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Action Ukraine Report

"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT"
An International Newsletter
In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis, and Commentary

"The Art of Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion,
Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World"

"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT" Year 04, Number 264
morganw@patriot.net, ArtUkraine.com@starpower.net
Washington, D.C., Kyiv, Ukraine, SUNDAY, December 19, 2004

-----INDEX OF ARTICLES-----
"Major International News Headlines and Articles"

1. UKRAINIAN ELECTORAL BODY NOW HAS REGISTERED OVER
7,000 FOREIGN OBSERVERS FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
UNIAN news agency, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1232 gmt 17 Dec 04
BBC Monitoring Service, Kiev, Ukraine, December 17, 2004

2 PRESIDENT KUCHMA MEETS U.S. CONG DELEGATION
UT1 State TV, Kiev, in Ukrainian, Sat, 18 Dec 04
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, Sat, December 18, 2004

3. YANUKOVYCH REMAINS PRIME MINISTER DESPITE
KUCHMA'S DEMAND THAT HE RESIGN
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Fri, Dec 17, 2004

4. THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF UKRAINE ACCUSES PRESIDENT
LEONID KUCHMA OF BEING CONTROLLED BY THE USA
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Fri, December 17, 2004

5. YUSHCHENKO TO FOCUS ON ACCESSION TO WTO, EU
ASSOCIATED MEMBERSHIP IF ELECTED PRESIDENT
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Fri, December 18, 2004

6. "UKRAINIANS STEP UP TO CLAIM DESTINY"
COMMENTARY: By Richard S. Williamson
Formerly a U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
Chicago Sun Times, Chicago, Illinois, Sat, Dec 18, 2004

7. U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN UKRAINE, EVEN IF PROVED,
MAY MEAN VERY LITTLE:
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN NOT THAT BLACK AND WHITE
OP-ED By David Marples, Edmonton Journal
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, Fri, December 17, 2004

8. "UKRAINE WHOLE AND FREE:
WHAT I SAW AT THE ORANGE REVOLUTION"
COMMENTARY: By Anders Åslund
The Weekly Standard magazine, Volume 010, Issue 15
Washington, D.C., December 27, 2004

9. INFORMATION BREAKTHROUGH
Orange revolution brings Ukraine a step closer to an information society
By Oksana Omelchenko, The Day
The Day Weekly Digest in English, #35
Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, 14 December 2004

10. ORANGE SCARVES LABOUR OF LOVE FOR CITY WOMAN
By Carol Sanders, Winnipeg Free Press
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada, Saturday, Dec 18th, 2004

11. "BYZANTINE EAGLE, SYMBOL OF 'ORANGE' REVOLUTIONS"
By Oleksandr Lytvynenko, D.S. (politics)
The Day Weekly Digest in English, #35
Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, December 14, 2004

12. "A TEMPLE OR A CANVASSING STATION?"
The church is facing a crucially important question: will it remain
uninvolved in politics and defend its independence from political forces?
Compiled by Klara Gudzyk, The Day
The Day Weekly Digest in English, #35
Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, December 14, 2004

13. "PUTIN AND THE RISING TIDE OF PARANOIA"
By Ira Straus, Founder and U.S. coordinator of the
Committee on Eastern Europe and Russia in NATO
The Globalist, Washington, D.C., Fri, December 17, 2004

14. UKRAINE: LETTER TO THE DONBAS VOTER'S COMMITTEE
AND UKRAINA TV ABOUT CENSORSHIP
LETTER TO DONBAS: From Lidia Wolanskyj
Founder of Eastern Economist and EE Daily
Kyiv, Ukraine, Wednesday, December 8, 2004
Copy of letter also sent to The Action Ukraine Report
Washington, D.C., published, Sunday, December 19, 2004
========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No. 264: ARTICLE NUMBER ONE
========================================================
1 UKRAINIAN ELECTORAL BODY NOW HAS REGISTERED OVER
7,000 FOREIGN OBSERVERS FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

UNIAN news agency, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1232 gmt 17 Dec 04
BBC Monitoring Service, Kiev, Ukraine, December 17, 2004 (12:32)

KIEV - December: The Central Electoral Commission [CEC] has already
registered 7,095 official observers for the Ukrainian presidential election.
UNIAN reports that the news was announced by Ruslan Knyazevych, a
member of the CEC, at today's meeting of the CEC.

New observers are being registered by the CEC every single day. Today,
617 observers were registered from the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe the Moscow international discussion club,
the Freedom House organization, the National Democratic Institute, the World
Congress of Ukrainians, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, the
Ukrainian-Polish forum, the Israeli-Ukrainian legal foundation, the European

Parliament, the American centre for international trade union solidarity as
well as from Japan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Georgia and the US.

Knyazevych said the CEC is receiving applications from people who want
to register as official observers every hour. -30-
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ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No.264: ARTICLE NUMBER TWO
========================================================
2. PRESIDENT KUCHMA MEETS US CONG DELEGATION

UT1 State TV, Kiev, in Ukrainian, Sat, 18 Dec 04
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, Sat, December 18, 2004

KIEV - A bipartisan US congressional delegation arrived in Kiev today to
assess the situation in Ukraine ahead of the repeat presidential runoff.
During a meeting with President Leonid Kuchma, the members of congress
discussed US-Ukrainian relations and the political situation in Ukraine. The
American guests are also planning to meet parliament speaker Volodymyr
Lytvyn and the head of the Central Electoral Commission, Yaroslav
Davydovych.

The US delegation is headed by Republican Senator Dana Rohrabacher [as
heard: Rohrabacher is actually a Republican member of the House of
Representatives]. It was Rohrabacher who submitted to the House of
Representatives in September the Ukraine Elections Bill, which foresees
sanctions against Kiev and individual Ukrainian officials and politicians if
the election is deemed non-democratic. Some Ukrainian political forces
even proposed to declare Dana Rohrabacher persona non grata. -30-
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ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No.264: ARTICLE NUMBER THREE
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3. YANUKOVYCH REMAINS PRIME MINISTER DESPITE
KUCHMA'S DEMAND THAT HE RESIGN

Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Fri, Dec 17, 2004

KHARKIV - Presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovych has said that he
remains in the post of prime minister despite the parliament's no-confidence
vote in the Cabinet of Ministers and President Leonid Kuchma's proposal
that he submit his resignation letter. Yanukovych announced this to
journalists in Kharkiv.

Yanukovych said that Kuchma demanded his resignation letter immediately
after the parliament's no-confidence vote in the Cabinet of Ministers. He
added that he did not consider it necessary to abide by the parliament's
decision because he considered the decision illegal and that it was adopted
under pressure by the mass protests involving supporters of the Our
Ukraine coalition's leader and presidential candidate Viktor Yuschenko.

"I think that Leonid Kuchma simply did not know me well enough when
he made this proposal. I will never accept humiliation of 15 million voters.
Therefore, in representing their interests, I said I would always put the
interest of the Ukrainian people first," Yanukovych said. As Ukrainian News
earlier reported, Yanukovych traveled to the Kharkiv region on Friday
morning for meetings with voters. -30-
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ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No. 264: ARTICLE NUMBER FOUR
========================================================
4. THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF UKRAINE ACCUSES PRESIDENT
LEONID KUCHMA OF BEING CONTROLLED BY THE USA

Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Fri, December 17, 2004

KYIV - The Communist Party of Ukraine accuses President Leonid
Kuchma of being controlled by the United States of America. This was
disclosed in the statement of the party leader Petro Symonenko, the
text of which Ukrainian News obtained.

