ACTION UKRAINE REPORT - AUR
An International Newsletter, The Latest, Up-To-Date
In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis and Commentary
Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion,
Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World
UKRAINE'S NEW CRISIS
ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By James Sherr (Article One)
UKRAINE POLITICS: THE SCRAMBLE FOR POWER
There is little chance Ukraine will enjoy political stability or
coherent government for the foreseeable future. (Article Seven)
VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO'S 'WHITE HOUSE'
Ukrainian presidential secretariat's weaknesses analysed (Article Twelve)
"SOCIETY OF YU'S AWARENESS"
No alternative to "grand coalition" in Ukraine - Russian pundit (Article Sixteen)
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT - AUR - NUMBER 733
Mr. E. Morgan Williams, Publisher and Editor
PUBLISHED IN WASHINGTON, D.C., SUNDAY, JULY 16, 2006
The Best Commentary and Analysis About Ukraine is found in
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INDEX OF ARTICLES --------
Clicking on the title of any article takes you directly to the article.
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1. UKRAINE'S NEW CRISIS
ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By James Sherr
CSRC, UK Defence Academy, United Kingdom
Published by the Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #733, Article 1
Washington, D.C., Sunday, 16 July 2006
2. UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT WARNS WARRING FACTIONS IN
PARLIAMENT DEADLINE FOR CRISIS SOLUTION IS JULY 25
Weekly radio address to the people of Ukraine
Ukrainian Radio First Programme, Kiev, in Ukrainian, 15 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service - United Kingdom, Saturday, Jul 15, 2006
3. YUSHCHENKO TO PARTIES: SIGN DEAL OR FACE NEW ELECTION
By Ron Popeski, Reuters, Kiev, Ukraine, Sat Jul 15, 2006
4. UKRAINE'S SOCIALIST PARTY IN REVOLT
Local cells of Ukraine's Socialist Party outraged by leader's behaviour
Many want to start the Yuriy Lutsenko Bloc
UT1 state TV, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1200 gmt 14 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Sat, Jul 14, 2006
5. UKRAINE'S EX-PM YANUKOVYCH TOPS POPULARITY RATING
Yanukovych 31%, Tymoshenko 19%, Yushchenko 8%, Moroz 5.5%
Symonenko 3.5%, Vitrenko 3.3%, Other 29.7%
NTN, Kiev, Ukraine, in Ukrainian 1600 gmt 15 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Sat, Jul 15, 2006
6. PRES SECRETARIAT SAYS PARLIAMENT'S APPOINTMENT OF
PRIME MINISTER WITHOUT SUBMISSION BY PRESIDENT IS ILLEGAL
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Friday, July 14, 2006
7. UKRAINE POLITICS: THE SCRAMBLE FOR POWER
There is little chance Ukraine will enjoy political stability or
coherent government for the foreseeable future.
NEWS ANALYSIS: The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited (EIU)
New York, New York, Thursday, July 13, 2006
8. MAKE YOUR DECISION MR. PRESIDENT
Ukraine Crisis, Lawmakers Call on Yushchenko To Intervene
Associated Press (AP), Kiev, Ukraine, Friday, July 14, 2006
9. OUR UKRAINE PARTY NAMES ITS CONDITIONS TO JOIN
COMMUNISTS, SOCIALISTS AND PARTY OF REGIONS
IntelliNews - Ukraine Today, Kyiv, Ukraine, Friday, July 14, 2006
10. NEW BLOC COULD MEAN RIVALS WILL LEAD UKRAINE
By Judy Dempsey, International Herald Tribune and The NY Times
Paris, France, New York, Friday, July 14, 2006
11. UKRAINE'S NEW COALITION WILL NOT EXPEL COMMUNISTS
& NOT BACKTRACK ON YANUKOVYCH FOR PRIME MINISTER
Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian 1421 gmt 13 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Friday, Jul 14, 2006
12. VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO'S 'WHITE HOUSE'
Ukrainian presidential secretariat's weaknesses analysed
ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By Oksana Kozak
Glavred, Kiev, Ukraine, in Russian 0000 gmt 13 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Saturday, Jul 15, 2006
13. UKRAINE CHAOS POSES QUESTIONS ON EU ENLARGEMENT
Ukraine should focus on internal "Europeanisation" of its
political, judicial and business environment rather than
focusing on EU-based foreign policy for now.
Andrew Rettman, EU OBSERVER, Brussels, Belgium, July 13, 2006
14. THE ORANGE CIRCUS & UKRAINE'S CIRCULAR POLITICS
The Economist, London, UK, Thursday, 13 July 2006
15. EASTERN, WESTERN COUNCILS DIFFER ON UKRAINIAN CRISIS
NTN, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1400 gmt 14 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Fri, July 14, 2006
16. "SOCIETY OF YU'S AWARENESS"
No alternative to "grand coalition" in Ukraine - Russian pundit
COMMENTARY: By Stanislav Belkovskiy, a Russian pundit
Ukrayinska Pravda web site, Kiev, in Ukrainian 7 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Tuesday, Jul 11, 2006
========================================================
1. UKRAINE'S NEW CRISIS
ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By James Sherr
CSRC, UK Defence Academy, United Kingdom
Published by the Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #733, Article 1
Washington, D.C., Sunday, 16 July 2006
The surprise formation of an anti-Orange, 'anti-crisis' coalition, triggered
by the defection of the Socialist Party leader, Oleksandr Moroz, has
plunged Ukraine into its greatest political crisis since the presidential
elections of 2004.
The decision that supposedly triggered Moroz's defection, the blocking of
his bid to become Speaker, was understandable in the rude conditions of
Ukraine's political system: a system, in Kyrylo Orovetskyy's words, without
'fixed rules, moral umpires and political traditions'.[i]
In a system in which parliamentary immunity is licence to do 'anything', the
umpire had best be immoral on the home team's behalf, and Poroshenko fit
that bill. But in the algorithm of coalition politics and in terms of
political appearances, Poroshenko's nomination was not a wise one.
In the world of appearances, Moroz's claim to the post was also a fair one,
consistent with the imperfect standards of fairness that prevail in
proportional voting systems even in mature democracies.
However, Ukraine is not a mature democracy. In the USA, the UK and even
in France, party divisions are divisions within one political regime and not
between two. It is the defection from one regime to another regime - which
Moroz claims to have built his career opposing - that makes his defiance of
electoral commitments so breathtaking and makes the charges of treachery
so easy to justify.
THESE DEVELOPMENTS REFLECT:
[1] The chronic indecisiveness of Yushchenko: enhanced by an entourage
that quarrelled over the terms of an Orange coalition for three months since
the March elections. An astute politician would have consolidated the
Orange victory in March 2006 by swiftly concluding a coalition agreement.
Yet the President magisterially refused to be rushed.
At a macro level, he has been a visionary rather than a strategist; at the
micro level, he has been an arbitrator rather than an arbiter and a
conciliator rather than a tactician. Since his inauguration in January
2005, he has frequently lost sight of the enemy and the country.
[2] The thwarted ambition of Moroz: who cannot forget that in a free vote,
he might have become President of Ukraine in 1999-yet who, as junior
coalition partner in 2006, was not only barred from returning to his former
post, but asked to endure the added indignity of yielding to Petro
Poroshenko.
Nevertheless, he accepted this indignity in the Orange coalition agreement,
and the obvious question is what changed his mind between 22 June and 7
July.
[3] The comparative advantages of Regions: a 'vertical' of authority
modelled on Putin's,[ii] a cunning and brutal approach to power,[iii] the
best distillation of Western and Russian PR and the remorseless
employment of its financial resources to penetrate administrative
structures and buy up those who can be bought;[iv]
THEY ALSO HAVE EXTREMELY WORRYING
IMPLICATIONS FOR WESTERN INTERESTS:
[1] They are resurrecting the risk of turmoil and civil conflict in Ukraine.
At least two frontiers of legitimacy appear to have been breached:
the Constitution and parliamentary Code of Procedure; and the alleged
bribery of MPs.[v] Even Yushchenko, the inveterate conciliator, has
termed Moroz's move 'not in line with the constitution'.[vi]
Tymoshenko and much of Yushchenko's 'Nasha Ukraina' are calling
for new elections, key figures in the Socialist Party have resigned, and
activists from both camps are setting up tents outside parliament.
[2] They resurrect a threat to democracy. Unlike the left in Central
Europe, the Party of Regions is unreconstructed and unrepentant. It
continues to deny the legitimacy of Yushchenko's victory in 2004.
It is a distinctly regional force, hated by the majority of the country,
which despite disillusionment with Yushchenko, gave fewer votes to
Yanukovych in March 2006 (32%) than he received in the first round
of the 2004 presidential elections (36%).
The threshold of irreversibility-if the pre-revolutionary parties come back
to power, it no longer matters-has not been cleared in Ukraine.
[3] They resurrect a threat of Russian dominance and represent a setback
to security in the Black Sea region. Yanukovych and Moroz firmly oppose
Ukraine's membership of NATO.
Whilst rhetorically positive about the EU, Yanukovych will promote the
Russian sponsored Single Economic Space, which without Ukraine cannot
become the 'counterweight' to the EU that Putin seeks.
Although Yushchenko retains formal primacy in foreign and security policy,
his own weakness and the budgetary powers of the 'Rada' would, sooner or
later, render these prerogatives moot.[vii] In these circumstances, Georgia
would lose its strongest regional ally.
The newly revived GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) and
the larger Community of Democratic Choice would lose their rationale and
Ukraine's cooperation with the EU in Transniestria would end.
[4] They will multiply risks to energy security and diversity, which to a
significant extent depends upon Ukraine retaining ownership of its pipeline
network.[viii]
On 13 July, in contradiction to all previous assurances, the Chairman of
'Naftohaz Ukrainiy' (the state owned but opaquely managed gas company)
signalled that ownership would be ceded to a 'joint' Russo-Ukrainian entity
in exchange for low energy prices.[ix]
Although they might demand a price for their services, Yanukovych and
Moroz can be expected to do everything to facilitate Ukraine's integration
into Russia's energy 'space'.
POSSIBLE RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT:
The Russian leadership would have four reasons to support the scenario
that has developed:
[1] They recognised after March 2006 that the Party of Regions had little
chance of coming to power by democratic means;
[2] They are determined to block Ukraine's trajectory to NATO and have
been alarmed by Ukraine's progress in defence reform over the past two
years;
[3] They are afraid of Yulia Tymoshenko who, for all her deficiencies, is
an astute and courageous politician with the ability and determination to
oppose them;
[4] In particular, they fear that Tymoshenko will pick apart the gas accords
of January 2006, expose the schemes behind them and purge the energy
sector and security services of individuals aligned with or suborned by the
Kremlin.
The Kremlin also has opportunity, given its back channels to the Party of
Regions, as well as actors independent of them. Indications that one of
Moroz's interlocutors was Viktor Medvedchuk, Kuchma's former Chief of
Staff, might point to Kremlin involvement.[x]
Ukraine's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Borys Tarasyuk, has strongly implied
that the Kremlin is the author of a scenario, timed to coincide with the G8
summit.[xi]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
The fluidity of the situation and the risks to Western interests call for
prompt public messages by Western governments audible inside the G8
and across Ukraine's political spectrum.
But in the context of a new Middle East war and the ongoing wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan, the risk is not that messages will be insufficiently
strong, but that there will be no messages at all. If that risk can be averted,
the messages should stress:
[1] The importance we attach to the observance of democratic and
constitutional norms in Ukraine and our determination to support those
who defend them;
[2] The impermissibility of interference by others in Ukraine's internal
affairs;
[3] That the doors to Euro-Atlantic integration remain open and that
Ukraine's integration prospects depend solely upon its will and capacity
to advance them.
[4] Finally, Western governments (and the EU) should warn President
Yushchenko of the threat that will be posed to Ukraine's independence
if Russia acquires de facto control of its pipeline network. -30-
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ENDNOTES:
[i] Kyrylo Orovetskiy, 'Political Animal Moroz', 'Ukrainskaya Pravda' web
site, 7 July 2006, cited in 'BBC Summary of World Broadcasts') [hereafter
SWB]
[ii] According to Yulia Mostovaya, 'Only three people in the Party of
Regions-Akhmetov, Yanukovych and Kliuyev-make decisions, and everyone
else obeys.' 'Curtain Drops on the Maidan Stage', 'Zerkalo Nedeli', No 26
(605), 8-14 July 2006
[iii] As a case in point, Regions nominated the Chairman of its Political
Council, Mykola Azarov, for the Speaker's post, yet the entire faction
immediately dropped Azarov and voted for Moroz once the leadership
ordered it to do so. In Mostovaya's words, 'Just imagine a reversed
situation:
Our Ukraine nominates Poroshenko for the Speaker; right after that, the
president calls to Parliament and gives new instructions, and the whole
faction votes for Moroz-without questions, without objections. Even Petro
Poroshenko would not vote for himself. You say it is impossible, and you
are right'. 'Ibid'.
