"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT"
An International Newsletter
In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis, and Commentary
"The Art of Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion,
Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World"
UKRAINE SUPREME COURT RULES FOR YUSHCHENKO
CEC resolution certifying the election results dated Nov. 24, 2004
(and a Yanukovych victory) IS OVERTURNED
"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT" Year 04, Number 245
The Action Ukraine Coalition (AUC), Washington, D.C.
Ukrainian Federation of America (UFA), Huntingdon Valley, PA
morganw@patriot.net, ArtUkraine.com@starpower.net (ARTUIS)
Washington, D.C., Kyiv, Ukraine, FRIDAY, December 3, 2004
-----INDEX OF ARTICLES-----
"Major International News Headlines and Articles"
1. UKRAINE SUPREME COURT RULES FOR YUSHCHENKO
Yarema Bachynsky, COP, DA/SEAUP
Kyiv, Ukraine, Friday, December 03, 2004
2. WE SHOULD ALL BE PROUD OF THE PEOPLE OF UKRAINE,
THE PARLIAMENT OF UKRAINE AND YES THE SUPREME COURT
STATEMENT: Judge Bohdan A. Futey
Washington, D.C., Friday, December 3, 2004,
3. SUPREME COURT ORDERS CEC TO RE-RUN SECOND
ROUND OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Fri, December 3, 2004 (18:43)
4. UKRAINE ELECTION RULED INVALID
REUTERS, Kiev, Ukraine, Friday, December 3, 2004 5:45 PM
5. UKRAINE SUPREME COURT ORDERS PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION RUNOFF
Associated Press, Kiev, Ukraine, Fri, December 3, 2004 12:22 p.m.
6. UKRAINE VOTES FOR IRAQ WITHDRAWAL
Vote was nonbinding and President Kuchma can ignore it
CNN.com, USA, Friday, December 3, 2004
7. KUCHMA THANKS RUSSIA FOR MEDIATING POST-ELECTION
CONFLICT IN UKRAINE
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Fri, Dec 3, 2004 (13:47)
8. RUSSIAN TALK ON UKRAINE RECALLS COLD WAR
By Erin E. Arvedlund, The New York Times
New York, Thursday, December 2, 2004
9. "WHY ONLY IN UKRAINE?"
By Charles Krauthammer, Columnist
The Washington Post, Washington, D.C.
Friday, December 3, 2004; Page A27
10. UKRAINE'S ELECTIONS: THE FORCES IN PLAY (PART III)
By James Sherr, Conflict Studies Research Centre
Defence Academy of the United Kingdom [1]
Camberly, Surrey, England, Thursday, 2 December, 2004
11. YANUKOVYCH-GATE UNFOLDS AFTER UKRAINIAN ELECTIONS
Yet another Ukrainian political scandal over tape-recorded conversations
By Taras Kuzio, Eurasia Daily Monitor
Volume 1, Issue 139, Jamestown Foundation
Washington, D.C., Friday, December 3
12. UKRAINE: EAST-WEST BREAK-UP FEARS ARE OVERDONE
Oxford Analytica, Oxford, UK, Thursday, December 2004
13. "ORANGE REVOLUTION SQUEEZED"
ANALYSIS: by Peter Lavelle, United Press International
Moscow, Russia, Thursday, December 2, 2004
========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No. 245: ARTICLE NUMBER ONE
========================================================
1. UKRAINE SUPREME COURT RULES FOR YUSHCHENKO
LETTER: from Yarema Bachynsky, COP, DA/SEAUP
Kyiv, Ukraine, Friday, December 03, 2004
Dear Colleagues,
The Supreme Court just announced its decision in Yushchenko v. CEC
on the election results. In a nutshell:
1. CEC resolution certifying the election results dated Nov. 24, 2004
(and a Yanukovych victory) IS OVERTURNED
2. FOUND that the CEC could not determine the results of the voting
held on Nov. 21 as it had not reviewed 64 complaints filed before it
before Nov. 24 by the complainant Yushchenko
3. FOUND that the CEC had violated numerous (about two dozen as
I recall) provisions of the Presidential Election Law and the Constitution
of Ukraine by not waiting for (approximately 1300) complaints filed at
various courts around the country, prior to its Nov. 24 meeting
(essentially they found the CEC rushed and therefore denied the
complainant its right of appeal of these violations)
4. ORDERED the CEC to appoint a "repeat second round" of voting
with the 2 candidates who emerged after round 1 held on Oct. 31, 2004
5. ORDERED the CEC to appoint this repeat second round... in effect..
. in 3 weeks (that will make it Sunday, December 26, 2004)
6. ORDERED (by a separate court order) the President, Parliament and
Prosecutor General to undertake certain action flowing from this decision
(will update, but clearly there are orders that may or will lead to the
opening of criminal cases, and other actions).
7. DENIED the complainant Yushchenko his prayer that the president
of Ukraine be determined to be the candidate who obtained the greatest
number of votes in round 1 on Oct. 31, 2004 (i.e. that Yushchenko be
declared President on the basis of the Round 1 vote).
A full update will be prepared and circulated as soon as we have the
text of the decision. We will also provide any dissenting opinions etc.
at that point.
THIS IS CLEARLY A GREAT VICTORY FOR THE RULE OF
LAW IN UKRAINE!
Please forward as appropriate.
Regards, Yarema Bachynsky
COP, DA/SEAUP, Kyiv, Ukraine
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NOTE: Our thanks to Judge Bohdan A Futey for providing the
above letter by Yarema Bachynsky to The Action Ukraine Report.
=======================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No.245: ARTICLE NUMBER TWO
=======================================================
2. WE SHOULD ALL BE PROUD OF THE PEOPLE OF UKRAINE,
THE PARLIAMENT OF UKRAINE AND YES THE SUPREME COURT
STATEMENT: Judge Bohdan A. Futey
Washington, D.C., Friday, December 3, 2004
Greetings,
We should all be proud of the people of Ukraine, the Parliament of
Ukraine and yes, the Supreme Court of Ukraine. My faith and
confidence in an Independent Judiciary and the Rule of Law has been
restored.
Let us hope that the Executive branch will now go along and enforce
the decision of the Supreme Court. The will of the people cannot be
ignored.
Best regards,
Bohdan A. Futey, Judge
U.S. Court of Federal Claims
=======================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No.245: ARTICLE NUMBER THREE
=======================================================
3. SUPREME COURT ORDERS CEC TO RE-RUN SECOND
ROUND OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Fri, December 3, 2004 (18:43)
KYIV - The Supreme Court has ruled that the Central Electoral Commission
(CEC) should re-run the second round of this year's Ukrainian presidential
elections. The Supreme Court issued the ruling on Friday.
