Welcome to the U.S.-Ukraine Business Council

"Why We Need A Reset" - Analyis & Commentary by Bruce Jackson
"The Grounds for Apprehension" - Analysis & Commentary by James Sherr
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF)
Washington, D.C., Friday, March 19, 2010
U.S.-Ukraine Business Council (USUBC), Washington, D.C.
Tuesday, March 23, 2010

Washington, D.C.

Business Expansion, Economic Growth, Politicians, Government Officials, Policies & Programs


"Why We Need A Reset" - Analyis & Commentary by Bruce Jackson
"The Grounds for Apprehension" - Analysis & Commentary by James Sherr
Foreign Policy and Civil Society Program, On Wider Europe
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) Wash, D.C., Fri, Mar 19, 2010

SUMMARY: Is the election of Viktor Yanukovych as president of Ukraine an opportunity to correct Western and U.S. policy and free it of past illusions? Or is an event that should give the West pause and grounds for apprehension? Bruce Jackson and James Sherr take very different views on what this election means and how the West should respond.

In Jackson’s view, Washington’s policy toward Ukraine needs to be reset and liberated from fallacies that have guided our policy in the past. Above all, we need to see Ukraine as it is and not as we wish it to be.

Sherr supports a warm Western embrace of Yanukovych yet warns that the new president and his supporters have an ambivalent view of Western values and will seek to join the West on their own terms. He also warns that Ukraine is too vulnerable to maintain the neutrality that Yanukovych aspires to, and that it is naive to believe that Ukraine’s relationship with the EU can be a substitute for a strong relationship with NATO.

Commentary & Analysis: by Bruce P. Jackson, President
Project on Transitional Democracies, a nonprofit organization supporting post-Soviet
and Balkan democracies in building closer relations with the European Union and NATO

Viktor Yanukovych’s inauguration as president of Ukraine on February 25, 2010 offers an opportunity for a much needed change in United States’ policy toward Ukraine. The first order of business for the United States should be to wholeheartedly engage President Yanukovych and whatever coalition emerges as the new government. But a new U.S. engagement strategy must also learn from the mistakes of the past.

[1] First, for an American reset strategy to work in Ukraine, we must drop certain misperceptions that have guided past policy. Over the past two decades we have been consistently wrong about the political character of Ukraine, the values and aspirations of its people, and the profound weaknesses of its government and economy. With the exception of the success in dismantling Ukraine’s strategic nuclear forces, the United States has gotten very little if anything right about Ukraine or its politics.

Beginning with the infamous "Chicken Kiev" speech in July 1991 wherein U.S. President George H.W. Bush exhorted Ukraine to stay within the Soviet Union through the apotheosis of the democratic credentials of Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, Washington has neither seen Ukraine clearly as it is nor understood its aspirations properly.

Along the way, U.S. diplomacy has isolated Ukraine for selling Kulchga radars to Iraq that turned out never to have occurred, accused former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma of murdering journalist Georgiy Gongadze before having second thoughts, and has driven public support for NATO from roughly 50 percent in the late 1990’s to less than 10 percent today.

The clearest illustration of a well-intentioned policy gone riotously wrong can be found in the ill-fated NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) exercise held during the summer of 2006. Without checking the Ukrainian political calendar, a Texas National Guard unit of combat engineers was dispatched to Crimea with the improbable mission to repair local toilets.

Unfortunately, this turned out to be an election period in this impoverished Russian-speaking region where the elderly and other unemployed can make extra money and have some fun by staging demonstrations, rallies, and protests for contract.

The opportunity of American troops from Bush’s home state under a NATO banner coming ashore to assault the beloved outhouses of Crimea was simply too tempting a target. U.S. forces were met on arrival by a countervailing force of hundreds of drunken babushkas who, upon finishing their bottles of vodka with which they had been liberally provided, tossed them in the general direction of the American soldiers and NATO. Quite good fun for these retirees, but it hardly served our policy objectives.

[2] Second, one reason we have been so wrong so often in the past is that our policy rested on a series of fallacies. Perhaps the main one was that we always assumed Ukraine was two countries divided roughly at Kyiv which pitted an Orange, liberal, European, West against a Blue, illiberal, Russia-loving, East and South. From this, we reasoned that the poetic bee-keeper from the Carpathians and the blond-braided prime minister in peasant dress personified the ideals of the European enlightenment, and conversely the primitives from the mines and steel mills of the Donbas were the last relics of Soviet man.

