"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT - AUR"
An International Newsletter, The Latest, Up-To-Date
In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis and Commentary
"Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion,
Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World"
ON THIS DAY - ONE YEAR AGO - DECEMBER 27, 2004
VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO WINS UKRAINE ELECTION RE-RUN
"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT - AUR" - Number 626
Mr. E. Morgan Williams, Publisher and Editor
Washington, D.C., TUESDAY, DECEMBER 27, 2005
--------INDEX OF ARTICLES--------
1. AFTER UKRAINE, THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK
LEAD EDITORIAL COMMENT: Financial Times
London, United Kingdom, Tuesday, December 27 2005
2. ON THIS DAY- ONE YEAR AGO - MON, DECEMBER 27, 2004:
YUSHCHENKO WINS UKRAINE ELECTION RE-RUN
BBC NEWS, UK, Monday, December 27, 2004
3. DEMOCRACY'S HIGH PRICE
EDITORIAL: The Washington Post,
Washington, D.C., Sat, Dec 24, 2005, Page A16
4. FIRST CRACKS IN THE ARMOUR OF KREMLIN'S SPIN DOCTORS
COMMENTARY: Ukrayinska Pravda, Kyiv, Ukraine, Mon, Dec 19, 2005
5. POST-SOVIET VOTING, AND DOGGING THE WATCHDOGS
Letter From Moscow: By C. J. Chivers
The New York Times, NY, NY, Wednesday, December 14, 2005
6."CORRUPTION STEALS THE FUTURE FROM EVERY INDIVIDUAL"
Georgian president talks up new democracy forum in Ukraine
INTERVIEW: with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili
By Volodymyr Skachko, Kiyevskiy Telegraf, Kiev, Russian, 9 Dec 05, p 1,5
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Monday, Dec 12, 2005
7. USAID TO PUSH DEMOCRATISATION AGENDA
By Edward Alden in Washington, Financial Times
London, United Kingdom, Friday, December 23 2005
8. IN A YEAR OF ACHIEVEMENT,
POLITICS AND PENSIONS TO THE FORE
Junichiro Koizumi, Japan; Viktor Yushchenko, Ukraine; Adair Turner, UK
By Brian Groom, Nicholas Timmins and Stefan Wagstyl
Financial Times, London, UK, Friday, December 23 2005
9. STUCK IN THE USSR
Russian foreign policy mere continuation of the Soviet foreign policy.
COMMENTARY: Kirill Rogov, Deputy Editor-In-Chief
Kommersant, Moscow, Russia, Monday, Dec 26, 2005
10. "BALANCE OF GAINS AND LOSSES"
Russia finds it hard to forgive Poles for their involvement in Ukraine
By Mieczyslaw Ryba, Polish Newspaper Nasz Dziennik website
Warsaw, Poland, in Polish Thursday, 8 Dec 05
BBC Monitoring Service,. UK, in English, Monday, Dec 12, 2005
11. UKRAINE'S DANCE OF THE OLIGARCHS
By Judy Dempsey, International Herald Tribune (IHT)
Published by The New York Times,
Neuilly Cedex, France, Friday, December 23, 2005
12. THE ORANGE REVOLUTION: A YEAR AFTER
PANEL: The Orange Revolution: A Year After
Paula Dobriansky, Taras Kuzio, Anders Aslund
American Enterprise Institute (AEI), Wash, D.C., Dec 2005
13. FLAWS OF MENTALITY
ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By Sergiy Sorkoa
Ukrayinska Pravda, Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, December 26, 2005
14. WHAT ARE THE RUSSIANS BUYING?
OP-ED: By Anne Applebaum, The Washington Post
Washington, D.C., Wednesday, December 14, 2005; A29
15. A RUSSIA-UKRAINE GAME OF CHICKEN
NEWS ANALYSIS: By Judy Dempsey
International Herald Tribune, Europe, Friday, December 16, 2005
16. WE ARE TOGETHER, WE ARE MANY, LET'S HELP!
Ukrayinska Pravda, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wed, December 21, 2005
17. PROVIDE DIRECT ASSISTANCE TO IMPOVERISHED UKRAINIAN
ELDERLY THROUGH AMERICAN FRIENDS OF "FOR SURVIVAL"
Make A Difference: For Survival, For Dignity, For Ukraine
Katie Fox, Volunteer Director, American Friends of "For Survival"
Washington, D.C., Wednesday, December 21, 2005
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1. AFTER UKRAINE, THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK
LEAD EDITORIAL COMMENT: Financial Times
London, United Kingdom, Tuesday, December 27 2005
When President Viktor Yushchenko took power in Ukraine's Orange
Revolution a year ago he forecast the revolt would encourage democracy
across the former Soviet Union.
Twelve months later, his prediction rings a bit hollow. The year that began
with Mr Yushchenko's triumph has ended with the success of Nursultan
Nazarbayev, the authoritarian president of Kazakhstan, who earlier this
month won his third presidential election with 91 per cent of the vote. His
victory was welcomed by the region's other authoritarian leaders, notably
Russia's Vladimir Putin. The forces of anti-democracy are striking back.
The region's democrats must not despair. Even if revolution has now
provoked an effective reaction, the campaign for political liberty in the
former Soviet Union is not finished. But success will be a long time coming.
After the Soviet Union's collapse, authoritarian ex-Communist officials took
power in most ex-Soviet republics, often rebranding themselves as
nationalists to gain legitimacy. Under former president Boris Yeltsin,
Russia bucked the trend and witnessed flashes of genuine democracy but
under Mr Putin it has emerged as an increasingly authoritarian state.
The first democratic shock came with Georgia's Rose Revolution two years
ago, when protests brought Mikheil Saakashvili to power. Then came Ukraine,
followed by Kyrgyzstan's Tulip Revolution, when Askar Akayev was deposed
as president. As the largest of the three states and the one closest to Russia,
Ukraine caused the most heartache. Incumbent rulers feared that if a revolt
could succeed in Ukraine it could succeed anywhere, even in Russia.
They were right to be afraid. Mr Yushchenko showed decisively that even
decades of totalitarianism could not keep people in chains.
Now the forces of reaction have gone into overdrive. In Uzbekistan, hundreds
died in a bloody crackdown on demonstrators in the town of Andijan. In
Russia, the Kremlin has taken a more sophisticated approach, recognising
that a regime that shoots its own people is a regime that has failed. The
modern authoritarian ruler must maintain the pressure on the media and on
potential challengers. But he must also give citizens some of what they
want - especially good jobs, pensions and public services. Kazakh officials
have come to the same conclusion. So have the authorities in Azerbaijan,
where pro-government parties won recent parliamentary polls.
These authoritarian states have seen that while elections create chances for
the opposition they are also an opportunity for rulers to legitimise power.
Successful authoritarian presidents want to be popular and demonstrate their
popularity in a public test. The secret lies in rigging the test. Mr
Nazarbayev's supporters resorted to crude ballot-stuffing. But this leads to
international criticism and embarrassment for any self-respecting president.
Better to prepare the ground in advance - mainly through media
manipulation - so the establishment's candidate wins without too much foul
play on the day.
This is the Kremlin's strategy for 2008, when Mr Putin is required to step
down and make way for a successor. In Belarus, President Aleksander
Lukashenko is taking a more repressive approach in the run-up to next
year's presidential election. But, unlike Mr Putin, he is past caring about his
international image.
The authoritarian presidents are making the most of the revolutionaries'
current difficulties. In Georgia and Ukraine, Mr Saakashvili and Mr
Yushchenko have split with former allies. In Kyrgyzstan, post-revolt
in-fighting risks descending into chaos.
But democrats must not lose hope. Despite the setbacks, the three revolts,
especially the Orange Revolution, have changed the former Soviet Union.
They have proved the region is not a no-go zone for democracy. They have
developed an armoury of peaceful weapons - including mobile phones and
websites.
Above all they have demonstrated that, under the right conditions, people
power works. The region's authoritarians have responded by trying to make
sure the right conditions are not created anywhere else any time soon. The
challenge for the region's democrats is to do precisely the opposite. -30-
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2. ON THIS DAY- ONE YEAR AGO - MON, DECEMBER 27, 2004:
YUSHCHENKO WINS UKRAINE ELECTION RE-RUN
BBC NEWS, UK, Monday, December 27, 2004
KIEV - Election officials in Ukraine have declared opposition leader Viktor
Yushchenko the winner of the country's presidential elections by a clear
margin.
With more than 98% of the votes counted, Mr Yushchenko is eight points
ahead of the Prime Minister, Viktor Yanukovych. The election was a re-run
of a vote last month, won narrowly by Mr Yanukovych, but annulled due
to fraud.
There have been accusations of dirty tricks throughout the campaign,
including allegations of a plot to murder Mr Yushchenko.
Doctors recently confirmed that Mr Yushchenko, who developed a
disfiguring skin condition in September, had been poisoned with dioxin.
VICTORY
Mass demonstrations in the capital, Kiev, against the first result have
continued all month. Mr Yushchenko declared victory at midnight GMT
while counting was still in its early stages.
"Today, in Ukraine, a new political year has begun," he told a jubilant
crowd of supporters. "This is the beginning of a new epoch, the
beginning of a new great democracy."
Thousands of demonstrators, many wearing the campaign's trademark
orange, celebrated with a concert and fireworks display.
Many have spent the last weeks camping in Kiev's Independence Square
despite sub-zero temperatures.
CRISIS
International observers from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) which is monitoring the elections say the re-run has been
much fairer than the earlier rounds.
"The people of this great country made a great step forwards to free and
fair elections by electing the next president of Ukraine," said the head of
the OSCE monitoring mission, Bruce George.
Ukraine has been plunged into bitter political crisis over the elections.
The first election result gave Mr Yanukovych 49.46% and Mr Yushchenko
46.61%. But Western poll observers complained of serious irregularities
and said the vote failed to meet international standards.
As demonstrations mounted and the political tension heightened, the
Supreme Court investigated and ruled the results invalid, paving the way
for fresh elections. -30-
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http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/27/newsid_4408000/4408386.stm
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3. DEMOCRACY'S HIGH PRICE
EDITORIAL: The Washington Post,
Washington, D.C., Sat, Dec 24, 2005, Page A16
A YEAR AFTER Ukraine's Orange Revolution, Russia's effort to combat
the spread of democracy in Eastern Europe continues unabated. Its latest
weapon is natural gas. As the heating season got underway this month,
Moscow announced through its state-controlled energy company, Gazprom,
that it would more than triple the price it charges Ukraine for gas supplies, to
$160 per 1,000 cubic meters.
When Ukraine's government sought to negotiate a more gradual increase,
Moscow threatened to raise the price further, to more than $200, or cut off
supplies as of Jan. 1. Russian President Vladimir Putin chose to trigger
this crisis just as Ukraine approaches a crucial parliamentary election on
March 26. Thanks to Mr. Putin, soaring energy prices for Ukrainian
consumers may be a punishing issue for the former Orange revolutionaries.
Next door in Belarus, pro-Moscow President Alexander Lukashenko has no
such worries. He, too, has an election coming up, on March 19; he abruptly
scheduled it last week, the day after holding a summit meeting with Mr.
Putin. At that meeting, Mr. Putin agreed to hold the price of gas for
Belarus steady next year, at $46 per 1,000 cubic meters. Belarus's
democratic opposition, which had been preparing for a presidential election
in July, was left with one week to register its candidate and just a few
more to campaign, without the benefit of mass media, money or the right to
free assembly.
Western leaders tended to assume after the Orange Revolution that Ukraine
had turned the corner toward democracy and could be expected to follow the
path of other former European communist states, such as Poland and Hungary.