"We witness still current President trying to transform its "decayed"
regime under dictate of the US Administration in new realities into the
new personalia," Symonenko said.

He also noted that the political situation in Ukraine recently took on
geopolitical meaning and the US is interfering in its home affairs. "In
fact, we are talking about impudent, off-handed interference of the US,
including that by financing of election campaign of the candidate they
specified... aiming to bring their puppet protege to the highest state post
in our country," said the leader of communists.

He said that mass actions against of election rigging held in Ukraine were
also organized by the US. "Ukraine, by essence, became another testing
site in implementation of the American doctrine in establishment of
strategic interests of the US anywhere on the globe," Symonenko believes.

"Both nature and content of the so-called orange revolution have shown that
these actions are of the same nature with already tested "revolutions" in
Yugoslavia, Georgia, and now in Romania," he said. Moreover, he stressed
that communists are now the only oppositional force in the country.

As Ukrainian News earlier reported, the Verkhovna Rada's deputy Serhii
Hmyria suggested that parliament created an interim investigation commission
to inquire into information that the United States is financing the election
campaign of Our Ukraine coalition leader and presidential candidate Viktor
Yuschenko.

Before that, the election campaign headquarters of presidential candidate,
Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych asked the Central Electoral Commission
(CEC) to check the reports about this.

In his recent speech on the Ukraina television channel Yanukovych accused
Yuschenko of using foreign money to finance his presidential election
campaign. -30- [The Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
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ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No. 264: ARTICLE NUMBER FIVE
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5. YUSHCHENKO TO FOCUS ON ACCESSION TO WTO, EU
ASSOCIATED MEMBERSHIP IF ELECTED PRESIDENT

Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Fri, December 18, 2004

KHARKIV - Ukrainian presidential candidate Viktor Yuschenko promises
that he will concentrate in his foreign policy on Ukraine's winning the
status of a free market economy country, its accession to the World Trade
Organization [WTO] and obtaining associated membership in the European
Union [EU], if elected the President of Ukraine. He said this to journalists
at a press conference in Kharkiv.

Yuschenko is confident that today Ukraine is on the path of integration in
European structures. He added that, in keeping with the incumbent
Constitution, Ukraine is a non-aligned state. At the same time, he said, a
number of projects are being carried out now with different international
organizations, including NATO, in different areas. According to Yuschenko,
it is practically impossible to speak about Ukraine's aligned or non-aligned
status without holding a referendum and a wide public discussion.

As Ukrainian News earlier reported, Ukraine has already signed 30 protocols
on mutual access to the markets of goods and services with WTO
member-states, and expects to join the organization before the end of 2005.
Ukraine is not satisfied with the Ukrainian-European Union action plan
approved by the Council of the European Union, and intends to propose a
long-term plan for its integration into the European Union after the
presidential elections. -30- [Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
=======================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No. 264: ARTICLE NUMBER SIX
========================================================
6. "UKRAINIANS STEP UP TO CLAIM DESTINY"

COMMENTARY: By Richard S. Williamson
Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
Chicago Sun Times, Chicago, Illinois, Sat, Dec 18, 2004

The developments in Ukraine are important for the Ukrainians, for
Moscow and for the march of freedom.

Will the second round of Ukraine's presidential election Dec. 26 be
free and fair, or, like the first round, will it be fraudulent? Will
Ukraine be on the side of democracy, or the side of dictatorship?

Russia has had influence over Ukraine for more than 300 years. It
was an important part of the Soviet Union. And when the U.S.S.R.
collapsed, Moscow worked hard to keep Ukraine under its tight
sphere of influence.

Russian President Vladimir Putin seeks to unite "Greater Russia." He
wants to regain some of Moscow's past power. To do so requires
more influence over the "near abroad" -- not less. And foremost among
these neighboring countries is Ukraine, with its deep cultural ties to
mother Russia, its coal-rich eastern areas, its size and large
population, and its strategic position as a bulwark between east and
west.

For Russia, Ukraine is a domestic issue, not an international one. One
recent poll showed that 68 percent of Russians do not think Ukraine is
independent.

Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma has been an instrument of Moscow's
influence in Ukraine. His handpicked successor, pro-Russian boss
Viktor Yanukovych, was supported by Ukraine's post- communist
establishment. In the closing weeks of the campaign, Putin came to
Ukraine twice to campaign for him and, reportedly, invested hundreds
of millions of dollars to secure Yanukovych's victory.

The message from on high was clear. Russia wanted and expected
Yanukovych to win. Unwilling to risk defeat by the voters, the
Ukrainian government rigged the election and engaged in large-scale
and systematic fraud.

On election day, a majority of the people cast votes for reformer
Victor Yushchenko. But fraud gave the victory to Vanukovych.

However, unlike the dark days of the past when the will of the people
could be denied, this time international election observers from
Europe and America were on the scene to document the irregularities
and deny the vote legitimacy.

While emboldened by the international election observers, in the end,
it was the Ukrainian people who blocked the illegal hijacking of the
election. Like the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia and the Rose
Revolution in Georgia before it, through the Orange Revolution in
Ukraine the people have gathered in the streets of Kiev to say, "No,
the old days of corruption and rigged elections must end. A new dawn
of the rule of law and the will of the people must begin."

As the world witnessed in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and one
year ago in Georgia, the repressive ramparts of authoritarianism
quickly crumble when the people see hope for democracy and say "no"
to the chains of oppression. For the United States, crowds in the streets
of Kiev mean democracy. For Russia, those crowds mean disintegration.

In part this drama is about Ukraine's geopolitical orientation. Will
Ukraine have an illegitimate authoritarian regime aligned with Moscow?
Or will Ukraine have a democratic government which has more in
common with the West and Europe?

The Russians are learning they can't rely on the old ways of doing
business. The people of Ukraine have been empowered and are taking
steps to control their own destiny. In the end, Ukraine can be a
friend of Russia and of the West. It need not be an either/or situation.

But more fundamentally, this is a struggle about democracy. It is
about values of individual rights, the rule of law and
self-determination. It is about opportunity and freedom. It is about
whether Ukraine will be part of the expansion of freedom and on the
side of history or pulled back into the quagmire of the entrenched
interests and authoritarianism of the past.

In the end it is for the Ukrainian people to decide. And, I'm
confident, like people everywhere, given the opportunity to rally for
freedom, the Ukrainians will write the newest chapter in the forward
march of democracy. -30- [Action Ukraine Monitoring Service]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FOOTNOTE. Richard S. Williamson is a former U.S. Ambassador
to the United Nations. He was nominated by President George Bush
in the fall of 1991 to be the alternate US representative to the UN for
special political affairs. The post carried with it the title of
"ambassador" in the Bush administration. Williamson is from Illinois.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
http://www.suntimes.com/output/otherviews/cst-edt-rich18.html
========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No.264: ARTICLE NUMBER SEVEN
Your comments about the Report are always welcome
========================================================
7. U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN UKRAINE, EVEN IF PROVED,
MAY MEAN VERY LITTLE:
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN NOT THAT BLACK AND WHITE

OP-ED By David Marples, Edmonton Journal
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, Fri, December 17, 2004

How seriously should one take the allegations of U.S. involvement in the
Ukrainian presidential election campaign, now entering its third stage?

The question prompted comments by Rep. Ron Paul of Texas before the
U.S. House of Representatives international relations committee on Dec. 7.
Paul declared that the U.S. government, operating through the U.S. Agency
for International Development, awarded "millions of dollars" to the
organization Poland-America-Ukraine Co-operation Initiative, which is
controlled by Freedom House of New York.