The Supreme Court ruled that the actions of the CEC regarding certification
of the results of the second round of the presidential elections were
illegal and cancelled the CEC's decision that declared Prime Minister Viktor
Yanukovych as the winner of the presidential elections. The Supreme Court
ordered the second round of the presidential elections to be re-run within
21 days after December 5.
Thus, the Supreme Court accepted the arguments of the Our Ukraine
coalition's leader Viktor Yuschenko that the CEC acted illegally but
rejected Yuschenko's petition to declare the candidate that won the largest
number of votes in the first round of the presidential elections as the
winner of the entire presidential elections. -30-
========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No.245: ARTICLE NUMBER FOUR
========================================================
4 UKRAINE ELECTION RULED INVALID
REUTERS, Kiev, Ukraine, Friday, December 3, 2004 5:45 PM
KIEV (Reuters) - Ukraine's Supreme Court has ruled that a disputed
presidential election officially won by Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich
was invalid. Chairman Anatoly Yarema, delivering the court's ruling
after five days of deliberations, said a "repeat vote" was required.
He said this ballot should take place three weeks counting from
December 5 -- meaning December 26 -- suggesting it would be a
re-run of last month's run-off vote which opposition candidate Viktor
Yushchenko alleged was rigged by authorities.
Judges backed arguments by Yushchenko's camp, which have
brought tens of thousands out on to the streets of the capital Kiev,
that the vote had been subject to systematic fraud.
The ruling on Friday, greeted by applause in the courtroom, appeared
to run counter to what beleaguered outgoing President Leonid Kuchma
had sought in nearly two weeks of bitter wrangling.
Kuchma had pressed for a completely new election, which would
have required up to three months to be organised, with him remaining
in office. Kuchma had secured the backing of Russian President
Vladimir Putin for his position in talks on Moscow on Thursday.
========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No.245: ARTICLE NUMBER FIVE
========================================================
5. UKRAINE SUPREME COURT ORDERS PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION RUNOFF
Associated Press, Kiev, Ukraine, Fri, December 3, 2004 12:22 p.m.
KIEV (AP)--Ukraine 's Supreme Court Friday invalidated the disputed
official results of the presidential runoff election and ruled that a repeat
vote must be held by Dec. 26, handing a huge victory to opposition leader
Viktor Yushchenko and his hundreds of thousands of supporters in the
streets.
The court issued its verdict in response to an appeal by Yushchenko to
cancel the official results of the Nov. 21 runoff, which he said had been
rigged in favor of Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych. The ruling is final
and can't be appealed, and the repeat vote is to be held nationwide,
rather than only in the districts specifically challenged.
In Kiev's Independence Square, jubilant Yushchenko backers blew
their orange horns, screamed his name and waved orange flags as
passing cars blasted their horns three times to sound out the three
syllables in "Yush-chen-ko."
Yushchenko has pushed for a quick repeat of the runoff, whose
results Western nations have refused to recognize. He rejected
outgoing President Leonid Kuchma's call for a completely new
election, which was widely seen as a bid to field a new candidate
more popular than Yanukovych.
Convoys of opposition reinforcements clad in Yushchenko's
campaign color of orange had crowded the capital to witness
what they hoped would be a dramatic judicial ruling against the
Moscow-backed government.
"This is a great victory of all people who have been standing at the
square, a great victory for Ukrainian democracy," said Mykola
Katerinchuk, the Yushchenko lawyer who drafted the text of the
appeal. Another Yushchenko ally, Yuri Klyuchkovsky, called the
verdict a "historic decision that opens the way for a fair solution
to the crisis."
Representatives of Yanukovych and the Central Election
Commission left the courthouse before the judges announced
their decision. In Yanukovych's stronghold in eastern Ukraine , his
backers expressed anger at the decision. "We have a president -
Viktor Yanukovych," said Konstantin Sadalsky, shaking his fist
at a TV screen in an Internet cafe in the eastern city of Donetsk.
In Kiev, Yushchenko supporters waited for him to emerge and
address them.
Parliament has scheduled a marathon all-weekend session to
pass legislation corresponding to the Supreme Court verdict. It
will need to pass changes to the membership of the 15-member
Central Election Commission and in election law to help prevent
fraud. -30- [The Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
=======================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No.245: ARTICLE NUMBER SIX
Your comments about the Report are always welcome
========================================================
6. UKRAINE VOTES FOR IRAQ WITHDRAWAL
Vote was nonbinding and President Kuchma can ignore it
CNN.com, USA, Friday, December 3, 2004
KIEV, Ukraine (AP) -- The Ukrainian parliament in a 257-0 vote on Friday
called on outgoing President Leonid Kuchma to withdraw the nation's 1,600
peacekeepers from Iraq, where they make up the fourth-largest contingent.
The vote was nonbinding and analysts said that Kuchma can ignore it.
"Due to the sharp deterioration of the situation in Iraq, the parliament
addresses the president with the proposal on withdrawal of troops from
Iraq," the resolution said.
Andriy Lysenko, the head of the Defense Ministry press service, said that
the military "answers fully to the president of Ukraine, and in case he
signs the document, the armed forces will execute his order." "So far,
we do not have such an order," Lysenko said.
Most Ukrainians want the troops brought home, and the deployment has
been a rare topic of agreement between the two Ukrainian rivals vying for
the presidency. Both opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko and Prime
Minister Viktor Yanukovych support a pullout.
Kuchma ordered the troops to Iraq, and their mandate there is open-ended.
Friday's vote was another indication that his hold on parliament is slipping
away as he reaches the end of his term. The legislature had turned down a
proposal on withdrawal earlier in the year.
Defense Minister Oleksandr Kuzmuk and other top defense officials already
announced that Ukraine would gradually pull its troops from Iraq, but not
without coordinating the move with other coalition members.
In October, Kuzmuk said that Ukraine and its coalition partners must first
secure the January elections in Iraq.
Top Iraqi officials have repeatedly urged Kuchma not to withdraw Ukrainian
troops and said they would like them to stay through the Jan. 30 elections.
In October, Ukraine downsized its contingent in Iraq by some 200 troops.
