCLE
There is another reason why Moysyk, whose candidacy had been agreed
with the leadership of the Supreme Council by telephone, did not make it
as far as parliament.
The thing is that before presentation to parliament, our president had not
met with any of the three candidates for the post of prosecutor-general
whose names had not simply figured in forecasts, but about whom
documents had been prepared.
No, of course, this is not a breach of the law. But it exhaustively
characterizes the degree of responsibility with which the president
approaches the decision of key personnel questions. Thus Moysyk was
interviewed by the first deputy head of secretariat, Vasyunyk. And the head
of secretariat, [Oleh] Rybachuk, talked with Prysyazhnyuk.
This sort of second level parallel interviewing led to the fact that on
Saturday [29 October], also by agreement with the president, Rybachuk sent
off the documents on Prysyazhnyuk and, according to unverified information,
with the presidential facsimile on the presentation.
However, on the Sunday [30 October] the president spoke with representatives
of his formally exiled entourage. And he was persuaded to change his mind
yet again. He gave his preference to Medvedko, the man who effectively
closed the [corruption] case against [former National Security and Defence
Council Secretary Petro] Poroshenko.
For this reason, there appeared formally the second, but in fact the third
presentation of a prosecutor-general. What is happening is that it is not
the president who is implementing personnel policy in our state, but
Rybachuk, Vasyunyk, Poroshenko or others.
Does Yushchenko realize that it will be he who is really answerable, nobody
else, for candidates formally approved by him?
The president demonstrated his specific attitude to approving candidates for
the most important jobs from the very first days. And so as a result there
was no surprise caused by the appointment of the current SBU [Security
Service of Ukraine] chief, [Ihor] Drizhchanyy, whom the president had seen
prior to that only once it seems, and that at some conference.
One recalls that the former head of the presidential administration,
[Viktor] Medvedchuk, unceremoniously and not without success
endeavouring to control the security structures, had to wrest the natural
habitat of influence from [former] President [Leonid] Kuchma.
And now the "personnel department" in the person of Rybachuk, Vasyunyk
and others simply has to sort out this vital function of the head of state,
since otherwise it may simply remain unfulfilled.
PISKUN UNLIKELY TO GET HIS JOB BACK
The irrepressible Piskun with a serious face is continuing to fight for his
job in court. However, to go into the same office illegally twice is too
much even for our state, which has not yet lost the hope of becoming based
on the rule of law.
Probably the number of votes cast in parliament for Oleksandr Medvedko
(303) shows in particular a lack of belief in the return of Piskun. Mr Piskun,
of course, should realize that even if he does have any slight protection on
this level, then it is only one, and a very puny one at that. It can be
formulated as dismissal while he was on sick leave.
The point is, however, that even if the sick note were dated on the same
day, at the time of his dismissal, as far as is known, Piskun was not on
sick leave. No doubt this aspect will be an object of inquiry for the court.
As for the lack of reason for his dismissal, Piskun is pontificating about
this to the broad public. But the constitution has a provision for the
president's right to dismiss the prosecutor-general.
And it would seem that in this specific case the president does not have to
explain anything to him, no matter how many times you re-read the law about
the prosecutor's office.
In this case it is not a question of labour legislation, but of an office
envisaging constitutional and legal responsibility equally with that of the
prime minister's.
If the president should have explained something to anyone in this
connection, it is the people who bravely froze on the squares of the country
a year ago for the sake of having everything just, transparent and
understandable. But this is a duty of a moral rather than juridical nature.
However, ignoring it leads to the impression being created that seemingly
Piskun's dismissal is actually an exceptional case when Mr Piskun in the
final analysis suffered for the truth (with a certain strained
interpretation, but still). There was a hurry to close the case brought
under him against the president's close friend [Poroshenko] as soon as
Piskun was dismissed.
And if the president had bothered to clarify the situation to the public,
naming at least one of a dozen obvious reasons for dismissing the
prosecutor-general, it is possible that it would have been easier for
someone to brush those suspicions aside.
On the one hand, the president had enough time when thinking ways of getting
rid of Piskun to estimate which of the candidates could suit him and at the
same time be capable of getting parliamentary approval. Of course, the way
the head of state was deciding on candidates for the prosecutor-general is
worthy of a joke. But in fact it was not a simple choice.
REQUIREMENTS FOR NEW CHIEF PROSECUTOR
The authorities desperately needed a new prosecutor-general not associated
with certain political forces, and not odious. Ideally he would be a
professional, sensitive to impulses from above and not elevating his
professional independence to the maximum. There was clearly no suitable
candidate among the public figures that rumour was proposing for the job.
Because each of them had his history, attachments, reputation and business.
It would seem that there are enough prosecutors in the state. But try as
they might they could not find someone who was occupying a most
insignificant post in the system and who was not involved in carrying out
"state" or other orders.
They had to choose someone potentially capable of carrying a huge workload.
A worthy figure was not found among regional prosecutors. Every deputy
prosecutor-general had his baggage from his past professional life.
Considering who there was, they came to the conclusion that Medvedko was
not the worst candidate.
This choice, apart from anything else, also shows the staffing situation in
the prosecutor's office, where the least of the evils is the person who at
one time was personally involved in the infamous investigation of the case
of the murder of [journalist Ihor] Aleksandrov.
Ill-wishers are inclined to ascribe to Medvedko superfluous "services" in
this story. However, it is doubtful whether it was precisely he who was
responsible for the false theory of the investigation that accused [the
tramp Yuriy] Veredyuk, who had nothing to do with the killing.
Nevertheless, being involved in the investigation of the case, he bears
personal responsibility for the fact that in Ukraine the name Veredyuk has
become a common noun. Another complaint against the new prosecutor-general
is the closure of the case concerning Poroshenko by a commission headed by
him. This is as far as high-profile cases are concerned.
It is possible that details of less noisy cases in which he was involved in
his prosecution career will soon become public knowledge.
MEDVEDKO'S BACKGROUND
Fifty-year-old Oleksandr Medvedko has been working in prosecution bodies
since 1980. From 1980 to 2002 he worked in Donetsk Region as senior
assistant prosecutor in Druzhkivka, prosecutor in Kostyantynivka, chief of
directorate for supervision of legality of detection activity, inquests and
preliminary inquiry; then he became the first deputy prosecutor of Luhansk
Region.
Since July 2002 he has been deputy prosecutor-general of Ukraine and a state
justice adviser second class.
So Medvedko's working life has coincided with the period of the formation
and flourishing of the activity of very powerful local groups that shaped
the style of life for this specific region for a long time, a region where
gangs had their own "execution sites" and the police even now from time to
time dig up mass burial sites from those years.
