ACTION UKRAINE REPORT - AUR

An International Newsletter, The Latest, Up-To-Date
In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis and Commentary

Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion,
Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World

Mr. E. Morgan Williams, Publisher and Editor, SigmaBleyzer

WASHINGTON, D.C., WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 2007

Clicking on the title of any article takes you directly to the article.

Return to Index by clicking on Return to Index at the end of each article

1. UKRAINE: "THIS IS THE TIME FOR POLITICAL LEADERS TO
SHOW THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE COUNTRY'S FUTURE"
INTERVIEW: With Javier Solana, Secretary General of EU Council
BY: Tatiana Silina, Mirror-Weekly # 34 (663)
Kyiv, Ukraine, Saturday, September 15-21, 2007

2. THE 2007 ELECTIONS WILL DECIDE WHO WINS 2009
AND THE FATE OF THE ORANGE REVOLUTION
ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: by Taras Kuzio, for UP
Ukrayinska Pravda, Kyiv, Ukraine, Friday, September 14, 2007

3. NGO: UKRAINIAN VOTE TO BE DIRTIER THAN IN 2006
By Stephen Bandera, Kyiv Post Editor
Kyiv Post, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wed, Sep 12 2007

4. UKRAINIAN THEATER OF THE ABSURD
ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By Serhii Rakhmanin
Mirror-Weekly #33 (662), Kyiv, Ukraine, 8-14 September 2007

in Ukraine after the early parliamentary elections? Do you believe that
Ukrainian political bosses are capable of any progressive changes in the
country?

[Javier Solana] Ukraine has had a series of political crises in the past
years, largely stemming from a lack of clarity on the basic ground rules of
political life.

The constitutional reform of December 2004 was necessary to find a political
solution to the events following fraudulent presidential elections.

However, it left many questions unanswered and perhaps did not spell out
sufficiently clearly the division of competences between various leaders. We
have seen a power struggle, facilitated by the weakness of institutions.

Overcoming this and moving on with policies and reforms is what these
elections need to help happen. This should be the priority for Ukraine's
leadership.

Elections alone will not solve everything. They are a good method of
consulting the population on where the country should go and who should
govern. In an ideal case, they would bring sufficient clarity enabling all
key political forces to work together to build a functioning framework
within which crucial reforms can be pushed forward.

I count many of Ukraine's leading politicians among my personal friends. I
know them well and have full confidence in their ability to bring about
change and speed up the country's political and economic development.
Despite the series of crises we have seen, we have also seen on-going work
on reforms, even if much still remains to be done.

All the main political forces are also in agreement on the need for Ukraine
and the EU to continue to come closer. This is a good basis for finding the
much needed political will to take things forward, avoiding a relapse into a
crisis. This is the time for political leaders to show responsibility.

[MW] Does Ukraine need constitutional reform and what must it consist of?

[Javier Solana] I am on record as having said once that you need to play
by and not with the rules. However, now is the time for Ukraine to set
these rules. Yes, Ukraine does need to re-visit constitutional reform,
putting in place functioning checks and balances and sound institutions.

It is up to the Ukrainians to choose their constitutional model. I will not
comment on that. I would however recommend close cooperation with
the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe.

A constitution governs the basic ground rules of political life. Therefore,
it needs to be seen as legitimate by all the major political forces. For
this reason, the manner in which constitutional reform is agreed will be at
least as important as the content of the reform itself.

You will soon have a new parliament, representing the will of the
electorate. The new members of parliament will have been given a popular
mandate to adopt key legislation. They will represent various political
forces.

It is important that the key political forces can agree on amendments which
need to be introduced into the Constitution. They are the key political
players of Ukraine and if they do not agree to abide by basic rules you will
not get very far.

I fully realise that finding agreement among various forces will not be very
easy, especially remembering the power struggle we have seen.

However, the difficult process of forging an agreement will build stable
foundations for the future and provide the best guarantee that the rules set
through it will be honoured.

[MW] What is the influence of political instability in Ukraine on the
negotiation process on the preparation of the new enhanced agreement
between Ukraine and EU? Is there any progress in these negotiations?

[Javier Solana] We have now had half a year of negotiations on the new
agreement. I am very pleased to note that negotiations have proceeded well,
in a constructive atmosphere.

The instability in Ukrainian internal politics has not really affected them.
This is a clear sign that there is genuine agreement among all political
forces on Ukraine's orientation towards a closer partnership with the
European Union.

The new agreement will take our relationship to a qualitatively new level,
touching upon all spheres of the relationship. Ukraine clearly sees its
conclusion as a national priority, which is very good. Considerable progress
has also been made already on the foreign and security policy sections of
the agreement.

Both political dialogue between the European Union and Ukraine, and our
practical cooperation in foreign and security policy, as well as a number of
other areas will be deepened and strengthened.

While the effect of the past instability on the negotiations has been minor,
let me just note that the deepening of our partnership remains dependent on
the quality of Ukraine's democracy and reforms. This will determine
Ukraine's ability to manage a relationship which touches on many fields
which are traditionally seen as being in the domain of domestic politics.

The implementation of the new agreement will be greatly facilitated by
domestic stability in Ukraine and progress on the ground in political and
economic reforms.

[MW] In Europe there are propositions to sharply define future borders of
EU. What is your attitude to such ideas?

[Javier Solana] First let me stress that the European Union has not been
designed to be a fortress. On the contrary, we aim to strengthen the ties
with our neighbours as much as possible.

The European Union wishes to project its values -- democracy, the rule of
law and respect for human rights -- beyond its borders. I am convinced that
in this way we can increase the security and well-being of both our own
citizens and the people living next door to us.

Yes, we have discussions in the EU on our borders but these have not led us
to any conclusions so far. We wish to be open to the world and do more in
tackling problems such as regional conflicts, international crime, climate
change and energy supply, just to name a few issues of concern to us.

[MW] In his recent address to French ambassadors President Nicolas Sarkozy
proposed to work out a new strategy of European security and to approve it
next year, under the French presidency in the EU. What do you think of this?

Is there any need for this new strategy? In what way should it differ from
the old one? How will it affect Ukraine's role ?

[Javier Solana] We have all taken good note of President Sarkozy's
proposals. The European Security Strategy was agreed in 2003. It has

provided a good and functioning framework for EU security policy.

We are naturally continuously studying the strategy's implementation and
looking at possible development needs. In this context, we are also studying
the various ideas and proposals expressed by our Member States.

Ukraine is and will remain a partner of strategic importance for the
European Union. The new enhanced agreement, which we are currently
negotiating, will also contain a robust section on political dialogue and
the development of our deepening foreign and security policy partnership.
Both the Union and Ukraine see the value of working ever closer together to
deal with shared regional and global challenges.

[MW] The USA's plans to deploy missile-defense system in new EU members -
Poland and Czech Republic - were publicly named in some EU countries as a
"provocation" and "leading towards new Cold War". What are the propositions
of EU on the missile defense problem? What do you think about Russian
reaction - to suspend Russia's participation in the CFE Treaty - on the USA
plans?

[Javier Solana] The issue of the planned missile defense system has
implications for the security of Europe. It has so far been dealt with mainly

in the NATO framework, which is also the appropriate place for this discussion.

At the same time, there has been some discussion also within the European

Union. Following this discussion very closely, let me assure you that no-one

should talk about a "new Cold War" seriously.

As regards Russia's intention to withdraw from the Treaty on Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), we very much regret this announcement.
The CFE is one of the cornerstones of European security.

We very much encourage the on-going security policy related dialogue between
Russia and the United States. It is clear to us that both are committed to
addressing these issues in a serious and constructive manner.

[MW] Do you expect on the eve of cold weather new gas related surprises
from Russia, which seems to be becoming a traditional?
[Javier Solana] No.

[MW] Do you know what to do with Belarus?
[Javier Solana] Let me first note how much we appreciate our very close
European Union - Ukraine cooperation on policy towards Belarus. Belarus is

an important country for both of us and we both hope to see concrete steps

taken towards democracy. This would be good for the Belarusian people,

but also the region as a whole.

European Union policy on Belarus remains two-pronged: we have put in place
restrictive measures targeted at individuals responsible for electoral
misconduct and abuse, but we are also open to engaging with a broad range of
counterparts, from civil society to the authorities. The Union has sent a
clear message that it would be ready to extend to Belarus all the benefits
of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

It is also true that Minsk would be ready to work with the European Union on
fields such as energy and transport. However, concrete cooperation needs to
be based on shared values. As long as Belarus is not willing to take the
necessary steps to respond to our concerns, for instance the freeing of all
political prisoners, such cooperation is not possible.

We would all benefit from closer cooperation. Both the European Union and
Ukraine have followed closely developments in the oil and gas relationship
between Russia and Belarus. We have seen certain complications in the past
year.

In this context, we have called for transparent energy relations between the
parties, in the same manner as we did during the gas crisis between Ukraine
and Russia, in early 2006. All of us share concerns relating to energy
security. However, the situation in Belarus unfortunately prevents us from
concrete cooperation in the field of energy.

[MW] A lot of experts predict that Kosovo may unilaterally declare
independence after December 10. As far as we know, by now some

countries-contributors of international peacekeeping mission in Kosovo are

making it clear that under such a situation it is impossible to keep their military

forces there without a new UN security Council resolution which Russia is

blocking.

Has the EU any mechanisms to resolve the forthcoming crisis and to stabilize
situation in the region (using military forces if necessary )?

[Javier Solana] As you know, the overall responsibility for a safe and
secure environment in Kosovo rests with KFOR, which is a NATO-led

mission. The EU is preparing for a European Security and Defence Policy

(ESDP) mission in Kosovo in the area of the rule of law.

I do not want to enter into speculation about what may happen after 10
December, which is the deadline for the Contact Group to report to the
United Nations Secretary General. What is sure is that the EU-US-Russia
Troika that is conducting the current period of engagement between the
Parties - and in which Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger represents the EU -
is fully committed to the process of status negotiations, and that it will
leave no stone unturned to find a negotiated solution. This remains our
primary objective.

[MW] Unrecognized republics of the CIS - Abkhazia, Transdniestria,
South Ossetia and Nagorny Karabakh - have been waiting impatiently for a
long time for the precedence of Kosovo gaining independence. Do you

predict a "parade of sovereignties" after Kosovan independence? Do you

fear that this situation may be used by some forces in Crimea?

[Javier Solana] The EU has repeatedly made it clear that the resolution of
the Kosovo status issue is a sui generis case and will not set any precedent.
Each case you mentioned in your question is addressed by different

international mechanisms and on its own merits.

Resolving conflicts is about promoting stability which is a fundamental
responsibility of the international community. In this context, let me also
thank Ukraine for the good cooperation we have in seeking a viable
settlement of the Transnistrian conflict in Moldova, which is a neighbour

of both Ukraine and the European Union.

I have confidence in the unity of Ukraine. There were certain risks
regarding the Crimea in the 1990s. However, the escalation of tensions to a
conflict was prevented through skilful political leadership. With Ukraine
having just celebrated 16 years of independence, we can see that your
population views itself as Ukrainian.

The concept of being Ukrainian has also developed into a pluralistic one,
encompassing all traditions, religions and ethnic groups sharing the
citizenship of Ukraine. Any attempt to try to destabilise the situation in
Crimea would be artificial, and highly irresponsible. I do not see this
happening.
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LINK: http://www.mw.ua/1000/1550/60477/

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[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]

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2. THE 2007 ELECTIONS WILL DECIDE WHO WINS 2009
AND THE FATE OF THE ORANGE REVOLUTION

ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: by Taras Kuzio, for UP
Ukrayinska Pravda, Kyiv, Ukraine, Friday, September 14, 2007

Ukraine's September 30 parliamentary elections will decide two important
developments in Ukraine.

