US-Ukraine Business Council

"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT"
An International Newsletter
In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis, and Commentary

"The Art of Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion,
Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World"

Ukrainian Prime Minister and presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovych
has indicated that his policies would be more pro-Russian that those of
incumbent President Leonid Kuchma. Yanukovych repeated his calls for
granting the Russian language official status, which had earlier been
criticized by Kuchma. He also ruled out membership of military alliances,
departing from Kuchma's proclaimed course towards eventual NATO
membership. [article two]

"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT" Year 04, Number 182
The Action Ukraine Coalition (AUC), Washington, D.C.
Ukrainian Federation of America (UFA), Huntingdon Valley, PA
morganw@patriot.net, ArtUkraine.com@starpower.net (ARTUIS)
Washington, D.C.; Kyiv, Ukraine, TUESDAY, October 5, 2004

-----INDEX OF ARTICLES-----
"Major International News Headlines and Articles"

1. "UKRAINE AND THE CULTURE OF DEMOCRACY"
Speech by James Sherr, Conflict Studies Research Centre
Defence Academy of the United Kingdom [1]
Ukraine's Quest for Mature Nation Statehood: Roundtable V
Ukraine's Transition to a Stable Democracy
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Mon, 13 Sep, 2004
Published by The Action Ukraine Report
Washington, D.C., Tuesday, October 5, 2004

2. YANUKOVYCH INDICATES HIS POLICIES WOULD BE MORE
PRO-RUSSIAN THAN THOSE OF PRESIDENT KUCHMA
Ukraine will not join any military blocs or alliances
Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian, 4 Oct 04
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Mon, Oct 04, 2004

3. DOUBTS EXPRESSED ABOUT POTENTIAL FOR FREE AND
FAIR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN UKRAINE
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)
Washington, D.C., Monday, October 4, 2004

4. "UKRAINE'S NEW PRAGMATIC NATIONALISM"
By Taras Kuzio, Professor, Elliott School International Affairs
George Washington University, Washington, D.C.
Published by Kyiv Weekly, Kyiv, Ukraine, Friday, 31 Oct 2004

5. "IN THE LAND WHERE SOVIET STYLE LIVES ON"
Commentary by Peter Savodnik, Outlook Section
The Washington Post, Washington, D.C.
Sunday, October 3, 2004; Page B03

6. MEDVEDCHUK DENIES PLOTTING TO DISRUPT ELECTION
Ukrayinska Pravda web site, Kiev, Ukraine, in Ukrainian 4 Oct 04
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Mon, Oct 04, 2004

7. SUMMARY OF RUSSIAN TV'S SEPTEMBER REPORTS
ON UKRAINIAN PRESIDENTIAL RACE
Source: BBC Monitoring research in English 2 Oct 04
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Sat, Oct 02, 2004
========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No.182: ARTICLE NUMBER ONE
========================================================
1. "UKRAINE AND THE CULTURE OF DEMOCRACY"

Speech by James Sherr, Conflict Studies Research Centre
Defence Academy of the United Kingdom [1]
Ukraine's Quest for Mature Nation Statehood: Roundtable V
Ukraine's Transition to a Stable Democracy
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Mon, 13 Sep, 2004
Published by The Action Ukraine Report
Washington, D.C., Tuesday, October 5, 2004

Is Ukraine a democracy? This simple question is not so simple to answer,
and it is impossible to answer with a 'yes' or 'no'. The short answer is
that Ukraine is a new and flawed democracy: limited in scope and legitimacy,
oligarchic, unhealthy and now under strain.

But it is a democracy with long-term promise, and the promise stems from the
fact that Ukrainians as a people are quite democratically minded, certainly
by comparison to their eastern and northern neighbours. Today, ordinary
Ukrainians do not believe that they are living in a democracy, and that is a
good thing. It is one of several indications that citizens put a value on
democracy, that they have a set of standards about it, and they know that
the current state of affairs does not measure up to them.

There is also promise in the attitudes of a large number of Ukrainians who
are not ordinary. Not only in the Verkhovna Rada, but in any number of
state structures - not just the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but the Cabinet
of Ministers, Presidential Administration and Armed Forces - one also meets
respectable numbers of individuals who are democratically minded, and
whilst this includes people who are inclined to support the opposition, it
also includes people who are not.

This crossing of political lines is of critical importance, because it means
that there is an evolutionary path forward for Ukraine. It means that whilst
the growth of civic instincts is sharpening the divide between state and
society, it is also creating points of friction within the state and a
dynamic of evolution inside it. Will an undemocratic president reverse this
dynamic or will he simply retard it? Perhaps we will have a chance to see.

If we can be optimistic about the future, we also need to be realistic about
the present, and the present is defined by a well entrenched and
increasingly aggressive status quo. Can the character of this status quo be
explained purely by the interests of people in power? Or is its endurance
and 'maturation' not equally a result of a misunderstanding of how a healthy
democratic political order differs from Ukraine's - and why it is needed in
the interests of the country?

Today there are a number of misunderstandings, and paradoxically, the
democratic West has contributed to them. This is because, with some
distinguished exceptions, Western governments and international
organisations have tended to emphasise the mechanics of democracy
rather than the culture of democracy.

Free elections and a free press are mechanics of democracy: very important
mechanics, but they are neither the core of democracy nor the soul of it.

'Democracy' describes a relationship between the state and society, and
the key to this relationship is the character of institutions. Even if
elections are 'free and fair', there will be no real democracy if state and
public institutions continue to behave in an arrogant, autocratic, arbitrary
and self-serving manner. If they do, the vast majority of people will
continue to feel that their country is not theirs.

The fundamental problem in Ukraine is the gap between state and society.
In more commonplace terms, it is the powerlessness of ordinary people.
This powerlessness is something that is experienced on a daily basis - or,
at least, on any day when people have to deal with an institution, a
'structure of power', even if it is local or small. This, too, was the core
problem of the Soviet Union. Since the Soviet collapse, some things have
improved, some things have worsened, and much has remained the same.
In Ukraine today, there has been some, but far too little devolution of
political power. There has also been little devolution of economic power.