So professional activity from that period provided not so much experience
of combating organized crime as lessons of co-existence.
Piskun, under whom Medvedko joined the PGO, can be considered his
"godfather" to stretch a point. Deputy Prosecutor-General [Serhiy]
Vynokurov advised the prosecutor-general to take a look at Medvedko.
So Medvedko is obliged to him, so far as is known, for his appearance
in Kiev.
This will probably help the new prosecutor-general to be more easily
reconciled to the thought that he will have a particular deputy, a first
deputy, who will deal with not only personnel, but also with strategically
important matters. This argument was paramount in the bargaining with the
Communists over the appointment of the new prosecutor-general.
Medvedko's lack of publicity, which initially seemed to be a shortcoming, in
fact turned out to be a plus for him. A person without expressed political
sympathies and attachments. Potentially not capable of getting stronger (at
least before the coming elections) to such an extent as to be able, like
Piskun, to conduct a game on several chess boards.
However, as far as is known, from his personality characteristics as well,
he does not give cause for serious worries on this score. He will not go
against the president.
From Medvedko's public statements, one may draw the conclusion that he
uses juridical terms appropriately, showing an understanding of them,
unlike many of his predecessors in the job.
The entire prosecution system became a hostage to understandings, as a
result of which Piskun appeared in the prosecutor-general's chair, to the
amazement of many. The prosecution system found itself mothballed for
long months.
This most important organism of state power, in the absence of even
insignificant reform, could have a trial of strength only with the
judiciary.
And even now, in the decision about who would be the best candidate for
the office of prosecutor-general, the most important thing is not the
professionalism of the claimant, rather the confidence that as a minimum he
will not bite the hand that appoints him.
We will see very soon what the prosecutor's office will be like under the
new prosecutor-general and how far he will define the direction of its
activity. One of the first precursors of the emerging tendency will be the
fate of the deputy prosecutors-generals. It is his legal prerogative to
appoint them.
The question is clear regarding his main deputy [Vynokurov], as we
indicated. Let us see whether [Viktor] Kudryavtsev, who astonishes us with
his "liveliness" and whom rumour always linked with Medvedchuk, will keep
his job. Will [Viktor] Shokin keep his job?
They say that Medvedko has raised a glass with him on several occasions,
and that Shokin surprisingly survived the scandal connected with a leak of
information regarding the fugitive general [Oleksiy] Pukach [wanted in
connection with the case of murdered journalist Heorhiy Gongadze].
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
=======================================================
Send in a letter-to-the-editor today. Let us hear from you.
=======================================================
6. UKRAINE: PROCURATOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW
ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY: by Bohdan A. Futey
Zerkalo Nedeli (Mirror-Weekly) No. 43 (571) in Ukrainian
Kyiv, Ukraine, Saturday, November 5-11, 2005
While in Ukraine during one of my frequent visits, I read a newspaper
article which explained that the Procurator General was considering asking
for legislation granting him the authority to protest or appeal the supposed
"illegal" decisions being issued by the courts.
After pondering the ramifications of the Prosecutor General's statements as
well as the numerous constitutional provisions that came to mind, I knew the
Procurator General's statements could not go unanswered and immediately
formulated this response.
A prosecutor in the United States, whether federal or state, is a lawyer
for the executive branch of the government. The relationship between a
prosecutor and the executive is, therefore, one of attorney and client, and
it is essentially the same as the relationship between a lawyer and a
private client.
Just as a private attorney is bound by a judge's decisions, so too are
prosecutors. A State or Federal Attorney General may set policy by focusing
on prosecuting certain types of crimes, but, ultimately, it is the courts
that explain the law.
A prosecutor may advise the legislature on a law that will overturn a
judicial decision that he or she believes to be incorrect, but may not
disobey judicial decisions.
In trials, prosecutors act as advocates for the executive and are treated
as any other attorney; they are not accorded special status in proceedings.
If the government loses a case or a decision is rendered against it, the
prosecutor, whether state or federal, may appeal to the next higher court.
[1]
Once a decision has been made by the highest available court, however, the
prosecutor's remedies are exhausted. Although the executive may draft
legislation that overturns or limits a court's decision, the legislative
body must ultimately vote on any such law before a court decision may be
altered.
In the Federal government, the Attorney General is considered the highest
prosecutor and is also the head of the Department of Justice, essentially
combining the roles of Prosecutor General and Minister of Justice. He is
appointed by the President, but this appointment must be approved by the
Senate. [2]
The Attorney General often sets policy by issuing opinions regarding
various legal issues facing the executive branch and government agencies,
but because he or she is appointed by the President, any initiatives usually
track the President's policies.
The Attorney General serves "at the pleasure of the President" and,
therefore, may be discharged with or without cause. State and city
prosecutors, however, are often elected by the people and, therefore, their
policies may diverge from the executive branch's and they may not be
terminated by the executive. Once elected, elected prosecutors play
essentially the same role as appointed prosecutors.
Unique among the Attorney General's powers is his almost unchecked ability
to exclude people from entering the United States. The Attorney General may
unilaterally exclude those applying to enter the United States if he
believes the alien poses a threat to national security. [3]
A decision to exclude an alien from entering the United States is reviewable
by a court only under a petition for habeas corpus. [4] The reviewing
court, however, will be extremely deferential to the Attorney General and
will merely look at whether the decision was "facially legitimate and bona
fide."[5]
The division of labor in prosecutor offices is often sharply delineated.
In the federal system, there are separate offices for each district (region)
and divisions for criminal and civil prosecutions which are then split into
smaller divisions based on the subject of the case.
For example, the criminal division of an office may have different attorneys
handling robberies, homicides, drug crimes, white collar crimes, and
organized crimes.
In addition, the lawyers that prosecute trials are often not the same ones
that would handle appeals of decisions in those cases. Rather, there are
separate prosecutors that exclusively handle appeals.
Prosecutors also often perform investigative duties. For example, a
prosecutor may attempt to "listen in on" a person or organization's
communications or demand documents from an individual or organization.
This power, however, is also not wholly unchecked. In order to tap an
individual's phone without his or her knowledge or force an organization to
turn over documents, the prosecutor must seek permission from a judge.
Unlike the United States Attorney General, the responsibilities of the
Procurator General are enumerated in the Constitution of Ukraine, which
empowers him or her to:
(1) prosecut[e] in court on behalf of the State; (2) represent[] . . . the
interests of a citizen or . . . the State in court or in cases determined by
law; (3) supervis[e] . . . the observance of laws by bodies that conduct
detective and search activity, inquiry and pre-trial investigation; (4)
supervis[e] . . . the observance of laws in the execution of judicial
decisions in criminal cases, and also in the application of other measures
of coercion related to the restraint of personal liberty of citizens.[6]
While attempting to guarantee that the Office of the Procurator General
would be independent from the legislative, executive and judicial branches
of government, early drafts of the Constitution of Ukraine nevertheless
vested the Procurator General broad executive powers.
