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Action Ukraine Report

"ACTION UKRAINE REPORT"
In-Depth Ukrainian News and Analysis
"The Art of Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion,
Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World"

"Can Russia, after centuries of autocracy and imperialism, be turned into
the sort of nice democratic country that gets along easily with its European
neighbours? The answer seems to be: not for a while yet, to judge from a
policy paper released last week by the European Commission, the European
Union's executive body, which suggests that relations between the Union and
Russia are close to a post-Soviet low." [article three]

"ACTION UKRAINE REPORT" Year 2004, Number 34
ACTION UKRAINE COALITION (AUC)
www.ArtUkraine.com Information Service (ARTUIS)
morganw@patriot.net, ArtUkraine.com@starpower.net
Kyiv, Ukraine and Washington, D.C., Monday, March 1, 2004

INDEX OF ARTICLES

1. PUTIN'S DEMOCRATIC FACADE SHOULDN'T FOOL US ANYMORE
By Anne Applebaum, The Sunday Telegraph
London, UK, Sunday, February 29, 2004

2. VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO'S 50TH BIRTHDAY INTERVIEW
Describes his private life and formative years
Interview with Victor Yushchenko by Tetyana Kharchenko
Ukrayina Moloda, Kiev, Ukraine, in Ukrainian 21 Feb 04; p 5
BBC Monitoring Service,UK, in English, Feb 29, 2004

3. RUSSIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: DARK SKIES TO THE EAST
WORLD: EUROPE, By Riga, Moscow, and Brussels Economist Staff
The Economist print edition, London, UK, February 19, 2004

4. PUTIN'S RETURN TO THE PAST
[Common history with Ukraine, commemoration of the Pereyaslav Treaty]
Guest Column By Dr. David Marples, ExpressNews, Univ of Alberta Website
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, February 6, 2004

5. MORE RUSSIAN REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT IN UKRAINE
Major Complex To Be Built With Russian Money in Luhansk
"INSIDE UKRAINE," Kyiv, Ukraine, March 1, 2004

6. FOR RUSSIAN ORTHODOX, GREEK CATHOLIC SPREAD "LIKE
DANGEROUS VIRUS" SAYS UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC OFFICIAL
Religious Information Service of Ukraine (RISU)
www.RISU.org.ua, Lviv, Ukraine, February 25, 2004

7. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC AND RUSSIAN ORTHODOX
CHURCHES: CONTACTS AND PROBLEMS
RIA Novosti, Moscow, Russia, February 18, 2004
Republished in Johnson's Russia List, #8872, 18 February, 04, Article #2
davidjohnson@erols.com, CDI Project, www.cdi.org

8. LETTER TO THE EDITOR ABOUT THE ARTICLE: THE ROMAN
CATHOLIC AND RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCHES:
CONTACTS AND PROBLEMS BY REV. LAPIDUS
Letter to the Editor by Adam Wolf, adamwolf44@yahoo.ca,
Subject: response to article by Rev. Lapidus, JRL# 8072, Feb.18, 2004, #2
Published by: Johnson's Russia List #8088, 26 February 2004, Article #18
davidjohnson@erols.com, A CDI Project, www.cdi.org

9. UKRAINIAN ELECTIONS PROMISE FIERCE CAMPAIGN
By Natalia A. Feduschak, The Washington Times
Washington, D.C., Saturday, February 28, 2004

10. SOCIALIST LEADER ANTICIPATES VOTE-RIGGING
IN COMING UKRAINIAN ELECTION
"Neutralize intentions to rig the presidential election!"
By Oleksandr Moroz, Leader, Socialist Party of Ukraine
Silski Visti, Kiev, Ukraine, in Ukrainian, 17 Feb 04; p 2
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Feb 27, 2004
=========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-2004, No. 34: ARTICLE NUMBER ONE
Politics and Governance, Building a Strong, Democratic Ukraine
http://www.artukraine.com/buildukraine/index.htm
=========================================================
1. PUTIN'S DEMOCRATIC FACADE SHOULDN'T FOOL US ANYMORE

By Anne Applebaum, The Sunday Telegraph
London, UK, Sunday, February 29, 2004

Today, President Vladimir Putin of Russia is expected to announce the name
of his country's new prime minister. According to one of the president's
political supporters, the mystery politician will be an "absolutely trusted
man", and will lead a new government which is stronger, more independent,
and better able to make decisions than that led by the previous prime
minister, Mikhail Kasyanov, who was fired last Tuesday.

On the surface, there is nothing disturbing about this event. The very
words - "president" and "prime minister" - conjure up a friendly image of
democracy and rule of law. Nobody could quarrel with the notion that the
Russian prime minister ought to be trustworthy, or that his new government
ought to be good at making decisions.

The difficulty, in the case of Russia, is that formal appearances disguise
a somewhat different reality. This has long been the case. In 1839, the
Marquis de Custine, a French aristocrat, visited St Petersburg and was
horrified to discover Russian grandees sleeping on bug-ridden straw
pallets, behind the facades of their grand palaces.

Nowadays, of course, the facades are not palaces but democratic
institutions, and the reality is not straw pallets but an increasingly
despotic political system. Clearly, the Russian president's dismissal of
the government was not, as it would have been in a true democracy, the
culmination of a long political debate. Nor did it happen because the press
or the public were clamouring for the government to go.

Instead, it came as a bolt from the blue: President Putin made a brief,
emotionless address on state television, during which he did not criticise
the work of the previous prime minister, but simply said he thought the
decision "correct" at this particular time, which happens to be the middle
of a presidential campaign, in which he has no serious rivals. The
government itself was taken by surprise: a cabinet meeting scheduled for
Tuesday morning was repeatedly postponed, and then cancelled altogether,
a few minutes before the president sacked all of the cabinet's members.

Many in Moscow have been trying, this week, to read the tea leaves, and to
work out what the political significance of President Putin's decision
might have been. Some suspect that the former prime minister, Mr Kasyanov,
fell out of favour because he was too vocal in his support for the recently
jailed oil tycoon, Mikhail Khodorkovsky.

Others think that the president wants to dispose of the government's few
remaining "westernisers" - the politicians who believe in making the
Russian economy more capitalist, and Russian society more European. Still
others think the announcement was a campaign move, intended to make
President Putin himself appear strong and decisive before the country goes
to the polls on March 14.

The real point, though, is that no one in Moscow or anywhere else actually
knows for certain why this arbitrary decision was taken. Despite the
presence of formal democratic institutions, the Kremlin remains thoroughly
opaque, and resists even rudimentary attempts to make it more transparent.

And this resistance is growing. Democracy, in the end, is about more than
the occasional election. But since President Putin came to power, he has
gradually removed most of the accoutrements that make democracy more
than a mere formality. Thanks to President Putin, the most powerful Russian
media, including all major television stations, are now owned by friends of
the Kremlin.

Coverage of news unfavourable to the president, such as the war in Chechnya
or the Russian army's recent failed attempt to launch an ICBM missile, is
brief or non-existent. Political opposition remains legal - there are, in
fact, a few other people running for president - but only so long as
opponents remain weak. Anyone who appears poised to gain real power is
disposed of as quickly as Mr Khodorkovsky was arrested last autumn.

For the most part, President Putin has cleverly avoided large-scale
arrests, or a "crackdown" that would cause a real reaction in the West. But
there are signs that the American administration, at least, is finally
beginning to see behind the facade. During a recent visit to Moscow, the
American Secretary of State, Colin Powell, published an article noting that
"certain developments in Russian politics and foreign policy" have given
him pause. That was diplomatic language, but it is still farther than the
British Government has managed to go.

