"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT"
An International Newsletter
In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis, and Commentary

"The Art of Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion,
Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World"

THE WORLD WILL BE WATCHING ON DECEMBER 26

What major voter fraud programs are being put in place this time?
What happened to all those who committed voter fraud before? Nothing.
Will the observers be at the right place at the right time this time around?
Will the Central Election Commission work honestly for the first time?
Will the people really win this time or will voter fraud continue to win?

"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT" Year 04, Number 269
morganw@patriot.net, ArtUkraine.com@starpower.net
Washington, D.C., Kyiv, Ukraine, WEDNESDAY, December 22, 2004

-----INDEX OF ARTICLES-----
"Major International News Headlines and Articles"

1. "THE DANGER OF ABANDONING UKRAINE"
COMMENTARY: by Yegor Gaidar
Financial Times, London, UK, Tue, December 22 2004

2 THE KREMLIN'S DR JEKYLL:
UKRAINE IS A CHANCE FOR PUTIN TO RELAX HIS GRIP
Nick Paton Walsh, Moscow Correspondent
The Guardian, London, UK, Wed, Dec 22, 2004

3. WHY THE FEVER IN UKRAINE? A FEW NOT-SO-EASY ANSWERS
LETTER FROM EUROPE: By Steven Lee Myers
New York Times, New York, NY, Wed, December 22, 2004

4. "RIGHTING WRONGS IN UKRAINE"
COMMENTARY: The Monitor's View
The Christian Science Monitor
Boston, Massachusetts, Wed, Dec 22, 2004

5. THE "DOWNTRODDEN" COMPLEX MUST BE OVERCOME
Old problems of the new cultural policy
By Olha Vaslyevska, The Day Weekly Digest in English #36
Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, 21 December 2004

6. UKRAINIAN POLL SAYS YUSHCHENKO HAS 11 PERCENT LEAD
Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian, 21 Dec 04
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Tue, Dec 21, 2004

7. UKRAINE AND EUROPE:
A SHOTGUN WEDDING IS BOUND TO FAIL
By Anatol Lieven, International Herald Tribune (IHT)
Europe, Tuesday, December 21, 2004

8. YUSHCHENKO PLEDGES CLOSE TIES WITH RUSSIA
Says first foreign trip will be to Moscow
Ukrainian Radio First Programme, Kiev, in Ukrainian, 21 Dec 04
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Tue, Dec 21, 2004

9. PUTIN SAY HE WILL BOW TO POLL IN UKRAINE
Luke Harding in Berlin and Nick Paton Walsh in Donetsk
The Guardian, London, United Kingdom; Wed, Dec 22, 2004

10. RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER DENIES RIFT
WITH USA OVER UKRAINE
Centre TV, Moscow, in Russian 1800 gmt 18 Dec 04
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Tue, Dec 21, 2004

11. "RUSSIA WITHOUT A HEAD"
Latvian commentary urges western response to rising Russian authoritarianism
COMMENTARY: By Peteris Straitins
Diena, Riga, Latvia, in Latvian 20 Dec 04 p 2
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Tue, Dec 21, 2004

12. UKRAINE SEPARATISTS PLAN POLL VIOLENCE,
CLAIMS OPPOSITION
Askold Krushelnycky in Kiev, The Independent
London, United Kingdom; Wednesday, Dec 22, 2004

13. HOW RUSSIAN TROOPS HELPED THE ORANGE REVOLUTION
COMMENTARY: By James Hydzik
Kyiv, Ukraine, Tue, December 21, 2004
The Action Ukraine Report, Washington, D.C.
Wednesday, December 22, 2004

14. UKRAINE'S RE-RUN ELECTION CAN BE INVALIDATED
UNIAN news agency, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1546 gmt 21 Dec 04
BBC Monitoring Service - United Kingdom; Tue, Dec 21, 2004

15. "YUSHCHENKO HEALTHY, CALM AND FULL OF PLANS"
By Natalia Trofimova, The Day Weekly Digest in English
Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, December 21, 2004
========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No. 269: ARTICLE NUMBER ONE
========================================================
1. "THE DANGER OF ABANDONING UKRAINE"

COMMENTARY: by Yegor Gaidar
Financial Times, London, UK, Tue, December 22 2004

Viktor Yushchenko's likely victory in next Sunday's re-run of the Ukrainian
presidential elections raises hopes for a stable democracy in one of the
biggest countries in the post-communist world. But such a victory will also
have consequences far beyond Ukraine's borders, and the way in which both
Russia and the west reacts will determine what those consequences are.

Until now, the line between young and not always perfect democracies and
the countries where democratic institutions were either non-existent or
extremely unstable ran roughly along the 1939 border of the old Soviet
Union. A stable democracy in Ukraine would break that line and have a
significant influence on the whole Commonwealth of Independent States,
including Russia, for decades to come. It would also be strategically
important for Europe, which is why the west should set as a key priority
the design of an active and constructive policy towards Ukraine.

Ukraine does not need direct financial aid or debt write-offs. The west
should focus on different issues: lifting trade barriers and improving
access to markets, and encouraging investment in the Ukrainian economy.

The greatest risk is that the west - and the European Union in particular -
will become complacent about a historic opportunity that could determine
the kind of world we shall live in for the rest of this century.

Personal experience has made me well aware of such risks. Between 1991
and 1994, I was part of - and, for a time, head of - the government of the
Russian Federation. The communists' totalitarian regime and the Soviet Union
had just collapsed and 15 newly independent states had emerged. Most
launched market reforms, while some also tried to establish democratic
institutions - all this across a vast territory where some 30,000 nuclear
warheads were located. Needless to say, having spent billions of dollars to
contain the Soviet Union during the cold war, the west had failed to develop
a sound policy for the aftermath of its collapse.

Western leaders clearly approved of what was going on in Russia. But their
general attitude towards Russia's problems - although it was never put this
bluntly - was: "We never asked you to start the revolution and we never
called for the Soviet Union to be dismantled. You chose to do this. Now
cope with the challenges by yourselves, while we keep a sympathetic eye
on your efforts."

I deeply respect and highly value the officials of the International
Monetary Fund. In the early 1990s, the Group of Seven developed countries
assigned the mission to help promote Russian reforms to the Fund. I am well
aware that they were at pains to help. But the IMF is simply the wrong
structure for organising management of a crisis linked to the bankruptcy of
a nuclear superpower's economy and its political collapse. That was not the
sort of mission for which the IMF was created.

Things seem to be different in Iraq. The western nations are deeply involved
in managing the situation there and have launched large-scale initiatives to
write off the country's debt and co-ordinate international aid. That is
understandable. There is an important security issue and, after all, it was
not the Iraqis themselves who stirred up the trouble. The west as a whole -
and particularly the US - has to put things right.

The Ukraine situation is much closer to Russia in the early 1990s than to
present-day Iraq. And, as in Russia a decade ago, there is a danger that the
west will adopt a complacent "handle-your-own-problems" policy towards
Ukraine. This danger would be compounded if the west were concerned
about undermining relations with Russia, which are strategically important
given the ongoing fight against global terrorism. But caution in this regard

would be a mistake.

In the Ukrainian elections, Russia has spat in Ukrainian citizens' faces by
backing a presidential candidate with a criminal record. A Yushchenko
victory would mean a shattering and humiliating defeat for those who
devised that policy towards Ukraine.

Following such a defeat, it would be easy for Russia to decide that it was
the victim of an anti-Russian plot, led by the US and western Europe.

But Russia could also draw a different conclusion and learn a lesson from
its mistakes, doing everything possible to restore friendly and correct
relations with Ukraine and its new leadership. Regardless of single
policymakers' likes and dislikes, Russia is still keen to normalise
relations: neighbours occasionally quarrel but they have to live next
door to each other.

