"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT"
In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis, and Commentary
"The Art of Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion,
Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World"
" 'We consider Ukraine as our nearest partner, not only in geopolitical
terms, but in our strategic view of Europe's future, and the world order in
general,' Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said during talks with
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kostiantyn Hryschenko in Kyiv." [article one]
"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT" Year 2004, Number 59
Action Ukraine Coalition (AUC), Washington, D.C.
morganw@patriot.net, ArtUkraine.com@starpower.net
Washington, D.C.; Kyiv, Ukraine, WEDNESDAY, April 14, 2004
INDEX OF ARTICLES
1. RUSSIA SEES UKRAINE AS ITS NEAREST PARTNER
In geopolitical terms and in our strategic view of Europe's future
and the world order in general, states Russia's foreign minister
Interfax-Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, April 13, 2004
2. UKRAINIAN POLITICAL SITUATION IN A CHAOTIC STATE
AFTER REFORM VOTE FAILURE
Inside Ukraine Newsletter, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wednesday, April 14, 2004
3. RADA FAILS TO PASS CONSTITUTIONAL-REFORM BILL
Compiled by Jan Maksymiuk,` RFE/RL, Belarus and Ukraine Report
Prague, Czech Republic, Tuesday, April 13, 2004
4. "THE DEFEAT OF DEMOCRACY"
Veteran Ukrainian human rights activist Volodymyr Malynkovych
believes that democracy lost on the day constitutional reform was defeated.
By Volodymyr Malynkovych
Ukrayinska Pravda web site, Kiev, Ukraine, in Russian 9 Apr 04
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Apr 12, 2004
5. CHEVRON TEXACO MULLS JOINT VENTURE TO BUILD AND
OPERATE MAJOR PIPELINE EXTENSION ACROSS POLAND
Transport oil from Caspain region, across Ukraine, Poland to world markets.
By Kamil Tchorek, Warsaw Business Journal
Warsaw, Poland, Tuesday, April 13, 2004
6. "REVOLT IN KUT ECHOES IN UKRAINE"
Pressure for Troop Pullout Builds as Mission Turns Deadly
By Peter Baker, Washington Post Foreign Service
The Washington Post, Washington, D.C.
Tuesday, April 13, 2004; Page A16
7. "I WILL NOT BE AN EASY PREY FOR THE GHOULS!"
Interview with Ukraine's Lviv Region council head Mykhaylo Sendak
By Oleh Lyashko, Svoboda, Kiev, in Ukrainian 6 Apr 04; p 5
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Apr 12, 2004
8. JOURNALIST BEATEN IN COURT IN EASTERN UKRAINE
Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian, 10 Apr 04
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Apr 10, 2004
9. SURVEY: PERVASIVE CORRUPTION AND WEAK JUDICIARY
ARE KEY OBSTACLES TO DEMOCRACY STATES FREEDOM HOUSE
Freedom House, New York, New York, April 6, 2004
10. ORPHANS' AID SOCIETY (OAS)
You can become a sponsor for a Ukrainian orphan child in need
INFORMATION: Orphans' Aid Society (OAS)
Little Neck, New York, April 2004
11. RESPONSE TO "MYTHS ABOUT CANADA'S UKRAINIAN DIASPORA"
By Dr. Denis Hlynka, Acting Director
Centre for Ukrainian Canadian Studies, University of Manitoba
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada, April 14, 2004
RE: Response to Dr. Taras Kuzio's OP-ED article "Myths About Canada's
Ukrainian Diaspora," published by the Kyiv Post, Kyiv, Ukraine, April 7,
2004 and republished by The Action Ukraine Report-2004, Number 56,
article number 14, April 8, 2004.
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ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-2004, No. 59 ARTICLE NUMBER ONE
Politics and Governance, Building a Strong, Democratic Ukraine
http://www.artukraine.com/buildukraine/index.htm
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1. RUSSIA SEES UKRAINE AS ITS NEAREST PARTNER
In geopolitical terms and in our strategic view of Europe's
future and the world order in general, states Russia's foreign minister.
Interfax-Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, April 13, 2004
KYIV - Russia's foreign minister on Tuesday said Moscow sees Kyiv as its
closest partner, and called for deeper dialogue between the two countries.
"We consider Ukraine as our nearest partner, not only in geopolitical terms,
but in our strategic view of Europe's future, and the world order in
general," Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said during talks with
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kostiantyn Hryschenko in Kyiv.
Lavrov arrived on a one-day official visit to Ukraine on Tuesday.
"We expect to discuss these problems today and define specific ways of
interaction," the Russian minister said, adding that dialogue between
Ukraine and Russia should be deeper.
Talks between delegations from the two countries are continuing at
Ukraine's Foreign Ministry. (END)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOTE: Russia is so large and rich it does not actually need partners in the
sense that Russia keeps pushing with Ukraine. All such partners with Russia
automatically become junior partners. One cannot be an equal partner with
Russia. All such llong-run partnerships with Russia will benefit Russia far
more than any one of the partners. Watch out for Russia's bear hugs!
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ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-2004, No. 59 ARTICLE NUMBER TWO
Politics and Governance, Building a Strong, Democratic Ukraine
http://www.artukraine.com/buildukraine/index.htm
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2. UKRAINIAN POLITICAL SITUATION IN A CHAOTIC STATE
AFTER REFORM VOTE FAILURE
Inside Ukraine Newsletter, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wednesday, April 14, 2004
KYIV - The long Easter weekend seems to have brought little more in the way
of clarity to the political situation in Ukraine that resulted from the
failure on Thursday of the constitutional reform amendments to gain enough
votes for approval. While the road ahead seems no clearer - and that
situation may obtain for quite some time - information from a variety of
parliamentary and administration sources has begun to at least clarify the
set of circumstances that led to the result they did not expect.
Reports indicate that most of the major pro-presidential players involved
began last Thursday with very high expectations that before the sun set that
day the president would have gotten the 300 votes he needed to gain a
qualified constitutional majority for the amendment package that would strip
the office of the president of much of its power and, at least in theory,
allow him to continue to rule or strongly influence the rule of the country
through a strengthened Verkhovna Rada.
There are widespread reports that the expectations came asunder in day-long
extremely heated and frantic negotiations between top administration
figures, including the president, and highly placed figures in the Rada over
specific concessions that were to be traded for positive votes on the reform
package. Those asking for commitment on certain issues saw this as possibly
the last opportunity they might ever have to gain the advantages they wanted
and were unwilling to compromise without gaining president assent to their
desires.
Also, the successful insistence by Socialist faction head Oleksandr Moroz
that the reforms must carry a further amendment delaying their
implementation until after the presidential elections was thought to have
played a significant role in the lower vote count for the reforms.
In addition to those negotiations in which Viktor Medvedchuk was involved,
there are unconfirmed rumors that the president himself was involved
directly or indirectly with negotiations with Viktor Yushchenko's 'Our
Ukraine' faction on an agreement that could have tipped the presidential
election toward Yushchenko, while at the same time meeting some of Kuchma's
need for peaceful and unfettered retirement.
In fact, some Moscow news outlets have alleged since Thursday that there was
a Kuchma-Yushchenko deal. However, neither side will confirm such a deal and
the evidence suggests that such a deal was not concluded.
What is clear is that the Yushchenko forces have good grounds for their
charges that the pro-presidential forces have concealed something like 10
billion hryvnia in the 2004 budget that could be available to support either
a Kuchma campaign or the campaign of someone who would have Kuchma's
political blessings.