Belarus, they hoped, might be next: President Bush publicly singled it out
as "Europe's last dictatorship," and both Congress and the European Union
approved multimillion-dollar programs to support pro-democracy movements.
But the attention of Western governments to Eastern Europe has slackened in
recent months while Mr. Putin has stayed focused. He has never accepted the
Orange Revolution, describing it as a plot by Western intelligence agencies.
He has directed much of his foreign and domestic policy in the past year to
stopping similar democratic movements in Eurasia while making sure no such
cause can arise in Russia.
March could be a landmark in his counterrevolution: first the reelection of
Mr. Lukashenko, who can be counted on to use fraud and violence against
his opponents; then, one week later, a Ukrainian election that could greatly
weaken the pro-democracy parties Mr. Putin unsuccessfully tried to suppress
a year ago. That may not be all.
An official statement describing Mr. Putin's meeting with Mr. Lukashenko
last week promised new steps toward a long-discussed "union" that could
eliminate Belarus as an independent state, including the finalization of a
union constitution and the adoption by Belarus of the Russian ruble.
Will the West stand up for democracy in Belarus and Ukraine? So far there's
not much sign of it. The European Union decided shortly after Mr.
Lukashenko's announcement to postpone the launch of a radio service
intended to provide uncensored information to Belarusans. Poland's foreign
minister, Stefan Meller, spoke with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
about Ukraine's gas price problems during a visit to Washington this week,
but they did not reach agreement on a concrete response.
Many in the administration remain unwilling to react to, or even
acknowledge, Mr. Putin's aggressive campaign to undermine Mr. Bush's
pro-democracy policy. As U.S. lassitude continues, Mr. Putin's price keeps
going up. -30-
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4. FIRST CRACKS IN THE ARMOUR OF KREMLIN'S SPIN DOCTORS
COMMENTARY: Ukrayinska Pravda, Kyiv, Ukraine, Mon, Dec 19, 2005
The Ukrainian government, which owes its victory in the last elections,
among other things, to the international observers, now almost rejected the
participation of one of those observer missions.
On Tuesday, according to the Foreign Ministry spokesman it appeared that
international observers from the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States),
supervised by its executive head Vladimir Rushaylo are not needed in
Ukraine.
This statement allowed the opposition to claim that without the
international observers from the CIS massive voting fraud would take place
during the elections, in spite of the fact that President Yushchenko had
invited observers from almost every corner of the world to come to Ukraine
in the spring.
The Foreign Ministry explained its decision in stating that "one-sided
political partiality of the CIS observer mission's leadership during the
Presidential elections in Ukraine in 2004 led to biased and overly
ideological treatment of events, to conclusions that were distorted and far
from reality".
However, that same evening President Yushchenko stated that he would still
personally invite "observers and people of good will from every corner of
the world including the CIS". He didn't specify whether he wanted to invite
this observer mission in particular or generally representatives from the
CIS.
For those who are familiar with the history of this issue the one-sided
approach of the leadership of this observer mission is not a surprise. In
2002 President Kuchma along with other leaders of the CIS signed a
Convention on Standards of Democratic Elections, on Electoral Rights and
Freedoms within the CIS. This convention, by the way, was created on the
initiative and with direct involvement of the Russian Central Electoral
Office.
There are also rumours that in 2004 the former President Leonid Kuchma had
nominated to the head of the CIS Executive Committee Mr. Rushaylo, who
worked before as the Interior Minister and the Secretary of the Russian
Security Council.
GEOGRAPHY OF CIS OBSERVERS' BLINDNESS
Back in 2001 this same mission observed the elections of President
Lukashenko in Belarus and declared them legitimate.
In Ukraine for the first time results of observations of missions from CIS
and OSCE (The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe)
differed after the parliamentary elections of 2002. Then, observers from
the OSCE recognized the elections but pointed out the "general atmosphere
of mistrust".
Reports of Western observers mentioned already the use of state funds,
pressure on workers of state enterprises, meddling of authorities in the
electoral process, cases of violence and pressure against oppositional
candidates, against campaign workers and voters.
Western observers pointed out also the bias of the media, especially radio
and TV. The observers drew attention to the fact that the national TV
channel financed by the state was leaning in its coverage towards
pro-president candidates.
The observer mission of the CIS didn't see any of that. They didn't make
any comments to this effect. The word combination "free, honest and
legitimate elections" would migrate since then from one report to the other
irrespective of the country and the events that unfolded.
UKRAINE'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN 2004
The pinnacle of cynicism for the CIS mission became the presidential
elections in 2004.
When western observes condemned widespread fraud, when carrousel
voting (voting by the same people at different stations) and other
violations at the voting stations shocked the world, and when thousands of
Ukrainians went out onto Maidan (Independence Square) the observers from
the CIS stated that the voting that took place on November 21, 2004 was
conducted "according to the election laws of Ukraine" and the observer
mission declared them "transparent, legitimate and free".
Maybe because of statements like that President Putin was so impatient to
congratulate Mr. Yanukovych with the victory.
The further it went the better it became. Secret instructions that former
president's administration was spreading among journalists were ordering
them to interview particularly members of the CIS mission about how the
elections were conducted.
The goal of the secret instructions was to tell Ukrainians through the
authoritative voice of the observers that in the regions that supported
Yanukovych elections proceeded calmly. At the same time another observer
from CIS had to turn everybody's attention to numerous discrepancies in the
voter lists in Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast.
It happened that way not only in Ukraine.
ONE-CANDIDATE ELECTION IN UZBEKISTAN
In the same year 2004 Mr. Rushaylo's mission didn't notice a one-candidate
election in Uzbekistan . According to OSCE these elections didn't live up to
the democratic norms - citizens of that state were denied the real choice
because the opposition was not allowed to compete for seats in the
parliament.
The OSCE also believed that the Uzbekistan government didn't allow the
opposition to participate in the elections and most often it was excused by
technical violations.
Back then the Uzbekistan government declared 85% participation, but in
reality voting stations didn't appear that crowded according to testimonies
of eyewitnesses.
Pro-Russian observers called this show transparent, democratic and perfectly
organized. "Observers recognized these elections as legitimate, free and
transparent", declared the report.
KYRGYZSTAN IN 2005
Next country where views on elections cardinally differed between CIS and
OSCE observers was Kyrgyzstan in 2005.
Voting fraud there during the parliamentary elections led to the protests
and the downfall of President Askar Akayev's regime, which had to flee the
country.
The OSCE declared that those elections didn't live up to the democratic
norms and pointed out, above all, the bias of the media and even established
cases of bribery of voters.
However, even though the CIS observers did note some "drawbacks and
neglect" during the preparation to elections, they again called them
"legitimate, free and transparent".
All that happened when thousands of citizens of Kyrgystan began to protest
widespread fraud.
IN AZERBAIJAN ELECTIONS
In Azerbaijan elections, where mostly pro-government forces won, the
Rushaylo's mission saw "some violations". However, according to them
these violations "were not massive and did not influence the free will of
voters and the results of the elections in any significant way".
In the meantime, even the Azerbaijan Central Election Committee
acknowledged violations in 10 voting districts and ordered new elections.
The OSCE observer mission, however, in its report noted that elections on
the 6 of November "didn't live up to many standards of the OSCE and the
Council of Europe".
Interestingly enough, the CIS observers mentioned in their report President
of Azerbaijan Ilcham Aliev's decrees that exonerated the political
opposition and allowed them actively to participate in the election
campaign.
However, in Ukraine almost everybody knows that the Azerbaijan
government didn't allow the leader of the opposition party Rasul Guliev,
who is now a refugee, to return and participate in the elections. Also,
before the elections groups that supported the opposition were raided.
ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN KAZAKHSTAN
The last straw for Russia was the election campaign in Kazakhstan .
The OSCE again was very critical. According to the preliminary reports, in
spite of some improvements, the elections didn't live up to a "number of
Kazakhstan's obligations before the OSCE as well as to other international
standards concerning democratic elections".
The OSCE also drew attention to the fact that the situation with vote
counting grew worse, that there were cases of multiple voting, of ballot
dumping and pressure on student voters.
The observers also noticed that in general in their coverage the media gave
preference to the current president Nazarbayev.
The CIS mission noted, however, that the ratio of negative and positive news
coverage about the candidates and the president demonstrated that "the state
media generally showed them as neutral or positive and the independent,
non-government media were more categorical in their coverage".
After the next slap in the face from the western observers, the Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov lost his temper and resorted to quite harsh
statements. He demanded from the west to "stop their attempts to impose
their version of democracy on Russia's neighbours".
In Russia they probably suspect that particularly the independent
conclusions of the OSCE lead to revolutions in the post Soviet countries.
It is no wonder then, that Russia finally lost its temper, because those in
the former Soviet capital could never abandon the role of influence in the
former soviet republics and would make maximum effort not to allow
"other" forces to come to power.
Even the Russian spin doctor Stanislav Belkovsky blurted out that "from the
Kremlin's point of view the CIS observers are an armour in the Kremlin's
spin wars and they have nothing to do with observing voting". -30-
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Article translated by Oleg Gorbik. Contact: ukrpravda@gmail.com
LINK: http://www.pravda.com.ua/en/news/2005/12/19/4935.htm
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[return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
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5. POST-SOVIET VOTING, AND DOGGING THE WATCHDOGS
Letter From Moscow: By C. J. Chivers
The New York Times, NY, NY, Wednesday, December 14, 2005
MOSCOW, Dec. 13 -- Early this year, as President Bush began his new
term, he declared a vision with allure for many people living within the
stunted democracies or autocratic governments in the former Soviet Union.
"The policy of the United States," Mr. Bush said, "is to seek and support
the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and
culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world."
Eleven months on, Mr. Bush's inaugural challenge is facing an oblique but
determined attack in territory once under Moscow's sway. The battlegrounds
are elections, which offer a glimpse into an emerging nation's political
health. At issue are perceptions. What exactly is democratic progress? And
who gets to define it?
In much of the former Soviet Union, a patchwork of corrupt and
semi-functional states where authoritarianism has proven durable and
political liberalization has been uneven or thwarted, elections are
routinely flawed or stolen, making rigged polls as sure a feature of the
political landscape as the remaining statues of Lenin.
From eerily empty polling places in Chechnya to the rubber-stamp victories
President Islam A. Karimov of Uzbekistan, post-Communist governments
often manipulate electoral outcomes, ostensibly lending a patina of popular
legitimacy even to plainly undemocratic men.
Now, alarmed by popular uprisings that followed rigged elections in Georgia,
Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, Russia is leading many former Soviet states in an
effort to undermine honest discussion about lingering patterns of electoral
misconduct. A precise attack is under way.
The target is the election monitoring arm of the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe, a group representing 55 nations, including the
United States, which is the principal monitor of elections behind the former
Iron Curtain.
Although attacking observers is not a direct affront to Mr. Bush's stated
policy, it might as well be. The United States makes clear that it relies on
the European group to inform its view of an election. And as the United
States has applauded the observation missions, the Kremlin and many of its
former charges have chosen an opposite course.
The goals are clear: Weaken credible Western observers, while creating
alternate observations for public consumption.
The European group's election-monitoring arm, known as the Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, or O.D.I.H.R., sends long-term
and short-term observer teams to countries holding elections.
The teams analyze each campaign period and election day, including voter
and candidate registration, safeguards against multiple voting, ballot counting,
use of state resources, media coverage, police conduct and more. As they
work, they publish, producing assessments that have become prominent
report cards of an election's conduct.
Since 1996 the observers have covered 146 elections or referenda in
countries once under Communist rule. Many reports have been unsparing,
detailing government shortfalls and abuse.