[1] Firstly, who will be elected as Ukraine's president in two years time.
[2] Secondly, if the orange revolution (and its candidate Viktor Yushchenko)
will have failed to achieve their stated goals in 2004 of Ukraine's
democratic breakthrough.

Both of these factors explain why the 2007 elections will be less 'free and
fair' than Ukraine's first 'free and fair' elections last year.

Yushchenko's presidential secretariat and Our Ukraine-Narodna Samoborona
are headed by more assertive leaders than last year, as any comparison of
Viktor Baloga-Volodmyr Lutsenko to Oleh Rybachuk-Yuriy Yekhanurov will
show.

This years elections will decide who will form the next parliamentary
majority and thereby who will head the country's next government.

But, this is not all as a failure to establish an orange coalition and
government - in the same way as last year- would also make it difficult for
Yushchenko to be re-elected for a second term.

If this were to transpire Yushchenko would prove that election candidates
with the support of Western-Central Ukraine (i.e. Yushchenko in 2009 and
Leonid Kravchuk in 1994) would only serve one term. This year's elections
are also therefore a prequel for the 2009 elections.

Yushchenko is not only threatened by the anti-orange camp. If Yulia
Tymoshenko does not return as head of government after this year's elections
she would have no reason to repeat her 2004 refusal to stand in the
presidential elections.

For Tymoshenko the choice has to be either Prime Minister in an orange
government or the main orange candidate in 2009 as she has the highest
popularity among orange politicians and is in possession of the largest
orange parliamentary faction.

Polls do not show Our Ukraine-Narodna Samoborona improving on their
poor performance of last, despite a change in leadership and tactics.

Polls show that the gap between BYuT and Regions is declining on last year,
when it was 10%. BYuT would seem to be replacing the left as the one to
which disaffected former Regions voters in eastern Ukraine are defecting to.

Despite the cosmetic house clean of Our Ukraine-Narodna Samoborona by
removing Petro Poroshenko the bloc has been unable to remove its central
problem that has bedeviled it since it was created in 2001-2002.

The bloc remains divided by its internal contradictions: at the same time as
it includes oligarchs (in 2002-2006 orange oligarchs and in 2007 the Pryvat
group) it also espouses anti-oligarch and anti-corruption rhetoric.

Lutsenko blames his lack of action when he was Interior Minister on
'bandits to prison' on the prosecutor's office. But, it was President
Yushchenko who permitted the prosecutor's office to be controlled by
Svyatoslav Piskun when he could have removed him under the presidential
constitution still in force in 2005.

Meanwhile, Yushchenko blames his in action on not having a parliamentary
coalition with whom he could work. But, he could have easily had an orange
coalition in April 2006 but instead chose to undertake 'multi-vector'
coalition negotiations that led to Yanukovych's surprise return to
government.

Ukrainian voters know that the cause of inaction on 'bandits to prison' lies
in Yushchenko's and Our Ukraine's internal contradictions that have always
been there and have never gone away.

Tymoshenko is right in saying that only she would never give immunity to the
'bandits' who were given immunity in 2004-2005 and have revived themselves
in Regions.

For his 2009 re-election, Yushchenko needs Our Ukraine-Narodna Samoborona
to improve on its poor performance in 2006 when it obtained 10% less than in
2002. It also needs an improved performance to increase its bargaining
position with BYuT.

The parliamentary coalition established after the 2007 elections will
heavily influence the outcome of the 2009 elections. With the prime
minister's position strengthened following constitutional reforms in 2006, the

office is an even better launching pad for the presidency.

However, Yushchenko has proven unable to work with two of his three prime
ministers, Tymoshenko and Yanukovych, because he sees both as potential
competitors for the presidency. Ideally, Yushchenko would prefer that
neither of them become Ukraine's next prime minister.

For Yushchenko to be able to put in place a non-threatening technocrat as
prime minister, Our Ukraine-Narodna Samoborona would have to come in
second place, which is unlikely.

If Yushchenko attempts to pressure Our Ukraine-Narodna Samoborona into
entering a grand coalition with Regions this might be more palatable than in
2006, as it would not include the Communists and he may obtain an agreement
to not have Yanukovych as prime minister.

However, it would split Our Ukraine-Narodna Samoborona and prevent the
planned post-election unification of its constituent nine parties into a
pro-presidential party that would become the vehicle for Yushchenko's
re-election in 2009.

Polls suggest that the Yuriy Lytvyn bloc will enter parliament where it
could be poised to play the same role as the SPU last year in deciding which
side (orange or blue) gets to establish a coalition majority. Last year the
SPU's difficulties with Our Ukraine pushed it to defect to the blues.

This year, the Lytvyn bloc will have greater difficulties in working with
BYuT. Yushchenko and Poroshenko proposed to Kuchma in 2002 that Lytvyn
head Our Ukraine in the 2002 elections but Kuchma refused. Lytvyn's
relations remain good with Yushchenko but poor with Tymoshenko.

A grand coalition would push BYuT into opposition. Tymoshenko was the only
one of four opposition leaders who did not stand in the 2004 elections. If
Tymoshenko went into opposition in 2007-2009, during a grand coalition,
Yushchenko could lose his few remaining orange voters.

With no orange voters left, Yushchenko would be reliant on Regions voters to
back him in 2009 who, after seven years of hostile propaganda against him,
would be unlikely to vote for him.

The orange revolution promised many things most of which have not been
fulfilled in the domestic or foreign policy domains.

Indeed, of the five countries which have undergone democratic revolutions
since 1998 - Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine - only the first
two have successful post-revolutionary democratic consolidations while
Georgia's democratic progress has both positive and negative attributes.

Of these five states, Ukraine and Serbia have suffered from the greatest
threats of counter-revolution and democratic regression.

Both had slim 52% victories of opposition candidates in 2000 and 2004 and
their opposition alliances disintegrated over how to deal with past abuses
in office (including violent crimes) and current government policies. Of
these five countries the former corrupt and violent regime came back to
power in only Ukraine and Serbia.

If an orange coalition and government are not therefore created after this
years elections the orange revolution, like the bulldozer revolution in
Serbia, will have proven to have been failures.

The return of the Anti-Crisis coalition and Yanukovych government will
signify the re-consolidation of Kuchma's regime in Ukraine for the next five
years and the electoral defeat of Yushchenko in 2009.

The 2007 elections are the key to Yushchenko's re-election in 2009. But,
if the president repeats his same disastrous 'multi-vector' coalition
negotiation strategy as in 2006 he will enter history as a one term
president.

The outcome of the elections and post-election negotiations on a coalition
and head of government will ultimately also decide if Ukraine's orange
revolution will follow Serbia's in becoming a failed post-revolutionary
democratic breakthrough.
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Dr. Taras Kuzio is a Research Associate at The Institute for European,
Russian and Eurasian Studies, George Washington University.
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LINK: http://www.pravda.com.ua/en/news/2007/9/16/8885.htm
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[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
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3. NGO: UKRAINIAN VOTE TO BE DIRTIER THAN IN 2006

By Stephen Bandera, Kyiv Post Editor
Kyiv Post, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wed, Sep 12 2007

The head of the Committee of Voters of Ukraine Ihor Popov said that these
elections will be "dirtier" than last year's vote.

The "cleanliness of the 2006 elections was a social requirement," he said at
a press conference in Odessa on Sept. 6.

"In 2006, President Viktor Yushchenko was very interested in showing the
world that we are capable of conducting honest elections, that he could have
been willing to sacrifice their result," according to the UNIAN report.

"The result will be paramount [in the] current elections," he said. "To
achieve the result, the election participants will use all of their
capabilities."

Popov predicted that "bought votes" would be worth up to Hr 100 ($20) on
election day. He said that no more than 50,000 votes would be bought on
Sept. 30; any more "will be very visible." Fifty thousand votes represent
approximately 0.2 percent in the final count.

Popov also predicted that any political party unhappy with the vote-tallying
process "will create a scenario of protesting election results, even
revolutionary action."

"Further escalation of societal tension can lead to direct action of the
losing side that does not recognize defeat and use all resources to prove it
is right," said Popov. He also pointed to shortcomings in electoral law: A
losing party can "nullify" its list and force new parliamentary elections.
TELEVISION FAVORITISM
Last month the Party of Regions, headed by Prime Minister Viktor
Yanukovych, led all political parties in the number of campaign ads on
national television, while Yulia Tymoshenko's Byut bloc spent the most time
advertising on the airwaves. Ten national channels were monitored by the
Academy of Ukrainian Press Aug. 20-25.

More than 1,000 ads were reviewed in the five-day period last month,
representing 62,700 seconds, or more than 17 hours of airtime. The
monitoring showed that 68 percent of ads were openly campaign-related -
15 percent less than recorded a month prior to last year's elections.

The more recent findings showed nearly a third of all ads were "partially
hidden or anonymous." More than 7 percent of ads fell to "an anonymous
subject of the electoral process."

The study found that more than 25 percent of election-related ads in the
course of five days were aired by Regions. Byut led the airwaves in terms of
total time with 23.5 percent. The Our Ukraine-People's Self-Defense (OUPSD)
bloc loyal to President Yushchenko followed closely.

Former parliament speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn's bloc was more aggressive in
its television advertising than the Socialists, President Yushchenko and the
Communists.

Some channels displayed favoritism. Television and radio company Ukrayina -
part of Regions' sponsor Rinat Akhmetov's media holdings - is only airing
Regions' advertisements.

Seventy percent of all political ads on the Donetsk-rooted NTN channel were
from Regions, while the STB television channel did not air any Regions ads.

The study found Byut concentrating on channels like STB and leading in total
airtime on all channels except Ukrayina, NTN and the nation's leader Inter.
OUPSD's television campaign was more balanced across all channels.
PAPER: $5 MILLION MUSICIANS
The Delo newspaper reported on Sept. 7 that Ukrainian performers stand to
make $5 million from political parties during the election campaign.

The paper reported that four entertainers appearing at concerts sponsored by
Regions stand to make the most: from $10,000-30,000 per concert. Acts paid
for by OUPSD earn up to $10,000. The paper noted six bands and singers who
are on tour for OUPSD.

Byut, meanwhile, is targeting youth and Ukrainian-language audiences with
smaller but numerous concerts across the country. Folk voice icon Nina
Matvienko told Delo that she earns a little more than her monthly pension
from Byut for her performances, according to the report.
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LINK: http://www.kyivpost.com/nation/27373/

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[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]

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4. UKRAINIAN THEATER OF THE ABSURD

ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By Serhii Rakhmanin
Mirror-Weekly #33 (662), Kyiv, Ukraine, 8-14 September 2007

There is no pre-election campaign without acting. Oliver Stone called
politics "a refuge of might-have-been actors". During this grandiose
performance, epicureans disguise themselves as anchorites, fire-eaters - as
peacemakers, and whores - as nuns.

In the Ukrainian theater of the absurd, the same old monologues ring true on
a makeshift stage: "Internet connection for schools!" "Prisons for felons!"
"Childbirth allowances for mothers!" "Punishment for bribers!" Somehow it
all sounds like "Jedem das seine".