So far the unknowns seem to far outweigh the known factors in the developing
political equation in regard to the presidential race. However, some things
appear certain.
First, there is a consensus that the constitutional reforms as contained in
the package voted on Thursday are dead for this session of the Rada. No one
expects the Social Democrat claims of an improperly operation of the
electronic voting system or any other such stratagem to be successful. Some
matters that require only a simple majority of 226 votes in favor will need
to be dealt with in order to complete election preparations. However, the
major rules and procedures concerning the presidential vote are expected to
be unchanged.
Secondly, if there can be said to be a recognizable winner of Thursday's
vote, it was probably Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych who now has the
added incentive for running a strong campaign because he knows that the
powers of the presidential office will not have been decimated by the reform
amendments.
Finally, the depth's to which Ukraine's major national media have fallen has
been aptly demonstrated by the confusion following the reform vote. All
major outlets, particularly television, have been remarkably silent on the
issue since they seem to have no clear instructions from a somewhat
dispirited and confused presidential administration. Coming to conclusions
and opinions without presidential guidance seems to be a skill that the
complacent major media has lost, at least for the time being.
One newspaper, Kievskiy Telegraf, alleges that on Thursday after the reform
vote, several of the members of the Donetsk-oriented Regions of Ukraine
faction were heard ordering their assistants to make reservations at some of
Kyiv's most luxurious restaurants for very lavish meals, apparently feeling
that the failed reform amendment vote was very good news for the future of
Donetsk and the putative Donetsk standard bearer. (END)
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ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-2004, No. 59: ARTICLE NUMBER THREE
Check Out the News Media for the Latest News From and About Ukraine
Daily News Gallery: http://www.artukraine.com/newsgallery.htm
=========================================================
3. RADA FAILS TO PASS CONSTITUTIONAL-REFORM BILL
Compiled by Jan Maksymiuk, RFE/RL, Belarus and Ukraine Report
Prague, Czech Republic, Tuesday, April 13, 2004
UKRAINE - The Verkhovna Rada on 8 April voted on a controversial
constitutional-reform bill, falling six votes short of the 300 votes
required for approval. The bill was supported by 294 lawmakers from the
pro-government coalition, the Communist Party, and the Socialist Party, as
well as by some independent deputies.
The opposition Our Ukraine and Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc, which did not
take part in the vote, met its result with jubilation and sang the Ukrainian
national anthem in the session hall. "[The vote was] possibly one of the
first victories of the democratic forces in this parliament," Interfax
quoted Our Ukraine leader Viktor Yushchenko as saying. Yushchenko, who is
the most popular contender approaching the 31 October presidential ballot,
staunchly opposed the bill that provided for significant cuts in the
president's powers. "This is not a victory of the opposition, this is a
failure of the authorities," Stepan Havrysh, coordinator of the
parliamentary pro-government majority, commented shortly after the abortive
vote.
However, a few hours later, following a conference with presidential
administration chief Viktor Medvedchuk, who is widely believed to be the
main architect of the constitutional reforms, Havrysh changed tack. Havrysh
said on Inter Television that the Verkhovna Rada will hold a repeat vote on
the constitutional reforms since, he argued, lawmakers voted not for bill
No. 4105, which provided for these reforms, but for unregistered bill No.
1674-4, which was announced by speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn before the vote.
To support his argument, Havrysh quoted a relevant passage from the official
minutes of the session that actually mentioned Lytvyn proposing bill No.
1674-4 for the vote.
Verkhovna Rada staff subsequently explained that the numbers 4105
and 1674-4 refer to the same piece of legislation -- under the first the
constitutional-reform bill is registered with the Verkhovna Rada, under the
second it is registered with the Justice Ministry. However, the bill
submitted to the vote on 8 April included an addendum by Socialist Party
leader Oleksandr Moroz stipulating that the legislation will come into force
only after the 2004 presidential election. In other words, the bill was
somewhat different from the one endorsed by the Constitutional Court last
month, following its preliminary approval in December and February.
Moreover, the Verkhovna Rada on 7 April adopted a procedure for
voting on the constitutional-reform bill that banned the introduction of any
amendments to it during its second and final reading. Thus, there are formal
reasons for the pro-government coalition to demand a repeat vote. True, it
is not clear yet whether the constitutional restriction forbidding the
amendment of the country's constitution twice within the same year may be
applied to the 8 April vote.
It is another question whether the parliamentary pro-government
coalition will actually push for a repeat vote. Some Ukrainian observers
argue that after 8 April the number of supporters of the constitutional
reforms in the Ukrainian parliament can only be less than 294. According to
this line of reasoning, some of the pro-government and independent deputies
who were elected under a first-past-the-post system in 2002 did not appear
in the session hall on 8 April or voted against the constitutional-reform
bill, thus withstanding the pressure reportedly applied upon them by the
presidential administration.
They purportedly disliked not only the pressure but also the
all-proportional parliamentary-election law that was adopted last month as
the pro-government coalition's concession to buy support for the
constitutional reforms from the Socialist and Communist parties. Thus, there
is absolutely no reason for those deputies to be more enthusiastic about the
constitutional reforms after 8 April.
Whatever the final outcome of the constitutional-reform controversy
in Ukraine, it is already perfectly clear that the essentially democratic
proposals in the reform bill -- the presidency with fewer powers as well as
a stronger government and parliament -- have been pursued by the forces
grouped around President Leonid Kuchma as a way for preserving the positions
of the antidemocratic ruling elites in the country. Faced with the threat of
losing the presidential election on 31 October to Our Ukraine leader Viktor
Yushchenko, the pro-Kuchma camp devised the reforms that would strip the
presidency of several important prerogatives and shift the center of power
toward the government controlled by the current political establishment.
The position of Yushchenko in the constitutional-reform dispute is
also far from crystal clear and honest. Yushchenko advertised a
constitutional reform as one of his main programmatic goals before the 2002
parliamentary elections, but has abandoned the idea after opinion polls
began to suggest that he may win the 2004 presidential ballot. His main
slogan now is not to change the defective power system but to replace
defective people in power. Which, of course, does not provide an unambiguous
answer to the question whether he will return to reforming this system once
he and his people take control of it.
If the constitutional reform collapses completely, then the 2004
presidential-election campaign may be one of the harshest and toughest
political campaigns in the country. The political stakes will be very high
indeed. It is not out of the question that Kuchma may choose to run for the
post of president a third time. Such an option has been made possible for
him by a ruling of the Constitutional Court in December. Kuchma's popularity
is very low at present, and Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, who is
currently supported by some 15 percent of the electorate, seems better
equipped to challenge Yushchenko as the single candidate of the pro-Kuchma
camp.
However, many Ukrainian analysts assert that pro-Kuchma oligarchs are
very unlikely to unite behind Yanukovych against the Yushchenko threat.
According to them, they are likely to support Kuchma as a guarantor of the
stability and continuity of the current political establishment in the
country. Yanukovych in the post of president is for Ukrainian oligarchs
allegedly no less a risk than Yushchenko himself. (Jan Maksymiuk) (END)
=========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-2004, No. 59: ARTICLE NUMBER FOUR
Major Articles About What is Going on in Ukraine
Current Events Gallery: http://www.artukraine.com/events/index.htm
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4. "THE DEFEAT OF DEMOCRACY"
Veteran Ukrainian human rights activist Volodymyr Malynkovych
believes that democracy lost on the day constitutional reform was defeated
By Volodymyr Malynkovych
Ukrayinska Pravda web site, Kiev, Ukraine, in Russian 9 Apr 04
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Apr 12, 2004
The Ukrainian parliament rejected the constitutional reform backed by the
presidential administration on 8 April. Veteran human rights activist
Volodymyr Malynkovych, who is the secretary of the governmental commission
for the reform, believes that democracy lost on that day.
