"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT"
An International Newsletter
In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis, and Commentary
"The Art of Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion,
Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World"
"RESPECT FROM ONE'S OWN COUNTRY"
This is exactly what the citizens of independent Ukraine quietly hope
for, and sometimes openly demand. Respect and protection from the
state is the nerve that runs along modern Ukrainians political outlook.
[article number thirteen]
"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT" - Number 402
morganw@patriot.net, ArtUkraine.com@starpower.net
FROM: KYIV, UKRAINE, TUESDAY, JANUARY 4, 2005
NOTE: A new numbering system will be used in the future for The
Action Ukraine Report. There were 124 issues in year 2003 and
276 issues in year 2004 for a total of 400 issues. The first issue
for 2005, published last Saturday, Jan 1, 2005, now becomes number
401. This issue then becomes number 402 and so forth in the future.
EDITOR
-----INDEX OF ARTICLES-----
"Major International News Headlines and Articles"
1. UKRAINIAN ELECTION BODY REJECTS FORMER
PREMIER'S LATEST COMPLAINTS
ICTV television, Kiev, in Ukrainian, 3 Jan 05
BBC Monitoring Service,UK, in English, Monday, Jan 03, 2005
2. UKRAINIAN ELECTORAL AGENCY PROMISES OFFICIAL
RESULTS IN A FEW DAYS
Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian, 3 Jan 05
BBC Monitoring Service,UK, in English, Mon, Jan 03, 2005
3. UKRAINE HAPPY WITH NEW TURKMEN GAS DEAL
ITAR-TASS news agency, Moscow, in Russian, 3 Jan 05
BBC Monitoring Service,UK, in English, Mon, Jan 03, 2005
4. GEORGIAN PRESIDENT TO HOLD FURTHER TALKS WITH
UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT-ELECT YUSHCHENKO
Imedi TV, Tbilisi, Georgia, in Georgian, 1200 gmt 2 Jan 05
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Sun, Jan 02, 2005
5. YUSHCHENKO OUTLINES POLICIES TO GERMAN MAGAZINE
Interview with Viktor Yushchenko by Christian Neef
Der Spiegel web site, Hamburg, in German 31 Dec 04
BBC Monitoring Service,UK, in English, Sun, Jan 02, 2005
6. RUSSIA MAKING COMPONENTS FOR UKRAINIAN MILITARY PLANES
ITAR-TASS news agency, Moscow, in Russian, 2 Jan 05
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Sun, Jan 02, 2005
7. COULD NO-TILL FARMING REBUILD UKRAINE'S AG SECTOR?
By Glen Willard, The Ukrainian Observer, Issue 202
The Willard Group, Kyiv, Ukraine, December, 2004
8. "POST-SOVIET TERRITORY: TIME OF 'ORANGE ELITES'"
New elites in former Soviet states "old book in new glossy jacket" - pundit
Politkom.ru web site, Moscow, in Russian 30 Dec 04
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Mon, .Jan 3, 2005
9. "AT LAST, PRESIDENT YUSHCHENKO"
The Economist Global Agenda
Economist magazine, London, UK, December 29, 2004
10. "IN UKRAINE, A NEW IDENTITY"
By Vladimir Matveyev, Special to the Jewish Times
Baltimore Jewish Times, Baltimore, Maryland, Saturday, Jan 1, 2005
11. YALTA: CITY WHERE THE WORLD WAS DIVIDED HOPES
UKRAINE WILL REMAIN UNITED
Agence France Presse (AFP), Yalta, Ukraine, Sun, January 2, 2004
12. YUSHCHENKO'S DAUNTING FUTURE
The "Orange Revolution" has only just started, challenges are daunting.
ANALYSIS: By Peter Lavelle, United Press International (UPI)
Moscow, Russia, Monday, December 27, 2004
13. "UKRAINIANS WANT A COUNTRY THAT RESPECTS THEM"
THE PROFESSOR COLUMN: By Volodymyr Senchenko
The Ukrainian Observer, Issue 202, The Willard Group
Kyiv, Ukraine, December 2004
=========================================================
1. UKRAINIAN ELECTION BODY REJECTS FORMER
PREMIER'S LATEST COMPLAINTS
ICTV television, Kiev, in Ukrainian, 3 Jan 05
BBC Monitoring Service,UK, in English, Monday, Jan 03, 2005
KIEV - The Central Election Commission has rejected another three complaints
by former prime minister Viktor Yanukovych against the outcome of the 26
December repeat presidential election. The commission's chairman Yaroslav
Davydovych has said only formalities remain before opposition leader Viktor
Yushchenko can be declared winner. Yanukovych will have a week to appeal
to the Supreme Court once the CEC announces the official result.
The following is the text of report by Ukrainian ICTV television on 3
January:
[Presenter] The Central Electoral Commission [CEC] is working hard.
Full-fledged sittings were held in Lesya Ukrayinka Square on 31 December
and 1 January. Today the CEC considered three new complaints submitted by
presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovych's team against the result of the
election in some constituencies in western Ukraine. All three complaints
have been rejected. But for now, nobody at the CEC can give the date when
the official election results will be announced.
[Correspondent] The guards of electoral order are working hard and in a
coordinated manner. All resolutions are approved without much disagreement,
and most of them unanimously. Today the CEC rejected three complaints by
the Yanukovych against the outcome of the vote in several constituencies in
western Ukraine. The CEC did not find any irregularities in the actions of
district electoral commissions. Yanukovych's proxy, Nestor Shufrych, was not
happy with this. His last hope is the Supreme Court. If the court is guided
by the law rather than revolutionary necessity, Yanukovych will win,
otherwise democracy will lose, Shufrych said.
[Shufrych] It seems we will have a situation when before or after any
election the losing side could initiate a new revolutionary situation and
influence the outcome.
[Correspondent] Yanukovych's supporters will submit a complaint to the
Supreme Court after the official results of the election are announced. The
Central Electoral Commission should do this by 10 January. Thanks to the
normal work of the CEC computer system, the final results will be almost
identical to the preliminary ones [sent to the CEC electronically from
across Ukraine], CEC chairman Yaroslav Davydovych said.
[Davydovych] It works with almost the same precision as a spacecraft.
Deviation from the preliminary result will be about 0.001 [per cent]. The
Ukrainian election was honest, transparent and legitimate.
[Correspondent] The winner of the election, Viktor Yushchenko, will probably
take the presidential oath in the week after Christmas [6 January]. Under
the law, the inauguration should be held within 30 days from the election.
The winners say that the losers are filing complaints only to play for time
for their own benefit.
[MP Yuriy Klyuchkovskyy, Viktor Yushchenko's proxy] These are certain
moves in privatization and some other things. These are covering up the
traces, destruction of certain documents, work with potential witnesses and
- so to speak - even attempts to leave the country. This is a strategic play
for time.
[Correspondent] Be that as it may, but the election is in its final stage.
Davydovych is convinced that only formalities remain, and they will be dealt
with strictly within the law. -30- [Action Ukraine Monitoring Service]
=========================================================
2. UKRAINIAN ELECTORAL AGENCY PROMISES OFFICIAL
RESULTS IN A FEW DAYS
Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian, 3 Jan 05
BBC Monitoring Service,UK, in English, Mon, Jan 03, 2005
KIEV - The Central Electoral Commission [CEC] will announce the official
election results in a few days, the CEC head, Yaroslav Davydovych, has said.