>From the very beginning, Tony Blair was one of President Putin's greatest
friends in the West, going out of his way to be photographed beside his
friend Vladimir everywhere from the opera in St Petersburg to the woods
around the Russian president's dacha. Perhaps it is time that the British
Prime Minister - however much he too might like to dismiss his Cabinet
without explanation - also tried being less easily fooled. (END) (ARTUIS)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Anne Applebaum is a member of the editorial board of The Washington Post.
Her book "Gulag: A History of the Soviet Camps," published by Penguin, was
awarded the Duff Cooper prize for literary non-fiction last week.
=======================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-2004, No. 33: ARTICLE NUMBER TWO
Check Out the News Media for the Latest News >From and About Ukraine
Daily News Gallery: http://www.artukraine.com/newsgallery.htm
=========================================================
2. VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO'S 50TH BIRTHDAY INTERVIEW
Describes his private life and formative years

Interview with Victor Yushchenko by Tetyana Kharchenko
Ukrayina Moloda, Kiev, Ukraine, in Ukrainian 21 Feb 04; p 5
BBC Monitoring Service,UK, in English, Feb 29, 2004

Popular Ukrainian opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko has described his
private life and formative years in a newspaper interview. Speaking in the
run-up to his 50th birthday [February 23], Yushchenko said he felt 20 years
younger. He also described his service in the Soviet army and said he
enjoyed physical exercise, skiing, mountaineering, reading and painting.

The following is the text of the interview Yushchenko gave to journalist
Tetyana Kharchenko, published in the Ukrainian pro-opposition newspaper
Ukrayina Moloda on 21 February; subheadings have been inserted editorially:

[Kharchenko] It was lunch time when we met [leader of the centre-right
opposition bloc Our Ukraine] Viktor Yushchenko. He joked he could not
remember how many meetings he had had that day. His schedule was extremely
tight and he had to find time for everything.

That is the way he works every day. Morning consultations, tens of important
meetings, a session in the Supreme Council [parliament] where he heads the
largest faction, Our Ukraine, negotiations with partners and opponents,
visits to the regions and business trips abroad. He has to live amid
continual attempts to discredit him, as the pro-government media come up
with dirt and misinformation against him every day.

"I am used to politics always intruding into my private life," Yushchenko
confesses. "But I have never thought I will learn how to accept this."
Yushchenko changes before our very eyes when he forgets about politics for a
while and talks about his service in the army, a genuine leather ball he got
as a gift when he turned 10, or the first money he made and then hid from
his mother in a potato garden.

Our today's conversation is, in principle, nonpolitical. Moreover, there is
a reason to talk about personal things: on Monday [23 February], Yushchenko
will turn 50.

MILITARY SERVICE

Mr Yushchenko, in Soviet times you were considered to be very fortunate,
because your birthday coincided with Soviet Army Day [marked on 23
February], which is now called Motherland Defenders' Day. Does the
coincidence of these two holidays mean anything to you?

[Yushchenko] When I was a child, I was very proud I was born on 23 February.
I had a feeling as though I was not simply involved in a glorious function
of being a defender and soldier, but also as though I was marked in a
special way. When it was time to go to the army, I happened to serve on the
border with Turkey. This was very tough service, "full of deprivations", as
our army newspapers put it.

[Kharchenko] But the army is actually supposed to harden men\ý [newspaper
ellipsis]

[Yushchenko] I was conscripted in autumn. After our moderate climate,
winters in the mountains of the Caucasus seemed harsh. In addition, I was
four-five years older than all other conscripts, had a diploma and a job. So
if for a lot of boys service was a test, regarded as a certain stage in
maturing, I already looked at this in a different way.

I can remember that initially I often asked experienced soldiers how long
the service was. They said: "Viktor, this is all very simple: you come in
the autumn, you are given a shovel. You keep shovelling snow until the
shovel is taken from you, and that's when you know you have served half a
term."

In the Caucasus, blizzards rage every day from autumn to spring. We did not
even have water to wash our faces with, and had to melt snow to make tea.
Yet drill annoyed more than everyday inconveniences. When soldiers are
drilled senselessly, when you have to crawl with your overcoat on across
heaps of snow 10 times back and forth so that snow gets into your sleeves up
to armpits, you always begin to question the rationality of this kind of
military service.

[Kharchenko] So are you an advocate of a professional army?

[Yushchenko] I am convinced that a person should do everything
professionally. Military matters should not be dealt with by amateurs. Being
a soldier is too serious a profession, it requires good physical and
professional training, and special moral qualities. In their turn, soldiers
and officers should get deserved pay for their service.

[Kharchenko] Did your girlfriend see you off when you went to the army? Did
you receive letters from home?

[Yushchenko] She did. And then this was something sacred to me. Those
feelings kept me warm. When you are in the army and get a letter from back
home, this makes you very happy. Our frontier post was some 100 km from the
closest settlement, [the Armenian town of] Leninakan, and Belarusian postman
Tolya delivered mail once a week. That was quite an event, and we waited for
Tolya as if he were the most important man.

[Kharchenko] What about your girlfriend? Did she welcome you back from the
army?

[Yushchenko] My friends wrote to me they had seen her with another man. They
told me to think hard and do something. I read this, but how could I get the
attention of my beloved back when I was in the Caucasus? Time cured old
memories, but back then it was not easy to bear this out. Not long ago, a
week ago or so, I finished reading [19th century Ukrainian poet Taras]
Shevchenko's diary.

In it, Shevchenko described a moment when he was told about his discharge
[from compulsory military service]. He so much looked forward to that moment
that he even knew which kind of wind should blow to make a sailing vessel go
in the direction of his garrison. These pages evoked memories of my own
demobilization. I still remember how eagerly we waited for this minute.

FIRST MONEY EARNED BY YUSHCHENKO

[Kharchenko] You mentioned that you had been conscripted to the army from
your work. What was your first pay?

[Yushchenko] I had made my first money much earlier. Once I signed a
contract with my grandmother Katrya, may she rest in peace. She gave me a
task to graze three goats and said she would sell one of them in the autumn
and give me money for it. I remember that I not only had to graze our
neighbours' cows but also had to take care of those goats the whole summer.
Grandmother Katrya did a fair thing, sold a goat and gave me all the money,
as much as 28 roubles! That was my first serious financial project.

At first I put that money in a cardboard box from vitamin pills and hid it
at home inside the oven. Then every two-three hours I took the box out and
re-counted the money. In a while, I realized the oven was not a safe place,
mother could find the money and spend it on things other than those I dreamt
of. Therefore, I took those roubles out and hid them in a potato garden.

Later I began to look for the money and could not find it. I kept searching
for it the next day. In a word, I was not able to find the money. In
September, when mother was digging the potatoes out, she came up to me and
said: "I found your buried treasure yesterday. I spent it on a school
uniform for you. That will be your present, Viktor." But how could that be a
present?

[Kharchenko] What did you want to buy with that money?

[Yushchenko] I did not know myself. At first, I had to enjoy the money I had
made myself. Then, I would probably buy a bicycle\ý [newspaper ellipsis]

[Kharchenko] In a few days you will be 50. Can you feel the burden of such a
venerable age? Are you sorry that you will not have to bury money in potato
gardens any more?

[Yushchenko] To be honest, I do not feel I am 50. Obviously, this date just
says that my parents made the right decision to give life to such a child
(laughing). Well, seriously, I feel as though I were about 30. Because I
remain the same as I was when I was 30: I live an interesting life, I have
not become indifferent to my soul and people, and I keep myself in a good
shape.