The opposition Our Ukraine stood against the reform aimed at strengthening
parliament vis-a-vis the president only because its leader, Viktor
Yushchenko, is believed to be the frontrunner in the forthcoming
presidential campaign, Malynkovych said in his article. Ukraine lacks
political forces that put democracy above their private goals, Malynkovych
believes.
The following is the text of Malynkovych's article, posted on the Ukrayinska
Pravda web site on 9 April and entitled "The defeat of democracy";
subheadings have been inserted editorially:
Yesterday my team - the team that wants to see the power system
democratized - lost. Although it seemed that victory was quite close (we
were only short of six votes), the defeat was not a matter of chance.
SELF-INTEREST TRIUMPHED OVER PRINCIPLE
Everything was natural. In our country there are no political forces that
regard the interests of democracy as being more important than their own
ambitions.
The most consistent people in conducting constitutional reform were,
undoubtedly, [Oleksandr] Moroz's Socialists. I doubt, however, that that
party's stance over the anti-Semitic items in the [opposition-leaning]
newspaper Silski Visti can be regarded as consistently democratic.
When the question of proportional elections to parliament was being
discussed, Moroz did, I think, make a mistake when he refused to support the
amendment tabled by an PDP [People's Democratic Party] MP (on two party
lists), saying that it ran counter to the overall blueprint.
The amendment received 214 votes. The Socialists too would have voted for
it, and then yesterday's vote would have been quite different. At least some
of the "offended" single-seat MPs whose votes were lost yesterday by the
reformists would have voted for it.
As for Moroz's position at the last stage of the reform struggle, it seems
to me to be impeccable.
Evidently, if the Constitutional Court was ready to agree to a change in the
date on which the whole law came into effect, it would not have objected to
the governors' being appointed by the prime minister after the
[parliamentary] elections in 2006. The stipulation about the imperative
mandate [when MPs are forbidden to swap factions] could have been shifted to
the "Transitional Provisions" by restricting its application to a single
convocation. The clause about the new powers of the Prosecutor's Office
could have been deleted.
I think that the scenario whereby the Constitutional Court might have
required a bill that had been voted on to undergo a re-examination by
experts is unlikely, but its outcome is easy to forecast. The version of
bill No 4105 proposed by Moroz is not at variance with Article 157 of our
constitution.
But Moroz was let down by his erstwhile opposition colleagues, who had the
most to gain from such amendments. They failed to back him and wrecked the
vote. Why? Because wrecking the vote was all that they wanted - at any
price.
Only the terminology of the "Our Ukrainians" [i.e. the members of
Yushchenko's centre-right opposition bloc Our Ukraine] is democratic; in
fact, they are not in the least opposed to Saakashvili-style authoritarian
rule, so long as a "good" president (i.e. one from their own ranks) sits in
the presidential chair. So they are pleased to greet yesterday's enemies as
heroes simply because they did not vote for reform (for purely selfish
motives), thereby giving their presidential candidate a chance of
authoritarian rule.
But Yushchenko is, I stress, only a candidate at the moment, and it will
certainly not be easy for him to win the elections. His opponent ([Prime
Minister Viktor] Yanukovych, let's say) now has additional incentives to
fight (all out!) for the president's chair: the winner's powers will be
almost unlimited. What is more, the Communist electorate (some 20 per cent
of all voters) will, under no circumstances, cast their votes for Yushchenko
following the latest public battles between their MPs and the "Our
Ukrainians". So the outlook is still vague.
Contrary to the view of those who support our present constitution, I think
that it is completely lopsided. At any moment, the president can, without
parliament's consent, dismiss the prime minister (Article 106, Part 9). Let
us imagine for a moment that the president's chair is occupied not by
Yushchenko but by Yanukovych, whereas the parliamentary elections of 2006
are won by the opposition (a perfectly credible scenario under a
proportional electoral system).
Can anyone doubt that Yanukovych will not make use of his constitutional
right to dismiss the prime minister and later to dissolve parliament too, if
the government acts against his personal and clan interests?
It has to be said that the "Our Ukrainians" have not, to put it mildly, been
very skilful in stringing along the politically unsophisticated man in the
street with democratic blandishments. They started their speeches with
statements to the effect that it was a great sin to modify our marvellous
constitution, and ended by saying that they were prepared to amend it, but
only when Kuchma was not in power.
I make no mention of the speeches of our Joan of Arc [reference to radical
opposition leader Yuliya Tymoshenko, an ally of Yushchenko], since all the
texts there are intended for consumption by the street crowd and by no one
else. Yet one feels somehow embarrassed for [opposition MP] Anatoliy
Matviyenko [of Tymoshenko's faction]. After all, he knows what's what and
seems to be sincerely interested in constitutional reform.
However, Yushchenko and [ex-deputy prime minister Viktor] Pynzenyk still
have the time to convince sceptics that they really want to change the power
system and that Our Ukraine's behaviour when voting for a proportional
electoral system and for bill No 4105 was just a tactical step and nothing
more.
It will be a simple matter to make us change our minds. Yushchenko will have
to put in his election manifesto not an abstract statement about his
readiness to do everything that is recorded in the opposition foursome's
memorandum, but a specific commitment to implement a programme for the
transition to a parliamentary-presidential republic after the parliamentary
elections in 2006.
In other words, if he wins the presidential elections, Yushchenko must
initiate parliament's consideration of a new version of the constitutional
amendments in the spring of 2005, so that the law is finally adopted at the
autumn-winter session of that year.
That will be the best indication of his sincerity. It is extremely hard to
believe in Our Ukraine's democratic spirit without it.
DANGER SIGNALS IGNORED
Now for the other members of the cast of yesterday's political show.
[Petro] Symonenko's Communists, undoubtedly, wanted reform to be carried
out. But, believing in the Soviet tradition of a rigid vertical power
structure, they were convinced that the master (in this case, the president)
had issued an order and the party had to obediently carry it out. But times
have changed. Even in his own party, one MP (Borys Oliynyk), after,
evidently, inhaling too much of the tainted air of bourgeois democracy in
Strasbourg, ventured to disobey the order from the politburo.
In the "majority" camp there were never any like-minded people at all. They
were ready to submit only out of fear or for their own selfish interests.
But Kuchma is no longer what he was. He is on his way out and so is not so
intimidating, but the interests of the single-seat MPs have been dealt a
crushing blow. So a reply from them was to be expected. Who would flee to
another bloc, who would move aside completely, and who would try not to
take part in the decisive vote?
Such are the realities. But our Communists live in the past and do not
notice the realities of today even when they are staring them in the face.
Accordingly, it was they who sharply resisted the amendments to the bill on
proportional elections and so wrecked the vote on 8 April.
The Social Democrats, who also seemed to have an interest in reform, might
have saved the day. If they had supported the amendment from [Viktor]
Musiyaka's group or PDP [People's Democratic Party] MPs, the situation
might have changed (the Communists would have had no choice but to vote
for the bill they needed).
All the more so since they could have been made to understand the real
balance of forces and could have been persuaded to see that, if no
concessions were made, reform might founder. [Presidential chief of staff
Viktor] Medvedchuk did not do that. He was certain (as, I think, was
[Stepan] Havrysh [coordinator of the parliamentary majority]) that all the
majority MPs could be lined up to order and made to vote "as required".