While the Constitution still addresses the Procurator General's Office in
its own chapter (Chapter VII), separate from the chapter dealing with the
executive branch (Chapter V), the Constitution includes provisions which
effectively place the Procurator General within the executive branch. [7]
For example, presently, the consent of the Verkhovna Rada is not required
for the dismissal of the Procurator General, only for his or her
appointment.[8]
Given the Ukrainian Constitution's specific enumeration of the Procurator
General's powers and given the Office of the Procurator General's intended
or unintended association with the executive branch, the Procurator
General's recent comments concerning his so-called "oversight" of "illegal"
criminal and civil court decisions are particularly troubling.
Stated another way, the Procurator General and, in turn, the executive
branch, through its apparent control over the Procurator General, are
attempting to implement measures to control the outcome of judicial
adjudications. The mere allusion to such a course of conduct, on its face,
runs directly contrary to several fundamental constitutional principles.
FIRST, Ukraine's Constitution adopts the principle of separation of powers
in Article 6 and establishes legislative, executive and judicial branches.
[9] In order to avoid superordination or subordination of the separate
branches, the Ukrainian Constitution provided each branch with a range of
checks and balances over the other branches.
To properly effectuate the principle of separation of powers, however, the
Constitution requires that the branches of government not only be separate
but also, in my view, coequal.
This proposition presupposes that one branch of government does not exert
undue influence over the other and does not attempt to "oversee" the actions
of the other. Against this backdrop, the Procurator General's statements
cannot be reconciled with the constitutional principle of separation of
powers.
SECOND, the "oversight" of "illegal" decisions reveals an underlying
dissatisfaction with the outcome of selected judicial proceedings and the
statements can only be interpreted as expressing an intention to alter an
undesired result. Plainly stated, "oversight" is a back-handed vehicle by
which to influence judicial decisions.
The Constitution and the laws of Ukraine, however, provide for and guarantee
the independence and immunity of judges.[10] It cannot be disputed that
"[j]ustice in Ukraine is administered exclusively by the courts."[11]
Further, the Constitution of Ukraine explicitly prohibits "[i]nfluencing
judges in any manner . . . ."[12]
This provision is incorporated within Article 14 on the Law "On Judiciary
in Ukraine": "[w]hile administrating justice judges are independent of any
influence, unaccountable to anybody, and subordinated only to the law."
Although the Procurator General is certainly free, within limits, to voice
his disagreement with a court's decision, [13] and such discourse is
strongly encouraged, especially in criminal cases, [14] the "oversight" of
the judiciary as alluded to in the Procurator General's statements goes too
far and cannot under any reading withstand constitutional scrutiny.
In conclusion, statements and actions which are directed toward exercising
undue control over the judicial branch, as opposed to constitutionally
derived checks and balances, should be avoided.
While to some "oversight" of the judiciary could appear to be a viable
solution to the perceived problem of judicial shortcomings, in practice it
contravenes the rule of law and undermines judicial independence.
Whether the so-called control is viewed as positive or negative, it
nevertheless amounts to outside influence, a phenomena which should not
be present in any judicial proceeding.
It is the courts, not the Prosecutor General, that are empowered to decide
legal matters and merits of cases. The Procurator General's remarks were,
therefore, ill-advised and should not form the basis of any credible
judicial reform. [15] -30-
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bohdan A. Futey is a Judge on the U.S. Court of Federal Claims in
Washington, DC, appointed by President Ronald Reagan in May 1987.
Judge Futey has been active in various Rule of Law and Democratization
Programs in Ukraine since 1991. He served as an advisor to the Working
Group on Ukraine's Constitution, adopted June 28, 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FOOTNOTES:
1 If a jury acquits a criminal defendant, however, the government may not
appeal the verdict.
2 U.S. Const. art. II , § 2.
3 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c)
4 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 312 (2001) (citing Eiku v. U.S., 142 U.S.
651, 663 (1892))
5 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769 (1972)
6 Ukr. Const. chap. VII, art. 121.
7 The relationship between the Office of the Procurator General and the
executive branch is not, however, wholly unchecked. In the event the two
entities are perceived to be corroborating in an inappropriate manner,
"[t]he Verkhovna Rada . . . may express no confidence in the Procurator
General . . . [which would] result in his or her resignation [dismissal]
from office." Id. chap. VII, art. 122.
8 Id. chap. VII, art. 122; Id. chap. V, art. 106.11. If the political
compromise goes into effect on January 1, 2006, however, the President
will not be able to dismiss the Procurator General without the consent of
the Parliament.
9 Id. chap. I, art. 6 ("State power in Ukraine is exercised on the
principles of its division into legislative, executive and judicial
power.").
10 Id. chap. VIII, art. 126; see also id. chap. VII, art. 129 ("In the
administration of justice, judges are independent and subject only to the
law.").
11 Id. chap. VIII, art. 124.
12 Id. chap. VIII, art. 126.
13 Id. chap. II, art. 34 ("Everyone is guaranteed the right to freedom of
thought and speech and to the free expression of his or her views and
beliefs.").
14 A distinction needs to be made between criminal and civil cases. While
Article 121 authorizes the Procurator to direct state prosecutions in court
and to oversee the legality of investigative bodies, it simultaneously
restricts the Procurator's power to oversee the observance of laws to
situations involving the enforcement of decisions in criminal cases. The
President, on the other hand, is the "guarantor" of the Constitution, and
has broad oversight over state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and human
rights and freedoms. Id., chap. V, art. 102.
15 It should be noted that in cases involving national security, the Office
of the Procurator General or, in the United States, the Department of
Justice, represents the interest of the state and has a right to appeal an
adverse decision which it believes was rendered incorrectly. While the
decision must be complied with pending resolution on appeal, no one is
contesting the Office of the Procurator General's right to exhaust available
permissive avenues of legal redress. -30-
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
=======================================================
7. GEORGE SOROS SAYS UKRAINE'S BIG TASK IS TO REFORM
THE LEGAL SYSTEM TO FIGHT PERVASIVE CORRUPTION
"Transition from robber capitalism to legitimate capitalism"
Associated Press (AP), Kiev, Ukraine, November 8, 2005 .
KIEV - U.S. billionaire philanthropist George Soros said Tuesday that
Ukraine's next big task must be to reform its judicial system to wipe out
the pervasive corruption that taints most court decisions here.