[Kharchenko] But there are such things which you could afford to do 20 years
ago and which you would never do when you are 50\ý [newspaper ellipsis]

[Yushchenko] Yes, I have become more tolerant. If 20 years ago I had been
told I would learn not to react to the dirt currently thrown at me by pocket
progovernment newspapers and TV channels, I would not have believed. But
today I realize that showing emotions is not always the right decision. To
assert one's position one should be correct to the other's position. One
should stand up for his own rightness by arguments and virtues.

BIRTHDAY PLANS

[Kharchenko] What kind of present are you expecting from your family?

[Yushchenko] You cannot even imagine the various feelings and ideas raging
in my family over this! I informed my home intelligence that it would not be
a bad idea to get me a mini-tractor to work on at the dacha. Physical work
on the land is the best rest activity for me.

[Kharchenko] Could you remember the best present you have got from your
elder brother Petro?

[Yushchenko] Surprising as it is, I might not remember what he presented to
me last year or the year before last year, but I remember well a football
which I got from my him when I was 10. In the whole village nobody probably
had a ball like mine. Even the school had only three balls, and one had to
sign up to get a ball.

So when Petro brought me my own ball, I even took it to bed with me when I
went to sleep. The ball had a nice smell of new leather. But it was not
filled with air. As it turned out, pumping it required a special nipple
pump. I asked all neighbours, searching for that pump, but nobody had it.
Yet I was boundlessly happy with that present, it was something that I
remember for the rest of my life.

[Kharchenko] How are you going to celebrate your anniversary?

[Yushchenko] Our family was not in the habit of attracting too much
attention to a child's birthday. Now I can take my daughters to a circus on
their birthdays, organize games, and the little ones get all excited about
this day two weeks before it and two weeks after the fun. It was not like
this back then. My father-in-law's family even told me a story that until he
came of age, nobody had remembered his birthday.

Only when it came to getting papers ready for his passport and it was
necessary to put a date of his birthday, his mother came to a village
council and said, "Mykhaylo was probably born on the 17th, because our cow
had borne a calf on 15 June, and we wrote this date on a roof beam. Mykhaylo
was born two-three days after the calf." That is the way things were in
those times.

Even now I do not really approve of loud celebrations; it is more
comfortable and calmer without them. In addition, the 50th anniversary is my
day, and I have the right to spend it the way I like, in a family circle.

HOBBIES

[Kharchenko] Are you an early riser or a late riser? Do you manage to wake
up early and do exercises?

[Yushchenko] Basically, like all those who grew up in the countryside I am
more of an early riser and like to wake up early. Every day, I get up at six
or half past six in the morning. But now I am not your typical early riser
because I come home late because of my packed schedule. I come home and
wake the girls up to talk to me at least for a little while. My wife does
not
approve of these midnight games, but she understands how important this
communication is to us. Otherwise, I would not see the kids at all because
of my work.

[Kharchenko] Despite your being so busy, do you still practice your hobby,
painting?

[Yushchenko] Honestly speaking, I have not held a brush in my hand for a
long time, but this Christmas I got a chance. My family and me went to the
mountains for a few days. Fluffy snowflakes kept falling to the ground like
in a fairy tale: roofs and spruce trees turned into heaps of snow. This was
a true idyll which reminded me of an atmosphere of my childhood. I felt like
painting, and I painted two Ukrainian winter landscapes in oils.

[Kharchenko] What do you do with your paintings later? Do you give them to
your friends, sell or keep them?

[Yushchenko] A Christmas landscape was ordered by my wife. Now it adorns our
drawing room where another seven or eight of my paintings hang. I give most
paintings away as a present. I gave my last-but-one painting to an auction
held by the Friends of Children charity which is taking care of orphanages.
Some of my friends have kept asking me to give them a painting for a few
years. Every year I promise that as soon as I get three-four free days I
will certainly paint it. But I am short of time.

[Kharchenko] It is known that you like to treat guests with dishes cooked by
yourself. What is your speciality now?

[Yushchenko] It is special green salad: I buy leek, parsley, dill, lettuce -
everything I can get hold of. Then I chop them finely and experiment with
various spices and oils. It is delicious, original and healthy.

[Kharchenko] What are your favourite sports?

[Yushchenko] Four years ago I tried downhill skiing, and since then I have
grown to love this sport. Today, I think I am a good skier and already ski
on so-called "black" [i.e. difficult] slopes. On the eve of my birthday, I
made a present to myself: my friends and I went to the Carpathians and spent
some six hours skiing! Generally, I am fond of mountains. When I was a
student, I spent some time working as an instructor in mountain tourism and
guided groups in the Carpathians. I try to go there at least once a year.

[Kharchenko] You mentioned Shevchenko's diary. Do you read any Ukrainian
writers?

[Yushchenko] Unfortunately, I am catastrophically short of time for reading
belles-lettres. Among contemporary Ukrainian writers, I am trying to follow
works by Yuriy Andrukhovych. I have recently bought his novel called "12
Rings". Before that I had read a well-published collection of poetry by
Volodymyr Tsybulko, "The Book of Warnings". As regards my literary tastes, I
like classical literature, memoirs, historical literature, especially if it
is about Ukraine's history. (END) (ARTUIS)
=========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-2004, No. 33: ARTICLE NUMBER THREE
Major Articles About What is Going on in Ukraine
Current Events Gallery: http://www.artukraine.com/events/index.htm
=========================================================
3. RUSSIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: DARK SKIES TO THE EAST

WORLD: EUROPE, By Riga, Moscow, and Brussels Economist Staff
The Economist print edition, London, UK, February 19, 2004

Strategists in Brussels no longer talk sweetly of encircling the enlarged
European Union with a "ring of friends"

NOW that the German Question has been solved, the Russian Question beckons.
Can Russia, after centuries of autocracy and imperialism, be turned into the
sort of nice democratic country that gets along easily with its European
neighbours? The answer seems to be: not for a while yet, to judge from a
policy paper released last week by the European Commission, the European
Union's executive body, which suggests that relations between the Union and
Russia are close to a post-Soviet low.

The Commission calls for "discussing frankly Russian practices that run
counter to universal and European values". It says Russia has problems with
democracy, human rights and press freedom. It points to rows over the
environment, trade, border regimes and technical co-operation. It says aid
to Russia has had "at best mixed" results; and it chides Russia for
"assertive" behaviour towards neighbours.

Some of these arguments go back years. But they are getting more heated with
the approach of the EU's eastward enlargement in May. The EU will embrace
ten countries in all, seven of which were subjects or satellites of the
Soviet Union. As these countries impose tight EU visa rules, and close their
markets to Russian goods, such as noisy aircraft which fail to meet EU
standards, Russia has been jolted into realising that EU enlargement will
affect it much more in practical terms than the eastward advance by NATO,
which used to monopolise its attention.

So Russia has redirected its diplomatic firepower. It wants to renegotiate
its "partnership and co-operation agreement" with the EU, which is supposed
to govern all aspects of the relationship. It has also put forward a list of
14 big items, from trade concessions to visa-free travel, that it wants
brought into the negotiations. It has threatened to let the treaty
lapse-though EU officials claim that Russia itself would lose more from that
course, by risking trade privileges with the EU.

The EU also says that Russia, for all its demands, has shown little recent
enthusiasm for detailed talks. The distractions of Russia's parliamentary
election in December and an approaching presidential one in March may be
partly to blame. But there is more to it than that. Russia resents being
informed-as happens now-of EU positions which have already been agreed among
governments and so are scarcely changeable. It wants new joint bodies which
will give it a seat at the table when EU governments are debating decisions
that may affect its interests. It wants something more like the arrangement
it has with NATO, where its representatives sit alongside those of NATO
governments in a ministerial council and a cascade of lesser panels,
enjoying "a voice but not a veto" in alliance deliberations.