To a distressing degree, the networks of privilege that existed before are
the networks of privilege that exist now. Some of the exceptions are not
very flattering to the post-Soviet order: criminal networks, who once
operated apprehensively and in the shadows but who, despite being termed
'shadow structures', now operate with impudence and near impunity. And
on the other end of the spectrum, there is the decline in privilege of the
very people who under the old system deserved it: the scientifically,
technically and intellectually skilled - skilled, that is, in every art
except finance.

To be sure, there has also been real progress. In recent years, there has
been solid economic growth (albeit less than official statistics suggest),
there has been the emergence of a real (but still vulnerable) middle class,
a surge of property ownership (but without firm contractual rights) and
signs of honest (but hampered and harassed) entrepreneurship. Yet
Ukraine remains a country of people who feel alienated from their political
order.

The West has been slow to face these realities, and for several critical
years, it damaged its standing by appearing to praise any practice pursued
in the name of profit, privatisation and the free market. With good reason,
many people in Ukraine have failed to see the difference between
privatisation and plunder or between free markets and rigged markets.

Therefore, we should not be surprised by the fact that Western ideas are
not dominating discussion. We need to change the discussion.
If the relationship between state and society is the core issue, then
institutions are the bridge between them. What kind of institutions does
Ukraine need?

First, Ukraine needs institutions that operate within a culture of authority
rather than a culture of power. Authority is power that is codified and
limited to legitimate and openly articulated purposes. And it is not
codified by the authorities themselves, but by the people's elected
representatives. Today, all manner of 'authorities', beginning with the
militsia, have become very entrepreneurial with the powers they have.
That is not authority, but its abuse.

Second, Ukraine needs institutions that operate within a proper framework
of law. A system of 'codified arbitrariness' (to quote the French authority
Francoise Thom) is not law. Laws derive from a coherent and
comprehensible legal system founded on Hart's principle: 'the unity of
primary and secondary rules'. And law enforcement must be separate
from politics. This means that the institutions which enforce the law must
be politically neutral. In the United States, as in Ukraine, no one likes
the tax authorities. But they trust the tax authorities irrespective of
which political party or interest is in power.

Third, Ukraine needs institutions that operate within conditions of
transparency. At its most elemental level, transparency is the ability to
see. This means the ability to see who people are. When Ukrainian citizens
vote for a Communist, Socialist or a member of Nasha Ukraina to sit in
parliament, they expect them to advance the programmes of these factions
and not appear inside another faction within weeks of taking up their seats.

Today, not only in politics but in business, there is very little ability to
know who people are. During the next major privatisation, try asking who
the leading contenders are - who are the real owners? what is their
citizenship? what are their resources? where are they invested? - and see
what kind of answers you get.

But transparency also means the ability to know what decisions are taken,
where they are taken, by whom they are taken and, preferably, why. Was
the Melitopol accident in May (which destroyed an enormous quantity of
munitions and millions of dollars in property - and which, by a few months,
preceded the dismissal of Ukraine's Minister of Defence) really an accident
or the result of a decision? To be sure, Ukraine has had bigger scandals
than Melitopol.

After nearly all of them, it has proved impossible to answer these basic
questions. Without credible facts, rumours become credible, even the
most incredible rumours, particularly if they are based on conspiracy.
People who put their trust in conspiracies rarely put their trust in other
people. It is unlikely that such people will (pace President Kuchma, 1996)
'pull together at a crucial moment'.

The absence of transparency not only produces an absence of accountability,
which is essential to democracy, but cynicism, which is poisonous to it. It
also threatens national security, and this was clearly stated by the authors
of the 1997 National Security Concept and re-echoed by the authors of the
2003 Law on the Foundations of National Security. The good news is that
these are official documents. But they won't have a practical influence
until someone implants the notion that information, like air, is a 'public
good' rather than a strategic commodity and an instrument of power.

Ukraine's political culture is not comfortable with this notion. Nor is its
business culture, which operates less according to the conventions of
Western competitiveness than according to the conventions of
finansovaya-informatsionnaya bor'ba (financial-informational struggle).

This last point leads to two areas that are rarely discussed when democracy
is discussed. The first, indeed, is the culture of business. Today, there
are two cultures of business in Ukraine, and two cultures of business are
drawing a line across Europe. In one a business transaction is designed to
benefit both buyer and seller. In the other, it is part of a Darwinian
relationship, a form of bor'ba za vlast' (the struggle for power). In the
latter, business norms are conspiratorial: inbred, collusive, opaque to
outsiders, and based upon networks rather than markets - networks that
straddle the spheres of business, politics and, far too often, crime. These
norms are not only a threat to democracy and Ukraine's EU integration
prospects, but to good business.

Two examples will suffice. When the blue eyed genius of Russian capitalism,
Anatoliy Chubays, became Chairman of United Energy Systems, he
discovered that this vast enterprise - by any reckoning one of the largest
in the world - did not possess a budget. He should not have been surprised.
If there is no budget, how do you know who is making money, who is losing
money, who is wasting it and who is stealing it? A friend of mine working
in another large Russian business, co-located in Ukraine, had this to say:

We have three tiers of management: junior management, who are insecure;
senior management, who are involved in high politics (and whom we never
see) and middle management. And what they do is steal.

Some years ago, another friend negotiated with the regional authorities to
lease land for development. Not surprisingly, the negotiations were
difficult and protracted, but at last a contract was concluded. Over the
next year, he invested most of his capital in this enterprise, and the
following year his business became very profitable. At that point, the very
authorities who had so carefully negotiated every detail of his contract
told him that it was invalid. They presented him with a list of the 'laws'
he had supposedly violated and threatened to issue criminal charges unless
he transferred the land back to them. Since that point, he has spent a
third of his time negotiating, a third of his time in court and a third of
his time in hospital. Who can have faith in entrepreneurship if
entrepreneurs end up in these straits? Who can have faith in political
rights if no economic rights exist?