The world around is becoming a theater of shadows where the spectators
trust every word the shadow says. They believe that the figure shown on a
political leader's income statement is the actual sum of his income and not
the price of ostrich leather shoes or a Louis Vuitton trinket. They believe
that he has met the obligations he assumed.

They believe that "the egging attempt" at the Prime Minister was
orchestrated by the President. They believe that the Orange Revolution was
only for abolishing MP immunity. They believe that prices have stopped
rising and even started dropping. They feel ashamed to have been so blind
before.

This week, this theater stages another performance in which the main
characters of the pro-government coalition led by Parliament Speaker
Olexandr Moroz and the opposition led by President Viktor Yushchenko.

Both acted rather poorly as defenders of the Constitution and both
threatened with annihilation, accusing each other of a coup. Both termed
their plans to change the Constitution as "reformative" and labeled their
opponent's plans as "violation of the evolutionary Law".

The President issued four decrees to terminate the parliament's standing and
appointed a preterm election without constitutional grounds. The grounds for
termination stated in his April decree and those stated in his August decree
were entirely different.

In spring his opponents swore that they would never agree to a preterm
election and in summer they all applied as candidates. They trumpet
lawlessness and are readily engaged in this lawlessness, validating it.

This prolonged confrontation exposes numerous flaws in the Constitution
and their cardinally different interpretations by the opposing sides. The
lawyers (employed by either side) fail to perform their peacekeeping
functions.

Instead, they act as assault detachments. Their opponents promise to
rewrite the Constitution but are reluctant to correct the most evident
flaws.

They intimidate each other with calls for national referendums but they
forget that under the outdated but still active law on referendums it is
impossible to hold any. (Five years ago, both Yushchenko and Yanukovych
promised to do everything possible to update the law.)

Both camps keep calling for a "return to legal frameworks" and both keep
failing to recognize those frameworks. Parliament, dead de jure, is trying
to show signs of life. The President, having declared it "defunct", keeps
polemizing with the decedent.

He denied it the right to adopt any legislative acts, but as soon as the
government stepped up work on the draft of the 2008 national budget, his
secretariat threatened to veto the budget bill unless the President's
initiatives were taken into consideration. Under such circumstances, it is
absurd to ask which side is right.

Yet, this question has to be answered, at least because the people want to
know. It has two aspects - legal and moral. In other words, is this
parliament valid? The President and the opposition forces are convinced
that it is not.

They refer to two documents: the presidential decree of August 1, 2007
and the Constitutional Court's ruling of October 17, 2002.

The presidential decree terminated parliament, but "termination" and
"dissolution" are different legal terms. What some lawyers call "termination
of the right of the collective representative and legislative body" others
call just "a mechanism for launching the procedure of a preterm election".
The latter's argumentation looks very sound.

First, the systems of state management are based on the fundamental
principle of continuity. The country must not be left without its a high
representative body even for a day.

Secondly, Article 90 of the Constitution says that the parliament "shall
terminate the day a new parliament convocation holds its first session".

Members of the pro-government coalition and the opposition call each other
"ignorant" and interpret Article 90 differently. But why not remove the
cause of this variance? Why not turn to the Constitutional Court or
supplement this article with a clarification?

So far, no one has undertaken such an initiative. Instead, the MPs prefer
to play up more "profitable" issues like accession (or non-accession) to
NATO, the status of the Russian language, MP immunity, or the parliament's
division into two houses.

Five years ago the Constitutional Court gave its interpretation of five
articles of the Constitution. As it explained, parliament is valid "if not
less than two-thirds of it have been elected and sworn in. This precondition
extends to the entire period of the convocation and may not be considered
as the prerequisite for opening the first session."

Although some legal experts call this interpretation into question as "too
liberal", it is binding nonetheless. Others doubt that this ruling is
applicable today, arguing that in 1996, when the Constitution was adopted,
parliament was elected by a simple majority model and there was a risk of
too many vacant seats in parliament.

Now, when parliament is elected according to a partisan representation
model, there can be no empty seats: the candidate rolls of political parties
are long enough and there are always substitutes for those who may vacate
seats between elections.

The pro-presidential side rejects this argument, saying that the
Constitutional Court's ruling is still in effect and binding. The
pro-government side insists that the 162 opposition MPs who resigned
voluntarily to invalidate parliament acted against their voters' will. Both
sides are equally right and wrong.

There is also the moral aspect. Take, for instance, the issue of MP
immunity: many earnestly believe that its abolition could solve every
problem at once - from water and heat supplies to preparations for the
Euro-2012 soccer finals. At first, members of the coalition called this
issue "far-fetched". Then they called it "non-topical".

Then, as soon as pro-presidential political forces made the abolition of MP
immunity their canvassing slogan, the pro-government camp took it on
vigorously and promptly. Members of the coalition majority voted
unanimously to relinquish some of their privileges and initiated amendments
to the Constitution to deprive MPs and the President of immunity.

The design is clear: to snatch the trump card from their rival's hands and
make a fool of the President: by signing the law he would admit to the
parliament's validity and by ignoring it he would give his opponents a
wonderful opportunity to accuse him of double standards.

This appears to be a clever tactical move, but in fact it is sheer
disrespect for voters. If this problem is not worth two hoots, then why
waste time and taxpayers' money adopting the law abolishing MP immunity?
If it is important, then what prevented the coalition from adopting it
before?

Back in October 2006 Regions Party faction leader Yevhen Kushnaryov said it
was ready to support the opposition's initiative to abolish MP privileges.
He did vote for the bill introduced by the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc and Our
Ukraine. So did Vasyl Kiselyov. The rest 182 members of the faction did not.

In February 2007 Mykhailo Chechetov said in an interview that the Regions
Party changed its approach: "The Regions Party will say yes - no problem.
But representatives of the Tymoshenko Bloc and Our Ukraine beg us not to
vote for this law!

They say that their leaders will force them to vote for it, but the leaders
have billions and the ordinary MPs like them have nothing but their
salaries. When we heard accusations against abolishing MP privileges, we
changed our position. Do you really think that businessmen in the RP faction
need a miserable salary of $4,000 a month? They make $100 million!"

In 2000 those in opposition today were strongly against the law on
abolishing MP immunity that was initiated by then-President Leonid Kuchma.

The Constitutional Court said: "The immunity of a representative serves as a
warranty for exercising his or her duties freely and effectively and is not
his or her personal privilege. Parliamentary immunity is a legal instrument
typical of a majority of states, including European ones." This quotation is
for those who say that "the civilized world has long given up this
anachronism".

It should be noted that the Constitutional Court did not rule out the
possibility of abolishing MP immunity, presuming that it would not narrow
civil rights and freedoms.

The author believes that the attempt to strip MPs or the President of
immunity is just a pre-election act.

By voting for the relevant amendment to the Constitution, the coalition put
the Constitutional Court into a quandary. So far, CC judges have managed
to avoid a direct answer to the question of the legitimacy of this preterm
election. Now, if they OK the bill on this amendment, they would recognize
the parliament's legitimacy, and if they turned it down, they would play to
the President's hand.

In the meantime, one stupid act is following another. At the President
Yushchenko's initiative, the National Security and Defense Council is
recommending the government to suspend two ministers from office.

As is known, the only grounds to suspend a public servant from office are
the institution of criminal proceedings. In all other cases, the right
measure is "dismissal". That is the parliament's prerogative, but the
President claims that the parliament has ceased to be.

Too many are sick and tired of this absurd show on the Ukrainian political
stage. Must it go on?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LINK: http://www.mw.ua/1000/1550/60408/

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5. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS ARE NEEDED
Presidential secretariat proposes amendments to Ukrainian constitution

Article by Ihor Yukhnovskyy
Zerkalo Nedeli, Kiev, in Russian 15 Sep 07; p 4
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Tue, Sep 18, 2007

Academician Ihor Yukhnovskyy has presented constitutional amendments

drafted in the presidential secretariat. Writing in a serious weekly, he said that
the president and parliament should have enough powers to ensure the stable
functioning of the executive. Leftovers from the Soviet system have to be
eliminated to prevent duplication and uncertainty.

Yukhnovskyy said that the parliament elected on 30 September should

approve the amendments and schedule a constitutional referendum.

The following is the text of the article by Yukhnovskyy entitled
"Constitutional amendments are needed" published in the Ukrainian weekly
Zerkalo Nedeli on 15 September; subheadings have been inserted editorially:

In June the president of Ukraine, [Viktor] Yushchenko, Academician [Borys]
Paton and I and proposed elaborating a draft Constitution of Ukraine.

This matter had been habitual for me since 1995, when, heading the
parliamentary group Derzhavnist [Statehood], we developed the initial
version of the 1996 constitution.

Soon after, I received a draft constitution from the presidential
secretariat, elaborated by a group of eminent legal scholars under the
leadership of Professor [Volodymyr] Shapoval.

This draft almost fully coincided with my views on the constitution of the
transitional period. Therefore, in this article I considered it advisable to
give a description of Prof Shapoval's draft.

Independent Ukraine arose as a result of the state self-determination of the
Ukrainian nation. This is a truth backed up by centuries of the struggle of
Ukrainians against national enslavers.

It also proceeds from the universal principle of settlement, from the fact
that the indigenous nation and the territory that it settled represent a
stable natural unity.

The principle of the national idea lies at the basis of the Constitution of
Ukraine and should always lie at the basis of policy of all branches of
power in Ukraine.

The rejection of the policy of the present government by broad strata of the
population of Ukraine is connected with the non-national nature of that
policy. The national idea imbues the vital functions of all states in
Europe. The same should hold true in Ukraine.

If this national principle is observed, one can also talk about means of
governance in the state. The second principle that should be laid at the
basis of the constitution is the principle of rational and careful
separation of powers between the branches of power.

But what do we have in Ukraine?

We lived through a presidential republic [as received; should be a
semi-presidential republic] under [Leonid] Kuchma and we are living through
the nonsense of the parliamentary republic of [parliamentary speaker
Oleksandr] Moroz under the presidency of Yushchenko.
Flawed structure of the executive
Let us consider the structure of the present executive. For now we have
inherited the administrative structure of the former USSR.

The Soviet Union was a state with deeply centralized governance of the
entire public complex. There was a dictatorship of the CPSU [Communist

Party of the Soviet Union] Central Committee.

The state was in charge of all means of production and information. There
were many ministries and state committees. Ukraine inherited this whole mass
of institutions.

But now the basic form of ownership is private property. Major private
companies have appeared owning production complexes in all areas of the

life of society. The ministries practically do not make money.

And that is why there are many people in the executive of Ukraine who often
do not know what they are meant to be doing. They think up work for
themselves, and bureaucracy grows from this.

Apart from the ministries, there is also the Cabinet of Ministers with
deputy prime ministers. The Cabinet of Ministers has a large staff. They
duplicate and filter the actions and instructions of the ministries. The
basic component of the Cabinet of Ministers is the deputy prime ministers.

Each of them is responsible for the work of several ministries. The first
deputy prime minister stands above the deputy prime ministers. And at the
top there is the prime minister. The last person in this pyramid is not an
executive, but a purely political figure.

And that's not all. In Ukraine there is also a nationally elected president.
An administration functions under him. The presidential administration deals
with the same questions as the Cabinet of Ministers. The administration
contains competent and often very ambitious people.

This is why the highest level of the executive in Ukraine has the form of
two fairly long and parallel chains.

Ministries - ministers. The Cabinet of Ministers - deputy prime ministers,
the first deputy prime minister and the prime minister; the presidential
administration - heads of administration; the president.