Another organization of concern is the International Center for Policy
Studies, which sent election observers to Ukraine. One of its board members
is presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko. Freedom House's branch in
Kyiv helped provide training to the youth group Pora, which played an active
role in the street protests. Other organizations, like the Renaissance
Foundation, operate indirectly as promoters of democracy.

According to a report on CNN, the U.S. Department of State acknowledged
it had spent $65 million in Ukraine, including funds to help pay for exit
polls that indicated challenger Yushchenko had an 11-point lead entering
the runoff round on Nov. 21.

The discrepancy between these exit polls and the announced results by the
Central Election Commission led to the street protests in Kyiv that
continued for more than two weeks and led to the nullification of the
results by the Parliament and Supreme Court.

Exit polls represent a questionable technique. In Belarus, a similar poll,
funded by the U.S. and European countries, indicated President Alexander
Lukashenka was about to lose his referendum last October on whether he
would be allowed to amend the constitution and run for a third term in
office. An internal poll conducted by respected sociologist David Rotman,
on the other hand, forecast Lukashenka had the support of 66 per cent of
the electorate, which proved much closer to the final official figure of 79
per cent.

Before the Belarus referendum, the U.S. had sent a powerful delegation to
two major conferences in the Baltic States that focused on bringing change
to Belarus. At the first of these, team leader Senator John McCain referred
to Lukashenka as a "dictator" and "tyrant" who needed to be removed. Only
Belarusian opposition leaders and foreign representatives were invited to
these meetings. More recently, the EU has placed a travel ban on the chair
of the Belarusian Election Commission, Lidziya Yarmoshyna.

Thus far, the initiatives of the Bush administration, so successful in
Georgia, have failed in Belarus. That brings us back to Ukraine: to what
extent was the United States prepared to intervene in an East European
country that had recently drawn much closer to Russia?

It would be naive to deny the United States' initiatives have made some
difference in Ukraine. Ukraine's young people have grown in political
awareness and democratic procedures. But funding has been provided
on both sides.

Yanukovich has received an estimated $200 million in campaign funds from
Russia, mainly from oil companies, as well as backing from his sponsor,
Rinat Akhmetov, Ukraine's richest man and the owner of the Donetsk
soccer team.

Also, such criticism implies both a willingness to accept a black and white
portrayal of the entire campaign: the pro-western and democratic challenger
against a malevolent prime minister backed by the Kuchma regime and its
ally Vladimir Putin's Russia; and an assumption that opposition intends to
move Ukraine out of the Russian orbit rather than to institute a change of
government.

In fact, the political situation in Ukraine is complex and constantly
shifting. Yanukovich has abandoned his former mentor, Kuchma, and complains
bitterly about the president's lack of support. His new campaign manager is
Taras Chornovil, the son of Ukraine's most famous dissident, and the former
government leader of L'viv region, Vyacheslav. Chornovil was known for some
time for his anti-Kuchma views.

Yushchenko's own campaign manager, Oleksander Zinchenko, is a deputy
chairman of Parliament who was formerly a member of the United Social
Democratic Party led by Viktor Medvedchuk, head of the presidential
administration. According to Freedom House's Nations in Transit 2004,
Medvedchuk's group has two oligarchic rivals: the Donetsk group under
Yanukovich and the Dnipropetrovsk group under Viktor Pinchuk, the
son-in-law of Kuchma.

Even new appointments have followed a bizarre pattern: after the decision
of the Supreme Court to nullify the election results, Sviatoslav Piskun was
appointed the new prosecutor general. Yet Piskun had been fired in October
2003 as a direct result of inquiries into the deaths of journalists Heorhiy
Gongadze and Ihor Aleksandrov.

What is discernible, despite the changing political allegiances, is the
wide gap between the two candidates in outlook and thinking. Both
candidates are part of the establishment and have been for a number of
years. Critically, however, the Yushchenko has decided to remove the
Kuchma government through protest and the ballot box.

He is also the most popular man in Ukraine. That his victory is supported
by the United States, ultimately, may mean very little. -30-
--------------------------------------------------------------------
David Marples, a specialist on Ukraine and Belarus, is a professor of
history at the University of Alberta
========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No. 264: ARTICLE NUMBER EIGHT
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8. "UKRAINE WHOLE AND FREE:
WHAT I SAW AT THE ORANGE REVOLUTION"

COMMENTARY: By Anders Åslund
The Weekly Standard magazine, Volume 010, Issue 15
Washington, D.C., December 27, 2004

DONETSK, Ukraine - ON THE FIFTEENTH DAY of Ukraine's orange
revolution, I arrived in Kiev. My car got stuck in a traffic jam caused by a
demonstration at the parliament. I abandoned the car and joined the rally.
The demonstrators' determination was stunning. The sea of people was
perfectly orderly and calm. Two slogans predominated: "Yushchenko is
our President" and "Do not stop our Freedom!" A third line ran "East
and West together!"

This was a call for law and order, freedom, and national unity. Some groups
marched under Ukrainian flags, some under the orange flags of opposition
candidate Viktor Yushchenko emblazoned with the name of their town or
village. The demonstration didn't seem to have any class identity at all.
Hardly any names of businesses, parties, or organizations were to be seen.
No one talked about social or economic issues. This was pure politics.
Ukraine's orange revolution is a classical liberal revolution, like 1848, or
the Velvet Revolution in Prague in 1989. This rising against lawlessness and
repression, for democracy and freedom, is a true bourgeois revolution.

Half in jest, people call it a revolt of the millionaires against the
billionaires. Three of the revolutionary leaders are very wealthy
businessmen (Yulia Tymoshenko, Oleksandr Zinchenko, and Petro
Poroshenko).

They criticize not big business, but "bandits." The incumbent candidate,
Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich, gets his key support from the three most
prominent oligarchic groups, which between them reportedly put up $300
million for his campaign. But overwhelmingly the Ukrainian business
community supports the challenger, Yushchenko, in protest against the
capture of the state by these three.

Ukraine's presidential election also reflected a sharp regional divide.
Yushchenko won big in 17 western and central districts. They are
predominantly Ukrainian-speaking, though several are Russian-speaking.
Yanukovich won equally massively in 10 Russian-speaking eastern and
southern districts, scaring voters with the specter of western Ukrainian
nationalism.

To get a better idea of what was going on, I traveled to Donetsk, Prime
Minister Yanukovich's stronghold in the east, to talk to business leaders,
especially some of the steel barons. I was impressed. These self-made
billionaires are as smart as they are dynamic. To them, politics is a means
of advancing their business. They have bought up old Soviet steelworks and
turned them around. One has opted for upstream vertical integration in raw
materials (iron ore and coal), while another has concentrated on downstream
purchases of steelworks in New Europe.

At present, they sell most of their steel to China and quite a lot to the
Middle East, but they are painfully aware that the Chinese bonanza won't
last long. Then they will have to sell more to Europe, which protects itself
against Ukrainian steel. In order to break down that barrier, they want to
buy downstream companies in Europe, have Ukraine join the World Trade
Organization, and develop a free trade agreement with Europe.

I asked them about their business interests in Russia. Nobody seemed to
own any significant assets there. Nor do they have any real Russian
partners, though they sell a bit to their big neighbor. Energy they acquire
on a free market, whereas the Russian steel companies are their severest
competitors. However geographically close they are to Russia, the Donetsk
steel barons long for Europe.