He was used to "getting his own way" and was unwilling to look carefully at
life's realities or listen to the advice of sober-minded people. Medvedchuk
and Havrysh lost out and wrecked a very important cause. Consequently, it
seems to me that it might be no bad thing if the president took a look at
how they "measure up to their job specifications", to put it
bureaucratically.
In short, among those who had, apparently, vowed to vote for constitutional
reform, convinced advocates of democracy were, clearly, in the minority. For
the majority of them, there was nothing to be gained from political
democracy. So the majority MPs, three-quarters of whom got into parliament
via single-seat constituencies, endeavoured to avoid taking part in the vote
under any pretext. Some of them pulled it off.
So a defeat in the vote was on the cards. This author has repeatedly written
about that possibility (notably in Ukrayinska Pravda of 26 March).
Ukrayinska Pravda has to be given its due: it even accurately forecast the
number of those who would vote in favour - 294.
No natural victory could be assumed. But there was a chance. And I awaited
the result of the vote with bated breath. I hoped. But it was not to be.
Amendments to be reconsidered in a year's time
Even so, the two-year struggle for political reform has not been in vain.
Today the subject is on everyone's lips. All the leading political forces
promise to reform the power system, and I do not think they will be able to
renege on those promises.
There have been some very tangible successes. If the majority MPs had had
nothing to gain from constitutional reform, they would never have agreed to
vote for the democratic law "On the elections for the president of Ukraine"
and for the proportional system for elections in the centre and in the
localities, which is particularly important.
That is a very great success. I am certain that the proportional electoral
law will prevent the current "parties of power" from gaining a majority in
parliament in 2006. This means that a new stage in the struggle for
democracy in Ukraine will begin after those elections.
As for statements from majority MPs to the effect that they voted for the
wrong bill yesterday, so that another attempt can still be made to take a
vote on bill No 4105, that is utter nonsense. Article 158 of the
constitution states: "A bill to amend the constitution of Ukraine that has
been considered by the Supreme Council of Ukraine and has not been passed
may be submitted to the Supreme Council of Ukraine no sooner than a year
after the day on which the decision on the bill was taken." [Quotation in
Ukrainian]
Was bill No 4105 considered during this session? No doubt about it. The
amendment that was made had no effect on the bill's real substance. So it
will not be possible to return to a consideration of the draft law on
redistributing the powers of the power structures before 9 April 2005. Lose
with good grace, gentlemen. One cannot violate the law - even for the sake
of a noble cause. (END)
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ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-2004, No. 59: ARTICLE NUMBER FIVE
Exciting Opportunities in Ukraine for Travel and Tourism
Travel and Tourism Gallery: http://www.ArtUkraine.com/tourgallery.htm
===========================================================
5. CHEVRON TEXACO MULLS JOINT VENTURE TO BUILD AND
OPERATE MAJOR PIPELINE EXTENSION ACROSS POLAND
Transport oil from Caspian region, across Ukraine, Poland to world markets.
By Kamil Tchorek, Warsaw Business Journal
Warsaw, Poland, Tuesday, April 13, 2004
WARSAW - A long-anticipated project to build a pipeline extension across
this country to transport oil from the Caspian region to world markets now
has a chance of attracting major commitment from Chevron Texaco.
The American energy giant is in Poland this month to discuss the formation
of a joint venture company to construct and operate the project later this
year.
The project is expected to cost zl.1.4 billion (?300 million) and will take
until the end of the decade to complete.
This foreign direct investment (FDI) opportunity was only made possible
thanks to an essential bilateral agreement signed between Ukraine and Poland
in February. Before the agreement, energy experts pointed to a very real
threat that the project would be stalled by Russian lobbyists, who have
seemingly lost influence to their American counterparts.
The existing 674-km, one meter diameter pipeline, running from the Ukrainian
port of Odessa on the Black Sea to Brody near the Polish border in western
Ukraine, was completed, together with a terminal at Yuzhny, in May 2002. It
currently has the capacity to transport up to 14.5 million tons of oil per
year.
This is now set to be extended as far as Plock in Poland and from there to
Gdansk. Once the massive infrastructure project is completed, oil will be
shipped from the Georgian coast to Odessa, piped to Gdansk and then shipped
on to Western Europe and the rest of the world.
However, a Russian plan envisages a 'reverse supply' solution, whereby the
extension to Poland would never be built, and Russian oil from Siberia would
instead be piped south to Odessa, and then shipped on from there to world
markets.
In the words of Ilan Berman, vice-president for policy at the American
Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC, "Since the Odessa-Brody issue
has less to do with output than with controlling Ukraine's economic and
political independence, Russia has continued to press for reversal."
Indeed, the Russian 'reverse supply' solution has seemingly irrational
aspects to it, such as the chronic congestion of the Bosphorus Straits that
would barely be able to host a surge in tanker traffic caused by the supply
of Siberian crude from Odessa.
Russia currently enjoys a relatively monopolistic position in Eurasian
energy, controlling the pipelines from major new oil finds in Kazakhstan and
Azerbaijan to the rest of the world. A pipeline route that omitted Russia
would work in favour of the world's big oil consumers in America and Western
Europe, offering price competition and a degree of choice.
"Multiple pipelines are more competitive than single pipelines. The interest
of the USA and the EU and in Central and Eastern Europe is to have multiple
sources of supply," says Joseph Stanislaw, vice-president of Cambridge
Energy Research Associates. "Multiple routes enable the consumer competitive
opportunities that enable economic growth in the resource-using areas. If
you are the producer, you'd rather have total control."
One major influence group is the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) which is
constantly looking for cheaper ways to get Caspian oil to major world
markets. "The Russian mindset is very different," argues Stanislaw. "They
can charge a lot for their transportation, except that Russia does not own
the resources they are trying to move across. Russia has an economic
interest in who owns the pipeline."
It is precisely to preserve the project by placating as many interested
parties as possible that Polish pipeline operator PERN has invited some as
yet unnamed Russian energy companies into the joint venture with Chevron
Texaco. "A climate is being created," PERN President Stanislaw Jakubowski
told the press. "We have been talking to Chevron... we have also invited
some Russian companies to join the project."
The momentum for securing the direction of oil flow north from Odessa rather
than south to Odessa is also being maintained by a number of local
downstream developments. Although the existing pipeline ends in Brody,
within two months oil will be piped there, siphoned into tankers and
transported to refineries in southern Poland. A demonstrable demand and
supply chain is said to be vital in securing finance for the massive
infrastructure project.
"In May or June, the transport of light crude oil should begin," Oleksadnr
Todiychuk, president of Ukrtransnafta, the Odessa-Brody operator, told the
press.
Cezary Filipowicz of Uktransnafta's Poland division added that in recent
days his company has secured an arrangement where Caspian crude transported
via Odessa will be refined in Kralupy in the Czech Republic. "This is a very
good signal to investors," Filipowicz says. "It shows that the Odessa-Brody
pipeline makes sense."
At a recent conference in Warsaw, Nursultan Nazarbayev, president of
Kazakhstan, the biggest supplier country of the Caspian region, discussed
the progress of the Polish side of the project with the national oil
companies of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Ukraine, as well as
multinationals such as ConocoPhillips, Shell, Channoil and Chevron.