Nine Ukrainian soldiers have died in Iraq, including three in combat. More
than 20 have been wounded. -30-
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/12/03/ukraine.iraq.ap/index.html
=========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No.245: ARTICLE NUMBER SEVEN
=========================================================
7. KUCHMA THANKS RUSSIA FOR MEDIATING POST-ELECTION
CONFLICT IN UKRAINE
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Fri, Dec 3, 2004 (13:47)
KYIV - President Leonid Kuchma is grateful to Russia for it part in
settling the post-election conflict in Ukraine. Presidential press service
informed Ukrainian News of his meeting with President of Russia Vladimir
Putin on Thursday.
"It would be surprisingly if Russia stood apart. I am grateful that [Russian
State Duma Chairman] Borys Gryzlov was taking part in the roundtable
talks for Russia, the man with great powers, the man who can say the word
on behalf of Russian parliamentarians and on behalf of Russia as a whole,"
the press service quoted Kuchma as saying at the meeting.
As Ukrainian News earlier reported, Putin is opposed to the idea of holding
a second run-off voting in Ukraine and calls Ukraine a totally Russian-
speaking country. Russia supports efforts of Kuchma aimed at solving the
post-election conflict. -30-
=========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No.245: ARTICLE NUMBER EIGHT
Suggested articles for publication in the Report are always welcome
=========================================================
8. RUSSIAN TALK ON UKRAINE RECALLS COLD WAR
By Erin E. Arvedlund, The New York Times
New York, Thursday, December 2, 2004
MOSCOW, Dec. 1 - The Kremlin's words reached a shrill peak on
Wednesday over the election crisis in Ukraine, as Russian officials here
dusted off cold war vocabulary and summoned bitter visions of lost imperial
ambitions and fears of Western meddling in Russia's sphere of influence.
The words began flowing in earnest over the weekend, as a Kremlin
political strategist, Gleb O. Pavlovsky, voiced what many Russians fear
is the true cause of the Ukrainian political crisis: that the West is using
Ukraine as a testing ground for a "revolution" that may subsequently
spread to Russia.
"We will have to prepare ourselves to deal with not political technologies,
but revolution," Mr. Pavlovsky warned Sunday in an interview with NTV
television.
Sergei V. Yastrzhembsky, Russia's representative to the European Union,
echoed Mr. Pavlovsky, and hinted that who was behind all this was no secret.
He pointed to what he said was the similarity between street rallies in Kiev
in support of the opposition candidate, Viktor A. Yushchenko, and earlier
demonstrations in Poland and Belgrade. "Possibly, the money came from the
same purse, and there were the same puppeteers behind the scene."
The Kremlin under President Vladimir V. Putin is vastly different from what
it was in the early post-Soviet years under Boris N. Yeltsin, who embraced
the West and broke with traditional allies such as Belarus. Mr. Putin served
in the security services and has publicly rued the end of the Soviet Union,
and the Kremlin today views Ukraine in many ways as belonging to Russia.
Even young, successful Russians, whose memory of Soviet times is mostly of
product shortages, share Mr. Putin's political views on Ukraine. "My Russian
colleagues completely bowled me over, saying things like 'Russia should be
sending the tanks into Ukraine - right away,' " said a British-born banker
who works at a Russian company here.
At a more basic level, events in Ukraine have crystallized fears in Russian
society, which is trying desperately to rebuild law and order, maintain
economic growth and stem endemic corruption. Culturally and historically,
Ukraine is "in many ways the mother of Russia," explained Oleg D. Kalugin,
a former Soviet-era K.G.B. general who fled to the West and now lives and
works in Washington.
Those fears are deeply rooted, a United States official said. "There is a
real fear that if Ukraine turns away from Russia, Russia's physical security
is put at greater risk," he said. "It involves centuries of wounded
imperialism, foreign invasion, centuries of fears of foreign influence and
that the West can't be trusted."
Some of that mood seemed to be captured in the words of Kirill A. Frolov,
a conservative commentator and Ukraine specialist. He said outsiders must
understand that Mr. Yushchenko and his supporters are not democrats. While
conceding that Russia and the West "are not still enemies," he said, "the
main mistake of the West is helping Yushchenko and a new socialist regime."
"They don't want to understand Ukrainian nationalism is the enemy of
democracy," he said. "Yushchenko is the banner of this nationalism. It's a
brown regime. The West will help Yushchenko and have a great problem.
It's a mistake."
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/02/international/europe/02moscow.html
=========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No. 245: ARTICLE NUMBER NINE
Letters to the editor are always welcome
=========================================================
9. "WHY ONLY IN UKRAINE?"
By Charles Krauthammer, Columnist
The Washington Post, Washington, D.C.
Friday, December 3, 2004; Page A27
There has been general back-patting in the West about renewed
European-American comity during the Ukrainian crisis. Both the United
States and Europe have been doing exactly the right thing: rejecting a
fraudulent election run by a corrupt oligarchy and insisting on a new vote.
This gives us an opportunity to ostentatiously come together with Europe.
Considering our recent disagreements, that is a good thing. But before
we get carried away with this era of good feeling, let us note the reason
for this sudden unity.
This is about Russia first, democracy only second. This Ukrainian episode
is a brief, almost nostalgic throwback to the Cold War. Russia is trying to
hang on to the last remnants of its empire. The West wants to finish the job
begun with the fall of the Berlin Wall and continue Europe's march to the
east.
You almost have to feel sorry for the Russians. (I stress almost.) In the
course of one generation, they have lost one of the greatest empires in
history: first their Third World dependencies, stretching at one point from
Nicaragua to Angola to Indochina; then their East European outer empire,
now swallowed by NATO and the European Union; and then their inner
empire of Soviet republics.
The Muslim "-stans" are slowly drifting out of reach. The Baltic republics
are already in NATO. The Transcaucasian region is unstable and bloody.
All Russia has left are the Slavic republics. Belarus is effectively a
Russiancolony. But the great prize is Ukraine, for reasons of strategy
(Crimea), history (Kiev is considered by Russians to be the cradle of Slavic
civilization) and identity (the eastern part is Russian Orthodox and
Russian-speaking).
Vladimir Putin, who would not know a free election if he saw one, was not
about to let an election get in the way of retaining sway over Ukraine. The
problem is that his bluff was called, and he does not have the power to do
to Ukraine what his Soviet predecessors did to Hungary and Czechoslovakia
during the Cold War. Hence the clash of civilizations over Ukraine and, to
some extent, within Ukraine: the authoritarian East vs. the democratic West.