The future of the whole post-Soviet zone, stability in Europe, Russia's
relations with the west and the long-term prospects for development in
Ukraine and Russia will depend on whether the Russian leadership
realises this - and whether the west, in turn, ensures that it has Russia
as a partner rather than an opponent. -30-
--------------------------------------------------------------------
The writer is director of the Institute for the Economy in Transition
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ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No.269: ARTICLE NUMBER TWO
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2. THE KREMLIN'S DR JEKYLL:
UKRAINE IS A CHANCE FOR PUTIN TO RELAX HIS GRIP

Nick Paton Walsh, Moscow Correspondent
The Guardian, London, UK, Wed, Dec 22, 2004

MOSCOW - It was never meant to be that way, not in our back yard, the
Kremlin must have sighed. On Independence Square in Kiev, the focus of the
"Orange revolution", a man introduced as a Russian journalist stood up to
say things that in Moscow would be considered unforgivably un-Russian. He
wanted to apologise on behalf of all Russians; they were not all like their
president, Vladimir Putin. He looked forward to seeing similar tent camps on
Red Square - and hoped one day to see Putin in the dock alongside Ukrainian
president Leonid Kuchma.

For the Kremlin, events in Ukraine have been a stunning wake-up call. The
"effective" politics - state media bias and demolition of all opposition -
that led Putin to a 74% victory in Russia's presidential vote in March,
riled Ukrainians, reminding them that Russia's shows of strength are not
always benevolent. Crucially, it was this popular disenchantment, not some
squabble between the elite clans that now rule the former Soviet Union, that
lost Ukraine for Russia.

The miscalculation and defeat was undeniable. Even Kremlin sympathisers
like the toady Itogi magazine hailed Ukraine as the "worst defeat for
Russia's external policy in the post Soviet period", and condemned the
vacuum of ideas in the Kremlin.

But the key danger is that both Moscow and Washington will continue to
play out traditional stereotypes, as they have done up to now in the Ukraine
crisis. Putin, a child of Soviet suspicion, will have to resist talk that a
Yushchenko government would be yet another attempt to encircle the
motherland.

Washington remains insensitive to Moscow's foibles. The Pentagon announced
a $40m extension to its training programme for US troops in Georgia, a
southern neighbour of Russia, at the height of the Ukraine crisis. The
world's only superpower remains paranoid enough about militarily obsolete
Russia to feel the need to criticise its leaders as foes rather than to try
to win them over as allies.

There is a tendency to overestimate how far Putin is prepared to go. He
claimed recently that the US is seeking a "dictatorship of international
affairs". But yesterday, after meeting German chancellor Gerhard Schroder,
he said he would work with either Yushchenko or his opponent, prime minister
Viktor Yanukovich - just as last week he said that Ukraine joining the EU
suits Russia's interests. There is a balance there, and not just for the TV
cameras. Dr Jekyll needs coaxing out of Putin by the west.

Given the depression over repression in Moscow, it sounds almost naive to
suggest that Putin should see Ukraine as a chance to soften his grip, rather
than stiffen it. But he should. He could fire those advisers who took him
into the Ukraine debacle, and show that the strongman is as tough in the
face of failure as he is in pursuing success.

The Kremlin must drop the cliche that the west seeks only to undermine
Russia, and pay more than lip-service to the idea that democracy is supposed
to serve the people, not the state. In return, the US, EU and Nato should
realise that Russia will be no threat unless backed into a corner. And maybe
then, by 2008, talk of tent camps in Red Square will seem like folly.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nick Paton Walsh is the Guardian's Moscow correspondent,.
E-mail: nick.walsh@guardian.co.uk
========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No.269: ARTICLE NUMBER THREE
========================================================
3. WHY THE FEVER IN UKRAINE? A FEW NOT-SO-EASY ANSWERS

LETTER FROM EUROPE: By Steven Lee Myers
New York Times, New York, NY, Wed, December 22, 2004

KIEV, Ukraine, Dec. 21 - Ukraine's "orange revolution" was either a mass
outpouring of popular will or the collapse of an enfeebled authoritarian
power. Or maybe it was the political and judicial maturation of a teenage
democracy. Or it was a Western plot concocted in the corridors of
American power and carried out with cunning by subversive forces like the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. (The latter is the
theory favored in parts north and east of here, particularly in the
Kremlin.)

In reality, the political upheaval and mass demonstrations that ultimately
overturned Ukraine's fraudulent presidential runoff last month probably
resulted from a mixture of all those things. And by all accounts, Ukraine,
alone among the former Soviet republics, had several essential ingredients
for democracy that had managed to survive the turmoil of 13 years of halting
transition: political competition, judicial independence and, of course, the
political activism of voters in a vast swath of the world where apathy
typically rules.

For those optimists who would like to export Ukraine's experience - and in
Russia, Belarus and other former Soviet republics, there are many - those
conditions might take years to develop elsewhere, if ever.

"The political trend here is different than in Russia or Belarus," said
Kalman Mizsei, regional director of the United Nations Development Program,
who has worked extensively in Ukraine and other post-Communist nations in
Eastern Europe. "Maybe it's the difference in the fabric of civil society in
different countries. Maybe it is hidden, and only emerges in times of
extraordinary events."

Ukraine holds a new runoff on Sunday, and if the opposition leader, Viktor
A. Yushchenko, wins, as expected, it might be tempting to view his triumph
as simply the inexorable march of democracy. But there was nothing
inevitable about what unfolded after two rounds of voting led to the
disputed victory for Prime Minister Viktor F. Yanukovich.

It might well have turned out differently if President Leonid D. Kuchma,
like Eduard A. Shevardnadze in Georgia a year before, had decided to risk
bloodshed and international opprobrium by crushing the demonstrations.

Mr. Kuchma, whose popularity evaporated after 10 years of economic gains
marred by scandal and, at the end, vote fraud, is unlikely to be seen as a
hero by many here. Still, faced with protests and uncertain support among
the security services, Mr. Kuchma gave up, negotiating a compromise that
left Mr. Yanukovich isolated.

"I think the explanation is quite simple," Mikhail B. Pogrebinsky, the
director of the Kiev Center for Political and Conflict Studies who has
worked closely with Mr. Kuchma's government, said in an interview on
Tuesday. "A revolution like this would not happen if the power had not
decided to leave." The power, however, was given a shove. And the
groundwork for that took shape years ago.

Mr. Yushchenko, a former central banker, served as prime minister under Mr.
Kuchma, but after breaking with him, found a political base from which to
challenge him. Ukraine's Parliament is hardly a model of legislative ideals,
but its rancorous sessions reflected the country's vigorous political blocs.

The Parliaments in Russia and Belarus, by contrast, have turned into rubber
stamps for the executive branch. And the lack of political competition in
those countries extends to their presidencies, as well.

President Aleksandr G. Lukashenko of Belarus won the right to remain in
power indefinitely in a referendum in October. President Vladimir V. Putin
of Russia won a second term in March against a diminished field of opponents
who, like Mr. Yushchenko, faced the overwhelming resources of the state and
suffered a lack of coverage on state television.

The moral and financial support of Europe and the United States has become a
lightning rod for criticism here and in Moscow (which spent much more than
the Western nations, according to published accounts in Russian newspapers).
The Bush administration spent $58 million during the past year on programs
intended to cultivate democratic values, but not specifically, United States
officials said, the candidacy of Mr. Yushchenko. -30-
========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No. 269: ARTICLE NUMBER FOUR
========================================================
4. "RIGHTING WRONGS IN UKRAINE"

COMMENTARY: The Monitor's View
The Christian Science Monitor
Boston, Massachusetts, Wed, Dec 22, 2004

The Philippines sent deposed strongman Ferdinand Marcos to retirement in
Hawaii. Serbia handed Slobodan Milosevic to a criminal trial at The Hague.
South Africa gave a pass to F.W. de Klerk, its last president under
apartheid.

Should he win his hard-fought campaign to become Ukraine's president on
Sunday, what should reformer Viktor Yushchenko do about Ukraine's outgoing
president, the autocratic Leonid Kuchma? And what about the layers of
criminality and corruption, to which the rigged Nov. 21 election and the
apparent dioxin poisoning of Mr. Yushchenko attest?

Emerging democratic countries can take many different roads to justice, but
they confront the same choices: justice vs. revenge; widespread prosecutions
vs. trials for just the top dogs and a general amnesty for the rest; an
emphasis on the future vs. preoccupation with past wrongs.

South Africa found a way to balance these interests with its Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, based on confessions and pardons. Iraq's human
rights minister has expressed an interest in using that model.

Some disturbing high-profile murders have taken place under the Kuchma
government, but Ukraine has not been a country of mass arrests, widespread
torture, or genocide. Essentially, the problem is greed. This has bred
corruption in high places.