The election victory of Viktor Yanukovych—who hails from the putatively regressive east of Ukraine—indeed the first-place finish of Yanukovych in all four major elections since Yushchenko’s victory in the 3rd round in 2004—makes this simplistic division of Ukraine into cowboys and Indians now rather difficult. So does the fact that the positions of Yanukovych and Tymoshenko during the campaign on many major issues—such as Russia, Europe, NATO, and economic recovery—were nearly identical.

The point of departure for a new U.S. policy must be to accept that both Blue and Orange are representative of Ukraine, that all major political figures are in one way or another Ukrainian patriots, and that Ukraine is a single nation, although a nation with confused and confusing politics. This must form the basis of resetting relations with Ukraine.

From this perspective, the recent election results look less like some major reversal of 2004 than the reasonable and even predictable choice of voters. Other than Angela Merkel, virtually every incumbent Western political leader has been turned out of office during the Great Recession.

Unlike Germany’s strong performance during the recession and early return to growth, Ukraine’s GDP has declined by 15 percent; its currency has been devalued by 50 percent; and its public finances are in worse shape than Greece’s. With this economic background, it is surprising that Yanukovych’s margin of victory was not greater after the chaotic and crisis-filled years of Orange governance.

[3] Third, Washington’s engagement should not be limited to the most prominent political personalities. It must also normalize relations with the Ukrainian business community, particularly with the so-called "oligarchs." The top ten business leaders in Ukraine control vast industrial conglomerates each of which employs as many as a quarter of a million workers directly and supports several million Ukrainians indirectly.

For better or for worse, these oligarchs are the single most important political constituency in Ukrainian politics, the source of funding for all political parties, and the most pro-European voice in Ukrainian society.

Their self-interest lies in closer relations with the European Union to gain market access, in political stability to improve the business environment, and in the reform of a government whose past dysfunction has only devalued their assets. Engaging Ukrainian politicians without engaging their constituency is a mistake.

[4] Fourth and perhaps most important, a new U.S. policy needs to recognize that the next two to three years—roughly from the election of Yanukovych in Ukraine to the re-election of Vladimir Putin in Russia in 2012—provide a window of opportunity in which to construct a new Eastern Policy for the West. Ukraine is the gateway for the engagement and soft integration of post-Soviet democracies. Washington also needs to take the long view on what constitutes success.

Closer relations between Europe and Turkey have been under construction since 1963 when Turkey first joined the European Economic Community. Efforts to eliminate governmental corruption in Bulgaria and Romania have been underway for 20 years. Attempts to impose financial discipline or a credible tax code on Greece have been underway on and off since 1949.

Major change in Ukraine can and probably will take place but over decades. The extended timeline required to achieve reform and to change the cultural and political attitudes in Ukraine also means that Europe is much more likely to be the major partner for Ukraine than the United States. The EU’s plan for Ukraine within the Eastern Partnership contains a free trade agreement, a roadmap to visa liberalization, and substantial foreign aid.

They all dwarf what little is on offer from Washington in the underfunded Millennium Challenge Corporation or other declining foreign aid accounts. If it wants to have leverage, Washington needs to follow the EU’s lead on Ukraine and step up its coordination with Brussels on a common policy of engagement.

In keeping with a policy of close coordination between the United States and the European Union, there are several subjects that Washington should avoid.

The perceived push to bring Ukraine into NATO has become the most divisive of "wedge issues" in Ukrainian politics. Both Yanukovych and Tymoshenko ran on a platform of deferring consideration of NATO until a referendum sometime in the indefinite future. This political consensus on "NATO Not Now" leaves us little choice but to de-emphasize NATO in the bilateral relationship.

Looking at the larger regional issues, the United States might also look at efforts to de-militarize our engagement in Europe’s east as possible. The debate on the Russian Black Sea fleet, missile defense deployments, PfP exercises, the NATO Information Office in Kyiv, the debate on Membership Action Plan, and the Russia-Georgian War—all of these have arguably setback for objectives in Ukraine and neighboring states.