Ilan Berman maintains that the extension of the Odessa-Brody pipeline to
Plock and eventually Gdansk could still be disrupted. "With Ukrainian
President Leonid Kuchma again under fire politically - this time as a result
of a series of controversial constitutional amendments aimed at manipulating
the electoral process," argues Berman, "the current administration in Kiev
may find it tempting to turn once again to the Kremlin to broker its
continued legitimacy."
Berman also points out that America's increased military involvement with
Poland, which is likely to see U.S. military bases relocating from Germany,
coincides with Poland's increasingly strategic location in energy
geopolitics. In an article in Insight magazine Berman writes, "The
Odessa-Brody extension deal has positioned Poland to be a major energy hub
for new, non-OPEC and non-Russian crude from Central Asia." (END)
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ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-2004, No. 59: ARTICLE NUMBER SIX
The Story of Ukraine's Long and Rich Culture
Ukrainian Culture Gallery: http://www.ArtUkraine.com/cultgallery.htm
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6. "REVOLT IN KUT ECHOES IN UKRAINE"
Pressure for Troop Pullout Builds as Mission Turns Deadly
By Peter Baker, Washington Post Foreign Service
The Washington Post, Washington, D.C.
Tuesday, April 13, 2004; Page A16
KIEV, Ukraine, April 12 -- As mortar shells fell around them, a detachment
of Ukrainian soldiers beat a hasty retreat last week, abandoning the Iraqi
city of Kut to insurgents in a significant setback to the U.S.-led
occupation forces.
With one of their own dead and five others injured, the Ukrainians pulled
back to the relative security of a base camp outside the city. But that
wasn't far enough for many countrymen following news of the event from here.
As the revolt against the U.S.-led occupation in Iraq grew, so did pressure
to bring home Ukraine's 1,650 soldiers.
"It was one thing when we gave our troops the role of peacekeepers, and a
completely different thing when our troops found themselves in the very
center of a civil war by the people of Iraq," said Mykola Katerynchuk, a
leading opposition member of parliament from the Our Ukraine bloc, which is
pushing to withdraw the nation's troops from Iraq. "As it turns out, we
completely misunderstood our role in that country."
With the fourth-largest contingent among U.S. allies in the occupation force
behind Britain, Italy and Poland, Ukraine reflects the stresses and emotions
evident in most of the three dozen nations with troops in Iraq. Street
protests against military deployments have erupted in Japan, Australia and
South Korea. Opposition parties or newspapers in Poland, Italy, Bulgaria,
Hungary, Australia, South Korea, Latvia and Thailand have called for troop
withdrawals. Parents of soldiers met with Bulgaria's president on Monday to
beg him to save their sons.
Since Spain's incoming Socialist prime minister announced a withdrawal of
his country's troops if the United Nations did not take over the military
operation, the United States has sought to persuade Ukraine and other
nations to keep their troops in Iraq. Although forces from most of those
nations have not played a significant military role, U.S. officials say
their presence is a symbol of support for Bush administration policies in
Iraq.
So far, most U.S. allies in Iraq have vowed to stay the course, with varying
degrees of determination. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi of Japan has
resisted demands to call forces home despite the kidnapping of three
Japanese civilians. Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain, which has 10,000
troops deployed in southern Iraq, offered a spirited defense of its Iraq
policy over the weekend, while Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi of Italy
paid a surprise visit to his forces in Iraq to demonstrate his resolve.
South Korea on Monday reaffirmed its commitment to dispatch 3,600 troops
to the Kurdish region of northern Iraq despite the unrest of the last week.
Foreign Minister Ban Ki Moon told reporters in Seoul that although the
situation in Iraq had grown worse than expected, there was "no possibility
of change" in the deployment plan.
But others appear increasingly apprehensive about events. Kazakhstan's
defense minister last week said his nation would withdraw its 30 troops,
only to be contradicted later by a government statement that said a decision
would be based on security considerations. The Philippines said it would
defer a decision on a pullout until it could reevaluate its deployment.
Hungary and Thailand held out the possibility of removing their troops if
conditions in Iraq worsened.
"Bulgaria will be there. So far," Zlatin Traupkov, the Bulgarian president's
secretary for foreign policy, said by telephone on Friday. "There is no
political decision for withdrawal from operations," he said.
President Bush called Berlusconi and the presidents of Poland and El
Salvador on Friday to shore up support. Vice President Cheney is traveling
in Japan and South Korea, where he is encouraging perseverance despite the
kidnappings of their citizens.
In addition to the U.S. military force of about 135,000, 34 countries have
contributed a total of 26,500 troops to the Iraq occupation force. Most of
them are engaged in humanitarian or peacekeeping efforts.
The Ukrainians arrived last year with no tanks or heavy weaponry -- but
plenty of defective helmets -- anticipating the sort of policing activities
they performed in the former Yugoslavia in recent years. The soldiers
volunteered for the duty to collect far larger paychecks and receive better
training. Many of them were deployed in Kut, about 100 miles southeast of
Baghdad, and elsewhere in Wasit province, manning checkpoints and
destroying old ammunition depots.
Maj. Gen. Leonid Holopatiuk, a top officer on the Ukrainian general staff
and head of the military's Euro-Atlantic cooperation department,
acknowledged that the mission has changed dramatically in recent days.
"The majority of our contingent in Iraq was ready for a more classic
peacekeeping mission," he said in an interview. But he added, "The question
of withdrawal is not on the table. . . . If we start to withdraw our troops
under the pressure of such actions, as we saw in Spain, what was the use to
start the whole operation? I think we have to go to the end."
The participation of Ukrainian troops has been particularly important for
President Leonid Kuchma in repairing relations with the United States, which
were strained two years ago by allegations that Ukraine had sold Saddam
Hussein, then Iraq's president, a sophisticated $100 million radar system.
Although Kuchma denied the charge, the FBI authenticated an audiotape
smuggled out of the country by a former bodyguard on which the president
allegedly authorized the sale.
Kuchma's domestic opponents now accuse him of sacrificing Ukrainian soldiers
for the sake of business backers who value ties with the United States. "The
people of Ukraine demand the withdrawal of our troops while the ones who
make the decisions don't want to accept this because it will spoil their
financial position," the leader of the country's Communist Party, Petro
Symonenko, said in an interview.
Symonenko pushed for a vote in parliament on Friday to withdraw the troops,
but the president's supporters thwarted the move.
With elections looming in October, the issue seems certain to remain hot.
"The troops in Iraq might become part of the political struggle in Ukraine
against the backdrop of the presidential campaign," said Sergei Zgurets, a
military and political analyst here. "That's where we are now." (END)
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http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A6482-2004Apr12.html
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ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-2004, No. 59: ARTICLE NUMBER SEVEN
The Genocidal Famine in Ukraine 1932-1933, HOLODOMOR
Genocide Gallery: http://www.artukraine.com/famineart/index.htm
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7. "I WILL NOT BE AN EASY PREY FOR THE GHOULS!"
Interview with Ukraine's Lviv Region council head Mykhaylo Sendak
By Oleh Lyashko, Svoboda, Kiev, in Ukrainian 6 Apr 04; p 5
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Monday, Apr 12, 2004
Lviv Region council head Mykhaylo Sendak has said he is not going to resign
despite pressure from top state officials. Speaking in a newspaper
interview, Sendak said Ukrainian first deputy tax chief Serhiy Medvedchuk
and the United Social Democratic Party headed by his brother, presidential
administration chief Viktor Medvedchuk, are intent on having the council
head dismissed.
They were behind embezzlement and fraud charges filed against him, Sendak
said. He added he was also offered compensation if he ceased to oppose them.