"It is the absence of a reliable judicial system that has created so many
difficulties in the last year, particularly with regard to property rights,"
Soros told journalists during a visit to the Ukrainian capital, Kiev. He
didn't elaborate.
But the recent breakup of the team that led last year's Orange Revolution
and the dismissal of the Cabinet - which badly hurt the popularity of
President Viktor Yushchenko and his government - occurred amid
allegations that officials were actively supporting competing sides in a
legal dispute over the ownership of a giant steel mill.
"Ukraine faces a very difficult transition from what might be called robber
capitalism to legitimate capitalism," Soros said.
Soros' Renaissance Foundation has earmarked $5.5 million to spend on civil
society projects in Ukraine next year, though he said it wasn't yet clear
how much of that would target judicial reform. "But without it, there can't
be economic progress," Soros said.
The foundation's other goals will be to support the establishment of a
public broadcasting corporation, freedom of speech and efforts to end
corruption at universities.
Acknowledging widespread accusations that his funding and organizations
have helped trigger "color revolutions" in ex-Soviet states, Soros said:
"Actually, I am not in favor of revolutions in spite of what some people
might be saying about me."
He called revolutions a symptom of "a lack of democracy and deficit in
democratic institutions." "A revolution doesn't actually make up for that
deficit," he said, noting, however that it does "create an opportunity," for
progress, which attracts civil society foundations such as his.
Yushchenko has also said that court reform is a key priority, calling last
week for judges to receive a big increase in salaries to discourage
bribe-taking. -30-
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
=======================================================
Send in names and e-mail addresses for the AUR distribution list.
========================================================
8. NATIONAL SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA OF UKRAINE TO PERFORM
ROZHKO'S WORKS IN ROYAL CONSERVATORY IN BRUSSELS
New Europe, Athens, Greece, Monday, November 7, 2005
BRUSSELS - On November 22, 2005 the concert of Ukrainian composer
Nataliya Rozhko "PER ASPERA." and National Symphony Orchestra of
Ukraine, Artistic Director and Chief Conductor Volodymyr Sirenko, will
be held in Grand Hall of the Royal Conservatory of Brussels, Belgium.
The concert is organised by the Mission of Ukraine to the EU under the
patronage of Mrs. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for
External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy. The General
Sponsor of the Concert is the Indutrialniy Soyuz "Donbass", Ukraine
(Industrial Union "Donbass").
The National Symphony Orchestra of Ukraine was founded in 1918. Among
the head conductors of the Orchestra since its creation were such famous
musicians as Olexander Horily, Stefan Turchak, Volodymyr Kozhukhar, Fedir
Gluschenko and Ihor Blazhkov.
The Orchestra has welcomed such renowned conductors as Kurt Zanderling,
Leopold Stokovsky, Kyrylo Kondrashyn, Yevhen Mravinsky, Yevhen Svitlanov,
Kostyantyn Simeonov and Henady Rozhdestvensky, as well as soloist Arthur
Rubinstein, Issac Stern, Montserrat Caballe, Jose Carreras, David Oystrakh,
Svyatoslav Richter, Mstislav Rostropovich, Gidon Kremer and many others.
Today`s conductor of the Orchestra Volodymyr Sirenko is an Honoured Artist
of Ukraine (1997) and the Russian Federation (2003), and winner of the most
prestigious Ukrainian award, the Taras Shevchenko National Prize (2001).
Volodymyr Sirenko has performed often in Russia, USA, South Korea, France,
Italy, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Belgium
and UK.
As a visiting conductor, he worked in particular with the Symphony Orchestra
of St. Peterburg, Moscow Philharmonic Orchestra, Simfonia Varsovia (Warsaw),
Bratislava Radio Symphony Orchestra and the Royal Philharmonic Orchestra
(London).
Author of the Concert is a modern Ukrainian composer and pianist Nataliya
Rozhko, member of the National Association of Composers of Ukraine.
Nataliya Rozhko`s music is performed by distinguished groups at festivals,
competitions and concerts both in Ukraine and abroad. It impresses by
combining the simplicity of its emotional expression and its deep and
complex meaning. -30-
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
=======================================================
Send in names and e-mail addresses for the AUR distribution list.
=======================================================
9. DEAD AND BURIED WAR HERO CLAIMS MEDAL 60 YEARS ON
For liberating Ukraine from Nazi occupation during WWII
Tom Parfitt in Moscow, The Observer
London, UK, Sunday November 6, 2005
It was only by chance that Georgy Ponomarev found out he was dead.
There had been rumours. Talk of his name on a war memorial on a faraway
hilltop. But it was not until the 81-year-old's friend was awarded a 60th
anniversary medal this year - for liberating Ukraine from Nazi occupation
during the Second World War - that the truth came out.
Georgy, a former Red Army infantryman from the southern Russian city of
Stavropol, fancied a medal too for his part in pushing the 'Hitlerovtsi'
out. Yet when he called the Ukrainian military commissariat, the official
said: 'You can't have it. You died in 1943.'
Only now has Georgy been able to get a court decision proving he is very
much alive. Next week he will get his medal. Behind the mix-up is a tale of
survival that has turned Georgy into a minor celebrity.
It was winter 1943 when the teenage sergeant led his platoon of nine in a
desperate attack on a German bunker near the Ukrainian village of Sofievka.
They crept up with their grenades but came under fire, and a shell exploded
next to Georgy as he and his men retreated, the shock wave catapulting him
into the air.
When he regained consciousness hours later, all was dark and a great weight
pressed down on his body. Fighting for breath, Georgy realised the full
horror of the situation: he was underground. 'My right hand was hit by
shrapnel and didn't work, but I could move my left and I began to claw the
earth away,' he recalls.
Luckily, the soil was dry and crumbly. 'I wanted to live; the instinct was
strong. I was about a metre deep. Finally, I made a hole and got my head
out, then my torso.' Deafened and lost, he stumbled into enemy territory and
a German patrol found him.
Only at the end of the war did he find out what had happened. Georgy had
imagined he was covered by debris from the shell. By chance, he ran into an
old comrade from his platoon, Aleksei Chuykov. 'Don't you recognise me?'
Georgy remembers asking him. Chuykov went white: 'My God, I buried you
myself.'
It transpired that, under fire, Georgy's comrades had presumed him dead and
buried him with several comrades, in the crater where he fell. As the senior
soldier of the group, he was laid on top of the pile of corpses.
Escape from an early grave was not the final horror of Georgy's war. After
capture he was sent to Germany by train. En route he escaped, but was
recaptured and sent to Auschwitz. There his weight dropped to 35kg and he
only survived because a friend in the kitchens slipped him extra portions of
turnip soup.