In Ukraine as in the United States, economic recovery will be the top priority. Undoubtedly, we will discover that the new government in Kyiv will be reluctant to lay off workers, cut pensions and remove subsidies in the middle of a recession. The implementation of painful reforms will be slow.

However, the United States is already offering to send expert teams from the National Economic Council and other agencies that have recent experience in financial markets, stimulus packages, austerity measures, and industry restructuring. Engaging with technocrats in critical areas of finance and energy would be appreciated in Kyiv and might actually be helpful.

Beyond this, the United States could consider combining its foreign aid to Ukraine with the targeted programs of the European Union in macro-financial support, infrastructure modernization, and energy conservation. There is such a thing as too many donors in a start-up democracy, each with their unique conditions and pet peeves.

In Ukraine, the United States and the European Union could forge the kind of partnership that worked in the Balkans and create a joint program for aid to Ukraine. In addition to aid for economic recovery, the greatest long-term need is aid at the level of the Marshall Plan for student visas, scholarships, educational exchanges, and the teaching of European languages. Relatively speaking, Ukrainian youth was left behind in the last phase of European outreach and integration.

Two final pieces of advice for American policymakers:

[1] Let the International Monetary Fund (IMF) do the heavy lifting; that is what it is there for. There is always the feeling that the Secretary of State must demand an additional condition or two when she visits a country just to show she is doing her job. But in Ukraine the IMF has the conditionality governing the early and most urgent reforms about right.

In the months and years ahead, there will be ample opportunities to get our two cents in on anti-corruption, election financing, constitutional reforms, VAT reforms etc. But for the next six months, the IMF should take the lead on reform.

[2] Last but not least, U.S. policy needs to stop conflating its Russian policy with Ukrainian policy. It is possible to reset our relations with Russia and engage with Ukraine in partnership with the European Union at the same time without doing damage to either. In years past, there was often the impression that the United States intended to mud wrestle Russia for the soul of Ukraine. At the very least, this is a distraction. At worst, Ukraine will again get lost and become the first casualty of renewed Great Power competition.

In conclusion, the heart of a new period of sustained engagement with Ukraine must be a willingness to look at Ukraine in its own terms. In the past, our exaggerated concerns about undue Russian influence in Ukraine were more reflective of our fears about Russia than our hopes for Ukraine.

Our understandable preoccupation with governmental corruption and criminality became an excuse to isolate the business leaders of the nation and push them in the direction of Moscow. Our support for what we mistook as Ukrainian liberalism became support for unbridled populism. Our well-intentioned insistence on progress with NATO first became an obstacle to closer relations with Europe at all.

Support for democracy in Ukraine must be support for the aspirations of Ukrainians not for the anxieties, fears, and romantic illusions of diplomats and activists back in Washington. Yanukovych’s objectives have now been clearly stated.

[1] First, Ukraine must regain the trust and confidence of the IMF to allow the release of aid that will provide liquidity for economic recovery. Sustaining a relationship with the IMF will require painful cuts in government spending on subsidies to the gas industry and social payments.

[2] Second, Ukraine must move quickly to build closer relations with the European Union within the programs of the Eastern Partnership. Within the first year of the Yanukovych Presidency, Ukraine must complete negotiations on a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement (DCFTA) and on a roadmap to a visa-free regime with Europe. Successes on free trade and free travel can have a profound cultural and political impact on the development of Ukraine as a European democracy.

Finally, Ukraine must renegotiate its gas contract with Russia, remove the onerous "take or pay" provisions and establish stable pricing in line with currently depressed demand. The industry itself must be restructured and split into a public utility supplying gas to Ukrainian consumers and a pipeline company shipping gas to Europe.

While it will be controversial, the gas transit system will have to become a multi-national syndicate much like Nabucco and North Stream if the gas sector is to modernize and remain solvent. With the elimination of subsidies, the renegotiation of prices, and the restructuring of the sector, Ukraine can then join the EU’s Energy Community Treaty and begin to receive EU funds for modernizing the gas transit system. The United States should support that, too.

These are meaningful near-term objectives with the IMF, Russia, and the European Union that can stimulate economic recovery and build modern relationships with Ukraine’s neighbors, the European Union, international financial institutions, and the United States. U.S. policy should support President Yanukovych and the next government in achieving the objectives they have set for their country and very little more than that for the immediate future.