In recent years, as assessments have documented abuses in countries whose
leaders then fell amid popular uprisings, and after the observers were
critical of the election last year of President Vladimir V. Putin, Russia
has begun to treat the reports as highly provocative.
"Autonomy of the O.D.I.H.R. has turned into a complete absence of control,
and decent governments cannot accept this," Sergey V. Lavrov, the Russian
foreign minister, said at the annual meeting of the European group last week
in Ljubljana, Slovenia. "It is also necessary to introduce order in the
publications of assessments."
The observers' leadership, while not seeking confrontation with the Kremlin,
has firmly defended their work. "We are holding a mirror up," said Christian
Strohal, director of the monitoring office. "Maybe there are some people who
do not like the picture in the mirror. But if they smash the mirror, the
picture is not going to change."
Mr. Lavrov's speech was only part of the attack. Working with Belarus,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Russia also sought to introduce rules that would
have weakened the monitoring group and delayed publication of its reports.
The United States and other government rebuffed the proposal, and for now
the observation mission seems secure.
But the observers themselves say they expect more problems. "Because we
have gone into their territories and pronounced bad elections bad, they want
to see O.D.I.H.R. emasculated," said Bruce George, a member of British
Parliament who led a mission this month monitoring the presidential election
in Kazakhstan.
Challenges to the observers' position have also been multiplying. As
elections have become freighted with the potential to discredit the status
quo, the Commonwealth of Independent States, or C.I.S., an alliance of 11
former Soviet states, has begun deploying observer missions of its own.
These missions release reports that faintly resemble the European group's
reports but lack detail and underlying data. They invariably reach
conclusions the opposite of the Western monitoring effort, which are then
funneled into state television for domestic and regional consumption,
assuring citizens in the former Soviet sphere that democratic change is
indeed afoot.
Mr. George said he regards such tactics with suspicion and contempt. "In my
view their methodology is simple," he said. "Be really nice to your friends.
You would think we were observing on different planets."
Vladimir Karpechenko, a supervisor of the C.I.S. observation missions,
refused requests for interviews, and declined to provide explanations of
their methodology. But a comparison of reports shows differing approaches.
In Azerbaijan, the European group provided an analysis of television news
coverage, showing how coverage favored the state. It also documented
"bad" or "very bad" ballot counting 43 percent of polls observed.
The C.I.S. observers said the news coverage was balanced, but provided no
evidence of how it reached its conclusions. One concern it did note was a
suggestion that the indelible ink used for marking voters' hands, a program
encouraged by the West to discourage multiple voting, might carry health
risks.
Daniel Fried, an assistant secretary of state who overseas American
diplomacy in the region, said efforts to blunt the European group's
observation are creating "a bizarre alternative universe," which he expects
to grow. "We're going to see more of this parallel world, the alternative
world, which is kind a mockery of the democratic world," he said.
In the future, he said, some post-Soviet countries may forbid the European
group from observing their elections. In that case, he said, the United
States will send a clear signal that countries that do not allow the
observers to work will not enjoy as much respect in the West as those
that do. "Respectability goes to countries that let O.D.I.H.R. in," he said.
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LINK: http://www.nytimes.com
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6."CORRUPTION STEALS THE FUTURE FROM EVERY INDIVIDUAL"
Georgian president talks up new democracy forum in Ukraine
INTERVIEW: with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili
By Volodymyr Skachko, Kiyevskiy Telegraf, Kiev, Russian, 9 Dec 05, p 1,5
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Monday, Dec 12, 2005
Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili has said that the creation of the
Community of Democratic Choice in Kiev on 2 December is important for
countries like Georgia and Ukraine. In an interview with a Ukrainian weekly,
Saakashvili said both countries are on the path of NATO and European
integration and need one another for support.
He does not regard the Community to be anti-Russian: Russia will feel calmer
with democratic, predictable neighbours. Saakashvili said he does not plan
to take Georgia out of the CIS.
The following is an excerpt from the interview Saakashvili gave to Volodymyr
Skachko entitled "Corruption steals the future from every individual" and
published in the Ukrainian newspaper Kievskiy Telegraf on 9 December;
subheadings have been inserted editorially:
The arrival in Kiev of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili coincided with
two events: the Ukraine-EU summit and the formation of Community of
Democratic Choice. The Georgian leader is pleased with both events, because
he considers them a continuation of the "rose revolution" in his country and
the Orange Revolution in Ukraine.
However, he started his meeting with Ukrainian journalists by saying what
Georgia is now proud of: annual growth rate of 7 per cent, road building, an
increase in the state budget, the high popularity rating of the authorities
and a successful struggle against corruption.
[Saakashvili] Georgia is a country where the level of corruption is one of
the lowest in Europe. I am absolutely sure of this, because the source of
the five-fold increase of our budget was not some special revenue: it was
money that was previously stolen, but is now coming into the budget.
Money that was previously being stolen is now going to the construction of
roads, hospitals and schools. To start with, we were accused of almost some
sort of authoritarian working methods. Now everyone understands that the
people who were answering for what was committed have answered according
to the law.
Not only our former opponents, but also some very significant officials whom
we took into the administration are now in not very distant places [jailed].
Because we are not standing on ceremony with corrupt people. We have only
one principle: if someone stole, he has to answer. Corruption is
unacceptable, because it steals the future from every individual.
[Skachko] Mr President, what practical result are you expecting from the
forum of the Community of Democratic Choice?
[Saakashvili] I believe that our countries are very similar to each other,
just as our problems are. Despite the fact that the Baltic countries are
already in NATO and the EU, Romania is already in NATO and is joining the
EU, while Georgia and Ukraine are still only on the path of integration. But
the challenges facing us are very similar.
We both emerged from the post-communist, post-Soviet system. This means
first of all that we should share experience with each other. Second, we
should help each other, because if we don't, nobody else will. For example,
the Baltic countries came out with an initiative to help our states in
European integration.
This is very important, because most countries of Old Europe are still
somewhat sceptical about the accession of new states. And in a situation
like that, the voice of states that know us well and are confident that we
are just as European as they are is very important.
And the main thing is for that voice always to be heard where it is needed.
For this we have to meet each other and talk. The main thing that I am
expecting is that after the formation of the Community of Democratic Choice,
which is not an international organization, the frontier of Europe must no
longer be artificially set.
The frontier of Europe runs along the border of Ukraine and Georgia and
Moldova and all the other countries that have European ambitions. And the
creation of this community makes Europe complete. It makes the process of
European integration irreversible for everyone. After all, what is the idea
that everyone agrees on?
That the countries that are European by culture, history and ambitions
should definitely become part of all major European structures. This is the
theory. The practice is that everyone is scared of further enlargement.
SITUATION IN AZERBAIJAN
[Skachko] There is an opinion that the new wave of democratization of
Europe at present stopped in Azerbaijan. It is said that you have good
relations with Ilham Aliyev. What's going on in that country? Will Azerbaijan
join more actively in the Community of Democratic Choice?
[Saakashvili] Yes, Georgia is a great fan of the democratization of
Azerbaijan. We always help our Azerbaijani friends with advice. When it was
necessary, we even sent them ink for voting, because at that point there was
a big shortage of it there, while in Georgia there had been so many
elections in recent years that we had more than enough ink - enough for all
(laughs). And I hope that the process of democratic dialogue with Azerbaijan
will continue.
In general I'm perfectly confident that the process of democratization is
irreversible for all countries. I think that Azerbaijan is a country with a
very big future. But real prosperity will be provided by further democratic
dialogue, and I am absolutely sure that President Ilham Aliyev himself
understands this perfectly well. All my contacts with him convince me of
this.
Of course, we can see difficulties. And of course we worry every time these
difficulties are shown on television and the whole world watches them. But I
am sure that we are talking about a country with a very educated people that
has brilliant economic prospects. It's a fine partner for Georgia, for
Ukraine and all the others. The country has an absolutely full-scale
democratic future.
What is more, I tell you that everyone understood in their own way how they
should react to the revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia. I think that most
countries have realized that there is a need to reform and open up the
political system. And this is an irreversible process. The people in the
entire post-Soviet space have now become a far more important factor than
ever before.
Some people recognize it and some don't, but people's opinion, the mood of
the electorate, the mood of every individual person means far more since
Kiev's Maydan [Independence Square, heart of the Orange Revolution] and
Tbilisi's roses than they ever meant before.
NOT ANTI-RUSSIAN
[Skachko] The Community of Democratic Choice is considered a sort of
anti-Russian association. Do you agree with that view?
[Saakashvili] No. I believe that it is very important for Russia to have
democratic neighbours. Russia will feel easier because democratic neighbours
are more predictable; they are far more peaceable, pragmatic and realistic.
This means that one can expect far fewer nasty surprises from democratic
states than even from friendly dictators. Of course, there are complex
processes now taking place in Russia.
Let me say it right out - a decision is being taken to raise the price for
gas. I believe that it is a definitely political rather than economic
decision. In this sense there are, of course, difficulties and problems, but
in the sense of long-term development, I think that Russia will only gain
from the region becoming more European, more democratic, more civilized,
predictable and friendly towards it.
[Skachko] How do you assess the fact that now the government in Ukraine
that came after the revolution is increasingly losing its ratings?
[Saakashvili] You know, I'm not a judge of Ukrainian domestic politics.
Although I suffer very much because of the problems and rejoice at
everything good. But I know one thing: a year after the revolution, the
Georgian government had a lower rating than today. Why? Because after the
revolution big expectations arose, and people wanted everything immediately.
This is a normal phenomenon. [Passage omitted: expanding this]
[Skachko] After the return of Ajaria to Georgia, it is being said that
Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia will also be returned. Both Georgian and
Ukrainian experts agree that the replacement of Russian peacekeepers by
Ukrainians is also possible. How far do you think that such a replacement is
possible? That's the first question.
The second is more creative. Very many Ukrainian artists are advocating the
opening in Kiev of a Ukrainian-Georgian village. Actually there already is a
site, but there are also some bureaucratic obstacles. What is your attitude
to this?
[Saakashvili] If someone opens a Ukrainian-Georgian village, I'll move in
there with pleasure (laughs). But this is the first I've heard of this
splendid idea. [Passage omitted: lyrical musings]
UKRAINIAN PEACEKEEPERS FOR GEORGIA?
As for the territorial integrity of Georgia\ [ellipsis as published] When
the question of Ajaria was being decided, everyone thought: as usual,
militant nationalists are organizing a fight, and there'll be a war - that's
the sort of propaganda there was. There was nothing of the sort. Ajaria now
is the most successful part of Georgia. I welcome everyone to Batumi [Ajaria
capital], especially in summer. [Passage omitted: praising the beauty of
Batumi]
Abkhazia is one of the most beautiful places in the world, and it is simply
shameful that only one fifth of the pre-war population remains there. They
threw out almost all the Ukrainians, all the Estonians and Georgians, the
greater part of the Abkhaz, Russians and all the rest. And some generals and
a very small part of the population remained there.
Naturally, the world needs to pay attention to this so that those generals
don't decide everything. I think that Ukrainians by their nature are not
only the most peace-loving nation - any Ukrainian international
participation has all the qualities of professionalism, neutrality and
objectivity.
As well as humanity, which is very important, because it is a question of
protecting people. Ukrainian peacekeepers have given a very good account of
themselves wherever they have been. I want to remind you that in 1993 during
the war with Abkhazia, when Sukhumi was in flames, Ukrainian helicopter
crews under fierce artillery fire carried out hundreds of flights.
They evacuated the civilian population. There were also Ukrainians there who
sacrificed their lives. We have not forgotten the feat of those pilots. We
remember it 15 years later and will still remember it in 150 years and in a
thousand years' time.
[Skachko] So will there be a replacement of peacekeepers?
