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Action Ukraine Report

"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT"
An International Newsletter
In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis, and Commentary

"The Art of Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion,
Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World"

"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT" - Number 421
morganw@patriot.net, ArtUkraine.com@starpower.net
Washington, D.C. and Kyiv, Ukraine, TUESDAY, February 1, 2005

-----INDEX OF ARTICLES-----
"Major International News Headlines and Articles"

1. PRES YUSHCHENKO FORECASTS RADA'S APPROVAL OF
TYMOSHENKO'S APPOINTMENT AS PRIME MINISTER ON FEB 3
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, January 30, 2005 (12:08)

2. UKRAINE SOCIALISTS WILL APPROVE PRIME MINISTER
TYMOSHENKO IF AGREEMENTS ARE HONOURED
UT1 TV, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1900 gmt 31 Jan 05
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Mon, January 31, 2005

3.UNITED UKRAINE BACKS TYMOSHENKO'S PRIME MINISTERIAL
CANDIDACY DURING CONSIDERATION IN PARLIAMENT
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Mon, January 31, 2005

4. UKRAINE'S COMMUNIST LEADER SYMONENKO FORECASTS
RADA'S APPROVAL OF TYMOSHENKO'S APPOINTMENT AS PM
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Mon, January 31, 2005

5. TYMOSHENKO INSTRUCTS CABINET TO BEGIN PREPARATORY
WORK FOR AGRICULTURE'S SPRING FIELD CAMPAIGN
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Mon, January 31, 2005

6. TYMOSHENKO STEAMS ONWARD TO PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE
Parties line up to confirm Tymoshenko
By Oleg Varfolomeyev, Eurasia Daily Monitor
Volume 2, Issue 21, The Jamestown Foundation
Washington, D.C., Monday, January 31, 2005

7. UKRAINIAN PROSECUTORS DROP TYMOSHENKO CHARGES
The Associated Press, Kiev, Ukraine, Monday, January 31, 2005.

8. UKRAINE: STRANGE PAIR
The president has an ambitious ally.
By Steven Paulikas, Newsweek International, Feb 7, 2005 Issue

9. KIEV'S 'PRINCESS' LOOKS FOR REVENGE
By Mark Franchetti, Moscow
Sunday Times, London, UK, Sun, Jan 30, 2005

10. "UKRAINE'S IRON LADY"
Yuliya Tymoshenko still has to convince doubters that she's
the right choice to be the new Prime Minister
By Yuri Zarakhovich, TIME magazine, USA, Sunday, Jan. 30, 2005

11. YULIA TYMOSHENKO TO BE UKRAINIAN PRIME MINISTER
By Taras Kuzio, Eurasia Daily Monitor
Volume 2, Issue 18, The Jamestown Foundation,
Washington, D.C., Wednesday, January 26, 2005

12. "MANY WERE CALLED, BUT FEW CHOSEN"
COMMENTARY: By Yulia Mostovaya
Zerkalo Nedeli On The Web, Mirror-Weekly
International Social Political Weekly
Kyiv, Ukraine, Saturday, 29 Jan - 4 Feb 2005

13. UKRAINE: HOW I AM GOING TO WAKE THIS SLEEPING
ELEPHANT AND RIDE INTO EU
Viktor Yushchenko tells Anthony Browne and Robert Thomson
how he plans to fulfil his mission to revitalise Ukraine
By Anthony Browne and Robert Thomson
The Times, United Kingdom, Monday, January 31, 2005

14. VICTOR YUSHCHENKO'S MOTHER DIED AT AGE 86
Press Service of Ukraine's President Viktor Yushchenko
Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, January 31, 2005
==========================================================
1. PRES YUSHCHENKO FORECASTS RADA'S APPROVAL OF
TYMOSHENKO'S APPOINTMENT AS PRIME MINISTER ON FEB 3

Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, January 30, 2005 (12:08)

KYIV - President Viktor Yuschenko forecasts that the Verkhovna Rada
will approve appointment of Acting Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko for
the post of Prime Minister on Thursday, February 3. Yuschenko's press
service informed about this.

"President of Ukraine V. Yuschenko believes that Prime Minister of Ukraine
should be approved on the session of the Verkhovna Rada next Thursday,
and than the government should be formed," the press service informed.