He told journalists that the CEC is currently processing vote count
statements from district electoral commissions.
He reminded that the CEC received statements from all 225 district electoral
commissions before New Year. All the figures from 170 statements has already
been entered into the database, and the CEC plans to complete the job on
Monday [3 January], Davydovych said.
There are no facts suggesting serious irregularities," Davydovych said. He
said that the election results, which have been received after processing
vote count statements from district electoral commissions, differ from
electronic results by several hundred votes. He said that the documents
about irregularities, separate opinions of members of district electoral
commissions and appendixes to vote count statements also show no serious
irregularities.
Davydovych added that the CEC is currently following the schedule of
publicizing the election results. He stressed that the CEC members "should
get ready" for a meeting which will announce the [official] election
results. "This will be a fundamental meeting," Davydovych said. He added
that "all materials that deserve attention", which arrived from district
electoral commissions, would be considered. In addition, the meeting will
consider vote count statements from all 225 constituencies. -30-
=========================================================
3. UKRAINE HAPPY WITH NEW TURKMEN GAS DEAL
ITAR-TASS news agency, Moscow, in Russian, 3 Jan 05
BBC Monitoring Service,UK, in English, Mon, Jan 03, 2005
ASGABAT - "It does not make any sense for Ukraine to look for an
alternative to Turkmen gas. We are fully satisfied with the new contract
with Turkmenistan," the chairman of the Naftohaz Ukrayini [oil and gas of
Ukraine] National Joint-Stock Company, Yuriy Boyko, said following the
signing of the one-year contract on supplying 36bn cu.m. of gas at the new
price of 58 dollars per 1,000 cu.m. of gas in 2005 in Asgabat today, in
response to a question from an ITAR-TASS correspondent .
Turkmen President Saparmyrat Nyyazow and Boyko signed the contract.
The new price is 14 dollars higher than the price fixed in the contract for
2004.
"An increase in prices for energy resources is a worldwide trend," Boyko
said. "Today's contract is necessary for the dynamic development of
Ukraine's economy in future and for the implementation of Turkmenistan's
investment programme, in which Ukrainian companies are actively involved,"
he said. -30- [The Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
==========================================================
4. GEORGIAN PRESIDENT TO HOLD FURTHER TALKS WITH
UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT-ELECT YUSHCHENKO
Imedi TV, Tbilisi, Georgia, in Georgian 1200 gmt 2 Jan 05
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Sun, Jan 02, 2005
TBILISI - [Presenter] The Georgian president will remain in Ukraine for
several more days. Mikheil Saakashvili has arrived in the beautiful
Carpathian Mountains with his host [Ukrainian opposition leader and
president-elect] Viktor Yushchenko. In Ivano-Frankivsk the newly elected
president of Ukraine will discuss the formation of a new government with his
team. He will also have talks on bilateral cooperation with Saakashvili.
According to Yushchenko, integration into Europe is very important for
both Georgia and Ukraine.
[Saakashvili] You can see how important the Georgian revolution is in
Ukraine, for every individual, not just for politicians. The revolution was
very important here and was a kind of example for every Ukrainian. Georgia,
as you can see, is very close to everyone's heart here. All in all, this
country is a strategic partner for us, a great country with huge potential.
It is very important for us and for Georgia's position in the world, because
the revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine have changed virtually everything in
the post-Soviet world. Our union in this respect is very symbolic.
[Yushchenko, in Russian] This is a working holiday and will last a few days,
during which I intend to meet my team to discuss the formation of a new
government. We will spend [orthodox] Christmas here, it is a beautiful
place.
[Question] What will you discuss with President Saakashvili? [Yushchenko]
Issues relating to European integration, democracy and freedom of speech
within the CIS and bilateral development. -30-
=========================================================
5. YUSHCHENKO OUTLINES POLICIES TO GERMAN MAGAZINE
Interview with Viktor Yushchenko by Christian Neef
Der Spiegel web site, Hamburg, in German 31 Dec 04
BBC Monitoring Service,UK, in English, Sun, Jan 02, 2005
Ukraine will continue to have normal relations with Russia but Putin must
not block Ukraine's way into the European Union, opposition leader Viktor
Yushchenko, winner of the 26 December presidential election, has said in an
end-of-year interview to a German magazine. He said there would be no
political persecution of individuals but insisted there would be respect for
the law. He also said regional governors should be elected in the regions,
there was a pressing need to reform the judiciary and the black economy
had to end.
The following is the text of an interview conducted by Christian Neef, place
and date not given, posted on the web site of the German news magazine
Der Spiegel on 31 December 2004:
[Neef] Viktor Andreyevich, have you had any contact with Russian
President Vladimir Putin since your election victory?
[Yushchenko] There has been no direct contact as yet.
[Neef] Putin has warned lately that the people around you are under an
"anti-Russian influence". Whom is he talking about?
[Yushchenko] I recognize what place Russia has in Ukrainian history.
Relations with Moscow will continue to be in Ukraine's best interest. This
is why I have no interest at all in strengthening any anti-Russian forces.
Russia continues to be a strategic partner in the political, economic and
military fields. Our strategy aims to achieve European integration and this
is the framework in which we need to resolve all problems together with
Russia. There is not a single anti-Russian minded person among those
around me.
[Neef] Does this also refer to Putin's much quoted "Zionist forces"?
[Yushchenko] His press service later changed this into "anti-Semitic
forces". I am pleased that no such problem exists in Ukraine. I have
excellent relations with Jewish organizations. I attend the Hanukkah
festival with my family every year. Anti-Semitic thinking ceased to exist a
long time ago in my team.
[Neef] How do you intend to improve relations between Kiev and Moscow?
[Yushchenko] We would like to encourage making mutual investments,
removing trade barriers and resolving problems associated with the influx of
workers. I will naturally focus on Ukrainian interests, but I will also bear
in mind Russian concerns, regarding, for example, the transit of oil and gas
or outstanding debt payments. There is, however, one condition: Putin
must not block our way into the European Union.
[Neef] What will your future cabinet look like? Will you recall the
governors from the eastern areas of Ukraine who are ill-disposed towards
you?
[Yushchenko] Our government will be formed on the basis of the agreement
that we have reached with our partners. It will be a government of national
confidence, embracing different political forces that share the aims of my
own team. As far as the governors are concerned, I am not in favour of
appointing such officials centrally. They should come directly from the
areas concerned.
[Neef] Will you institute legal proceedings against those local politicians
who oppose your government? Or perhaps proceedings for unjustified
enrichment?
[Yushchenko] I would not rule this out, but there will be no political
persecution. Respect for the law must be the yardstick for all actions,
including those with regard to the current president, his wife, and
son-in-law. At the same time, I want to return to Ukraine's history of the
1990s, the era of privatization: 98 per cent of Ukrainian companies act
within the scope of the legislation that we have introduced over the past 14
years. I do not like the word renationalization. What we want is stability
and the business community also wants to know where things stand. Our
managers want to have independent legal authorities that stop prosecuting
companies and put an end to unlawful acts of repression on the part of the
tax offices, the police or the secret service. The new government has to
assume responsibility for this. However, we also want to have clear-cut
rules: beginning 26 December, everyone will be obliged to pay taxes. The
black economy must come to an end.