NOTE: Bruce P. Jackson is president of the Project on Transitional Democracies, a nonprofit organization supporting post-Soviet and Balkan democracies in building closer relations with the European Union and NATO.

Commentary and Analysis: by James Sheer
Head of the Russia and Eurasia Program at Chatham House [UK]

Viktor Yanukovych’s election as Ukraine’s fourth president should incite both hope and apprehension. For the past five years, Western governments have been frustrated by an Orange leadership that lacked the cohesion and capacity to rise to the challenges it had set. Yanukovych has set less ambitious challenges, and one hopes that they are more realistic.

But if he believes that Ukraine can enter Europe without embracing the values of Europe, he will be mistaken. If he believes that Ukraine can be neutral and self-reliant, he will find himself pursuing a mirage rather than advancing national security. The task of Western policy must be to help Yanukovych arrive at these conclusions himself.

Realism about Yanukovych demands realism about Ukraine. It is not the country it was in 2004, let alone 1991. The cynicism reflects the perceived "betrayal" of Maidan—tens of thousands who protested on Independence Square not for Ukraine to enter Europe (let alone NATO), but so that it would finally have leaders who governed in the interests of the country rather than themselves.

Most of those who voted for Yanukovych have limited expectations of him, but they seek stability rather than repression and have a far stronger sense of what they can and must achieve on their own. They don’t suffer from the myths that still obstruct clear thinking in the West.

[1] The first of these is that Ukraine is two countries masquerading as one. While there are serious regional divisions, to equate them with ethno-linguistic divisions is to fall into a trap. Ukraine is not so much an ethnically-divided country as a mixed one. For all his faults, Ukraine’s second president, Leonid Kuchma, recognized that its ethno-linguistic tolerance was a strength.

The language policies of Ukraine’s third president, Viktor Yushchenko, chipped away at that strength and gave Russian propagandists a card, but one that was never effective. Identification with the Ukrainian state has been growing across all regions of the country.

In a 2008 article by Adrian Karatnycky,1 the Gorshenin Institute cites that 87.5 percent regard Ukraine (and 7.5 percent Russia) as their real home and 75 percent believe that all Ukrainians should learn the Ukrainian language. The overwhelming majority believe that Ukraine should be either a unitary state (60 percent) or a federative state (20 percent), while only 7.6 percent believe that Ukraine and Russia should have a common government.

There are only two factors that make the differences between Lviv and Donetsk more significant than those between Massachusetts and Mississippi: weak institutions and hard geopolitics.

[2] The second myth, revived by Yanukovych’s victory, is that Ukraine will return to Russia. It is no longer capable of doing so: a view repeatedly, if gently underscored by Ukraine’s recently appointed Foreign Minister, Kostyantyn Gryshchenko. (2) Whereas Russia’s political culture is defined by power, Ukraine’s political culture is defined by distrust of power. This difference is not lost on the majority of the country’s citizens.

Over the past five years, it has evolved from a virtual democracy into an immature and decidedly cynical democracy.
A president embarked on reintegration with Russia would find himself adamantly opposed by this majority, by most departments of the Ukrainian state that link their future with Europe, and by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and armed forces that have acquired a decidedly Euroatlantic orientation.

Such a course would also be opposed by the majority of industrial groups and even by many Russian businesses based in Ukraine who see the European market as their future and the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union as a road to nowhere.

At the same time, there are grounds for apprehension. President Yanukovych will have to share power in order to use it. But the grammar and syntax of coalition building in Ukraine’s Parliament puts personal interests and money ahead of principles and policy.

On March 4, a law facilitating coalition building at the expense of party discipline and electoral mandates—and in defiance of the recommendations of the Venice Commission—cleared its first reading. This could produce a less broad-based and reformist coalition than would otherwise be the case.

While some capable reformers (like Sergey Tygypko) are likely to secure leading positions, the risk is that they will be counterbalanced, or even overshadowed, by those who are unreformable: by Mykola Azarov, architect of the Kuchma era tax administration and, allegedly, its opaque and coercive practices; Andrey Klyuev, Kuchma’s deputy prime minister for energy; and Yuriy Boyko, former head of Ukraine’s state energy company, Naftohaz, and a key architect of the reviled system of intermediaries and hidden subsidies. The latter’s approach to EU norms of accountability, competitiveness, and transparency ranges from incomprehension to contempt.