One had been a major supporter of Yanukovich. Another had maintained his
neutrality, but appeared to prefer Yushchenko as a way of leveling the
playing field with his bigger competitor. Not even big businessmen dare
speak their minds in the authoritarian eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk
and Lugansk. My interlocutors spoke with great respect of Yushchenko, who
has carefully avoided insulting the east. Now all they want from the
election is a clear result--contrary to President Leonid Kuchma, who appears
to be working for a prolonged political crisis, which would destabilize the
Ukrainian economy and thus hurt the opposition.

But what about the calls for separatism coming from some eastern officials?
All my interlocutors got excited when I asked about secession, and declared
this idea absolutely intolerable. The business leaders in eastern Ukraine
had told their regional officials that they had no right to talk secession,
and the officials had shut up. Separatism was no threat, I was told, nor
would the business community allow it to develop.

Pleased by all this, I went back to Kiev. If they meant what they told me,
the big Ukrainian businessmen are not prepared to accept a protracted
political crisis, because it would cost them too much. They are willing to
accept a Yushchenko presidency, and they are concerned about their
reputation in the West so that they can purchase more companies in Europe.
They are adamantly in favor of keeping Ukraine intact, because any breakup
would disrupt their business empires. Their prime contacts are in the
Ukrainian elite.

The political crisis in Ukraine is a natural result of President Kuchma's
policies. On the positive side of the ledger, he has allowed a dynamic and
competitive market economy to develop, but on the negative side, a handful
of companies have been unfairly favored. Now, the very rich want to level
the playing field with the super-rich, while ordinary Ukrainians are fed up
with corruption, lawlessness, and repression. The east-west tension seems
to be a secondary issue.

Russia's extensive meddling in the Ukrainian election is curious,
considering that eastern Ukraine is already longing for Europe. The best
explanation seems to be President Putin's dislike for democracy, and his
fear that democracy could spread from Ukraine to Russia. It is also possible
that President Kuchma used Putin for his own purposes, as he schemes to
play everybody off everybody else.

Ukraine is knocking on the door of the European Union. It needs help as it
endeavors to clean up corruption and lawlessness. But most of all it needs
access to travel, markets, and education in its beloved Europe--and the
prospect of membership in the European Union. For the E.U., it will be no
small challenge to welcome the Ukrainian nation that is finally being born.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Anders Åslund is director of the Russian and European program at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) in Washington, D.C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
E-mail: Editor@weeklystandard.com; http://www.weeklystandard.com
=========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No.264: ARTICLE NUMBER NINE
Suggested articles for publication in the Report are always welcome

=========================================================
9. INFORMATION BREAKTHROUGH
Orange revolution brings Ukraine a step closer to an information society

By Oksana OMELCHENKO, The Day
The Day Weekly Digest in English, #35
Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, 14 December 2004

The crisis is over, to use the medical parlance. Slowly but surely, life is
returning to normal. As Independence Square has emptied, the television
receiver is no longer the focus of family life. Not surprisingly, during the
past few tumultuous weeks most Ukrainians stayed glued to television screens
round the clock for the latest news reports. Now newspaper vendors are
reporting declining sales, while the merits of Yushchenko as opposed to
Yanukovych are no longer the hot topic on public transport.

In effect, all of the above symptoms were the key manifestations of the
crisis. In time of great hardship, information becomes the most demanded
item on the market. Without a doubt, psychologist, political scientists, and
sociologists will devote much ink to what happened between November 21 and
December 9. It is obvious today that the orange revolution has brought forth
new forms of communication, ushered in a revival of the electronic mass
media, and brought Ukraine a step closer to an information society.

Experts say that orange ribbons have become the hit of 2004. To quote Denys
Bohush, general director of Interactive PR Group, little by little they have
turned from the campaign color of one of the presidential contenders into a
nonverbal form of communication. According to Bohush, orange ribbons were
more a symbol of unification and common struggle than a symbol of support
for one's candidate of choice. It must be admitted, however, that the
popularity of the orange ribbon is in large part due to its color.
Psychologists describe orange as an extremely energetic and action-provoking
color.

People who gathered to stand up for their rights till the very end needed
information as air itself. According to experts, regular news reports from
the stage, broadcasts of a television channel most trusted by the
protesters, and the news bulletin circulated by the students of the
Journalism Institute had stemmed the spread of rumors, which is phenomenal
given the audience of 200,000. Meanwhile, rumors could have caused the
gravest of consequences. First, rumors help sow discord among the rally
participants. Second, they can trigger aggression that the speakers onstage
tried so painstakingly to contain. According to Heorhy Pocheptsov, Ph.D. in
philology and chairman of the Information Policy Faculty at the National
Academy of State Administration under the President of Ukraine, the
continuously chanted slogans and the way the rally was orchestrated served
to unite those who flocked to Independence Square.

The leaders faced the problem of deterring the rally from aggressive action,
while simultaneously trying to overcome the depression that set in primarily
because of the lack of aggressive action. According to Pocheptsov, it is
unethical to keep people at such a high peak of activity and suggestibility
for such long periods. In such a state people tend to see things in either
extremely dark or bright colors. Yet there is a different opinion. According
to Oleksandr Yarema, first deputy chairman of the Ukrainian National
Committee of Youth Organizations, the events of the orange revolution are
proof that the laws of mass behavior do not always hold.

"A huge number of people came to Independence Square absolutely
consciously to defend their vote and freedom. Many showed initiative in
trying to determine what they could personally do in a specific setting.
Notably, they did all of this from their heart and not owing to some PR
technologies," Yarema says.

In any case, much has changed in Ukrainian society. According to Denys
Bohush, while formerly the average Ukrainian spent three and a half hours
daily thinking about politics (versus the three and a half minutes spent by

the average American), now his political ruminations take up to four hours.
Not surprisingly, the specifics of Ukrainian legislation have become more
accessible and understandable to Ukrainians both in the urban and rural
setting. Things have also changed in terms of satiation of informational
hunger.

Mr. Bohush believes that broadcasts from Independence Square during
prime time have helped television channels to regain public trust that was
undermined during the smear campaign ahead of the elections. "All of this
means one thing: the public is currently experiencing a critical need to
sound off. What is most important now is not stopping the public but
instead assisting it in doing so," believes Pocheptsov. -30-
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Day Weekly Digest, Kyiv; http://www.day.kiev.ua/103/
=========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No. 264: ARTICLE NUMBER TEN
Names for the distribution list always welcome
=========================================================
10. ORANGE SCARVES LABOUR OF LOVE FOR CITY WOMAN

By Carol Sanders, Winnipeg Free Press
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada, Saturday, Dec 18th, 2004

WINNIPEG - FOR weeks, Luba Huk has been busy in her basement
making orange scarves. The energetic grandmother in her late 70s is
donating her time and effort to raise money for the protesters in
Independence Square in Kyiv, Ukraine.

"This has turned into a huge thing," said Huk's daughter Arusia Leskaw.
Her petite widowed mother is the driving force producing the scarves.

The donated orange mufflers are being snapped up by people around the
city who want to show their support for free and fair elections in Ukraine.

Orange is the colour of presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko,
considered the champion of Western-style democracy.

Huk came to Canada with her parents as a teen and later opened the first
Ukrainian-language nursery school in Winnipeg. She operated the nursery
school for years, said her grown daughter. "She has taught thousands of
Ukrainian people in this community."