The second area that tends to be ignored in discussions of democracy
is the culture of administration. It, too, tends to be authoritarian,
compartmented and opaque. In most advanced democracies, the
administrative culture values hierarchy, but it also values two antidotes
to it.

The first antidote is the devolution of authority and initiative: the
so-called 'bottom-up' culture. The second is an emphasis on horizontal
integration, both within institutions and between them: in short, the
opposite of the 'administrative vertical' exalted in Russia and, very often,
in Ukraine. Both depend on the sharing of information. This is what a
senior British general meant when he explained to a group of Ukrainian
generals how he made a decision: 'I communicate one level up, one level
down, one level to the left and one level to the right'.

By 'communicate', he meant that he listened before giving instructions and
that he made recommendations before his superiors gave instructions to him.
Do these practices not explain why the most motivated and productive
Western institutions are lean and why so many Ukrainian institutions are
underproductive and overstaffed? Can a democratic political system
coexist with an authoritarian system of administration? Yes it can, and
there are examples to prove it. But the coexistence creates an incongruity
in a country's authority structure which is damaging to democracy.

Finally, there is the area we dare not ignore, Ukraine's force structures:
not just the Armed Forces, but the Security Services, Interior forces,
Border Service, customs and, of course police. To transform these
structures - to train people according to today's values rather than
yesterday's, to inculcate decent norms of professionalism, to make these
professionals feel they are part of society - it is necessary to respect
those who try hold onto their professionalism in adverse circumstances, and
it is necessary to understand the work that they do. Governments of former
dissidents in Central Europe have often failed to do this, and the result is
that these most democratic of people have contributed to the democratic
deficit in their countries.

Governments must also provide these services with money. This is not
an alternative to spending money on social welfare. It is part of social
welfare. If militsioneriy (police) are paid wages inconsistent with life,
it is inevitable that they will cheat rather than die. Here as elsewhere,
the goal is not to 'eliminate corruption' - a goal which is as unrealistic
in Britain as it is in Ukraine. The goal is to create a state of affairs in
which corruption is a matter of choice, rather than a matter of survival.
If the state cannot afford to fund force structures, somebody else will,
and democracy, welfare and national security will suffer.

In conclusion, the point is not to criticise the world, but to change it.
We will not change it unless we recognise that institutions matter. Perhaps
they matter more than presidents. Institutional cultures, subcultures,
resources and resourcefulness have broken the power of presidents, no
matter how fairly elected or popular. So, if there is a proper election in
Ukraine and the opposition succeeds in winning it, only the first challenge
will have been surmounted. The more serious challenge will be to hold
power and not simply hold office. The worst scenario for Ukraine is not
that Yushchenko loses the election. Far worse is that he wins and then
fails.

This, too, may be decided by cultural factors. The current authorities are
not the product of a democratic culture, but a Leninist culture. The
opposition might consider this an amoral culture, but it would be perilous
to despise it. Leninists understand organisation, time-keeping, planning,
pragmatism and power. Let us hope that enough members of the opposition
understand the same. -30-
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] Disclaimer: The views expressed are the author's and not necessarily
those of the UK Ministry of Defence.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
James Sherr, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Defence Academy of
the United Kingdom, Camberly, Surrey, England; e-mail:
james.sherr@lincoln.oxford.ac.uk
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
James Sheer has worked on Ukrainian issues for many years especially
in the defence area, including NATO. He is an outstanding analyst and
speaker. He is in much demand as a speaker on issues related to Ukraine.
=======================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No.182: ARTICLE NUMBER TWO
=======================================================
2. YANUKOVYCH INDICATES HIS POLICIES WOULD BE MORE
PRO-RUSSIAN THAN THOSE OF PRESIDENT KUCHMA
Ukraine will not join any military blocs or alliances

Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian, 4 Oct 04
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Oct 04, 2004

KIEV - Prime Minister and presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovych has
made [allowing] dual citizenship, granting the Russian language official
status and proclaiming non-aligned status of Ukraine part of his election
manifesto. He said this on 4 October during a visit to Mykolayiv Region, the
cabinet press service said. [Passage omitted: Yanukovych pledges to boost
the economy] Yanukovych spoke for the creation of a strong Ukrainian army,
which would rely on the Ukrainian arms industry. "Ukraine will not join any
military blocs or alliances," Yanukovych said.

Speaking about foreign policy, he stressed that economic ties with Russia,
the creation of a Single Economic Space and free movement of goods and
services would be his priority. He added that Ukraine should also develop
relations with the EU, and aim for the creation of a free trade zone in the
near future.

Yanukovych stressed once again that Ukraine should allow its nationals to
hold dual citizenship. "Any person born in Ukraine should be able to become
our citizen, no matter where they live, and without the need to relinquish
their existing citizenship," he said. Speaking about the language issue, the
prime minister said that Ukrainian should remain the state language, but
Russian should be granted official status.

Yanukovych also spoke about the tax system, which he said should encourage
economic growth. "Corporate tax rate should be reduced to 15 per cent, VAT
to 12 per cent, and social taxes to 25 per cent, with regressive taxation,"
he said. He also advocated the introduction of fines for tax-evasion instead
of criminal responsibility. [Yanukovych trails opposition leader Viktor
Yushchenko by 5-8 percentage points ahead of the 31 October election,
according to latest polls.] -30-
========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No.182: ARTICLE NUMBER THREE
========================================================
3. DOUBTS EXPRESSED ABOUT POTENTIAL FOR FREE AND
FAIR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN UKRAINE

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)
Washington, D.C., Monday, October 4, 2004

WASHINGTON, D.C. - Two election campaign observers who recently
visited Ukraine expressed concern that a free and fair presidential election
may not take place on October 31. With two-thirds of Ukrainians
declaring their doubts about a fair election, and with allegations surfacing
about the possible poisoning of an opposition candidate, both experts told a
RFE/RL audience last week that this is a high-stakes election for the people
of Ukraine.