While several configurations of power are possible, it is difficult to envisage one without these individuals. (3) Ukraine’s energy dependency upon Russia and Europe’s dependency on Ukraine’s increasingly stretched and antiquated gas transit system (GTS) is also cause for concern.

Yanukovych’s proposed response is "to return [Ukraine and Russia] to the format of relations we had five years ago," but with a difference: the resurrection of Russia’s stillborn 2002 scheme to transfer ownership of the state-owned GTS to a three-way Ukraine-Russia-EU consumer consortium—and, on the basis of that concession, restore subsidized energy prices, attract investment in the system’s expansion, and secure Russia’s abandonment of the South Stream pipeline project.

Yet every aspect of this wish list is out of kilter with reality. Since Kuchma left office, two gas crises and the Russia-Georgia War have changed the climate in Europe. Energy security and diversification are now seen as imperatives, and several measures proposed by the European Commission have begun to take root.

The global economic crisis, the rapid expansion of U.S. gas production, and the attractiveness of liquefied natural gas (LNG) have created a more open gas market and a sharp fall in demand for Russian pipeline gas. The German appetite for the consortium is no longer what it was. Although the ambitions of Gazprom and the Kremlin to control Ukraine’s GTS are unchanged, a return to subsidies is simply unaffordable.

The alternative of course would be to lessen dependency rather than enhance it. But that would require a rationalization of Ukraine’s convoluted energy system, eliminating illicit deals and multi-tier pricing arrangement, and creating the legal safeguards to honest investment in Ukraine’s untapped indigenous energy resources. Such a roadmap—presented by Western energy companies since the 1990s and latterly on the margins of the EU’s Eastern Partnership in March 2009—has run into the buffers of every Ukrainian government since independence.

Yanukovych’s incoming team may even be preparing a giant step backward by restoring the role of the supply intermediary, RosUkrEnergo, that the November 2009 agreement between Tymoshenko and Putin removed from the equation.

Without sweeping reform and the removal of internal subsidies, Naftohaz will remain impoverished, Ukraine’s gargantuan energy inefficiencies will proceed unchecked, barriers to investment will stay in place, and the modernisation of the GTS will go unaddressed. (4) Prolongation of the status quo, not to say a retrograde enhancement of it, will keep EU assistance off the table and enhance the EU’s determination to bypass Ukraine.

Yanukovych’s first foreign visit to Brussels is to be welcomed. The fact that he declared his "key priority" an association agreement and free trade area with the European Union is even more important. His rejection of membership in the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union shows that he is serious, but he and many of his supporters have a decided ambivalence about the values of the European Union.

The task of the European Union is to show that these values are an intrinsically practical matter. They are embedded in political and business culture, institutionalized in courts that serve law and not power, in markets that provide choices for buyer and seller, in police that protect rather than prey upon citizens, in bureaucracies that are accountable rather than predatory, and in contracts that bind.

The absence of these conditions not only keeps foreign investment out of Ukraine, it strangles Ukrainian entrepreneurship and impoverishes the state. In parts of the former Soviet Union, the United States, and Europe energy majors have been willing to endure the caprices and predations of political authorities in exchange for exceptional financial reward. But they will not do so otherwise, and the smaller and medium-sized businesses that generate the bulk of trade and FDI cannot endure these risks at all.

Association agreement or not, Ukraine will not advance toward EU standards unless it advances toward European values. But until the EU provides credible prospects of integration—of free trade and visa-free regimes, and a realistic long-term hope of membership—both the message and the messenger will be distrusted.

President Yanukovych has set aside the goal of joining NATO. Yet Ukraine must still resolve the question of its relationship with the alliance, and NATO must resolve the question of its relationship with Ukraine. For too long, the argument about NATO has been an argument about enlargement.

Yet the founders of Ukraine’s national security system have long understood—long before Ukraine gave any thought to membership—that a relationship with NATO was a tool to defend its independence. By 1997, the scale and depth of NATO-Ukraine cooperation probably exceeded that between NATO and any other partner.

Well before any membership aspiration was articulated, Ukraine’s defence establishment recognized that cooperation with NATO provided the only effective means of strengthening the national security system, advancing defense reform, enhancing the country’s freedom of action, and enabled Ukraine to depart from its post-imperial past and participate in global affairs.