But this struggle is less about democracy than about geopolitics. Europe
makes clear once again that it is a full-throated supporter of democracy --
in its neighborhood. Just as it is a forthright opponent of ethnic cleansing
in its neighborhood (Yugoslavia) even as it lifts not a finger elsewhere
(Rwanda, southern Sudan, now Darfur).
That is why this comity between the United States and Europe is only
temporary. The Europeans essentially believe, to paraphrase Stalin, in
democracy on one continent. As for democracy elsewhere, they really
could not care less.
They pretend, however, that this opposition to America's odd belief in
spreading democracy universally is based not on indifference but on superior
wisdom -- the world-weary sagacity of a more ancient and experienced
civilization that knows that one cannot bring liberty to barbarians.
Meaning, Arabs. And Muslims. And Iraqis.
Hence the Bush-Blair doctrine of bringing some modicum of democracy to
the Middle East by establishing one country as a beachhead is ridiculed as
naive and messianic. And not just by Europeans but by their "realist" allies
here in the United States.
Thus Zbigniew Brzezinski, a fierce opponent of the Bush administration's
democracy project in Iraq, writes passionately about the importance of
democracy in Ukraine and how, by example, it might have a domino effect,
spreading democracy to neighboring Russia. Yet when George Bush and
Tony Blair make a similar argument about the salutary effect of establishing
a democracy in the Middle East -- and we might indeed have the first truly
free election in the Middle East within two months if we persevere --
"realist" critics dismiss it as terminally naive.
If you had said 20 years ago that Ukraine would today be on the threshold of
joining a democratic Europe, you, too, would have been called a hopeless
utopian. Yes, Iraq has no democratic tradition and deep ethnic divisions.
But Ukrainian democracy is all of 13 years old, much of it dominated by a
corrupt, authoritarian regime with close ties to an even more corrupt and
authoritarian Russia. And with a civilizational split right down the middle,
Ukraine has profound, and potentially catastrophic, divisions.
So let us all join hands in praise of the young people braving the cold in
the streets of Kiev. But then tell me why there is such silence about the
Iraqis, young and old, braving bullets and bombs, organizing electorate
lists and negotiating coalitions even as we speak. Where is it written: Only
in Ukraine? -30- (letters@charleskrauthammer.com),
=========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No. 245: ARTICLE NUMBER TEN
Letters to the editor are always welcome
=========================================================
10. UKRAINE'S ELECTIONS: THE FORCES IN PLAY (PART III)
By James Sherr, Conflict Studies Research Centre
Defence Academy of the United Kingdom [1]
Camberly, Surrey, England, Thursday, 2 December, 2004
1. Ukraine's authorities are deploying all of their political
resources to create pretexts, phantom issues and bogus compromises to
recover the ground that they have lost over the past week. One of their
key objectives is to enlist the EU as an accomplice in these efforts.[i]
Success in this goal would, in their view, split the opposition, exhaust
and demoralise their grass roots supporters and entrap Yushchenko in a
'process' that would be no less rigged than the elections themselves.
2. These new tactics stem from several adverse developments: the
decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court (25 November) to accept
Yushchenko's appeal and adjudicate on the legality of the elections;[ii]
parliament's vote of no confidence in Yanukovych's government (1
December); the crumbling of Yanukovych's forces; continued defections
from the state apparatus[iii] and growing indications that power ministries
will not carry out orders to suppress the opposition. (On 29 November,
a major movement of Ministry of Interior forces against Kyiv
demonstrators was foiled by the insubordination of MVS officers.)
3. The first gambit was eastern secession (most prominently, the
convening on 29 November 'Northern Donetsk All-Ukrainian Congress').
In Ukraine, this threat (and the spectre of 'civil war') rang hollow for at
least two reasons. First, it was plainly a manoeuvre from the top which
lacked grass roots support. Second, the Donetsk power structures them-
selves, who are in sharp competition with Russian business interests,
understand that secession would make them almost entirely dependent
upon Russia.
Yanukovych's attendance at this Congress (alongside the Mayor of Moscow,
Yuri Luzhkov)[iv] appeared to associate him with unconstitutional measures.
For a would be president, this was a blunder of the first order, and he has
not recovered from it. Yet some in the West accepted the manoeuvres at
face value and, by defending the right of the authorities to 'hold the
country together', may have unwittingly backed a pretext for using force.
Fortunately, the secessionist game collapsed as quickly as it started.
4. The more recent gambit is President Kuchma's offer to hold 'new'
elections. Off camera, Kuchma (and more recently President Putin) has
made it clear that 'new elections' means starting the process de novo, with
a new first and second round, a newly composed Central Electoral
Commission and new candidates. In practice (and according to the
constitution), this would keep the present authorities in power and restore
'normality' (i.e. the status quo ante) for three months. Although there is
nothing in common between this 'concession' and the opposition's demand
for a rerun of elections (i.e., the second round), EU negotiators on 26
November did not appear to grasp the distinction.
5. The third gambit is accepting the opposition's demand for a
rerun, but only in exchange for the immediate acceptance of 'political
reform': code for the implementation of Kuchma's long tabled (and long
rejected) package of proposals to render the presidency a largely symbolic
office and transfer effective power to a prime minister, elected by
parliament. The authorities' leverage over parliament might be considerable
under this scenario. Even if parliament did not elect Kuchma himself to
this post (an outcome he appears to seek), it is likely that the successful
candidate would render Yushchenko impotent.
6. Kuchma's surprise visit to Moscow on 2 December demonstrate
that Putin remains a pivotal player. Thus far, his policy has been based
upon a combination of deliberation, delusion and guile, all underpinned
by compelling geopolitical interest. Putin's greatest delusion, endemic to
the circles who advise him, is the underestimation of Ukrainian national
consciousness and civil society. Deliberation, reflected in the intimate
involvement of Russian 'political technologists' in Ukraine's electoral
fraud, has run into the buffers of these delusions.[v] These blunders are
exposing Putin to an unprecedented degree of criticism in Russia itself.
Yet his response has been to strengthen Kuchma's hand and intensify
his own intervention, whilst decrying the 'interference' of others.[vi]
7. The determination of Ukraine's authorities to remain in power
overrides any need to be honest with honest brokers. To these
authorities, 'compromise' is a means of struggle. Given this fact, there
could be adverse consequences in Ukraine if the EU pursues it as an
end in itself. For Ukrainians, the issue is legitimacy, not stability. Any
stability achieved at the expense of legitimacy would be fraught, short-
lived, deeply damaging to the EU's standing and, sooner rather than
later, its interests. -30-
ENDNOTES
[i] The first EU led mission took place on 26 November. It comprised
Javier Solana (EU High Representative for the Common Foreign &
Security Policy), Jan Kubis (Secretary General of the OSCE), Alexander
Kwasniewski (President of Poland), Valdas Adamkus (President of
Lithuania) and Boris Gryzlov (Chairman of the Russian State Duma
and Putin's Special Representative).