The European Commission hates that idea, fearing that Russia-EU relations
would then become hostage to bilateral ties between national governments and
Russia, in which the latter could dominate more easily. Memories are fresh
of the EU-Russia summit in November when Italy's prime minister, Silvio
Berlusconi, supposedly representing EU governments, disowned EU positions:
he sympathised with Russia's war in Chechnya and its harassment of the Yukos
oil company.

The Commission's latest analysis of Russia marks a sharp change from its
starry-eyed optimism of a year ago, when it published a document called
"Wider Europe" saying that Russia, and other countries of eastern Europe and
the southern Mediterranean, could be turned into a "ring of friends" around
the enlarged Union, absorbing the Union's political and economic values and
being rewarded with aid and improved market access.

The EU failed to see that Russia is once again driving hard bargains in the
world; it is less interested in friendship than it is in commercial and
diplomatic gains. The EU forgot that Russia is fed up with foreign-dictated
reforms, having had its fill of them in the 1990s. Nor does Russia have all
that much to gain from wider access to EU markets for most goods and
services. Its biggest exports are oil and gas, limited only by the EU's fear
of over-dependence.

Wherever the Russian Question now leads, the question of eastern Europe will
follow. The EU's "Wider Europe" strategy also calls for closer ties to
Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, new neighbours of the enlarged Union. Poland
talks of offering them full membership some day. But Russia sees them as its
own close strategic allies, as its natural business partners, and as members
of an enlarging Russian-led free-trade area. It will hardly look on sweetly
if the EU tries to lure away its key allies.

All this means that EU governments face big decisions in the coming months.
One is whether to stand firm in the current sparring with Russia. That could
mean letting the "partnership and co-operation" accord collapse. The
consequences could be offset by temporary arrangements, but the symbolic
damage would be far-reaching.

Another is how to respond if Ukraine's presidential election and Belarus's
parliamentary election, both due in October, are too blatantly rigged.
November's peaceful revolution in Georgia, another ex-Soviet republic, has
provided a tempting precedent. There, encouraged by America, opposition
forces profited from public anger at a gerrymandered election to overthrow
an incompetent (though pro-American) president, Edward Shevardnadze, and
to vote in a younger and probably more effective pro-American leader,
Mikhail Saakashvili. Russia will be on guard now against any similar
foreign-led move in Ukraine or Belarus.

It has reason to worry. Some Americans scarcely conceal their hope for a
revolution against Belarus's wild-eyed and dictatorial leader, Alexander
Lukashenka, or against Ukraine's entrenched and corrupt nomenklatura.

Central Europeans will tend to agree unreservedly. They want to see Russia
challenged and contained. The EU's older members will tend to be much less
gung-ho. They are impatient already with the political and economic demands
of the current enlargement, and have little wish to get drawn deeper into
eastern Europe, nor to argue with Russia any more than necessary. Finding a
common policy towards eastern Europe that satisfies old and new EU members
will be a big challenge for the enlarged Union. Finding one acceptable to
Russia too, if that is a criterion, will be harder still. (END) (ARTUIS)
LINK: http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=2446825
=========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-2004, No. 33: ARTICLE NUMBER FOUR
Exciting Opportunities in Ukraine for Travel and Tourism
Travel and Tourism Gallery: http://www.ArtUkraine.com/tourgallery.htm
=========================================================
4. PUTIN'S RETURN TO THE PAST
[Common history with Ukraine, commemoration of the Pereyaslav Treaty]

Guest Column By Dr. David Marples
ExpressNews, University of Alberta Website
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, February 6, 2004

February 6, 2004 - January 21, 2004, marked the 80th anniversary of the
death of the founder of the Soviet state, Vladimir I. Lenin. To commemorate
the occasion, the Russian Public Opinion and Market Research organization
surveyed the population. More than 65 per cent of respondents considered
that Lenin had played a positive role in history; 26 per cent felt that his
role was negative; and nine per cent had no opinion.

The poll comes in the wake of new initiatives by President Vladimir Putin to
consolidate his power and start a second term as president in the elections
this March, following his controversial triumph in the parliamentary
elections of 2003, when his government-backed party Russian Unity took
more than half the seats in the new Duma.

Putin is also taking important steps to bring former Soviet republics more
closely into the Russian fold. His attention has been directed toward two
Slavic neighbours, Ukraine and Belarus.

In January, Putin visited Kyiv, where he met with his Ukrainian counterpart,
Leonid Kuchma. Officially the trip was to celebrate the end of a cultural
occasion: the culmination of the period known as "Days of Russia" in
Ukraine, which followed a similar celebration of "Days of Ukraine" in Russia

in 2002. During his visit, Putin spelled out the new unity and friendship
between Russia and Ukraine. Indeed while Putin's grasp of history seemed to
be singularly narrow, there is little subtlety about his overall goals.

The year 2004 marks the 350th anniversary of the Pereyaslav Treaty, signed
between Ukrainian Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Russian Tsar Aleksey
Mikhailovich, ostensibly for a combined effort to defeat the Poles. In
practice, the treaty either united Ukraine with Russia-Putin's version and
that of traditional Soviet history-or tied Ukraine to the colonial Russian
yoke-the version of most patriotic Ukrainians.

The USSR lavishly celebrated the 300th anniversary of the treaty in 1954,
building a symbolic arc on the hill above the Dnipro River in Kyiv. Putin
and Kuchma seem intent on celebrating the new anniversary despite the fact
that Ukraine has been independent for more than 12 years.

Putin also visited the Pecherska Lavra (the famous Monastery of the Caves),
where he declared that it was on the Dnipro River that Prince Vladimir
started to baptize Russia. Thus he embraced the version of history that the
medieval state of Kievan Rus' is the birthplace of Russia--superseding even
traditional Soviet propaganda that Kievan Rus' marks the foundation point of
the three Slavic peoples: Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians.

Not so long ago, Kuchma might have responded irately to such a version of
the past. This time, however, he smiled sweetly and expressed his regret
that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is at present completely independent of
its Russian counterpart, adding that he personally supports the concept of a
united Orthodox Church serving both Russia and Ukraine.

Paradoxically, while Putin was emphasizing the importance of Ukraine for
modern-day Russia, his relations with Belarus, a country with which Russia
has formed an official union, have soured. Belarusian president Alyaksander
Lukashenka, whose political outlook almost renders Putin a closet liberal,
resents the fact that Russia would control a proposed common currency by
2005, and has begun to express his support for continued Belarusian
independence.

Nonetheless, skeptics maintain that such dissension is temporary and minor.
Putin certainly prefers to see a would-be dictator like Lukashenka in office
in Minsk rather than one of the more unpredictable figures from the
opposition. Complete incorporation may be economically inexpedient, but
Belarus is clearly part of the Russian orbit, and has been since the
collapse of the Soviet Union.

Elsewhere, Russia has consistently impeded attempts to end the protracted
conflict in Moldova over a breakaway "Slavic" region on the Dniester River.
It has also included Kazakhstan in its plans for a common economic space,
and it maintains a significant influence in Central Asia, despite the
presence of U.S. troops in the region.

The breakthrough over the past year, however, has been in Ukraine, where
Russian businesses have been accused of monopolizing privatized resources
and industries, which in turn are responsible for a period of sustained
economic growth in Ukraine. Russia's own GDP rose by a reported seven per
cent in 2003, marking a period of prolonged growth for the Federation backed
by oil and gas profits.