Donald L. Ritter, a former Congressman and senior member of the
Commission on Security and Cooperation on Europe (aka U.S. Helsinki
Commission), said that if stronger Western support is not given to ensure
a fair election, "the doors to Ukraine might not be as open in another 5
years." According to Ritter, members of the "[old] Soviet hierarchy" make
up the current power structure in Ukraine, and are "hanging onto power to
protect their benefits and privileges." They are endangering Ukraine's
future because "without a free market, there can be no free people," Ritter
concluded.

A former European Parliament member and European representative on
the World Bank's Inspection Panel, Maartje van Putten, stressed the
importance of an active European role in assisting Ukraine during its
transition to democracy and free market economy. While acknowledging
the role of U.S. support of democratic processes in Ukraine, particularly
in funding election observer missions, van Putten said that, because Ukraine
is on "our continent," Europe should do more to help democracy develop
there. She expressed the hope that, "as long as the borders remain open,
communication can still take place."

Ritter and van Putten reported finding government-censored media
throughout Ukraine, and van Putten said there was little evidence that most
of the 26 candidates for president were even conducting election campaigns.
She noted seeing avenues lined with government-endorsed candidate Viktor
Yanukovych's campaign billboards, but very few publicity materials
supporting other candidacies, including that of opposition leader Viktor
Yushchenko. Nonetheless, she found that Ukrainians were remarkably open
about expressing their concerns to the election campaign monitors. Van
Putten also believes that people are "communicating" information by word
of mouth about conditions and campaign issues.

Both Ritter and van Putten urged the Western press to write more about
the current Ukrainian presidential election campaign. Ritter asked, "Why
isn't the Western press concerned about the recent [alleged] poisoning
of the leading opposition candidate?" Van Putten agreed, saying that
"the Ukrainian people have been denied a free society for too long."
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty is a private, international
communications service to Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe;
the Caucasus; and Central and Southwestern Asia funded by the U.S.
Congress through the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

To hear archived audio for this and other RFE/RL briefings and events,
please visit our website at http://www.regionalanalysis.org
Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave NW,
Washington, DC 20036, tel: 202-457-6900, fax: 202-457-6992
CONTACT: Martins Zvaners (202) 457-6948, Melody Jones
(202) 457-6949; http://www.rferl.org
========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No.182: ARTICLE NUMBER FOUR
========================================================
4. "UKRAINE'S NEW PRAGMATIC NATIONALISM"

By Taras Kuzio, Professor, Elliott School International Affairs
George Washington University, Washington, D.C.
Published by Kyiv Weekly, Kyiv, Ukraine, Friday, 31 Oct 2004

British experts on Russia were the first to define Russia's leaders, already
under President Borys Yeltsin, as "pragmatic nationalists" who supported
cooperation with, but not integration into, the West. What these experts
understood as "pragmatic nationalists" were derzhavnyky, the position that
state leaders adopt in any "normal" state. Such a definition is even more
applicable to Russia since 2000 under Vladimir Putin who has removed the
oligarchs from running the state and, like U.S. President George W. Bush, is
a pragmatic nationalist.

During the Kuchma era Ukraine did not become a "normal" country and the
framework developed by British experts to define post-Soviet Russia could
not be readily applied to Ukraine as there was little evidence of "pragmatic
nationalists" being in power. Instead, personal, clan or regional interests
dominated over state (i.e. derzhavnysky) national interests.

This is now changing. Since Viktor Yanukovych became Prime Minister in
November 2002, and especially this year as Ukraine approaches the end of
the Kuchma era, there are many signs of the development of Ukraine's own
pragmatic nationalism.

In this sense, sociologist Viktor Nebozhenko was correct to describe this
year's elections as a contest between "two representatives of nationalism:
(Viktor) Yushchenko's historical-cultural nationalism and (Viktor)
Yanukovych's economic nationalism. And this and that want the best for
Ukraine, but from different perspectives" (Hromadske Radio, September 8).
CHUMATSKY SHLIAKH
Ukraine's pragmatic nationalism seeks to rely upon one's own forces and
choose Ukraine's "own way" (Yanukovych). Such a view appeals to a large
group of Ukrainians. 45 percent on the SDPUo web site www.temnik.com.ua
replied that "Nobody" when asked "Who is Ukraine's main Friend?" (13
percent believed it was the USA while only 22 percent thought it was
Russia).

Ukraine's newly emerging "pragmatic nationalism" refuses to "blindly copy"
Europe or the West but instead to develop according to Ukrainian traditions,
President Leonid Kuchma and Rada speaker Voldymyr Lytvyn have argued.
President Kuchma told the Central European Initiative in Romania this year
that, "Ukrainians have to learn to rely in the first instance upon our own
resources".

This view was first raised by then Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk in the mid
1990s but at that time it fell on deaf ears because Ukraine was actually
seeking (at least in rhetoric) to copy Europe by integrating into the EU and
NATO. Now, both Kuchma and Yanukovych advise us that Ukraine is "not
ready" to integrate into the EU or NATO. Instead, Yanukovych explained that,
"Ukraine should build its own national security system". This is because
Ukraine has its own "strategic interests" which will be defended, Yanukovych
confidently states.

Another aspect of Ukraine's "pragmatic nationalism" comes from deep feelings
of post-colonial insecurity. In the 1990s Ukraine attempted to deal with
its inferiority complex vis-à-vis Russia which did not then treat it as a
serious state, but only as a temporary aberration.