The Ukrainian participants comprised President Kuchma, Prime Minister
Yanukovych, Viktor Yushchenko and Volodymyr Lytvyn (Chairman of
the Ukrainian Parliament). A second visit occurred on 1 December.
[ii]Of course, the court's decision, which is likely to be announced on 3
December, cannot be predicted. But the fact that the hearings, which
began on 29 November, are being conducted by the civil branch of the
court, which consists of judges known for their independence, has
caused unease to the authorities.
[iii] By now, these include a large number of officials of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. By 2 December, 450 diplomats and officials recognised
Yushchenko as Ukraine's rightful president. Defections have also taken
place within the Ministry of Interior (MVS) and SBU. The latter include
General Skybynets'kiy, adviser to SBU Chairman Ihor Smeshko (but now
without line responsibilities), General Skipal'skiy (adviser and a former
Deputy SBU Chairman) and four other unnamed general officers. Whether
these are serving officers, advisers or retired officers is not indicated.
For his part, General Smeshko has stated: 'I rule out any use of force
against our own people. The SBU states again that it will not interfere in
political processes'.
This posture of studied neutrality has made it possible for SBU
officers sympathetic to the opposition to provide it with some timely
intelligence. Yet there is no open source indication thus far that the SBU
has withdrawn intelligence, security and communications support from the
President, Presidential Administration and government. Thus far, there is
no sign that the Armed Forces have been drawn into the political struggle.
For background, see James Sherr, Into Reverse, The Dismissal of Ukraine's
Minister of Defence (CSRC Occasional Brief 04/26, 29 September, 2004).
[iv] Mayor Luzhkov, a strong supporter of Crimean separatism (and a major
investor there), has long been associated with a hard, 'chauvinistic' policy
towards Ukraine.
[v] Alexei Makarkin, Deputy General Director of the Political Techniques
Centre, Moscow, recently stated that 'we have dropped out of the circle of
active players' (gazeta.ru, 29 November). Other Russian analysts convey an
atmosphere of confusion, setbacks, redeployment of forces, rethinking of
tactics and a determination to fight from new positions. According to the
respected geopolitician, Aleksandr Dugin, whose views are regarded
sympathetically by the Kremlin, 'a war must be avoided to the last possible
moment. If this becomes impossible, the war must be won' (RIA Novosti,
29 November).
[vi] It is still unclear what role, if any, Russian spetsnaz might play in
events. Earlier reports of their presence are given credence by a carefully
detailed compilation of eye-witness accounts in the respected Russian
newspaper, Kommersant, on 29 November ('Russian Spetsnaz have been
in Ukraine since 23 November' [Rossiyskiy spetsnaz nakhoditsya v Ukraine's
23 noyabrya], kommersant.net, 29 November 2004). The paper reiterates
earlier reports that one mission of an estimated 800 troops is to exfiltrate
presidential, governmental and SBU documents to Russia.
For President Putin, RF security and intelligence services, and energy/
economic structures, it would be vital to ensure that documents revealing
the extent and methods of Russian intervention in Ukraine not fall into
opposition (or Western) hands. The Kommersant article contains highly
specific but sporadic accounts of landings and surface movements of
detachments and 'vestiges' [slediy] of 'Vityaz' special purpose MVD
forces at Gosmotel' aerodrome (near Irpin'), Vasil'kov military aero-
drome near Kyiv and Kyiv Boryspil International Airport. -30-
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] Disclaimer: The views expressed are the author's and not necessarily
those of the UK Ministry of Defence.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
James Sherr, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Defence Academy of
the United Kingdom, Camberly, Surrey, England; e-mail:
james.sherr@lincoln.oxford.ac.uk
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
James Sherr has worked on Ukrainian issues for many years especially
in the defence area, including NATO. He is an outstanding analyst and
speaker. He is in much demand as a speaker on issues related to Ukraine.
The Action Ukraine Report appreciates the assistance received from
James Sherr regarding the publication of his articles.
=========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No. 245: ARTICLE NUMBER ELEVEN
Letters to the editor are always welcome
=========================================================
11.YANUKOVYCH-GATE UNFOLDS AFTER UKRAINIAN ELECTIONS
Yet another Ukrainian political scandal over tape-recorded conversations
By Taras Kuzio, Eurasia Daily Monitor
Volume 1, Issue 139, Jamestown Foundation
Washington, D.C., Friday, December 3
The first year of Leonid Kuchma's second term as president of Ukraine was
marked by a scandal that eventually became known as Kuchmagate. The
affair was triggered by the release of secret tape recordings made in his
office by a security guard. Two years later another scandal emerged;
"Kolchuga-gate" concerned Kuchma's authorization of the sale of Kolchuga
military radar systems to Iraq.
Now Ukraine has Yanukovychgate. This scandal involves a large number
of audiotapes related to Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych. These tapes,
which are of far better quality than those made by Mykola Melnychenko
in 1999-2000, were made by the Security Service (SBU) and leaked to
challenger Viktor Yushchenko days after the presidential runoff on
November 21.
The Yanukovych camp did attempt to block electronic surveillance of its
activities. But their efforts obviously failed. Unlike in the Kuchmagate
tapes, such an extensive operation could have only been undertaken by more
than one SBU officer. The SBU has a technical operations department and
does control and monitor government communications.
Significantly, the Yanukovych audiotapes were accepted as evidence by
the Supreme Court, which is sitting to discuss mass violations in the
runoff. Ukrainian courts never accepted the Melnychenko tapes were as
evidence. The SBU tapes will add to the documents intercepted by
Yushchenko supporters that the authorities had attempted to smuggle out
of the presidential administration building.
The tapes contain hundreds of intercepted telephone conversations from
Yanukovych's "shadow election headquarters" between October 30 and
November 23, taking in both rounds of the elections. Yanukovych always
had two campaign headquarters. The official face, led by the dapper
chairman of the National Bank, Serhiy Tyhipko, played on the positive
attributes of Yanukovych's election program, such as his social policies.
The "shadow campaign" headquarters had a fundamentally different role a
nd was led by Deputy Prime Minister Andrei Klyuev, a close Donetsk
ally of Yanukovych.