[Neef] What will be the role of your opposition colleague Yuliya Tymoshenko?
[Yushchenko] She is our political partner. She has the right to run for the
highest position.
[Neef] Including the post of prime minister -
[Yushchenko] Naturally.
[Neef, interrupting] - although she is wanted under an arrest warrant in
Russia for allegedly bribing army officers?
[Yushchenko] I do not know a single court order that would support these
accusations. However, potential candidates for the position would also be
Petro Poroshenko, Oleksandr Moroz and Anatoly Kinakh.
[Neef] Will you call current President Leonid Kuchma to account for the
election fraud?
[Yushchenko] Just as any ordinary citizen, he is also obliged to obey the
law. No-one will forget what happened when steel giant Krivorishstal was
privatized and no-one will disregard the shadow privatizations that the
state chancellery handles to this day.
[Neef] Some of your allies want to reopen the agreed constitutional reform
that curbs the rights of the president.
[Yushchenko] It was Yanukovych who broke our skeleton agreement by
invalidating the electoral law for himself on 26 December. This is why
several groups in parliament want to appeal to the constitutional court,
instituting proceedings for details of the reform.
[Neef] Do you support such an appeal?
[Yushchenko] In moral terms, yes. The fact that the majority in parliament
appoints the government beginning in 2006, with the president having the
right to dissolve parliament - these are normal European standards. But
making deputies vote only with their parliamentary group has something
medieval about it. We also need to strengthen the role of judges because the
excessive weight of the public prosecutor's office is absurd. To this day,
it is able to block any trial from going ahead.
[Neef] Will you recall your troops from Iraq?
[Yushchenko] Our participation in the resolution of the crisis in Iraq is
due to Ukrainian interests. We have economic contacts and investments there.
Our units have purely humanitarian tasks. Everything depends on the future
national government of Iraq whether it thinks it continues to need us.
Naturally, we will also discuss the issue with our allies. -30-
==========================================================
6. RUSSIA MAKING COMPONENTS FOR UKRAINIAN MILITARY PLANES
ITAR-TASS news agency, Moscow, in Russian, 2 Jan 05
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Sun, Jan 02, 2005
OMSK, Russia - Omsk's Polet factory began to assemble the middle section
of the fuselage of the Russian-Ukrainian AN-70 military transport aircraft
on the New Year's eve. The company won a tender to make the aircraft for
Russia two years ago. In Ukraine, the Aviant factory in Kiev has already
begun to make its first two AN-70's.
Polet told ITAR-TASS that the assembled part of the fuselage is intended for
Ukraine, which has earmarked 25m dollars for this purpose. Two transport
aircraft are planned to be put together in Ukraine in 2005. Voronezh and
Novosibirsk enterprises may be involved in this cooperative effort. Nikolay
Kalyagin, Polet deputy head engineer for aviation, said the first middle
section of the fuselage will go to Kiev in the second quarter of 2005; the
second in the fourth quarter. "If Russia makes the decision to make its own
AN-70's, our fuselage production will be up and running", said Kalyagin.
[Passage omitted to end: background] -30-
=========================================================
7 COULD NO-TILL FARMING REBUILD UKRAINE'S AG SECTOR?
By Glen Willard, The Ukrainian Observer, Issue 202
The Willard Group, Kyiv, Ukraine, December, 2004
Many people still think of Ukraine as the breadbasket of Europe or of the
former USSR. And indeed, with a third of the world's richest black soil
(locally called chernozem), Ukraine was at the turn of the 20th century a
world leader in agricultural production.
True chernozem, according to the Columbia Encyclopedia, is black, but
there are various gradations into gray and chestnut-brown soils. It forms in
areas that have cold winters, hot summers and rapid evaporation of
precipitation. Generally only tall grass is found native on chernozem. It
has large quantities of nutrients, excellent structure, and good water-
holding capacity, making it very suitable for agriculture. It is most widely
distributed in Ukraine, where it forms a large part of the good agricultural
soil.
In the late 1920s, Stalin and the collectivization of Soviet agriculture
eliminated many of the peasant agrarian reforms that the Czarist government
had begun as early as 1906 under P.A. Stolypin, who served as Interior
minister and prime minister between 1906 and his death in 1911. Even after
Stolypin's assassination in Kyiv, reforms during his tenure produced great
agricultural harvests and the country was a world leader in grain production
into the early 1920s.
While Ukraine contributed greatly to agricultural production to the whole
of the USSR, its production potential was severely limited by Soviet
agricultural methods and practices. Further, Ukraine's agricultural
production, like that of all other production, particularly industrial, fell
precipitously in the years following the breakup of the Soviet empire in
1989. It was only at the beginning of the late 1990s that Ukrainian
agriculture began to recover and make progress.
BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE
For the past several months, and of late on a somewhat ad hoc basis, I've
been attempting to acquire some knowledge and understanding of the present
status of the agricultural industry in Ukraine. That knowledge, I believed,
would then allow me to form some opinions as to the future potential and
importance of the industry to the overall economy of Ukraine. Admittedly, in
advance, I was hoping to come to a conclusion that, at least at some point
in the future, Ukraine would again be the "breadbasket of Europe" (or of the
FSU, Asia, Eurasia, or wherever). In short, I began predisposed to look for
and find a happy ending to a story or stories on agriculture in Ukraine. My
research continues. I plan more articles on the subject as I discover more.
I am presently in the middle of my studies. Beginning with little knowledge
or background in farming in Ukraine or of the agricultural industry in
general, I have not yet reached the point where I can draw conclusions.
While I've interviewed many in the industry, including professionals,
academics and some in government, I must continue my education. As yet,
my shortcomings I fear lie in the area of how it all works together. This is
partly caused by not having spent enough time analyzing statistical
information, laws and regulations, governmental subsidies that may exist
and agricultural loan programs.
I have, however, seen some bright spots, and I've met a lot of interesting,
talented and dedicated people. As I progress, I'll try to bring some of
their stories and experiences together.
NO-TILL AGRICULTURE CONFERENCE
I saw a truly remarkable event occur between November 18 and 23 at the
Agro-Soyuz Corporation's agricultural facility headquarters in
Dnipropetrovsk region. A conference, "NT-CA, Sustainable and Effective
Agriculture" was held at the site. This was an international conference to
educate Ukrainians and others concerning the benefits of a no-till systems
approach to profitable and environmentally sound farming.
Before discussing no-till farming, I'll describe what I felt was most
remarkable about the event. First, it was a gathering of approximately 600
participants, each of whom paid $300 to attend, plus the cost of their food
and lodging in nearby Dnipropetrovsk. Most of the registrants were from
Ukraine and Russia, which had 280 and 200 participants respectively.
Kazakhstan was well represented with 70 participants and the others were
from a number of other countries including Belarus and Armenia.
The quality of the international experts, with their years of knowledge,
expertise and practical experience was also impressive. Speakers came from
the United States, Canada, Australia, France, Germany, Brazil, Chile and
Paraguay. Some of the experts were academics, some came from government
and research institutes, and others were farmers with advanced degrees. All
had extensive practical farming experience and most provided lectures on
very specialized subjects.
The facilities provided by Agro-Soyuz were superb from any standpoint one
could imagine. Located on a farm, the infrastructure was truly impressive.