According to Yuschenko, the Rada may also approve governmental program
of Ukraine's development on Thursday.

As Ukrainian News earlier reported, Yuschenko earlier submitted a draft
resolution to the Verkhovna Rada on approval of appointment of Acting Prime
Minister Yulia Tymoshenko for the post of the Prime Minister of Ukraine.
Yuschenko appointed Tymoshenko acting prime minister on January 24.

In keeping with the Constitution, the President appoints the Prime Minister
with the Parliament's consent, and the Cabinet of Ministers members on the
Prime Minister's proposal. -30- [Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
==========================================================
2. UKRAINE SOCIALISTS WILL APPROVE PRIME MINISTER
TYMOSHENKO IF AGREEMENTS ARE HONOURED

UT1 TV, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1900 gmt 31 Jan 05
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Mon, January 31, 2005

KIEV - [Presenter] The Socialist Party [SPU] is ready to support Yuliya
Tymoshenko's candidacy for the post of prime minister on the condition that
their 6 November 2004 accord with Viktor Yushchenko and other verbal
agreements are honoured.

The SPU leader, Oleksandr Moroz, said this after the party's political
council meeting today. He said he would meet Tymoshenko later today to
discuss the SPU's role in the future cabinet. Moroz also said the Socialists
would accept posts in the cabinet only if they can really influence domestic
and foreign policy.

[Moroz] After the first round of the election, we made a verbal accord that
one in six executive posts across Ukraine, this is about 4,000 people, will
be agreed with our party. If our party enters the cabinet, and then we see
that the authorities' policy runs counter to what we signed with Yushchenko
on 6 November, we may decide to quit the party [as received, presumably
government] which will be mandatory for all our activists within the
government structure.

[On 6 November Moroz agreed to support Yushchenko in the second
round of the presidential election in return for Yushchenko's backing of
constitutional reform.] -30- [Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
==========================================================
3. UNITED UKRAINE BACKS TYMOSHENKO'S PRIME MINISTERIAL
CANDIDACY DURING CONSIDERATION IN PARLIAMENT

Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Mon, January 31, 2005

KYIV - The United Ukraine parliamentary faction intends to back the
candidacy of Yulia Tymoshenko for the post of prime minister during its
consideration in the parliament.

The faction's leader Bohdan Hubskyi announced this to journalists.
According to him, the fact that the parliament intends to also hear the
Tymoshenko government's action program on Thursday, February 4, is
a positive thing.

Hubskyi believes that the parliament should approve the appointment of
Tymoshenko to the post of prime minister.

"The candidacy submitted by the president should be approved," he said.
According to Hubskyi, this is necessary because the Ukrainian people have
expressed their support for Yuschenko and the parliament must also now
support him. -30- [The Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
==========================================================
4. UKRAINE'S COMMUNIST LEADER SYMONENKO FORECASTS
RADA'S APPROVAL OF TYMOSHENKO'S APPOINTMENT AS PM

Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Mon, January 31, 2005

KYIV - Communist Party leader Petro Symonenko forecasts that the
Verkhovna Rada will approve appointment of Acting Prime Minister
Yulia Tymoshenko for the post of prime minister. He made this statement
to the press.

Symonenko believes her candidacy will receive from 260 to 270 votes in
parliament. Asked whether his parliamentary faction would back Tymoshenko
for premiership, he said the decision is yet to be taken at a meeting of the
CPU central committee on February 2.

The most important thing the CPU is expecting from Tymoshenko is fulfillment
of the tasks declared by President Viktor Yuschenko in his election platform
like increment of wages, pensions and other social benefits. -30-
==========================================================
5. TYMOSHENKO INSTRUCTS CABINET TO BEGIN PREPARATORY
WORK FOR AGRICULTURE'S SPRING FIELD CAMPAIGN

Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Mon, January 31, 2005

KYIV - Acting Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko has instructed the
Cabinet of Ministers to begin preparatory work for the field campaign in
spring. The Cabinet's press service informed the press about the January
29 meeting of the Cabinet at which this instruction was made.

In particular, the Ministry of Economy is commissioned to make a detailed
analysis into the cost of resources required in agriculture.