However, he and the Lviv Region council would continue to expose "illegal"
activities pursued by the party's leadership, Sendak said.
The following is the text of the interview Mykhaylo Sendak gave to Oleh
Lyashko, published in the Ukrainian pro-opposition newspaper Svoboda on 6
April under the title "I will not be an easy prey for the ghouls!";
subheadings have been inserted editorially:
As Svoboda has already reported, when moving to Kiev to take the post of
first deputy head of the State Tax Administration earlier this year, [the
brother of the Ukrainian presidential administration chief, Viktor
Medvedchuk, Serhiy] Medvedchuk Jr predicted that his old opponent, Lviv
Region council chairman Mykhaylo Sendak, would resign "of his own accord" by
the end of the first quarter. On 1 April, Svoboda's correspondent met Mr
Chairman in one of Kiev's hospitals, where he was last week, and took an
exclusive interview.
CONFLICT WITH MEDVEDCHUKS
[Lyashko] Mr Sendak, have you resigned as was announced by Medvedchuk?
[Sendak] No, I am not going to do this. As long ago as in February, my
opponents in the United Social Democratic Party of Ukraine [USDPU, led by
Viktor Medvedchuk] alleged that they had collected over 50 council members'
signatures to demand my resignation. So last Tuesday [30 March] I attempted
to hold a session of the regional council in Lviv where I proposed
deliberating on this issue. Yet council members of the faction led by
Medvedchuk Jr [Social Justice] did not turn up at the session, which blocked
its work. In view of this, after consulting with other council members I
decided to ask the parliamentary speaker [Volodymyr Lytvyn] to dissolve our
council.
[Lyashko] Back in February the USDPU accused you of committing "housing"
abuse. Where are you living now?
[Sendak] As before, I live in Drohobych [a town in Lviv Region]. I did not
spend a single day in a flat in Lviv bought for me using budget funds. I am
not going to move into it, although I am legally entitled to do this.
Incidentally, the flat was purchased at the insistence of USDPU council
members who later created a scandal around this.
[Lyashko] When did your problems with the USDPU begin?
[Sendak] In 2002. Immediately after I was elected chairman of the regional
council, I said that we were not going to be only an appendix to the
executive the way it had been in Lviv after Vyacheslav Chornovil [a
prominent right-wing Ukrainian opposition leader who died in a car crash in
1999] had left for Kiev.
The confrontation was aggravated by the tragedy on the Sknyliv airfield
[near Lviv, where a fighter jet crashed into a crowd of spectators during an
air show] in August 2002. Back then, contrary to the position of the then
governor, [Myron] Yankiv, we tried to tackle the issue of misspending
millions of hryvnyas allocated for the Sknyliv victims. After a session of
the regional council passed a vote of no confidence in Serhiy Medvedchuk in
June 2003 and demanded that he resign, the conflict came to a head.
[Lyashko] What would Medvedchuk and Co achieve by ousting you from your
post?
[Sendak] Today this "justice" group has almost everything in their hands
both in Lviv Region and elsewhere in the country: administrations, courts,
law-enforcement and tax agencies, customs and cash flows. Although it does
not have some serious levers of influence, the regional council is a serious
obstacle to them because its statements attract public attention to their
usually illegal activities. Why would USDPU guys need a chairman who
continuously rubs their nose in this?
CRIMINAL CHARGES DISMISSED
[Lyashko] As is customary in our country, the USDPU responded by accusing
you of committing crimes, didn't they?
[Sendak] Yes. First, the tax authorities accused a transport enterprise,
which I had run for 18 years before I was elected regional council chairman,
of misspending budget money and evading taxes. It was told to pay over 7m
hryvnyas [about 1.32m dollars] in fines. After we dismissed these charges in
courts of all instances, the Drohobych District prosecutor's office
initiated a criminal case on a fraud charge.
Currently, this case is being considered by the Prosecutor-General's Office,
and I do not know what is happening to it there. I stand accused of
fraudulently buying the transport enterprise shares without paying their
holders. I can assure you that these charges are absolutely unsubstantiated
and that I have never done anything like this.
[Lyashko] Yet you did buy the shares, didn't you?
[Sendak] In 1999. I did this to prevent the enterprise from being purchased
by then city mayor [Oleksiy] Radziyevskyy whose son had his eye on the
enterprise. When I moved to the regional council, I gave these shares to the
head of the [enterprise's] trade union. They did not yield any dividend
anyway. And then, what is wrong with buying these sorry shares? Why has this
fact not interested anybody for five years?
[Lyashko] If you believe there is nothing criminal about your actions and
the shares were paid for, you have nothing to worry about.
[Sendak] I wish it were like this! The transport enterprise's shareholders
who total over 600 people are being worked on by some 200 tax and police
officers. People are caught and brought to the prosecutor's office where
they are forced into confessing that I seized their shares by force,
threatening to sack them. The tax authorities offer money to many of them to
get them to say whatever is needed. There are a few people whom I sacked for
absenteeism and alcohol abuses who have already given necessary testimonies.
Nevertheless, hundreds of other people send me letters describing how they
are being pushed into giving false testimony.
[Lyashko] How will you act if the prosecutor's office asks the court to
issue an arrest warrant for you? You have no immunity [from prosecution].
[Sendak] For this to happen, there should be grounds, but there are none in
my case, as my lawyer Bohdan Ferents maintains. However, I do not rule out
that Medvedchuk can try this to subdue Lviv Region and the regional council,
which is able to prevent the planned rigging of the [31 October]
presidential election. I will defend myself with all the legal means
available to me because I have not done anything for which I should be
criminally prosecuted. I will not be an easy prey for these ghouls! I am not
going underground.
[Lyashko] An acquaintance of mine, now former Luhansk mayor Serhiy
Lukyanenko also said he would not give up. When he was detained here in Kiev
in November 2003, he even threatened he would slit his veins. Luhansk
governor [Oleksandr] Yefremov did to him what Medvedchuk wants to do to you.
At first, Lukyanenko faced criminal charges of tax evasion, then he was
removed from his post of mayor. After that he was jailed, and new elections
were held without him. Now that he is no longer dangerous, he has been set
free.
[Sendak] I assure you that I am not going to either slit my veins or commit
suicide in any other manner. Our task is to prevent usurpation of power by
the USDPU not only in Lviv Region but in the country at large. For this we
all have to be safe and well.
"LAVISH" OFFERS REJECTED
[Lyashko] You could have already solved all your problems if you had agreed
to your opponents' proposals.
[Sendak] Indeed, I have never been as poor as I am now, but I declined to
accept housing, a job in Kiev, any sum of money which were offered to me.
Following this, criminal charges were brought against me, and there are
attempts to sack my son who is employed by the Chernihiv prosecutor's
office. The Communist system is not even slightly comparable to what is
currently going on in our state!
[Lyashko] For how long are they going to be after you?
[Sendak] For as long as Medvedchuk Sr, who backs his younger brother in
every possible way, is head of the presidential administration. I am
prosecuted on dreamt-up charges which will crumble as soon as the USDPU
loses its grip on the law-enforcement agencies.
[Lyashko] Did you appeal in court against a decision to initiate a criminal
case?
[Sendak] Yes, as soon as we learnt of it. However, this appeal is still not
examined because the president is again reforming courts and they feel at a
loss. I should also note that I still do not properly know what charges
exactly were brought against me because the prosecutor's office denies me
and my lawyer access to case materials.
[Lyashko] How do your colleagues, council chairmen, respond to what is
happening to you?