Orange Revolution amendments made situation worse
In such long and therefore not specifically accountable chains two

unwieldy links are superfluous: deputy prime ministers and the presidential
administration.

They can be eliminated both in the presidential and in the parliamentary
form of governing the state.

What form, in particular, should this acquire in Ukraine?

Presidential rule: ministries - ministers; the prime minister - he is the
deputy president; the president.

Parliamentary form of rule: ministries - ministers, the first deputy prime
minister, the prime minister. The president with limited representative
duties.

The weakness of the 1996 constitution was that it conferred too many powers
on the president. The president was not in a state to cope with them: both
defence and security and government - appointing ministers, dismissing the
prime minister and ministers, the National Security and Defence Council of
Ukraine, the Constitutional Court and the prosecutor's office, foreign
policy and economic activity and other matters.

That is why the presidential administration fulfilled his functions for the
president. It came to be above the Cabinet of Ministers.

The chairman of the presidential administration turned into the head of the
presidential administration. Everyone remembers the infamous rule of the
heads of presidential administration, [Dmytro] Tabachnyk and [Viktor]
Medvedchuk. The position in the state was becoming intolerable.

Moroz proposed amendments to the constitution. They were not properly
elaborated in parliament. Parliament accepted them, so to speak, almost ad
hoc, with a knife pressed to its throat [during the Orange Revolution]:
either you vote for all the amendments, or we Socialists will not vote for
the third round of presidential elections.

The 2004 constitutional reform, unfortunately, was worse than the 1996
constitution. Its introduction in 2005 led to an imbalance both in the
executive and the legislature.

This fact demoralized the whole of society with dreadful force - from the
highest branches of governance of the state and legal proceedings down to
very bottom.

Ukrainian society drew a dramatic lesson in the development of its state. We
are now starting to understand how important are the articles of the
constitution under which Ukraine has to live. Therefore we are faced with
the task of building a balanced system of power in a future parliamentary
republic.
Transitional parliament to draw up draft constitution
The Supreme Council [parliament] that will be elected in 2007 will have the
functions of a transitional parliament, whose main task is to draw up, under
the chairmanship of the current president, Viktor Yushchenko, a draft new
constitution (or two drafts).

The draft must be put to a nationwide referendum. It has to be determined
when the new constitution comes into force and elections to the Supreme
Council and elections of the president of the state are to be announced
according to the new constitution.

The new Constitution of Ukraine should come into force in October 2009 [as
received, should be January 2010], after the election of the new president
of Ukraine.

The duty should now be placed on President Yushchenko to convince the
parties that get into the Supreme Council at the 30 September elections to
adopt amendments to those articles of the 1996 constitution with the changes
adopted in 2004 that are hampering the functioning both of the Supreme
Council, the government and the president by two thirds of the vote of the
overall list.

The content of those amendments are to be drawn up by 30 September 2007. A
constitutional pact is to be concluded in order to ensure that amendments to
the constitution passed at the beginning of the first session of parliament
of the new convocation come into force immediately, before their official
confirmation at the second session of the Supreme Council as it should be
according to Chapter 13 of the Constitution of Ukraine.

Amendments formulated in the draft constitution by the authors V. Averyanov,
N. Kozyubra, A. Korneyev, R. Mikheyenko and V. Shapoval (the leader of the
group) can serve as the basis for this work.
Main points of proposed draft
What is the essence of this rational and clear-cut document?

The draft by eminent Ukrainian lawyers eliminates shortcomings of the 1996
constitution and shortcomings in the amended 2004 constitution. It is based
on the assumption that we now have an actual president, and he will be so
until autumn 2009.

And so, how does the executive look? The president, nationally elected,
represents the state, is responsible for the security of the state and leads
foreign policy. He appoints the prime minister on the recommendation of the
Supreme Council. He appoints and dismisses ministers on the recommendation
of the prime minister.

The Cabinet of Ministers consists of the prime minister and ministers. In
the absence of the prime minister, his duties are performed by a minister
nominated by him.

The prime minister forms the government. The prime minister can be
simultaneously a Supreme Council deputy.

The president has the right to rescind resolutions from the Cabinet
concerning foreign policy, defence and security.

The president chairs sittings of the government devoted to questions of
defence, security and foreign policy.

There is no longer any need to grant the president the right to propose to
the Supreme Council [parliament] the candidacies of the defence and foreign
ministers and the head of the Security Service.

The duties of first deputy prime minister are abolished, as are the services
of the presidential secretariat dealing with matters of defence, security
and foreign relations.

In exchange, the National Security and Defence Council [NSDC] headed by

the president will include the prime minister, the defence, interior, foreign
and justice ministers, the head of the Security Service and other members
appointed by the president.

The president can introduce any other questions of the state's strategic
development through the NSDC and thereby they automatically gain the
endorsement of the prime minister and the main ministers taking part in the
NSDC sitting.

Ministers can also simultaneously be Supreme Council deputies. Consequently,
their position is considerably more stable, both in politics and in regard
to their dependence on the president and prime minister.

The administrative structure of the state looks like this: the state,
regions, districts and communities. Each of the links has its own elected
councils of deputies - from the Supreme Council to local councils and
corresponding executive bodies.

By analogy with the prefectures in France, regional and district
administrations in Ukraine will perform functions of supervision. Heads of
administration of regions and districts are appointed by the president on
the recommendation of the Cabinet of Ministers.

Such a structure of local government corresponds to the structure of
governance in all European states. It had long ago been elaborated for
Ukraine as well.

In this way, a more clear-cut and accountable structure of executive power
is being established in the state. Local self-government is being created.

The Supreme Council, as the highest body of legislative power, retains its
functions: it passes laws and decisions about various appointments and about
the impeachment of the president.
Proposed rules for forming government
Our eminent lawyers ascribe great significance to the question of the
government's stability and capacity to function. The impression is being
created that they want to say: the state is functioning if its government is
functioning.

A strict mechanism is being established for forming the government on the
part of the Supreme Council. A Supreme Council majority (even if formed
temporarily) in a period not exceeding 30 days takes a decision regarding
the candidacy for the post of prime minister.

The candidate for the post of prime minister within 15 days presents his
government's draft action programme for consideration by the Supreme
Council.

The Supreme Council approves the draft programme in a period of time not
exceeding 15 days. If the draft programme is approved, the president issues
decrees within a period of three days on the appointment of the prime
minister. The president appoints the ministers on the presentation of the
prime minister.

If the Supreme Council fails to approve the action plan of the Cabinet of
Ministers presented by the prime ministerial candidate within the allotted
time, the president terminates the powers of the Supreme Council ahead of
schedule.

After that, within three days the president appoints a prime minister and,
according to his recommendations, the ministers.

What do these time frames mean?

Of course, the parties that get into parliament are fully aware whom they
want to see as prime minister and ministers. But anything can happen. And so
the newly elected parliament has 30 days to reach agreement as to whom it
will present to the president for the job of prime minister.

If in the 30-day period the deputies fail to agree on the candidacy of the
prime minister and determine a candidacy agreed by the majority, the fate of
the executive in the state becomes unreliable. Parliament must be dissolved.

Okay, say parliament has decided on a prime ministerial candidate. He
presents the action plan of his future government to the Supreme Council. It
has 15 days to approve it. If the programme is not approved within that
time, the question arises of whom the Supreme Council will recommend as
prime minister.

There is a collapse of power, and here the president is obliged to terminate
the powers of this non-functioning parliament. And he will be obliged to act
independently, which is set down in the draft of our eminent lawyers.

The Supreme Council can take a decision of no-confidence in the Cabinet, as
a result of which it will resign.
Premier to get wider rights of ministerial dismissal
The prime minister who was determined by the Supreme Council has the right
to declare his resignation to the Supreme Council. The resignation of the
prime minister means the resignation of the whole government.

The prime minister dismisses a minister.

What is new here?

This replaces a demand to the Supreme Council within a month to form a
majority and then - again within a month - the government, the demand to
pass a resolution on the candidacy of the prime minister and approve the
draft action plan of his government, thereby forming the highest executive
body of the state. Otherwise, the Supreme Council is dissolved.

The president can dissolve the Supreme Council for two reasons: when it is
incapable of choosing the candidacy of the prime minister and approving the
government's draft action programme, and for political reasons. In the
latter case, the president can set a referendum on an early termination of
the powers of the Supreme Council.

If, as a result of the referendum, the president's proposal is endorsed, the
Supreme Council by a two thirds majority can pass a decision on an early
termination of the president's powers.

Parliament is losing an extremely troublesome function connected with the
appointment and dismissal of ministers.

In general, question of appointments and dismissals cannot belong to the
Supreme Council. As wretched experience has shown, they cause the deputies
to quarrel and negate the work of the supreme body of the state.

In the proposed draft of our eminent lawyers under the editorship of
Volodymyr Shapoval, there is also a range of amendments regarding the
judiciary and a range of editorial amendments.

All of this makes the draft a document worthy of our attention and certainly
a basis for the transitional version that is due to be approved at the first
session of the newly elected Supreme Council of Ukraine.

The draft under the editorship of Volodymyr Shapoval is a draft of an
improved presidential form of rule. In today's conditions there can be no
other transitional document. Ukraine has a nationally elected president in
office. He will occupy that post until 2009. He was elected on the basis of
the 1996 constitution.
Ukrainian parliament needs upper chamber
The creation of an upper chamber of the Ukrainian parliament is an urgent
matter. Regardless of whether the republic is presidential or parliamentary.

People often think that in a parliamentary republic the president will
fulfil the role of the Queen of England. How profoundly mistaken they are!
The Queen of England is the great queen of the British Commonwealth. The
House of Lords is completely loyal to her.

The most eminent personalities of England sit in this upper house of the
English parliament. There is no [written] constitution in England.

The House of Lords is a great receptacle of English common law and norms of
behaviour, a guardian of the traditions of the state. It is like a huge roof
under which the life of society seethes and where governments work and are
replaced.

Ukraine also needs a senate - an upper chamber of the Ukrainian parliament.
A senate would duplicate consideration and adoption of a certain group of
important laws, would deal with questions of the qualification of leading
personnel and appointments to office of judges and other appointments.

A senate would perform the role of a constitutional intermediate link
between the lower chamber - the Supreme Council - and the president, between
the government and the Supreme Council.

A senate would represent the interests of the regions in the budget process,
would be concerned with nature protection and would deal with questions of
state security.

In most countries in the world the government is appointed either by the
president at the recommendation of the prime minister or by the prime
minister himself, but in both cases with a consideration of its
qualification by the senate.

There is no special difference between parliamentary and presidential forms
of rule, if there are no superfluous links in running the state.

Especially when the majority in parliament is related to the president's
party in a presidential republic, or to the prime minister's party in a
parliamentary republic.

Apart from parliament and the government, in various states there exist
systems of governance and consultative organizations fairly independent of
the electoral bodies of power.

It is not worth thinking, for example, that in the FRG [Federal Republic of
Germany] the chancellor and his ministers decide all questions of foreign
and domestic policy.

A system of state secretaries is deeply embedded in the FRG. As a rule,
there are highly qualified permanent bosses in the ministries and in the
state. Politician ministers come and go, but state secretaries remain.

In France the country has an economic and social council, which has highly
qualified representatives of various areas of manufacturing, science and the
trade unions, including former high-ranking government members.

Recommendations from the council have to be considered by the government
without fail and given an explanatory response in the event of their
rejection.

In a word, a senate, an economic and social council and a system of state
secretaries are additional independent links in balancing and rationalizing
the state system.