[Saakashvili] It all depends on international organizations. UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan was in Tbilisi recently, and our position was explained
to him: Georgia is in no hurry for now. Nothing happens immediately. In
order to achieve good results, intensive work is needed. And we will work.
I'm sure that there is no alternative - it's one country. And it is so
small, how can it be divided into parts again? It was united over many, many
centuries and will be united. [Passage omitted: prospects for economic
development in Georgia]
NO PLANS TO PULL OUT OF CIS
[Skachko] Tell me, how do you see the future existence of the CIS? And
another question: what has happened to the Russian visas that have stopped
being issued?
[Saakashvili] Stopped being issued to whom?
[Skachko] To citizens of Georgia.
[Saakashvili] I haven't yet requested a Russian visa (laughs). We have a
visa regime, a unilateral one - Georgia has abolished its visa regime with
Russia. In principle Russians can receive visas at the airport. And we, like
Ukraine, have abolished the visa regime with the EU and many other
countries. With Russia it has been going on for four years now and
everything is OK.
Yes, it got on some people's nerves. Yes, it became harder for people to
meet. But at the end of the day everyone finds other roads. The Baltic
countries are a fine example. They were under constant pressure. And so?
Estonia, for example, is now the most successful country in the whole of
Europe, one of the most successful in the world.
It went through several years of economic pressure, bans on its exports to
traditional markets and a total visa blockade. But it survived and became
stronger. We don't want, of course, to go through big trials. But if
obstacles are placed in our way, we will still overcome them and stand on
our feet.
[Skachko] Do plan to withdraw from the CIS?
[Saakashvili] I personally don't have any such plans. It's being discussed
in the Georgian parliament. I'm more inclined to take specific, pragmatic
rather than general decisions. [Passage omitted: the CIS does have
problems.]
[Skachko] But if parliament votes for withdrawal from the CIS, will you
support that decision?
[Saakashvili] As far as I can judge, this is not now expected. We will
discuss these questions, but I don't predict any hasty decisions, because we
in Georgia have also become very pragmatic. [Passage omitted: expanding
this]
ENGAGEMENT WITH BELARUS NEEDED
[Skachko] What do you think should be done about Belarus, which is not a
member of your Community of Democratic Choice?
[Saakashvili] I have already said that some countries correctly understood
the Ukrainian Maydan and the Georgian roses. I had, for example, very
interesting conversations with President [Nursultan] Nazarbayev [of
Kazakhstan] and other neighbours who understand that attention must be paid
to the political process that is happening in the world, open up the
political system and reform it. And many positive aspects have appeared in
Russia itself as well.
In Belarus it was understood in reverse - that you have to be even stricter,
even more resolute, and then nothing will happen. [Passage omitted: You
can't intimidate people indefinitely.]
[Skachko] And what needs to be done with [Belarusian President Alyaksandr]
Lukashenka - pressure him or find a common language?
[Saakashvili] I believe that we need to continue contacts with the people of
Belarus at various levels and help spread ideas of freedom and democracy.
Isolation is not the way. And in this question I think that the birth in
Kiev of the Community of Democratic Choice is also sending a very strong
impulse and signal.
First and foremost to the people as a whole. Not to the president, the
government or other official representatives, but to the people of Belarus
as a whole. A signal that democracy is being consolidated and that there is
no alternative to it. That's the main thing. [Passage omitted: Georgian
revolutionary team still united; free speech flourishing in Georgia.]
[Skachko] Whom do you support in the conflict that there is in the
revolutionary team in Ukraine between [President Viktor] Yushchenko and
[former Prime Minister Yuliya] Tymoshenko? And in general do you think that
Tymoshenko simply had her own viewpoint and that's why she left? Have you
not tried to conciliate them?
[Saakashvili] You know, I have great respect for both leaders. I believe
that Viktor Yushchenko is truly a perfectly phenomenal hope for Ukraine on
the international level. And naturally I won't hide the fact that it was
always painful for me to see such things happening. I have great respect for
that entire team, and the whole world has great respect.
Because they all deserve to be appreciated by people at least for what they
did in opening Ukraine to the world. Two years ago few people in the world
knew, to my great distress, what Ukraine was. Such a huge country, with such
potential, with such people, with bigger industrial potential than a
considerable part of Europe - and nobody knew about it. [Passage omitted:
importance of Orange Revolution]
[Skachko] Have you met with Yuliya Tymoshenko after the conflict? And
were there any attempts at conciliation?
[Saakashvili] You know, I don't intend to interfere in this. It's an
internal problem. True, it's been hard for me to watch it. But I think that
Ukraine's progress will not stop, and I will continue meeting with all
participants in this process with pleasure, because all Ukrainians are very
close and dear to us. Even those who during the revolution were on the other
side.
Ukrainians are a completely unique people in the centre of Europe. And
like a magnet it attracts all the others. In its potential, Ukraine has all the
hallmarks of a big state, but in its character this nation is completely
open and has not a single bad quality of big states - arrogance, imperial
ambitions and so on.
You have to understand what Ukraine means for all the other nations.
Ukraine is the hope for our development, for our Europeanization, for
our own success. -30-
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7. USAID TO PUSH DEMOCRATISATION AGENDA
The agency, for instance, had struggled this year to move money from
other accounts to support the democratic transformations in the
Ukraine and Lebanon, two high priorities for the State department.
By Edward Alden in Washington, Financial Times
London, United Kingdom, December 23 2005
The US Agency for International Development will unveil early next year a
comprehensive strategy for improving democracy and governance in
developing countries.
In an interview with the Financial Times, Andrew Natsios, the USAID
administrator who steps down at the beginning of next year, said the
democracy strategy was a key milestone in the re-orientation of US aid
programmes to focus on issues of effective governance alongside traditional
development projects.
Mr Natsios also confirmed that the administration was drawing up proposals
for a broader overhaul of the organisation of US foreign aid, but would not
discuss details, saying some of the final decisions had yet to be made.
He said there were structural issues that needed to be addressed, in
particular the fragmentation of responsibility for development programmes
across different departments and agencies in the US government. "There are
problems that need to be addressed for the protection of the president's
legacy on foreign aid."
With the Bush administration's commitment to spreading democracy and
repairing failed states that might harbour terrorists, foreign aid has
become an increasingly critical part of the overall US national security
strategy. Since 2000, the US aid budget has doubled from $10bn to more
than $20bn this year.
But Mr Natsios said aid programmes could still be making a much greater
contribution to US security. A senior US general recently told him that in
Baghdad's Sadr City - a poor, Shia-dominated neighbourhood - "in the areas
you have programmes, I have almost no casualties. In the areas you have no
programmes, I have very high casualty rates".
He said the general told him "there's a direct connection between your
programming and how people feel about the US presence in Iraq".
Mr Natsios said domestic political pressures had made it difficult to
re-orient US aid to support democracy-building. He said earmarking - in
which Congress allocates US aid funds to specific countries and sectors
- was "a very serious problem".
According to a just-completed internal analysis of the $4.5bn based budget
for USAID, only $200m is subject to discretionary control by the agency, he
said.
"The difficulty is how do you do strategic budgeting when you don't have the
discretion to shift money around from one sector to another and from one
region to another?"
The agency, for instance, had struggled this year to move money from other
accounts to support the democratic transformations in the Ukraine and
Lebanon, two high priorities for the State department.
"American foreign aid is driven to some degree by domestic constituencies
and domestic interests in a way which is not necessarily responsive to the
problems of the developing world, which is the purpose of the programme.
It responds to our culture wars and our issues here domestically."
He said "the sectors that are most important usually receive the least
funding" because there were no organised interests championing those
programmes. Agricultural development had been particularly difficult to
fund, he said, in part due to opposition from environmental groups. -30-
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8. IN A YEAR OF ACHIEVEMENT,
POLITICS AND PENSIONS TO THE FORE
Junichiro Koizumi, Japan; Viktor Yushchenko, Ukraine; Adair Turner, UK
By Brian Groom, Nicholas Timmins and Stefan Wagstyl
Financial Times, London, UK, Friday, December 23 2005
If 2005 was the year of Google, three other figures were, in the view of the
Financial Times' editors, the closest challengers in the quest for the
person who made the biggest impact.
Junichiro Koizumi, Japan's charismatic and often maverick prime minister,
did what politicians elsewhere have failed to do: he gambled on economic
reform and won a landslide election victory against many predictions.
Promoting privatisation of the country's bloated post office as a symbol and
vehicle for broader change that would shrink the state and create room for
enterprise, he took the potentially suicidal course of dissolving parliament
and expelling 37 rebels from his ruling Liberal Democratic party. His reward
was the most famous victory in its 50-year history.
The depth of Japan's appetite for reform remains to be proved and Mr
Koizumi will stand down after five years next autumn in order, he says, to
listen to music and visit fine restaurants. Other aspects of his tenure, such
as his assertive stance in foreign affairs that has deepened tensions with
China, are more problematic.
But he has broken the mould of a deeply conservative political system and
created a huge opportunity for the world's second largest economy as it
starts to emerge from 15 years of deflation and stagnation.
Viktor Yushchenko, Ukraine's president, transformed the political map of
Europe through the Orange Revolution, the popular revolt that ended the
authoritarian regime of former president Leonid Kuchma and restored
political liberty.
His victory in the disputed presidential elections of late 2004 showed that
democracy can be made to work even in the hostile territory of the former
Soviet Union. His triumph shocked the region's authoritarian leaders,
including Russia's Vladimir Putin, and gave heart to opposition forces as
far away as Kyrgyzstan and Lebanon.
His scarred face, the result of a poisoning attempt, became a potent symbol
of the fight for liberty against brutality. Mr Yushchenko, inaugurated on
January 23, has run into difficulties in office as his followers split amid
arguments and accusations of corruption. The president tried to restore
discipline by sacking Yulia Tymoshenko, his firebrand prime minister, and
other government members.
It has not been enough to stop disenchantment at lack of progress in
improving living standards and Mr Yushchenko faces a key test in
parliamentary elections next March. The realities of post-revolutionary
politics have taken some of the gloss off the Orange Revolution but they
have not undermined its achievement. A nation raised in political
subservience has learnt the meaning of liberty.
Adair Turner, chairman of the UK's government-sponsored but independent
Pensions Commission, was charged with coming up with a design to avert a
looming pensions crisis in the country's public and private sectors. He
produced an elegant formulation of the problem that will resonate with
policymakers around the world.
The former director-general of the CBI - now Lord Turner - said the
combination of rising longevity and falling fertility meant one of four
things. Either, on average, future pensioners were going to be poorer - or
people would have to work longer, save more or pay more taxes. "Anyone
who does not tell you which of those options his or her solution involves
and to what degree is not serious," he said.
Lord Turner's answer - which the government may or may not adopt - was
a mix of the three: a more generous state pension, paid for partly by a higher
state pension age and by higher taxes, allied to more private saving through
a state-sponsored (but not state-run) savings plan. Individuals would be
automatically enrolled while retaining the right to opt out.
Other countries will choose their own mix of policies but that is the
equation with which they will have to work. -30-
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9. STUCK IN THE USSR
Over the last decade, the Russian foreign policy has actually
been the mere continuation of the Soviet foreign policy.
COMMENTARY: Kirill Rogov, deputy editor-in-chief
Kommersant, Moscow, Russia, Monday, Dec 26, 2005
It's been a custom since the 1990s that the Russian foreign policy has been
dominated by friendships with the rogue nations whose affairs are either bad
or hopeless. What emotional effort we put into shielding Slobodan Milosevic
from the foreign invasion! We have almost made ourselves believe that
there's no one in the whole world closer to us than Serbs, and when the NATO
was dropping bombs on them, we spoke with one accord: they are bombing us.