The shadow office was established to channel funds above the legislated
candidate spending limits and to undertake activities that undermined the
Yushchenko campaign. The shadow team also coordinated state-
administrative resources and the media in favor of Yanukovych and
against Yushchenko.
Tyhipko and Yanukovych always presented themselves as conducting a
"free and fair" campaign through three strategies. First, they denied that a
shadow campaign existed. Second, they insisted that dirty tricks came
from other candidates (i.e. the phony candidates promoted by the
authorities). Third, they insisted that both Yushchenko and Yanukovych
had allegedly hired Russian political advisors. The Yanukovych camp
hired two long-time associates of Russian President Vladimir Putin,
Marat Gelman and Gleb Pavlovsky, who run the "Russian Club" in Kyiv.
In reality the Yanukovych campaign had four inter-related units: 1)
Tyhipko's official campaign; 2) Kluyev's shadow campaign; 3) "technical" or
"fake" candidates; and 4) Russian advisors. Of these four, only Tyhipko's
had a "clean" image. The other three components were behind Ukraine's
dirtiest election to date. To suggest -- as Tyhipko and Yanukovych are now
doing -- that they knew nothing of the other three elements is unbelievable.
The audiotapes provide information as to how voting was conducted and
massaged, "who directed this process and how, and why the voting dynamics
changed so intricately during the presidential elections in Ukraine"
(Zerkalo nedeli, November 27). The tapes also provide insight into how the
Yanukovych campaign added upwards of 2 million votes -- and raised turnout
by 19% -- in Donetsk oblast between rounds one and two. In comparison,
turnout increased by only 3% in Lviv, Yushchenko's base.
Unlike some of the Melnychenko tapes, the voices on these new recordings
are clearly identifiable. These figures include Kluyev, Viktor Medvedchuk
(head of the presidential administration), Sergei Kivalov (chairman of the
Central Election Commission [CEC]), Sergei Kluyev, "political technologist"
Yuriy Levenetz, and long-time Yanukovych adviser Eduard Prutnik.
One of the most interesting sections on the tapes is a conversation about
how the official results in round two were to be "massaged." One
conversation, early in the evening on election day and three days before the
official results were released by the CEC, describes how, "We agreed about
3-3.5% difference to our advantage" (www.maidan.uar.net/audio/). It is
unlikely that it is a mere coincidence that the CEC declared Yanukovych
victor with a 2.72% lead.
The audiotapes provide concrete evidence of the existence of a "transit
server" whose purpose was to manipulate the results as they were sent from
local Territorial Election Commissions (TECs) to the CEC. The "transit
server" was based in the presidential administration.
Details of the "transit server" were leaked to the Yushchenko camp and
the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv during the first round of the elections, but the
authorities always denied its existence. Nevertheless, the long time it took
the CEC to receive protocols sent by electronic mail from TECs always
seemed suspicious.
The tapes also include conversations by Kluyev, ordering provocations to
be undertaken to discredit Yushchenko. In one instance, Kluyev orders an
unknown person to "organize some fights or something like this."
The audiotapes, together with other mounting evidence collected by the
Yushchenko camp and submitted to the Supreme Court, proves beyond
any shadow of a doubt that the authorities never intended to hold a clean
election.
While possessing knowledge of pre-planned election fraud, Kuchma and
Yanukovych nevertheless repeatedly "guaranteed" to the United States and
EU that Ukraine would hold free and fair elections. This is, therefore, a
major case of deception conducted by Ukraine's leaders that has now
backfired and may lead to their own undoing. -30-
=========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No. 245: ARTICLE NUMBER TWELVE
=========================================================
12. UKRAINE: EAST-WEST BREAK-UP FEARS ARE OVERDONE
Oxford Analytica, UK, Thursday, December 2004
EVENT: Donetsk regional council decided yesterday that it would hold a
referendum on autonomy next month.
SIGNIFICANCE: This move follows Sunday's congress attended by Prime
Minister Viktor Yanukovych and local councils in east Ukraine, which called
for autonomous status. The congress highlighted the regional divisions
between east and west that have surfaced during the presidential elections.
It prompted reports raising the spectre of Russian-backed secession in the
style of Moldova's Transnistria -- Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov attended
the congress.
ANALYSIS: During presidential elections on October 31 and November 21,
west Ukraine voted overwhelmingly for opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko,
while east Ukraine, even allowing for electoral fraud, largely backed Prime
Minister Viktor Yanukovych (see UKRAINE: Authorities prepared to face
down opposition - November 23, 2004). To an extent this reflects historic
divides (west Ukraine was outside the Soviet Union until 1945) and
linguistic differences (Ukrainian predominates in the west and centre,
Russian in the east and south). In the tense post-election crisis, demands
for
autonomy from Donetsk have added to fears that Ukraine is on the verge
of civil war or about to break up.
Such fears, and the extent of the division between east and west Ukraine,
are exaggerated. During President Leonid Kuchma's decade in office, regional
divisions have in fact declined considerably. Notably, separatism in Crimea
collapsed in 1995, and in 1998 the autonomous republic obtained a new
constitution that recognises Ukrainian sovereignty. Although regional
tensions remain, their apparent prominence at present owes much to their
accentuation during the elections by the Kuchma-Yanukovych camp, which
used a wide array of tactics developed by Russian political advisers to
'blacken' Yushchenko.
THE STRATEGY WAS TWOFOLD:
Yushchenko was denied positive television coverage on state television and
private channels controlled by oligarchs loyal to Kuchma and Yanukovych.
Soviet-style propaganda portrayed Yushchenko as an 'extremist', 'fascist',
'anti-Russian' and 'US puppet'. One component was a Soviet-style
anti-American campaign that targeted Yushchenko, whose wife is American (see
UKRAINE: Anti-Americanism an election tool for Kuchma - January 9, 2004).
In addition, Soviet-style demonisation of west Ukrainians re-emerged. These
tactics have been partially successful -- east Ukrainian voters fear a
Yushchenko victory because of his alleged 'anti-Russian' stance.
Regime fears. However, the reluctance of the Kuchma-Yanukovych camp to
cede power owes more to two other factors:
The pro-regime centrists hail from the former ruling elites of the Soviet
Ukrainian nomenklatura. They look upon Ukraine almost as their patrimony,
believing that only they have a right to rule the country.