The 9,000-hectare farm had fields dedicated to various crops, a large
grain-storage facility, a swine operation, a dairy herd and even an
experimental ostrich farm. The campus also boasts a 124-hectare Concept
Farm, where a nine-crop rotation system is being studied over a 10-year
period. Agro-Soyuz has also operated a Farm Resources Center for several
years, where farming applications are both studied and taught. The teaching
is mostly through inexpensive or free seminars for Ukrainians as well as for
those who come from throughout the world.
For the international conference, a new office building and teaching
facility was built. It contains classrooms, an auditorium,
telecommunications and Internet connections, and audiovisual systems.
In addition, the center has a complete press facility with all that visiting
journalists might require.
NO-TILL FARMING
No-till farming has been around for several decades. Its use has rapidly
spread for the last decade. No-till brings biological and environmental
considerations to the farming process, as it helps prevent soil erosion,
helps retain soil fertility and moisture. It also requires fewer and more
environmentally safe fertilizers and chemicals, resulting in greater crop
yields. It is profitable partly because it saves labor, because there is
little need to repeat plowing and furrowing. Other benefits include a
"greenhouse effect" benefit, in that less carbon dioxide is released.
Though no-till is used throughout the world, it has not gained much
popularity in Europe and Asia. My understanding is that it might wreak havoc
with governmental processes in Western Europe, where farming is heavily
subsidized and EU-regulated. In many other countries however, no-till has
taken root and is expanding. In the United States along, no-till farmining
is practiced on 22.4 million hectares, or more than 19 percent of all
agricultural land. More than 45 percent of Brazil's agricultural land uses
no-till methods, and in Paraguay, no-till usage has reached 60 percent of
that country's farmland.
In Ukraine, Agro-Soyuz and other companies are the European pioneers in
the application of no-till cultivation. The methods may help Ukraine regain
its status as a "breadbasket" nation. -30- [Action Ukraine Monitoring]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Website: www.ukraine-observer-com
=========================================================
8. "POST-SOVIET TERRITORY: TIME OF 'ORANGE ELITES'"
New elites in former Soviet states "old book in new glossy jacket" - pundit
Politkom.ru web site, Moscow, in Russian 30 Dec 04
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Mon, .Jan 3, 2005
MOSCOW - The new elites that have emerged in Ukraine, Georgia,
Lithuania and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union are not new at all, but
representatives of the old nomenklatura, those holding top posts who
previously had to be endorsed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
a Russian political comment web site has said. What is new is the way that
these people have changed the rules of the game by appealing to the people
in the street rather than fellow members of the elite for support.
The following is text of report by Vitaliy Portnik "Post-Soviet territory:
Time of 'orange elites'" posted on Russian Politkom.ru web site on 30
December; subheadings inserted editorially:
The triumph of the "orange revolution" in Kiev, which resulted in a repeat
presidential runoff election and the success of opposition leader Viktor
Yushchenko, prompted many observers to express the opinion that a new
elite has emerged in Ukraine's political arena. However, before accepting
this opinion, it is necessary to answer the main question: How much novelty
can one expect from an elite comprising numerous representatives of the old
nomenklatura? Besides, is this principle for forming a new elite exclusively
Ukrainian?
CHANGING RULES OF GAME
Even superficial familiarization with the biographies of Viktor Yushchenko
and his comrades-in-arms shows that they cannot be called "new people" by
any means. However, these very nomenklatura members had realized that given
the rules of the game set in their country they were hopelessly behind other
clans and would never have a chance to come to power or control financial
flows and therefore, decided to change those rules. The changes presumed an
honest election (although it is a tough question how honest any election in
the former Soviet Union can be); moreover, these nomenklatura members
decided to seek support not from the elites but directly from the people.
It was the people's response to their call for support that caused the
"orange phenomenon" and the holding of a repeat election; moreover, it
revealed a huge number of opposition supporters both among the nomenklatura
and within the national bourgeoisie. However, Yushchenko's supporters were
not pioneers in the field of changing the rules of the game.
It was a change of rules of that had resulted in the "rose revolution" in
Georgia a year before the events in Ukraine. Mikheil Saakashvili, Zurab
Zhvania, and Nino Burjanadze are the same typical representatives of the
nomenklatura of Eduard Shevardnadze's period as Viktor Yushchenko and his
comrades-in-arms are representatives of the nomenklatura of Leonid Kuchma's
period. The opposition members in Georgia were not afraid to seek support
directly from the people either, and therefore, received an unprecedented
credit of people's confidence.
When the events in Ukraine and Georgia are interpreted in Russia, we are
usually told that those were not revolutions at all; those were merely
mutinies orchestrated in the West, and a line is drawn on the map from Kiev
and Tbilisi to Belgrade, where the opposition with the people's help had
forced Slobodan Milosevic to admit his defeat during the presidential
election in Yugoslavia. However, this comparison does not look quite
correct. Yes, the techniques were similar in many respects.
However, the Serbian elite was not "orange", to mention only the fact that
Vojislav Kostunica, who defeated Milosevic, was never a member of the
nomenklatura that ruled the country, and Zoran Dzindzic, Vesna Pesic and the
other politicians who supported him during the election were on the margins:
They had not occupied any administrative post or enjoyed the dictator's
confidence. When we speak about Saakashvili and Yushchenko we have to
draw a different kind of parallel, which will not make Moscow extremely
happy, for it will not be able to interpret the events as manipulation by
the West's far-reaching hands. The point is that the first appearance of an
"orange" elite did not take place in Tbilisi or Kiev. It took place in
Vilnius.
LITHUANIA LED WAY
Many details of the biography of Rolandas Paksas, who was recently dismissed
from the presidential post, are reminiscent of Yushchenko's. In their turn,
their biographies are reminiscent in many ways of another winner of a
presidential election, a former prime minister who had to seek people's
support this year when the authorities did not want to appoint him as their
successor: Abkhazian leader Sergey Bagapsh. He had had to leave the prime
minister's post in his day, which did not prevent Bagapsh from remaining the
most outstanding figure in the self-proclaimed republic despite the fact
that he never managed to become a member of President Vladislav Ardzinba's
inner circle.
Paksas acted similarly: When he became prime minister in a conservative
government he failed to find his niche in the established system of
relations within the traditional elite, as a result of which he had to form
a "third" political camp in addition to the existing right-wing and
left-wing camps after his resignation.
The ideology of this camp is difficult to define, but the main point is that
Paksas was not afraid to directly seek the people's support and to become
the people's favourite. Paksas's career came to an end specifically due to
the fact that he underestimated the degree of the Lithuanian political
elite's dissatisfaction with his change of rules of the game and the fact
that the elite was ready to use any mistake committed by the new president
to remove him from big politics.
However, it is significant that it was former Prime Minister Kazimiera
Prunskiene, a person who was not new to big politics and who, just like
Paksas, had been squeezed out of the nomenklatura because of her excessive
independence and readiness to ignore the established rules of the game, who
played the role of the new elite's representative and Paksas's "shadow"
during the subsequent presidential election.
The success of Viktor Uspaskikh's party during the legislative election in
Lithuania this year was also a peculiar continuation of the "Paksas
phenomenon". It was peculiar because Paksas was a member of the elite
who changed the rules of the game, but was well known due to his previous
activities and had an established reputation as a politician, whereas
Uspaskikh was a person out of nowhere whose success was based
exclusively on the electorate's confidence in his optimistic promises.