When it became clear that the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein is in for great
trouble, we immediately recalled our traditional ties with Iraq and our
economic interest there. We tried to convince the world that we would make
Saddam back down by negotiations, and tried to convince Saddam that we
were able to prevent the invasion.
It is totally impossible to understand why we were trying to back up Eduard
Shevarnadze when his power was falling apart like a house of cards since
shortly before it, we had been threatening him with pre-emptive missile
strikes.
Once the knot of the Middle East politics got firmly tied around Syria, we
stepped in acting as the best friend of Syrians. We were trying to convince
everyone again that we could be efficient mediators and could talk Syria
into meeting some demands of the United States. We suggested trade-offs
for the both again in a hope to kill two birds with one shot. Syria,
however, doubted our abilities like North Korea did unwilling to use our
mediations. Iran seemingly sneezed at our "saving" initiatives too.
Curiously enough, the nations and regimes that we are regularly defending in
vain don't feel any gratitude towards us. They view our stance as ambiguous
and unsafe. The model where Russia first vehemently shields a country
oppressed by the United States and later backpedals at the eleventh hour
choosing a neutrality for some bonuses in the Russia-U.S. relations has been
knows since the Soviet times, since the first war in the Persian Gulf.
This is the root of the problem, I guess. Over the last decade, the Russian
foreign policy has actually been the mere continuation of the Soviet foreign
policy of its sunset time. The policy's first stage full of decisive
condemnations of the U.S. dictates resembles the policy of the
missile-crammed menacing USSR in the Brezhnev époque.
The second stage of the silent compromise with "the American aggressor" is
in essence the policy of the weakening tiger of the Gorbachev disarmament.
This is the policy of the decrepit empire eager to trade its former fetishes
for lucrative contracts.
The diplomatic thought in the Kremlin and in Smolenskaya Square has been
stubbornly following this plain pattern for ten years. The banner of our
diplomacy reads: "Formerly, there was the USSR here without which not a
single issue was resolved."
Pretending to be a global player we are losing a game the moment we start
it. Maybe, it's time to give up the fidelity to the foreign policy of the
non-existent country? -30-
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10. "BALANCE OF GAINS AND LOSSES"
Catholic daily views Polish-US relations, priorities of Poland's
foreign policy Russia finds it hard to forgive Poles especially
for their involvement in Ukraine
By Mieczyslaw Ryba, Polish Newspaper Nasz Dziennik website
Warsaw, Poland, in Polish Thursday, 8 Dec 05
BBC Monitoring Service,. UK, in English, Monday, Dec 12, 2005
Text of an article by Mieczyslaw Ryba: "Balance of gains and losses"
published by Polish newspaper Nasz Dziennik website on 8 December
For several years now Polish foreign policy has had to cope with a new
configuration of forces in the Western world. That is because, ever since
the Iraqi war, we have been dealing with constant rivalry between the United
States and the European Union on the international arena. In that contest,
the Polish state has declared itself on the side of the Americans.
This has spurred considerable controversy between Warsaw and Paris, and
between Warsaw and Berlin. It should also be considered, however, that both
France and Germany opted for Russia as their strategic partner, and it is
Russia which is making an impact on Polish interests ever more adversely.
To Germany and France, which are losing in the global competition with the
United States, Russian oil and market look like an opportunity to be
exploited. In turn, to Russia, trade in raw materials is the pivotal factor
owing to which it can try to rebuilt its empire, even if on a limited scale.
The plan to build a trans-Baltic pipeline bypassing Poland ensues from the
fact that our country is viewed as lying in America's direct zone of
influence and thus cannot be counted upon and needs to be maximally
weakened.
The price we are paying for our alliance with the United States keeps
climbing, if only considering the ban on imports of Polish food products
into Russia. Soon it may turn out that this price will be in hundreds of
millions of dollars once the Russians introduce gas price increases.
RELATIONS WITH USA
Hence, the question of the balance sheet of gains and losses for our
alliance with the USA remains open. The gains are reflected in some
contracts in Iraq as well as in Poland's enhanced standing on the
international area. As for the losses, they are mainly reflected in various
clashes with Russia.
For Russia finds it hard to forgive Poles for Iraq and especially for their
involvement in Ukraine. The so-called Orange Revolution was largely
supported by American foundations, and hence the actions of Polish
politicians were perceived by Moscow as hostile burrowing in its zone of
influence.
Of course, the change in the political alignment in Ukraine has proved
advantageous to Poland (it affords an opportunity for building a new order
in Central Europe). Still, there remains the question of whether it was wise
for many Polish politicians to proclaim on the first pages of newspapers
their direct involvement in the Ukrainian events. It is always possible to
provide aid and support a revolution without incurring publicity.
To be sure, the direct involvement of Polish politicians in the affairs of
the Ukrainian neighbour can at least be excused in substantive terms,
because the changes taking place there were in Polish national interest. But
the same cannot be said of Iraq. Our involvement in Iraq has exposed us to
the ire of not only many regional Euro-Atlantic powers but also to the
terrorist threat, heretofore absent in Poland.
Most analysts are of the opinion that the advantages we were able to derive
in our negotiations with the Americans were too low. This is not about
contracts for several Polish companies but about political support. For if
the Polish government has decided to support the Americans in a situation in
Iraq that is difficult to them, why should the American government remain
passive in a situation in which our exports to Russia are being blocked and
the history of the enslavement of Central Europe is being falsified as
regards Katyn and the Yalta decisions?
Such examples can be multiplied. American reactions are either trivial or
totally absent. That is because the Americans want to have correct relations
with Russia given the turmoil in the Near East and the disputes with China.
Hence, our support for the Iraqi war is not reciprocated with support for
our country's problematic situations.
The Americans can support hundredfold as much their Israeli ally in
situations that are thousandfold more complicated (the conflicts in the Near
East), whereas the Polish ally receives secondary treatment.
Poland's involvement in Ukraine should be rapidly bolstered by the Americans
in the sense that they should provide extra financing for building bold
infrastructural projects (such as a Warsaw-Kiev highway, to be built with
loan guarantees provided by the US government to American contractors).
Such projects would alter the position of Central Europe in the context of
the economic processes ongoing on the Old Continent. Yet no such decisions
have been taken, and neither have Poles made the related demands to the
Americans.
POLISH POLICY
Summing up, Polish policy should pursue the aim of maximum sovereignty. A
tactical alliance with the Americans can help achieve that aim. At the same
time, our global involvement should correspond to our potential. Poland has
no interests to pursue, nor the potential to pursue them, by involving
itself in the conflicts in the Near East.
If it wants to thus involve itself in the interest of, say, the Americans,
it should do so only if it is protected by the United States in conflicts
with its neighbours. Otherwise, any such involvement smells of naivete and
stupidity.
It is not good when a country poses for itself global aims exceeding its
potential. But it is even worse when the converse happens and a weak country
tries to pursue a quasi-imperial policy. In this way it exposes itself to,
on the one hand, ridicule and on the other, danger.
In the current situation, especially following the change of government in
Poland, we can expect that top government bodies will be purged of foreign
agents and independence from Russian domination will be gained. Should this
succeed, we can thereupon afford rapprochement with Russia and, to that end,
even perform spectacular gestures on the international arena. For then this
will no longer threaten our domestic sovereignty.
NEW ALLIES
Allies can also be sought elsewhere. The question arises whether, in
addition to the economic involvement of the Koreans in our country, we
should also consider major incentives for Chinese capital. Were the Chinese
to maintain economic bridgeheads in Poland, they would much more willingly
support us on the international arena.
For while the strategic alliance of Poland with the United States makes
sense, it makes just as much sense that Poland, located in the heart of
Europe, should pursue the broadest possible "multilateral" policy so as to
arm itself with a gamut of options in the face of difficult situations. Only
then will we be able to speak of solid foundations for preserving Polish
independence in the context of contests on the international arena. -30-
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========================================================
Be A Vice-President Of The Ongoing Orange Revolution
========================================================
11. UKRAINE'S DANCE OF THE OLIGARCHS
By Judy Dempsey, International Herald Tribune (IHT)
Published by The New York Times,
Neuilly Cedex, France, Friday, December 23, 2005
KIEV - If anyone wants to make any sense of what is happening to Ukraine
one year after the Orange Revolution, then a walk past the Parliament
building on Hrushevskoho Street in Kiev could explain a lot.
When in session, the area resembles an open-air luxury car exhibition. All
the latest four-wheel-drive models from BMW, Mercedes, Porsche and
Lexus are parked on the sidewalks and in the streets. Most of the vehicles
are black, with bulletproof materials installed beneath their sleek skins.
Their tinted windows are so thick and dark that no one can look inside to
see the state-of-the-art GPS navigation consoles, the elaborate
communications systems mounted on the dashboards and the plush leather
upholstery. All have drivers, most of them dressed in black leather jackets.
When asked who owned the cars, the drivers either refuse to answer or
simply say, "A parliamentary deputy."
That may be surprising, in a country where salaries for members of
Parliament range from 4,700 to 5,000 hryvnia, or $935 to $995, a month.
But then, this is Ukraine. Since the country won its independence in the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Parliament has become dominated by
the oligarchs - enormously wealthy industrial managers who have interests in
steel, iron, coal, the media and soccer clubs.
They have used Parliament as a forum to protect their interests. These
include campaigning for tax breaks, retaining customs fees to protect their
companies against imports and ensuring a weak, poorly paid judiciary that
has allowed sales of state-owned enterprises at well below market prices.
"Parliament operates under the political umbrella of the oligarchs," said
Igor Burakovsky, director of the independent Institute for Economic
Research and Policy Consulting. "The Parliament consists of many
personal interests - particularly how the oligarchs can influence the
appointment of the cabinet."
Yet only a year ago, tens of thousands of people stood in freezing
temperatures outside Parliament, demanding not only free elections but an
end to corruption and the power of the oligarchs over political life. They
blamed the oligarchs, many of whom own television stations, for muzzling
the media and not allowing objective reporting of the presidential
elections.
The demonstrators held banners bearing pictures of Viktor Yushchenko and
Yulia Timoshenko, leaders of the Orange Revolution, who they believed
would sweep away the old guard and usher in a political system based on
transparency and accountability.
Yushchenko eventually won in a democratic and free vote. He defeated
Viktor Yanukovich, who was backed by Russia and hailed from the
Donetsk region in eastern Ukraine, home to some very powerful oligarchs.
But a year after the Orange Revolution, the oligarchs remain in good humor.
They have started to put their energy and money into next March's
parliamentary elections as they gauge which camp they will support. "Until
the elections, all reforms are on hold," said Vasily Astrov, Ukraine expert
at the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies.
The March elections are crucial because the stakes this time are higher than
ever. For the first time, the president's powers will be curbed while those
of Parliament will be strengthened as Ukraine moves from a presidential
system to a full-fledged parliamentary democracy. This change was agreed to
a year ago, with support from Yushchenko, who said it would put Ukraine
firmly on the path to democracy.
But the move places Yushchenko in a tricky position. As president, he will
lose the power to appoint a cabinet. So the oligarchs are jostling to
influence the outcome of the election, since the largest political groupings
will have the biggest say over cabinet posts.
Under the new rules, the party with a majority in Parliament will nominate a
candidate for prime minister. The president, who will remain commander in
chief of the armed forces and will nominate the foreign and defense
ministers, will no longer have the power to dismiss Parliament without its
consent.
"It will be very difficult to predict the outcome of the elections," said
Elisabetta Falcetti, Ukraine analyst at the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development. "The existence of the oligarchs introduces a completely
new dimension to economic analysis."