Kuchma and his allies fear a Yushchenko victory because of a wide array of
crimes they are accused of -- election rigging, corruption, arms trafficking
and violence against journalists and politicians. Evidence available from
this election campaign (Ukraine's dirtiest) have reinforced these fears.
Autonomy bid. These high stakes led to the holding of the autonomist
congress. Yanukovych feels betrayed by his allies in Kyiv (including
Kuchma), who have failed to back him to the end and are instead looking for
another way out of the crisis (see UKRAINE: Opposition gains upper hand but
risks remain - November 29, 2004). The threat of Donbas secession may be
intended to give him additional leverage, and ensure that his Donetsk clan
is not ignored in any final deal with the opposition.
Participants in the congress did not call for separation from Ukraine, only
for the creation of a 'South-Eastern Autonomous Republic'. However, thus far
only Yanukovych's home base of Donetsk has stated its intention to hold a
referendum, in January.
Narrow base. This reflects the fact that, although the congress claimed it
was representing all south and east Ukraine, most of the regions --
including Crimea, Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson and Dnipropetrovsk -- have
refused to back it. Industrial giants in Zaporizhzhia and Mariupol also
refused to support autonomist moves.
The Dnipropetrovsk clan is headed by Serhiy Tyhypko, who was in charge of
Yanukovych's election campaign. On Monday, he resigned from this position
and as governor of the National Bank. Kuchma may be planning to replace
Yanukovych with Tyhypko as the regime's candidate in repeat elections,
promoting him as a 'compromise candidate' (although it is highly unlikely
that the opposition would support him). Tyhypko condemned the autonomist
congress.
Most city councils in south and east Ukraine, where opposition forces have
some support, also condemned the congress. Other regional governors who
initially backed it began a day later to backtrack -- notably Yevhen
Kushnariov, Kharkiv regional governor. Kushnariov's initial support for the
referendum was condemned by Kharkiv's city council, while his own political
party, the People's Democrats, voted with the opposition for Saturday's
parliamentary resolution that condemned the second round elections as
invalid.
Lack of legality. It is still unclear if the referendum will go ahead.
Donetsk Governor Anatoliy Blyzniuk has ruled out autonomy or separation
from Ukraine. If Donetsk does proceed with a referendum, it will have no
legal standing. The region held a similar poll during the 1994 presidential
election, to no effect. Ukraine has permitted Crimea to create an autonomous
republic because it is the only Ukrainian region with an ethnic Russian
majority. The creation of a second autonomous region in Donetsk would
require changes to the 1996 constitution. It would be impossible to find the
300-plus votes to permit this -- the Donetsk faction would not be supported
even by other pro-Kuchma factions, such as Labour Ukraine.
Yanukovych losing support. The autonomist congress further undermined
Yanukovych's support in Kyiv. Kuchma, Defence Minister Oleksandr Kuzmuk,
and Parliamentary Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn condemned steps towards
autonomy or separatism. The Security Service and Prosecutor's office have
been ordered to investigate the demands made at the congress (described by
Lytvyn as "unconstitutional") under the Criminal Code.
Since the congress, Yanukovych's patriotic credentials, especially within
the security forces, have been tarnished. This partly explains why many have
defected to Yushchenko (some were already uneasy at the prospect of a
commander-in-chief who had a criminal record). The emergence of evidence
that Yanukovych's election team colluded with the presidential
administration in massive election fraud has further damaged his reputation.
Relations with Russia. President Vladimir Putin's overt intervention -- both
in the elections themselves and, through Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, in moves
for Donetsk separatism -- could make relations between Ukraine and Russia
worse in the event of an opposition victory than would otherwise have been
the case. Yushchenko himself is not anti-Russian. However, many of his
supporters now blame Russian political advisers for dividing Ukraine, and
also believe that Moscow was behind the alleged poisoning of their candidate
in early September. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the majority of whose
diplomats declared for Yushchenko after round two) condemned Luzhkov's
presence at the Donetsk congress, and called in Russian embassy officials in
Kyiv, who were given stern warnings.
CONCLUSION: The threat of a break-up of Ukraine is exaggerated. Demands
for autonomy status in Donetsk reflect anger at the failure of the local
candidate, Yanukovych, to gain the presidency, and perhaps Yanukovych's need
for leverage. However, legal obstacles, such as changing the constitution,
would rule out the creation of a Donetsk autonomous republic. Any referendum
results in favour of this outcome will be ignored, as in 1994. -30-
=========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No. 245: ARTICLE NUMBER THIRTEEN
Your financial support for this Report is needed
=========================================================
13. "ORANGE REVOLUTION SQUEEZED"
ANALYSIS: by Peter Lavelle, United Press International
Moscow, Russia, Thursday, December 2, 2004
MOSCOW -- The recent string of victories won by Ukraine's political
opposition, lead by Viktor Yushchenko, may be deceptive. The "Orange
Revolution" is still set to succeed, but much of its "revolutionary juice"
is being squeezed from it.
Nature abhors a vacuum, and outgoing President Leonid Kuchma is
aggressively filling the political vacuum created by Ukraine's
post-presidential election of Nov. 21 - denying official victory to either
Viktor Yushchenko or regime-sponsored candidate Prime Minister Viktor
Yanukovych.
In an contest believed to have been fraught with gross fraud and other
irregularities, Ukraine's Supreme Court intervened, barring the Central
Election Commission from declaring Kuchma's handpicked successor,
Yanukovych, the winner. The Supreme Court is expected to make public
its review of the election on Thursday or Friday. Depending on the court's
conclusion, either the runoff presidential vote or the first and second
rounds will be deemed invalid. There remains the unlikely possibly that
Yushchenko will be declared the winner.
The "Orange Revolution" was given another victory, of sorts, when
parliament this week passed a no-confidence resolution against Prime
Minister Viktor Yanukovych and the rest of his government. The opposition,
thousands of whom occupy Kiev in a round-the-clock protest, interpreted this
as a strong victory. The vote against Yanukovych showed that the authorities
were finally losing their grip on power.
However, due to nuances in the law concerning the passage of
no-confidence motion against the government, the constitutionality of
parliament's vote against Yanukovych is ambiguous. A lawyer familiar
with Ukrainian legislation told United Press International that the Supreme
Court might have to rule on the legality of parliament's action - and this
could take up to six months.
The Supreme Court's intervention in Ukraine's political crisis and
parliament's attempt to remove Yanukovych from power (as well as
de-legitimize his presidential candidacy) have not directly benefited
Yushchenko's bid to be named the legal incumbent to the presidency.