Ukraine is too vulnerable to maintain the neutrality that Yanukovych aspires to. To be sure, it is also too vulnerable to accede to NATO at present, and arguably its leaders may have exacerbated the country’s vulnerabilities, not to say divisions, over the past two years by stridently and prematurely articulating this objective.

But until Ukraine is anchored in the Euroatlantic system, it is far less likely to be a "bridge" between the United States, the European Union, and Russia than a casualty of the rivalry between them.

Ukraine is not been blessed with the same "geopolitical cornucopia" of Switzerland, Ireland, or Austria. Its GDP per capita is one twentieth to one thirty-fifth that of Europe’s neutral and non-aligned states. It is not a member of the European Union (or like all EU states, under NATO’s de facto umbrella), and it has only begun to develop the civic confidence and disciplines—not to say the professionalized armed forces and security services—that these states take for granted.

To imagine that defense cooperation with Russia would accomplish the same ends is the height of naivety. Moreover, it is mistaken to believe that participation in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) will substitute for a strong security relationship with NATO and the United States. If the impulse behind that relationship withers, Ukraine’s security and that of Europe will suffer. If the United States does not give vitality to the process, it will cease to inspire and protect.

Does Yanukovych understand this himself? As Prime Minister under Kuchma, he was the architect of the NATO-Ukraine memorandum on strategic airlift and supported the Membership Action Plan that he now opposes. At his recent Brussels news conference, he pledged to continue to implement current NATO-Ukrainian programs and preserve Kyiv’s partnership with the alliance. 

"With the best will of West and the world, the new leadership’s objectives will prove difficult to realize. This is not because these objectives are insincere, but because they stand in contradiction to the mode of governance and economic management that has become habitual to Yanukovych and his closest confidants."

How will he respond if these goals are threatened? Twelve days before Yanukovych’s inauguration, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s head of administration, Sergei Naryshkin, presented the incoming president with a list of demands including the severing of intelligence connections with NATO and the return of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) to Crimea. (5)

It would be surprising if a severing of defense ties with Georgia were not on the list as well. If Yanukovych accepts these demands, the trust underpinning the NATO-Ukraine relationship will start to unravel. If, as he has implied, he is willing to extend the lease of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet beyond 2017 on the basis of "a package" of economic concessions, rather than legally binding and enforceable safeguards, then both that relationship and Ukraine’s security will suffer.

Hard-headed Western interest and a realistic modicum of hope justify the warm welcome extended to Yanukovych by Brussels and Washington. But with the best will of West and the world, the new leadership’s objectives will prove difficult to realize. This is not because these objectives are insincere, but because they stand in contradiction to the mode of governance and economic management that has become habitual to Yanukovych and his closest confidants.

Their interests and instincts have not been renovated by five years of exposure to the realities of European integration, the transformation of global energy markets, the hardening of Russian policy, and the democratization of Ukrainian life. When reality comes into conflict with these instincts, as it surely would, will the learning curve advance or will it buckle?

Part of the answer depends on the West: on practical inducements to integration, rather than rhetoric and proselytizing, on tangible measures to enhance security, rather than timetables of enlargement, on building networks and relationships with that part of Ukraine that the Orange Revolution alienated and excluded. But it will depend primarily on Ukrainians: on their ability to adapt to pressure and prove once again that "Ukraine is not dead yet."

NOTE: James Sherr is head of the Russia and Eurasia Program at Chatham House [UK]. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF).

(1)  Adrian Karatnycky, "Partition Ukraine? I Think Not," Open Democracy, March 5, 2010, http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/adrian-karatnycky/partition-ukraine-i-think-not.
(2)  Interview with Aleksandr Venediktov on Ekho Moskviy Radio, September 4, 2009, http://echo.msk.ru/programs/razvorot/617151-echo.
(3)  Sergey Rakhmanin, "The Choice of Instruments" [Nabor Instrumentov], Weekly Mirror [Zerkalo Nedeli, No. 9 (789), March 6-12, 2010.
(4)  Edward C Chow, "Next President’s Task: End Energy Corruption," Kyiv Post, January 29, 2010 (republished by U.S.-Ukraine Business Council, March 5, 2010).
(5) "Sweets à la Kyiv," Kommersant-Vlast, 22 February 22, 2010.

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