Now, this inferiority complex emphasis has shifted its focus towards the
West. Ukraine's centrist "pragmatic nationalists" refuse to "kneel" before
the West, Viktor Medvedchuk angrily asserted. Ukraine should not integrate
into Europe as a, "younger sister. We have already gone through this",
Kuchma said. Yanukovych added that, "Ukraine will never agree to be anyone's
younger brother. We must never allow Ukraine to be humiliated anywhere".
Both Kuchma and Yanukovych have rejected out of hand the alleged
"disrespectful" tone of Western criticism of Ukraine's undemocratic
practices.
WHO IS MORE NATIONALIST: YUSHCHENKO OR YANUKOVYCH?
Of the two leading presidential candidates Yanukovych is more nationalistic
than Yushchenko. Not, in ethno-cultural terms but in terms of being in
favour of Ukraine's own "chumatsky shliakh".

Ukraine's centrists, such as Yanukovych, do not desire to integrate with
either Russia or the EU and NATO. Integration of whatever type would take
power (i.e. sovereignty) from them. As this years elections are showing,
Ukraine's "pragmatic nationalists" also do not desire to share power with
anybody domestically.

This wish to monopolise domestic and external power in Ukraine was clearly
seen in the privatization of Kryvorizhstal in June. State Property Fund head
Mykhailo Chechetov described its purchase by Ukrainian investors as a
"patriotic" deed. Such views are reminiscent of post-colonial nationalists
in the non-aligned movement who champion "national capitol". Even candidate
Anatoliy Kinakh describes his position as "economic nationalism".

This is very different to political leaders on the left and right. Both of
these groups desire to integrate with either Russia and the CIS (the left)
or with the EU and NATO (the national democrats). Integration in any
direction automatically requires the giving up of sovereignty which the left
and national democrats would have to agree to.

Of the two leading presidential candidates (Yushchenko and Yanukovych) it is
the former who would be more interested in EU and NATO integration and
hence would be forced to give up some Ukrainian sovereignty. In other words,
Yushchenko would no longer just voice rhetoric in support of integration, as
was the case until now.

Anatoliy Halchynsky, director of the National Institute Strategic Studies,
criticises the Yushchenko camp as being in favour of "To Europe at any
price". He dislikes this position because it will mean integrating into
Europe as a "younger sister".

If elected president, Yanukovych would evolve towards a Russian-style
foreign policy. This would mean pragmatically cooperating with the West but
focusing most of his attention on Russia and the CIS United Economic Space.
While reversing Ukraine's foreign policy focus, Ukraine would pragmatically
cooperate with the West in some areas which were in its national interests.
This pragmatic approach is what guides Russia's dealings with the West and
best suits ideologically amorphous Russian and Ukrainian centrists.

In President Kuchma's last year in office there is a growing re-assertion of
Ukrainian (pragmatic) state-economic nationalism vis-à-vis the outside
world. This is because of a widespread view among President Kuchma and his
allies that the West demands a lot from Ukraine but fails to itself deliver
on promises, such as the failure of the G7 to compensate Ukraine for closing
the Chornobyl nuclear plant. The lack of compensation is because Ukraine is
not respected, Kuchma believes, "It is because they are "big" and we are
small!".
PRAGMATIC NATIONALISM
Ukraine's pragmatic nationalism, like its Russian counterpart, does not see
how "real patriots" can be in opposition as they understand "opposition" as
working against the derzhava. Such views obviously mean the opposition are
denied legitimacy in Ukraine's political system.

They understand the Communists as being in opposition because they do not
want an independent Ukrainian state, but find it impossible to comprehend
how Yushchenko can be in opposition and still call himself a patriot? True
patriots also allegedly do not talk negatively of Ukraine when they travel
abroad. Ukrainian citizens (and members of the diaspora) should only
therefore talk positively of Ukraine when they are outside the country.

Stepan Havrysh talks of "healthy nationalism" as being the same as
patriotism, or love for one's own country (obkom.net.ua, 30 August). Ukraine
's Ministry of Transportation is headed by Transport Minister Heorhiy Kirpa
who is a well respected, energetic minister. Over the Summer Kirpa launched
his own political party, Renaissance (Vidrodzhenia), whose underlying
ideology is "state nationalism".
COOPERATION WITH EUROPE, TOGETHER WITH RUSSIA
Ukraine's new state-economic nationalism feels more at home aligned with
Russia than with the West. One reason is that the former does not lay
political demands upon Ukraine's elites.

Ukraine's pragmatic nationalists are not pro-Russian, just as they were
never pro-Western during the 1990s. Ultimately, they do not seek to
integrate fully with Russia and the CIS, just as they did not with the EU or
NATO. Integration in any direction is a threat to their monopolisation of
power.

In the 1990s Ukraine's centrist elites were threatened by Russia because it
refused to recognize either Ukraine's borders or sovereignty. This was
mainly resolved by February 1999 when Russia's upper house ratified the
1997 treaty, only 8 months before the end of Kuchma's first term in office.

During Kuchma's second term the threat has changed from Russia to the
West. Ukraine's ruling elites are well established and Russia now recognizes
Ukraine's sovereignty and borders. It is now the West's demands to hold
free and fair elections, permit independent media, and improve democratic
conditions that have become the main threat to Ukraine's centrist, ruling
elites.

Ukraine's "chumatsky shliakh" is therefore an indirect admission that the
requirements made of countries to integrate into the EU and NATO are
incompatible with Ukraine's elites remaining in power. In an age of
globalisation and integration such isolationist nationalism has little
perspective. -30-
========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No.182: ARTICLE NUMBER FIVE
========================================================
5. "IN THE LAND WHERE SOVIET STYLE LIVES ON"

Commentary by Peter Savodnik, Outlook Section
The Washington Post, Washington, D.C.
Sunday, October 3, 2004; Page B03

Vladimir Putin's recent call for a new Russian authoritarianism -- and the
near-total support the president's proposal enjoys at home -- should rattle
not only Western diplomats but democratic opposition leaders throughout
the former Soviet Union. For them, Russia's reversal raises a fundamental,
even existential, question: Are the people living in the 15 former Soviet
republics capable of governing themselves? Do they yearn to be free? Or
is it their nature to acquiesce to dictatorship when the apparent price of
freedom -- say, the massacre of hundreds of schoolchildren -- becomes
too expensive?