The woman who is now retired and hard of hearing belongs to Plast, a
Ukrainian cultural and educational organization like Scouts. It operates in
Ukrainian communities around the world, helping to keep alive the Ukrainian
language and nationalism, said Leskaw.

Huk belongs to the seniors wing of Plast, and came up with the plan to make
scarves out of her patriotism and eagerness to help, said Leskaw. "She came
to Canada in the 1940s and she's excited about what's going on there now,"
said Leskaw.

What's going on is an election that's seen as vital to Ukraine's
independence, something that is drilled into Ukrainian Canadians from the
time they are small children, said Leskaw.

The orange scarves are popular, and are available while supplies last at the
Ukrainian Cultural and Educational Centre and at Saints Vladimir and Olga
on McGregor Street after Sunday services, she said. -30-
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E-mail: carol.sanders@freepress.mb.ca
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ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No. 264: ARTICLE NUMBER ELEVEN
=========================================================
11. "BYZANTINE EAGLE, SYMBOL OF 'ORANGE REVOLUTIONS"

By Oleksandr Lytvynenko, D.S. (politics)
The Day Weekly Digest in English #35
Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, December 14, 2004

"Help me, oh Roman Eagle
Who branded my shackled ancestors!"
Yevhen Malaniuk

The orange revolution, as a spontaneous movement of the middle class and
bourgeoisie, is drawing to a close. Elements of political technologies are
increasingly evident in what is happening in Kyiv. Students and businessmen
are gradually being replaced by somber-faced men between the ages of 30
and 50. The expressions on people's faces are changing. This is a good sign,
all things considered, as the sociopolitical process is gradually returning
to normal and the civic movement is reverting to the political format. All
this does not rule out the possibility of the situation becoming further
aggravated, but it has become clear that we are now living in a totally
different country.

This new Ukraine will be studied [by historians and politicians] and now is
the time to realize that the Ukrainian nation is emerging not on an ethnic
but primarily on a civic basis. Much has been said and written (and will be)
about the beginning of an extensive public discussion, about the unblocking
of media channels, about the broadening of the public sphere, about the
formation of a new European political culture. However, considerably less
attention is being paid to things that are less apparent but even more
topical, namely the sociocultural foundations of the political system. An
analysis of this aspect allows one to arrive at rather unexpected
conclusions and offer forecasts of practical significance.

It is generally known that the Battle of Ukraine, started by the Kremlin,
was meant to protect the post-Soviet space as a separate geopolitical
reality. At present, Russian experts are writing with increasing frequency
about a struggle to preserve the Russian space; there is growing awareness
that what is happening on the Maidan will determine the destiny of the
Russian Federation. Yet all this is not that important against the backdrop
of thoughts of the possible decay of the grand Russian idea of the Third
Rome and the restoration of unity in the Christian world, albeit a
post-Christian one.

There is an interesting phenomenon taking place. A series of successful and
not-so-successful velvet (floral) revolutions have taken place in 1997-2004
in Eastern and Southern Europe. Democracies have reigned triumphant in
Bulgaria, Serbia, Georgia, and most likely in Ukraine, and have failed
completely in Belarus and only partially in Armenia. These countries differ
in terms of their geopolitical status, historical destinies and political
systems, but have the same predominant Orthodox - and closely related
Armenian - traditions. Also, they generally belong to the so-called
post-Byzantine cultural circles.

Envoys of the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople converted their peoples
to Christianity. The Basileus and the Eastern Roman Empire generally formed
political traditions and brought political ideas and categories to Ukraine.
More than 650 years have elapsed since the fall of Constantinople, but its
eagles are still soaring in our skies, as a colleague of mine recently put
it. Paradoxically, the wave of floral revolutions has allowed us to see the
ghosts of these peculiar birds and hear their faint screech from high above.

These revolutions, with their similar objectives and motivating forces, even
scenarios, took place simultaneously, but only in some of the post-Byzantine
countries. This destiny did not befall Greece, Macedonia, Romania, Turkey,
and the Russian Federation. Whereas the first four countries have long
become part and parcel of Europe (which is precisely the main objective of
all such fateful political carnivals, one of which we have just
experienced), in Russia the question remains open.

The 2004 presidential campaign attracted the closest attention of the
Russian political leadership and numerous representatives of Russian "civil
society." Russian spin doctors became almost folk heroes in Ukraine; they
practically dominated the campaign headquarters of all presidential
candidates, which makes one wonder whether the Ukrainians have anything to
do with electing the next head of their Ukrainian state. Thousands of pages
have been written about the political exploits of Vladimir Putin, who until
recently was the most popular politician in Ukraine. Countless other
examples could be cited. These and many other [campaign] efforts actually
proved very effective, as the 20% gap between the leading candidates was
almost bridged, which all experts noted in February 2004.

However, one little thing passed unnoticed, which would eventually reduce
to nil all these more than tangible achievements. For a number of reasons,
primarily hypertrophied rationality and pragmatism, cultural distance from
broad social strata, etc., the Russian campaign architects ignored the
masses' cravings for justice as the basis of the political mentality in a
post-Byzantine society.

People in Belgrade, Sofia, Tbilisi, and Kyiv revolted because they yearned
for truth and the restoration of justice. Now it doesn't matter whether all
those transgressions did take place or were imbedded in public opinion by
modern communications technology, especially considering that there is no
hiding the fact that justice continues to be abused in the postsocialist
countries. Under the circumstances the bourgeois democratic movement for
human rights interacted with archetypes in mass consciousness and detonated,
albeit on a small scale. After that all hell broke loose.

This factor should be considered when analyzing the situation and predicting
its evolution. The events of November were determined by the activation of
old and profound mental strata and by a powerful spontaneous civic movement,
which leads to several important conclusions.

FIRST, the powerful impact of the bourgeois democratic movement on the
transformation of Ukrainian society and the state should not be overstated.
Without a doubt a breakthrough was made in the protection of human rights
and freedoms, but the process of asserting a civil society will shortly face
a very important challenge, the need to establish relations with the
"socially nearby" regime. Failure to find effective responses will radically
strengthen inevitable authoritarian trends in social development.

SECOND, the protective mechanisms in social consciousness are tangibly
weakened and this considerably heightens its sensitivity to the slightest
irritant. In the next couple of months the value of every word will be
cardinally higher than before November 22. Under these conditions the
responsibility of those who work with words will be greater. Current
problems will look like child's play compared to what may happen as a
result of criminal propaganda or even careless treatment of media
capacities.

Without exaggeration, the future of this country for decades ahead will
depend on what will be spoken and written during these months. In
particular, national interests, as the very foundation of politics in any
country, are now being formed.

THIRD, there is a unique opportunity for Ukraine's further cultural
consolidation. It is precisely now that a complex of measures must be worked
out and implemented before long in order to form a new Ukrainian identity
that will integrate with and remove such sensitive problems of regional
linguistic, religious, and other distinctions. With separatist moods
becoming increasingly more active, this problem has acquired special
significance. Rather artificial declarations must not be allowed to receive
mass public support in the first place in such problem regions of Ukraine as
the Donbas and Halychyna.

FOURTH, a unique range of opportunities is emerging in Ukraine, in the
face of social depression that will certainly occur in about a year. It is
in
the nearest future that acute and very socially tangible reforms must be
carried out: above all, pension, land, and housing management reforms,
along with targeted social aid, insurance medicine, etc. This also addresses
the question of administrative and political division reforms. Implementing
such painful transformations in the shortest possible time will help
considerably to expedite the overall modernization of Ukraine, while
reducing negative social effects to a minimum.