[Sendak] In private conversations they are supportive of me, but they do not
dare to speak up because the same thing may happen to them.
[Lyashko] Thank you for the interview. I wish you the speediest recovery.
Stand firm! (END)
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ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-2004, No. 59: ARTICLE NUMBER NINE
Ukraine's History and the Long Struggle for Independence
Historical Gallery: http://www.artukraine.com/histgallery.htm
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8. JOURNALIST BEATEN IN COURT IN EASTERN UKRAINE
Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian, 10 Apr 04
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Apr 10, 2004
KIEV - Journalist Volodymyr Boyko has said he was beaten up by policemen in
the room of the Donetsk Kalininskyy district court, the public organization
Institute of Mass Information [the Ukrainian partner of the Reporters
Without Borders international human-rights organization] has said.
Boyko himself told the institute that on 9 April 2004 he came to the court
to make a report for the newspaper Svoboda from the courtroom, where the
case of the head of Svoboda's office in Donetsk Region, Mykhaylo Khaladzhi,
was being heard. But the judge called the police to turn him out of the
courtroom. The journalist refused to obey, saying the demand of the judge
was unlawful, as he came to carry out a task set by the editorial office and
the hearings were open.
After that, the policemen beat him up right in the courtroom and damaged his
notebook following an instruction of judge Olena Karpushova and of a deputy
prosecutor in Donetsk Region, Boyko said. [Passage omitted: description of
Boyko's minor injuries]
Svoboda's editor-in-chief Oleh Lyashko said the editorial office was going
to demand that criminal proceedings be launched into the case, the Institute
of Mass Information said.
Earlier, Svoboda published Boyko's reports on the Khaladzhi case, in
particular, the journalist's article saying that the documents on the case
included the minutes of a court hearing which was falsified, probably by
judge Karpushova.
Criminal proceedings were instituted against retired police Lt-Col Khaladzhi
after his interview with the [Donetsk-based opposition] newspaper Ostrov
about what Khaladzhi described as criminal business of Prosecutor-General
Henadiy Vasylyev's closest allies, the the Institute of Mass Information
said. (END)
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ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-2004, No. 59: ARTICLE NUMBER NINE
The Rich History of Ukrainian Art, Music, Pysanka, Folk-Art
Arts Gallery: http://www.artukraine.com/artgallery.htm
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9. SURVEY: PERVASIVE CORRUPTION AND WEAK JUDICIARY
ARE KEY OBSTACLES TO DEMOCRACY STATES FREEDOM HOUSE
Freedom House, New York, New York, April 6, 2004
NEW YORK - A Freedom House study released today finds that
pervasive corruption and weak judicial systems are major impediments to
the development of democracy in transitional societies.
The survey, titled Countries at the Crossroads, is the first of its
kind, providing a comparative assessment of thirty countries that are at
key points in their democratic development. In each case, it provides an
in-depth analysis of governmental effectiveness in creating sound
policies as well as evaluating the implementation of those policies.
"The findings in this new survey underscore the urgent need for
sustained policy attention and assistance to countries that are at a
crucial phase in their democratic evolution. These countries are at key
transition points, and to ignore their needs creates a risk of both
individual backsliding and regional democratic deterioration," said
Freedom House Executive Director Jennifer Windsor.
The countries examined by the survey were selected based on their
significance to the future of democracy in the Middle East, the
Americas, Asia, Africa, and the former Soviet Union.
"----------------------------------------------------"
NOTE: To read the what the report says about Ukraine click on:
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/crossroads/2004/Ukraine2004.pdf
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ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-2004, No. 59 ARTICLE NUMBER TEN
Politics and Governance, Building a Strong, Democratic Ukraine
http://www.artukraine.com/buildukraine/index.htm
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10. ORPHANS' AID SOCIETY (OAS)
You can become a sponsor for a Ukrainian orphan child in need
INFORMATION: Orphans' Aid Society (OAS)
Little Neck, New York, April 2004
Through the Orphans' Aid Society (OAS) , you can become a sponsor for a
Ukrainian child in need. The Society delivers financial assistance to orphan
children so that a relative or guardian can sustain them in their home in a
family environment. Your contributions of $15.00 per month not only provide
for basic needs but helps to keep these children out of public institutions.
The Society delivers your funds twice a year, in two $90.00 allotments and
checks in with the child. Your entire contribution -- 100% -- is delivered
to the orphan. The Society's administrative expenses are solicited
separately so we can ensure our sponsors that their orphan receives the full
stipend.
Since 1992, the OAS, a 501(c)(3) not-for-profit organization, has enriched
the lives of over 1300 children as well as sponsors all over the world.
These children are located in every oblast in Ukraine. Every oblast has at
least one coordinator who validates the needs, monitors progress and
interacts with the child and the family or guardian with whom the child
lives.
There are many such orphans now waiting for a sponsor. Can you open your
heart and share your blessings with at least one of them? We hope a sponsor
can be found to provide the minimal financial support ($180 per year) and
maintain contact with the child throughout her/his school years. We
encourage our orphans to write and we ensure delivery of letters to the
sponsors.
Our volunteer staff translate the letters, deliver the funds, organize
summer camps and workshops and in general contribute to improving the
lives of the children both spiritually and materially.
Please contact us for additional information on how you can become a
sponsor. Don't delay. Write or call us today:
ORPHANS' AID SOCIETY, INC.
Mary Jowyk, Founder and President
George Nesterczuk, Chairman of the Board
P.O. Box 630245
Little Neck, NY 11363 0245
tel: (718) 423 4966, fax: (718) 423 8885
e-mail: oasukraine@yahoo.com
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NOTE: Thanks to our good friend Chrystia Sonevytsky for bringing the
outstanding work of the Orphan's Aid Society, Inc.to our attention.
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ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-2004, No. 59: ARTICLE NUMBER ELEVEN
The Rich History of Ukrainian Art, Music, Pysanky, Folk-Art
Arts Gallery: http://www.artukraine.com/artgallery.htm
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11. RESPONSE TO "MYTHS ABOUT CANADA'S UKRAINIAN DIASPORA"
By Dr. Denis Hlynka, Acting Director
Centre for Ukrainian Canadian Studies, University of Manitoba
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada, April 14, 2004
RE: Response to Dr. Taras Kuzio's OP-ED article "Myths About Canada's
Ukrainian Diaspora," published by the Kyiv Post, Kyiv, Ukraine, April 7,
2004 and republished by The Action Ukraine Report-2004, Number 56,
article number 14, April 8, 2004.
A recent opinion piece by Taras Kuzio titled MYTHS ABOUT CANADA'S
UKRAINIAN DIASPORA, which has recently appeared (April 8, 2004) in
several in-print and on-line sources, deserves careful consideration,
analysis, and some rebuttal. Dr. David Marples is to be congratulated for
being first out of the post with such commentary.
As such, I will try to steer away from his points, and instead move in other
directions. Dr. Kuzio's argument reaches ultimately towards a discussion of
the mission and vision of the Ukrainian Canadian community in the 21st
century. These issues are not simple.
Of first concern is the very term diaspora. The word is fraught with
slippery multiple meanings. To use the term without being very clear about
who we are talking about is counter productive.
The clearest use of the term Diaspora according to Webster refers to the
Jewish dispersion. Obviously this is not us. A second use refers to those
individuals or groups who feel displaced and, who consider their main
allegiance to some country other than Canada, in this case, Ukraine. This is
probably the main group to which Kuzio refers.
A third definition, might include those who come from Ukraine and are, to
use an older term, "displaced persons", but have become in every sense of
the word Canadian.