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6. UKRAINE: WILL THE ELECTION END THE TURMOIL?

ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By Dmitry Shlapentokh
For World Security Network, DTT-NET.COM
Brussels, Belgium, Thursday, September 13, 2007

Ukraine continues to be deeply divided along regional/linguistic lines. At
the same time, this cultural/linguistic difference is not the only reason
for the persistent instability.

The Orange Revolution of 2004 did not improve the Ukrainian economy; and
this is one of the strongest reasons why Yanukovich, the major contender of
pro-Western Yushchenko, became Prime Minister.

Although he represents mostly the Russian-speaking East, he would not
necessarily be anti-Western if economic goodies in the form of investment/
grants, etc. would come from the West.

Will the elections on September 30 bring a clear outcome in favor of one
side or "more of the same" ?
A multi-faceted conflict
Similar to what has occurred in other post-Soviet states, the Ukrainian
elite tried to forge a new nation and minimize Ukraine's debt to Russian
history and culture, despite more than 300 years of living together and
similarities in cultural and religious practices.

This design does not work as the recent turmoils/revolutions (2004-__)
indicated. Ukraine became deeply divided along regional lines; and even the
sameness of religious tradition does not prevent Ukrainians from bitter
conflicts with each other or from bringing Russia into play.

At the same time, it would be oversimplistic to see Russia as the cause of
the conflicts and to believe that a decisive victory of the side hostile to
Russia would necessarily benefit the USA. Indeed, my recent visit to Ukraine
convinced me that no simple solution to the preset-day crisis is in store.
The conflicts, or at least the tension, might proceed for a long time; and
the outcome could be unexpected.
Geopolitics of the Church
The deep religious split inside the Ukraine Orthodox Church, which reflects
the Ukraine geopolitical split between West and East, could be seen even in
Sofia Cathedral, erected during the regime of Yroslav the Wise. It had been
the major Orthodox cathedral of Kievan Russia and could well be regarded as
the place from which Orthodox Christianity came to most Eastern Slavs,
Ukrainians and Russians.

The very place seems to be inspired; while I was there, some Russians and
Ukrainians visiting the cathedral remembered their common roots and the fact
that they had lived together for more than 300 years.

The Russian tour guide spoke in Russian to a crowd mostly from Russia and
led them to the tomb of Yroslav the Wise, stating that Yroslav was not only
a builder of the cathedral but also promoted Slavic culture.

He was a man who should be dear to all Eastern Slavs for he toiled for the
culture of entire Slavdom. I joined the group when the guide continued to
preach the historical unity of Orthodox Russians and Orthodox Ukrainians.

An older woman approached us and said that she had volunteered to join the
Red Army in WWII; and her mother, quite a religious person, let her go
because she believed that if she fought for a noble cause God would protect
her. She regarded the collapse of the USSR as a personal tragedy.

She came from Moscow to pray to the relic of St. Vladimir for the future
unity of Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians. This sense of unity between
Russians and Ukrainians was shared not only by those who came from Russia
but also by local Ukrainians.

The woman custodian explained that all the problems of Ukraine befell
because the present-day Ukrainian Metropolitan had split from the Russian
Patriarch. He had no right to be the Metropolitan and became so only because
he had received the support of Yuschenko.

He was spiritually foreign to Ukraine, and, instead of pushing Ukraine
toward Russia, had pushed Ukraine toward America, spiritually foreign to
Russians and Ukrainians. The woman said nothing good could come from
Ukraine's gravitation to the West, away from brotherly Russians.

She stated that during the Orange Revolution she and others moved around
Kiev praying for peace because there was a fear of civil war. While at that
time bloodshed was averted, she was quite pessimistic and believed that, in
general, everything was moving forward to some nasty end.

While some of the people I met in the cathedral still long for
Ukrainian-Russian unity, others had quite a different view; and the very
fact of their presence in the citadel of Orthodox Christianity appealing to
unity made no difference to them.

The Russian woman curator blasted Ukrainians. In her view, Ukrainians were
petty, sly Byzantines who sell everything to the highest bidder. Upon
Yushchenko coming to power, thousands of people were purged from their jobs.

She spent 40 years in Ukraine but could stand here and be ready to emigrate
to Russia; in fact, she said, Ukrainians and Russians had absolutely
different mentalities.

Her Ukrainian co-worker in the cathedral had an entirely different view of
Russians and Ukrainians. She proclaimed that Russians had never treated
Ukrainians equally. For example, they took several icons-pre-Mongol icons-to
keep for a while, but never returned them.

The same deep split between pro-Western or plainly nationalistic,
self-centered Ukrainians and those who still believe that Russians and
Ukrainians could live together could be seen in the other ancient center of
Orthodoxy-Pecherskaia Lavra.

It was one of the first and one of the most revered of Orthodox Christianity
monasteries, with more than a thousand-year history. As is the case with
other ancient monuments in Kiev, Lavra had co-existed with monuments related
to recent Ukrainian/Soviet history.

Near Lavra, was a granite memorial with the names of Ukrainian soldiers who
perished in the Afghan War. However, as soon as you go inside the monastery,
you see mostly ancient stuff, including centuries-old trees.

There is, for example, a huge oak near the 17th century tombs of saints.
Glittering, flickering flames of candles are already seen at the entrance to
the catacombs where there are mummies of monks and saints.

Not everybody could face this encounter with death, manifested by the small
dry bodies. One of the girls started to lose consciousness. And, nearby, an
old man and a young man and woman made the sign of the cross. People took
water from a holy water font.

It would seem that the cathedral in Lavra should turn people only to
metaphysical thought: death, the meaning of life, etc. Still, similar to the
Sofia Cathedral, the monastery is a place of bitter conflict, which splits
Ukraine between nationalists-mostly European-oriented-and those who
gravitate toward Russia. And they are the ones who control the monastery.

There were posters on the road leading to the catacombs. One poster provided
a short history of the Church; the history divided into two parts. The first
part was until 1054, when the split occurred between Orthodox and Roman
Catholics. The Church had continued splitting into various branches,
including the Ukrainian Orthodox Church led by Filaret, who is Yuschenko's
supporter.

The poster blasted him. It stated that Filaret had split from the true
Orthodox Church and was excommunicated by the Patriarch.

Thus, those who wanted to save their souls through this Church would be
cursed and not saved. I asked the nearby nun whether their policy of
antagonizing Filaret and his church had led to conflict with Yushchenko.

She responded that she thought about how to follow the road of the Lord and
did not care about the position of Yushchenko. The nun was definitely the
only one who believed that Russia and Ukraine should be together, if not
politically at least spiritually. I found the same attitude when I visited
one of the museums in Lavra.

The Lavra monastery had several museums, including one with golden and
silver artifacts of various people who lived in the territory of present-day
Ukraine, from pre-historical time to the present. This provided the
opportunity for the tour guides to elaborate on the historical relationship
between this variety of people, including Russians and Ukrainians.

The elderly guide in the Ukrainian Museum of Historical Treasures (Scythian
Gold) at Lavra elaborated before the small group on the origin of the
Scythians. She stated that one should look at the images of the Scythian
warriors on the silver vase.

"One could see here that the Scythians were not Asiatics, but were Slavic
people, and from them stemmed both Russians and Ukrainians." She implied
that Russians and Ukrainians are brotherly people who should, if not united,
at least live in peace with each other.

The split even affected families. In the monastery, I met an elderly couple
who had an entirely opposite view of the future relationship between Russia
and Ukraine and, consequently, on the relationship between Russian and
Ukrainian Orthodoxy.

The man did not idealize the Russian Orthodox Church and stated that the
Russian Patriarch had behaved disgustingly, kissing the hands of Yeltsin,
who was nothing but a criminal.

Indeed, it was the present-day leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church and
Yeltsin who were responsible for the dissolution of the USSR. Still, the
very fact that these particular leaders were scoundrels did not mean that
two brotherly peoples should live apart; and he believed that Ukrainians and
Russians would be together. The man's wife disagreed with him. In her view,
Ukrainians would never join Russia.

Finally, there was an attempt for reconciliation. I came to another church
that was outside the walls of Lavra. In the middle of the church a young
priest with a thin, ascetic face repeated quickly, "the God Almighty saves
us sinners." Another priest stood nearby, and I asked him about his church
affiliation. He responded that his church belonged to the Filaret church.

The other church was controlled by Moscow and attacked them mostly because
of the financial support of Moscow businessmen and those businessmen from
Russia who bought a lot of property in Ukraine.

"But," he said, "this is not the point. If the Lord wishes to see two
different churches, so be it. One should not fight against God's will. And
we could live together with other churches if it would not involve the
church in a political ploy."
Geopolitics on the street
While even in the presence of the most venerable symbols of the Eastern
Orthodox Church, religion was enmeshed in the political/geopolitical
conflict. This was even more the case on the streets and inside the
buildings of Kiev.

While working in one of the local Kiev archives, I discussed with an archive
employee the present geopolitical problems and Ukraine's possible future. I
discussed the possibility of splitting East Ukraine and that Russians might
be engaged in an attempt to take East Ukraine.

But the young woman exploded and proclaimed that Ukrainians could not think
about separation; and all of this is a ploy of the Russians who live in
Ukraine. And, she said, if the Russians did not like present-day Ukraine,
they could well go back to Russia.

She proclaimed that she loved and respected Russians but would not close her
eyes to the Russians' misdeeds, such as the Russian outrage in Chechnya and
Russia's attempt to snatch Ukrainian territory, such as the Crimea. This
attempt would be resisted. She and other scholars-archivists proclaimed that
it was not a question of Ukraine but of Russia falling apart.

On the street, the future of Ukraine and its relationship with Russia could
be equally heated, and the negative views of Russians could be combined with
sort of the positive views of Europeans.

This sort of positive view of Europeans, tempered with a sort of distancing
from them is quite similar to what one could find in Russia. Most ethnic
Russians would state that West Europeans, German, French, British, etc., are
people who are closer to Russians than anybody else.

Still, this closeness does not mean absolute sameness, for Russia belongs to
the eastern part of Europe and has an idiosyncratic Orthodox culture. And
similar to Russians, most Ukrainians seem to share a dislike of the USA. It
goes without saying that Yanukovich people are strongly anti-American. One
of them with whom I struck up a conversation on the street blasted Yuschenko
for corruption and proclaimed that Yuschenko prepared to make Ukraine a
springboard for America's attack against Russia.

Still, it is not just Yanukovich supporters but seems even to be Yuschenko
folk, usually pro-Western, who have rather skeptical views about the USA.
For example, there was a man, apparently a Yuschenko supporter, with whom I
talked near one of Kiev's archives.

The man in the archives pointed out that he could not understand Americans
of Ukrainian descent who visit Ukraine and who seem to be Orthodox people
who care about Ukraine, but very few of whom actually invest in the
Ukrainian economy and culture.

Another person became involved in the conversation and stated that this was
not surprising for Americans are sly and not to be trusted and he would not
believe anything that they might say. This anti-Americanism did not preclude
intentions to visit or even live in the USA, for the USA still has the image
of a country where one could make money more easily than in Europe.

While quite a few Ukrainians reject the idea of unity with Russia, others
embrace this idea wholeheartedly as a natural unity of Orthodox brotherly
nations. There was, for example, a member of the Brotherhood of Korchinsky;
Dmitry Korchinsky is an ideological ally of Alexander Dugin, the well-known
Russian philosopher who dreams of the creation of a great Eurasian empire
with Orthodox Russia as the core. So during my visits to Kiev, I decided to
visit the Brotherhood's headquarters.