"OLD BOOK IN NEW GLOSSY JACKET"
Uspaskikh is not the last unexpected winner of this kind; he is rather the
first one. Political society is already established in Lithuania and
therefore, processes take place faster in that country than in Georgia or
Ukraine. It is in these countries that the new elites will be much more
difficult to cope with than in Lithuania. The weak point of the "orange
elites" is specifically the fact that although they seek people's support
during elections they are not going to seriously change any rules following
elections. Their main goal is not to change society, but to take the toppled
authorities' place.
However, since they cannot squeeze out the old nomenklatura completely, and
nor do they want to do so in view of inevitable personnel problems, it will
be an old book in a new glossy jacket. Many people in the West will like
this. Many people in the East will be worried. However, this will hardly
satisfy citizens in those countries where the "orange elites" come to power.
Incidentally, it is not out of the question that the list of these countries
will soon be substantially expanded.
"Orange elites" appear in those countries where the system of nomenklatura
relations becomes stiff and prevents the development of both society and the
nomenklatura itself. However, the electorate is concerned about its own and
its country's future, after all, and not about a particular dissatisfied
functionary's success! I do not rule out that in its search for real changes
the electorate will soon need absolutely new people promising miracles and
not connected to the former authorities in any way. Or at least capable of
pretending that they are not connected. People such as Viktor Uspaskikh in
Lithuania:
Is it not significant that many observers started to claim during the
Ukrainian events that Yuliya Tymoshenko, Viktor Yushchenko's most radical
supporter, wants to assume the post of labour minister in his future
government - the very post Viktor Uspaskikh has already assumed in the
government of Algirdas Brazauskas? It is a good social post which does not
greatly affect the image and allows making preparations for the future.
Many people feel surprised that many Lithuanians regard Uspaskikh, a Russian
born in Siberia and having ties with Gazprom, as a symbol of national
success and that he speaks Lithuanian, a language that he has learned, even
with his daughter; it is equally surprising that Tymoshenko - a Russian
woman from Dnipropetrovsk who became an oligarch thanks to her ties with
Gazprom - is currently regarded as a symbol of Ukraine's national revolution
and makes fiery speeches in Ukrainian, a language that she has learned.
However, people's affections are governed by their own rules. People can
ignore obvious facts and sincerely believe in something that can never
happen. It is this belief observed in developing societies that allows to
presume that "orange elites" will once be replaced by truly new politicians.
It's a shame that they will be obvious populists, at least initially. -30-
=========================================================
9. "AT LAST, PRESIDENT YUSHCHENKO"
The Economist Global Agenda
Economist magazine, London, UK, December 29, 2004
WAS it a revolution? For some hard-to-impress observers, Victor Yushchenko's
win in Ukraine's re-run presidential election was too peaceable to count as
one. Almost no heads were knocked together or buildings stormed. The mass
rallies in Kiev's Independence Square that gripped the capital after the
rigged vote on November 21st at times resembled glorified rock concerts. On
victory night, the celebrating crowd had shrunk from its awesome peak. None
of that, however, should detract from the drama, or the magnitude, of what
Mr Yushchenko's orange-clad supporters achieved. "For fourteen years," their
candidate declared in the small hours of Monday December 27th after polls
had closed, "we were independent, and now we are a free nation". Nor should
the surly refusal of Victor Yanukovich, his beaten opponent, to concede
defeat, obscure what was a clear orange win.
According to the official count, Mr Yanukovich (currently Ukraine's prime
minister) lost the re-run presidential vote by just under eight percentage
points, or more than 2m votes (in a country of 48m people). Alleging
widespread irregularities, Mr Yanukovich has filed complaints with the
electoral commission and the Supreme Court, which on December 3rd had
annulled the results of the November election, itself a run-off between the
two Victors after a first round of voting on October 31st. In an attempt to
force Mr Yanukovich to concede, Mr Yushchenko's supporters blockaded the
government headquarters on Wednesday, forcing Mr Yanukovich to miss a
cabinet meeting.
There were certainly some electoral shenanigans this time, too: exit polls
had predicted an even bigger Yushchenko win. But the new voting regulations
agreed by parliament during the stand-off, and the mass protests following
the last poll, appear to have worked. International observers reported fewer
irregularities, less intimidation and freer media coverage. Mr Yanukovich's
implausible efforts to portray himself as the true opposition candidate and
Mr Yushchenko as a stooge of Leonid Kuchma, the outgoing president,
flopped. After the court challenges and his eventual inauguration, Mr
Yushchenko's first job will be to form a government.
That will mean disappointing some within the broad coalition that has helped
to propel him to power. Among the candidates for prime minister are: Petro
Poroshenko, a businessman ally who says he is ready to serve should the call
come; Yulia Timoshenko, a demagogic firebrand who, like many
revolutionaries, might prove as much of a liability in government as she was
an asset on Independence Square; Anatoly Kinakh, like Mr Yushchenko
himself Oleksandr Moroz, the socialist leader, who, like Mr Kinakh, had
been a presidential candidate in the first round of voting.
Whomever he picks, Mr Yushchenko and his team need to prove to Mr
Yanukovich's supporters-44% of voters according to the official count,
heavily concentrated in the industrial, Russian-speaking southern and
eastern regions-that they are not rabidly anti-Russian Ukrainian
nationalists, as previous official propaganda had portrayed them; and that
that they do not intend to marginalise the east and south culturally and
ruin them economically. That should prove easier than it would have been for
Mr Yanukovich to pacify the orange-clad opposition supporters had he won.
It will certainly help that Mr Yushchenko will come to power through an
election rather than an outright putsch.
Among Mr Yushchenko's less glamorous tasks will be the dragging of a large
chunk of the Ukrainian economy out of the shadows, where, according to the
president-elect's calculations, 55% of it now resides. Some Ukrainians may
be more willing to pay taxes if they are persuaded that their new government
is more honest than its predecessor. He also needs to address-though
probably not too forcefully-the corrupt privatisations that he had
excoriated during his campaign. But he also needs to kiss and make up with
Russia and Vladimir Putin, who backed Mr Yanukovich and has thus been
humiliated by his defeat. The new president and his government will also
need to decide how to treat Mr Kuchma, Mr Yanukovich and those other
members of the outgoing regime who have been implicated in electoral fraud
or worse.
Mr Kuchma's allies want him to be remembered as a heroic statesman, who
forged a country from a rusting chunk of the Soviet Union. His alleged
involvement in political assassinations make that unlikely, as does
Ukraine's illicit sale of military kit to Saddam Hussein. Still, Mr Kuchma
will draw a modicum of credit for the avoidance of large-scale violence
during the crisis-to which others in his administration were reportedly
willing to resort-and for helping to dampen the wild secessionist talk that
briefly flared up in the east. Mr Poroshenko says he knows of no deals
concerning Mr Kuchma's future. Others may be more vulnerable, and may
know it. Hryhoriy Kirpa, the transport minister, who was allegedly involved
in the corrupt channelling of public money to Mr Yanukovich's campaign,
was found dead at his home on December 27th, having apparently committed
suicide.