That context argues for legal pursuit of only the most flagrant wrongs,
along with systemic government and business reforms. It's encouraging that
Ukraine's prosecutor general has decided to reopen the Yushchenko poisoning
case and the investigation into the murder of two journalists.

Kuchma himself is a tricky case. He's widely despised, and Yushchenko might
risk unrest if he grants him amnesty. Kuchma was implicated in one of the
journalist murders, the case has never been fully probed. A trial could
distract from the reform road. A solution might be to send him on a
permanent holiday in Russia, if such a deal has not already been struck.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/1222/p08s02-comv.html
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ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No. 269: ARTICLE NUMBER FIVE
========================================================
5. THE "DOWNTRODDEN" COMPLEX MUST BE OVERCOME
Old problems of the new cultural policy

By Olha Vaslyevska, The Day Weekly Digest in English #36
Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, 21 December 2004

The recent events in Ukraine have given rise to an irresistible desire for
something new, a new society, policy, economy, etc. The problem of a new
cultural policy in Ukraine was discussed a week ago Friday by experts from
the Ukrainian Club. The participants first tried to determine the format of
national culture. Andriy Yermolayev, president of the Sophia Center for
Social Studies, noted that the Ukrainian cultural policy is entirely
different from the being pursued by the Ministry of Culture.

It is a balanced existence of Ukrainian society on a whole, a so-called
cultural democracy. It is based on the understanding that culture is formed
by all forces in society, and is thus its property. Oleksandr Bohomolov,
vice president of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, proposed placing
the problem on a broader base, namely the creation of a New Ukrainian
Project. As the assembled experts unanimously agreed, this project should
rely on a standardized and consistent linguistic, historical, and
ideological (democratic) policy.

The experts focused most on the language issue in Ukraine. Although the use
of the official language in the popularization of national culture is
undeniable, Ukrainian remains an "article of trade." Halyna Yavorska, an
expert practical linguist, said that whereas in the early 1990s the language
policy was based on the postcolonial syndrome, now there is a vast range of
opportunities to build the right kind of linguistic environment. During the
meeting most of the experts insisted that the use of the mother tongue at
home would immediately resolve all problems in the sphere of cultural
policy.

Others recalled that in the course of Ukrainizing television, for example,
this medium did not become any more transparent, professional, or effective.
Cultural workers, however, insisted that the Russian cultural environment
has no effect on the development of the Ukrainian one. Another participant,

a stage director, stressed that if he produced his masterpiece on Ukrainian
soil it would be Ukrainian property, regardless of the language.

When the subject of television was discussed, almost every participant
mentioned that practically all the channels had begun proclaiming their
unbiased approach during the Orange Revolution. Oleksandr Hrytsenko,
head of the Razumkov Center for Economic and Political Studies, pointed
out that radio and television are working every day to restore a Soviet
identity.

Andriy Yermolayev quoted Yuri Andropov: "We don't know the country
that we are living in." He added that the professional media could help
Ukrainians learn more about their country and its culture.

Another pillar that bolsters what is still a virtual model of the new
cultural policy is history, or rather its revision. Volodymyr Nikitin,
deputy director of the International Center for Advanced Studies, noted that
the "downtrodden" complex has to be overcome first and that it is crucial to
assume responsibility for a new kind of cultural and political progress.
Eventually, it would be worthwhile to switch to the principle of building a
national heritage by revising everything attributed to it a priori. Andriy
Yermolayev emphasized that our national history, which consists of a list of
grievances and claims, should be revised once and for all, and this should
be done now, because rewriting it every year causes social disorientation.
He added that history is a sensitive matter that requires a consistent
approach.

As for the cultural sphere, it should be noted - and Mr. Nikitin said as
much - that it is currently divided into "higher" and "lower" culture. There
is no average concept of so-called mainstream culture. Cultural workers
present at the meeting pointed to insufficient funding for their projects
and stressed the interdependence between the economy and culture; that the
economy is assessed in terms of culture and vice versa. Since the financial
aspect was beyond the purview of the discussants, the debates ended there.
However, it was pointed out that investors would be found after building a
positive cultural image of Ukraine, if not from within the country, then
outside its borders. -30- LINK: http://www.day.kiev.ua/103/
========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No. 269: ARTICLE NUMBER SIX
========================================================
6. UKRAINIAN POLL SAYS YUSHCHENKO HAS 11 PERCENT LEAD

Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian, 21 Dec 04
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Tue, Dec 21, 2004

KIEV - Press release of the Razumkov centre [for Economic and Political
Studies]: [opposition presidential candidate Viktor] Yushchenko will beat
[Prime Minister and presidential candidate Viktor] Yanukovych by 53 per
cent to 42, according to a poll conducted by the Razumkov centre.

These are the results of the poll conducted by the sociological service of
the Razumkov centre on 14-19 December 2004 (prior to the [20 December]
TV debates between the presidential candidates). The service polled 2,008
people over the age of 18 in 118 towns and villages, including cities, small
towns, and big and small villages across all Ukrainian regions. The margin
of error does not exceed 2.3 per cent, excluding the design effect.

Those polled responded to the question "Who are you going to vote for in
the [26 December] repeat presidential election runoff?" as follows: for
Yushchenko - 48 per cent, for Yanukovych - 39 per cent, against both
candidates - 5 per cent, those who will not go to the polls - 3 per cent,
and undecided - 5 per cent.

Of those who intend to go to the polls, 52 per cent are ready to back
Yushchenko, 40 per cent - Yanukovych, 5 per cent will vote against both,
and 3 per cent are undecided. Of those who intend to go to the polls and
have already made their choice, 53 per cent will vote for Yushchenko, 42
per cent - for Yanukovych, and 5 per cent - against both.

Therefore, a week before polling day Yushchenko is firmly in the lead,
with 11 per cent ahead of Yanukovych.

An important factor is that after the first round Yushchenko succeeded in
changing public opinion in his favour and, most importantly, to instill
confidence in the voters that his victory is inevitable. According to the
poll, 50 per cent of those polled are already certain that Yushchenko "has
more chances of becoming Ukrainian president", although only 19 per cent
believed in his victory a month and a half ago. those who believe in the
victory of Yanukovych are much fewer - a mere 21 per cent of those polled,
although the figure was 58 per cent a month and a half ago.

The poll says Yushchenko's victory will be even more certain if Yanukovych
withdraws from the race. Asked "Who are you going to vote for in the repeat
presidential election runoff if the other candidate withdraws from the
election and only Yushchenko's name remains on ballots?", those polled
answered as follows: 50 per cent - for Yushchenko , 35 per cent -against
him, 9 per cent will not go to the polls, and 6 per cent of those polled are
undecided.

Of those who intend to go to the polls in this case, 56 per cent are ready
to vote for Yushchenko, 40 per cent - against him, and 4 per cent of those
polled are undecided. Of those who intend to cast their votes and have
already made their choice, 59 per cent are willing to vote for Yushchenko
and 41 per cent - against.

The results of the poll show that in both cases Yushchenko has a good chance
of mustering over 50 per cent of the votes: 53 per cent if Yanukovych fights
to the end, and 59 per cent if Yanukovych withdraws.

The specifics of this poll by the Razumkov centre is that interviews were
conducted outside the homes of those polled, in the streets, making no
record of people's addresses in questionnaires. This anonymity allowed for
partial compensation of the "factor of fear" - the fear of those polled to
openly speak about their electoral preferences with an unfamiliar
interviewer, as was the case in earlier polls conducted by the Razumkov
centre. [Passage omitted: agency warning that the media cannot publish
poll results 15 days before polling date] -30-
========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No.269: ARTICLE NUMBER SEVEN
Your comments about the Report are always welcome
========================================================
7. UKRAINE AND EUROPE: A SHOTGUN WEDDING IS BOUND TO FAIL

By Anatol Lieven, International Herald Tribune (IHT)
Europe, Tuesday, December 21, 2004

WASHINGTON-There is a right reason and a wrong reason for the
West to support the camp of the presidential challenger Viktor Yushchenko
in Ukraine, just as there is a right way and a wrong way to set about
integrating Ukraine into the West.

The right reason for supporting Yushchenko and the mass movement that has
gathered behind his candidacy is that these people are protesting not only
a blatantly rigged election but also a thoroughly rotten regime. Quite
apart from the rigging and the apparent assassination attempt against
Yushchenko, the personal history of the officially backed candidate for
president, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich, makes him quite unfit for
senior office in Ukraine or any other decent state. This is also why the
West must oppose Russian pressure in support of Yanukovich.