Back home after the war, his amazed family showed him the letter that stated
he was dead. Georgy later married, had children and worked as an engineer.
Only this year did things come to a head. When Georgy applied for the
veterans' medal promised by the Ukrainian president, Viktor Yushchenko, the
bureaucrats replied: 'If you're alive, prove it.'
Now bed-ridden, Georgy requested a court hearing at his home to confirm his
identity. 'All his documents and witness statements allowed us to confirm he
was the same man who "died" there,' said Stanislav Saneev, the judge at the
hearing.
Georgy has invited court officials to attend a dinner where he will wash his
medal in vodka, according to tradition. He reserves the greatest thanks for
the man who buried him alive.
'Stalin had given an order to remove warm clothes from all corpses. But
Chuykov left me in my padded jacket and my hat. Without them I would
have frozen to death.' -30-
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,6903,1635436,00.html
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
10. UKRAINIAN SOCIETY "PROSVITA" TO LAUNCH NEW PROJECT,
AIMED AT DEVELOPING UKRAINIAN NATIONAL CULTURE
Yaroslav Dovhopol, Ukrinform, Kyiv, Ukraine, Tue, November 8, 2005
KYIV - The Ukrainian society "Prosvita" will launch an art project, within
the framework of which a series of cinema, animation and musical works,
aimed at developing national culture and popularizing the Ukrainian language
are supposed to come out, President of the "Prosvita", peoples' deputy Pavlo
Movchan said on Monday.
According to him, the noval project is a selection of new films of Ukrainian
artists including "Brotherhood", "Logos", animations, "Kobzar" CD and
cassettes and CDs with "Ukrainian Collection. Ethnic Music of Ukraine".
Pavlo Movchan noted that this project will be funded by the society.
According to him, the project will promote popularization of the Ukrainian
language and culture among Ukrainians. It also enables to see pearls of the
Ukrainian folk arts in a new national format.
According to an outstanding producer and journalist Volodymyr Kvetyk, who
is a co-author of the project, such works as "Lys Mykyta" and "Taras Bulba"
deserve a certain attention. "Taras Bulba" will be also presented abroad.
The project will be presented at the Central House of Officers within the
framework of the literature-artistic evening, dedicated to Day of the
Ukrainian language. -30-
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
11. WINNERS AND LOSERS IN KREMLIN'S GRAB FOR OIL
COMMENT & ANALYSIS: By Arkady Ostrovsky
Financial Times, London, UK, Sunday, November 6 2005
Russia's two best-known oligarchs have just got their rewards. Roman
Abramovich was last month paid $13bn by Gazprom, the state gas monopoly,
forSibneft, an oil company that the publicity-shy billionaire had controlled
with a group of unnamed partners.
In the week the money landed in Mr Abramovich's offshore bank account,
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, formerly the main shareholder in Yukos, once the
largest oil company in Russia, arrived in Chita - one of the most remote and
harsh Siberian prison camps.
Just over two years ago, the two men planned to create one of the largest
oil groups in the world. As a result of the biggest merger in Russian
history, Yukos and Sibneft would have accounted for almost a third of
Russia's total output. A significant part of the new company was to be
sold to ExxonMobil or ChevronTexaco.
But the Kremlin turned the tables. Today, it controls most of Yukos and
Sibneft while Mr Khodorkovsky serves an eight-year sentence for fraud
and tax evasion.
In the past two years the most important sector of Russian economy - oil and
gas - has undergone the most fundamental changes since the mid-1990s
privatisation responsible for the creation of the country's powerful
oligarchs. Oil assets that were privatised at knockdown prices are moving
back under state control.
The new order in the energy sector was achieved principally through three
deals. First, the government dismantled Yukos and through a series of
legally dubious machinations sold the largest part of it to Rosneft, the
state oil company run by people close to the Kremlin.
Second, it spent $7.5bn on increasing its stake in Gazprom, Russia's largest
company, to 51 per cent. Third, it allowed Gazprom to buy Sibneft, the
country's fifth-biggest oil company, in the largest deal in Russian
corporate history.
The result: the state has majority control of Gazprom, which last year
produced 20 per cent of the world's gas. It has tripled the size of Rosneft
and directly controls 30 per cent of Russian oil output. In addition, the
state controls oil and gas infrastructure.
Given Russia's dependence on natural resources - energy accounts for 40
per cent of gross domestic product - these changes, together with tighter
restrictions on foreign ownership of resources, have enormous and
potentially negative implications for Russia's economy.
But it is not just a domestic issue. Russia is the world's second largest
producer of oil, after Saudi Arabia, and the biggest exporter of natural
gas. Russia supplies 30 per cent of all oil demand in Europe and a quarter
of its gas. Any fluctuation in Russian oil production has an impact on world
oil prices.
Roger Munnings, chairman of KPMG's global energy and natural resources
unit, says: "These hydrocarbons are of significant importance to the world's
economic development.
Being a reliable partner in the supply of energy is seen by Russia as one
tool for re-establishing its geopolitical importance and, thereby, national
pride. The fact that Russia wants to have control over strategic assets is
entirely understandable."
Russia is particularly keen to show its importance to the world as it
prepares to take over the rotating presidency of the Group of Eight leading
industrial nations next year. Moscow has chosen to put energy security at
the top of its agenda and is currently trying to flesh it out.
"Russia has looked at Saudi Arabia and decided that it likes the model.
Nobody criticises the Saudis - they are too important as a supplier," says
Christopher Weafer, chief strategist at Alfa Bank, Russia's largest private
bank.
So who are the winners and losers in the growing state presence in energy?
Foreign companies have never had a particularly easy ride in the Russian oil
sector, but conditions are becoming tougher, if also clearer, for them.
When BP bought a 50 per cent stake two years ago in TNK, a Russian oil
company, it was supposed to pave the way for more foreign investment in the
sector.
Two years on, the 50/50 partnership remains an exception rather than the
rule. Last year ConocoPhillips was allowed to buy an 8 per cent stake in
Lukoil. It has the right to increase its holding, but only to 20 per cent.
Moreover, Moscow is about to introduce restrictions on foreign companies'
rights to explore oil and gas fields that the government considers
"strategic". Under a proposed subsoil law no company with foreign
participation of over 50 per cent would be allowed to bid for a field which
has more than 1bn barrels of reserves or is situated near sensitive defence
sites.
Earlier this year the government cancelled the auction for two large fields
to prevent TNK-BP from bidding for them. These fields - Trebs and Titov -
have now been deemed "strategic" and potentially out of reach for TNK-BP.