[iv] For detailed allegations about Regions penetration of the SBU (Security
Service of Ukraine), see Vira Chorna, 'The Security Service of Ukraine? SBU
Chief Ihor Drizhchanyy has the SBU Serve the Clans and Moscow', 'Ukraina
Moloda', 1 June 2006
[v] Yulia Tymoshenko claims that some members of her own faction were
offered between $5-10m to defect to the 'anti-crisis' coalition.
('Ukrainian faction leader hopes to resolve crisis by "political means", TV
5, cited in 'SWB' 13 July) In a Ukrainskaya Pravda interview with Ruslan
Shelenko on 11 July, a leading member of Regions, Taras Chornovil, asked to
confirm whether the Socialists were offered $83m or $250m in bribes, denied
the charges. ('New Ukrainian coalition MP advocates Speaker, denies
bribery allegations', cited in 'SWB', 11 July).
[vi] Presidential website, cited in 'SWB' 13 July.
[vii] As if anticipating the fact, Yanukovych warned that one of the first
steps of the new parliamentary coalition would be to change Ukraine's
foreign policy. Whereas Borys Tarasyuk firmly stated that this was not its
prerogative (1+1 TV, Kyiv, 8 July 2006, cited in 'SWB'), President
Yushchenko, whilst reiterating his 'determination' to preserve the
pro-Western course, seems more prepared to enter into a dialogue about this
with the coalition. (e.g., 'President Yushchenko Urges New Coalition not to
Alter Ukraine's Pro-Western Course', 'Action Ukraine Report', 11 July 2006).
[viii] In summer 2005 Gazprom's leadership admitted that its principal
interest was not the price Ukraine paid for gas, but low transit costs to
its principal market, the EU. The Ukrainian network supplies the EU with 80
per cent of the gas that it imports from the former Soviet Union.
[ix] Since the conclusion of the Ukraine-Russia gas accords in January 2006,
President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yekhanurov have on numerous
occasions assured Western representatives and the Ukrainian public that the
oil and gas pipeline network would remain under Ukrainian ownership. Yet
on 13 July, the new Chairman of 'Naftohaz Ukraiyniy', Oleksandr Bolkisev,
officially endorsed an understanding that Moscow will maintain the previous
gas price for Kiev, 95 dollars per 1,000 cu.m., until the year end, as a
quid pro quo for negotiating the 'joint management' of the Ukrainian gas
transport system. (TV5, 13 July, cited in SWB).
[x] According to 'Ukrainskaya Pravda Online', 7 July, Medvedchuk (not a
traditional ally of Moroz) promptly sent him a congratulatory telegram on
conclusion of the coalition. The press service of Medvedchuk's Social
Democratic Party of Ukraine (United) expressed the assurance that Moroz
'would support further democratisation of authority, protection of the
social interests of Ukrainian citizens, stable economic growth and effective
external policy on behalf of Ukraine'.
[xi] Speaking on Ukraine's TV 1 on 13 July, Tarasyuk stated that '[s]pecial
concern is aroused by the fact that the so-called anti-crisis members are
acting in accordance with carefully planned scenarios, which are developed
outside Ukraine. One gets the impression that the authors of those
scenarios, apart from destabilization in Ukraine, need a cheap demonstration
ahead of the G8 meeting. 'We regard these steps as external attempts to
interfere in internal political processes in Ukraine'.' -30-
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOTE: The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily
those of the UK Ministry of Defence. James Sherr has been actively
involved in matters related to the government, politics and international
relations of Ukraine for many years. He is one of the top European experts
in the field and appears on the program at many conferences. He also
writes his analysis and commentary articles on a regular basis. The AUR
appreciates the opportunity to publish his latest article. AUR EDITOR
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Contact: James.Sherr@lincoln.oxford.ac.uk
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[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
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2. UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT WARNS WARRING FACTIONS IN
PARLIAMENT DEADLINE FOR CRISIS SOLUTION IS JULY 25
Weekly radio address to the people of Ukraine
Ukrainian Radio First Programme, Kiev, in Ukrainian, 15 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service - United Kingdom, Saturday, Jul 15, 2006
KIEV - Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko has warned warring factions
in parliament that they have time until 25 July to reach a compromise, form a
legitimate coalition and nominate a prime minister.
Speaking in a weekly radio address on 15 July, Yushchenko took a dim view
of a possible snap parliamentary election, but said he will not hesitate to
disband parliament after 25 July as a last resort if the bickering in
parliament carries on.
He accused parliamentary forces of not being responsible enough and of being
unprepared to work in a parliamentary-presidential republic. He vowed not to
allow Ukraine to plunge into "anarchy" and "chaos". Yushchenko warned
politicians against ultimatums and radicalism.
He stressed that Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic foreign-policy line will remain
unchanged regardless of the colour of the parliamentary coalition. The
following is the text of the address by Yushchenko carried by Ukrainian
radio on 15 July; subheadings inserted editorially:
Dear Ukrainians. Esteemed public.
More than 50 days have passed since the Supreme Council [parliament]
convened for its first session. There has been no significant progress in
forming a government and a coalition since then. For 50 days Ukrainian
citizens have been watching leaders of factions fighting for portfolios and
blackmailing one another.
It is painful to watch the process. It is a shame that the country's
legislative body is being turned into a show venue. There has been mounting
indignation and concern because parliament cannot comply with the minimum
European democratic standards.
BICKERING IN PARALYSES PARLIAMENT
The formation of a viable and stable coalition aimed to form a professional
government is a priority task for the Ukrainian parliament. I am indignant
at MPs' inability to reach understanding and compromise.
I am concerned by the long fight of the private interests and selfish
ambitions of people who are primarily involved in dealing with their own
narrow partisan and personal interests. Ukrainian citizens who have
delegated five political forces to parliament deserve respect for themselves
and their choice and deserve a viable parliament.
This week I demanded strict compliance with the Ukrainian constitution and
laws from the Supreme Council, primarily in forming a coalition and a new
government. I am concerned by the fact that MPs are freely interpreting the
constitution, in particular the nomination of prime minister. The country
needs a legitimate government. MPs should be aware of this.
When constitutional reform came into force on 1 January 2006, the Ukrainian
parliament received extended powers. The new role requires high
responsibility from every MP, and particularly so from faction leaders.
I am forced to state that the first months of the Supreme Council's work
have shown that the five political forces that made it into parliament have
turned out to be unprepared to work under a parliamentary-presidential
republic. None of the leaders of parties or blocs has shown the required
level of responsibility.
I fully share the strong public dislike of confrontation, intrigues,
intolerance, neglect of principles and political harassment. Society is
tired. Society is disgusted at the evolution of events in parliament, and
all people's deputies, political leaders in particular, are responsible now
for this political apathy.
Even during the election campaign I warned leaders of political forces that
their uncompromising fight for positions will turn out to be ruinous to this
country. Unfortunately, the thirst for power and posts is the main driving
force for Ukrainian politicians.
Agreements are being breached, distrust between politicians is growing
stronger, the situation in parliament and bodies of local government is
becoming more extreme. All this plays against Ukraine, worsening its
international image.
JOURNALISTS, THE PRESIDENT IS YOUR ALLY
I am concerned about revanchist moods among some politicians. I consider
it inadmissible when a people's deputy dares to hamper journalists' work.
I welcome the solidarity reaction from representatives of the mass media to
a brutal incident when their colleagues were beaten outside the Supreme
Council building.
Journalists have demonstrated to politicians that there will be no return of
Kuchma-ism, including attacks on the media.
Dear journalists, when it comes to protection of freedom of speech, the
president is your ally.
Today I am addressing every people's deputy, leaders of parliamentary
forces: you represent the legislative body of a large European country. It
is your duty to live according to principles of democracy, to be governed by
European civilized rules of the game in politics. Ukraine needs stability
and unity. Intrigues and confrontation in the Supreme Council jeopardize the
reforms.
WAYS OUT OF CRISIS
What is my view on a way out of the situation that has occurred in
parliament?
FIRST, this parliament was elected by voters in a free and democratic
election. The composition of the Supreme Council reflects the moods in
society and the political likes of voters. Dear countrymen, as the president
of Ukraine, I have accepted your choice. I facilitated and I will facilitate
the dialogue between leaders of political forces in parliament.
I am certain that the options for a compromise are not exhausted yet. It is
necessary to restore mutual trust and to resume parliament's work, and
consequently that of a new government. This is the very subject of this
country' interest today.
SECOND, parliament should resume its work within the frameworks of
legislation and internal procedures. Any future activity of the Supreme
Council would lose sense without this.
The parliamentary majority should wake up to its responsibility for the
country's unity. This requires decisions aimed to search for dialogue and
reconciliation. The election is over, and therefore, it is necessary to
refrain from radicalism.
Ultimatums voiced by politicians aggravate the differences rather than
solve the problem.
THIRD, regardless of the nature of the majority, political leaders must
realize that the chosen course of democratic reforms, economic
transformations and Euro-Atlantic integration is irreversible.
This demand is dictated by time and society, by our national choice in 2004,
for which millions of Ukrainians voted. This country's foreign-policy course
remains unchanged. Parliament and the government should work together to
attain our strategic goal.
Esteemed Ukrainian community. I am deeply and firmly convinced that Ukraine
should develop exclusively within the legal realm. Attempts to rock this
country and call into question its democratic prospects are doomed to
failure. I want all responsible parliamentarians to hear me. You are holding
a chance to resolve the situation. The president and society will duly
appreciate your efforts.
PARLIAMENT DISSOLUTION A LAST RESORT
I realize that at the present time there are political forces set on a
radical development of events. They are interested in confrontation for
the sake of one thing - absolute power. But they need to realize than any
scenario involving force would only worsen the split and differences in
society.
To cut the Gordian knot in politics does not always mean to solve the
problem. Therefore, my position is that an early parliamentary election is
too expensive a luxury for this country. A new election campaign would
worsen the public apathy, would stall our pace towards WTO entry and
would suspend the adoption of the state budget for next year.
The president's right to disband parliament is his last argument, which he
will not hesitate to use if parliament, leaders of political forces or every
member of parliament fail to wake up to their responsibility before Ukraine.
But as a head of state who realizes the price of the step, I hope that
politicians will have enough wisdom to find a compromise by 25 July - the
day when, according to the constitution, the president will get the right to
disband a paralysed parliament, which has failed to form a new government.
I will not allow anarchy or chaos. I will not allow actions that would
benefit forces working against Ukraine. I will not allow this country to be
artificially torn in half by politicians. Neither the president nor the
Ukrainian people will allow this to happen. Wisdom to us all. -30-
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3. YUSHCHENKO TO PARTIES: SIGN DEAL OR FACE NEW ELECTION
By Ron Popeski, Reuters, Kiev, Ukraine, Sat Jul 15, 2006
KIEV - President Viktor Yushchenko, vowing to keep Ukraine from plunging
into anarchy, on Saturday gave bickering politicians 10 days to form a
government or face dissolution of parliament and a new parliamentary
election.
Ukraine has functioned for nearly four months with neither a full-fledged
government nor a working parliament after a March election produced an
inconclusive result.
The chamber, disrupted by protests led by deputies both allied and opposed
to the pro-Western Yushchenko, has been largely in recess amid successive
rounds of coalition talks. A three-party coalition behind the "Orange
Revolution" that thrust Yushchenko into power in 2004 collapsed this month.
Formed in its place was a grouping led by the Regions Party of Viktor
Yanukovich, the Moscow-backed figure Yushchenko defeated in the revolution's
aftermath. But the president this week said his nomination as prime minister
was unconstitutional.
In a weekly radio address, Yushchenko called for new efforts at compromise,
but said he was ready to resort to dissolution.
"The president's right to dissolve parliament is his final argument, to be
used if parliament and political parties fail to comprehend their
responsibility before Ukraine," he said.
"As a head of state who understands the cost of such a step, I hope
politicians will find the wisdom to produce a compromise by July 25. I will
allow no anarchy or chaos. Nor will I allow actions to the advantage of
those working against Ukraine's interests. I will not permit the country to
be torn asunder by politicking."
Yushchenko had initially opposed dissolution, an option open to him under
constitutional changes that reduced his powers.
EAST-WEST SPLIT
His chief of staff, Oleg Rybachuk, also said at the weekend that a new
election was possible if no cabinet able to tackle Ukraine's longstanding
divisions between the industrial Russian-speaking east and the nationalist
west could be formed.
Yanukovich made a comeback after his humiliation in 2004 -- his party, which
finished first in the March poll, is allied in the new prospective coalition
with Socialists and Communists.
Leaders of his Regions Party say they are willing to bypass the president to
secure Yanukovich's endorsement by parliament.