The wrong reason to support Yushchenko and his followers is out of a desire
to continue the cold war, "roll back" Russian influence, and turn Ukraine
into a Western buffer state against Russia. This is wrong because close
ties to Russia are cherished not only by the 10 million ethnic Russians in
Ukraine, but also by very many ethnic Ukrainians - insofar as one can
distinguish between the two, since across large parts of the south and east
of Ukraine, Russians and Ukrainians speak the same language, share the
same culture and are thoroughly intermarried.

Even if a majority of Ukrainians decides that it wishes to end the special
relationship with Russia, this is a decision which any wise Ukrainian
government will have to approach with great care. We have learned from the
recent history of the Balkans, the Caucasus and other parts of the world
that in deeply divided societies, the fate of states cannot and should not
simply be decided by numerical majorities. Careful national
consensus-building is also essential, even if this takes a long time.

Many Ukrainians are attached to Russia not only because of shared culture
and history, but also because economic ties between Ukraine and Russia
considerably outweigh those between Ukraine and the West. Millions of
Ukrainians work legally in Russia and send back vitally important
remittances, while only a handful are allowed to work legally in the West.

There is also a right way and a wrong way to promote Ukraine's integration
with the West. The right way is through the European Union, as part of a
transformation of both Ukraine and the EU itself over the next generation.

This process is appropriate because it is organic. As economies, societies
and political systems develop in a West European direction and away from
their Communist past, so they naturally draw closer to membership of the
EU. But this is not a one-way process. If the EU succeeds in admitting
Turkey and the Balkan countries over the next 15 years, it will be
impossible to deny membership to a reformed Ukraine. But if the EU does
admit these states, then it will be fundamentally transformed as an
institution.

The EU may have to become a much looser grouping, in which eastern and
southern members are no longer so sharply divided from non-EU states. This
in turn would permit the forging of a new relationship between the EU and
Russia that would diminish Russian fears of being essentially expelled from
Europe by EU expansion.

The wrong way to try to integrate Ukraine with the West is through early
membership of NATO. Such a move would infuriate and terrify Russia, and
risk a severe Russian reaction. And if NATO membership long preceded
Ukraine's actual economic and social integration into the West, then the
close ties between Russia and Ukraine, and the strong support of many
Ukrainians, could give Moscow dangerous opportunities to make its anger
felt.

Those who warn of such a reaction from Moscow are often accused of crying
wolf, given Russia's failure to react against NATO membership for the
Baltic states. But Ukraine is much more important to Russia from every
point of view. And there is also a famous proverb about camels and last
straws.

Taking Ukraine into NATO long before it is ready to join the EU would fail
a basic test of realpolitik. Rather than a strong and stable buffer state,
the West would acquire a weak and divided one - in other words, no true
buffer state at all. That could be a recipe for disaster if, at any point
in the future, America's military commitment to Europe were to falter.
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ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No. 269: ARTICLE NUMBER EIGHT
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8. YUSHCHENKO PLEDGES CLOSE TIES WITH RUSSIA
Says first foreign trip will be to Moscow

Ukrainian Radio First Programme, Kiev, in Ukrainian, 21 Dec 04
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Tue, Dec 21, 2004

KIEV - Ukrainian opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko has said in a radio
electioncast that his first foreign trip as president will be to Moscow, and
promised to build "excellent strategic relations" with Russia. He also said
close ties with Moscow were not incompatible with European integration.

The following is an excerpt from Yushchenko's 40-minute campaign address
broadcast by Ukrainian radio on 21 December:

[Presenter] A question about foreign policy now. During this election
campaign, this issue has featured prominently. Where will you go on your
first foreign trip as president?
[Yushchenko] Obviously, Moscow.

[Presenter] After Vladimir Putin congratulated your opponent - twice - on
election victory [before Ukraine's Supreme Court invalidated the election
result], will you be able to shake hands with the Russian president?

[Yushchenko] Of course. These are all details which we should leave in the
past, for the sake of national interest. We must turn this page. All sorts
of things happen. I am sure we will have excellent strategic relations with
Russia. We will also have an effective channel to the European Union, where
our strategic interests also lie. One doesn't stand in the way of the other,
believe me. -30- [The Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
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ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No.269: ARTICLE NUMBER NINE
Suggested articles for publication in the Report are always welcome
=========================================================
9. PUTIN SAY HE WILL BOW TO POLL IN UKRAINE

Luke Harding in Berlin and Nick Paton Walsh in Donetsk
The Guardian, London, United Kingdom; Wed, Dec 22, 2004

Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, yesterday gave his strongest hint so far
that he will accept Ukraine's pro-western presidential candidate, Viktor
Yushchenko, if he wins the country's repeated run-off election.

Mr Putin said he was prepared to work with Mr Yushchenko, who is contesting
the poll on Boxing Day against Ukraine's pro-Moscow prime minister, Victor
Yanukovich. "I know Mr Yushchenko as I do the current prime minister, Mr
Yanukovich," the Russian leader said. "He has also been a member of
President Kuchma's team, like Yanukovich . . . If he wins I don't see any
problem."

His relaxed comments came after talks in Germany with the German leader,
Gerhard Schroder. They suggest that Moscow has grudgingly accepted that
there is little it can do to impede a likely victory by Mr Yushchenko in
Sunday's election.

Mr Putin openly supported Mr Yanukovich during last month's disputed poll -
in defiance of his European allies who pointed out that it had been rigged.
Ukraine's supreme court eventually overturned the November 21 result.
Yesterday Mr Yanukovich signalled further defiance, saying he would do
everything he could to stop Ukraine from breaking apart. He promised to
protect the country's unity "irrespective of the position I occupy".

With only five days of campaigning still to go, tension in Ukraine mounted
yesterday when a convoy of more than 200 supporters of Mr Yushchenko was
pelted with eggs and blocked from entering the pro-government eastern
stronghold of Donetsk.

The confrontation came as the Friendship Train, made up of supporters of Mr
Yushchenko and members of the youth activist group Pora, targeted towns
which backed Mr Yanukovich. -30- (www.guardian.co.uk/ukraine)
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ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No. 269: ARTICLE NUMBER TEN
Names for the distribution list always welcome
=========================================================
10. RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER DENIES RIFT
WITH USA OVER UKRAINE

Centre TV, Moscow, in Russian 1800 gmt 18 Dec 04
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Tue, Dec 21, 2004

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has played down a reported row
between Russia and the West over the disputed election in Ukraine. In an
interview given to Russian TV, Lavrov said that he and US Secretary of State
Colin Powell seriously disagreed during the 8 December meeting of foreign
ministers from member states of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), but the meeting was cordial nevertheless.
However, Lavrov accused the West of having double standards and said that
the OSCE should be reformed.

The following is an excerpt from the interview Lavrov gave to Aleksey
Pushkov, presenter of the "Postscript" weekly current affairs programme on
Russian Centre TV, broadcast on 18 December; subheadings inserted
editorially:

[Presenter] Interestingly, NATO leaders have just issued a statement. NATO
wants to respond to [Viktor] Yushchenko's victory in some way and if he does
win the election it may consider the possibility of Ukraine's entry into
NATO. They say the decision to accept Ukraine into the alliance will be made
within five years. Moscow was hardly happy about this news and it is no
accident that we are finding it increasingly difficult to talk to America.
We met Sergey Lavrov in the Foreign Ministry building in Moscow the other
day to find out if a new confrontation is really developing between us and
the United States.

[Presenter, in office] Good afternoon, Sergey Viktorovich.
[Lavrov] Good afternoon.