The woman who guarded the building told me that she did not know much about
the Brotherhood but their programs were, indeed, something horrible. On the
second floor, there was a big man with three young boys. One of them
explained that the revolution was just starting and one should wait.

The members of the Brotherhood told me that the numerous demonstrations and
hunger strike sit-downs had been the product of the Orange Revolution.
Still, the very fact that masses were awakened by the Orange Revolution does
not mean that people would follow Yuschenko and his clique; and the current
situation could move in the opposite direction.

He added that the very presence of various protesters indicated that the
country is boiling. The uprising would smash the present-day elite and
create a great Orthodox empire. The members of the Brotherhood asserted that
a new Orthodox Empire would emerge in the center, in Kiev; and they said
that they support Dugin in many ways. All of these statements about the
bloody revolution were preached in quite a peaceful manner.

I shared information about the Brotherhood program with the lady who guarded
the entrance. She responded that she still did not understand anything but
she was convinced that the end of the world was near and that one should
read the Bible. Near by, a girl turned decisively towards her boyfriend, and
they engaged in passionate kissing.
The road to a new crisis or friendship with the West?
On the surface, the division of the country is rooted in exclusively in the
regional and linguistic differences. One could also conclude that the
influence of Ukraine's giant Eastern neighbor--Russia--is also crucial in
the division of the country and also could be seen as the prime cause for
the political tension. And there is, of course, a point in this assumption.

Still the role of the cultural differences and geopolitical play should not
be much exaggerated. There is more behind this. In fact, one should look at
the reasons for the "orange" revolutions and similar upheaval in the other
post-Soviet states.

One might state that people were enraged by the corruption and authoritarian
drives of quite a few of the post Soviet regimes. One could state that it is
corruption that led to the revolution in Georgia.

Still, one could question this theory; for in Georgia, for example, the
corruption has been pandemic during the Soviet regime. Still, few Georgians
saw it as a great evil. The same could be said about the Ukraine.

Corruption, authoritarianism and linguistic cultural frictions became the
source of the serious problems only because they sublimate or reinforce the
people's real concern: their economic problems.

The split from the USSR had not led to the improvement but rather to the
decline of the living standard for quite a few Ukrainians. The ideologists
of the "orange revolutions" of 2004, the current president Viktor Yushchenko
first of all, related these problems with the fact that Ukraine is not
nationalistic enough. It does not clearly distant itself from Russia and, as
was implied here, does not completely follow the Western market economy.

Still, the revolution of 2004 did not bring any positive economic changes
'and one could assume--at least from anecdotal evidences during my visit to
Ukraine-- that the economy has continued to deteriorate. And it was this
that increased the popularity of Viktor Yanukovich, Yushchenko's major
competitor and the leader of the "Party of Regions."

It was not just that Yanukovich had represented an Eastern, more Russified,
part of Ukraine; but he also represented a different social/economic model.
It implied that the wholesale privatization and withdrawal of the state from
economic arrangements would be devastation for Ukrainian industry and, in
the long run, for the Ukrainian economy. And it was this new economic and
related geopolitical arrangement that finally made Yuschenko Prime Minister.

This hardly pleases Yushchenko, who finds himself increasingly isolated
after parting with his longtime ally, the charismatic Yule Tymoshenko. And
Yushchenko tried to do what has been done in Russia despite his implication
that Ukraine is absolutely different from its semi-Asiatic neighbor.

In April 2007, he disbanded the Rada-Ukrainian parliament in the same way as
Yeltsin had done in 1993. In the same fashion he also dismissed
Constitutional Court judges and the Prosecutor General.He also tried to
reassert its absolute authorities over army and law enforcement agencies.

The similarities between Russia in 1993 and Ukraine in 2007 were reinforced
by the cases of direct violence. Yet, Ukraine is not Russia. The violence
did not lead to bloodshed and the president is not able to master absolute
authority. And, therefore, Yushchenko was compelled to agree to a new
parliamentary election.
What will the election bring?
Of course it is hard to predict the exact configuration of events. Still
most likely Yanukovich's "Party of Regions" and his allies will dominate
Rada. Does this mean that the West--or, to be precise, the EU (for the
interests of Europeans and the USA should necessarily coincide)--should
worry about a Russian take-over? One might well question this.

Displeasure with the present regime is not just a manifestation of the
regional/cultural/linguistic differences but is also rooted in economic
problems. And it is this economic pragmatism that could make Yanukovich
Ukraine as friendly to Europe as Yuschenko Ukraine. Indeed, the victory of
Yushchenko will not lead to any serious economic concession from Russia.

The cold pragmatism of Putin's regime could be seen in his treatment of pro-
Russian Belorussia, which pays a much higher price for gas than before. One
could hardly expect that Yanukovich's Ukraine would be treated differently.
And here European help might be of great importance.
Recommendations
Europeans' generous economic help and direct investment, especially in key
Ukrainian industries, might not look economically sound. Still, it might be
a great sense from the geopolitical point of view. And while Russian gas
prices would push Ukraine away from Russia, the generous investment /grants
from the West would pull Ukraine closer to Europe regardless of the
political make-up of the people in Kiev.
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(www.worldsecuritynetwork.org is partner of dtt-net.com)
http://www.dtt-net.com/en/index.php?page=view-article&article=2720

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7. THE GET-OUT-OF-JAIL-FREE CARD

ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By John Marone,

Kyiv Post Staff Journalist, Ukraine
Eurasian Home, Moscow, Russia, Monday, September 3, 2007

The hottest topic in Ukrainian politics these days is whether lawmakers
should lose their perks. With early elections scheduled for September 30,
parliamentary hopefuls need the issue to motivate an otherwise fed up
electorate.

The tricky part, though, is that all the major blocs are promising the
country the same thing - to strip themselves and their colleagues of
long-held immunity from prosecution.

On the surface, it appears that Ukraine's political players have finally
grown up, receding from the radical fringes. Rather than beating the old
ideological drums of east-west division, such as equal status for the
Russian language or NATO membership, politicians are addressing issues

that unite their countrymen.

The one sentiment that all Ukrainians arguably share is the desire to give
the country's so-called oligarchs their comeuppance.

Residents of Donetsk and Lviv alike know full well who is responsible for
their miserly salaries and pensions. And what could be better revenge than
making MPs equal before the laws they pass? The issue of parliamentary
immunity has thus become one that bridges the electoral divide.

But the apparent consensus between opposite camps of lawmakers on a single
issue is not comparable to the grab for the center witnessed in Western
politics. Canceling parliamentary perks is not the equivalent of, for
example, both the Republicans and Democrats offering tax breaks, or of
Britain's Labour Party becoming more business-friendly under Tony Blair.

Ukraine's main two political camps have not moved closer to each other on
the policy spectrum, because policy is not what really divides them.

Both the pro-Western Orange and Moscow-friendly Blue are more interested in
defending their narrow business interests than in shaping the future of the
nation.

However, with voter distrust at an all-time low since the country's Orange
Revolution, all competing blocs have had to latch on to the issue of
immunity to ensure they get re-elected. It's not a high price to pay,
though, as none of them has any intention of fulfilling the promise.

US and British politicians are also not above pandering to the public for
votes, and campaign promises are often forgotten. However, Western
parliamentarians are subject to prosecution for criminal offenses.

The only Ukrainian lawmaker to be stripped of his immunity was Pavlo
Lazarenko, a former prime minister who fell out with the powerful president
at the time, Leonid Kuchma. Fearing Ukrainian justice, Lazarenko fled to the
US, where he was subsequently sentenced to a prison term for money
laundering.

Lazarenko's punishment came about not because of the crimes he committed,
but because he ran afoul of a vindictive Kuchma. Still in the US, Lazarenko
has released statements that he plans to return to Ukraine or run again for
office in absentee.

Since Viktor Yushchenko came to power in 2005, the presidency has had to
relinquish its near monopoly on power to the parliament. Theoretically, that
means that Ukraine's lawmakers are not as vulnerable to the executive
threats and bullying so common under Kuchma. So why do they still need
immunity from prosecution?

Well, for starters, Yanukovych's parliamentary majority and Yushchenko's
supporters are as hostile to each other as ever. For now, the pro-government
majority controls the Prosecutor-General's Office and police, while the
intelligence services and army are loyal to the president.

Depending on the outcome of the upcoming elections, one side or the other
could get all the marbles, enabling it to drum up bogus charges against
opposition MPs.

But even if the president or majority coalition were prevented from
persecuting minority lawmakers, there would still be a demand for immunity.
The Verkhovna Rada is run by businessmen seeking to legislatively promote
their business interests as well as receive a get-out-of-jail-free card.

A gangster with enough money could be able to ensure himself a place on a
party list and thus immunity from prosecution at home and maybe even abroad.
One of the rallying calls of Ukraine's Orange Revolution, which swept
Yushchenko into power, was: Put the bandits behind bars. The problem is how
to separate the bandits from the lawmakers.

This time around, Yushchenko's faction, Our Ukraine - People's Self Defense,
has retailored the slogan to: One law for everyone. Instead of emphasizing
the immunity issue, the president has targeted a wider range of
parliamentary privileges, such as free apartments for life, the use of posh
spas and double pay during parliamentary breaks. "The state has to provide
lawmakers with working conditions not pleasure," the president announced
last month.

The issue is so universally supported among Ukrainian voters, that the
government majority could only up the ante, pushing Yushchenko to go even
farther. Yanukovych's Regions party announced recently that it would take
part in an extraordinary parliamentary session to cancel deputy perks on
September 4.

The Socialist, the Regions coalition partners, had been trying for a month
to call an extraordinary session in the hopes of bolstering their dismal
ratings.

But the Orange parties have said they would not recognize any bills passed
during such a session, as the president dismissed the parliament earlier
this year.

Thus, the Regions, which boasts more than its fair share of deputies glad to
have immunity from prosecution, has turned the tables on the president,
using his own tactic against him. If the president doesn't recognize the
session, his opponents will claim he doesn't support the cancellation of
lawmaker immunity.

In response, Yushchenko has called for the issue to be revisited after
voting on September 30. Once Ukrainians have already cast their votes,
though, it's unlikely that their representatives in parliament will be as
eager to listen to them.

Opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko tried to cancel the free spas, apartments
for life and other financial incentives last year, but her fellow lawmakers
defeated the initiative.

The situation with perks is not analogous to paying policemen more money so
that they don't take bribes. Most Ukrainian lawmakers buy their places on
party lists. A top businessman can't afford to not become a lawmaker, while
a lawmaker can't afford his mandate without having a business.

The situation is also not analogous to lobbying, because oligarchs represent
the industry, the lawmaker and often the media in one person. Immunity from
prosecution, although having served to protect minority lawmakers, is
primarily a privilege that sets the privileged above everyone else. That's
why the latter are keen to have it cancelled and the former are unlikely to
do so.

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http://www.eurasianhome.org/xml/t/opinion.xml?lang=en&nic=opinion&pid=841&s=skws4h55x2ubknmpo2opx155
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[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
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NOTE: Send in a letter-to-the-editor today. Let us hear from you.
========================================================
8. PROMISES, BUT NO CHANGE IN UKRAINE
As Ukraine prepares for fourth election in only 3 years,
voters have had it with their politicians

By Mitch Potter, Europe Bureau, Toronto Star
Toronto, Ontario, Canada, Saturday, September 15, 2007

KYIV - Perfect day, perfect script, perfect candidate. With 50,000 supporters
on hand and her fiery words vowing war against all that ails Ukraine, the
day has all the makings of a campaign triumph for Yulia Tymoshenko.