Lawyers say most disputes are rooted in the reforms approved during the
revolution to ease tension. Yushchenko wants them put to the Constitutional
Court, but the opposition has blocked nominations to the court.
Among the options now being considered by politicians is a "broad coalition"
bringing together some members of the president's Our Ukraine party with
Yanukovich's Regions Party.
Its advocates say this could heal rifts between the east, Yanukovich's power
base, and western regions which distrust him.
Two parties still backing an "orange" coalition -- Our Ukraine and the bloc
of ex-prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko -- have been impeding parliamentary
activity for a week.
Tymoshenko, who stood to be restored as premier in an "orange" team, says
only a new election can solve the crisis. "We must not under any
circumstances be afraid of giving the people the right to settle this
matter," she told the weekly Zerkalo Nedeli. "Our people are a lot smarter
and wiser than many people give them credit for." -30-
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[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
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4. UKRAINE'S SOCIALIST PARTY IN REVOLT
Local cells of Ukraine's Socialist Party outraged by leader's behaviour
Many want to start the Yuriy Lutsenko Bloc
UT1 state TV, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1200 gmt 14 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Sat, Jul 14, 2006
KIEV - [Presenter] The Socialist Party is in revolt. [Party leader]
Oleksandr Moroz's joining the anti-crisis coalition [with the pro-Russian
Party of Regions and the Communists] has led to significant political
repercussions in the party's regional branches.
Members of the Socialist Party in Poltava said they want to dissolve the
branch. The ones in Vinnytsya called for the party's extraordinary congress
and for expelling Moroz.
The Socialist Party's youth wing staged protests in Volyn Region. They
started calling themselves the Anti-Criminal Choice organization and
declared [Interior Minister] Yuriy Lutsenko [who was a senior member
of the Socialist Party] their leader. [Passage omitted: repetition]
[An activist of the Socialist Party's cell in Lutsk] We are pulling out from
the Socialist Party and together with Yuriy Lutsenko we will form a new
party - the Yuriy Lutsenko Bloc. -30-
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5. UKRAINE'S EX-PM YANUKOVYCH TOPS POPULARITY RATING
Yanukovych 31%, Tymoshenko 19%, Yushchenko 8%, Moroz 5.5%
Symonenko 3.5%, Vitrenko 3.3%, Other 29.7%
NTN, Kiev, Ukraine, in Ukrainian 1600 gmt 15 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Sat, Jul 15, 2006
KIEV - The Razumkov Centre [for Economic and Political Studies] has
looked into the attitude of Ukrainians towards a grand parliamentary coalition
with [the president's] Our Ukraine [People's Union party, OUPU]. The centre
polled 3,500 people in seven Ukrainian cities.
It has turned out that half of city residents in Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk and
Simferopol in Ukraine's east and south spoke in favour of Our Ukraine's
joining the anti-crisis coalition [comprising the parliamentary factions of
the Party of Regions, the Socialist Party and the Communist Party].
In Kherson, a mere 33 per cent [of those polled] would like to see the OUPU
together with the Party of Regions, the Socialists and the Communists. Over
23 per cent of those polled in Lviv, less than 30 per cent in Kiev, and 25.5
per cent in Vinnytsya spoke in favour of a grand coalition.
If a parliamentary election were held today, Party of Regions leader Viktor
Yanukovych would have the highest rating, with 31 per cent of those polled
willing to cast their votes for him.
The leader of the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc, Yuliya Tymoshenko, ranks second,
with over 19 per cent. Incumbent President Viktor Yushchenko comes third,
with over 8 per cent.
Parliament speaker [and Socialist Party leader] Oleksandr Moroz is the
fourth in the rating, with 5.5 per cent. Almost 3.5 per cent of those polled
would vote for Communist leader Petro Symonenko. The leader of the
Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine, Nataliya Vitrenko, has a similar
showing, with 3.3 per cent.
The poll was conducted by the Socis centre, which polled 1,800 respondents.
The margin of error is 2.4 per cent. -30-
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6. PRES SECRETARIAT SAYS PARLIAMENT'S APPOINTMENT OF
PRIME MINISTER WITHOUT SUBMISSION BY PRESIDENT IS ILLEGAL
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Friday, July 14, 2006
KYIV - The Presidential Secretariat believes that the Verkhovna Rada cannot
elect Premier without receiving a candidature from the President that should
be preliminarily submitted to him. Advisor of the President and Head of the
Main Legal Policy Service Mykola Poludionnyi was speaking at a briefing.
'According to the Constitution, there exists no other way but submission of
a candidature to the post of Premier to the parliament from the President of
Ukraine,' Poludionnyi said.
As he noted, the Constitution foresees the President's authority to submit a
candidature to the Premier post to the Verkhovna Rada, which foresees the
President's power to turn down this candidature.
'This is the President's authority, which corresponds with his possibility
to decline this candidature, otherwise why does the Constitution offers 15
days to the President to consider this candidature?' Poludionnyi said.
He admitted that there might be various situations linked with the
President's acceptance or non-acceptance of a candidature offered to him.
He recalled that Yuschenko suggests that the candidature to the Premier post
should be a consolidating one. 'The President views this candidature as
uniting Ukraine, not splitting the country,' Poludionnyi said.
He expressed hope that the Party of Regions faction would not implement the
scenario when the Rada elects the Premier candidate that was nominated by
the coalition of the Party of Regions, Socialist and Communist parties
without a corresponding submission from the President.
'I hope this is not the plan of the Party of Regions, but a political move
with elements of blackmailing aimed at forcing the President to submit their
candidature to the post of Premier,' Poludionnyi said.
He believes that if the Party of Regions offers this as a possible scenario,
then these actions have constituent elements of the crime foresee in article
109 of the Criminal code (force assumption of power).
'If someone wants to violate this procedure, then this may be viewed as
elements of the crime foreseen in article 109 of the Criminal Code (force
assumption of power), and correspondingly, the state will not shut its eyes
to this and will respond duly,' Poludionnyi said.
As Ukrainian News earlier reported, The Ukrainian Republican Party Sobor,
a member of the Our Ukraine bloc, regards the plans of the parliamentary
majority coalition comprising the Party of Regions, Socialist and Communist
parties to announce Viktor Yanukovych Ukraine's premier without the
presidential presentation in the Verkhovna Rada as an attempt on coup.
On July 13, the parliamentary majority coalition said it intended to submit
the representation itself to appoint Viktor Yanukovych Ukraine's premier if
President Viktor Yuschenko fails to submit the representation within 15 days
after the coalition's submission of Yanukovych's candidacy to the president.
Yuschenko claims that neither the democratic coalition's submission to
appoint Yulia Tymoshenko as premier nor the anti-crisis coalition's
submission to appoint Viktor Yanukovych as premier were legitimate. Earlier
Yuschenko said that the candidature of the post of premier should raise no
confrontations. -30-
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7. UKRAINE POLITICS: THE SCRAMBLE FOR POWER
There is little chance Ukraine will enjoy political stability or
coherent government for the foreseeable future.
NEWS ANALYSIS: The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited (EIU)
New York, New York, Thursday, July 13, 2006
Ukraine's president, Viktor Yushchenko, is caught between an oligarchic,
pro-Russian alliance that is demanding to form a government, and the rump
of his allies from the "Orange Revolution" who now have little prospect of
governing and insist on fresh elections. This turnaround in fortunes has
been caused by the decision of the Socialist Party to leave the Orange camp.
The most likely outcome is that some or all of Mr Yushchenko's Our Ukraine
party will join the oligarchic Party of Regions in government. But whatever
the outcome, there is little chance that Ukraine will enjoy political
stability or coherent government for the foreseeable future.
Mr Yushchenko met the leaders of Ukraine's political parties on July 12th
with the stated aim of finding a government that could consolidate the
nation. Elections in March left the Socialist Party as de facto king-maker
in parliament. To one side of the Socialist Party are its former "Orange"
allies in government, Our Ukraine and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc.
On the other side are defeated presidential candidate and former premier
Viktor Yanukovych's Party of the Regions, as well as the Communists. A
coalition with either grouping would create a parliamentary majority.
MOROZ'S SWITCH
The long-standing assumption was that the party's leader, Oleksandr Moroz,
would opt to reconstitute the Orange coalition. Indeed, in late June the
three parties announced that they would form a majority grouping. Under this
arrangement, Our Ukraine's Petro Poroshenko was lined up to become the
parliamentary speaker, the post previously held by Mr Moroz. I
in early July, however, the Socialist Party reversed course, allying with
the Communists and the Party of Regions to elect Mr Moroz as parliamentary
speaker. Mr Moroz's decision has raised eyebrows in Ukraine and outside, not
least because he has long had the reputation of being an implacable opponent
of Ukraine's oligarchs-and the Party of the Regions is indisputably the
oligarch party in Ukraine.
Although Mr Moroz may have become disillusioned with his Orange allies, who
squabbled in government and were too often distracted by trading accusations
of corruption, there nevertheless remains a qualitative difference between
the pre- and post-Orange Revolution governments with regard to corruption
perceptions. It thus appears Mr Moroz's personal interests have been
decisive.
On July 11th the three-party coalition between the Socialists, the
Communists and the Party of Regions was endorsed in parliament and
survived its first votes. Since Mr Moroz's election as parliamentary
speaker, however, the other parties in parliament have disrupted the work
of the chamber by preventing votes and debates from taking place.
Fistfights between deputies have been a regular occurrence.
Mr Yanukovych and his allies, who have called themselves the "anti-crisis
coalition", are pressing to be recognised as the country's government. Our
Ukraine and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, meanwhile, are calling on Mr
Yushchenko to dissolve parliament and call fresh elections.
They insist that the "anti-crisis coalition" is an illegitimate government,
principally because Mr Moroz violated a rule that requires a party to give
ten days' notice before it leaves a coalition-something that the Socialist
Party failed to do before aligning with Mr Yanukovych for the speakership
vote.
Senior figures in Our Ukraine and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc further allege
that the Party of Regions-which has the wealthiest financial backers in the
country-has engaged in vote-buying in order to win the vote (a practice that
was common during the Kuchma era).
WHERE NOW?
There are several potential solutions to the current impasse, no one of
which has a particularly high level of probability attached to it.
[1] First, the "anti-crisis coalition" could form a government. However, its
work would probably be hampered by disruption in parliament. Also, any
coalition led by Mr Yanukovych would be highly unpopular in at least half of
the country.
[2] Second, Mr Yanukovych could seek to bring part of Our Ukraine into his
government, with a view to ruling at the head of a coalition that would be
more representative of the country as a whole. On some accounts up to
one-third of Our Ukraine's parliamentary grouping has business connections
and would be inclined to join with the Party of Regions.
[3] Third, Our Ukraine's leadership could decide that the party as a whole
would enter a coalition alongside the Party of Regions; probably this would
mean the Communists do not enter the government, and there would be a major
question mark over the Socialist Party's involvement given the bad blood
that now exists between Mr Moroz and his erstwhile Orange allies.
However, a sizeable proportion of Our Ukraine deputies would refuse to
support such a government, fearful that it would be seen as a betrayal by
their voters. Moreover, in such a grouping Our Ukraine would probably press
for Yuri Yekhanurov to remain as prime minister-but it is far from certain
that Mr Yanukovych would agree to surrender the premiership to a party that
has far fewer parliamentary deputies than his own.
[4] Fourth, Mr Yushchenko could push for fresh elections, as demanded by
former premier Yulia Tymoshenko. However, there are several drawbacks to
this. The constitutional basis for doing so is unclear-Ukraine is operating
under untried rules following constitutional reforms that took place at the
start of the year. Also, to have another election would be costly for the
state budget and would likely mean another six months of government
inaction.
Indeed, a fresh election would probably not result in a parliament greatly
different to the current one. If a new election were to bring about a
change, this would most likely involve the Party of Regions edging closer to
a majority and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc gaining seats at the expense of Our
Ukraine. For all of these reasons, Mr Yushchenko is less likely to opt for
this course.
JOINING THE OLIGARCHS
Either the second or the third scenario would appear to be the most likely
way forward. However it is not clear how many Our Ukraine deputies would
be prepared to join the Party of Regions in government.
The likely policy orientation of a government driven by the Party of Regions
will certainly give many Our Ukraine deputies pause for thought-although
probably it is not a deal-breaker. In terms of its public image and the
outlook of its electorate, the Party of Regions is by Ukrainian standards a
pro-Russian party. It was and remains the party that Russia's government
would prefer to see in power in Ukraine.
However, the Party of Regions is primarily devoted to serving the interests
of Donetsk business groupings. When the party's leaders were in government,
state policy was not particularly pro-Russian. Indeed, Russian investors had
more opportunities in the west of Ukraine than in Donetsk, the country's
Russian-speaking heartland.