[Presenter] I wish to begin our conversation with your recollections of your
conversation with [Colin] Powell at the OSCE meeting in Sofia recently [8
December]. I recall a huge front-page photo in the Financial Times which
said Russia and the USA clash over Ukraine. In the picture you are sitting
together with the US secretary of state. [Video shows a Financial Times page
with a photo of smiling Lavrov and Powell and English-language headline
"US-Russia clash over Iraq and Ukraine"]
Did you really clash with him over Ukraine? What exactly happened in Sofia?
Why did the whole international press report this as the beginning of some
kind of a rift between Russia and the USA?
DIFFERENCES HYPED UP
[Lavrov] Partly it is unprofessional because some of those who reported the
event apparently came without doing their homework and without finding out
how preparations had been made for the OSCE Ministerial Council meeting.
Partly, some journalists, mostly Western, but also some Russian journalists,
were being sensationalist, perhaps to sell the product better to the
consumers.
In fact, back in July of this year we passed on to the OSCE a statement
which nine presidents of CIS countries had approved in Moscow to clearly
indicate the need to do something to rectify the apparent imbalances that
had been observed in the OSCE's activity in recent years. Against the
background of inactivity on economic and security issues, the attention was
somehow focused on issues of humanitarian supervision [Russian: gumanitarnyy
priglyad], or looking after the humanitarian situation, and indeed not in
all countries, but only in those located, as we put it, east of Vienna. It
would seem that those that have joined NATO and the European Union have
passed the test of democratic maturity, while the rest need looking after.
Colin Powell spoke after me during the discussion. The American assessments
are well known to us, because they conveyed them to us in preparation for
the meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council. They were nothing unexpected
and they were to the effect that of course there is always room for
improvement, but overall the United States has complete confidence in the
OSCE and does not think the OSCE needs any serious reform. You see -

[Presenter - interrupting] That is to say, Powell did not agree with you, to
put it simply.
[Lavrov] He did not agree with me, but this does not mean that something
happened in Sofia. The approaches were well known, on the part of Russia
on one hand -
[Presenter - interrupting] Maybe they became clear to the public, whereas
earlier they were not clear.
[Lavrov] Perhaps, but I reiterate, the media could perhaps take a more
active interest in the process -
OSCE BIASED
[Presenter - interrupting] Well, they are playing their own games. I
understand that the majority of those observers, OSCE monitors who were
in Ukraine, were in eastern regions. In the west, if there were any, they
were only a few. Incidentally -
[Lavrov - interrupting] Not exactly. Around 70 per cent were in the east
and 30 in the west.

[Presenter] So 70 per cent were in the east. So this was assumed, the
presumption of guilt of eastern Ukraine was built into this distribution of
70 there, 30 here. Then I read some reviews, some from the West, and
incidentally one British group acknowledged that there had been
irregularities in western Ukraine.
[Lavrov] Let us just mention that over 90 per cent of votes in Lviv were
cast for Yushchenko in the first round.

[Presenter - interrupting] Over 90 per cent. In Ternopil, 93.5 per cent.
[Lavrov] That did not raise any objections from the OSCE.

[Presenter] No, that was okay, that was a good figure, but 96 per cent in
Donetsk is a bad figure.
DOUBLE STANDARDS
You worked for more than nine years in New York in the capacity of Russian
envoy to the UN, didn't you? You would know the American psychology and,
more generally, the psychology of the entire Western diplomatic elite.
[Lavrov] I am afraid I do not know it quite so well. [laughs]

[Presenter] Still, better than most. Please tell me, then, how could this
be? A former State Department staff member came out this week, she gave a
news conference and she said 65m dollars was officially spent by the United
States, via various foundations naturally, but officially, it was not the
CIA working, but government organizations - the State Department allocated
money to support opposition movements in Ukraine. Then Congress member Ron
Paul from the state of Texas spoke - George Bush's native state for that
matter.
[Lavrov] Let me interrupt you. They said this money was allocated not to
support opposition movements but to encourage democratic procedures, for
democratic education of the population, to raise their awareness of the
methods and basics of preparing and conducting elections.

[Presenter] I see. My information is that this money somehow, in some clever
democratic way, invariably ended up -
[Lavrov - interrupting] So they told me. I have endeavoured to set this out
to you.

[Presenter] Yes, I quite understand. So they told you, officially. However,
this money somehow always goes into some causes of a political nature. And
that Texas member of Congress, Ron Paul, confirmed this. He said several
million dollars went straight into financing the opposition and he said he
considers the Bush administration's statement that there must not be any
external interference in Ukraine's affairs to be utmost hypocrisy. Given
your US experience, just how do they manage this? Everyone understands
everything. It is plain that they have been backing Yushchenko all along.
They have led him down the path of life since 2000 and then, as it turned
out, down the political warpath. Now Powell speaks and, with a straight
face, he says there should be no interference, this is an outrage, how can
they interfere? Where does this fantastic hypocrisy come from? Do they think
anyone is going to believe them?
[Lavrov] There are certainly double standards involved. Some of the
assessments voiced by our Western colleagues [changes tack] - I would not
venture to reproduce them verbatim, but their purport was absolutely
unambiguous: if the opposition candidate did not win, then this was possible
only if the election was rigged. One can hardly agree with this prejudiced
approach, just as one cannot agree with statements, which could be heard
from some Western European capitals at the height of the election campaign
and in between the two rounds of the vote, that Ukraine should be with the
West. So double standards, unfortunately, do exist and we are proposing to
reform the OSCE precisely for there to be less of them, ideally, to banish
them entirely from international activity and from life in general.
KOMMERSANT GOT IT WRONG
That meeting was absolutely normal, absolutely comradely, although we did
seriously diverge on a whole range of issues.
The photograph you have mentioned on the Financial Times front page -

[Presenter - interrupting] You are both smiling in it.
[Lavrov] We are laughing in it.

[Presenter - interrupting] Yes, you are laughing in it and there is no sense
that there is a war between you.
[Lavrov] It was a reflection of a normal, comradely attitude to one another
and an attitude of mutual respect, even when discussing issues we disagree
on. For that matter, this work of the Financial Times was professional. Our
newspaper Kommersant, on the other hand, when reporting on the same meeting
and portraying it as a total rift, a scandal Russia raised, carried a
photograph where Colin Powell and I were also portrayed, but we were caught
at a moment of some bewilderment and the photograph was used to emphasize
the correctness of their assessments of the Sofia event. Sadly, the
photograph was several months old.

[Presenter] So it did not come from Sofia at all.
[Lavrov] I think it was from New York. We met at some point in summer or in
spring or maybe during the General Assembly session in September. This is
perhaps an indication of the professional attitude to work.
NO MORE DIVIDING LINES
[Presenter] But generally you believe that our relationship with America and
the West is progressing more or less normally and Ukraine will not become a
negative turning point, in your view. I am judging by your words because in
the international press, in academic circles and in political circles there
is a lot of talk that this political rivalry between Moscow and Washington
in Ukraine can be the beginning of a broader rivalry in other issues.
[Lavrov] You know, someone might want this to be happen. We have spoken
about double standards. I do not want to believe that someone really has a
desire to break Ukraine away. Then again, what can it be broken away from?
It is going to stay where it is, it lives side by side both with the West
and with the East. If anyone has the idea to build a new wall between the
eastern border of Ukraine, so to say, and what lies on the other side of
that wall in the east, I think that would be such an apparent relapse into
Cold War thinking that the majority of European countries and indeed the
United States would rebel against this.
I have already said that statements that Ukraine must be with the West have
been made in Europe. We have spoken out about this. This is provocation and
incitement and an attempt to build dividing lines again. I think the
approach that was set out at the ministerial meeting of the NATO-Russia
Council last week [9 December] reflects a shared position and if it does not
remain only on paper, then no rift should emerge, not even a risk of a split
should arise.
The approach is that the declaration we approved at the NATO-Russia Council
acknowledges that Ukrainians should resolve their own problems based on
their constitution and their laws, they should resolve them without attempts
to resort to force, without attempts at incitement, coercion, intimidation
and the Ukrainian people should decide their own destiny without outside
interference.