FIFTH, when determining the guidelines and priorities of a new national
policy, it is necessary to make a thorough study of the peculiarities of the
period following the floral revolution, as in Serbia, Bulgaria, and Georgia.
Given all the understandable distinctions, studying this experience may
help to avoid a number of unnecessary mistakes.

SIXTH, cardinal changes must be made in Ukraine's foreign policy so as to
give it a fresh impetus in the post-Soviet space, especially with regard to
Belarus and the countries of the Southern Caucasus. On the crest of the wave
of postrevolutionary euphoria we stand a chance of turning Ukraine into a
regional leader and formulating priority national interests in the strategic
perspective.

SEVENTH, orange revolutionary ideas will be exported to Russia whether
we like it or not; indeed, there is no way to control this process. Our
societies are too closely integrated, there are too many aspects uniting
them, and Russia is too much involved in Ukrainian affairs. Under the
circumstances it is necessary at this stage to work out a new
Ukrainian-Russian policy. The latter must, among other things, take into
account the psychological specifics of the current Russian leadership's
perception of Ukraine. This question primarily addresses possible images,
phobias, etc. Our restraint and wisdom will play a crucial role in the next
couple of years, not only in Ukrainian-Russian relations but also in the
development of northern Eurasia as a whole. -30-
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The Day Weekly Digest, Kyiv; http://www.day.kiev.ua/103/
=========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No. 264: ARTICLE NUMBER TWELVE
Letters to the editor are always welcome
=========================================================
12. "A TEMPLE OR A CANVASSING STATION?"
The church is facing a crucially important question: will it remain
uninvolved in politics and defend its independence from political forces?

Compiled by Klara Gudzyk, The Day
The Day Weekly Digest in English, #35
Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, 14 December 2004

The current presidential campaign in Ukraine is rich in overwhelming and
staggering surprises, laying bare good and bad things that have been kept
away from the public eye for decades. For example, many people believe that
there are few true patriots in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow
Patriarchate, especially among the parish clergy, deacons, priests, bishops,
let alone the cloistered communities.

This superficial and unjust view has been largely due to the overactive (if
not scandalous) political activities of the UOC MP's brotherhood leaders and
certain "loudmouthed" (to quote Ivan the Terrible) religious media. But by
far the most important reason is that UOC clergymen have never publicly
distanced themselves from the statements and endless "religious processions"
of these brotherhoods, which are often marked by anti-Ukrainianism.

Now we realize that our attitude is not entirely justified and that the
divisions in Ukrainian society are not always along confessional (as well as
geographic or linguistic) lines. Evidence of this is the following selection
of abridged statements found on the Internet, issued by UOC believers and
clergymen, who voice their attitudes toward the current situation and boldly
assess the civic stand taken by their church.

One such statement was signed by dozens of UOC parish priests and
parishioners (including Revs. Petro Zuyev, Bohdan Ohulchansky, Andriy
Dudchenko; Yuri Chornomorets, Candidate of Theological Science;
Yevhen Avramchuk, Candidate of Philosophical Science). It reads in part:

"Beloved Brothers and Sisters,
"We call on you to support your people and condemn those who are
transgressing His Commandments by stealing millions of votes, spreading lies
in the media, and who are even ready to violate the Commandment Thou shalt
not kill. The Orthodox Church can and must support the defense of human
rights and freedoms that are being ignored. Let us remember that Patriarch
Paul of Serbia came out in support of his people, that Catholicos Ilia of
the Orthodox Church of Georgia also supported his people despite the church'
s anti-Western orientation. Peace and stability cannot be based on
falsehood, violence, and bloodshed or the Lord will punish this country, its
people, and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church..."

Rev. Bohdan Ohulchansky believes that establishing a resourceful
reconciliatory authority is of great importance in this critical phase of
Ukrainian history; this authority should remain above all confrontations, so
that people representing different political platforms could appeal to it as
an ethical and arbitrative authority. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church could
become this authority for all confessions, considering that it is
represented by over ten thousand parishes throughout Ukraine. This gives
rise to a crucially important question: Are the church's leaders capable of
maintaining principled noninterference in politics and independence from
political forces?

Temptation by power is one of the three temptations that Jesus overcame
in the desert. In the last critical weeks of our history the church has been
tempted by political forces that are playing their political games - hence
the threat that the people will feel less confidence in the church. If it
shows its support for either side, the church will lose its influence as
well as the possibility to profess its ethical principles and its stand
before the entire Ukrainian nation.

The chapter "The Church and Politics" in "The Fundamentals of the Social
Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church" reads: "In the face of political
divergences, controversies, and struggle, the church professes peace and
cooperation among people who harbor various political views. It further
admits the presence of various political persuasions among its bishops,
parish clergy, and flock..." Further on we read this important passage: "The
hierarchs and priests of the church - the church community at large - cannot
take part in any political organizations or election campaigns by publicly
supporting political organizations that campaign for a certain candidate,
etc."

The fact remains that the Orthodox Church has in fact been involved in the
current political confrontation. Regrettably, we often substitute Gospel
morals with corporate ethic rules; we support things we consider of benefit
to our church community from the material standpoint or in terms of social
influence. Whether designated goals are reached using ethical means is of
minor importance. Even more regrettably, such goals may be reached by
building up social tensions, with the opposing side refusing to accept the
Orthodox Church. We must pray for peace and accord. We must not turn
our temples and pulpits into battlegrounds for people with different views.
Inner unity, faith, and charity are our most important tasks.

Sviatoslav Rechynsky believes that the current presidential campaign has
laid bare a number of scandalous phenomena of our times. Perhaps the worst
is the ease with which the powers that be have sacrificed the soul of the
people and their church. The regime is trying to present the Orthodox Church
as a live shield, a hostage of their survival. Another sad fact is that a
number of clergymen have swallowed the bait and become involved in what
they should have stayed away from by the dictates of their conscience and
faith.

The official propaganda machine has introduced a series of myths into the
ecclesiastical milieu, which myths are being actively promulgated by church
marginals. Most of these myths may be found in various statements and
messages issued by the Union of Orthodox Citizens of Ukraine (incidentally,
this organization has been operating without the blessing of UOC hierarchs).
Myth One: Yushchenko is a national extremist and Uniate protOgO (although
he has never declared his affiliation to the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church
and is Eastern Orthodox). Myth Two: If Yushchenko comes to power, the
UOC will be persecuted.

However, the policy of the Strength of the Nation Coalition is based
precisely on building a political system in Ukraine, where no one could ever
crowd out or oppress anyone. According to the third myth, which is being
actively disseminated among believers, no one should vote for Yushchenko
because he has been twice married. In the first place, Ukraine is a secular
polity, and a second marriage can hardly be considered an obstacle on the
road to presidency. Also, it's his private life and we are electing a
president, not a patriarch.

The fact that a number of pastors have fallen prey to the propaganda machine
is damaging primarily to the flock, as these people will convey their
distrust of such clergymen to the whole church. A great many examples of
this attitude could be cited. People stop going to church because they hear
canvassing speeches instead of sermons. People go to church to communicate
with the Lord, not with canvassers clad in cassocks.

A group of young UOC MP activists sent an open letter to Metropolitan
Volodymyr (Sabodan): "Your Eminence,
"Your inspired and penetrating Message to the Presidential Candidates of
Ukraine and to the Electorate was made public knowledge on November 14,
2004, in which the church world heard the quintessence of your pastoral
stand. However, two weeks earlier, the Inter Channel broadcast your
interview in which you recalled, among other things, having given your
blessing only to candidate V.F. Yanukovych, and that you saw in him 'a true
Orthodox believer worthy of becoming head of state.' Almost immediately
after your interview UOC parishes became venues of canvassing efforts in
support of V. F. Yanukovych..."