What then would Mr Yanukovych do in government, if given a free hand? He
would be likely to put the brakes on Ukraine's movement towards NATO,
which has made rapid and substantial progress in the past year.
He would also make EU accession less of a priority, both in terms of foreign
policy and with regard to the domestic policy agenda (where rules and
regulations have to be aligned with EU norms in order to support a
membership bid).
It is also possible that Mr Yanukovych would seek to make Russian a state
language. Elsewhere, a number of the improvements made since the Orange
Revolution could be vulnerable to rollback: a robust, independent electoral
machinery and increased transparency; a vibrant, diverse media; the retreat
of the secret services from political activities; and increased transparency
in budgetary and privatisation affairs.
NO REAL SOLUTIONS
Regardless of which scenario transpires, the events of the last three months
confirm that Ukraine is unlikely to enjoy political stability or a
government that is coherent or robustly reformist for the foreseeable
future. The political parties have shown themselves to be unable to
compromise or to honour basic agreements.
Score-settling certainly has taken precedence over constructive activity.
Most parties, moreover, have quickly parted from their electorates and their
pre-election manifestos. And the losers, regardless of where on the
political spectrum they stand, can be expected to disrupt the work of the
new government. Crowning all this, the country remains divided between the
east and west.
An Orange coalition, if it had been formed, would almost certainly not have
been any more successful than the brief and divisive government led by Ms
Tymoshenko. Indeed, the Party of Regions is perhaps the grouping best able
to control a government and give it some coherence-if only because of the
financial and coercive tools it has at its disposal to keep a heterogeneous
coalition together.
By joining Mr Yanukovych's party in government, deputies from Our Ukraine
will hope to have a restraining influence and to heal some of the rifts in
the country, while at the same time enjoying a share of the fruits of power.
Yet the great danger for Our Ukraine is that it will be subsumed into a
Regions-led government and thoroughly discredited through its participation.
It is no wonder, then, that Mr Yushchenko is hesitating to make any firm
decisions. -30-
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Economist Intelligence Unit: www.eiu.com
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8. MAKE YOUR DECISION MR. PRESIDENT
Ukraine Crisis, Lawmakers Call on Yushchenko To Intervene
Associated Press (AP), Kiev, Ukraine, Friday, July 14, 2006
KIEV - Ukrainian lawmakers Friday called on President Viktor Yushchenko
to intervene to end political stalemate in the country, either by dissolving
parliament and calling new elections or by working with the new pro-Russian
parliamentary majority.
"Make your decision (Yushchenko). It is the entire Ukrainian people who are
waiting for your decision," said Oleksandr Turchynov, one of the pro-Western
lawmakers calling for new elections.
"We consider that the head of state should set aside his personal feelings
of sympathy or aversion and do everything that he can to complete the
formation of a professional and capable government," the Party of Regions,
the biggest party in the new parliament, said in a statement.
Ukraine has been in political paralysis since March parliamentary elections,
in which the Party of Regions won the most seats but fell short of an
overall majority. The inconclusive result underscored the divide between the
largely Russian-speaking east of the country, which looks to Moscow, and the
nationalist Ukrainian-speaking west.
"The only way out of this situation is dialogue in which the president could
play the key role, the role of the man who unites the nation, but he is not
ready," said Evhen Kushnaryov, a Party of Regions lawmaker.
The new coalition is headed by Party of Regions leader Viktor Yanukovych and
includes Communists and Socialists. The coalition nominated Yanukovych,
whom Yushchenko defeated in 2004 to win the presidency after the Orange
Revolution, to be prime minister. Yushchenko's party has rebuffed calls to
join the coalition, which it has branded as illegitimate.
Former Orange Revolution allies formed a coalition last month after weeks of
bargaining, but that agreement collapsed when the Socialist Party switched
sides and formed a coalition with the Communists and Party of Regions last
week.
Top members of Yushchenko's party have suggested that they would accept some
union with Yanukovych's party, but they oppose Yanukovych as prime minister
and the inclusion of the Communists. Yushchenko held talks with Yanukovych,
but the negotiations appeared to end in an impasse.
The new alliance controls at least 238 seats in the 450-seat parliament, and
has threatened to go ahead with a vote on Yanukovych as prime minister if
the president refuses to return the nomination to parliament by July 25, as
required by law. -30-
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9. OUR UKRAINE PARTY NAMES ITS CONDITIONS TO JOIN
COMMUNISTS, SOCIALISTS AND PARTY OF REGIONS
IntelliNews - Ukraine Today, Kyiv, Ukraine, Friday, July 14, 2006
KYIV - Our Ukraine party announced its conditions to join anti-crisis coalition.
[1] At first it demands the Communists party should be excluded from the
coalition.
[2] Also the president wants the future PM to represent Our Ukraine. [3] And
finally he stresses that the judges of the constitutional court should be first
nominated, said acting foreign minister Borys Tarasyuk, whose party Narodnyi
Ruch (Peoples Movement) belongs to political bloc Our Ukraine.
However, Tarasyuk added that after consultations with Party of Regions the
demands were rejected and the parties stopped consultations. In turn head of
Party of Regions Victor Yanukovich said that conditions proposed by Our
Ukraine bloc were not acceptable. -30-
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10. NEW BLOC COULD MEAN RIVALS WILL LEAD UKRAINE
By Judy Dempsey, International Herald Tribune and The NY Times
Paris, France, New York, Friday, July 14, 2006
KIEV - Ukraine's political landscape shifted radically on Friday after
President Viktor Yushchenko's party said it would join a coalition with its
archrival, the pro-Russian Party of the Regions led by Viktor Yanukovich,
who could make a comeback as prime minister.
In an extraordinary shift in fortunes for Yanukovich, who lost to Yushchenko
during a presidential run-off in January 2005, any coalition would include
Our Ukraine, one of two parties that spearheaded the 2004 Orange Revolution.
The Socialist party, which opposes economic reforms and Ukraine's joining
NATO, will also join the coalition. But Yushchenko has insisted that the
Communists, who are part of an earlier coalition agreement, must be
excluded. Yanukovich has until Tuesday to decide whether he will meet
Yushchenko's demands.
The participation of the Socialists in the new government could derail U.S.
attempts to invite Ukraine to start negotiations for joining the alliance at
the NATO meeting in Riga in November.
The "anti-crisis" coalition - the third attempt at forming a different
coalition nearly four months since the parliamentary elections - was
brokered after marathon talks on Thursday and Friday. The Party of the
Regions had won the most seats during the March election but not enough
to establish a stable government.
The latest coalition, however, will not include the other leader of the
so-called Orange Revolution, Yulia Tymoshenko, whose party, the
Tymoshenko Bloc, came in second in the elections.
Tymoshenko said this past week that she had no intention of supporting the
anti-crisis coalition and would instead join the opposition after her own
political fortunes ebbed and flowed over the past several weeks.
Tymoshenko, who is immensely popular among the younger generation, was
poised 10 days ago to become prime minister after the pro-Western Orange
Revolution parties had obtained the support of the Socialist Party, led by
Oleksandr Moroz.
But the coalition negotiations became bogged down by bitter rivalries and
clashes between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, whose cooperation during
the heady days of the Orange Revolution has all but disappeared.
Yushchenko repeatedly tried to block Tymoshenko from taking the top
government job, particularly since the new constitutional changes that came
into effect last January has strengthened the post of prime minister at the
expense of the president, whose powers have been considerably weakened.
There were disputes, too, over who would be president of the Parliament and
who would lead the parliamentary committees.
Amid such political haggling, Moroz suddenly changed sides, saying he would
move over to the Party of the Regions. With support from the small Communist
Party, Yanukovich this week said he would establish the next government.
Moroz was rewarded by being elected president of the Parliament, a powerful
position he had long sought. -30-
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LINK: http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/07/14/news/kiev.php
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11. UKRAINE'S NEW COALITION WILL NOT EXPEL COMMUNISTS
& NOT BACKTRACK ON YANUKOVYCH FOR PRIME MINISTER
Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian 1421 gmt 13 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Friday, Jul 14, 2006
KIEV - The leader of the [pro-Russian] Party of Regions [and prime
minister-designate of the coalition formed by the Party of Regions, the
Communists and the Socialists], Viktor Yanukovych, has said that his
parliamentary faction will never agree to the [propresidential] Our Ukraine
bloc's proposal to expel the Communist Party from the coalition and to stop
claiming the post of prime minister.
Yanukovych was speaking to journalists in Kiev today. "We view Our Ukraine's
proposal to expel the Communist Party of Ukraine (from the coalition -
Interfax-Ukraine) and the second one - to stop claiming the post of prime
minister - as a lack of desire to continue the talks [on forming a grand
coalition] or the desire to block the process," Yanukovych said.
"This is our fundamental position and we will never change the coalition. We
can only expand it," he said. Commenting on the suits filed by Our Ukraine
against the formation of the coalition, Yanukovych said: "Why didn't they
file a suit over the composition of the coalition? File a suit, say that you
do not want such a coalition."
[At 1427 on 13 July, Interfax-Ukraine quoted Yanukovych as saying that if
the president fails to submit his candidacy for the post of prime minister
to parliament for approval, the coalition will do so on its own which is in
line with parliamentary procedures.] -30-
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12. VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO'S 'WHITE HOUSE'
Ukrainian presidential secretariat's weaknesses analysed
ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By Oksana Kozak
Glavred, Kiev, Ukraine, in Russian 0000 gmt 13 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Saturday, Jul 15, 2006
The Ukrainian people have lost faith in the authorities mainly because
of the institutional weaknesses of the president and his secretariat,
journalist Oksana Kozak reports in an article published on a Ukrainian
web site.
With contributions from various political pundits and politicians, she lists
the "weaknesses" of the secretariat as being the lack of a clear strategy,
failures in communication, image and organization, its loss of influence on
parliament and the regional elite and loss of control over the general
situation in the country.
Whilst confident that Oleh Rybachuk will remain head of the secretariat as
he has the trust of the president, she lists possible other candidates for
the post including Ivan Vasyunyk, Viktor Baloha, Yuriy Yekhanurov and
Roman Bezsmertnyy.
The following are excerpts from the article entitled "Viktor Yushchenko's
'White House'", published on the Glavred web site on 13 July; subheadings
have been inserted editorially [by the BBC Monitoring Service and by the
Action Ukraine Report (AUR)].
The surprise formation of a coalition of a different colour than expected
has rather put back the "domestic problems" of the country's chief executive
which need sorting out. We are talking about the presidential secretariat.
PRESIDENT HAS LOST INFLUENCE, NOTICEABLE WEAKENING
Despite the perpetual reorganization, the "White House" on Bankova [street
in Kiev where the presidential administration building is situated]
continues to live according to "Murphy's and Parkinson's Laws", which
explain how such structures tend to break up.
There has been a noticeable weakening of the president's influence on the
political situation in the country and the work of state structures. The
logical outcome of this trend has been a radical fall in the level of trust
in the president and the state power structures as a whole.
INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS OF PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARIAT
One of the main reasons for the head of state's decline has been the
institutional weakness of the presidential secretariat. Why has this
happened?
Murphy's Law says that anything that can go wrong will go wrong. As
Napoleon said, the situation in war changes every fifteen minutes. As far
as recent events in Ukrainian politics are concerned, the president could
have done with the right support yesterday.
In any event, we needed the president's immediate reactions to the formation
of a coalition of whatever format and to the initiatives of the coalition
members regarding the candidature of the prime minister.
The risks and prospects of a split in the pro-presidential Our Ukraine party
and the departure of some of them to the opposition and others to a
coalition with the Party of Regions need to be assessed and, the possibility
of dissolving parliament needs to be considered.
One needs to be seen as the "president of all of Ukraine" and the arbiter of
the nation, but at the same time to try to convince those who once voted for
him - for Yushchenko - that he is not at all "betrayed Maydan [central
square in Kiev, the heart of the Orange Revolution]".
One needs to think of 2009 - the year of the next presidential elections,
and not to rule out the possibility of early elections, to remember the
winter and Gazprom, not to forget about European integration and NATO,
to keep in one's head [Yuliya] Tymoshenko, [Viktor] Yanukovych and
constitutional reform, and God knows what else.
It goes without saying that one person (unless, of course, he is Julius
Caesar) can hardly be expected to think and worry about all this at the same
time. For this there exists a secretariat (an administration or clerical
office) - an auxiliary body under the Ukrainian president (together with the
UNSDC [Ukrainian National Security and Defence Council], which was set
up within the framework of paragraph 28, article 106 of the Ukrainian
constitution.