This question of post-Soviet political identity is particularly salient in
Belarus, Russia's immediate neighbor to the west: On Oct. 17, Belarusans,
having rejected freedom in favor of security a decade ago, head to the polls
for parliamentary elections. Their dictatorial president, Alexander
Lukashenko, has shown little appetite for democratic reform. But the liberal
activists running for office -- a hodgepodge of social democrats, free
marketeers, reconstructed Marxists and others who call themselves the
Five-Plus Coalition -- believe now is their moment.

This is, at least for the present, a dubious proposition. In Belarus, the
fourth estate is more or less an organ of Lukashenko's regime, and elections
are for show; fears of ballot tampering and last-minute disqualification of
democratic candidates are rampant. Before liberal reform can sweep Belarus
or Russia, Ukraine, Moldova or Georgia, the people of those nations will
have to choose whether they want to be subjects or citizens, whether they
want the right (and the responsibility) to build their own future.

This may sound odd to Americans, since most of us take it for granted that
all peoples want to be the masters of their own destinies. But at a time
when the United States is exporting, or attempting to export, democracy to
the Middle East, it's legitimate to ask whether, in fact, everyone
everywhere wants to be like us. Our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, as
well as the uncertainty surrounding the post-Soviet world, should give us
pause.

Stanislav Shushkevich, the former head of the Supreme Soviet of Belarus and
current leader of the Social Democratic Party, voices skepticism about the
democratic movement's chances of making any headway this year, even as he
remains committed to the idea of democracy. He points out that Belarusans
have been conditioned by centuries of oppression to put up with almost
anything; a quarter of the pre-war Belarusan population was murdered by the
Soviets and the Nazis in the 1930s and '40s.

To many, Lukashenko is but a pale shadow of Stalin and Brezhnev, an utterly
unexceptional postscript to socialist totalitarianism. Indeed, Lukashenko
retains support among peasants living in pre-Soviet villages, and the
pensioners and World War II veterans whose lives were defined by the
struggle against fascism, five-year plans and the socialist march toward
"freedom."

When I visited him in the capital city of Minsk last May, Shushkevich, who
is nearing 70, speculated that the moment for peaceful transition may have
been lost. A former nuclear physicist, it was he, along with Boris Yeltsin
and Leonid Kravchuk, then president of Ukraine, who formally dissolved the
Soviet Union in a Belarusan hunting lodge in late 1991.

Ten million Belarusans who had been rotting away in a "workers' paradise"
haunted by the gulag and made nearly uninhabitable by the Chernobyl disaster
were set free. A liberal regime took power, with Shushkevich at its head.
But the West, Shushkevich told me, missed its best opportunity to help build
a stable democracy when it failed to give Belarus low-interest loans. The
"shock therapy" of privatization proved too great for Belarusans, he said.
Lukashenko, a parliamentary deputy at the time, was able to capitalize on
widespread discontent.

After three years of independence, the Belarusans decided they'd had enough
of democracy. With the 1994 election of Lukashenko, they made clear what
they wanted: Order, predictability and an all-powerful state to safeguard
against drug traffickers, arms dealers and foreign investors looking to
carve up downtown Minsk. They also made it clear what they did not want:
Freedom. The freedom to build a life, to express an opinion, to be more than
a cog in the communal organism.

Today, Lukashenko is the unquestioned dictator of his country, having spent
the past decade marginalizing opposition leaders, shutting down independent
newspapers and squeezing business owners to the point of near-extinction.

Shushkevich doesn't foresee a peaceful evolution to a more democratic
society. He believes that a challenge to Lukashenko is more likely to
resemble what took place in Romania, where dictator Nicolae Ceaucescu
was murdered in 1989, than in Czechoslovakia, where a bloodless Velvet
Revolution toppled the communist regime that same year. "My parents and
grandparents would put it this way," he said of Lukashenko's long-term
prospects. "This man will not die a natural death."

This is indeed a critical time, and not only in Belarus. Ukrainians will
vote for their next president on Oct. 31, and the recent suspected poisoning
of opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko is just one of many signs that reform
will not come easily to the former Soviet Union.

There is a tragic inevitability to all this. "In the course of the 20th
century, successive regimes, wars, revolutions, gulags, eliminated the most
active, the most independent, the most energetic people," said historian
Roman Szporluk, the recently retired director of Harvard University's
Ukrainian Research Institute. "For people to survive under Stalin, under
communism, you had to pretend to be stupid. If you go on this way
generation after generation, you really create a certain mode of behavior."

Still, the younger reformers -- the university activists, independent
journalists, anarchists and human rights lawyers -- are more optimistic than
people like Shushkevich. They despise Lukashenko for his backwardness
and his thick peasant accent. They fear the local KGB, the nighttime
arrests, the "ideological managers" who regulate their schools and
businesses, the inanity and iniquity of a system that has no legitimacy
or meaning. But they believe freedom is as inevitable as the classless
utopia their great-grandparents were promised.

Valentina Polevikova, a former trade union leader and now a democratic
candidate from Minsk in the parliamentary elections, characterized the
reform movement as an effort to change the way Belarusans think about the
relationship between the state and civil society. "I want to talk to them so
that they understand that Lukashenko has been lying to them for 10 years
the way the Soviets lied to them for 70 years," she told me.