Yushchenko is lining up his allies in the hope that he will have a prime
minister with whom he can work.
From interviews with his advisers, it appears that Yushchenko is still
undecided about forming an alliance with Timoshenko, his former prime
minister and the leader of the Motherland Party. Yushchenko dismissed her
last September, partly over economic policy but also because they simply
could not work together. Since then, he has had a better relationship with
Yuri Yekhanurov, a leading member of Yushchenko's Our Ukraine Party.
Yushchenko's main supporter among the oligarchs is Petro Poroshenko,
chairman of a large financial group called Ukrpromivest that includes
shipbuilding, car assembly and confectionery businesses.
Yushchenko retains Poroshenko's support even though he fired him as
secretary of the National Security and Defense Council last September after
the two men clashed with each other and Timoshenko.
Two other oligarchs, David Zhvania and Yevgeny Chervonenko, are standing
behind Yushchenko as well, although they were also ousted from the cabinet
in September, as Yushchenko struggled to achieve a balance among the 14
political parties with seats in Parliament.
Yanukovich, who was personally endorsed by President Vladimir Putin of
Russia in last year's presidential election, has started to reorganize his
Party of the Regions in a bid to become prime minister after the
parliamentary elections, or at least play a big role in the next government.
Yanukovich has the support of Rinat Akhmetov, the most powerful oligarch
in the eastern industrial center of Donetsk, who owns System Capital
Management, a diversified industrial and financial services group.
Timoshenko, a former business tycoon who made her money in the energy
field, is wooing some powerful oligarchs as well, despite her promise in a
recent interview to curb their powers.
"In the economic sense, some oligarchs, corrupt civil servants and business
interests basically built a coalition of forces to extract money from the
state," she said in an interview this month. "The less state, the better,"
she said, "because more state encourages corruption. It leads to an alliance
between the bureaucrats and the oligarchs."
Yet Timoshenko herself depends heavily on oligarchs, including Alexander
Volkov, a legislator from Donetsk. She is also negotiating an alliance with
Igor Kolomoyski, a former board member of Ukraine's central bank and now
head of the Dnipropetrovsk Private Group, which specializes in ferrous
metals and coke. Yet only last year, Kolomoyski had supported Yanukovich.
So what made Kolomoyski switch sides? Ukraine is awash with rumors and
speculation. Astrov says Kolomoyski has become Timoshenko's main financial
supporter. Though her advisers become defensive when the issue of oligarchs
is raised, Ukraine experts say that when Timoshenko was prime minister and
pursued a relentless program of expropriating and reselling businesses, she
often acted from political motives.
Timoshenko has said "some of the resales had been necessary" in trying to
break the oligarchs' political power. But according to Astrov, Timoshenko,
as prime minister, campaigned hard to transfer the ownership of Nikopol
Ferroalloys Plant, a lucrative steel business, to assist Kolomoyski.
Nikopol's owner was Viktor Pinchuk, son-in-law of the former president,
Leonid Kuchma. Pinchuk also owned the Kryvorizhstal metallurgical
enterprise, which he had bought at well below market price in 2004.
Yushchenko had Kryvorizhstal taken from Pinchuk and the business was
resold last October for $4.8 billion, six times the original price. Astrov
said Kolomoyski wants control of Nikopol, and it is scheduled to be resold
in 2006.
Whichever oligarchs side with whichever political party in the coming weeks,
Hyhoriy Nemyria, director of the Center for European and International
Studies, said a Parliament with real powers was "creating a new reality."
"The real centers of power - the president and the National Security and
Defense Council and cabinet - have been eliminated as a result of the
constitutional reforms that will create a parliamentary democracy," said
Nemyria, who is an adviser to Timoshenko.
"All the main political leaders, including Yushchenko, have yet to decide
with which parties they will ally themselves before the elections and
afterward in Parliament," Nemyria said, "because none of them will have an
outright victory. What we are seeing now is a situation where everyone is
out to make strategic compromises in order to gain power, but so far, little
is being said about reforms." -30-
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LINK: http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/12/23/business/wbolig.php
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12. THE ORANGE REVOLUTION: A YEAR AFTER
PANEL: The Orange Revolution: A Year After
Paula Dobriansky, Taras Kuzio, Anders Aslund
American Enterprise Institute (AEI), Wash, D.C., Dec 2005
On December 3, 2004, following massive protests, the Supreme Court of
Ukraine officially annulled the second round results of the country's
disputed presidential elections, widely reported to have been manipulated by
the government. In the rerun, Viktor Yushchenko, the hero of the "Orange
Revolution," was elected. He was sworn in promising economic growth,
rapid integration into western political and economic structures, and an end
to corruption.
Widely celebrated in Ukraine as a "democratic breakthrough," many are now
asking whether the regime has so far fulfilled the hopes and aspirations of
the Ukrainians. Can President Yushchenko overcome the difficult domestic
challenges, including the disappointing economic outlook and the dismissal
of his entire cabinet in September?
What are the prospects for the upcoming constitutional reforms and
parliamentary elections? These and other questions were discussed at a
December 5 AEI panel dedicated to the one-year anniversary of the Orange
Revolution.
[1] THE HONORABLE PAULA DOBRIANSKY - U.S. Dept of State
As Thomas Jefferson once stated: "We are not to expect to be translated
from despotism to liberty in a featherbed." Stable, prosperous, orderly
democracies are not something that can be created in short order and without
arduous toils. Modern history has shown that democratic transitions tend to
proceed gradually, haphazardly, with bumps and turns along the way.
After all, even the United States was not a model democracy one year after
its revolution. Most often, however, countries that have democratic
revolutions ultimately succeed in instituting liberty and rule of law.
When former secretary of state Colin Powell led the U.S. delegation to
Viktor Yushchenko's inauguration, it was incredible to see the thousands
of people on the streets, all wearing orange caps and scarves. A sense of
palpable euphoria was everywhere. The Ukrainian people had finally
emerged as the stakeholders of their own future.
Shortly thereafter, Yushchenko traveled to the United States and spoke in
front of a joint session of Congress thanking the United States for its help
and support during the revolution. During his visit, Yushchenko met with
President George W. Bush and signed a strategic partnership agreement. Bush
congratulated Yushchenko for being an inspiration for those fighting for
freedom and liberty.
One year later, Ukrainians are still working on cementing their newly earned
democracy. Although much progress has been made, numerous issues have
arisen: the most dramatic being the breakup of the Orange Coalition in
September of this year. However, the positive signs of change are
everywhere. Today, Ukrainians have a sense of ownership in their country.
The development of civil society has been impressive: it has grown by leaps
and bounds. Democracy has unleashed creativity and innovation never before
thought possible.
Ukrainian leaders have also worked to promote democracy abroad and have
encouraged, as exemplified by signing the Borjomi Agreement with Georgia,
to democratize countries in the Caspian, Baltic, and Black Sea regions. The
Ukrainian government has also been committed to fighting terrorism, weapons
proliferation, trafficking in persons, and AIDS. Ukraine's aspirations to
join NATO and the WTO will only come to fruition if tangible, progressive
steps are taken. There is no reason to believe they won't be.
Although lingering problems remain--protectionist economic policies,
instability, and limited economic reform--we should all remember that no
country has made a transition from a communist system to one of democracy
with market reforms without some turmoil.
While the hurdles to progress may at times seem insurmountable, as we look
to Ukraine before the Orange Revolution, we can see great progress. The
United States stands ready to help Ukraine and the Ukrainian people to
achieve its goals and aspirations.
[2] TARAS KUZIO - George Washington University
As a precursor to the discussion, it must be noted that the future success
of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine depends on the reunification of the
Yushchenko-Yulia Tymoshenko coalition. The Orange Revolution in
Ukraine has yielded positive outcomes in several key areas. The first is
democratization and human rights. There has been a massive civic
empowerment of the population, in comparison to the Leonid Kuchma
years.
It is estimated that half of Kyiv's population took part in the protests
against the fraudulent elections last year, while nearly two-thirds of the
population of the country now feels that they can effectively stand up for
their right and freedoms, according to recent polls. During Kuchma's regime,
these numbers were significantly lower across the board.
Another key benefit has been the constitutional reform, which has switched
Ukraine from a presidential to a parliamentary system of government. In the
experience of Eastern and Central European states, the parliamentary system
has fared better in promoting democracy and lessening the corruption and
authoritarian tendencies that are prevalent in presidential systems of the
members of the Commonwealth of Independent States.
In addition, this system encourages party growth and competitive party
politics, which will be displayed in the upcoming elections. The virtual
disappearance of the Communist Party and the complete collapse of the
pro-Kuchma centrist camp have been welcome developments.
Although there has not been a complete breakthrough, significant
improvements have been made in combating the pervasive corruption of the
Kuchma regime. The oligarchs are now emerging "out of the shadows" and
forming a more entrepreneurial class, which has already successfully
contributed in raising revenues by a third for the state budget through
increasingly effective collection of profit taxes.
The revolution has helped Ukraine to further disassociate itself from
Russia, as evidenced by a recent Freedom House report, and move in a
direction toward democracy rather than authoritarianism. In contrast to
Russia, Ukrainian civil society is being empowered rather than actively
restrained. This is evidenced by far broader freedom of speech, religious
tolerance, and ultimately the free elections that have happened in Ukraine
for the first time since 1993.
There have been, however, several glaring problems with the implementation
of some of the objectives of the Orange Revolution. Yushchenko has pursued
too broad of an agenda, not focusing enough on domestic matters, and has
thus emerged as more of a symbolic leader in the mold of Mikhail Gorbachev-
-popular abroad, unpopular at home. Why did Yushchenko need the wide
presidential prerogatives, if he did not intend to use them before the
change to the parliamentary system?
Part of Yushchenko's inability to assert his power has been the "parallel
government"--involving the security chief Petro Poroshenko--that has
surfaced to assert its own private interests. The division and "betrayals"
has thus emerged as a key issue.
The allegations of corruption (although without evidence) within the
Yushchenko camp, the constant presence of the business elite around the
president, and the recent Yushchenko-Viktor Yanukovych pact have caused
the public opinion to sour and have precluded the effective progress of the
ideals of the Orange Revolution. Another key underachievement has been the
stalled reprivatization scheme, where the only success has been the sale of
the Kryvorizhstal plant, for which Tymoshenko must be properly credited.
For the Orange Revolution to attain its original ideals, Yushchenko and
Tymoshenko must be reunited. Furthermore, the reprivatization efforts must
continue, and high-level charges against the corrupt elements of the Kuchma
regime must be vigorously pursued.
So far, none of the senior officials have been charged. In fact, this
indicates that there has been no complete break with the former regime.
Thus, Yanukovych's Regions of Ukraine have taken advantage of the
situation and are now in the lead for the March elections.
[3] ANDERS ASLUND - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
With the Orange Revolution, the change to a parliamentary system from a
presidential system means that Ukraine has become more democratic. Yet in
spite of this positive development, economic policy in Ukraine over the past
year can be described as nothing short of disastrous.
The growth rate of the country was lowered by 1percent each month after the
revolution, with the result that Ukraine will have growth of only 3 percent
this year, compared to 12 percent last year. This is further demonstrated by
the fact that in August, GDP fell by 1.6 percent in comparison with August
last year. It is hard to imagine a worse economic policy than the one that
Tymoshenko pursued.
Why was the economic policy so flawed? In a word, reprivatization is the
prime cause of Ukraine's current economic woes. Tymoshenko at one point
had discussed reprivatizing some 3,000 enterprises. In reaction to this,
investors stopped investing and producing much. Metallurgy and machine
building fell most dramatically, and investment in construction also fell.