Of course, unlike the UNSDC, the presidential secretariat is not a
constitutional body, but judging by the comments of mainly those who are
strangers to what goes on inside the structure serving the president and
those who are directly connected to the building on Bankova, nothing is that
simple. [Passage omitted: history of the presidential secretariat]
WEAKNESSES OF SECRETARIAT APPARENT
The weakness of the secretariat has become apparent in a variety of ways:
[1] FIRST, IT HAS FAILED IN ITS STRATEGY: The presidential secretariat
has failed to work out a clear, consistent and comprehensible strategy of
the president's actions in the conditions of a parliamentary campaign and in
the conditions of the new constitution. The outcome was that the president's
Our Ukraine party could only make third place and suffered a rapid fall in
its ratings after the elections.
[2] SECOND, IT HAS FAILED IN TERMS OF ORGANIZATION: Efforts
to ensure the president's constitutional powers are on their last legs. The
secretariat has not become an intellectual centre of power capable of
generating new ideas, decisions and initiatives to improve the rating of
trust in the president. The principle of "one-man management" (which I shall
talk about later) has been contravened, but the main thing is that he has
failed to bring in new blood.
[3] THIRD, A FAILURE OF IMAGE: There has been chaos and a failure
to decide where the president stands (first there were his statements about
"a president of all the Ukrainians", and then there was a clear link between
the president and the Our Ukraine party).
[4] FOURTH, A FAILURE OF COMMUNICATIONS: The presidential
secretariat has lost its "levers of influence" on the "old" Supreme Council
and has virtually completely surrendered its positions before the new
parliament.
[5] FIFTH, A FAILURE IN REGIONAL PERSONNEL: The presidential
secretariat began to lose influence on the regional and local elites even
before the parliamentary elections. Having sensed a weakness at the centre,
local officials in the main began to be drawn towards the Yuliya Tymoshenko
Bloc in the west and the Party of Regions in the east.
Having concentrated on creating various concepts, which were completely
isolated from real life, the secretariat has gradually been losing control
over the situation in the country. It is already quite obvious that it
should not be tending any illusions about "a real democratic authority",
because weakness of power does not mean democracy.
Clearly, the president himself is also aware of this. Back in April Mr
Yushchenko gave the secretariat a real dressing down.
He complained about virtually everything, that there was no clear plan of
work of the president even for the next day; nobody was monitoring reaction
to the president's decrees and instructions; there were no significant ideas
at state level and he had to think of everything (for example, the
"Mystetskyy Arsenal", the regeneration of Baturin and Trypillya culture);
there was no intellectual process for creating a parliamentary coalition;
nobody was thinking about how to live in conditions of the new
constitutional reform, and so on. Mr Yushchenko gave them ten days to
correct the situation.
[Newspaper subheadline] The general principle of uncertainty: complex
systems lead to unexpected consequences.
It is perfectly possible to regard the president's office (administration,
secretariat) as a barometer of what is happening with the leader of the
country in the specific conditions of a specific political situation.
An analysis of the creation, the blossoming and the collapse of the Leonid
Kuchma regime confirms that at different times, and certain periods, the
president needed different advisers and aides who could carry out tasks
required at the time. The administration, therefore, was in a certain sense
a litmus of what was happening both to the president himself and the system
as a whole.
PREVIOUS HEADS OF PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION
DMYTRO TABACHNYK - 1994 - 1996
The first head of Kuchma's administration was Dmytro Tabachnyk (1994 to
December 1996), who immediately set out to ensure that the body he headed
was an independent one and that his personal influence on the president was
decisive.
YEVHEN KUSHNAREV 1996 - 1998 AND
MYKOLA BILOBLOTSKYY 1998 - 1999
The next heads of the presidential administration - Yevhen Kushnarev
(December 1996 - November 1998), and now one of the leaders of the Party of
Regions, and Mykola Biloblotskyy (November 1998 - November 1999), later
appointed Ukrainian ambassador to Russia, did not particularly distinguish
themselves in this post: they worked quietly and tried not to show any
particular ambition and bided their time.
VOLODYMYR LYTVYN 1999 - 2002
During his time as chairman of the presidential administration (the end of
1999 to May 2002), Volodymyr Lytvyn went through a good school of
backstage politics and turned his structure into a secret body for working
out political decisions.
This was very apposite, because in the winning camp - the leading
financial-political groups who supported Kuchma in 1999 - there was already
dissatisfaction with the regime, the centre of which was the president, and
the system which allowed access to resources only through Kuchma himself.
People said that at that time, and in subsequent years, right up to 2004,
which led to the Orange Revolution, that Kuchma hardly trusted anyone apart
from Mr Lytvyn. It was thanks in no small part to this that Lytvyn's further
career was sealed - the speaker's job at the Supreme Council for the four
years of the fourth convocation.
VIKTOR MEDVEDCHUK 2002 - 2004
Viktor Medvedchuk, who became the last head of Kuchma's administration
after the 2002 parliamentary elections, was able to elevate this structure
to the very peak of influence. Of course, Medvedchuk was personally loathed
and feared, and Bankova became the embodiment of authoritarianism, spilling
over into the tyranny of two or three individuals.
So, willingly or unwillingly, Medvedchuk took upon himself a considerable
share of the negative image both of the regime and of Kuchma himself. It
would be unjust to deny that under Medvedchuk this structure worked for
President Kuchma in an organized way and brought results.
"This is a powerful analytical apparatus which can work very effectively if
it is not faced with criminal objectives," was how the political expert
Viktor Nebozhenko, who once worked in the administration, described it.
OLEKSANDR ZINCHENKO 2005
First State Secretary Oleksandr Zinchenko tried to take the ramparts at
Bankova, as they say, at a leap. It was a new life starting tomorrow: we
shall cut down on this, re-shape that, hire Harvard graduates to work.
True, it was much easier to talk about this than to do it.
At close inspection it turned out that Zinchenko's secretariat could be
compared to Viktor Medvedchuk's administration like two peas in a pod, the
only difference being, as later it turned out, one worked and carried out
tasks for the president, whereas the other, well, didn't quite.
However, in a situation where there was increasing tension between Yuliya
Tymoshenko and Petro Poroshenko, and between the cabinet and the UNSDC
which they headed, and where the conflict between the groups of influence
waging a struggle for the right to redistribute power within the framework
of the system had reached its head and much more influential people
(Tretyakov, for example) were working alongside Zinchenko, that he himself
felt superfluous and out of the picture.
That may be precisely what nudged Zinchenko into spilling the beans: it was
he who became the mouthpiece of sensational statements in which we first
heard the negative term "dear friends".
An avalanche of resignations of all and sundry followed, and the former
deputy prime minister for European integration in the Tymoshenko
government, Oleh Rybachuk, arrived at the secretariat.
ANALYSTS' VIEWS
1. ANDRIY YERMOLAYEV
"The secretariat reflects the situation and the way things are around
Yushchenko," [analyst] Andriy Yermolayev says. "At first Yushchenko kept
calm about the notion that this was some kind of playground for people with
a high IQ. But it seems you can't trust your colleagues. It is possible that
in this situation Yushchenko behaved like a "simple country boy", i.e. he
took an easy decision, relying on people whom he knew and trusted.
Yushchenko managed to restore for himself the comfortable situation of 2000,
but in this way he was not able to turn the secretariat into a "big stick".
[Newspaper subheadline] Helrang's Law says wait and the bad things will
disappear by themselves, bringing the prescribed damage.
However, from remarks made by others relevant to our theme, not everything
is so bad in the house on Bankova.
2. VIRA ULYANCHENKO
For example, [head of Kiev Region administration] Vira Ulyanchenko,
having secretly been "not the first, but not the second, either" in the
secretariat, says that the secretariat is being improved, that "information
policy is starting to be drawn up differently and some quite serious people
have emerged who will work on the president's ideas and speeches". And
in general, "a kind of socio-cultural layer of intellectuals is being put
together around the secretariat."
3. MARKIYAN LUBKIVSKYY
"It is possible that the leadership is also hatching some kind of plans for
reorganization and improvement, I don't know. But it is important that none
of this harms work in general," says the head of the humanitarian policy
service in the president's secretariat, Markiyan Lubkivskyy.
"The service has now reached a certain stage in its stabilization and
organizational improvement. Therefore, it is important that the changes do
not harm that stability which has been so hard to achieve.
It is obvious that the secretariat demands intellectual reinforcement - I am
talking above all about communications channels with independent experts
and organizations and with representatives of the "third sector". We must
try to use the intellectual potential in society as effectively as possible
for the benefit of this structure."
Institute of Strategic Studies & National Academy of State Administration
Lubkivskyy believes that the Institute of Strategic Studies under the
Ukrainian president, and also the National Academy of State Administration
under the president which was headed by Vira Nanivskaya, the former director
of the International Centre of Prospective Studies, will be the bridgeheads
of this intellectual potential.
On the subject of, to put it mildly, the disorder and "diversification"
which is only possible within the walls of the secretariat, Lubkivskyy, who
has seen all there is to see within these walls, says this: "The
administration must be as liberal as possible in relation to its citizens in
the matter of the development of democratic values, but extremely tough
within itself.
This is the model which can help us in today's situation. In other words,
the administration, on the one hand, should be as open and transparent as
possible, and loyal to the principles of democracy, but on the other hand
tough and self-disciplined within. If it can do this then we are on the
right road."
[4] DMYTRO TABACHNYK - SECRETARIAT "INEFFECTIVE" -
But those who have nothing to do with today's secretariat, whom we might
call casual observers, see what is happening rather differently. Obviously,
their opinion cannot be considered absolutely objective, but still.
For example, Dmytro Tabachnyk, who at one time was head of the president's
administration, and is now Crimean MP for the Party of Regions, is very
categorical in his assessment - it is ineffective, and that's all. "During
the eighteen months of Viktor Yushchenko's cadence, he was unable to supply
an analysis of his actions and failed to create an apparatus which would
ensure a sufficient degree of control and fulfil real prognostic functions,"
he said.
"Today the secretariat has completely lost such a vital function as control
over the activities of the power structures with regard to carrying out the
president's decrees and instructions. I believe that the most important
thing about President Kuchma's first administration was that he was able to
get ahead of a situation.
The president's administration at that time offered a new playing field and
all opponents either had to criticise its actions or find their own options
in a particular situation. The administration at the time made the president
the most significant political player, because he would calculate every
situation and was several moves ahead of it. We don't see this today, and
this is the secretariat's main weakness."
Tabachnyk also says that the structure serving the president has not been
able to alter its functions in line with the new conditions of a
parliamentary-presidential republic and has stuck to its old principles,
despite perturbations.
Because of this, he believes, it continues to fail: "Yes, the president is
no longer responsible for the economy, but he could have made up for these
lost functions by predicting results better and being ahead of the economic
crises which shook society throughout 2005, and calculated his moves in
foreign and domestic policy more precisely.
In order not to lose prestige, he should, for example, have put a to stop to
some of the foolhardiness of the Tymoshenko government - where was the
president's peace-making which could have risen above the battle?
In other words, the secretariat failed to help Viktor Yushchenko not only
to become a leader of the opposition, but also president of the whole of
Ukraine."
Viktor Yushchenko will have to take into account the realities of the
redistribution of powers and responsibilities between the cabinet and
parliament and purely "presidential" structures like the UNSDC and the
secretariat.
Moreover, he will have to try to create his own system of balances and
counterbalances where the president would be if not a "disconnecting",
then at least a strong link who could not be circumvented whatever the
conditions.
[Newspaper subheadline] Jones' Motto says friends may come and go,
but enemies accumulate.
The current possibilities of the president being in a permanent
confrontation not only with a possible pink-and-blue coalition, and not only
with Yuliya Tymoshenko, who has already set out her stall in the opposition
camp, but also with a section of the Our Ukraine comrades, are very, very
imminent if nothing is done.
There is also the fact, as we have already said, that both "burning" and
strategic questions must be tackled. And there must be "no thinking about
the white refrigerator" - the presidential elections, the groundwork for
which it would seem all possible participants are already preparing.
ON WHOM CAN VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO RELY?
On whom can Viktor Yushchenko rely at a time when the cards are being
shuffled in such a bizarre way? This, undoubtedly, will depend both on how
the cards lie in the next few days, and also on who can reach an agreement
with whom.
Nevertheless, it is believed that the president holds in his hand a small,
but very significant group of comrades who are hypothetically capable of
switching to an administrative role in the secretariat and who are duty
bound at this time to become the brain and the muscles of the president.
[1] OLEH RYBACHUK UNLIKELY TO BE REPLACED
Let us straightaway make a proviso: Nobody is going to remove Oleh
Rybachuk from the post of head of secretariat and this probably won't
happen, although there are rumours that (a) Rybachuk is apparently preparing
to build diplomatic relations with a certain "good European country" and to
busy himself with his favourite European integration and (b) that, on the
contrary, Rybachuk will actually become the head of that very Ukrainian
National Bank.