Looking every inch the modern-day Joan of Arc, with a flowing white gown

========================================================
9. ORANGE PRINCESS TACKLES THE TWO VIKTORS

IN FIGHT TO 'SAVE THE REVOLUTION'

By Tony Halpin in Bila Tserkva, The Times

London, United Kingdom, Monday, September 17, 2007

Alone on a stage facing a crowd of 5,000 people, Yuliya Tymoshenko cut an
isolated figure, the eye of a storm that is her election campaign to become
Ukraine's next Prime Minister.

Immaculate in an ivory suit, her hair wound in its trademark peasant halo,
she railed for an hour against the corruption that blights Ukraine's economy
and political life.

As she spoke screens flashed pictures of the two Viktors who form, with her,
the country's three-way struggle for power - Prime Minister Yanukovych, her
principal adversary, and President Yushchenko, her former partner in the
Orange Revolution that promised democracy and prosperity.

The subliminal message was clear: three years on, the revolution of 2004 has
been betrayed by weak leadership and an unholy alliance of oligarchs and
self-serving ministers. Only Yuliya has kept the Orange faith.

Ms Tymoshenko has always brought firebrand glamour to Ukraine's politics,
but an added element of granite is visible now in her single-minded
determination to return to power two years after Mr Yushchenko dismissed
her as Prime Minister on national television.

That event signalled an acrimonious split in the Orange coalition that
allowed Mr Yanukovych's Party of the Regions to form a Government after
parliamentary elections last year. His attempts to recruit opposition
lawmakers to create a majority big enough to change the constitution and
strip Mr Yushchenko of power triggered the political crisis in April when
the President dissolved parliament and called early elections.

Ms Tymoshenko, 46, was nicknamed the "gas princess" in the 1990s after
earning a fortune in Ukraine's energy industry. She has transformed herself
in this election into a populist scourge of venal billionaires and a
champion of ordinary Ukrainians.

Her message plays well in a country where the average salary is $200 (ё99) a
month. She avoids accusations of rabble-rousing by pointing to a "Contract
with Investors" signed at a meeting with 300 industrialists last week that
promised transparent privatisations and a level playing field for business.

Her speech at the rally in Bila Tserkva, a bleak industrial city 90km (56
miles) south of Kiev, was heavy on detail but the crowd listened
attentively. Later that evening she was mobbed by people who had waited for
two hours to seek autographs and take pictures. Her voice has grown hoarse
from campaigning for the September 30 poll, but her face betrays no hint of
strain.

A frantic schedule of public rallies has drawn large crowds, breeding
confidence in her team that Ms Tymoshenko's time has come.
"Every party leader believes that he is the best Prime Minister of Ukraine
and I am no exception," she told The Times, deflecting a question on whether
she was ready to assume power.

Her image is everywhere, staring out from billboards urging voters to back
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko's (BYuT) Ukrainian breakthrough reform programme.
Supporters wear white T-shirts bearing her face or BYuT's symbol of a red
heart, underlining the notion that this is as much love affair as political
movement.

The Orange camp has patched up its differences. Ms Tymoshenko has agreed
with Our Ukraine, Mr Yushchenko's party, to form a coalition government if
they win a majority. Rumours persist, however, that the latter may cut a
deal with Mr Yanukovych.

Ms Tymoshenko dismisses the threat, saying that Mr Yushchenko would be naОve
to trust a man who was within weeks of impeaching him. She added: "I don't
think the President wants to go through that again."

The pro-Russian Mr Yanukovych remains a formidable machine politician, who
repeatedly emphasises the divisions between his opponents. "The question 'do
the voters believe that the Orange forces can work together?' has an
exclusively rhetorical character," he told reporters.

The risk for Mr Yushchenko is that voters return a parliament unchanged from
the one he dissolved. He told The Times that the elections would be a
"detonator for radical changes", but he needs Ms Tymoshenko to succeed if
his gamble is to pay off.

Ms Tymoshenko remains polite about her former ally - who last week accused
Russia of blocking the investigation into the plot to poison him with
dioxins that ravaged his features - but many around her regard Mr Yushchenko
as weak and indecisive.

Few doubt that she will challenge for the presidency in 2009 and she is
making efforts to show her national appeal, spending most of her time
pitching her pro-Western platform of EU and Nato membership into Mr
Yanukovych's power base in the Russian-speaking east of Ukraine, where
many are nostalgic for the Soviet Union and close ties with Moscow.

"They want a decent way of life, but for 16 years [since independence] the
country could not provide this. They have to feel that Ukraine is their
home, and we will try to prove that to them," she said.
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http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article2468965.ece

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[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
10. ORANGE GEAR A NO-NO IN UKRAINE FOR ROAD CREWS

By Ethan NcNern, Scotsman, Wednesday, 19th September 2007

BUILDING crews working on a new stretch of road in Ukraine were ordered to
remove their fluorescent orange gear - because they were due a visit from
the man who was humiliatingly defeated in the country's 2004 "orange
revolution".

Viktor Yanukovich, now the Ukrainian prime minister, apparently still sees
red when he sees orange, even though he has bounced back from that
presidential election defeat.

Mr Yanukovich, who is leading his Regions Party into parliamentary elections
on 30 September, opened the new stretch of road in central Ukraine on
Monday.

Before his arrival, Volodymyr Demishkan, head of the state roads authority,
told workers "Take off those orange overalls", according to the Kommersant
Ukraine newspaper.

Many workers refused, but another official pleaded with them, saying he
would otherwise face dismissal. Eventually, they complied.

Mr Yanukovich lost the 2004 presidential election to Viktor Yushchenko after
weeks of mass rallies against poll fraud by protesters in orange regalia.

He returned to head a new government in August last year, after a
pro-western "Orange" coalition collapsed. The Regions Party sports blue and
white colours.
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LINK: http://news.scotsman.com/international.cfm?id=1498362007

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11. MICHAEL CAPUTO'S UNIQUE INTERPRETATION OF UKRAINE

By Tammy Lynch, from Kyiv, Senior Research Fellow
Boston University▓s Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology & Policy
Letter Submitted-To-The-Editor, The Washington Times, Washington
Published by Action Ukraine Report #868, Article 11
Washington, D.C., Wednesday, September 19, 2007

RE: UKRAINE ELECTIONS
COMMENTARY: By Michael R. Caputo
The Washington Times, Washington, D.C., Wed, Sep 12, 2007
http://www.washingtontimes.com/article/20070912/COMMENTARY/109120012/1012

After reading Michael Caputo▓s unique interpretation of Ukraine▓s political
scene, I am left wondering if he has ever spent any length of time in the
country. Most of all, I am disturbed by the impression it may leave in the
West.

Given his previous lobbying for Russia▓s Gazprom, Caputo▓s innumerable
factual misrepresentations of the work of Russia-critic and former Ukrainian
Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko were not a surprise. But, his beatification
of former Ukrainian Parliamentary Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn is perplexing.

This ⌠fresh face■ was thrown out by voters in 2006 for his past ties to the
corrupt regime of former President Leonid Kuchma. Caputo▓s criticism of
Ukraine in general seemed warped by the view through a Russian lens.

In actuality, Ukraine sports a growing, if wobbly, democracy, with political
pluralism of which it √ and the West √ should be proud. Caputo would do
well to spend a few weeks in Ukraine where the opinions of ordinary citizens
would likely differ from those in Moscow.
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12. UKRAINE'S QUEST FOR MATURE NATION STATEHOOD
ROUNDTABLE VIII, UKRAINE-EU RELATIONS
October 16-17, 2007, Ronald Reagan Building, Washington, DC

Steering Committee, Ukraine's Quest for Mature Nation Statehood
Roundtable VIII, Ukraine-EU Relations, New York, NY
U.S.-Ukraine Business Council (USUBC)
Washington, D.C., Wednesday, September 19, 2007

NEW YORK/WASHINGTON - You are respectfully invited to the eighth
annual roundtable of the Ukraine's Quest for Mature Nation Statehood
series, to be held at the Ronald Reagan International Trade Center in
Washington, DC on Tuesday/Wednesday, Oct 16-17, 2007. This year,
the forum will be entitled "Ukraine-EU Relations".

The two day conference will bring together government and key non-
government representatives of Ukraine, the EU and the US as well as
experts from the world of academia to examine and evaluate Ukraine's
capacity to "thrive alongside" its great Western neighbor as well as its
readiness, if asked to join, to eventually "thrive inside" the European
Union.

To facilitate the said examination, the event will run four regular sessions
featuring eight panels, six highlight focus sessions, two working lunches
and two conference receptions. In total, nearly seventy speakers are
expected to address the conference proceedings. The list of invited
speakers is provided below.

You are welcome to attend all of the specified plenary sessions. Your
presence will certainly enhance the proceedings you may choose to join.
In addition, you are welcome to partake in Roundtable's traditional
evening receptions. There is no registration fee for the Roundtable but
donations are encouraged to help cover the considerable expenses
necessary for such a Roundtable.
TWO-DAY PROGRAM SUMMARY:
Tuesday, October 16 (Day One); Wednesday, October 17 (Day Two)
DAY ONE: Oct 16, Tuesday, Registration & Coffee: 8:00-9:00am
Opening Remarks: 9:00 a.m., Last Session: 5:00 p.m.
Conference Reception: 7:00 p.m.
DAY TWO: Oct 17, Wednesday, Registration & Coffee: 8:00-9:00a.m.
Opening Remarks: 9:00 a.m., Concluding Remarks: 5:00 p.m.
Patron Reception: 7:00 p.m.

ENTIRE PROGRAM OUTLINE: The entire Ukraine's Quest for

Mature Nation Statehood, Roundtable VIII, Ukraine-EU Relations

program outline can found at the following link:
http://usukrainianrelations.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=27&Itemid=56

REGISTRATION DUE BY WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 10
Due to the time constraints involved with organizing such a large forum,
we kindly ask that you respond by Wednesday, October 10, 2007
concerning your acceptance to participate.

SUGGESTED DONATIONS: There is no registration fee for the
Roundtable this year but donations of 50 US dollars per day are
encouraged to help cover the considerable expenses necessary for
such a Roundtable. If donating, please make out your check to:
"CUSUR-UA Quest RTVIII." A system to make donations online
will be in place soon.

ONLINE REGISTRATIONS AVAILABLE AT:
http://usukrainianrelations.org/index.php?option=com_performs&formid=1&Itemid=84
Fill out the online registration and submit online or print out registration
form and fax to 212 473 2180 or print-out registration form and mail.

All completed registration forms [and donations] need to be sent online,
by fax or by mail to: Center for US Ukrainian Relations
43 St. Mark's Place, New York, NY 10003
For further information, kindly contact Marta Kostyk, UA Quest RTS
Technical Coordinator, by phone: (212) 473 0839, fax: (212) 473 2180,
or e-mail: cusur1014@gmail.com, at your convenience.