Businessmen who looked to profit from reprivatization did not invest more
either, instead hoarding cash so that they could purchase the cheap property
that potentially would come to market. Thus, on average, while Ukraine had 9
percent growth per year over the past five years, the economy is now in
crisis.
Furthermore, Tymoshenko's government sharply increased social expenditures.
Prime Minister Yanukovych had doubled public pensions from the previous
year, and Ukraine now saw 16 percent of its GDP going towards public
pensions. In a normal country, public pension expenditures amount to 6 to 8
percent of GDP. In Ukraine, this figure currently stands at 14 percent of
GDP, which is the highest share of pensions to GDP in the world. The
government also increased public salaries by 57 percent.
As both of these policies cannot feasibly be reversed, one would expect
Ukraine to see a significant budget deficit. Yet this has not occurred, as
Ukraine has gotten rid of many low posts in the old tax system. Resulting in
sharply increased tax collection, this policy has now caused public revenue
to rise from 36 percent to 42 percent of GDP.
In the United States, this figure is about 30 percent. If taxes remain too
high, Ukraine cannot expect much economic growth in the future. Tymoshenko
also began to regulate the prices of oil, grain, and meat, with resulting
negative consequences for the economy. All in all, these disastrous economic
policies, coupled with little real economic reform, led to a terrible
economic situation.
As a result, Yushchenko sacked the government. Ukraine's current prime
minister, Yuri Yekhanurov, is the complete opposite of Tymoshenko--pragmatic
rather than ideological, with a clear economic agenda which he knows how to
implement. Economic growth has thus returned--in September, growth was 3
percent, an upswing of 4.6 percent from one year to the other. This shows
that Ukraine's economy has no big structural problems - just that business
had been afraid to operate under Tymoshenko.
This is further evidenced by the current flurry of mergers and acquisitions
activity in the country now, in the absence of any real structural reforms.
Foreign direct investment looks to increase as a result, but Ukraine still
has much to do--including reform of the civil and legal frameworks for
business and more financial regulation from its current minimal state.
What is Ukraine's political outlook? Currently, there are three major
parties: the party of Yanukovych, a political machine that brought
substantial economic growth; the party of Tymoshenko, which has the
attraction of the leader and can represent any views, given the license of
her voters to change her views whenever she pleases; and the party of
Yushchenko, which has developed into a modern conservative party
emphasizing classical liberalism. As few outside of Tymoshenko's own
party accept her, a reestablishment of the Orange Coalition looks unlikely.
Another major outcome of the Orange Revolution is that major polarization
between Ukraine and Russia is now likely. With Ukraine much more
democratic, while Russia has veered increasingly sharply towards
authoritarianism, Moscow's leaders feel that the people can do little on
their own.
Consequently, whatever happens in Ukraine, through the eyes of leadership
in Moscow, is due to the manipulation of Ukraine's leaders. Further, this
manipulation is of course pushed by Washington, so that anything happening
in Ukraine is perceived as ultimately the work of Washington. As such,
Ukraine is being pushed to the West strongly by Russia, and relations
between Russia and the United States look only to become increasingly
worse. -30-
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AEI's Ilya Bourtman and Diana Iskelov and research assistant
Igor Khrestin prepared this summary.
LINK: http://www.aei.org/events/filter.all,eventID.1201/summary.asp
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13. FLAWS OF MENTALITY
ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By Sergiy Sorkoa
Ukrayinska Pravda, Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, December 26, 2005
While analysing the events of the November - December of the last year
some experts conclude, that the 'Orange Revolution' was not a revolution
as such, considering its main features: it did not bring about a change to
socio - political system in the country, nor has it changed the elites in
the society.
However, by predicting the events that would develop after March the 26th,
2006, it can be asserted that the elections to councils at all levels in the
Ukraine could attain the signs of a Revolution.
The elections would reinforce the political reform, which legally starts
acting on the 1st of January, 2006, but factually after the finalisation of
the election results.
As a result of this the socio - political system will change from
presidential - parliamentary to parliamentary - presidential and also a
substantial change in political elites would occur.
As early as in 1999 Zbigniew Brzezinski predicted, that during President
Kuchma's second term elites in Ukrainian politics will change. At the top
echelons of Ukrainian ruling establishment, representatives of ex-
communist party nomenclature and red directors would be replaced by
a new wave of managers and economists.
During the years of 1999 - 2004, that's what happened, new politicians such
as Yushchenko, Timoshenko, Yanukovich, Medvedchuk, Yekhanurov and
others, reached the highest offices in the state and are now defining the
rules of the Ukrainian political Olympus.
However, at the time, and even now, all of them worked in the political
system created by Kuchma and often themselves helped along to the
creation of such state governing mechanism.
Next year on the 26th of March there would not only be a substantial
alteration of the ruling establishment at all levels ( by 30 - 40% in the
Parliament (Verhovna Rada) and by 50 - 80% in the local councils), but a
change in the system of government itself.
At the moment, the Ukrainian society is unsure of where it is heading. Not
least of all because of the array of interests of the internal political
groups and foreign geopolitical interests of Russia, USA, EU and Poland,
who all in one way or another are connected to Ukraine.
Unfortunately, the weakness and irresoluteness of the current authorities in
Ukraine act as an incentive for interest in the elections not only of the
Ukrainians but also of close and not so close neighbours.
Right now the competing sides are just taking up the starting positions on
the field of the political game that will ensue in Ukraine during the
winter - spring of 2006.
Although, there were already diversionary moves and artillery preparation in
the shape of the petrol and the sugar crisis, the corruption scandal, the
dismissal of the Timoshenko's government and the struggle for the 2006
budget.
In turn, declarations came from the USA about the abolition of the Jackson -
Vennik amendment and there is the EU declaration on giving the Ukraine the
status of the market economy, and finally the powerful 'gas attack' directed
at Ukraine from the Russian side. It can be stated with assuredness, just
watch what will happen next!
All of the sides of this game understand, that Ukraine before and after
March 2006 - will be two different entities. Each one of the sides of the
political game has its own vision of how Ukraine should look in 2006.
Hence again, as always - "this is our last and most decisive battle"! Thus,
yet again, the Ukrainians will be divided into the reds and the whites, the
orange ones and the blue ones, the easterners and the benderovtsi, the rich
and the poor, the Europeans and the Asians, the patriots and the traitors,
the pro-Russian and the pro-American, the Ukrainian speaking and the
Russian speaking ones.
It appears, that the Ukrainians should step aside for a moment from these
passions and have a look at battles, concerning their own country, raging
between Russia and the USA, Poland and Belarus, communists and anti -
communists, the right wing and the left wing ones.
Then, like in a joke: the forest-keeper came and kicked everyone out.
Most bewildering is the Russian position, who does not learn and it appears
does not want to learn from its own strategic foreign policy mistakes.
What benefit does Russia reap from its empire-building missionary role?
Billions and billions of dollars have gone to waste for nothing, - on
supporting a worldwide revolution, in support of the red and the pink
regimes in Africa and Latin America and in support of abhorrent modern
regimes of Lukashenko and Karimov.
Millions of Russian lives were lost for no apparent reason in Korea,
Vietnam, Afghanistan and Chechnya.
Are the average Russian citizens together with the wise and mighty Vladimir
Vladimirovich unable, without bias, to answer the question: why every
country that in their history had the misfortune to encounter Russia's
assistance puts its uttermost efforts to keep away from Russia?
Why almost all of the Russian neighbours (with the exception of not very
democratic and dependant regimes), are unfriendly towards it, such are the
Baltic countries, Eastern European states, Georgia and Azerbajdjan? Why
Russia without a thought but with the stubborn determination pushes
Ukraine to join attitudes of these countries?
What did Russia loose, when the Baltic and Eastern European countries
entered NATO and EU? Did the Russian security suffer at all or did
Russia loose out economically in any way?
If Russia desires a counter revolution in Ukraine, it will get such a
revolution that the distance already separating it from Ukraine would be
furthered by yet another two steps.
Still, during the Soviet era, a journalist from one of the papers decided to
investigate the differences in the mentality of the inhabitants of Moscow,
then still Leningrad (St Petersburg) and Kiev, by a way of a simple
experiment: what an average person from those cities, while in the public
transport, would do if somebody stubbornly tried to pressure them out
of their standing place.
The results were as follows: the inhabitants of Moscow, usually quite
vociferously, entered into a confrontation. People from Leningrad
apologised and offered the place to one another.
As a rule however, Kiev's residents silently used their arms and legs to
stubbornly hold their places and stood firm. Notably, the harder they
were pushed the more stubborn their resistance grew.
Our and foreign politicians, still have not understood: the harder you
pressure the Ukrainians the more vigour there will be in their opposition.
(Translated by Vladyslav Kostyuk)
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LINK: http://www.pravda.com.ua/en/news/2005/12/26/4945.htm
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14. WHAT ARE THE RUSSIANS BUYING?
OP-ED: By Anne Applebaum, The Washington Post
Washington, D.C., Wednesday, December 14, 2005; A29
Even here in Washington -- a city populated by lobbyists who once held
political office and government officials who once worked as lobbyists --
it's hard to top the story of Gerhard Schroeder. Last week the former German
chancellor announced that he'd accepted a job offer from Gazprom, the
state-controlled Russian energy mega-company.
As one of his last acts in office, Schroeder signed an agreement to build a
diplomatically and environmentally controversial Baltic Sea gas pipeline
from Russia to Germany. Now he's working for the company that will build it.
It's as if Jimmy Carter had negotiated the return of the Panama Canal to
Panama -- and then signed a lucrative contract to manage the shipping lanes.
But there's more here than just the former German chancellor's quest for
personal enrichment -- or funds to pay alimony to his three ex-wives. The
story also reflects the growing international power of Russian money. Much
like the Saudis, who spent the 1970s buying up London real estate, the
Russian tycoons spent their first decade of billionaire-hood sunning
themselves in southern France and crowding the slopes at Gstaad. And just as
the Saudis eventually learned to make more fruitful use of their money --
putting prominent Americans on lucrative boards, donating money to their
favorite causes, even befriending their wives -- the Russians, too, have now
realized that petrodollars go a long way.
What they've been seeking so far is respectability of the sort that will
help Americans overlook their murky origins and will win Russian companies
coveted listings on Western stock exchanges. Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the oil
tycoon in prison in part because he got too good at this sort of thing, gave
big chunks of money to the Library of Congress.
In return, the librarian of Congress hosted a party for his foundation. A
similar desire for respectability compelled Vladimir Potanin, another
Russian magnate, to become a patron of the arts. In return, the Guggenheim
Museum in New York put him on its board.
This year the Woodrow Wilson Center -- a federal institution that raises
some funds privately and that encompasses the Kennan Institute for advanced
Russian studies -- even gave a "Corporate Citizenship" award to Vagit
Alekperov, chairman of Lukoil, another energy mega-company. At the award
dinner, James Langdon of the D.C. law firm Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld
lauded Alekperov as "an innovator and leader," which suited all concerned.
Alekperov, a man who with amazing speed acquired 10 percent ownership of a
company whose reserves may match those of Exxon Mobil, got his credibility.
The Wilson Center raised some $400,000, mostly from U.S. oil companies, at
that dinner. Fred Bush, chief fundraiser for the center, says of the new
Russian billionaires that he's "happy to have their money" and wishes they'd
give more.
Others point out that it's better for Russian moguls to support Russian
scholars than to fritter their money away buying lift tickets. The
suggestion of influence does cause some discomfort, particularly since many
Russian companies aren't exactly independent of the Russian state.
Last week Paul Saunders, executive director of the Nixon Center, furiously
denied a Russian newspaper report of Kremlin plans to set up a think tank,
funded by the Russian government and Russian oligarchs, in conjunction with
the center, which is affiliated with the Richard Nixon Library and
Birthplace. Saunders admits that the Nixon Center accepts "small" amounts of
money from Russia, but he issued a statement calling the Russian journalist
who wrote the story a "specialist in black PR."