[Presenter] Can you see Ukraine joining NATO, though? The Georgian
leadership has said they will join NATO in 2007.
[Lavrov] You see, President Putin, when he spoke to a conference of Russian
ambassadors abroad this July, made a point of saying and emphasizing that we
have no monopoly on the post-Soviet space. We have our legitimate interests
there, we expect our neighbours in the post-Soviet space to respect and
consider those interests in the same way as we strive to respect and
consider their interests. Certainly, everyone who develops a close, friendly
and especially allied [Russian: soyuznicheskiye] relationship with us will
enjoy our particular attention. This involves both preferential economic
cooperation and trade at special prices. Yet I reiterate: we are not
imposing our friendship on anyone and we have no monopoly on that space.
However, we assume that no-one else has a monopoly on this space and these
nations make their own decisions on what relationships to build with this or
that neighbour, what organizations they view as their medium-term or
long-term partners and this position was set out by President Putin very
clearly. [Passage omitted to end: personal questions] -30-
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ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No. 269: ARTICLE NUMBER ELEVEN
=========================================================
11. "RUSSIA WITHOUT A HEAD"
Latvian commentary urges western response to rising Russian authoritarianism

COMMENTARY: By Peteris Straitins
Diena, Riga, Latvia, in Latvian 20 Dec 04 p 2
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Tue, Dec 21, 2004

The destruction of the Russian oil giant Yukos and the reorganization of
other major players in the country's economy are ominous signs of a rise in
authoritarianism which should alarm its neighbours, including Latvia, and
western countries, writes Peteris Straitins in a commentary published by the
Latvian newspaper Diena on 20 December.

Following is the text of the commentary, entitled "Russia Without a Head";
subheadings inserted editorially:

Russia yesterday took yet another dangerous step towards the monopolization
of economic and political power there - a process which creates long-term
threats to our own economic and political security. The NATO umbrella will
not be able to protect us from the corrupt nature of politicians here who
can be used by Russia's nationalized companies to extend their influence in
our country. The concentration of political and economic power is taking
place at full throttle in Russia itself right now, and no one is hiding the
fact that the Kremlin considers energy companies to be a foreign policy
weapon.

Yesterday the institutions of power in Russia completed their most important
"job" - the full destruction of Yukos, which was once the most powerful
privately held oil company in Russia. A total of 76.79 per cent of the
company's primary oil extraction company, Yuganskneftegaz, was auctioned
off. The shares were bought not by the natural gas monopolist Gazprom, as
had been expected, but by a little known company from Tver that is called
Baykalfinansgrup.

Gazprom had registered for the auction, and there are several possible
reasons why it did not make an offer. The controlling share at Yukos is held
by Menatep, which has threatened to focus on Gazprom exports when it comes
to collecting losses that have been caused to it. A consortium of western
banks, meanwhile, refused to issue a syndicated loan to Gazprom so that it
could buy Yuganskneftegaz. Perhaps the Kremlin is simply afraid of the fact
that those countries to which Russia exports natural gas are starting to be
very cautious with respect to the artificially created foreign policy
"weapon" and that these countries may instead start to look for alternative
sources of delivery.

No matter what the reason in this process, it seems that the organizers of
the auction would never have allowed any company which is "inappropriate"
to take part in the auction. That is clearly seen in the price that was paid
for the shares - 9.35bn dollars. Leading investment banks such as J.P.
Morgan Stanley and Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein had assessed the value
of Yuganskneftegaz at between 16bn and 22bn dollars and between 15bn
and 18.5bn dollars respectively. Without the blessing of the Kremlin, the
"billionaires of Tver" would surely have had no chance of taking part in
the auction.
OTHER ATTACKS ON PRIVATE BUSINESS
The destruction of Yukos is not the only attack against independent economic
forces in Russia. The relevant institutions recently filed a questionable
tax demand against the mobile communications operator Vimpelkom. In the
case of Yukos, we might perhaps still have "hoped" that the principle of
"steal that which has been stolen" was in place, but the fact is that
Vimpelkom is based not on questionably privatized oilfields, but rather on
an infrastructure that was financed by private investors. Of course, it was
not any search for justice which led the government to turn on Yukos. It
was the fact that the Kremlin did not care for the political ambitions of
its primary owner, Mikhail Khodorkovskiy.

It is not just Yukos and Khodorkovskiy, however, who are paying for the
Kremlin's ambition, it is the entire Russian society. The latest events
prove that private property is once again unprotected in Russia, and this
has quickly caused significant harm to the national economy. The growth rate
in investments in Russia has declined rapidly, from 12 per cent last year to
just four per cent this year. That has happened at a time when oil prices
are high, and one must ask what will happen when those prices decline.
Capital is once again flowing out of Russia. The government thinks that 9bn
dollars will disappear in this way this year, while independent assessors
think that the sum will be two times higher. This means that Russia will not
be able to preserve the economic growth rate which exists at this time.
THREATS TO LATVIA
The incompetence of this vertical system of power is also creating threats
to Latvia, because we receive all of the natural gas which we use from
Gazprom. That is a company which is very poorly governed from the business
perspective. It is not investing enough money to find new sources of natural
gas in the future. Liquidized gas can be purchased elsewhere and transported
by sea, but that would be much more expensive. If it turns out that Gazprom
hid behind Baykalfinansgrup, then the former company's already crushing debt
burden will become even more difficult, thus making it even harder for it to
develop its basic area of operations.

The destruction of Russia's economy is taking place at a time when the
Russian people are already very weak. The population is shrinking very
rapidly, and this is a process which can be facilitated in the future by the
rapid spread of AIDS and multi-resistant tuberculosis. Russia's weakness
reduces hopes that it might develop on the basis of the scenario of Chile or
South Korea - an authoritarian but competent regime which eventually leads
to the emergence of a democratic system even if that has not been the
intention of that regime.

Instead Russia is seeing the flourishing of racism and xenophobia, and the
development of a civil society is being repressed. Surveys show that 70 per
cent of Russia's residents think that a strong hand is needed in government
to resolve their problems, and only 20 per cent think that democracy is the
better answer. That is why President Vladimir Putin remains so popular even
after all of the political failures that have taken place.
WESTERN RESPONSE
We cannot force Russia to implement competent economic policies, but we
can certainly reduce the threats to our security which are created by the
rebirth of imperialism there. Latvia must fight against the carelessness of
some of our Western partners when it comes to relations with the neighbour
to the East. The leaders of several EU member states - Italy, France and
Germany in particular - have closed their eyes to Russia's movement towards
authoritarianism, thus hoping to win economic benefits.

It is also true that in Western Europe, and particularly among left-wing
political forces, there are lots of idiots who support any country which
announces that its goal is to reduce the influence of the United States in
the world. Luckily, the harsh reaction of the West to Russia's interference
in the internal affairs of Ukraine suggests that the vast naivety is
beginning to disappear. We do not have to try to get the EU to treat Russia
in a hostile manner, but we do have to make sure that efforts to renew the
empire come up against strict countermeasures. -30-
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ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No. 269: ARTICLE NUMBER TWELVE
Letters to the editor are always welcome
=========================================================
12. UKRAINE SEPARATISTS PLAN POLL VIOLENCE,
CLAIMS OPPOSITION

Askold Krushelnycky in Kiev, The Independent
London, United Kingdom; Wed, Dec 22, 2004

KIEV - FEARS ARE mounting that Boxing Day elections in Ukraine will be
wrecked by an orchestrated campaign of violence after reports that pro-
government "thugs" were being supplied with weaponry from a Russian naval
base in Crimea. Hryhoriy Omelchenko, an opposition MP, claims to have
evidence that up to 300 AK-47 automatic rifles, as well as grenades and
explosives, have been handed over to groups linked to separatist politicians
in eastern Ukraine. A spokesman for the Russian Black Sea fleet, based in
the Ukrainian peninsula of Sevastopol, denied the allegations.

Mr Omelchenko, a former Soviet-era KGB officer who also served as a
colonel in the Ukrainian intelligence service after independence, said he
received his information from serving officers. "The intention is to use
blood-shed to disrupt the election so badly that it is declared invalid," he
told The Independent. Separatist politicians in east Ukraine threatened to
declare the region autonomous and create "self- defence units" after the
presidential election victory of their Kremlin-backed candidate, Viktor
Yanukovych, the Prime Minister, was quashed and a new election ordered.

"[After the violence] they will argue that any new election should have
neither [Viktor] Yushchenko nor Yanukovych as candidates and fix it for
one of their people to win," he said. Mr Omelchenko, the deputy chief of the
parliamentary committee on organised crime and corruption, said the plan
calls for police officers loyal to Mr Yanukovych from his eastern Ukrainian
fiefdom of Donetsk, to lead "small groups of criminals" given guarantees of
immunity.

"They will be in civilian cars, in convoys of about 10 cars with five people
in each one," he said. "Their job will be to cause as much violence and
mayhem as possible so the government declares the election invalid. "I hope
that if these people know their plans are no longer secret they will think
twice about them and they will throw all these weapons down a well or an
old mine shaft."