The joint venture also has foreign minority investors who could tip the
total foreign holding in the company over 50 per cent.
Yuri Trutnev, Russia's natural resources minister, says that if that is the
case, TNK-BP would be allowed to bid for new licences only by forming a
joint venture with a Russian company.
Given the size of the projects and the scale of investment they require, it
is unlikely that Russian companies could go it alone. They could invite
foreign companies in as partners but one thing is almost certain: any
foreign participation will limited to a minority stake and will be on
Russian terms.
"In the past, Russian oil companies were squeezed in terms of their
financial capabilities and their technology. But times have changed. Today,
Russia companies have the same access to capital markets and can buy the
best western technology.
They are happy to bring in foreign companies to reduce risks, but on their
terms," says Sergei Oganesyan, head of the Russian federal energy agency.
The same rules apply to the gas sector. "If you have a gas project, you have
to work a deal with Gazprom for access to the pipeline. Otherwise you will
end up with a very bright gas flare and a very uncommercial project" says Mr
Weafer.
TNK-BP is a case in point. It has a licence to develop the giant Kovykta gas
field but the $15bn project depends entirely on Gazprom's participation.
Gazprom demanded that it should have a majority stake in a joint venture
with TNK-BP and be in charge of exporting gas from the site. TNK-BP had
little choice but to agree.
Even so, Gazprom, which has other priorities, has put the project on the
back burner. "Even though Gazprom does not have a licence for this field, it
treats it as one of its own," says one person familiar with the situation.
Foreign companies are not the only ones concerned about the state companies
muscling in. The few remaining private Russian oil companies are equally
worried.
"If a chairman of a state company calls someone powerful before the auction
saying this licence should go to his company, it will have a very distorting
impact on the market," one oil company executive says.
Given Russia's recent history of applying administrative pressure on private
companies, this fear is real. Mr Weafer says: "The Russian state will be a
direct competitor for the licences it itself awards."
Moreover, economists say apart from distorting competition, the growing
state presence in the oil sector could damage the Russian economy.
Andrei Illarionov, the outspoken economic adviser to Mr Putin, has warned
that Russia is repeating the mistakes Venezuela made in the late 1950s when
it nationalised its oil and gas industry and as a result suffered a steady
decline in its per-capita gross domestic product. The evidence in Russia is
so far not encouraging.
The growth in Russian oil output and investment - one of the main
contributors to the country's economic expansion over the past five years -
has already been affected. After five years of increasing on average at 9
per cent a year, oil production growth started to slow over the past year
and is likely to drop to below 3 per cent.
Vladimir Milov, head of the Energy Policy Institute, an independent
think-tank, says the growth of oil production in Russia is being held back
by various forms of administrative pressure.
He argues that the punitive tax system, where the state skims almost all
revenues over $25 a barrel, and a shortage of pipelines renders the
much-needed development of new fields senseless.
Most of Russia's growth in oil over the past five years was driven by
private companies. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development estimates that Russia's private oil companies directly accounted
for between one-fifth and one-quarter of gross domestic product growth in
2000-03.
The contribution of state-controlled oil companies was negligible. "It is
unlikely that Russia's private oil companies could have achieved the growth
of the last few years if they had remained under state control," the OECD
concluded.
Mr Illarionov says the latest action by the government causes a
redistribution of resources from efficient owners such as Yukos in favor of
less efficient ones. Gazprom, for all its size, remains one of the least
efficient companies. Last year its staff costs went up by more than 30 per
cent, while its net revenues increased only by 24.2 per cent.
Gazprom's market capitalisation per barrel of reserves is one of the lowest
in the industry. Rosneft's average annual production from 2000 to 2004
increased only by 3 per cent, compared with 26 per cent growth at Sibneft.
Both Gazprom and Rosneft have a lower return on total assets than Russian
and most international peers.
But if neither foreign companies nor the Russian economy benefit from recent
changes in the energy sector, who does? Some observers say that the latest
changes in the oil industry have been driven by something less high-minded
than the interests of the state.
Mr Milov says: "It is laughable to talk about nationalisation of the oil
industry. A nationalisation is the transfer of private property into public
ownership. What we are seeing is the transfer of assets from the state to
people close to the Kremlin."
Rosneft, one of the least transparent companies, is chaired by Igor Sechin,
a deputy head of the Kremlin administration and widely believed to be behind
the attack on Yukos and Mr Khodorkovsky. The chairman of Gazprom is
Dmitry Medvedev, Mr Putin's chief of staff.
Some suspect that Mr Putin himself might fancy a job at the helm of Gazprom
once his second and, according to the constitution, final presidential term
ends in 2008. "We are seeing the birth of a new oligarchy in Russia. The old
oligarchs simply had political connections in the Kremlin. The new ones are
actually in the Kremlin," Mr Milov says.
Mr Putin rejects this view. In a recent meeting with foreign journalists, he
argued that there was nothing unusual in the fact that a member of the
presidential administration sits on the board of a state-controlled company.
"It is a usual practice. It does not lead to personal wealth. They don't get
shares in the company. They only represent the interest of the state," Mr
Putin said.
However, some Russian observers say a partial privatisation of a state-owned
company could create a mechanism that would turn a state-employed manager
into a shareholder of a company. Rosneft has announced its plans to offer 49
per cent of its shares in an initial public offering - a move that seemingly
contradicts the general trend towards greater state control over strategic
part of the economy.
"An IPO is a way of creating liquid shares that would allow the managers [of
Rosneft] to legitimise their ownership," says one powerful Russian
businessman. "Over the next few years we shall witness a smooth transition
of assets from private businessmen into semi-state ownership and back into
private hands - but different ones. They need to do this fast, before the
2008 presidential elections, and it is race against time," he adds.
This may help to explain why the management of Rosneft fought so strongly
against being integrated into Gazprom - a deal that was approved by Mr
Putin. Alexei Miller, the chief executive of Gazprom, told the Financial
Times in March: "The final decision has been taken.
The merger will be completed by July." But after last-minute lobbying by the
management of Rosneft, the deal fell apart and Rosneft won its autonomy from
Gazprom.
"The merger would have deprived Mr [Sergei] Bogdanchikov [chief executive of
Rosneft] of any real decision-making power or control over the cash flow of
Rosneft. It would have turned him into a hired manager," says an investment
banker familiar with the terms of the original deal.
Analysts also question the logic of the government paying $7.5bn to Gazprom
in order to increase its stake in the monopoly from 39 per cent to 51 per
cent.
The official line is that moving to majority control was a necessary step
before an imminent lifting of restrictions on foreign ownership of Gazprom's
shares (currently, foreign investors are allowed to buy only Gazprom's
American depository receipts, which are more expensive).