The open letter cites a number of irrefutable examples of church pulpits
being used as campaign podiums and of believers who support opposition
candidates being driven away from churches: "We are witnesses to a gruesome
division of parishioners and priests, since there are people in the
canonical church who have cast their ballots for the government-nominated
and opposition candidates. However, portraying one as a champion of
Orthodoxy and the other as a servant of the devil means only one thing:
sowing the seeds of discord among people...

What harm would have come to the UOC had it kept a neutral independent stand
during the election campaign? Does anyone seriously believe that the church
could have suffered because of its balanced position? Meanwhile, by odiously
backing a single presidential candidate the church will inevitably lose its
prestige and its missionary activities will suffer." -30-
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Day Weekly Digest, Kyiv; http://www.day.kiev.ua/103/
=========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No. 264: ARTICLE NUMBER THIRTEEN
Letters to the editor are always welcome
=========================================================
13. "PUTIN AND THE RISING TIDE OF PARANOIA"

By Ira Straus, Founder and U.S. coordinator of the
Committee on Eastern Europe and Russia in NATO
The Globalist, Washington, D.C., Fri, December 17, 2004

From President Putin on down, Russians have reacted with outrage at recent
events in Ukraine. Ira Strauss takes a closer look at the current hysteria
over alleged foreign conspiracies aimed at Russian interests. He finds that
Russians need to overcome their paranoia ¬ and offers a few pointers on how
the West can help this process along.

Russians give an impression of being quite fearful these days. Most of
them, it seems, cannot imagine that the Ukrainian people have spoken freely.
Is Russia next?
Instead, they conjure up the image of a big, bad American political
technology steamroller that first ran over Serbia, then Georgia ¬ and now
is running over Ukraine.

And next, these Russians fear, it might run over Russia itself. The
newspaper Izvestia titled its December 1, 2004, article on this subject:
"Next Stop: Russia."

Some of these comments have made it into the Western press. What
Westerners are probably not aware of is that it is a mass phenomenon.
In a radio poll, fully 52% of listeners told Ekho Moskvy that the
"Ukrainian scenario" could be repeated in Russia.

And it's not just the Russian public that is running scared of the supposed
American revolutionary steamroller. A number of high-ranking politicians
and strategists, many of them closely allied with the Kremlin, are doing
the same.
Russian overreaction
They are using the fear as an argument for "tightening the screws" further,
even for "counter-revolution," in the words of Gleb Pavlovsky, a Kremlin
advisor.

Such a Russian overreaction, Russian liberals say is just what could
finally bring on Ukrainian-style events in Moscow, by severing the last
honest links between government and people ¬ and between media discourse
and truth.
The past as future
During similar hysterias in the past ¬ such as during the Kosovo conflict
in 1999, when it was considered normal and correct in Russia to say that
"America is bombing Belgrade today, Moscow tomorrow" ¬ President Putin
and his "political technologists" played a moderating role.

They restored Russia's sense of stability and rebuilt relations with the
West. Nevertheless, the general argument for paranoia was never eliminated
¬ only suppressed. Russia regained confidence after 1999, thanks to a
strengthening of the central government and the use of authoritarianism to
project an image of strong leadership.

Fast forward to 2004. Russia seems thrown back on its 1999 sense of
insecurity. The Kremlin helped create the mess in Ukraine by overplaying
its hand and trying to pit the pro-Russian majority of Ukrainians against
the pro-Western minority.
Blame game
But the unintended result was that in the November 2004 election, a
majority of Ukrainians united against this policy of divisiveness.

Faced with such an outcome, it was easier for Russians to blame their
failure to get the pro-Russian candidate elected on a conspiracy rather
than on the free will of the Ukrainian people.
The crucial difference
And that is why the situation in 2004 could play out differently from that
in 1999. Instead of moderating the national hysteria, as they did in 1999,
the Kremlin and its supporters have now joined it ¬ blaming everything on
America and the West.

President Putin, too, has been unusually slow in regaining his composure.
He backed off from his very outspoken pro-Yanukovych posture, but
proceeded to plot openly with outgoing Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma.

In addition, Mr. Putin complained loudly about the "foreign interference"
by the West. But while there has been some open and transparent Western
support for the opposition, Russia proceeded in the most brazen fashion
with its own covert interference, which at times was genuinely
conspiratorial.
Double standard
Mr. Putin's people complained of a Yushchenko "coup d'etat," while the
Kremlin itself actually plotted with Mr. Kuchma in his attempted coup
against Ukraine's constitutional order.

In 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev counted it as his greatest success that the
Russian people had formed enough of a civil society that they could stand
up to the August 1991 coup by Soviet hardliners.
A sad development
In 2004, Mr. Putin complains of conspiracy and subversion when the
fledgling Ukrainian civil society stands up against Mr. Kuchma's attempted
coup.

This change in how the emergence of civil society is viewed by the Kremlin
is sad ¬ a truly negative evolution in Russian state thinking.

Most ominously, Mr. Putin has combined the paranoia of 2004 with the
paranoia of 1999. "This sort of development," he said on a trip to Turkey
on December 7, 2004, would mean "dividing Europe into westerners and
easterners, into first-class and second-class people."

Mr. Putin added that the latter would be subjected to "a nice but stern man
in a colonial helmet who will show them under what political understanding
they must live. And if, God forbid, the ungrateful foreigner resists, he
will be punished with bombs and missiles, as it was in Belgrade."
Taking a stand
Beliefs like these have dangerous consequences. Westerners should not let
them pass unchallenged. They should refute them, as Colin Powell did, when
he rebutted the Russian foreign minister's charges at the December 7, 2004,
OSCE meetings in Sofia.

Mr. Powell rightly pointed out that the Western support of democratic
elections is not the same thing as interference in democratic elections.
Don't feed the paranoia
It is tedious ¬ but necessary ¬ to patiently remind Russians of some
elementary distinctions and some basic facts of recent history.

At the same time, the West should not feed the phobias by its other
policies. It does so when it combines its promotion of democracy with
demands for Russian geopolitical withdrawals.

So while Mr. Powell was right in defending Western involvement in Ukraine
as fair-minded promotion of democracy, he undermined his case when he
coupled it with demands for Russian withdrawal from Georgia and Moldova.

"Next," Russians will say, "America will be demanding our withdrawal from
Sevastopol," the strategically important Black Sea port.
Conspiracy theory
Such demands would look to Russians like clear proof of their belief that
the United States was promoting the Ukrainian opposition candidate
Yushchenko all along as part of a geopolitical master plan for driving
Russia out of Ukraine ¬ along with the rest of the CIS.

What the West should be talking about instead is finding a constructive
compromise on Sevastopol, so that the Russian navy can stay there. For
example, this could happen by putting the base under the auspices of the
NATO-Russia Council.
Balancing the NATO issue
It would have been better to avoid any talk of Ukrainian entry into NATO
until after Russia calms down, but already the talk has begun.

It needs to be balanced by talk of upgrading the NATO-Russia Council ¬
and eventual full Russian membership in the alliance.

The implementation of such a balanced approach will depend, of course,
on a return to common sense in Russia as well as on Western willingness to
innovate.