But these are just rumours, although, to be honest, many people, probably,
would be truly happy for Mr Rybachuk if he at least got something which he
really likes. Because judging by the reactions of those who know him well,
the secretariat is clearly not a place where Rybachuk is happy with life.
And yet everything began so well (as it always seems to): the secretariat,
the White House and the president, the guarantor of stability and a mediator
in conflicts, the coalition fulfils the president's programme, the president
offers long term strategies and goes abroad, just like in America.
Rybachuk plants within the secretariat the ideas of democracy and European
integration, diversifies the flow of information and conducts a policy of
openness and transparency. "I will not carry tonnes of paper for signature,
this is not part of my job," he said in an interview for the BBC immediately
after his appointment.
"I need to create a presidential secretariat in line with the standards of
countries which have a strong presidential authority. I am not the kind of
man who will take everything upon himself. My job is to organize the
analysis and information service and to lay open the secretariat."
Rybachuk would probably sincerely want things to be like that. He is trying,
but for some reason it seems that he very quickly gets bored with all this
and he goes off somewhere to chill out. No, the president understands all
this - that's the way he is.
True, sometimes things don't work out - I have already spoken about the
latest hitch: at such times it suddenly transpires that there is nothing -
no analysis, no strategy or tactics and they can't even write a speech
properly.
SECRETARIAT'S REORGANIZATION REVIEWED
And the Audit Chamber only last week published the results of a review of
the reorganization of the secretariat on the subject of the effective use of
funds from the state budget by the State Affairs Administration.
It happened that during the course of 18 months there existed simultaneously
three organizations apparently looking after the president's activities: the
disbanded administration and two secretariats.
People were being paid wages, bonuses, compensation and so on, which
stretched out to over a million hryvnyas. At the same time it was revealed
that there were not that many "Harvard graduates" on the staff, and there
were plenty of people without higher education. The president had been
informed about all of this.
But, we repeat, all this may have no effect whatsoever on what Rybachuk does
in the future. He has the reputation of being a good negotiator and of being
creative. The downside here is the fact that he is not a tough bureaucrat
and manager.
But, at the end of the day, as Vira Ulyanchenko said, there is nothing
terrible about that, there are deputies who can do that. Besides, however
that may be, Mr Rybachuk remains a very close and trusted person to the
president who would be a match for anyone in the president's cabinet.
[2] IVAN VASYUNYK'S QUALITIES - 'GREY CARDINAL'
However, it would seem that Rybachuk is not the only one. No less
influential, although not so public, is the first deputy head of the
secretariat, Ivan Vasyunyk, who at the same time is the president's
godfather.
Unlike Rybachuk, Vasyunyk does not shirk routine office work, which
earned him a reputation as quite a decent administrator, capable of
bringing order to current affairs and tackling problems as they build up.
Thanks to these qualities, Mr Vasyunyk managed to achieve considerable
influence: the president listens to his opinion and he is gradually easing
himself into the role of a "grey cardinal" who virtually runs Bankova.
Also, in a fairly short time Vasyunyk has managed to head a new group of
favourites which was formed after the departure of the "dear friends" - the
so-called group of "Galicians" from western Ukraine.
Thanks to Vasyunyk's lobbying, this group obtained key posts in the fuel
and energy complex, in particular the Naftohaz Ukrayiny national joint-stock
company [NJSC]: Mr Vasyunyk's brother Ihor is currently deputy head of the
board of this company.
Vasyunyk is actively lobbying the appointment of his brother to the post of
head of the NJSC, competing with Oleksiy Ivchenko's man [Anatoliy]
Popadyuk, Oleksandr Tretyakov, who ran the NJSC as the president's first
aide, and also with such a giant in questions of the fuel and energy complex
as the former deputy prime minister on these questions, Vitaliy Hayduk.
[Newspaper subheadline] The rule of the ruler is there are no straight
lines.
But Vasyunyk is not just taking up the case for his relatives: he would like
to see [Emergencies Minister] Viktor Baloha, who at one time dissociated
himself from the "dear friends" group and joined up with the notorious
"Galicia" group, in the post of head of the secretariat.
This would mean a strengthening both of the "Galicians" and of Vasyunyk
himself. Incidentally, his candidature of Baloha is also being lobbied by
another man close to the president - a native of Khoruzhyvka and now editor
of Ukrayina Moloda [newspaper], Mykhaylo Doroshenko.
[3] VIKTOR BALOHA "EXPERIENCED'
They say that Baloha is quite a successful leader, and his advantage is his
considerable experience: Mayor of Mukacheve, governor of Transcarpathia,
minister for emergency situations and head of the Our Ukraine regional
election headquarters at the 2006 parliamentary elections.
At the same time, he is described as a politician who made his political
career solely out of business: money from the Barva company, management
of the USDP(U) election headquarters in Transcarpathia in 1998, appointment
as head of regional administration in 1999.
Then came conflicts with the then deputy Ivan Ryzak, clashes with the
leadership of USDP(U) and a statement about resigning from the post of
governor, which coincided with the resignation of the Viktor Yushchenko
government in 2001.
Then there were the parliamentary elections of 2002, Mukacheve-2004 and the
presidential elections won by Yushchenko. Baloha became a member not only
of the team, but also of Viktor Yushchenko's inner circle.
Like someone else from the "inner circle", Yuriy Yekhanurov, Viktor Baloha
was also from the very outset a supporter of the so-called "broad
coalition": for example, in the rural council in Transcarpathia, Mr Baloha
gave impetus to the formation of this "broad" majority, at the same time
anticipating all possible accords at the centre.
[4] YURIY YEKHANUROV'S "RELIABILITY"
Also among the possible candidates for the post of head of the secretariat
is today's acting Prime Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov. It was he whom Viktor
Yushchenko did all he could to put forward for the post of prime minister in
a coalition government, perhaps not an "orange" coalition, but a "broad"
one.
It was precisely Yekhanurov with whom the president held long intimate talks
for many long months. It was precisely Yekhanurov as prime minister of "his
own" government that he delegated to be number one in Our Ukraine's
electoral list.
True, Mr Yekhanurov himself even during the election campaign tried al he
could to distance himself from the party's brand and positioned himself as a
"prime minister who works" and who tackles the problems of the national
economy.
Yekhanurov was regarded as one of the most respected negotiators on the
subject of the "broad" format of a coalition which, incidentally, did not
stop him from entering the "orange" negotiating group together with [Our
Ukraine leader] Roman Bezsmertnyy.
In the light of recent events - Our Ukraine's departure to the opposition,
the prospects of Viktor Yanukovych becoming prime minister and even the
dissolution of parliament, the prospect of Yekhanurov's premiership becomes
more and more illusory, although it is not being taken off the agenda.
In the event of a section of Our Ukraine still deciding to enter into a
coalition with the "blue-and-whites", anything can happen: in any event,
Yevhen Kushnarev has already spoken of such a possibility.
If there is still opposition, Yekhanurov can still move to Bankova. The
calm, responsible and even-tempered Yekhanurov has managed to win not just
the president's friendship but also his boundless trust, someone he can rely
on. It is quite important that Yekhanurov is his "own" politician, like Oleh
Rybachuk. Consequently, the arrival along with him of the "group of
comrades" is minimised.
[5] ROMAN BEZSMERTNYY "GOOD ORGANIZER"
Nevertheless, a change of atmosphere in the secretariat in connection with
the infusion (or the return) of the influential group is also possible. The
time is coming when the president may need not just one reliable shoulder
but at least a dozen. I am talking about Roman Bezsmertnyy, who is also
linked with the Razom [Together] group, i.e. with Poroshenko-Martynenko-
Zhvaniya.
Bezsmertnyy's name does not evoke among most politicians and citizens an
all-understanding grin or poorly concealed irritation.
During his many years in politics Mr Bezsmertnyy has learnt many things and
has seen a great deal but, nevertheless, he has not lost a certain
romanticism and is capable of spontaneity and, at first glance, acting on
impulse.
At the same time, ever since he was President Kuchma's representative in
parliament, he has not shunned hard routine work which goes unnoticed, for
which (he has been convinced of this more than once) he does not expect
thanks, but the fruits of which others are only too happy to take advantage
of.
Bezsmertnyy has been dealing with organizational matters in Our Ukraine for
ages, practically from the time it was founded. He was in charge of its
election headquarters in the 2004 election campaign before Tymoshenko and
Zinchenko came on the scene. He also dealt with territorial-administrative
reform, which was virtually the only large-scale project of the new
administration.
He ran Our Ukraine's staff in 2006, although the impression was Bezsmertnyy
and his staff were the only ones who needed this campaign. As I have
mentioned, both the president and the first number in the list Yuriy
Yekhanurov tried to distance themselves from the campaign, so as not to be
exposed for using administrative resources. So the elections were held in a
democratic way, and Our Ukraine came third, behind the Yuliya Tymoshenko
Bloc.
After announcing the results of the campaign Viktor Yushchenko tried to put
the blame for all this on Bezsmertnyy, but his anger passed very quickly and
he entrusted him with the talks on an orange coalition with Tymoshenko and
Moroz. As we know, all these many months of labour were in vain, but how
was he to know.
It is said that the People's Union Our Ukraine party is most of all today
interested in Bezsmertnyy, despite the fact that the president, by all
accounts, has rather gone off this idea. But, on the other hand, what other
political force can he now rely on?
So the invitation to Roman Bezsmertnyy to work in the secretariat will mean
(i) that the Our Ukraine project is getting a second wind, and (ii)
alongside the president has appeared a lobbyist of one of the once powerful
groups of influence.
ANALYST'S SUM UP THE CHOICE
WHAT TASKS WILL THEY HAVE? OBJECTIVES? PRIORITY?
What will the appointment of one of these politicians bring? What tasks will
the president give them? And what objectives will he himself pursue and what
plans will be given priority?
"One of the plans for building the secretariat is a secretariat as an
instrument of compromises and talks, i.e. in essence, it will be the centre
of power," was how the political analyst Andriy Yermolayev commented on
the situation. "This calls for a man who is influential in elite circles and
who can fulfil the function of a moderator at talks on behalf of the
president."
"The appointment of Bezsmertnyy, Baloha or Yekhanurov could mean that
the president is considering the secretariat as an instrument of his
influence on the elite, including the regional elite," Yermolayev believes.
"Today the Yushchenko regime has entered a phase similar to the one which
the Kuchma regime entered in the mid-nineties: there were several groups
competing around the leader and a "struggle of bulldogs under the carpet"
broke out.
So all these names are not just abstract options, this is lobbying - news
stories, statements and predictions as a way of promoting one's own ideas
about the development of the situation."
[Newspaper subheadline] O'Brien's Law says that for various reasons nothing
is done.
Of course there are others the frame as well as those I have listed. There
are other names, opinions, predictions, expectations and variations of
models of the secretariat. "It is not a question of individuals or the
chairman, but how the work is organized, so that the secretariat functions
in the most effective way. If it does, there is no need for talk about
individuals," Markiyan Lubkivskyy believes.
"What would I advise?" Dmytro Tabachnyk says. "To formulate a structure
in line with the new constitution, to get rid of all the "heroes of the
Maydan" who have not worked a day in the structures of power, and go
back to relying on professionals with enough experience. The apparatus
should be a sufficiently monolithic structure.
But when a whole number of groups of influence have there their own field
of activity and their own opportunities for signing decrees, this shows that
the apparatus cannot work and that it is demoralized and destructive. And
the leader should be a specialist administrator.
For example, in the first years of Soviet power, all the staffs - civilian
and military - were headed by specialists, people who did not belong either
to the Bolshevik elite or to the pre-revolutionary band of party members."
Half joking and half seriously, Tabachnyk suggested the following - to work
for a year as head of the secretariat on contract as a manager. The
conditions - "a salary, as in the National Bank" and all appointment
decisions going through one person (i.e. Tabachnyk).
The political expert Yermolayev believes that, apart from the "moderate
model" of the secretariat described above, a model of a creative centre, of
a headquarters for working out decisions which would embrace initiatives
of the cabinet and the parliamentary coalition is also possible.
ANATOLIY HRYTSENKO
In this event, the political analyst believes, it would be advisable to
attract people like the current Defence Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko, who
headed the Razumkov Centre and Viktor Yushchenko's analytical
department at the 2004 presidential elections.
VOLODYMYR LYTVYN
[Former parliamentary speaker] Volodymyr Lytvyn is also being named in this
context. This candidate also has his pluses and minuses: on the one hand he
is an experienced backstage politician who has already run the
administration, a peace-maker and a conductor of parliament, "one who can
tie the ropes" and so on, and the other a "Kuchmist", and he also said
recently that he does not rule out standing for president.
OLEKSANDR TRETYAKOV - PETRO POROSHENKO
Nor should one rule out the return to Bankova of, for example, [former
presidential aide] Oleksandr Tretyakov or [former UNSDC Secretary] Petro
Poroshenko, who for six months have partially rid themselves of the label of
"dear friends" and emerged as independent politicians.