Polevikova and other reformers said the elections two weeks from now will
show whether Belarusans' three-year experiment with freedom in the early
1990s was an aberration or a promise of the possibility of a different kind
of political identity. This may be putting too much emphasis on a single
campaign. The reformist coalition has spent more than a year recruiting
candidates, but it's unlikely they'll win even a handful of the 110
parliamentary seats up for grabs.

In the longer term, though, there are reasons to be hopeful. First, Belarus
is not a place like Iraq, with its ancient hatreds, war-torn cities and
radical theocrats hellbent on annihilating all things Western. It is a
European nation with churches, newspapers and an intelligentsia that has
given rise to a protest class of students, trade unionists, veterans of the
Afghan war, even ex-KGB agents.

More importantly, it is not defined so much by language, ethnicity or race
as by geography. "I think ethnic origins don't mean anything," said poet
Nikolai Viniatski, while taking part in a protest against the regime in
Minsk last spring. Belarus is populated by Orthodox Russians, Polish
Catholics, even a smattering of Jews.

Intermarriage is easy and ubiquitous. It was the Soviets who concocted this
mix, as part of their plan to "de-ethnicize" the proletarian mass. And now,
ironically, it is that cultural reengineering of a half-century ago that is
laying the foundation for post-Soviet democracy, activists believe. In
Belarus, Viniatski explained, there is no tribalism; the ethnic tension that
colors life in the Baltics, the conflagration that is the Caucasus, could
never happen here. People are, for the most part, comfortable with
difference. You might call them post-ethnic.

You might also call them post-ideological. In Belarus, they know that Marx's
scientific materialism is dead. That dream turned out to be a joke for which
tens of millions died. This has made Belarusans bitter and ironic. Over
vodka, in their kitchens, they call their fearless leader a buffoon who
likes to work out with the national hockey team but has been barred from
the White House. They wonder when they will be able to join the community
of nations.

All this can be to the good, even if the elections later this month are
unlikely to spark a revolution. In Belarus's East European neighbors and
elsewhere, after all, bitterness and irony have often served as a ripe
medium for change. -30-
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Peter Savodnik is political editor of the Hill newspaper. He traveled to
Belarus on a fellowship from the German Marshall Fund of the United States.
Author's e-mail: psavodnik@thehill.com.
LINK: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A1924-2004Oct1.html
========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No.182: ARTICLE NUMBER SIX
========================================================
6. MEDVEDCHUK DENIES PLOTTING TO DISRUPT ELECTION

Ukrayinska Pravda web site, Kiev, Ukraine, in Ukrainian 4 Oct 04
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Mon, Oct 04, 2004

KIEV - The head of the Ukrainian presidential administration, Viktor
Medvedchuk, has dismissed allegations that he is plotting to disrupt the
upcoming presidential election. In an article posted on 4 October on the
pro-opposition web site Ukrayinska Pravda, Medvedchuk said the
accusations were nothing more than "an act of provocation" by the
opposition.

On 30 September, Ukrayinska Pravda published an article by reputed Kremlin
adviser Stanislav Belkovskiy, in which he said that Medvedchuk had secured
Putin's support for a scheme to disrupt the 31 October election through
violations.

Medvedchuk ridiculed Belkovskiy's statements, saying there is no way the
analyst could have possibly learnt what Medvedchuk and Putin discussed at
a recent meeting. President Leonid Kuchma's chief of staff, however, did not
reveal what the meeting was about.

He added that Belkovskiy seems to have been "hired out" by Russian emigre
tycoon Boris Berezovskiy to Ukrainian opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko.
========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No.182: ARTICLE NUMBER SEVEN
========================================================
7. SUMMARY OF RUSSIAN TV'S SEPTEMBER REPORTS
ON UKRAINIAN PRESIDENTIAL RACE

Source: BBC Monitoring research in English 2 Oct 04
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Sat, Oct 02, 2004

Ukrainian PM and presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovych was given top
billing by Russia's state-controlled Channel One and state-owned Russia TV
in their reports on the presidential election campaign in Ukraine during
September. The month culminated in Yanukovych's privileged briefing for
Russian media chiefs on 27 September. That event was made even more
unique by the presence and - as was made amply clear in the reports -
support of ambassador and former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin
on behalf of Russia.

The 24 September "attack" on Yanukovych was widely reported. Meanwhile,
only one TV channel - Channel One - was monitored to report on 21
September on opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko's accusation that he
had been poisoned by state officials. The report's verdict was "without
proof". No Russia TV report on the subject was monitored.

Russia TV's "Vesti" main evening news on 2 September reported on a
Ukrainian book event during a Moscow fair. In the video, Ukrainian President
Leonid Kuchma smiles from a photograph that greets visitors to the stand. "A
political biography of the Ukrainian prime minister is among the latest
editions brought to Moscow," the report remarks once observations of a more
general nature are out of the way. "It is called The Viktor Yanukovych
Enigma."

A report monitored the same day from Channel One (1400 gmt) fleshed out
the event as it told its viewers about "books which look set to top the
bestseller list". (In the video, the same photograph of Leonid Kuchma that
was in evidence in the Russia TV piece competes for prominence with
volumes of Taras Shevchenko) "And for the first time ever, the Ukrainian
political genre has had a stand of its own", with both Yanukovych and
Yushchenko the subject of recent biographical accounts.

"Valentyn Chemerys's book, The Viktor Yanukovych Enigma, represents
the first attempt to tell the Ukrainians about the real prime minister
through his biography, pictures from a family album (some of which we see
on screen, one with Yanukovych in a hard hat and a boiler suit among coal
miners underground) and previously unpublicized facts about his personal
life, "the report goes on to say. The publisher states his interest in the
human side of Yanukovych. Yanukovych smiles from the cover of the book.