The EU should make the effort to reconcile its EU-Russia and EU-Ukraine
common space projects ¬ and to reconcile them both with a Russia-Ukraine
common economic space.
No disconnect intended
Otherwise, it could cause Yushchenko's EU orientation to disrupt the
organic connections between the Ukrainian and Russian economies ¬
connections that are necessary both for the economic success of Ukraine
under Yushchenko and for the Russian economy.

In the past, Russia has come out of its paranoid moments and adapted to
reality, even if retaining a residue of the phobias and resentments.
However, there are no guarantees.
Russia's mental health
Today, Russia is once again teetering on the edge. If a nuclear superpower
becomes mentally unsound, it will be extremely dangerous ¬ more so than in
the relatively stable Cold War era.

The West should pay attention and avoid feeding the frenzy. But in the end,
Russia must bear the primary responsibility for its own mental stability.

It is time for Russians to notice, when looking across the border, the
existence of a large population of Ukrainians, whose will cannot be wished
away by media lies or police manipulations.

Russians also have to stop pointing fingers westward to explain their own
failure in Ukraine.
Can Putin be trusted?
But what should worry Russians the most as they are whipping themselves
into a frenzy against the West is that the rest of the world has quietly
drawn two conclusions.

First, that the fault lies with the Russian side ¬ and second, that it has
started asking whether it can trust the Putin regime at all. -30-
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE GLOBALIST: www.theglobalist.com
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
FOOTNOTE: Ira Straus was a Fulbright professor of political science at
Moscow State University and the Moscow State Institute of International
Relations from 2001 to 2002.
Mr. Straus is also the founder and U.S. coordinator of the Committee on
Eastern Europe and Russia in NATO (CEERN), an independent NGO. Its
members include Atlanticists in the United States and Europe, as well as
Russian westernizers.
Since its creation in 1992, CEERN has been working to promote the inclusion
of Russia and all new democracies from the post-Soviet space in NATO.
>From 1985 to 1991, he served as executive director of the Association to
Unite the Democracies, an organization formed in 1939 to promote a political
union of the Atlantic countries with a door open to others to join as they
democratize and modernize.
Mr. Straus got his B.A. in Russian history at Princeton in 1976 and wrote
his dissertation in 1981 at the University of Virginia on Euro-Atlantic
institutions and their relevance to the East. -30-
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ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No. 264: ARTICLE NUMBER FOURTEEN
=========================================================
14. UKRAINE: LETTER TO THE DONBAS VOTER'S COMMITTEE
AND UKRAINA TV ABOUT CENSORSHIP

LETTER TO DONBAS: From Lidia Wolanskyj
Founder of Eastern Economist and EE Daily
Kyiv, Ukraine, Wednesday, December 8, 2004
Copy of letter also sent to The Action Ukraine Report
Washington, D.C., published, Sunday, December 19, 2004

Dear Folks at the Donbas Voters' Committee and Ukraina TV,

Regarding your story on the censorship of the NRTC, which I read on your
site today, I understand your concerns about the NRTC somehow limiting
what you say on the air. This is always an important issue for any media.

Still, in any country there are certain laws, from the Constitution all the
way down to libel and slander laws, and regulations about truth in
advertising, that ultimately put some limits on what can be said in the
media. This is normal practice in any civilized country and does not fall
under the concept of "censorship." These laws have been agreed by the
representatives of the people and they are there to keep a country
functioning properly.

For instance, the Constitution of any country treats serious calls to break
up a country (as opposed to a drunk wandering down the street and shouting
similar nonsense) as a crime. In a normal country, if a public official or
politician were to call for the break-up of their country, they would be
arrested almost immediately and put on trial. If an elected official were to
invite a neighboring country to bring its troops into his country, the same
would happen.

In some countries, such people might eventually be executed for their crime.
Why? Because they are betraying their country and their fellow countrymen.
There are proper ways to voice political dissatisfaction and to negotiate
change, but unilaterally calling to break up your country or inviting your
neighbors to bring in their troops are not among them.

Moreover, any elected official is duty bound to consult with his electorate
before making a serious political move, and not to incite them to do
something they have never expressed an interest in, just because he is
personally dissatisfied with a political process. This is a betrayal of the
trust that voters put in their representatives. Thus, restrictions on the
media in disseminating such illegal activities are natural and do not
constitute censorship in a normal country.

What, then, constitutes "censorship"?

Censorship is when, for instance, important political events take place in a
country and certain media fail to report on them. Another form of censorship
is when the statements of certain political players are taken at face value
and no effort is made to present a different, let alone critical point of
view on the same matter. A different form of censorship is when statements
are taken out of context and distorted by those reporting on an event or a
person.

Yet another form of censorship is when a media organization holds round
tables with supposed experts to provide a "balanced" point of view on
controversial events, but in fact all the people in the discussion have the
same point of view and no contradictory point of view is really represented.

And finally, there is a form of reporting that also falls into this category
because it involves the suppression of facts, and that is when actual lies
are presented in the media. This is clearly a form of censorship when it is
done by reporters in response to orders they receive from their higher-ups.

Various forms of censorship can happen through what is known in Ukraine
as "temnyky" or hidden orders about how to present events or not to present
them. Or they can be done after the fact, when previously prepared materials
are altered or even taken off the air before they can be broadcast.
Sometimes even live shows can be interrupted and taken off the air.

What's wrong with censorship?

All of these forms of censorship are very dangerous. FIRST of all, they harm
their audience. People who listen to media that exercises these forms of
censorship are duped into thinking they are getting fair information (I
won't say "the truth" because that is too philosophical a phrase), but they
are not. As a result, they are deprived of the opportunity to make up their
minds about events and issues in a balanced way.

SECONDLY, these forms of censorship harm media workers. People who
work as journalists, reporters and other professionals cannot work openly
and honestly. This hurts them both professionally and morally. Their
professional skills deteriorate with time and their morale is damaged.

THIRDLY,censorship can harm the broadcasting company. As the situation in
Ukraine recently has shown, when people realize they are being tricked and
lied to, they stop trusting their news sources and switch to other media for
better information. Some television channels in Ukraine lost up to 20% of
their viewers, while others more than doubled theirs. Since loss of audience
affects advertising revenues, this shows clearly how harmful censorship can
be for commercial media operators.

FINALLY, all forms of censorship harm the country. They prevent citizens
from knowing what is really going on in their country and makes it easy to
manipulate them. Moreover, they can backfire on those who exercise the
censorship. When people find out they have been tricked, they can turn on
the politicians or other people who were responsible for the lies. It is a
dangerous fire to play with.

What are my impressions of Ukraina TV?

To see what your channel is like, since it is available in Kyiv, I've been
watching Ukraina TV from time to time over the last few weeks, as were many
people who were concerned about events in Donbas. I saw lots of old movies.
I saw the congress in Severodonetsk several times. I saw the congress in
Kharkiv. I saw Mrs. Yanukovych's speech. I saw your journalists' appeals in
English and German, claiming that they were being censored and that their
channel was not available in Kyiv. I did not see events in Kyiv that were
being broadcast on most other channels, including the Supreme Court sessions
and other important political events.

Everything that I saw seemed to reflect the very problems I have mentioned
in this letter. Every form of censorship that I discussed above was strongly
evident.

I understand that a Donetsk-based channel will prefer to highlight local
events. But even the most provincial channel cannot ignore national events
that ultimately affect the local audience. I suspect that this, more than
anything, is why your rating remains at 4%.

Sincerely, Lidia Wolanskyj
Founder of Eastern Economist and EE Daily
Kyiv, Ukraine, lidia@ln.ua
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