After the collapse of his speaker's career Poroshenko could easily settle
down in the secretariat. However, as they say, the final choice still
remains with the president.
So long as free recommendations are from time to time given to the president
(and, to a certain degree, this article could also come under this category)
and some people are still worried about the problem of the effectiveness of
the presidential administration, clearly not all is lost. But will anyone
take up these recommendations? -30-
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NOTE: Subheadings have been inserted editorially by the BBC
Monitoring Service and by the Action Ukraine Report.
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13. UKRAINE CHAOS POSES QUESTIONS ON EU ENLARGEMENT
Ukraine should focus on internal "Europeanisation" of its
political, judicial and business environment rather than
focusing on EU-based foreign policy for now.
Andrew Rettman, EU OBSERVER, Brussels, Belgium, July 13, 2006
BRUSSELS - Ukrainian diplomats in Brussels say political chaos
in Kiev will not derail the country's EU accession goal, but the EU's
frostiness on further enlargement - with some member states keen to fix
final borders - threatens to damage relations with the post-revolutionary
state.
"Regardless of the colour of the coalition, EU integration of Ukraine will
be the parameter of any government that will be created," Ukrainian EU
embassy number two man Konstantyn Yesilieiev stated. "Everybody sees
Ukraine in the EU. The differences are only on tactics."
"Right now the Ukrainian side is a little worried about the debate on the
future borders of the EU," he added. "The borders of the enlarged EU
should be limited at the eastern border of Ukraine...We need a firm
political statement from the EU [on future membership]."
The remarks - spoken at a gathering of eastern European ambassadors in
Brussels - come as former Orange Revolution allies Viktor Yushchenko and
Yulia Tymoshenko's coalition plans unravelled yet again this week, with
president Yushchenko starting fresh talks with the "blue" camp of
pro-Russian politician Viktor Yanukovych.
Ukraine has failed to agree on a government for the past three months with
riotous scenes in the Kiev parliament - the Verkhovna Rada - on Tuesday as
rival factions exchanged punches and sounded klaxons in an atmosphere
recalling the turbulent days of the 2004 revolution itself.
The EU is currently in talks over a new post-2007 association pact with
Ukraine, but member states in the June council refused to give European
Commission negotiators a mandate to insert any statement on enlargement into
the text - cutting even soft wording that "the EU recognises the European
aspirations" of Kiev.
"They are lucky we did not insert a statement saying we do not recognise
their aspirations. They could be fighting to remove that," one EU diplomat
joked.
Ukraine is a key energy transit state for the EU - channeling 80 percent of
Russian gas - and a target for NATO expansion. But 20 million of the
country's 50 million population is ethnically Russian and mistrusts any NATO
moves, often linked politically with EU moves in pro-Russian hotspots such
as the Crimea peninsula.
PLAY THE GAME
Slovak and Hungarian ambassadors as well as analysts such as UK expert
Alan Mayhew - who advised Poland and other new member states on EU
entry in the 1990s - urged Ukraine to focus on internal "Europeanisation"
of its political, judicial and business environment rather than focusing on
EU-based foreign policy for now.
"The European Treaty already guarantees you a European perspective. No
one can argue against that, although they can try and change the Treaty,"
Mr Mayhew said. "But as the Europeans keep coming at you with negatives,
don't react like Zidane, just keep playing the game."
French footballer Zinedine Zidane head-butted an Italian player after an
alleged insult in last Sunday's World Cup final but went on to win an award
for best player. "Maybe we should react like Zidane - after all he did what
he did and then got his prize," Ukraine's fiery Mr Yesilieiev stated.
The EU Treaty currently says that any country fulfilling political and
economic criteria and being geographically located in Europe can join the
club. But states like France and the Netherlands are pushing for new rules
allowing the EU to reject countries on grounds of internal public opinion or
potential over-stretch of EU institutions.
"In my opinion, after the Balkans the door will be closed. Ukraine and
Turkey are too big to join even though we cannot say this openly. We will
have to find something else, some kind of 'European Neighbourhood Policy
plus' for these countries," one EU diplomat told EUobserver.
EU BLUES
Ukraine's frustration with EU mechanisms began just a few months after the
Orange Revolution in November 2004, when Mr Yushchenko's right hand man and
then-deputy prime minister - Oleg Rybachuk - came to Brussels for high-level
talks on the country's future.
"He said to me - look, we've burned our bridges with Russia so you have to
let us in. I represent Yushchenko. I can negotiate for Ukraine. But I have
been sent from one commission department to the next for nothing. Tell me -
who is the guy to speak to in the EU? How can we get this done?" the EU
official recalled.
Meanwhile, Georgia's ambassador to the EU, Salome Samadashvili, warned
against taking Mr Yesilieiev's statements on foreign policy continuity at
face value, adding that the EU is being naive if it thinks the future of
Ukraine can be decided by EU free trade zones with no thought for Russian
geo-political manouevres.
"The Yanukovych coalition is built around hostility to NATO and this is
worrying. If the government changes, the Ukrainian embassy [in Brussels]
could soon begin receiving different instructions," Ms Samadashvili said.
"EU and NATO membership are not questions of economic pragmatism.
They are about political values and geopolitical vision," she added. -30-
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LINK: http://euobserver.com/9/22084
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14. THE ORANGE CIRCUS & UKRAINE'S CIRCULAR POLITICS
The Economist, London, UK, Thursday, 13 July 2006
"WE ARE forming a new political culture", President Viktor Yushchenko
told the people of Ukraine last week, "which will last for centuries." Given
recent events, that seems an optimistic timescale.
After the parliamentary election in March, it took three months for Mr
Yushchenko's Our Ukraine party to form a coalition with the two other
parties that had swept him into office in the "orange revolution" of 2004:
the Socialists and a block led by Yulia Tymoshenko.
The first orange coalition, in which Ms Tymoshenko was prime minister,
collapsed last September; this one fell apart after just two weeks. The
Rada, Ukraine's parliament, has since become a circus of fistfights and
cat-calling.
The trouble started when the Socialists did a deal with the Communists and
the Party of the Regions, the two other parties in parliament. With just
enough seats to form its own majority, this new "anti-crisis coalition"
proposed its own candidate for prime minister: Viktor Yanukovich, the Party
of the Regions' leader, who was the loser of the 2004 presidential vote to
Mr Yushchenko.
"Everything will be all right with gas," the pro-Russian Mr Yanukovich told
a newspaper, referring to the dispute between the two countries. "I
promise." His party had blockaded the Rada, to prevent the orange team
voting for Ms Tymoshenko as prime minister. After the Socialist defection,
her party created its own havoc. Tent cities sprang up outside in support of
various parties.
The official reason for the orange split was the Socialists' rejection of
the coalition's candidate for speaker, Petro Poroshenko, a businessman and
ally of the president. The objection was not unreasonable: it was the mutual
loathing between Ms Tymoshenko and Mr Poroshenko that helped to make the
first orange government unworkable.
The unofficial reasons were said to include large amounts of money and the
ambition of Oleksandr Moroz, leader of the Socialists, to be speaker
himself. He was duly voted in last week. "Moroz is Judas!" cried his spurned
allies. "The problem", opined Mr Moroz, "is that certain individuals want to
attain power at any price." Ms Tymoshenko blew him sarcastic kisses.
What happens now is anyone's guess-though probably, in the end, it will be
Mr Yushchenko's decision. Ms Tymoshenko, and some in Our Ukraine, say
that Mr Moroz's betrayal broke parliamentary regulations, so everything that
followed was illegitimate.
They want the president to dissolve the Rada and hold a new election (in
which Mr Moroz would be unlikely to do well). Mr Yushchenko could delay a
decision on Mr Yanukovich's candidacy as prime minister long enough to
permit this.
The other option may be a grand coalition that takes in bits of the
president's party as well as the Party of the Regions, drops the Communists
and leaves Ms Tymoshenko's block in opposition-though that would probably
mean finding a different prime minister to Mr Yanukovich.
There is still (just) a faint hope that some good will come from this farce.
A new election might produce a more stable parliament. Or a grand coalition
might ease the resentments of eastern Ukraine, which overwhelmingly backs Mr
Yanukovich-though it is hard to see such a coalition lasting long. At least,
says Hryhoriy Nemyria, Ms Tymoshenko's adviser, trying to be upbeat, there
has been no violence-except within the Rada. -30-
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15. EASTERN, WESTERN COUNCILS DIFFER ON UKRAINIAN CRISIS
NTN, Kiev, Ukraine, in Ukrainian 1400 gmt 14 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Fri, July 14, 2006
KIEV - [Presenter] Deputies of regional and local councils call extraordinary
sessions for the second day in a row. They express their opinions regarding
the political situation in Ukraine.
[Correspondent] Deputies of the Rivne regional council demand that the
president of Ukraine [Viktor Yushchenko] approve a decision to dissolve
parliament and hold an early election. They have adopted a decision to this
effect at an extraordinary meeting. The meeting was initiated by three
factions: [propresidential] Our Ukraine, the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc and
the Ukrainian People's Party [led by Yuriy Kostenko].
Members of the Party of Regions and the Socialist Party, which are fewer in
number, abstained from voting. Nevertheless, the governor of Rivne Region,
Viktor Matchuk, is satisfied with the situation in the Supreme Council
[parliament]. He says that politicians and officials are so deeply involved
in events in parliament that they do not interfere with the work of regional
officials.
As far as the parliament coalition is concerned, Viktor Matchuk does not see
any difference between the Orange coalition [Our Ukraine, the Yuliya
Tymoshenko Bloc and the Socialist Party] and the anti-crisis coalition [the
Party of Regions, the Socialist Party and the Communist Party].
[Matchuk] That coalition [of the Orange forces] divided Ukraine into west
and east. Now a new coalition has been set up, comprising the Socialist
Party, the Communist Party and the Party of Regions, which also divides
Ukraine, but this time into east and west. As for me, both options do not
provide for the unity of Ukraine.
[Correspondent] Members of the Crimean parliament have appealed to the
president to support the anti-crisis coalition and not to be slow in
submitting Viktor Yanukovych as nominee for the prime minister's post [to
parliament]. Nevertheless, this decision by people's deputies was not
approved by deputies from the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc's faction.
[Serhiy Velizhanskyy, a member of the Crimean parliament on the Yuliya
Tymoshenko bloc's list, in Russian] The decision today cannot have any legal
consequences because it is illegal. We cannot, as we are creating a
law-governed state, we cannot take part in illegal actions of any kind.
[Anatoliy Hrytsenko, speaker of the Crimean parliament, in Russian] Today
you heard that the Crimean parliament supported the proposal by the
coalition majority to nominate Viktor Fedorovych Yanukovych for prime
minister. I fully support this decision by the majority in the Ukrainian
parliament.
[Correspondent] Deputies of the Zaporizhzhya regional council today are also
concerned about the political situation in Ukraine. People's deputies, most
of them members of the Party of Regions, have called on the president of
Ukraine and the Supreme Council to form a grand coalition. Members of the
Yuliya Tymoshenko bloc and Our Ukraine, who are not numerous, could not
resist the majority in the Zaporizhzhya regional council.
[Yevhen Chervonenko, Zaporizhzhya Region governor, in Russian] Let us stop
thinking that Yuliya Volodymyrivna [Tymoshenko] is good and Yanukovych is
bad. We are all Ukrainians. Let us demonstrate that to become an official
means, first of all, to assume responsibility for people. I see that people
are tired. A new election will be boring from the psychological viewpoint,
first of all.
[Correspondent] Deputies of the Donetsk regional council today also approved
an appeal to the people of Ukraine and the guarantor of the constitution
[president]. They demand that the president not allow the dissolution of
parliament.
Donetsk deputies say that this step would lead not only to a repetition of
the Alchevsk accident [complete breakdown of centralized heating system in
the town of Alchevsk, Luhansk Region, in the midst of severe winter frosts
in January 2006], but would also kill Ukraine's economy. Regional officials
are certain that the economic development of the region depends completely
on the political situation in the country.
[Volodymyr Lohvynenko, head of the Donetsk regional state administration, in
Russian] I think that the centre will not be pleased even more if we fail to
fulfil those objectives and the economic programmes that I was personally
asked [to fulfil], to prepare households and the industrial sector for the
next heating season, to work in the next autumn and winter period. This is
very important.