Blair Ruble, director of the Kennan Institute, also worries that some might
think his scholars are influenced by Russian money, and he admits to having
questions about donations from Lukoil and other Russian companies. He says
he doesn't allow donors to have any influence over research. Besides, when
someone such as Schroeder goes to work for Gazprom, Ruble says, the
argument against accepting Russian money "becomes harder and harder to
make" to fundraisers and boards of directors.
Generalized paranoia -- and in particular the assumption that anyone
expressing an opinion about anything is being paid to do so -- is probably
the least attractive attribute of Russian political culture, and I'm not
going to indulge in it here. But Schroeder's new job should raise awareness
that there may be some mixed motives out there: If nothing else, Russian
companies, like their Saudi and indeed American counterparts, have now made
it known that they'll reward their friends. (applebaumanne@yahoo.com)
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http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/13/AR2005121301511_pf.html
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[return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
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15. A RUSSIA-UKRAINE GAME OF CHICKEN
NEWS ANALYSIS: By Judy Dempsey,
International Herald Tribune, Europe, Friday, December 16, 2005
BERLIN - A year after Russia failed to get its favorite candidate elected as
president of Ukraine and instead had to settle for the pro-Western leader
Viktor Yushchenko, Moscow is at it again, this time using natural gas as a
weapon to wield influence over its neighbor and former satellite.
Both countries are playing a high-stakes game of chicken that could have
unpredictable consequences for the region and for Europe. In dispute are
the price Ukraine pays for the natural gas it imports from Russia and the
transit fees it receives from Russia for the Russian gas piped across
Ukraine and into Western Europe.
The battle pits Gazprom, the Russian state-owned energy giant where the
big decisions are made by the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, against
Naftogaz, the gas pipeline operator owned by the Ukrainian government.
Not for the first time, Putin is using Gazprom as an instrument of foreign
policy - this time tightening the noose around Ukraine by insisting that the
price of natural gas exports to the country be raised from the equivalent of
$50 per 1,000 cubic meters, or 35,300 cubic feet, to more than $220.
But unlike several other former Soviet republics that have had to swallow
such increases, Ukraine is in a strong position to fight back: It owns one
of the biggest gas transit routes to Europe. More than 80 percent of
Russia's natural gas exports to Western Europe have to pass through
Ukraine.
If Russia increases its gas prices to Ukraine, then Kiev can push up the
transit fees it charges Gazprom, from $1.09 per 100 kilometers for 1,000
cubic meters of gas to perhaps as high as $2. (Gazprom has already said it
is willing to raise the transit fees to as much as $1.75.)
This dependence on Ukraine explains why Gazprom, with financial support
from Germany, decided to build a pipeline under the Baltic Sea that would
allow Gazprom direct access to its West European markets. But since the
North European Pipeline will not be completed until 2010, and even then
will not be able to accommodate all of Europe's natural gas needs, Russia
will only have diminished its reliance on Ukraine, not ended it.
As Ukraine digs in its heels, Gazprom has appealed for support from
European Union countries, particularly Germany, its largest market.
Gazprom says Ukraine is threatening to cut off supplies to Western Europe,
which obtains a quarter of its natural gas from Russia. Ukraine says it is
only responding to Gazprom's threats to stop delivering natural gas to
Ukraine - 29 billion cubic meters per year - if the two sides cannot reach a
deal.
Alexander Medvedev, deputy chairman of Gazprom, denies using such crude
tactics, or that the Russian government is using his company to blackmail
other countries. Gazprom is simply applying market rules, Medvedev said in
an interview in Berlin.
"The EU said Ukraine was a market-status economy and it wants to join the
World Trade Organization, so we are simply applying commercial criteria,"
he said. "That means paying world market prices for gas."
Few experts in the region believe the threats from either side. They say
that if energy supplies to Europe were disrupted, the credibility of both
countries would be undermined.
Igor Burakovsky, director of the independent Institute for Economic
Research and Policy Consulting in Kiev, says the threats were nothing
more than posturing.
"It is all propaganda that Gazprom will charge Ukraine $220," Burakovsky
said. "It will be lower. I can't say how much, but Ukraine will have to
start paying higher prices for its energy. It is also propaganda that
Gazprom would threaten supplies to Ukraine and Europe. Its credibility as
a reliable supplier of energy to Europe would be at stake."
Still, Putin has in the past used Gazprom as his foreign policy instrument,
albeit with mixed success. Gazprom raised natural gas prices to Poland,
forcing Poland to seek other suppliers and develop alternative sources of
energy. It raised gas prices to Georgia, which forced that country to
introduce economic reforms. And this month Gazprom announced it would
raise prices for the Baltic states and Moldova, whose government has been
tilted toward the West.
"Russia was punishing Moldova for its pro-Western stance," said Iwona
Wisniewska, an energy expert at the Center for Eastern Studies in Warsaw.
But Ukraine is different. The former Soviet republic is richly endowed with
iron, aluminum, metals, grain and coal, and it has a substantial armaments
industry, as well as an extensive gas transportation system. Ukraine was
once the second-largest contributor to the Soviet economy, after Russia, and
Russia remains its biggest trading partner. Ethnic Russians make up more
than one-sixth of the population.
It was Ukraine's independence in the early 1990s that dealt a deep
psychological and political blow to Russia's prestige and status as a great
power. Russia has tried to woo back its former satellite, but Yushchenko
has committed Ukraine to joining NATO and the European Union.
The EU's decision this month to give Ukraine market-economy status and
support its entry into the World Trade Organization was a welcome lift for
Yushchenko but a blow to Russia. It was then that the polemics between
Gazprom and Ukraine escalated.
Alexander Rahr, a Russia expert at the German Council on Foreign Relations,
said the game may be over for both sides. "These developments with the EU
showed Putin that he can give up the idea of rebuilding the Commonwealth of
Independent States in the old fashion," Rahr said.
"Putin is now saying, You have to choose between going to the West or else
supporting the idea of a Single Economic Space under Russia," Rahr said,
referring to a proposal made in 2003 at a summit of the Commonwealth of
Independent States, which is made up of 11 former Soviet republics. "Anyone
outside the Single Economic Space will be treated as a foreign capitalist."
Ukraine, too, will have to accept that the old days of cheap Russian gas are
over.
Despite all the rhetoric on both sides, Ukrainian economists have said there
could be a silver lining in Russia's plans to raise energy prices.
Burakovsky said pressure by Russia could finally speed up reforms of the
energy sector, which he said was corrupt and inefficient. Cheap energy, he
added, has given the energy-intensive manufacturing industry no reason to
modernize.
"We have been talking about raising energy prices and introducing a cash
payment system for our energy imports from Russia for many, many months,"
Burakovsky said. "Nothing was done. Maybe now, finally, the inevitability of
higher energy prices will precipitate some reforms."
Politically, higher energy costs could play into the hands of those
pro-Russian parties competing in Ukraine's parliamentary elections,
scheduled for March, because they could blame Yushchenko's pro-Western
stances as the reason for Russia's move.
In that case, Rahr said, there is a chance for the EU to play a role, by
opening up its markets to Ukrainian commodities. "If Europe goes on about
closer relations with Ukraine," he said, "here is a chance to lift some of
the trade barriers." -30-
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LINK: http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/12/16/business/gazprom.php
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[return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
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Power Corrupts and Absolute Power Corrupts Absolutely.
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16. WE ARE TOGETHER, WE ARE MANY, LET'S HELP!
Ukrayinska Pravda, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wed, December 21, 2005
KYIV - Ukrayinska Pravda continues the charity drive "We Are Together,
We Are Many, Let's Help" that was started last year. If we take a look
around, we will always find someone who needs our help.
Our first priority is to help orphanages that are lacking hot water,
bedding, pencils, soap, and other basic necessities, not to mention
clothing, dishes, etc.
Last year we published a list of orphanages with their addresses and
phone numbers. You can view the list here
http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2004/12/28/15317.htm
If you know addresses of other institutions such as senior care facilities,
orphanages, or individuals that need help, please include their information
in your comments.
Let's show we care. Every one of us can make a difference and brighten
someone's life.
The Orange Revolution demonstrated that Ukrainians will give everything
they have in order to support the right cause. Last year people brought
hot tea and coffee, pots of borscht, gloves and warm clothing to the
people on Maydan.
Maydan became a symbol of feeling that "WE CAN!" Today, WE CAN
help those that need it most.
It is our children. Children that do not have parents, but they are our
children. Do you know that there are thousands of them?
It is our seniors. Those who have not had a visitor in a long time, but
they are our neighbors, our seniors. It is someone in a wheelchair who
might be spending all his or her life inside the apartment. Maybe it is
your neighbor.
Go to the orphanage; bring them some fruit, candy and toys. Or holiday
decorations. Bring them clothing and books.
Maybe you have an old computer that can be fixed and installed in the
classroom. Internet providers can donate web access. Photographers can
donate their pictures. Plumbers can assist in fixing the old pipes and
businessmen can donate money to build new playground.
Please make a call to the orphanage and ask what they need. And they will
tell you: "Everything!" They need everything from TVs, VCRs and printers,
to pictures, linen and dinnerware. They need vitamins and medicine.
They also need your generosity, your kindness and attention. There are
many ways in which you can help. What is important is that you do it.
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Children who need help (by region)
http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2004/12/28/15317.htm.
Article translated into English by Yana Rathman.
LINK: http://www.pravda.com.ua/en/news/2005/12/21/4939.htm
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[return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
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17. PROVIDE DIRECT ASSISTANCE TO IMPOVERISHED UKRAINIAN
ELDERLY THROUGH AMERICAN FRIENDS OF "FOR SURVIVAL"
Make A Difference: For Survival, For Dignity, For Ukraine
Katie Fox, Volunteer Director, American Friends of "For Survival"
Washington, D.C., Wednesday, December 21, 2005
Dear Friends,
Please consider a final year end gift to Ukraine this year. As most of you
know, for the past several years I have been running a very small charity to
provide direct assistance to impoverished Ukrainian elderly. I decided that
I needed to do something to immediately and directly help the elderly people
who I saw begging on Kyiv's streets, in the wake of the economic collapse
that accompanied the break up of the Soviet Union.
This charity, the American Friends of "For Survival," is an all volunteer
effort, run by Americans here and in Kyiv. All funds collected are sent to
the American volunteers in Kyiv, who work with the established Ukrainian
charity "For Survival" so screen applicants and distribute funds. Every
cent of the funds we collect go directly to a poor elderly person to cover
basic living expenses.
I am making a final appeal this year, because, unfortunately, I have to.
Most of you know that Ukraine saw momentous changes this year, many
very positive. However, 2005 was also a year of tremendous inflation and
rising prices, especially in Kyiv. More than 80% of pensions are still
below the government-established minimum subsistence level.
"American Friends of 'For Survival'" is a registered 501(c)3 not-for-profit
organization. Donations are tax-deductible. Donations should be made out
to "For Survival" and mailed %Katie Fox, 3100 Connecticut Avenue #235,
Washington, D.C.
Thank you very much just for considering this and happy holidays!
Katie Fox, Washington, D.C.
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FOOTNOTE: The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) is publishing this
appeal because we have known about this project for some time and
are impressed with the work Katie Fox and the group of volunteers
that run the American Friends of "For Survival." Katie's daytime job
is as Deputy Director - Eurasia for the National Democratic Institute
(NDI) here in Washington. She can be contacted at katief@ndi.org.
Your support for this fine program will be much appreciated. EDITOR
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