In all of this, it will help that some of the tasks commonly faced by more
abrupt revolutionaries have already been accomplished. Many Ukrainian
institutions were themselves transformed during the protracted election
process: the media; the Supreme Court; even the security services (though
some top security officials may yet be incriminated in the poisoning of Mr
Yushchenko during his campaign, now confirmed by his doctors, which
continues to disfigure his face). Reforms to the constitution that Mr Kuchma
has secured, in exchange for the fairer election rules, will transfer to
parliament many of the powers he enjoyed as president, such as his sway over
most government appointments. That said, Mr Yushchenko will get to exercise
them until at least next autumn.
Whatever Mr Kuchma's motives, the dilution of the presidency's powers will
help to preclude future repetitions of his regime's abuses. Most of all
though, the convulsions of the last few months have changed the way many
ordinary Ukrainians think. Some in Russia, and indeed a few in the West, now
maintain that the "orange revolution" was in reality a cold-war style
western plot. Ukraine's size and location does make it a more important
country to America and the European Union than many others in the former
Soviet Union. But any support from outside the country for
election-monitoring and the like counted for vastly less than the resolution
of thousands of ordinary Ukrainians to keep protesting on the freezing-cold
streets of Kiev. Hardly any were there out of devotion to the European
Union, and few because they adored Mr Yushchenko, who was a clean candidate
but not a magnetic one. Most simply wanted honest government and an honest
election. Messrs Kuchma, Yanukovich and Putin simply didn't understand this.
=========================================================
10. "IN UKRAINE, A NEW IDENTITY"
By Vladimir Matveyev, Special to the Jewish Times
Baltimore Jewish Times, Baltimore, Maryland, Sat, Jan 1, 2005
Could Ukraine's protracted presidential campaign become a turning
point not just for the country's democratic development but even for
the identity of its Jewish community?
"I'm an ethnic Jew and a part of the Ukrainian nation," said Mikhail
Frenkel, a Jewish journalist in Kiev. "What we see today is the
process of consolidation of the Ukrainian nation," he said predicting
that many Jews will be part of this process.
In a country that has seen hundreds of years of anti-Semitism - and
where the concept of a multicultural identity is only beginning to
make inroads - this concept is nothing short of revolutionary.
The opposition candidate, Viktor Yuschenko, claimed victory after
earning an estimated 52 percent in a recent revote. The campaign
awakened Ukrainian society like no other development in the nation's
post-Communist history, leading to unprecedented civil protest in a
country previously regarded as one of the most socially and
politically stable countries of the former Soviet Union.
Particularly in Kiev and the major cities in Western Ukraine, Jews
joined other Ukrainians in supporting the masses who took to the
streets after the original presidential runoff Nov. 21, demanding free
and fair elections and an end to cronyism.
Ukraine's previous regime, headed by President Leonid Kuchma, was
tainted by widespread charges of corruption. The revote took place
after the country's Supreme Court overturned the victory of Kuchma's
protege, Viktor Yanukovich, in the Nov. 21 vote because of fraud.
For the country's Jews, the crisis also highlighted the complexities
of Jewish identity in a community that has lived through generations
of anti-Semitism.
That complexity is compounded by the fact that many Ukrainian Jews
come from mixed families, said Yevgeny Golovaha, vice director of the
Institute of Sociology at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine,
a prominent sociologist who is himself the product of a mixed marriage.
"I have a Ukrainian last name, a Jewish mother and Russian father.
Russian language and culture are very close to me, and I'm proud to be
a citizen of Ukraine," he said.
Many experts agree that despite 13 years of independence, Ukrainian
Jews still are best understood through the prism of their Soviet-era
experience.
In many ways, the decades of persecution fostered by the Communist
regime succeeded in taking away Judaism for most Jews, replacing it
with the pride of belonging to the Soviet Union. That pride translated
into an identity with post-Communist Russia, the country that was the
major power in the USSR.
While Jewish voters in Western countries generally support liberal
slogans and candidates, many Ukrainian Jews - perhaps the majority -
backed Yanukovich, who campaigned under anti-liberal, populist and
pro-Russian slogans.
"Most Jews backed Yanukovich because he represented the Soviet
regime," said Vitaliy Nachmanovich, a journalist and head of the Babi
Yar Memorial Committee in Kiev.
Some Jews also were worried by what they saw as Yuschenko's reticence
earlier in the campaign to criticize supporters who expressed
anti-Semitic views, a perception that was stoked by his opponent.
With the median age of the country's Jewish community believed to be
older than 60, it's not surprising that many Jews would long for a
country that gave them pride and stability.
Observers say many middle-aged and older Jews supported Yanukovich
out of fear that his opponent would dismantle the final remnants of what
reminded people of the Soviet Union, including its social welfare system.
But some Jews, especially younger and more educated ones, found it
relatively easy to adjust to the post-Soviet Ukrainian reality, and
they generally backed Yuschenko.
Observers say Ukraine's 200,000 to 500,000 Jews fall into three categories.
The vast majority of Ukraine's Jews are totally secular. A tiny minority -
estimated at 1 percent to 3 percent - are Orthodox. The third category is
those Jews who during the years of Ukrainian independence have acquired
some taste of Jewish culture and tradition and occasionally take part in
community-organized celebrations, but observe few Jewish traditions at
home. -30- [The Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LINK: http://www.jewishtimes.com/News/4410.stm
=========================================================
11. YALTA: CITY WHERE THE WORLD WAS DIVIDED HOPES
UKRAINE WILL REMAIN UNITED
Agence France Presse (AFP), Yalta, Ukraine, Sun, January 2, 2004
YALTA, Ukraine Jan 2--In the city where Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill
met to draw up a plan that would split up Europe and the world for the next
four and and half decades, citizens hope an election that has divided their
country won't break it in half.
Ukraine's five-week election saga has roiled this ex-Soviet nation --
pitting the more nationalist western half and the Russian-speaking south
and east against each other -- and in a Cold War flashback raised tension
between Russia and the West.
To the chagrin of many in Yalta -- where the leaders of the USSR, United
States and Britain met to carve Europe into spheres of influence setting
the stage for the start of the Cold War -- the West's favorite for
president won: Viktor Yushchenko.
In Crimea more than four out of five voters supported the Russia-backed
Viktor Yanukovich in the December 26 election, as compared to country
overall where Yushchenko won by 52 to 44 percent.
People here are doubly unhappy with the election because the Supreme Court
annulled a previous round which Yanukovich won after the opposition charged
there was massive fraud and organized weeks-long street protests and shut
down the government.
Now Yaltans feel they got the short end of the stick and fear reprisals
from Yushchenko who has promised to clean up Ukraine's clan-like business
environment and root out corruption on all levels.
"If the reprisals start the country will break apart immediately," said
69-year-old Anatoly, a civil servant in the Crimean regional government on
a stroll through a park near the palace where the Yalta Summit was held in
1944.
A souvenir vendor nearby said local officials who had switched to support
Yushchenko after they realized he would win were now making threats against
people they knew voted for Yanukovich.
"They said they wouldn't let us work here any more, they've already started
discriminating against Yanukovich supporters," said Maria who asked that
her last name not be printed.
Pro-Russian feelings are very strong in the Crimean peninsula which was a
part of the Russian Federation until 1954. Most of its population considers
itself to be Russian and the region has hosted Russia's Black Sea fleet
since its inception in the late 1700s.
In Soviet times the city was considered to be the foremost vacation and
health resort in the country and only Moscow's creme de la creme would
visit it every summer.
Earlier in the election the threat of Ukraine breaking into two pieces, one
that would integrate with Russia and one that would strive to join the
west, seemed real.