But many observers say this reasoning does not stand up to scrutiny. "The
new shares don't give the government any extra control compared to what it
already had," one investment banker says.
The additional shares the government bought with the $7.5bn were previously
held by Gazprom as treasury stock. "The only way in which the government
could have lost control over these shares is if the management, which is
appointed by the government, stole them," says Mr Milov.
The government's payment for Gazprom's shares is due to land on Christmas
day. Gazprom has already spent the money on buying Sibneft from Millhouse
Capital, a London-based investment fund controlled by Mr Abramovich. The
deal has been hailed by the government as a model of transparency and market
principles.
Yet the full beneficial ownership of Millhouse Capital or Sibneft has never
been disclosed. Sibneft says the company is controlled by Mr Abramovich and
his partners. What is clear, however, is that so far, Mr Abramovich and
those unnamed partners are the only direct beneficiaries of the government's
increasing role in the energy sector. There soon could be others.
WEAK INVESTMENT LEADS TO LOWER OUTPUT GROWTH
Just two weeks after being sold to Gazprom for $13bn, Sibneft warned that
its oil production this year would fall by 5 per cent.
Output at what remains of Yukos was down 22.5 per cent in the first nine
months. Despite high world crude prices, Russia's annual growth in oil
production has fallen to about 3 per cent - one-third of the annual level
achieved in the previous five years.
Excluding Yukos and Sibneft, Russian oil production grew by 6.3 per cent in
the first seven months of the year, says Steven Dashevsky, oil and gas
analyst at Aton Capital, a Moscow-based stockbroker.
Even if Gazprom and Rosneft manage to stabilise production at their newly
acquired companies, the overall growth rate is unlikely to reach previous
levels.
The main reason, say industry insiders, is that most of the growth was
achieved by private oil companies skimming off oil that is relatively easy
and cheap to extract but not developing new fields. Most Russian oil
production is still concentrated in western Siberia, from operations brought
on stream in the Soviet era.
Vagit Alekperov, the head of Lukoil, Russia's largest oil company, says not
a single large oil field has been discovered in the past seven years to
compensate for the falling production levels in older locations.
"Russia's natural resource base is in a dreadful state," he wrote recently
in Izvestia newspaper, with companies replacing only about 85 per cent of
reserves they produce.
Vladimir Milov, head of the country's independent Energy Policy Institute,
says there is enormous potential for new reserves in western Siberia, while
eastern Siberia remains almost completely untapped.
One factor constraining the development of new fields is a lack of
pipelines. Two years ago, companies including Yukos and Sibneft offered to
build a private pipeline that would have carried oil from western Siberia to
the deep-sea port of Murmansk for onward shipment in tankers to the US.
According to Mr Milov, the project was shelved.
Chris Weafer, chief strategist for Alfa Bank, says the pipeline to Murmansk
was a big element in the Russia-US energy dialogue that stalled after the
arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the then owner of Yukos who had lobbied
strongly for the pipeline to be built.
Instead, Russia concentrated on an eastern route and, after years of
deliberation, has decided to build a pipeline from Angarsk, near Lake
Baikal, to Daqing in China. The pipeline was initially supposed to go to
Japan. But Vladimir Putin, Russia's president, has recently told foreign
analysts that it would only later be extended to Japan.
Some doubt whether the second leg will be built. Analysts say a large loan
from China - which is believed to have helped Rosneft pay for
Yuganksneftegas, the former Yukos unit - probably played a role in deciding
the route.
Mr Weafer argues that the creation of Rosneft as a national company and
Gazprom's move into oil business may speed things up both in terms of
pipelines and auctions for new licences.
"One of the reason we are now seeing progress in long outstanding issues,
such as the award of licences, is that the state now has the vehicles by
which it itself can take a dominant role in those licences." -30-
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
12. UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT APPROVES MAKEUP OF
JOINT COMMISSION WITH PUTIN
Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian 1227 gmt 5 Nov 05
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Sat, November 5, 2005
KIEV - Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko has signed a decree approving
the make-up of the Ukrainian part of the Ukrainian-Russian interstate
commission, which was set up following an agreement between the presidents
of the two countries [Viktor Yushchenko and Vladimir Putin] on 8 May 2005.
Yushchenko also approved the make-up of the Ukrainian part of the committee
for economic cooperation of this commission and the subcommittee for the
Russian Black Sea Fleet and its deployment in Ukraine.
In particular, the Ukrainian part of the Ukrainian-Russian interstate
commission includes Yushchenko, Prime Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov, Defence
Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko, Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk, Minister of
Education and Science Stanislav Nikolayenko, National Security and Defence
Council Secretary Anatoliy Kinakh and also First Deputy Foreign Minister
Volodymyr Ohryzko.
The Ukrainian part of the committee for economic cooperation of the
commission is led by Yekhanurov. The committee also includes the ministers
of economics, agricultural policy, transport and communications, fuel and
energy and industrial policy.
It also includes some deputy ministers, the director-general of the National
Space Agency of Ukraine, the first deputy head of the State Property Fund
and a representative of the Ukrainian embassy in Russia.
The Ukrainian part of the subcommittee for security is led by Hrytsenko. It
also includes the director-general of the [Ukrspetseksport] state company
for the import and export of military and special-purpose goods and
services, Serhiy Bondarchuk, and presidential adviser Volodymyr Horbulin.
The Ukrainian part of the subcommittee for international cooperation, which
is headed by Tarasyuk, is made up of his deputies, Foreign Ministry
representatives and the deputy secretary of the National Security and
Defence Council, Serhiy Pyrozhkov.
The Ukrainian part of the subcommittee for the Russian Black Sea Fleet is
headed by Ohryzko.
It is made up of First Deputy Defence Minister Leonid Polyakov;
representatives of the Foreign Ministry and the SBU [Security Service of
Ukraine]; the deputy head of the state committee for construction and
architecture, Oleksandr Bondarenko; Sevastopol prosecutor Volodymyr
Dereza; the commander of the Ukrainian navy, Ihor Knyaz; the deputy head
of the State Property Fund, Svitlana Ledomska, and also of representatives
of the Sevastopol state city administration, the State Border Service, the
State Customs Service, the ministries of finance, justice and environmental
protection and the Derzhhidrohrafiya state hydrographic institution. -30-
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Systems
========================================================
Send in names and e-mail addresses for the AUR distribution list.