The Ministries of Industrial Policy, Fuel and Energy, and Agrarian Policy
have received instructions to see that farmers receive mineral fertilizers
and petroleum products in time and at previously agreed prices, and to this
end they must draft memorandums on coordinated work between the Cabinet
of Ministers and local producers of the aforementioned products for 2005.

Tymoshenko also ordered to provide financing for agricultural development
programs in the monthly funding earmarked for the sector.

She announced that on Friday, February 4, the corresponding ministries and
agencies are to report on the execution of these instructions, and in a week
a special meeting of representatives of the government, the National Bank
and other banking institutions will be held to find new crediting mechanisms
for the agricultural sector.

As Ukrainian News earlier reported, the food market has been unstable since
January 2003. In January 2003, prices of food-grade wheat and flour began
to grow and in two months surged by more than 20%, driving up bread prices.

The peak of the grain crisis fell on the last ten days of June 2003 when
retail prices of flour, macaroni goods and cereals began to rise prompted by
an unexpectedly sharp increase in consumer demand. In few days the prices
soared by 3% to 50% depending on the region and the kind of foodstuff. -30-
==========================================================
6. TYMOSHENKO STEAMS ONWARD TO PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE
Parties line up to confirm Tymoshenko

By Oleg Varfolomeyev, Eurasia Daily Monitor
Volume 2, Issue 21, The Jamestown Foundation
Washington, D.C., Monday, January 31, 2005

Ukraine's new president, Viktor Yushchenko, nominated his populist ally,
Yulia Tymoshenko, for prime minister on January 24 (see EDM, January 26)
and submitted her candidacy to parliament on January 28. The Ukrainian
constitution requires that a simple majority in the legislature, that is 226
votes in the 450-seat body, approve the president's choice for prime
minister. Voting is preliminarily scheduled for Thursday, February 3. In
spite of Tymoshenko's proverbial radicalism, her nomination stands a high
chance of being approved, judging by the mood inside parliament.

Several legislators and dissenters in Yushchenko's camp have recently spoken
up against Yushchenko's choice, questioning her integrity. Taras Stetskiv,
who was among the organizers of the Orange Revolution's tent city on
Independence Square in Kyiv, has accused Tymoshenko of trying to convince
Yushchenko to give her the prime minister's post by "maintaining" the
protesters' camp long after Yushchenko had ordered it to disband. Thereby
Tymoshenko discredited the tent city, Stetskiv said.

Roman Bezsmertny, the deputy head of Yushchenko's election headquarters,
went even further: "Ms. Tymoshenko has no right to manage the state as prime
minister," he said, commenting on the tent city issue. Bezsmertny accused
her of "manipulations and blackmail." He added that he had not been aware
of the secret protocol to a coalition agreement signed last summer, in which
Yushchenko pledged to appoint Tymoshenko prime minister if he became
president.

The protocol's publication on the internet prompted another legislator from
Yushchenko's Our Ukraine bloc, Oleksandr Morozov, to "feel ashamed," as
he put it in an open letter to Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, published by
Ukrayinska pravda. In the letter, Morozov questioned Tymoshenko's honesty
and Yushchenko's right to conclude agreements in secret from his colleagues.
It has been also reported on the internet, but denied by the newly appointed
National Security and Defense Council secretary Petro Poroshenko, that
Poroshenko's Solidarity group within Our Ukraine was planning to vote
against Tymoshenko. The dissenters, however, have not been numerous, nor
have they come up with an alternative to Tymoshenko. Yushchenko has reacted
calmly. Speaking in Davos, Switzerland, on January 29, he described the
debate as normal inter-party discussion.

Most of Yushchenko's allies in parliament, including Our Ukraine, the Yulia
Tymoshenko Bloc, the Socialists, and the People's Will faction of Anatoly
Kinakh are going to vote for Tymoshenko as being a member of their
coalition, even if some of them would prefer a different candidate. Valery
Asadchev of the nationalist People's Party has concisely expressed this
mood, saying that his party has always backed Yushchenko, "That is why now
we back the appointments made by the Ukrainian president." Parliament's
center faction, where Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn's People's Agrarian Party is
the strongest force, has backed Yushchenko since the start of the Orange
Revolution in November, and it is likely to jump on the bandwagon this time.