Opposition tactics have de-legitimized Ukraine's presidential elections
but have not necessary promoted the insistence of Yushchenko's electoral
victory. Kuchma has been quick to take advantage of this error and others.
Yushchenko is making other errors as well. While insisting he was the
winner in the runoff election, he is in the process of making deals with the
regime, with Western mediators egging him on. These deals include a repeat
of the entire election - not just the second round -- as well as political
reforms that would dilute the power of the presidency and increase the
power of the prime minister. With the talk of secession or greater regional
autonomy for eastern Ukraine, even further political dilution of central
political authority is also in the cards. All this is being discussed while
thousands continue their protest demanding that Yushchenko simply be
declared president.
Kuchma, probably the most hated man in Ukraine, has shown himself
to be quite adroit. Sensing the opposition has not made strong inroads in
negotiations with the pillars of state power - the military, security
forces, and most of the country's oligarchs - Kuchma remains Ukraine
primary power broker. When talk of eastern secession was loudest, he
met with governors he has the power to fire. Instead of the opposition
attempting to reach out to the east to keep the country sovereign, Kuchma
stole the initiative to negotiate on the opposition's behalf.
Changing the law to run another presidential election is also in
Kuchma's hands. The opposition can garner a small majority in parliament to
pass resolutions. However, to override a presidential veto on something as
important as electoral reform, parliament needs to assemble majority of
two-thirds - this is extremely unlikely.
Electoral reform could see Kuchma attempting to name his successor
again. By all accounts, Yanukovych is already a spent political force and
likely to be dropped by Kuchma when the moment is ripe and at his
discretion. Kuchma also most certainly knows the longer the Ukraine's
political crisis continues - slowly turning into a financial and economic
crises - the better he is positioned to find a "compromise" candidate to run
against Yushchenko in a third vote.
Peace and unity within the ranks of the opposition, protesting in the
winter's cold, could start to deteriorate. Decisions and negotiations over
wide array of issues are in play, but not including who actually won the
runoff election. This can't sit well with Yushchenko's followers for long.
United Press International has been told that Yushchenko's hardcore
backers are just inching to storm government buildings and force
Yushchenko's inauguration. This eventually is something Yushchenko can't
back at the moment, sitting with Western mediators and Kuchma taking his
time.
The protestors supporting Yushchenko have been a catalyst for change in
Ukraine. The opposition is still set to see a likely Yushchenko presidency.
However, by the time that happens much of the juice that fueled the "Orange
Revolution" will have been squeezed and consumed to protect much of
Kuchma's political status quo. -30-
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Peter Lavelle is an independent Moscow-based analyst and the author of
the electronic newsletter on Russia "Untimely Thoughts"
www.untimely-thoughts.com.
=========================================================
ARTICLES ARE FOR PERSONAL AND ACADEMIC USE ONLY
Articles are Distributed For Information, Research, Education
Discussion and Personal Purposes Only
=========================================================
Ukraine Information Website: http://www.ArtUkraine.com
=========================================================
"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT"
A Publication Supported Financially By Its Readers
Please add your name to our list of financial contributors!
"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT"-04, is an in-depth news and
analysis international newsletter, produced by the www.ArtUkraine.com
Information Service (ARTUIS) and The Action Ukraine Report
Monitoring Service (TAURMS). The report is now distributed to several
thousand persons worldwide FREE of charge using the e-mail address:
ArtUkraine.com@starpower.net. This is the 244th Report issued so
far this year, out of the more than 265 to be issued in 2004.
"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT" is supported through The Action
Ukraine Program Fund. Financial support from readers is essential to
the future of this Report. You can become a financial sponsor of The
Action Ukraine Program Fund. Individuals, corporations, non-profit
organizations and other groups can provide support for the expanding
Action Ukraine Program by sending in contributions.
Checks should be made out to the Ukrainian Federation of America,
(UFA), a private, not-for-profit, voluntary organization. The funds should
be designated for the Action Ukraine Program Fund (AUPF), and
mailed to Zenia Chernyk, Chairperson, Ukrainian Federation of
America (UAF), 930 Henrietta Avenue, Huntingdon Valley, PA
19006-8502.
For individuals a contribution of $45-$100 is suggested. Your contribution
to help build The Action Ukraine Program to support Ukraine and her
future is very much appreciated. -30-
========================================================
If you would like to read "THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT"-04
please send your name, country of residence, and e-mail contact information
morganw@patriot.net. Additional names are welcome. If you do not wish to
read "THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT"-04, around five times per week,
let us know by e-mail to morganw@patriot.net.
========================================================
"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT"-2004 SPONSORS:
"Working to Secure Ukraine's Future"
1. THE ACTION UKRAINE COALITION (AUC): Washington, D.C.,
http://www.artukraine.com/auc/index.htm; MEMBERS:
A. UKRAINIAN AMERICAN COORDINATING COUNCIL,
(UACC), Ihor Gawdiak, President, Washington, D.C., New York, NY
B. UKRAINIAN FEDERATION OF AMERICA (UFA),
Zenia Chernyk, Chairperson; Vera M. Andryczyk, President; E.
Morgan Williams, Executive Director, Huntingdon Valley, Pennsylvania.
http://www.artukraine.com/ufa/index.htm
C. U.S.-UKRAINE FOUNDATION (USUF), Nadia Komarnyckyj
McConnell, President, Washington, D.C., Kyiv, Ukraine .
2. UKRAINE-U.S. BUSINESS COUNCIL, Kempton Jenkins,
President, Washington, D.C.
3. KIEV-ATLANTIC GROUP, David and Tamara Sweere, Daniel
Sweere, Kyiv and Myronivka, Ukraine, 380 44 295 7275 in Kyiv.
4. BAHRIANY FOUNDATION, INC. Dr. Anatol Lysyj, Chairman,
Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA,
5. ODUM- Association of American Youth of Ukrainian Descent,
Minnesota Chapter, Natalia Yarr, Chairperson
========================================================
PUBLISHER AND EDITOR
Mr. E. Morgan Williams, Executive Director, Ukrainian Federation of America
(UFA); Coordinator, The Action Ukraine Coalition (AUC);
Senior Advisor, Government Relations, U.S.-Ukraine Foundation (USUF);
Advisor, Ukraine-U.S. Business Council, Washington, D.C.;
Publisher and Editor, www.ArtUkraine.com Information Service (ARTUIS),
P.O. Box 2607, Washington, D.C. 20013,
Tel: 202 437 4707, E-mail: morganw@patriot.net
========================================================