In four years, Russia has returned to a hegemonic, assertive role over its
neighbours. In October, it asserted a nebulous claim to the Tuzla Island,
off the Kerch peninsula of the Crimea. Amid the manifestation of surveys in
favour of Lenin, the assertion of a common history with Ukraine and the
commemoration of the Pereyaslav Treaty, Putin now expounds the deepest
sentiments of old Russian imperialism. The tsar is dead; long live the tsar!
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. David Marples, a professor of history at the University of Alberta, is
the author of Motherland: Russia in the 20th Century (2002). This article
originally appeared in the Edmonton Journal. The Univ. of Alberta Dept
of History and Classics Website: http://www.arts.ualberta.ca/~histclas/,
Dr. David Marples: http://www.arts.ualberta.ca/~histclas/marples.htm
=========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-2004, No. 33: ARTICLE NUMBER FIVE
The Story of Ukraine's Long and Rich Culture
Ukrainian Culture Gallery: http://www.ArtUkraine.com/cultgallery.htm
=========================================================
5. MORE RUSSIAN REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT IN UKRAINE
Major Complex To Be Built With Russian Money in Luhansk

"INSIDE UKRAINE," Kyiv, Ukraine, March 1, 2004

KYIV - The influx of Russian money into Ukraine has been increasing in
recent years but a major new investment announced in Luhansk may foreshadow
a new turn in this tide of Russian money, particularly in the
Russia-oriented eastern regions. In the near future, a huge construction
project will commence in suburban Luhansk consisting of at least 12
multistory apartment buildings, to be called the Academic Complex.

What makes this project different from the many private Russian investments
in commercial businesses and industries is that project funding is being
provided from Russian government budget funds, coming partly from the
Russian Federation and partly from the Moscow City State Administration.

Local residents are reported to favor the new complex since it fills a need
for moderately priced housing that Ukrainian state entities have been unable
to fill.

However, some observers have expressed concern since they see the Luhansk
project as part of a well-developed Russian government plan to strengthen
Russian ties in Ukraine, possibly related to the long-held desire of some
Russian nationalist politicians to eventually see the return of Crimea to
the Russian Federation. These same observers suggest that in view of the
Kerch Strait incident last year, all such Russian projects should be viewed
with some suspicion. (END) (ARTUIS)
=========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-2005, No. 32: ARTICLE NUMBER SIX
The Gencidal Famine in Ukraine 1932-1933, HOLODOMOR
Genocide Gallery: http://www.artukraine.com/famineart/index.htm
=========================================================
6. FOR RUSSIAN ORTHODOX, GREEK CATHOLIC SPREAD "LIKE
DANGEROUS VIRUS" SAYS UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC UNIV VICE-RECTOR

Religious Information Service of Ukraine (RISU)
www.RISU.org.ua, Lviv, Ukraine, February 25, 2004

LVIV- - The Russian Orthodox Church considers the development of the
Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) "like the spread of a dangerous
virus." This is according to Myroslav Marynovych, vice-rector of the
Ukrainian Catholic University and director of its Institute of Religion and
Society in Lviv, Ukraine.

On 25 February 2003, Marynovch gave his comments on the results of the trip
of Cardinal Walter Kasper, president of the Pontifical Council for Promoting
Christian Unity, to Moscow last week to discuss the development of the Roman
and Greek Catholic churches in the lands of the former Soviet Union.

According to AGI.it, on 19 February the cardinal met with Metropolitan
Kirill (Gundyaev) of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, chairman of the Department
for External Church Relations of the Russian Orthodox Church. On 21
February, the Press Department of the Holy See issued a note stating, among
other things, that "Both parties have agreed that, in order to solve any
issues that may arise in the future with regards to relations between the
Russian Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church, a work group will
be set up featuring members of both Churches. The aim of the group will be
examining and solving these issues."

According to the BBC Monitoring Service, Cardinal Kasper met with Patriarch
Alexis II, head of the Russian Orthodox Church, on 22 February, and said
that the Catholic Church would not set up a Greek Catholic Patriarchate in
Ukraine. At the same meeting, Patriarch Alexis said "Proselytism in the
territory of Russia and other CIS countries is spreading more and more
widely and broadly." Patriarch Alexis added, according to ITAR-TASS, that
the establishment of a Greek Catholic Patriarchate in Ukraine will give up
for lost relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Vatican for
decades. The patriarch is concerned about "the union spreading onto east
Ukraine, Russia and Kazakhstan."

Myroslav Marynovych commented on the situation for the Religious Information
Service of Ukraine:

"The address of Patriarch Alexis II is set," said Marynovych, "in a key
traditional for the Russian Orthodox Church. If the 'Uniate' Church will be
allowed to exist, this will be, to put it figuratively, only [hidden from
view] 'under the table' of history, in its own special regional ghetto.
Though natural in an era of migration, the church's extensive development is
treated like the spread of a dangerous virus that threatens Christian peace.
It is not possible to accept such an interpretation.

"However, the obstinacy and ultimatum-like character of the patriarch's
language is, in my opinion, not only the result of the worries of those
leaders of the ROC who refuse to reconcile. Some Roman Catholics in the
West with whom I have conversed express their unease with the supposedly
unreasonable acts of Eastern Catholics. In their understanding, Greek
Catholics should avoid actions that could aggravate the Moscow Patriarchate.
The UGCC's struggle to have its patriarchate established and to transfer the
patriarch's see to Kyiv, unfortunately, is received by some Roman Catholics
not as an element of the normal development of the UGCC, but as unmotivated
steps in the direction of confrontation. This creates a background against
which the obstinacy of patriarchal Moscow looks understandable.

"However, this result of the discussions in Moscow, seemingly negative for
the UGCC, is in fact an important step towards the normalization of
interchurch relations. It has allowed one main conclusion to emerge: the
Moscow Patriarchate's efforts to return relations with the Vatican to the
old rut of ostpolitik, and the hypnotic dependence of Vatican propositions
on the ultimatums of the Moscow Patriarchate, both contradict the spirit of
the modern era. I am convinced that, both in Catholicism and in world
Orthodoxy, dissatisfaction with the style in which the discussions in Moscow
were conducted will grow. Therefore, there will still be changes."
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sources: www.agi.it, BBC Monitoring Service, ITAR-TASS, and UKRAINE
REPORT-2004, No. 30, February 23, 2004.
=========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-2004, No. 32: ARTICLE NUMBER SEVEN
Ukraine's History and the Long Struggle for Independence
Historical Gallery: http://www.artukraine.com/histgallery.htm
=========================================================
7. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC AND RUSSIAN ORTHODOX
CHURCHES: CONTACTS AND PROBLEMS

RIA Novosti, Moscow, Russia, February 18, 2004
Republished in Johnson's Russia List, #8872, 18 February, 04, Article #2
davidjohnson@erols.com, A CDI Project, www.cdi.org

MOSCOW (Father John Lapidus for RIA Novosti) Deep-rooted stereotypes
dominate Western thinking when it comes to contacts between the Roman
Catholic and the Russian Orthodox Churches. The former has apparently
extended a helping hand to Russia, is eager to enrich Russians with
progressive Western ideas and generously offers them the cultural treasures
of the West.

In contrast, the Russian Orthodox Church is a stagnant, xenophobic
stronghold of obscurantism inherited from the Dark Ages. It is loath to
forgive old wrongs and reach a compromise with the Vatican, and it is always
finding fault with the Holy See.