[Correspondent] Deputies of the Ivano Frankivsk regional council have
adopted a resolution condemning the actions of people's deputies in the
Supreme Council, asking the Ukrainian president to end parliament's powers
and to schedule an early election. Deputies from the Party of Regions did
not support this decision, nevertheless, there are only two of them in the
Ivano Frankivsk regional council. -30-
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16. "SOCIETY OF YU'S AWARENESS"
No alternative to "grand coalition" in Ukraine - Russian pundit
COMMENTARY: By Stanislav Belkovskiy, a Russian pundit
Ukrayinska Pravda web site, Kiev, in Ukrainian 7 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Tuesday, Jul 11, 2006
Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko is interested in Socialist leader
Oleksandr Moroz being elected parliamentary speaker and the ruining of the
Orange coalition, a Russian pundit says in an article posted on a Ukrainian
web site.
As a result of this, a broad coalition involving Our Ukraine and the Party
of Regions will not seem like a betrayal of the Orange Revolution ideals but
more like Ukraine's salvation.
Although critical of Yushchenko as "weak" and "inconsistent", Stanislav
Belkovskiy says that he outperformed Yuliya Tymoshenko during the long
coalition saga and has a chance to unite the country.
Yushchenko's mission is to form the Ukrainian nation and to overcome an
east-west split in the country, he says, concluding that there is no
alternative to the broad coalition if it is to survive as an independent
state.
The following is the text of the article by Stanislav Belkovskiy entitled
"Society of Yu's awareness", published by the Ukrayinska Pravda web site on
7 July; subheadings have been inserted editorially [by the BBC Monitoring
Service and the Action Ukraine Report (AUR):
Can you hear the rustle of wings and the sound of heavenly hooves? It is
President Viktor Yushchenko returning from the quiet of his Swiss clinic to
his exhausted, sun-drenched homeland. To prevent an opposition triumph he
has finally come back to create a "grand coalition" and to offer the country
the most pro-compromise prime minister of all the people - Yuriy Yekhanurov,
as if you hadn't already guessed.
YUSHCHENKO BENEFITS FROM NEW COALITION FORMAT
It's a funny thing, but it would seem that, after a coalition drama lasting
three and a half months, Yushchenko could emerge as the winner.
Without having once seriously intervened in the difficult process of
building/destroying the coalition (the president's biggest contribution to
the downfall of the "Orange Revolution" was, arguably, his decision not to
let Yekhanurov loose on the pro-consensus "democratic" speakers),
Yushchenko bided his time: as evening fell the bodies of his enemies floated
along the river, past that very small hill where stood the main leader of the
Orange Revolution with his delicate complexion and silk ribbons.
Now the "grand coalition" - Our Ukraine plus the Party of Regions plus the
Socialist Party of Ukraine no longer looks like a retreat from the ideals of
the Maidan [central square in Kiev, the heart of Orange Revolution], but the
very opposite - the saviour of the country from a split and the only proper
way to the future. Because if we don't have a "grand coalition", then we
will have a "crimson-and-blue" one (Party of Regions plus Socialist Party
plus Communist Party).
You don't want [Party of Regions leader Viktor] Yanukovych as prime
minister? Then your choice is Yekhanurov. It's all the same.
Many times in recent months Yushchenko could have left himself exposed
and talked his mouth off.
But he didn't let it happen in a major way. He couldn't be provoked. And now
it isn't he who is to blame for the collapse of the "Orange coalition", but
the volatile [Socialist leader Oleksandr] Moroz.
During the long and exhausting positional war the boss of Bankova [street in
Kiev where presidential administration building is situated] overcame his
bewitching opponent Yuliya Tymoshenko, who is a dab hand at blitzkriegs. The
main task has been resolved - Ukraine will not become a country reservation
called Tymoshenko. And the coalition can now be painted any colour you wish.
"WEAK AND INCONSISTENT" YUSHCHENKO
Everyone knows that Yushchenko is weak and inconsistent, that he does not
know specific answers to specific questions and is often tiresome, trying
and languid.
But that was the type of leader who was destined to win - both in 2004 and
now. If Yushchenko had turned out to be of solid concrete he would not
have been a symbol of protest two years ago.
In actual fact, the head of Our Ukraine was successful because he was as
shallow as could be, and because he was absolutely the right person for all
those people who did not want a continuation of the turmoil of the past in a
future with some hope. "Down with criminal authorities!"
If you are against the authorities, then you are on my side. If for some
reason you like the criminal-oligarchic authorities, fine, go against me.
But don't ask for anything else, unless you want to rile me.
And so at the time inveterate socialists and accursed bourgeois types,
trumpeters of freedom and messengers of justice, radical national socialists
and people who knew nothing about matters of state jumped on the Yushchenko
bandwagon. Yushchenko, shallow and still free of political vanity, seemed
acceptable to countless people of all kinds. But he is like a vacuum.
Those who know all about theoretical physics call a vacuum "an ocean of
possibilities". These possibilities cannot be seen by the naked eye and are
somehow realized by themselves, without any special effort or great
expectations.
The incumbent Ukrainian president is a man with a vague personal mission.
He doesn't grab power by the scruff of the neck - that old battle-axe Dame
History has to give him a shove in the back, scolding him again and again:
"Come on, you silly old fool, who else is there ." The team does everything
for such a leader. However, teams change but the leader stays the same.
Nobody particularly likes him, but at each crucial moment it becomes clear
that we simply don't have anybody else who is suitable, pro-consensus or
all-compromising. So he will have to do. People will begin to make a much
more correct assessment of leaders of the "Yushchenkoid" type when they
have gone - retired or deceased.
WHAT IS YUSHCHENKO'S MISSION
What is Yushchenko's mission? He himself will never say, because he is
incapable of articulating himself properly. We can only work it out with the
aid of a special history detecting device which can register the faults and
fractures of time.
In the past eighteen months Mr Yushchenko, by hardly doing anything and
without putting two fingers together, has brought Ukraine to full final
independence and made it the No 1 country in the former Russian empire.
Now, evidently, Yushchenko will get down to building a single political
nation. Perhaps, he doesn't understand completely what all this means. But
he has been destined to consecrate the "grand" coalition and to lead the
Ukrainian people under the banner of a common destiny.
Swearing and spluttering, mercilessly berating their lacklustre,
inarticulate president, the Ukrainian people will follow him through the
mire of history in the direction they once decided.
"YU'S SENSE OF AWARENESS"
Yushchenko's incoherent and confused sense of awareness (let us now call
it "Yu's sense of awareness" for short) is a hollow where Ukraine's secret
will is hidden from the extraneous eyes of wolves, a will which is hard to
explain, but which must be followed.
Otto Bauer, the great Austrian socialist of the first third of the twentieth
century, and Theodore Herzl, the founder of scientific-practical Zionism,
gave the world the best definitions of a single political nation. According
to Bauer, "a nation is a combination of people linked by a common nature and
based on a common destiny.
A common destiny does not mean subordination to one's fate, but a common
experience of one and the same destiny with constant change and
inter-action". According to Herzl, "a nation is a community of people in the
past, united in the present against a common enemy."
COMMON ENEMY IS GAS-OBSESSED RUSSIAN FEDERATION
The common enemy has already been assigned. It is the unwashed, gas-
obsessed Russian Federation. In time - after several unsuccessful attempts at
storming the European fortress which ended in tears - some other being may
be appointed to the office of enemy. But for the moment the Russian
Federation has no rival.
There is also a single past, but not yet a common destiny. Destiny and
everything linked with it are interpreted quite differently in different
parts of Ukraine, which are cleverly called "politico-mental clusters".
ONLY A "GRAND COALITION" CAN CREATE SINGLE CONCEPT
And only a "grand coalition" can create this single concept, express it and
draw the whole of Ukraine into this concept, an authority in which the east
and west of the country are represented in equal measure, a structure where
west and east, the centre and south will be responsible for one another,
live for one another and create for one another.
Only a government of a grand coalition is capable of formulating objectives
and setting tasks which are topical and vitally important for the whole
country, without allowances and exceptions.
The fact is there is simply no alternative to such a coalition and such a
government if we are to become a single political nation. And if we are
destined to have a single political nation of Ukrainians, then we are
destined to have a grand coalition.
POST-COMMUNIST MOROZ'S ROLE
It is difficult to say how much the post-communist Oleksandr Moroz knows
about nation-building. But objectively he has played a positive role in the
Ukraine of today. That decrepit old Dame History allotted the leader of the
socialists a notorious place in the political dress circle, and she was not
wrong.
Now we can gently accuse Moroz of treachery and declare the new-fledged
62-year old speaker a political dead duck. And Mr Moroz himself somehow is
rather afraid of what he has done. His opera-like promptings and
pronouncements that the "Orange coalition" is not officially dead were not
made by chance.
Are we in too much of a hurry to bury Ukraine's top socialist? Won't we
still be shaking Moroz's hardened hand for a few more months or years in
gratitude?
After all, he decided to be the first to reveal the terrible secret to Ukraine
that the "orange coalition" was harmful for the country. And only a "grand"
(and broad) format was correct and therefore irreversible.
Moroz assumed responsibility for destroying the ghost of the "democratic
troika", rescuing from attack the softest, most ailing and vulnerable spot
in the Ukrainian political system - President Viktor Yushchenko. Moroz
proved to be both coarse and out of touch, but surely we can excuse this for
what he brought to the country?
Many people have already learnt how to build up their personal rating at the
expense of the country's resources and assets. No-one wants to or is in a
hurry to do the opposite. Who will cast a stone at someone who decided to
do just that, perhaps even not fully realizing what he was doing?
NOT WORTH MOURNING THE "ORANGE COALITION"
It is not worth mourning the "Orange coalition", if only because a coalition
of one's favourite irreconcilable enemies would not bring happiness to
Ukraine. A Maidan happens only once in a lifetime.
In 2004 people who did not want to live in a provincial stuffy
pseudo-democracy named [former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma's head
of administration] Viktor Medvedchuk and [Russian President] Vladimir Putin
stood on the Maidan.
They were united by a common enemy. When this enemy collapsed the unity
of the Maidan departed into history. After the victory of the revolution many
people got into the habit of brandishing the Maidan banner for their own
selfish ends, forgetting to admit to the people that the so-called "orange
forces" had neither a common ideology, a joint philosophy of life, nor a
single image of the future. Nor could they have.
WHAT WOULD UKRAINE HAVE BEEN WITH TYMOSHENKO?
What would Ukraine have become in the event of Tymoshenko's cabinet being
formed? A two-tiered country, with a commercial authoritarianism of
something like the Putin model wielding power at the centre, except that Ms
Tymoshenko is a more talented person and more bloodthirsty than her recent
(since September 2005) Kremlin friend.
Under the protection of commercial authoritarianism there would have been an
unhurried but frenzied redistribution of property, democracy would have
swiftly switched to a rapturous state of "stable management", and the
national media would have been gradually turned into Putin-Medvedchuk wall
newspapers "about our wise and beloved Yuliya".
Meanwhile, in nine regions of the east and the south a barbed-wire fortified
area of the Party of Regions would have very soon been built. The east-south
political logic would have very quickly boiled down to a straightforward: we
don't care what you, your worships, get up to in Kiev so long as it doesn't
concern us. All this would have meant a real split in the nation.
Ukraine would not, of course, have come to a formal collapse - there are no
systemic preconditions for that. The elite value their own independent state
too much to risk losing its substance and contents. But it would have been a
decisive step backwards on the path to building a single political nation.
Does Ukraine need this?
YANUKOVYCH UNLIKELY TO BE PREMIER AGAIN
Do you think that the Party of Regions, the Socialist Party and the
Communist Party will create a crimson-and-blue government, and [Viktor]
Yanukovych will become prime minister for the second time in his life? We
don't think so. Of course, the strength of mandate allows this. But politics
and arithmetic are different disciplines.
The Party of Regions today very much needs the political realities
post-Maidan to become legitimate. The Regionals do not want to go back
two years to a Ukraine of Kuchma-Medvedchuk, to a country of "younger
brother", where "hope is fine, but reliability is better". They want to be an
integral part of a Europe-orientated Ukraine.
Therefore, as partners they desperately need both the president and his
party. On this nervous basis there is, probably, a small but real split in
the Our Ukraine bloc. MPs who are inclined towards Yushchenko and
Yekhanurov will support the "grand coalition".
Some 12-15 members of the present faction will either move to the side or
try to join the enraged Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc. [Petro] Poroshenko's team
will most likely occupy the third position: make your "grand coalition",
only without us, for the moment without us. And then, after a few weeks of
turmoil, we'll see.
From the reaction of some particularly shrewd politicians, one can already
judge how things will happen and where. For example, Interior Minister Yuriy
Lutsenko. He is still a Socialist of sorts, but really a president's man and
before you know where you are he will be leading some new party.
He has clearly let the cat out of the bag to everyone: a "grand" coalition,
as such, is acceptable, it is only Prime Minister Yanukovych who is
unacceptable.
So who is destined to head the cabinet? Next week, we shall most likely have
a cabinet. And then things will start to get interesting - preparations for
early parliamentary and presidential elections. But this will be the subject
of the next article in this ongoing subject of history. -30-
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