When Yushchenko's protests in Kiev were strongest, Yanukovich hosted an
emotional summit of leaders from Russian speaking areas in his home region
Donetsk where participants said they were ready to split off.
At a similar meeting a week later in Kharkiv, Crimea's top officials sat in
the front row as delegates spoke of a plan to federalize Ukraine so the
Russian-speaking regions could get more independence from Kiev.
"The Russian language was the basis of the split," Anatoly said, adding
that the situation in Crimea was especially tense because of a Muslim
minority of Crimean Tatars who supported Yushchenko. "If anything
happened, if there was blood, everything would be finished," he said.
Yushchenko himself has downplayed the split saying in televised remarks
that close elections happen all over the world and this election has left
"no scar on society's body."
Not all Russian speakers in Yalta supported Yanukovich however.
On a concrete jetty bristling with fishing rods in Yalta's harbor, a
fisherman said he had hopes that a Yushchenko government would
clean up the country. "Ukraine's budget is like a barrel with no bottom,
Yushchenko can plug up the holes, and if he tries to drill his own new
ones, no one will let it past him," said Eduard as he tugged on his rod.
======================================================
12. YUSHCHENKO'S DAUNTING FUTURE
The "Orange Revolution" has only just started, challenges are daunting.
ANALYSIS: By Peter Lavelle, United Press International (UPI)
Moscow, Russia, Monday, December 27, 2004
MOSCOW, Dec. 27 (UPI) -- Claiming victory in Ukraine's hotly contest
presidential election on Sunday, opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko
faces many obstacles to complete the "Orange Revolution."
With a weakened presidency and the country's eastern regions heavily voting
for regime candidate Viktor Yanukovych, Yushchenko's struggle to change
Ukraine may be harder than finally being elected president in a free and
fair vote.
As of this writing, the election commission has not officially declared a
winner in Ukraine's court-ordered re-run of the Nov. 21 runoff election,
which was marred by gross voting fraud. Multiple exit polls and reports from
some of the 11,000 international election observers claim that Yushchenko's
victory is overwhelming.
Preliminary forecasts see Yushchenko winning 54 percent of the vote compared
with Yanukovych's 42 percent. Yushchenko certainly has won a plurality of
the votes, but his appeal to voters in Ukraine's east and south appears to
be lower than in the first and second rounds of balloting. Thus, for the
third time in a row, Ukraine's electorate remains very much divided. Western
Ukraine looks to greater integration into European institutions; the
industrial east and south Ukraine continue to demand strong links with
Russia.
Yanukovych, supported by outgoing President Leonid Kuchma, has all but
conceded - but with a threat. Mocking the "Orange Revolution's" street
demonstrations in Kiev, Yanukovych stated that his opponents will "learn
what opposition means." Such commentary suggests that Yanukovych is
preparing to lead Ukraine's new opposition. Given the political reforms
announced earlier in the month, Yanukovych is poised to remain a powerful
player in Ukrainian politics.
To get the presidency, Yushchenko and his close political allies agreed to a
significantly watered-down prize. Many of the powers of the presidency will
be transferred to parliament. Constitutional amendments passed in early
December award the president control over the military, security forces, and
foreign policy. The position of prime minister will be decided by
parliament. The presidency will have the right to veto passed legislation
and can be overridden by a parliament with a two-third parliamentary vote.
At present, Yushchenko's supporters control about a third of the seats in
parliament.
The reformed presidency will continue to appoint of regional governors.
This presidential right will be all-important as there is no indication that
the "Orange Revolution" has made inroads in Ukraine's eastern and southern
regions. Yushchenko has repeatedly stated that reaching out to these regions
will be his top priority. He has also stated his first state visit will be
to Russia in a bid to mend fences with the Kremlin, which openly supported
his opponent.
Ukraine has undergone long-needed political change and appears to have a
popular president-elect. However, the December compromise was designed
to deflate street protests and prevent electoral fraud in Sunday's third
ballot - both may not be the changes the country needs most. Ukraine's
political institutions have been updated while sitting atop an economy that
is run like feudal fiefdoms. New political reforms may not be strong enough
for Yushchenko to challenge Ukraine's economic and financial oligarchy.
Ukraine's economy is booming, while average monthly wage is $94 vs.
$236 in Russia.
Negotiating away a strong presidency was a mistake. When Eastern European
countries mandated limited powers for the presidency, their economies were
not in the grip of oligarchs. Political and economic reform worked in
tandem. In Ukraine political reform has occurred without changing the nature
of the economy. A strong presidency would have a better chance to take on
the oligarchs and enact other needed reforms. Instead, parliament will
become the focus of oligarchs fighting turf wars - including the
opposition's firebrand oligarch Yulia Timoshenko.
A strong presidency has the power to take the initiative - initiatives that
may not be particularly popular with powerful and wealthy insiders, but very
much needed. Fighting corruption and "democratizing" the economy is what
Ukraine needs more than anything else. Yushchenko and his "orange"
supporters may not have the tools to effectively to do either. This is
worrisome. The "Orange Revolution" is not just about winning the presidency
for Yushchenko, but how Ukraine very much needs to change.
There has been much written lately about divisions in Ukraine and how events
in Ukraine have divided the West and Russia. The real divisions are to be
found among the many Ukrainians who desire a modern and responsible
political culture and Ukrainian oligarchs willing to live under any
political arrangement allowing them to continue their control of the
economy. The compromise to gain the presidency for the "Orange
Revolution" suits oligarchy just fine - Ukraine's present institutional
arrange my not be powerful enough to take them on.
The election of Viktor Yushchenko is a major political breakthrough for
Ukraine. However, it is only a first step away from a decade of misrule
under Kuchma. The "Orange Revolution" has only just started, and the
challenges it faces are daunting. -30-
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
plavelle@untimely-thoughts.com; http://www.untimely-thoughts.com/?art=1220
=========================================================
13. "UKRAINIANS WANT A COUNTRY THAT RESPECTS THEM"
THE PROFESSOR COLUMN: By Volodymyr Senchenko
The Ukrainian Observer, Issue 202, The Willard Group
Kyiv, Ukraine, December 2004
Respect from one's own country.
This is exactly what the citizens of independent Ukraine quietly hope for,
and sometimes openly demand. Respect and protection from the state is
the nerve that runs along modern Ukrainians political outlook.
These feelings may be somewhat unfamiliar to our Western readers, because
they are probably already citizens of well-known countries afforded
international esteem, and this recognition is their personal parasol in
relations with the local authorities and citizens of other countries. For
example, the residents of the European Union enjoy an equal amount of
dignity and, frankly speaking, act a bit superior toward those of us who are
not members of the EU or NATO. The power of the newly united continent
makes them feel strong and confident.
This confidence is even greater among Americans and Israelis. In the case
of Americans, Europeans themselves may sometimes feel like the object of
haughty behavior. The muscle-bound U.S. military can dispatch air power or
marines to any corner of the globe, where its compatriots have been offended
or not given their due. Israel, for its part, is not so powerful as the
United States, but its citizens get no less respect or protection. In
addition to military force, Tel Aviv can also appeal to international Jewish
organizations for an even more important form of support - finance. In
short, everyone knows that it's not a good idea to mess with Israeli
citizens. This is good, this is right and this is the way it should be.