Let us, however, turn from public prejudice to hard facts, which reveal the
true state of relations between the two Churches. The Russian Orthodox
Church has repeatedly highlighted two major problems: Catholic missionary
activities in Russia and other CIS countries, and Russian Orthodox clashes
with Greek Catholics in western Ukraine.

Roman Catholic stances on the two issues are ambiguous, to put it mildly.
Of course, there have been many conferences with Russian Orthodox hierarchs
and activists, and many joint statements. In these communiques, Catholics
constantly assure Russians of their fraternal love and heartfelt respect
for their Sister Church. However, dozens of Catholic missionary orders work
in Russia, seeking to convert the local population. Proselytising is at its
most open in those orphanages that these orders run.

Why not conduct charitable and social work in close co-operation with the
Russian Orthodox Church, especially as the Vatican issued the appropriate
instructions to this end more than a decade ago (the 1992 document from the
papal commission Pro Russia)? Unfortunately, Western aid to Russia is
possibly not disinterested, and the needy are tempted to give up their
ancestors' faith for a free lunch.

The situation with the Orthodox clergy and flock in West Ukraine is no less
serious. The violent seizure of Orthodox churches reached unprecedented
levels in the early 1990s, which give rise to suspicions that the
leadership of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, with the local secular
authorities' support, was determined to oust Orthodox believers from
Ukraine for good. Only two Orthodox parishes survive in the major city of
Lvov and the municipal council has decided to pull down one of the churches
despite parishioners' objections.

The Ivano-Frankovsk regional administration flatly refused to assign land
plots for the construction of two Orthodox churches after Greek Catholics
seized the standing house of worship. There have been numerous similar
instances, but no one has ever defended the interests of the Orthodox
community.

No more than 10% of the Ukrainian population professes the Greek Catholic
faith, but the Church, nevertheless, aspires to a national status and has
demanded that the Vatican declare it a patriarchate. This is despite the
fact that the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians are Orthodox believers.

Why, then, is the Vatican so unwilling to bring order to its missionary
activities in Russia and throughout the Commonwealth of Independent States?
Why has not it moved to stop the Greek Catholic advance in the Orthodox
homelands of south and east Ukraine? The ENI news agency published
interesting information last July that shed some light on what underlies
this reluctance.

Seven of the eight seminaries in staunchly Catholic Ireland had been closed
down in the preceding ten years after enrolment collapsed. No one applied
to 28 out of the 68 theological schools of Spain in 2002/03. Last year,
there were only 606 students in Slovakia's seven Roman Catholic theological
schools, and fewer and fewer applications are being received every year.

Four theological schools in England and Wales ordained 48 priests in the
year prior to the report, while in the preceding five years the number of
theological students in Catholic Belgium had halved to just 26. In 2002,
111 priests were ordained in France, which has a population of over sixty
million.

Indeed, the number of French theological students decreased by 30%
between 1993 and 2003, and the statistics for Switzerland were no less
alarming: no one had applied to enrol in Catholic seminaries in Geneva,
Fribourg or Lausanne by the start of last year. Out of all the European
countries with strong Catholic traditions, Italy and Poland alone had
seen an increasing number of theological students and ordained priests.

These ominous figures raise suspicions that the Vatican regards Russia as
vast land ready for cultivation in an effort to overcome its European
crisis. In view of the figures, it would be entirely appropriate to ask the
Catholic hierarchy: "What makes you so sure of missionary success in Russia
when you cannot attract the young to the Church in your homeland?" The
statistics for the Russian Orthodox Church stand in stark contrast. In
1988, it had a mere 68 eparchies, close on seventy bishops and just over
7,000 priests, 21 monasteries, three theological schools and two academies.

Now, it has more than 130 eparchies, over 150 bishops, 16,000 parishes with
an approximate 20,000 priests, and more than 600 monasteries. Theological
education is offered in five theological academies, 33 seminaries,
institutes and universities, and many schools. About two hundred graduates
leave Moscow theological schools alone every year, the majority of whom are
later ordained.

The Russian Orthodox Church, therefore, has no reason at all to fear the
Roman Catholic as a formidable rival, as the Vatican's representatives
often say (see, for example, an interview with the Italian-based daily,
l'Avvenire, on March 18, 2002 given by Archbishop Tadeusz Kondrusiewicz,
Metropolitan of the Roman Catholic Church in Russia). The Roman Catholic
Church is really our Sister Church, and we Russians would like her to take
thorough stock of the situation, and regard her sister in a genuinely
Christian way.

The Russian Orthodox Church is now improving after the great
trials it underwent in the seventy years of a godless regime. In the past
fifteen years it has proved its viability and demonstrated its enormous
potential. It would be far more reasonable for the two largest Christian
churches to join hands, and together show Christ to the secular world. It,
however, does not take beautiful words of friendship to put an end to
confrontation, but practical work to prove that the Vatican is really
intent on improving the situation. (END) (ARTUIS
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOTE: Our thanks to Marta D. Olynyk, Editor, Political Affairs,
e-Poshta, for distributing this article. m.olynyk@sympatico.ca.
=========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-2004, No. 33: ARTICLE NUMBER EIGHT
The Rich History of Ukrainian Art, Music, Pysanka, Folk-Art
Arts Gallery: http://www.artukraine.com/artgallery.htm
=========================================================
8. LETTER TO THE EDITOR ABOUT THE ARTICLE: THE ROMAN
CATHOLIC AND RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCHES:
CONTACTS AND PROBLEMS BY REV. LAPIDUS

Letter to the Editor by Adam Wolf, adamwolf44@yahoo.ca,
Subject: response to article by Rev. Lapidus, JRL# 8072, Feb.18, 2004, #2
Published by: Johnson's Russia List #8088, 26 February 2004, Article #18
davidjohnson@erols.com, A CDI Project, www.cdi.org

Item 2 of the JRL #8072 of February 18th is a seeming attempt on the part
of Rev. John Lapidus to provide the reader with a non biased and balanced
analysis of the stand off between the Roman Catholic Church and the
Orthodox Church of Russia. Some of the points the author raises are valid.
Most however are questionable and I would like to address these.
[see article by Rev. Lapidus just above, number 7]

Rev. Lapidus highlights the Russian Orthodox Church's concern regarding
Catholic missionary activities in Russia and other CIS countries. He also
makes reference to the Orthodox Church's concern about the ongoing struggle
between the Orthodox and the Greek Catholics of western Ukraine. The issue
of the Catholic presence in the so-called "Russian Lands" is ever present
in the mind of the Russian Orthodox hierarchy. The Orthodox Church
considers the "Russian Lands", which include all of Ukraine and Belarus to
be its canonical territory. These lands should be off limits to Catholic
influence. In its view these lands and the Slavic peoples inhabiting them,
are Moscow's geo-spiritual monopoly.

The fact is that with the Union of Brest of 1596 a large part of the
Ukrainian Church chose a different path, a path it has adhered to for over
400 years, a path it has every right to follow. There is no doubt that the
act of Union was in large part the result of political rivalries between
east and west. There is no doubt that power politics and manipulations
played an important role.

History has proven that ecclesiastical power politics have been a cutthroat
business in both the Latin west and Byzantine east. Fundamentally though,
this fact is of little consequence. If a large proportion of Ukrainian
Christians feel strongly enough about their 400 year old Greek Catholic
tradition to stand by it in the face of repression and persecution, no one
has the moral or spiritual authority to disregard or denigrate this fact.