========================================================
"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT - AUR"
An Agent Of Change
A Free, Not-for-profit, Independent, Public Service Newsletter
ARTICLES ARE FOR PERSONAL AND ACADEMIC USE ONLY
Articles are Distributed For Information, Research, Education
Discussion and Personal Purposes Only
=====================================================
NOTE: The new book, " Day and Eternity of James Mace"
published by The Day in Kyiv, in English or in Ukrainian, is available
from the www.ArtUkraine.com Information Service. If you are
interesting in finding out how to order the new book please send an
e-mail to ArtUkraine.com@starpower.net. EDITOR
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOTE: The Ukrainian Federation of America (UFA) will be assisting
in the famine/holodomor/genocide commemorations in Kyiv during
November of this year. The Federation needs to raise several thousand
dollars for expenses related to the Holodomor Exhibition to be held in
the Ukrainian House. Donations can be made out to the Ukrainian
Federation of America and sent to the Federation at 930 Henrietta
Avenue, Huntingdon Valley, PA 19006. Please designate your donation
for the Dr. James Mace Memorial Holodomor Fund. EDITOR
=======================================================
UKRAINE INFORMATION WEBSITE: http://www.ArtUkraine.com
=====================================================
SigmaBleyzer/Bleyzer Foundation Economic Reports
"SigmaBleyzer - Where Opportunities Emerge"
The SigmaBleyzer Private Equity Investment Group offers a comprehensive
collection of documents, reports and presentations presented by its business
units and organizations. All downloads are grouped by categories:
Marketing; Economic Country Reports; Presentations; Ukrainian Equity Guide;
Monthly Macroeconomic Situation Reports (Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine).
LINK: http://www.sigmableyzer.com/index.php?action=downloads
You can be on an e-mail distribution list to receive automatically, on a
monthly basis, any or all of the Macroeconomic Situation Reports (Romania,
Bulgaria, Ukraine) by sending an e-mail to mwilliams@SigmaBleyzer.com.
"UKRAINE - A COUNTY OF NEW OPPORTUNITIES"
=======================================================
"WELCOME TO UKRAINE" &
"NARODNE MYSTETSTVO" MAGAZINES
UKRAINIAN MAGAZINES: For information on how to subscribe to the
"Welcome to Ukraine" magazine in English, published four times a year
and/or to the Ukrainian Folk Art magazine "Narodne Mystetstvo" in
Ukrainian, published two times a year, please send an e-mail to:
ArtUkraine.com@starpower.net.
=======================================================
"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT- AUR" - SPONSORS
"Working to Secure & Enhance Ukraine's Democratic Future"
1. THE BLEYZER FOUNDATION, Dr. Edilberto Segura, Chairman;
Victor Gekker, Executive Director, Kyiv, Ukraine; Washington, D.C.,
http://www.bleyzerfoundation.com.
Additional supporting sponsors for the Action Ukraine Report (AUR) are:
2. UKRAINIAN FEDERATION OF AMERICA (UFA), Zenia Chernyk,
Chairperson; Vera M. Andryczyk, President; Huntingdon Valley,
Pennsylvania
3. KIEV-ATLANTIC GROUP, David and Tamara Sweere, Daniel
Sweere, Kyiv and Myronivka, Ukraine, 380 44 298 7275 in Kyiv,
kau@ukrnet.net
4. ESTRON CORPORATION, Grain Export Terminal Facility &
Oilseed Crushing Plant, Ilvichevsk, Ukraine
5. Law firm UKRAINIAN LEGAL GROUP, Irina Paliashvili, President;
Kiev and Washington, general@rulg.com, www.rulg.com.
6. BAHRIANY FOUNDATION, INC., Dr. Anatol Lysyj, Chairman,
Minneapolis, Minnesota
7. VOLIA SOFTWARE, Software to Fit Your Business, Source your
IT work in Ukraine. Contact: Yuriy Sivitsky, Vice President, Marketing,
Kyiv, Ukraine, yuriy.sivitsky@softline.kiev.ua; Volia Software website:
http://www.volia-software.com/ or Bill Hunter, CEO Volia Software,
Houston, TX 77024; bill.hunter@volia-software.com.
8. ODUM- Association of American Youth of Ukrainian Descent,
Minnesota Chapter, Natalia Yarr, Chairperson
9. UKRAINE-U.S. BUSINESS COUNCIL, Washington, D.C.,
Dr. Susanne Lotarski, President/CEO; E. Morgan Williams,
SigmaBleyzer, Chairman, Executive Committee, Board of Directors;
John Stephens, Cape Point Capital, Secretary/Treasurer
10. UKRAINIAN AMERICAN COORDINATING COUNCIL (UACC),
Ihor Gawdiak, President, Washington, D.C., New York, New York
11. U.S.-UKRAINE FOUNDATION (USUF), Nadia Komarnyckyj
McConnell, President; John Kun, Vice President/COO; Vera
Andruskiw, CPP Wash Project Director, Washington, D.C.; Markian
Bilynskyj, VP/Director of Field Operations; Marta Kolomayets, CPP
Kyiv Project Director, Kyiv, Ukraine. Web: http://www.USUkraine.org
12. WJ Grain, Kyiv, Ukraine, David Holpert, Chief Financial Officer,
Chicago, Illinois.
=====================================================
"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT - AUR" is an in-depth, private,
independent, not-for- profit news and analysis international newsletter,
produced as a free public service by the non-profit www.ArtUkraine.com
Information Service (ARTUIS) and The Action Ukraine Report Monitoring
Service The report is distributed in the public's interesting around the
world FREE of charge. Additional readers are always welcome.
TO GET ON OR OFF THE DISTRIBUTION LIST
If you would like to read "THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT- AUR"
please send your name, country of residence, and e-mail contact
information to morganw@patriot.net. Additional names are welcome. If
you do not wish to read "THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT" around
five times per week, let us know by e-mail to morganw@patriot.net. If
you are receiving more than one copy please contact us and again please
contact us immediately if you do not wish to receive this Report.
===================================================
PUBLISHER AND EDITOR - AUR
Mr. E. Morgan Williams, Director, Government Affairs
Washington Office, SigmaBleyzer Private Equity Investment Group
P.O. Box 2607, Washington, D.C. 20013, Tel: 202 437 4707
Mobile in Kyiv: 8 050 689 2874
mwilliams@SigmaBleyzer.com; www.SigmaBleyzer.com
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Director, Ukrainian Federation of America (UFA)
Coordinator, Action Ukraine Coalition (AUC)
Senior Advisor, U.S.-Ukraine Foundation (USUF)
Chairman, Executive Committee, Ukraine-U.S. Business Council
Publisher, Ukraine Information Website, www.ArtUkraine.com
Member, International Ukrainian Holodomor Committee
=====================================================
Power Corrupts and Absolute Power Corrupts Absolutely.
=====================================================
return to index
=====================================================