These and other reasons are why the national state came about in the first
place.
When the USSR was strong, its citizens used to feel a protective state
parasol over their heads as well. This international cover had military,
diplomatic and ideological dimensions.
Of course, one cannot claim that Soviet citizens were loved and respected
all over the world, but other countries were at least a bit frightened of
us. For example, I remember reading about a truck full of valuable goods
that was robbed in Italy. The robbers were known for never leaving any
witnesses alive, but they did not do any killing this time, because the
drivers were from the Soviet Union. The bandits were apparently so afraid
of inviting an attack against their country by its well-armed eastern
neighbor that they restrained their murderous instincts.
Today, the citizens of Ukraine are the least-protected people in Europe.
Yes, Ukraine and Ukrainians are little-known in Europe, because even the
most remarkable of them continue to be considered Russians. Shortly after
Kyiv's declaration of independence, I had a squabble with French customs
officers who questioned the existence of a Ukrainian state. After I showed
them a map, they still kept saying "Russia, Russian" as they nodded their
heads. Within the past 13 years of its sovereignty, Ukraine has yet to
position itself among its European neighbors as a full-fledged country.
The situation with its citizens is of course analogous.
In addition, Ukraine has developed a strange stereotype as a country with an
unpredictable foreign and domestic policy. Ukrainians are seen as beggars
with weak morals and prone to criminality.
In my view, the root of the problem is that Ukrainian independence was never
unanimously approved. Some people viewed it as an attempt to destroy the
great Russian Empire. Others did not want another economic competitor in
Europe. Still others simply didn't like Ukrainians, believing them to be
xenophobic anti-Semites.
The media representative of these three different viewpoints created a
single negative image of Ukraine. Moreover, the images of the people and
the authorities were synthesized. For instance, the so-called "tape
scandal," which alleged the involvement of President Leonid Kuchma and
other top officials in serious crimes; or the U.S. accusations that Kyiv
sold radar systems to Saddam Hussein on the eve of the allied invasion
of Iraq.
SOMETIMES THE CHARGES BECOME ABSURD
I recall once reading that Poland had blamed Ukraine for an off-color
snowfall. Ukrainian factories, which in fact had been shut down, were blamed
for "the environmental disaster." Soon, they will allege that we cause
earthquakes...
Of course, our "friends" are also quick to note Ukrainian participation in
criminal groups or activities. From five million to eight million Ukrainian
citizens are working abroad and, as we know, every family has its black
sheep. But as soon as there is a report about a crime having been committed
somewhere in the world, the media immediately tells us that a Ukrainian
might be involved. Those media rarely go back and correct the earlier
assumption if it turns out to be wrong.
I would even say that it has become dangerous to admit that you are
Ukrainian abroad. To Czechs, Ukrainians are the bottom of the barrel,
although this does nothing for bilateral relations.
Another feeling of helplessness among Ukrainians is caused by their own
state's policy - by the absolute indifference of Ukrainian officials to
their compatriots at home and abroad. There are numerous instances of
Ukrainian citizens getting into a mess in some foreign country because the
officials in Kyiv failed to fulfil their direct obligations, one of which is
the protection of citizens. Despite the posh official appearances and
speeches of our authorities, diplomatic representatives often ignore the
international harassment of their fellow countrymen, to the anger and
disappointment of the latter.
This is why Ukrainians, contrary to Western expectations, yearn for a strong
state that would be respected, together with its citizens, throughout the
world. This is why a perfectly reasonable lawmaker in the Verkhovna Rada
could express regret over the country's decision to scrap its nuclear
weapons, the third-largest such arsenal in the world. Indeed, many ordinary
Ukrainians think that we should not have been so hasty to give up the nukes,
because the rest of the world doesn't seem to have appreciated the gesture
very much. Now there is neither a reason nor the resources to create any new
ones.
Some politicians skillfully used this sort of public sentiment when
independent Ukrainians began to really vote. Political parties that
understood the craving of the people for dignity and led them to believe
that they would get it found themselves elected to office. But since the
promise has still not been kept, and the authorities continue to busy
themselves with getting rich and exploiting their positions in government,
the alienation of the people will only grow.
Thus, in the eyes of the East and West, Ukraine remains the ugly duckling,
but change could be on the way, with or without the help of the authorities.
One vehicle of change is the culture's work ethic, which developed over
centuries of farming the land. Another national trait is resourcefulness,
which is shared by all the peoples of the Russian Empire - by necessity.
These national features, together with thrift, honesty and good-naturedness,
earned Ukrainians respect among other peoples. Another adjective used to
describe Ukrainians is "cunning." But slyness doesn't equate to dishonesty,
just as thrift doesn't mean stingy.
The reader will excuse me for patting my own country on the back, but I
would also like to call attention to Ukrainians' capacity for intellectual
and scientific achievement. Let it suffice to recall the Russian academic
Dmitriy Likhachev, who lamented the brain drain that resulted from Ukraine
breaking free of its bigger eastern brother.
These national qualities will eventually lead to national success, in the
form of competitive Ukrainian goods and services on international markets.
Then, Ukrainians will be able to create their own parasol without the help
of an authoritarian state. The people will gather around the party capable
of opening the "parasol."
It was precisely this desire to open one's own umbrella, decorated with the
colors of one's national flag, that led the former members of the Warsaw
Pact to join the EU and NATO. Ukraine will follow this path as well. Why
shouldn't it, however, join Russia? Because centuries of experience have
shown that the only relationship that can exist between the two east Slavic
nations is one of "big brother, little brother." But before this happens, a
majority of Ukrainians should be able to say: "I love my country because it
loves me."
Today, against the background of the authorities' bacchanalian corruption,
this change in national psychology seems impossible. One cannot force an
official with a low salary to refuse to take bribes or accept dubious perks,
which in effect rob the state of millions. Your can't make a silk purse from
a sow's ear. Corruption starts at the top, where high-ranking officials
demand income from their subordinates. Every time I give money to a traffic
cop, I divide the sum into three parts. He will retain only one-third of the
money. The other two-thirds will go "upstairs." My wife sometimes says to
me: "When you drive your car sober and don't break the rules, you are
depriving the state of revenue."
A good start in changing this situation would be to hire a few thousand
officials who would receive decent salaries. Vladimir Lenin once said: "Give
us 30,000 revolutionaries and we will turn Russia upside down." And they
did! Ronald Reagan also pushed through a lot of unpopular programs, such
as deregulation, with a handful of dedicated economists. In fact, there are
already many honest officials working in Ukraine, a good leader's job would
be to identify and promote them.
Change must come from the top. However the main obstacle to this is that
top officials need corrupt subordinates, who fulfill their needs loyally for
fear of being turned over to the tax police or other law-enforcement
agencies by their bosses, who in turn ultimately answer to political
appointees or elected officials.
But other policies such as international neutrality and regional trade can
enhance prosperity and thus strengthen the parasol. This means that the next
Ukrainian president must maintain Leonid Kuchma's balancing act between
East and West. This also means that any power that would like to secure
Ukraine's undivided loyalty might again try another tape scandal or Kolchuga
conspiracy.
If the authorities continue, however, to be indifferent to the security and
pride of their people, Ukrainians will build their parasols on their own,
and then the question will arise as to why these venal bureaucrats are
needed in the first place. -30- [Action Ukraine Report Monitoring]
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