The Uniate Church of Ukraine deserves both full recognition and full
respect. I am always taken aback by the uncompromising tone of the
Russian Orthodox Church, which seems unwilling to recognize and
respect the freedom of Ukrainians to decide for themselves. Freedom
of conscience is after all a universal right or is it?

Another issue, which the author raises is the Russian Orthodox Church's
concern about Catholic missionary activity in the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS). Such concern would seem to indicate that the
Russian Church sees itself as an imperial power. On what historical or
theological grounds can the Orthodox Church of Russia assume the right to
control the spirituality of the Kazakh, Uzbek, Kirgiz lands of Central
Asia, which are today independent entities and whose traditions are neither
Slavic nor Christian?

The author complains about the fact that Catholics are doing their own
charitable work in Russia whereas they should be working hand in hand with
their Orthodox brethren. Maybe he has a point here but social justice and
charitable work as such do not seem to be a central priority of the Russian
Orthodox establishment.

Then there is the issue of church seizures. Rev. Lapidus bemoans the fact
that the Greek Catholic Church of Western Ukraine is seizing Orthodox
churches. How can he, in all honesty, make such a statement without
highlighting the fact that these seizures are a reaction to the brutal
repression which the Uniate Church has been subjected to by both the
tsarist and Bolshevik regimes ever since the partitions of Poland. Many
Uniates preferred to suffer imprisonment and martyrdom rather then submit
to conversion by decree.

In more recent times, as a result of Western Ukraine's (Eastern Poland's)
forced annexation by the USSR the Uniate Church was forcibly incorporated
into the Moscow Patriarchate. Great numbers of lay people and clergy were
sent to die in the GULAG for refusing to renounce their faith and
allegiance.

The Greek Catholics of Western Ukraine have proven beyond any doubt that
their Church is more than the result of an imperial Polish whim. The Uniates
have been practicing their own brand of Byzantine Christianity for over 400
years. The current conflict in Western Ukraine is unfortunate.

One would hope that in the 21st century Christians would be capable of
dealing with such issues in a more civilized manner. As sad and unfortunate
as the situation is Rev. Lapidus is being intellectually dishonest when he
condemns church seizures while failing to mention that, for the most part,
these churches were seized from the Uniates in the first place. The picture
he is presenting is biased and incomplete.

And finally the author illustrates with statistics in hand that the Catholic
Church is a failing institution, a Church incapable of replenishing the
ranks of its priesthood. On the other hand these same statistics would
indicate that the Russian Orthodox Church is expanding exponentially.
The ranks of the priesthood are growing. There are increasing numbers
of parishes, seminaries, dioceses, and monasteries.

If this remarkable expansion is real, one could logically expect that such
newfound vitality should go a long way in neutralizing the sense of
imminent Catholic danger among the Orthodox hierarchy. Catholics in Moscow
number less than 100,000. Roman Catholic parishes are frequented primarily
by descendants of Polish and German exiles, by refugees from the third
world and by members of the diplomatic corps.

Articles such as the one by Rev. Lapidus do us all a disservice. Doubtless
neither Church is without blame in this situation and both Churches are
well versed in the sin of pride. Nevertheless when an author ventures into
the mine-field of Catholic-Orthodox relations in Eastern Europe he should
avoid presenting incomplete, distorted and one sided views. Such an
approach is destructive. It fans the flames of resentment and makes
meaningful dialogue impossible. (END) (ARTUIS)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOTE: Our thanks to Marta D. Olynyk, Editor, Political Affairs,
e-Poshta, for distributing this article. m.olynyk@sympatico.ca.
=========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-2004, No. 33: ARTICLE NUMBER NINE
The Art of Private Voluntary Organizations in Supporting Ukraine
Support Ukraine Gallery: http://www.artukraine.com/uasupport/index.htm
=========================================================
9. UKRAINIAN ELECTIONS PROMISE FIERCE CAMPAIGN

By Natalia A. Feduschak, The Washington Times
Washington, D.C., Saturday, February 28, 2004

KIEV - The two men most likely to face off in Ukraine's critical
presidential elections this fall made a rare public appearance last weekend,
setting the stage for what promises to be a fierce battle for the country's
highest office.

Rarely looking at each other, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych and
opposition leader Victor Yushchenko sat side by side during the opening
session of a conference last Saturday, which brought together 200 leading
policy-makers from the United States and Europe to discuss Ukraine's role
in the world.

It was the first such high-level meeting of policy experts since Ukraine
became independent in 1991.

Mr. Yanukovych blamed the opposition for blocking constitutional reforms
that would transfer power from the president to parliament in 2006.

Mr. Yanukovych said the changes are necessary for Ukraine's political
system to function more effectively.

"We will fight for a system of government in which the people will know
who is in power," Mr. Yanukovych said.

Many politicians complain President Leonid Kuchma has too much power
under the current constitution, which often puts him at loggerheads with
lawmakers. That system, they said, also has allowed government corruption to
flourish.

Mr. Yushchenko welcomed the prime minister's presence at the conference,
saying it was the first time the government was willing to sit down with the
opposition to discuss differences.

Mr. Yushchenko, however, said the constitutional changes the government
is proposing are merely a ruse to allow Mr. Kuchma and his supporters to
keep their hold on power.

"[The government's] end goal is authoritarianism," Mr. Yushchenko said.
"The authorities have taken the road of conserving the government. We want
to disrupt this show."

Opposition leaders have conceded some changes to Ukraine's constitution
are necessary. They maintain, however, that changes should not be carried
out nine months before the Oct. 31 vote or at the current hurried pace.

Despite their divergent political views, Mr. Yanukovych and Mr.
Yushchenko don't harbor the same animosity toward each other as they do
toward Victor Medvedchuk, Mr. Kuchma's chief of staff.

Mr. Yushchenko has accused Mr. Medvedchuk of waging war on businessmen
and media outlets sympathetic to the opposition by using tax inspections and
other unseemly tactics. Politicians and observers here say Mr. Kuchma has
virtually ceded much of his power to Mr. Medvedchuk, whose brother now
holds a powerful post in Ukraine's tax authority.

Other conference participants warned the presidential elections must be
free and fair, and media restrictions and tactics used against the
opposition must stop if Ukraine is to integrate into Europe and world
structures.

"If Kuchma were smart, then he would decide that his best legacy is to
allow free and fair elections," former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K.
Albright, who was guest of honor at the conference, said in an interview.

"I think he should realize this is his last chance to really have a
dignified exit."

With just over two months left before the European Union accepts new
member states, several conference participants called on the West for a more
proactive policy toward Ukraine. Borys Tarasyk, who heads the Ukrainian
parliament's committee on European integration, said a new "Friends of
Ukraine" group composed of American and European statesmen would be
established to continue the dialogue with Ukrainians.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
LINK: http://washingtontimes.com/world/20040227-100659-2567r.htm
=========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-2004, No. 33: ARTICLE NUMBER TEN
Send Us Names to Add to the Distribution List for UKRAINE REPORT
=========================================================
10. SOCIALIST LEADER ANTICIPATES VOTE-RIGGING
IN COMING UKRAINIAN ELECTION

By Oleksandr Moroz, Leader, Socialist Party of Ukraine
Silski Visti, Kiev, Ukraine, in Ukrainian, 17 Feb 04; p 2
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Feb 27, 2004

The opposition newspaper Silski Visti has published a political forecast by
Socialist Party of Ukraine leader Oleksandr Moroz, in which he considers
possible scenarios of political developments in the run-up to the
presidential election. The only hope for the incumbent authorities to cling
onto power is to resort to vote-rigging, Moroz said. They can also raise
their chances by holding an early election if President Leonid Kuchma
resigns.