QUEST ROUNDTABLE VIII STEERING COMMITTEE:
William Miller, Co-Chair; Bob Schaffer, Co-Chair
Oleh Shamshur, Co-Chair; Walter Zaryckyj, Program Coordinator
MEMBERS STEERING COMMITTEE:
Olexandr Aleksandrovich; Ilan Berman
Nadia Diuk; Olga Fishel
Katie Fox; Nadia Komarnycky McConnell
Elizabeth Knight; Ilko Kucheriv
Nico Lange; Orysia Lutsewych
Lewis Madanick; Marta Matselioukh
John Micgiel; Jan Neutze
Steven Nix; Ulyana Panchishin
Jan Pieklo; Herman Pirchner
Jeff Smith; Morgan Williams
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INVITED SPEAKERS:
Bob Schaffer (AFMC)
Paula Dobriansky (US Under Secretary of State)
Oleh Shamshur (UA Ambassador to the United States)
Andrii Veselovski (Dep. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine)
Orest Deychakivsky (CSCE)

Hryhoriy Nemyria (BUT)
Ellen Bos (Andrassy University)

Nelson Ledsky (NDI)
Steven Nix (IRI)

Fred Kempe (Atlantic Council)
Kostyantyn Hryshchenko (RPU/APM)

Borys Tarasyuk (OU/IEAC)
Pawel Zalewski (FRC/Sejm)

David Kramer (DAS/EEA/DOS)
Adrian Karatnyckyj (Orange Circle)

Oleksandr Todiychuk (MOU/UA-EC)
Igor Chalupec (PKN-Orlen/Fmr. Pres.)

Friedemann Muller (Inst. for Int'l & Sec. Affairs)
Keith Smith (CSIS); Tom Spellman (Halliburton)
John Micgiel (Columbia University);

Janusz Reiter (PL Ambassador to the US)
Morgan Williams (SigmaBleyzer, US-Ukraine Business Council)
Yuri Yekhanurov (Fmr. UA Prime Minister);

David Sweere (Kyiv-Atlantic Farms)
Urszula Gacek (Senat Rzeczpospolitej)

Anders Aslund (Peterson Institute)
Nadia McConnell (USUF)

Mykhajlo Volynets (CITU/UA)

Robert Fielding (AFL-CIO/UA)
Marek Matraszek (CEC)
Keith Crane (RAND)
Jan Bugajski (CSIS)
Klaus Scharioth (DE Ambassador to the US)
Vitkor Nikityuk (UA DCM to the US)
Ilko Kucheriv (DIF)
Joao De Vallera (Ambassador of Portugal to the United States)
Jan Pieklo (PAUCI)
Yuri Sergeyev (UA Ambassador to the UN)
Audrius Bruzga (Lithuanian Amb. to the US)
Steve Pifer (CSIS)
Nico Lange (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung)
Roman Shpek (UA Delegation to EU)
Michael Gahler (FRC/Euro-Parliament)
Ariel Cohen (Heritage Foundation)
Herman Pirchner (AFPC)
Zbigniew Brzezinski (Senior Counselor/CSIS)
F. Steven Larrabee (RAND)
leksandr Biletsky (European Movement/UA)
Oleksandr Sushko (CPCFPU)
Vooldymyr Dubovyk (CIS/ONU)
Yuri Scherbak (Kyiv Mohylian University)
Hryhoriy Perepylytysa (Dipl. Academy/UA)
Lewis Madanick (Open World/LOC)
Bohdan Sokolovski (State Secretariat)
Bogdan Klich (Euro-Parliament)
Steven Sestanovich (Columbia University)
Ilan Berman (AFPC)
Yevhen Kaminsky (IWE/NASU)
James Sherr (Sandhurst)
Celeste Wallander (Georgetown Univ.)
William Courtney (CSC/Dyncorp.)
Angelos Pangratis (Dep. Head of the EC Delegation to the US)
William Miller (WWIC)
Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE)
Robert Bensh (Cardinal Resources)
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SPONSORS:
American Foreign Policy Council; Atlantic Council of the United States
Center For US-Ukrainian Relations; Congressional Ukrainian Caucus
Columbia University/ECEC; Democratic Initiatives Foundation
Embassy of Ukraine to the United States; Harvard University/BSSP
International Republican Institute (IRI); Johns Hopkins University/SAIS
National Democratic Institute (NDI); New York University /LAP
UA Center for Strategic Studies; U.S.-Ukraine Business Council

US-Ukraine Foundation USUF)
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CONTACT: Marta Kostyk, US Quest RTS Technical Coordinator
Center for US Ukrainian Relations,

43 St. Mark's Place, New York, NY 10003
Tel: (212) 473 0839, fax: (212) 473 2180, E-mail: cusur1014@gmail.com
http://usukrainianrelations.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=27&Itemid=56
http://usukrainianrelations.org/index.php?option=com_performs&formid=1&Itemid=84
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13. CHADBOURNE & PARKE ADDS TWO PARTNERS IN KYIV

PR Newswire, New York, NY, Tuesday, Sep 18, 2007

NEW YORK - The international law firm of Chadbourne & Parke LLP
announced today that is has promoted two associates in its Kyiv office to
international partners and has hired an additional four associates in the
office.

Oleg Mazur and Sergiy Onishchenko will become international partners,
while the new associates are Vitaliy Artysh, Viktor Dovhan, Olena Repkina
and Yuriy Voytsitskyi.

"Oleg and Sergiy have proven themselves as skilled lawyers and business
advisors for our clients in a range of practice areas," said Chadbourne
Managing Partner Charles O'Neill. "They well deserve the expanded
responsibilities of international partner."

Chadbourne's Kyiv office continues to plan for further expansion with
additional new hires anticipated. The Firm will soon move to a new
location in Kyiv, enabling Chadbourne to double its office space there.

The Firm's Kyiv office represents multinational, foreign and local clients
in large transactions in a variety of industries, including banking, oil
exploration and refining, telecommunications, insurance, project and
trade finance, pharmaceuticals and consumer products.

Kyiv lawyers also advise clients on day-to-day legal issues in areas such
as corporate organization and governance, mergers and acquisitions,
privatizations, tax, real estate and litigation.

"We are very pleased to have Vitaliy, Viktor, Olena and Yuriy joining the
Firm," added Kyiv Office Managing Partner Jaroslawa Johnson. "They all
have built strong legal reputations and will smoothly integrate into the
work we're doing in the Kyiv office."
OLEG MAZUR, INTERNATIONAL PARTNER
Oleg Mazur specializes in finance, including capital markets (debt)
securitizations, structured finance, loans, credit facilities, securities
and foreign investment law. Prior to joining Chadbourne, he was a
senior associate at Baker & McKenzie in Kyiv.
SERGIY ONISHCHENKO, INTERNATIONAL PARTNER
Sergiy Onishchenko's practice focuses on general corporate law,
international transactions, foreign investments and real estate finance.

Mr. Onishchenko's experience includes representing clients in a variety of
real estate transactions, structuring and negotiating acquisitions of
enterprises in Ukraine, as well as representing both lenders and borrowers
in loan and equity financing.

He has written several articles on topics such as administrative law and
real estate. Prior to joining Chadbourne, Mr. Onishchenko taught
Administrative Law at the Kharkiv Law Institute. He holds a law degree,
with honors, from Kharkiv Law Institute and an LL.M. from Cornell Law
School.
VITALIY ARTYSH, ASSOCIATE
Vitaliy Artysh joins Chadbourne from the business consulting firm of Munk,
Andersen & Feilberg, where he was a senior lawyer and business development
consultant. He advised domestic and international companies on foreign
investments and real estate as well as on corporate, labor and import-export
laws.

He worked with many European Union companies on strategies to enter the
Ukraine market. Mr. Artysh hold Honors Bachelors and Masters degrees
from Ivan Franko National University of Lviv, Law Faculty.
VIKTOR DOVHAN, ASSOCIATE
Viktor Dovhan joins Chadbourne from the Kyiv office of the Salans law firm,
where he specialized in international trade and European Union law, as well
as Ukrainian commercial and corporate law and real estate issues. Mr. Dovhan
has particular experience advising on import/export operations and related
commercial and customs issues.

Mr. Dovhan holds a Specialist's degree in International Law from Ivan
Franko National University of Lviv and a Candidate of Science degree in
International Law from Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv,
Institute of International Relations.
OLENA REPKINA, ASSOCIATE
Olena Repkina joins Chadbourne from Shevchenko Didkovskiy & Partners
of Kyiv, where she was a senior associate. Her practice there concentrated
on banking and finance, mergers and acquisitions, corporate law, securities,
employment, and intellectual property.

Ms. Repkina holds a Master's degree, with honors, from the Law Faculty
of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. Prior to that, she held
internships with the Kyiv Regional Prosecutor's Office and the Supreme
Commercial Court of Ukraine.
YURIY VOYTSITSKYI, ASSOCIATE
Yuriy Voytsitskyi comes to Chadbourne from the Salans law firm, where he
was an associate in the Kyiv office. His practice focuses on corporate law,
taxation and banking and finance.

In addition to his work at law firms, Mr. Voytsitskyi has experience as a
lawyer in the private sector and with a non- governmental organization
dealing with economic and social issues.
ABOUT CHADBOURNE & PARKE LLP
Chadbourne & Parke LLP, an international law firm headquartered in New
York City, provides a full range of legal services, including mergers and
acquisitions, securities, project finance, private funds, corporate finance,
energy, communications and technology, commercial and products liability
litigation.

Legal services also include securities litigation and regulatory
enforcement, special investigations and litigation, intellectual property,
antitrust, domestic and international tax, insurance and reinsurance,
environmental, real estate, bankruptcy and financial restructuring,
employment law and ERISA, trusts and estates and government contract
matters.

Major geographical areas of concentration include Central and Eastern
Europe, Russia and the CIS, the Middle East and Latin America.

The Firm has offices in New York, Washington, DC, Los Angeles,
Houston, London (a multinational partnership), Moscow, St. Petersburg,
Warsaw (a Polish partnership), Kyiv, Almaty, Tashkent, Dubai and
Beijing.
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For additional information, visit www.chadbourne.com.
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NOTE: Chadbourne & Parke LLP is a long-time member of the

U.S.-Ukraine Business Council (USUBC) in Washington, D.C.

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14. FUND THE U.S.-UKRAINE FOUNDATION (USUF)
There is troubling news coming out of Washington these days -
and not just surrounding the war in Iraq.

EDITORIAL: The Ukrainian Weekly newspaper
Ukrainian National Association (UNA)
Parsippany, New Jersey, Sunday, September 16, 2007

Recently we learned that the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) has refused to fund the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation, known to our
community and to Ukraine as one of the most effective non-governmental
organizations helping transform Ukraine from a post-Soviet society into a
democratic and transparent state governed by the rule of law and served by
accountable public officials.

That the Bush administration does not see the folly of this refusal is,
frankly, beyond belief. The U.S.-Ukraine Foundation has an excellent track
record - one that may be second to none in helping Ukraine by working with
what the foundation likes to call its "democratic modernizers."

In the early 1990s, USUF was the first U.S. organization to provide hands-on
technical assistance to fledgling democrats involved in local government and
non-governmental institutions.

Some of these democrats of newly independent Ukraine received on-the-job
training in Ukraine; others were bought to the United States to learn from
counterparts in this country.

The successes have been many during USUF's 15 years of work. O.P. Popov, a
"graduate" of USUF's programs who today is Ukraine's minister of housing and
communal services, recently wrote to Rep. Nita Lowey, chair of the House
Subcommittee on States, Foreign Operations and Related Programs, urging her
to support funding for the foundation so that it could "continue its
significant contributions not only to the development of local democracy in
Ukraine, but also . to the strengthening of relationships between our
countries both at the national level and at the level of people diplomacy."

Another beneficiary of the USUF's programs, Tymofiy Motrenko, who heads

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