A fourth, more suspect use of the term, would be an attempt to include every
second, third fourth or fifth generation Canadian with some Ukrainian
heritage as an automatic member of such a "diaspora". Or, perhaps a member
of some such diasporic community must identify themselves as such. Does one
consider Wayne Gretsky, Jordan TooToo, William Kurelyk, or Myrna Kostash
to belong to the Ukrainian diaspora? I suspect not, though their Ukrainian
heritage is undeniable. If one is of mixed background, and if we are a
nation of immigrants, can one belong to two or three diasporas?
The first question, then is "who is the diaspora?" Most Canadians with some
Ukrainian heritage are probably not members of such a diaspora, neither by
choice nor by default.
Second. Dr. Kuzio argues that Ukrainian Canadians have "minimal influence
federally". He means, I think, in terms of an ability to move Canadian
politicians to support issues related to Ukraine proper. In that sense, he
may be right. Indeed, when Anthony Hlynka served in the House of Commons
from 1940 to 1945, he argued that it was his duty to represent not only his
riding of Vegreville, but all Ukrainians in Canada, all Ukrainian displaced
persons stuck in Europe, and indeed all Ukrainians in Ukraine.
Hlynka often pointed out that at that point in time, he was the only
democratically elected Ukrainian in the entire world. As such, he felt it
was his duty to speak on behalf of all of them.
Today things have changed. Canadian members of parliament of whatever
heritage they claim have a first and foremost duty to their riding and to
their country. In this, Ukrainian Canadians continue to make great strides.
Three. Dr. Kuzio suggests a kind of "academic inertia" to be found in
universities and other Ukrainian Canadian organizations. He says
"there's been a general disinterest in contemporary Ukraine, at the same
time as there's been too much concentration on culture, Ukrainian history
and Ukrainian-Canadian history."
Interest in ones culture is normal and natural. Our culture is here. It is
difficult to measure what "too much concentration" means.
He says: "There is widespread disinterest in contemporary Ukrainian issues
in institutions such as. the Ukrainian Professional and Businesspersons
Association (UPBA).
Until the 1980s the UPBA was heavily involved in contemporary Ukrainian
issues, helping raise funds for the Ukrainian Studies chair at the
University of Toronto. Since the 1990s its interest in political topics has
dwindled, and today its primary focus is on organizing social events for its
members."
This is a question of mission statement. Each organization must be free to
choose its own mandate; each individual "votes for" that mandate by joining
or not joining. If the UPBA wishes to be a social club, that is quite
acceptable. Indeed the very name suggests an association of professionals
and business persons getting together for their own interests. If one wishes
to change their mandate, the way to do so is to become a member, to get on
the executive, and make suggestions!
Kuzio continues: "Ukrainian-Canadians are usually stunned to find out that
there is only one course on contemporary Ukraine offered in Canada. "
Somehow, I assume Dr. Kuzio is NOT referring to the courses offered at the
Centre for Ukrainian Canadian Studies at the University of Manitoba.
Although our Centre operates on a shoestring budget, nothing like the larger
units in Alberta and Ontario, -- indeed nobody works full time at the
Centre --we nevertheless have on the books several courses including
18,251 Economy of Ukraine, from our Department of Economics, taught by Dr.
George Chuchman
19,292 Government, Politics and Society in Ukraine (Dept, of Political
Science) last offered by Dr.D. Daycock
11.303 Issues in Ukrainian History: In search of a National Identity (to be
taught by Dr. O. Gerus. and scheduled for 2004-5.
These courses are offered on a rotating basis, and have been in existence
for some 20 years!
"In Canada, the action is in Toronto and Ottawa. That the Ukrainian Canadian
Congress has a head office in Winnipeg shows to what degree
Ukrainian-Canadians are stuck in the last century."
Ontarions believe in Ontario. Politicians in Canada today and contemporary
Canadian political scientists recognize the importance of decentralization
in order to counter problems of "western alienation", for example. I wonder
if it helps to slam cities other your own. And by the way, which is worse?
That Winnipeg is blasted, or that Calgary and Saskatoon are ignored in this
diatribe? Ukrainian Canadian organizations of different stripes, with
different needs and different mandates exist across this country. They are
to be commended and supported.
And if most of these groups happen to be Ukrainian dance groups, there is
absolutely nothing wrong with that. Nobody sees the Japanese Canadian
community decrying the number of karate clubs as a misdirection of their
culture.
"No PhD students mean that no political scientists specializing in Ukraine
apply for professorships in Canadian political science departments. No
political scientists with an interest in Ukraine mean there are no courses
being taught in that area, and no academics writing articles about
contemporary Ukraine or being interviewed by the media about it. This also
means that the Canadian government lacks experts to consult in formulating
its policies towards Ukraine."
The same can be said about ANY field. No music courses which discuss the
roles of Lysenko, Bortniansky and Silvestrov means that their contributions
are ignored. No courses about Ukrainian elements in Canadian children's
literature means such a sub-field does not exist. No courses about Ukrainian
Canadian history means that this history will be put on the back burner.
Finally, let me make my own comments. Dr. Kuzio raises some important
issues; I just don't agree with his proposed directions. It is important
that our Ukrainian Canadian academic communities and our Ukrainian Canadian
business communities and our Ukrainian Canadian political communities and
social groups not slam each other, but examine their proposed mandates as we
move into the 21st century, and make their own way.
But the new realities within which we must work are these:
1. Ukraine is at last an independent country. While some organizations
and some individuals are willing to help them (which is commendable), in
general, it is not for us as Canadians to run their world. Before 1991, we
considered ourselves the guardians of a culture under siege. Now it is time
to give that culture back.
2. The term diaspora should be avoided as being too ambiguous. It is
counterproductive to find someone who is 1/10 Ukrainian heritage and to tell
them that it is their duty to support contemporary Ukraine.
3. Our organizations need to constantly re-invent themselves in line
with new goals for a new world.
4. All organizations should proudly be able to stand up and explain
what they do and why. Whether it be the Ukrainian Music Society of Alberta,
the Ukrainian Studies Foundation of BC, the Ukrainian Professional Business
Association clubs across Canada, our religious colleges, our active
traditional church groups both Ukrainian Orthodox and Ukrainian Catholic,
the various University centres, institutes, units and departments across
Canada or the dozens of others I have not listed, what is important is that
we recognize the diversity and potential contribution of all of these
groups. And of course, there is even some good work going on in Toronto
and Ottawa.
In conclusion, Dr. Kuzio is to be commended for raising an important issue,
an issue fraught with difficulty. But if we close down the Ukrainian
contribution to include only those who see Ukraine as their homeland, or
only those who see political science as the one source worthy of attention,
then we are doomed to failure.
On the other hand, one doesn't even need to claim a Ukrainian heritage in
Canada, because Ukrainian Canadians are a natural part of the landscape.
As often happens, distinguishing landmarks are eroding; new landmarks are
appearing. A Ukrainian surname neither guarantees nor is a requirement to
belong to a Ukrainian organization, or to consider oneself as of Ukrainian
heritage.
The road to the future should lie in a celebration of the Canadian identity
and the Ukrainian heritage. Our task is to show Canadians that we too have
made a contribution to a better Canada, and that - in light of the six
degrees of separation phenomenon - it is only a matter of time until all
Canadians will proudly claim to be part Ukrainian.
Dr. Denis Hlynka - not a member of the diaspora -
Acting Director, Centre for Ukrainian Canadian Studies
University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada
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