Moroz looked at two possible courses of events: when political reform is
carried out and when it is not. He also proposed ways in which the
opposition should respond to various possibilities in order to thwart the
presidential administration's plans.

The following is the text of the article by Oleksandr Moroz, entitled
"Neutralize intentions to rig the presidential election!" and published in
Silski Visti on 17 February; subheadings inserted editorially:

In analysing the political situation that has to do with the presidential
elections and all the previous practices of power formation, one can reach
a conclusion that the regime's main tool to achieve its aim can only be
falsification. In this connection there are so many arguments that this
premise can be taken for granted.

Let us forecast possible actions by the regime's supporters, meaning the
best conditions for using the criminal tool. Our experience makes it
possible to conclude that practically the only scenario for successful
vote-rigging (successful for the regime) is to hold a presidential election
in August this year. Let us examine reasons for such a forecast.

EARLY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Reasons. It is easier to falsify things by taking advantage of large masses
of those who do not want to or cannot take part in elections. Then, there is
a lot of room for manipulation. By-elections and other campaigns, general
statistics on the movement of people on holidays reduce the electoral
turnout rate by approximately 20 per cent. So, the regime's spin doctors
could count on elections in August when holidays are at their height.

Ways to legitimize early elections. The only way is to have an early
election of the president. The key to this is Leonid Kuchma's voluntary
resignation. Such an assumption might seem illogical, for the motives he
voiced for political reforms throughout one and half years have demonstrated
a strengthening of the dictatorship, not his concern for the democratization
of state governance. Has his interest changed now? Certainly not. Yet he
will not be able to carry out his intention on his own. The risks are too
high because even the universal use of government machinery cannot be a
guarantee.

Besides, he does not need power in itself; he needs it as a condition of
security (in a broad sense of these words). Voluntary resignation, to some
extent, improves the president's image: look, kind people, I truly want
change, do not want to hinder it, you should somehow manage on your own...
[newspaper ellipsis] Soft-hearted ordinary people love things like these.
Yet not everything is so simple because the content of political reform is
not clear. So, two scenarios seem likely. Either of them can be implemented.

POWER-FOR-SECURITY TRADE-OFF

The first scenario. Reform is not carried out. Power should be transferred
to that person who will guarantee the president's security either personally
(having such authority) or by ensuring him [Kuchma] respective status. As
regards status, for example, the post of prime minister (which is less
likely) or MP will be suitable. It is no problem to vacate such a position
for the president. A successor to the presidency can expect success if he a)
enjoys Kuchma's confidence, based on previous relations; b) has a sufficient
level of publicity. In other words, a person whom people know and on whose
potential they place their hopes.

[Prime Minister] Viktor Yanukovych meets these criteria more than anyone,
though the name is not that important. The current prime minister's
advantage is that, under the present constitution, presidential authority
and the ability to use government machinery would go to him if Kuchma
resigned. Yanukovych would have enough arguments for those who are in
charge of administrative resources - [regional] governors. Under the
constitution early elections should be held 90 days after the current
president leaves office. In other words, an "abdication" can be expected in
late April-early May.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE SCENARIO

The second scenario. Reform is carried out. In this case the content and
timing of constitution changes play a great role. There are quite a few
possible sequences, and they can be analysed separately. One of them is
that reform comes into effect 15 days after it is signed into law. If this
happens in late March, in a few days power may be transferred either
according to the first scenario or, following the agreement with the prime
minister (whose authority will be augmented), to another representative of
the authorities with a more or less untarnished reputation ([National Bank
governor] Serhiy Tyhypko, etc.). Most likely, the president has not yet
chosen this scenario.

This scenario is "passable". It does not disturb society because competition
between contenders would get a bit less sharp while control over the
parliamentary majority remains in the same hands. This scenario requires
that constitutional amendments be passed not later than March. (If this is
the case, bills on elections and other bills having to do with reform will
not be much disputed by the parliamentary majority).

Back-up scenario. It seems it was not by chance that the majority, which had
various possibilities to abide by parliamentary procedure, voted [on a bill
on constitutional changes] on 24 December 2003 in an illegitimate fashion
[by a show of hands]. Neither was it accidental that it received an order to
hold an emergency session only on the latest, to some extent, ambiguous
date, on the eve of 3 February. What was this done for? So that, in response
to MPs' appeals, the Constitutional Court would rule the votes on the
aforementioned days illegitimate. The authorities will need such a ruling
after the presidential election when it becomes clear to the regime whether
the president's power should be enhanced or weakened.

Both the model of the president's election and the duration of the
presidential campaign will matter in each scenario. It is not coincidental
that the latter factor is repeatedly mentioned by the propresidential forces
which are allegedly worried that parliamentary elections are held for 90
days and presidential elections are held for 180 days, though they are not
directly interrelated. It is a different thing that worries them.

There are two reasons. First, it is intended to diminish the opposition
candidates' chances of using old methods of campaigning and canvassing
because the up-to-date methods, especially television, are in the regime's
hands. In pursuit of this aim attempts are made to close the Silski Visti
newspaper, to take Radio Liberty off the air, to bring the regional mass
media under control. Second, it is intended to create grounds for the
plausible disqualification of that candidate (candidates) whose actions
could be qualified as violation of electoral laws in terms of premature
campaigning.

It is for this reason that there were delays in proposing candidates for a
new make-up of the Central Electoral Commission. The candidates were
selected taking account of the second reason mentioned here, with a view
to resorting to this method. This is a general outline of conditions for
likely vote-rigging.

OPPOSITION CAN THWART PRESIDENT'S SCHEMES

How to neutralize these plans? The first scenario (as well as the second)
could be, to a large extent, neutralized by the quality of the law on
presidential elections which should necessarily provide that the state
administration shall be distanced from the electoral process.

The third scenario could be blocked by several measures. First of all, it is
necessary to make the Constitutional Court send its reply as to the
legitimacy of the votes on 24 December and 3 February, as well as hand
down its ruling on the law on constitution changes. It does not matter
whether its replies will be positive or negative, but their existence will
later preclude manipulation or fraud, and the Constitutional Court will
not be held hostage to the regime.

Next, it is necessary to carefully think over the dates of the passage of
the bill on constitutional changes. To prevent anybody from doing stupid
things, the best of all would be to finally vote on the bill in June. The
nearest weeks will show if the political forces have mutual confidence as to
the reform of the power system. If it is sufficient, a June vote will not be
risky even provided the presidential campaign is shortened. The response of
the pro-regime structures to this circumstance will prove if the forecast
that has been made is right or wrong.

There are also other mechanisms to keep everyone within the framework of
the constitution. They are not at issue. Today the forecast I have made
suggests that leaders of groups and factions of the parliamentary majority
need to analyse their place and role in spin doctors' moves to keep the
regime in place, and consequences for themselves. The same is true for
other leaders from progovernment structures. I am certain they will not find
their interest in the developed scenario.

Leaders of the opposition factions need to act in a concerted and
coordinated fashion and to step over the differences that have recently been
accumulated, especially in view of the fact that many of the differences
have been planted. The regime can make a good job of deceiving its
opponents and intriguing.

Active elements in political parties should consider new nuances in the
development of political processes, mobilize the entire arsenal of their own
means, paying special attention to the need to explain things to people.
More than ever, citizens and each voter will be increasingly responsible for
forming the authorities, thus for the situation in the state. Many other
factors, including external factors, should also be considered.

What about the president? He can either refute what has been said above or
keep silent. In fact, this is one of the motives behind the publication of
this forecast.

We shall see. Then together we will make our own conclusions. (END)
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