The cover of Aleksey Lan's account of Yushchenko's career is rather less
complimentary. A close-up reveals a sinister image of a hooded Yushchenko
who stares out at the reader over the title of the book - "Yushchenko:
History of an Illness" - emblazoned in red below the grey image. It is a
book that contains "documents about privatizations and billions paid into US
bank accounts", in the words of the report, all of it "information about
Ukraine's former prime minister gathered by Lan during his service with the
tax police". "These are all well-documented facts, based on real documents
in the public domain," adds the author himself.

Yushchenko, we are told, is also the subject of "well-known Kiev journalist"
Andriy Derepa's profile of the ex-prime minister and his wife - "a US
national" - with the publication's veracity once again emphasized in the
report. Derepa himself is on hand to assert that, "as the book proves
through documents, she was linked to what we call the special services,
active in the US Departments of State and of the Treasury". "The books
are flying off the shelves," the report concludes.

On 5 September, Russia TV's "Vesti Nedeli" thought Yanukovych had the
edge in the battle for the red vote (of importance in a second round): Petro
Symonenko, the communist leader and himself a candidate, argued that
although Yushchenko claims to make relations with Russia a top priority, his
associates are anti-Russian. In a further nuance, there was video footage of
a nationalist gathering some months ago, at which Yushchenko's brother
made a controversial speech in the presence of "openly fascist" elements.

Yanukovych is complimented on his cabinet's performance. Yushchenko
is berated for a "politicized" visit to a region. And in a studio comment
afterwards, Russian political commentator and Kremlin insider Gleb
Pavlovskiy was concerned at the prospect of destabilization and disorder
in Ukraine if Yushchenko does not gain the number of votes he thinks he
deserves, as indeed is likely, Pavlovskiy asserts, on the basis of current
opinion polls.

On 12 September, Channel One turned its attention to Lviv, where left-
wing parties held protests to demand that a street in that city named after
former Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev be renamed following the
events in Beslan. This, it said, is opposed by one of the parties that form
Yushchenko's bloc. In the video report, which was filmed shortly after
Beslan, we learn that a Ukrainian TV channel supportive of Yushchenko
continuously called the hostage-takers "partisans", which Yanukovych
condemned. Finally, a political commentator said the current government,
led by Yanukovych, is the best the country's ever had. The report predicts
that Yushchenko, ahead of Yanukovych by "as little as" 1 per cent, will be
inevitably caught up with and overtaken.

Only one state TV channel - Channel One - was monitored to report on
Yushchenko's accusation that state officials had tried to poison him. In a
three-minute report on 21 September, a correspondent tells us how
Yushchenko, "emotionally but without proof", addressed parliament as a
result of which an inquiry would be set up. Thus, "scandal first, work
later", sums up the report, as it goes on to say that "no less" than next
year's budget, "with its social guarantees", has suffered. "The budget,
meanwhile, is quite revolutionary," and provides for compensation for the
1990s' savers. Yanukovych, in an interview, illustrates the figures. No
Russia TV report on this subject was monitored.

In the TV channels' description of an "attack" on Yanukovych on the campaign
trail by a "radically minded student" on 24 September, Russia TV the same
day was the most dramatic: it headlined its report as the Ukraine PM's
"several hours in intensive care", asked "Who is behind this?" and screened
footage of the incident. In the piece, what Russian NTV said was an "egg"
thrown at the PM became "two heavy metal objects". Yanukovych was
"wounded" and rushed to hospital. There were reactions from spokesman
Taras Chornovil, in whose version Yanukovych was hit by a stone, and
presidential aide Vasyl Baziv, who commented on the "vicious circle" of
"hatred". Yanukovych's reaction, in a press release, followed:
"Nationalism", he said, "is a disease."

We are told that the student has already confessed, and is a Yushchenko
supporter. "I have no questions to the young people who treated me in this
way, but I do have questions to their leaders - Yushchenko's entourage,"
were the remarks further attributed to Yanukovych by a Channel One report
the same day. "Elections come and go. Ukraine remains. Whether it remains
united or split is to be decided now," his election HQ echoed. It fell to
NTV to pick up on the discrepancies mentioned above (we see a close-up
of a splodge formed by a broken "pre-election" egg) and listen to the
opposition's side of the story.

The subject recurred on all three channels on 26 September, as NTV showed
Yanukovych in hospital but included an interview with a member of the
Yushchenko team who said the incident seemed suspect, while Channel One
and Russia TV rounded up developments in the campaign with an overview of
the Yanukovych, Yushchenko and Tymoshenko (Russian arrest warrant)
episodes. Meanwhile, Russia TV's "Vesti Nedeli" anchor appeared sceptical
of Yushchenko's version of events but thought much of the "well-documented"
attack on Yanukovych. Channel One the same day largely followed the same
pattern.

Finally, in one of the latest reports on the subject of the campaign, both
Channel One and Russia TV on 27 September gave prominence to
Yanukovych's privileged briefing for Russian media chiefs. The event was
made even more unique by the presence and - as was made amply clear in
the reports - support of ambassador and former Prime Minister Viktor
Chernomyrdin on behalf of Russia. Russia TV's report was the longer of
the two.

In it, we learn that with the speech over - in which Yanukovych complained
there was too little information about Ukraine in the Russian media ("the
editors-in-chief are promising to sort out the problem") - questions were
taken. Somewhat inexplicably, that part of the proceedings took place
without TV cameras present. "At least three sensational statements" were
made: Ukraine will not join NATO but will allow dual Russian-Ukrainian
citizenship and the use of Russian as the second state language.

Pavlovskiy, in his capacity as editor-in-chief of Russkiy Zhurnal, was on
hand to argue the case for Russia and Ukraine as a "single space". Lastly,
in the detail added by the Channel One report, Yanukovych quashed talk of
Yushchenko's prime ministership if he, Yanukovych, were elected president.

His argument? "The prime minister should be a leader, not someone who is
led." Of Yanukovych, meanwhile, Chernomyrdin left no-one in any doubt:
"He looks the part. He is strong, he is a sportsman. Just as a leader should
be." -30-
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