Volodymyr Lytvyn, the speaker of the parliament, said parliament would ask
the prosecutor general's office and the SBU (Security Service of Ukraine) to
investigate.

The pro-Western opposition leader, Mr Yushchenko, advocates Nato and
European Union membership, and Vladimir Putin, Russia's President, has
worked hard to prevent him becoming president.

Mr Putin visited Ukraine on the eve of both previous presidential election
rounds, in October and November, to boost Mr Yanukovych's popularity
among Ukraine's large Russian ethnic minority, and has been chastised
by the West for unseemly interference.

There have also been reports that Russian special forces have been present
in the country. Many of Mr Yushchenko's colleagues suspect Russia was
involved in the poisoning, last September, of the opposition leader, which
left him hideously scarred.

The opposition claims that as part of the scheme to use violence, the
government has attempted to replace the chief of the civilian and
paramilitary police in Kiev, the capital, with Vladimir Vorobyov, a
general from Donetsk.

Yuriy Pavlenko, an opposition MP and Yushchenko ally, said government
plans to unleash heavily armed paramilitary forces against pro-democracy
protesters last month were only blocked by senior Kiev police officers who
vowed to defend the protesters. He said the same people foiled the attempt
to install General Vorobyov at a meeting last Friday night. Mr Pavlenko
said: "I think they want bloodshed to start and for the police and special
forces to stand by initially, and then to go in and attack the opposition
supporters under the pretext of restoring peace."

The MP said that as part of an opposition compromise with the government
last month, Leonid Kuchma, the outgoing President, was to fire the Minister

for Internal Affairs, Mykola Bilokon, who has been accused of colluding in m
assive electoral fraud and of abusing his powers on many other occasions.
Instead he was allowed to take leave. Mr Pavlenko believes General Bilokon
may soon be reinstated.

"General Bilokon has proved in the past that he is ruthless and he knows
that if Mr Yushchenko becomes president, he will be prosecuted. He has
nothing to lose and the danger is that many of these people feel they have
nothing to lose," Mr Pavlenko said. -30-
=========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No. 269: ARTICLE NUMBER THIRTEEN
Letters to the editor are always welcome
=========================================================
13. "HOW RUSSIAN TROOPS HELPED THE ORANGE REVOLUTION"

COMMENTARY: By James Hydzik
Kyiv, Ukraine, Tue, December 21, 2004
The Action Ukraine Report, Washington, D.C.
Wednesday, December 22, 2004

Despite Viktor Yushchenko's announcement from the stage on Maidan
Nezelezhnosti that Russian troops had indeed been in Kyiv, confusion
remains over the size and even the very existence of RF Spetsnaz in the
area.

No less an authority than Janes Intelligence Digest confirmed Yushchenko's
words, but sources in Kyiv's diplomatic community and others with ties to
Ukrainian government ministries still insist that RF troops never entered
the country. However, the case can be put forward that not only were RF
Spetsnaz here, they played a role in the success of the Orange Revolution.

Rumors of the Special Forces entry into Ukraine came as early as Tuesday,
November 23. Yuliya Timoshenko reported that she met troops who she
declared as being Russian while she was at the Presidential Administration
buildings. The troops insisted that they were from Crimea. However, news
sources at the time stated independently that RF Special Forces had been
trucked in overnight.

Reports within Kyiv grew even more confusing as the week passed.
Oleksandr Zinchenko, working from information that 17 flights with soldiers
from Russia had landed at Boryspil' Airport, announced on November 24
that almost 1,000 of the RF's Vityaz Special Forces were in Kyiv, with
half of them based in the presidential administration buildings already.
Rumors of 'tall, physically fit men asking for directions to well-known
places' abounded.

What is certain is that two Antonov An-26 aircraft and an Ilyushin Il-76
landed in Kyiv area airports on November 23 and 24th. The Antonovs,
one of which UNIAN reports as having the tail code RA-26410, carried
30 troops each. These aircraft were to be serviced by a detachment at
Boryspil's military airport. The second in command at the airport, Lt.
Colonel Lyashenko, refused to deal with the Russian craft and resigned
instead. Though Security Bureau of Ukraine (SBU) chief Ihor Smeshko
denied the landing, he did confirm that Lyashenko had indeed resigned
on the 24th.

The Il-76, which can carry 140 troops, is said to have landed at Hostomel
airport in Irpin and the troops were stationed at Vasylkyiv. However, the
Ilyushin is said to have been a Ukrainian aircraft and the troops
disembarked wearing Ukrainian uniforms. Later reports claimed that the
troops were 'back in Russian uniform' but left only an hour before
investigators arrived.

At this point only 60 Vityaz can be considered as having been in Ukraine,
despite Jane's claim of 'up to 500'. It is known now that Crimean militsia
in the Kyiv region were actually issued ammunition on November 28, so the
troops that Tymoshenko met could have been Ukrainians. The Il-76 may
have had Ukrainian troops as well. But later reports claiming that the two
Antonovs came from Russia with money for Yanukovych's counter-
protestors flies in the face of Lyashenko's resignation.

Russian Federation President Wolodymyr Putin may have well acted on a
request (however illegal) from President Leonid Kuchma for troops to act as
a praetorian guard. That another part of the detachment was to retrieve
records, as Jane's reported, also makes sense. Since Ukrainian military
units were starting to pledge themselves to the Ukrainian people, Kuchma
could have hardly had much trust in his own soldiers. And that is why the
presence of foreign troops on Ukrainian soil, however unwelcome, may have
staved off bloodshed. With Kuchma's personal safety ensured by the Russians,
he could resist calls for the use of force to restore the administration's
idea of order.

In his interview with the Financial Times on December 14, then-deputy head
of the Presidential Administration Vasyl Basiv stated that President Kuchma
was "consistently against the use of force." Presidential candidate Viktor
Yanukovych and Presidential Administration head Viktor Medvedchuk are said
to have pressured Kuchma into doing so. It is still unclear who ordered the
militsia troop movement on November 28 which sources in Kyiv claim was
stopped by the SBU and backed up hours later by American diplomatic efforts.
However, Obozrevatel reports that an official review of the incident was
started on December 7.

There is one other factor, largely undocumented, which should be brought to
light. Though consideration of Russian reactions is rarely far from mind in
Kyiv, the Orange Revolution got underway to resolve internal problems, with
Russian interference as a factor rather than the whole problem. However, by
the 24th the mood in Kyiv had sharpened as concerns about the foreign
incursion gathered steam. As one normally peaceful scholar put it, "I'll
talk to the Ukrainian militsia for hours until they give up, but don't get
between my hand and a Vityaz throat."

Considering the masterful crowd control the revolution's organizers showed,
playing down the Russian military intrusion may have been seen as keeping
order, and not for fear of the people losing heart. By facing the
unthinkable - that yet again, Russian troops had been brought into Ukraine
to impose order - the protesters on Maidan steeled themselves to press on
regardless and determine their own fate. -30-
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James Hydzik is a writer and editor living in Kyiv
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ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No. 269: ARTICLE NUMBER FOURTEEN
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14. UKRAINE'S RE-RUN ELECTION CAN BE INVALIDATED

UNIAN news agency, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1546 gmt 21 Dec 04
BBC Monitoring Service - United Kingdom; Dec 21, 2004

DNIPROPETROVSK - Presidential candidate [and Prime Minister]
Viktor Yanukovych has said the [26 December repeat] election could be
disrupted. He was speaking at a meeting with Dnipropetrovsk Region's
activists today.

"The recently adopted law [that limits the use of absentee ballots and home
voting, which were viewed as main tools of vote-rigging during the previous
two rounds of the election] allows either side to disrupt the election," he
said commenting on adopted amendments to the law on presidential elections.
Yanukovych reiterated once again that the law violates constitutional rights
of numerous Ukrainian citizens. "We will collect as many complaints from our
citizens as needed [to invalidate the vote]", Yanukovych was quoted as
saying.

He added that his team was not involved in amending the law, but his
representatives found grey areas that allow the vote to be invalidated. "The
possibility of invalidating the election is inherent in this law",
Yanukovych said, adding that he wanted the election to be over before the
end of the year. -30- [Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
=========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT-04, No. 269: ARTICLE NUMBER FIFTEEN
=========================================================
15. "YUSHCHENKO HEALTHY, CALM AND FULL OF PLANS"

By Natalia Trofimova, The Day Weekly Digest in English
Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, December 21, 2004

Viktor Yushchenko's meeting with domestic media people last Wednesday
night turned out to be different from the "tight circle" format anticipated
by everyone on the guest list. This and the fact that Our Ukraine's leader
was
1.5 hours late, news of which was instantly proclaimed from every rooftop,
did not prevent me gaining first-hand impressions of the meeting, although I
had first seen Viktor Yushchenko at close range during the election
campaign. I'd read about his team's democratic and otherwise friendly
approach during all public actions.

On this particular occasion, I was almost instantly aware of a friendly,
almost homelike atmosphere. Nor was I shocked when a security guard
politely asked me to produce my credentials and let him look in my purse,
perhaps because I realized this was a real and sufficiently warranted
necessity, unlike the overstated admission procedures practiced at state-
run institutions. I was touched rather than irritated by the two bodyguards
stationed next to the presidential candidate, who had visited the press
conference room before it started and begged the journalists not to run
after Mr. Yushchenko.

As we sat there waiting to see the presidential candidate, his press
secretary Iryna Herashchenko was the only "open" line of communications,
asking us to please wait another five minutes, saying he was surely on his
way. Few if any complained, probably out of professional habit, but also
because most members of the Ukrainian media community support the true
opposition leader.

Viktor Yushchenko finally arrived. On entering the room, he apologized for
being late and asked if we media people had been offered food. Then, without
undue preliminaries, he launched into a dialogue. The first questions came
from foreign televisions channels, who had broken all deadlines for their
respective breaking news schedules. Viktor Yushchenko was asked four
questions: about his illness; his plans to consolidate Ukrainian society,
split as it was by the election campaign; relations between Ukraine, the EU,
and Russia; and all those thousands of Yanukovych supporters expected to
flood Kyiv as soon the rerun's official turnout becomes public knowledge.

I thought that Mr. Yushchenko's answers, even though they were a bit drawn
out (he seemed intent on making every idea as absolutely clear as possible)
were much more impressive than his campaign rival's recent markedly tough,
even aggressive, responses.
ILLNESS
When asked about his affliction, Viktor Yushchenko said he wouldn't want
the subject to be used in any campaign manner before December 26. He
didn't want it to cause any ethic or political speculations.

"I have a clean bill of health... I'm glad to know that the Rudolfinerhaus
Clinic will shortly issue an official statement concerning my physical
condition. This statement will read that I have no problems whatsoever with
any internal organs; that I'm perfectly all right physically. And the facial
disfigurements are gradually disappearing. Too bad the process takes time,
meaning I'll have to put up with them for a while more. The only reason they
're still on the issue of my health is because they want to discredit me as
a campaign rival.

They say I have the wrong kind of face and bill of health to stay in the
race, what with the other candidate, a pink-cheeked man who weighs 120
kilos. I'm sure that our people will cast their ballots for reasons other
than weight and complexion; today, the head of state is considered for what
he is worth in terms of morals, world views, and what he can propose to
make this country a normal polity." The opposition leader reaffirmed the
fact of his having been deliberately poisoned: "I didn't poison myself. I
was poisoned by the Ukrainian political system.

Numerous facts are being uncovered as evidence of what happened on that
particular date and what kind of dinner I could've been served along with
that poison. The problem is that I didn't eat and didn't drink everything I
was offered. That's the problem facing the other side, my being still alive.
I had two dinners that night. One held with my good friends, when we all
shared everything. And all are in good health. The other dinner was on a
more formal basis... I wouldn't want to name names. The General Prosecutor's
Office, initiating criminal proceedings in my deliberate poisoning case, is
faced with a very easy task; they have to detect and identify those
involved in and with that attempt on my life."
EASTERN LANDING FORCE
Earlier, Viktor Yanukovych said that thousands of his supporters would come
to Kyiv to "prevent a coup." His opponent had this to say on the matter: "I'
m perfectly sure that December 26 will witness [our] great victory. We don't
have to resort to any forceful methods to prove anything. The people will
have the final say by casting their ballots, and this will eliminate any
reasons for any debates on the opposing side. Nor will tens, even hundreds,
of thousands of people be able to say anything against the legitimate
turnout.

I think that this scenario [written by Yanukovych's team - Transl.] has no
future. I would suggest that the politicians who are plotting such actions
revise their plans. I understand that Yanukovych has only one option, to
broach a very hot Ukrainian issue, one that is fraught with considerable
political risk, and hold the temperature steady. However, I think that
Viktor Fedorovych [Yanukovych] would do best to discard it. I think that
he should save his face. After all, it doesn't mean losing one's political
and physical life. He is still supported by millions. He should treasure
this support, rather than continue casting pearls on projects that can't
serve the good of our society or our state. Everybody will realize as
much, sooner or later.

Subjects dealing with separatism, dual citizenship, and Russian language
status will eventually cause most people who support my current political
rival to see him for what he really is, a naked king. They will see his
concepts for what they really are; that they can't actually solve the
important issues faced by our country. My policy is aimed at holding a
nationwide roundtable, in which our political, business, media, and
religious elites will participate. I'm sure that by combining our efforts we
can work out fair and transparent policies and strategies."
CABINET-FORMING PRINCIPLES
"Everything happening in terms of executive cadre appointments before
December 26 is not the cadre policy of the bloc Strength of the Nation and
our partners. We are proceeding from the assumption that forming a cabinet
is a good opportunity to further enhance the parliamentary majority, a new
kind of majority. I wouldn't mind if not only victors but also partners were
members of the [new] government, inasmuch as their stand doesn't run
counter to the strategy and logic of our policy.

"Also, I don't rule out the possibility that our team will be divided on
some cabinet members. I'll hold countless talks to ease such tensions. As
for the premier, I mean those several candidacies being discussed in our
quarters, I haven't said yes or no to any of them. I'm convinced that it
would be premature to deal with such matters. Once we reach our ultimate
goal on December 26, I'll invite our partners to a roundtable and will voice
my opinion on the candidacies." Viktor Yushchenko also noted that a new
cabinet, relying on the current coalition basis, could be formed toward the
end of January or in early February 2005.
INAUGURATION
"The Central Election Commission will most likely announce the rerun's
official turnout on December 31. In view of Christmas holidays [celebrated
in Ukraine after the New Year] that last until January 14, I believe that
the inauguration ceremony should be postponed till after the holidays. This
important event will mark the triumph of the Orange Revolution and the
policy waged and fought for by Our Ukraine and our partners since March
2002. It's a great festive occasion and I hope it will be celebrated
properly, not in a slapdash manner but as an event of nationwide import."
BUDGET
"We have nothing to do with the budget bill to be submitted in December,
considering its objectives, structure, and shortcomings. This bill is a
product of Yanukovych's team. However, we understand that the bill should
pass before December 21, even if partially, I mean the interbudgetary
relations clauses, so that the financial system does not become paralyzed
all the way from the center down to the village council. Of course, after we
win we'll amend the budget; we'll try to make it more socially oriented and
humane.

We'll start by turning the pensioners' campaign allowance increase into a
regular addition to their pensions. Any cuts, any changes in these indices
are out of the question. Nevertheless, we condemn such treatment of
pensioners, because it's aimed at manipulating these people's views. But we
do realize that this problem must be solved proceeding from new official
recalculations."
HOW TO UNITE UKRAINE?
"Why has no one asked Leonid Kuchma this question when he was backed by
fourteen regions in the election campaign? Why did no one raise the problem
of Ukraine's becoming divided there and then? I was backed by 17 regions in
the runoff, including the Hero City of Kyiv. We expect to win in 19-21
Ukrainian regions, come December 26. The question of dividing Ukraine doesn'
t exist per se. There are no differences between these regions in terms of
their views of political prospects.

But there are all those political outsiders with their selfish ambitions,
people who've lost the campaign and have no bona fide political future in
Ukraine; these people apply the good old Soviet nostalgic techniques,
adding fuel to this fire, for the sole purpose of gaining room for political
maneuvering in certain regions of Ukraine. I believe that these kinds of
separatist and federalization ideas will not be accepted by the Ukrainian
political elite, and that above all they won't be accepted by the people.
It's a bad scenario for bad politician. -30-
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