The parties that backed Leonid Kuchma's choice for president, Viktor
Yanukovych, have so far failed to overcome the shock caused by his defeat.
They are hardly able to offer any organized resistance to Tymoshenko's
nomination. Yanukovych has been absent from Ukraine since January 20, and
Yanukovych's Party of Regions has not yet decided how to behave. One of
its leaders, former Donetsk mayor Volodymyr Rybak, has said in a recent
interview with Ukrayinska pravda that the majority of the party's local
organizations are, in fact, against going into opposition to Yushchenko.

Nestor Shufrych and former president Leonid Kravchuk of the United Social
Democratic Party have spoken positively about Tymoshenko's appointment. Only
the Communists, who ostentatiously oppose any "capitalist" government, seem
determined to vote against Yushchenko's choice. Tymoshenko's appointment
"will not reflect the interests of the people," Communist leader Petro
Symonenko replied, when asked if the Communists would support
Tymoshenko's nomination.

Meanwhile good news for Tymoshenko has come from the Ukrainian
Prosecutor-General's Office. Svyatoslav Piskun, who does not conceal that he
strives to remain in the post of prosecutor-general under the new president,
announced on January 28 that prosecutors have dropped all charges against
Tymoshenko, her husband, her father-in-law, and her former subordinates at
the United Energy Systems gas trading company. Embezzlement charges had
been levied against Tymoshenko in 1996, and the investigation has continued
on and off. Tymoshenko was briefly imprisoned by the court in 2001.

Tymoshenko regularly dismissed the charges against her as politically
motivated. Piskun's announcement came just two days after his Russian
counterpart, Vladimir Ustinov, had pledged that Moscow would pursue its own
bribery case against Tymoshenko. Ustinov made it clear, speaking on January
26, that Russia would not withdraw its arrest warrant for her on charges of
bribing Russian military officials over gas deals in the mid-1990s. This
circumstance may put Prime Minister Tymoshenko in awkward circumstances,
should she decide to travel to Russia. -30-
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
(Interfax-Ukraine, January 24; versii.com, Ukrayinska pravda,
ukr.for-ua.com, UNIAN, January 26; Ukrayinska pravda, Interfax-Ukraine,
Lvivska hazeta, January 27; Ukrayinski novyny, Interfax-Ukraine, Channel 5,
January 28; UNIAN, January 29).
==========================================================
7. UKRAINIAN PROSECUTORS DROP TYMOSHENKO CHARGES

The Associated Press, Kiev, Ukraine, Monday, January 31, 2005.

KIEV -- Ukrainian prosecutors said Friday that they have closed a
case against Prime Minister-designate Yulia Tymoshenko and her
family members due to lack of evidence.

"We are ending all proceedings because there are no elements of any
wrongdoing," Prosecutor General Svyatoslav Piskun told reporters.
"One cannot live a life under investigation."

He said prosecutors ended their probe into Tymoshenko's alleged
attempted bribery "five or six days ago," shortly after she was named
acting prime minister.

Last May, prosecutors accused Tymoshenko of trying to bribe a judge
to end court proceedings against a former associate from the gas
distribution company she once headed.

Prosecutors also ended their case involving Tymoshenko's husband,
Oleksandr, and her father-in-law, Henadiy Tymoshenko, who were
charged with fraud, embezzlement and tax evasion, Piskun said.

Last year, Russian prosecutors said they wanted to charge Tymoshenko
with bribing Defense Ministry officials in the mid-1990s. -30-
==========================================================
8. "UKRAINE: STRANGE PAIR"
The president has an ambitious ally.

By Steven Paulikas, Newsweek International, February 7, 2005 Issue

Newly inaugurated Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko is riding high,
having soothed relations with a quick visit to Moscow last week. Political
observers in Ukraine, however, wonder if Yushchenko hasn't already set
himself up for a fall, barely a week into office.

They point to his choice for prime minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, 44. To her
supporters, the fiery Tymoshenko is the unflinching face of reform-a former
economist known for her Western-influenced ideas and iron will. Joining
forces with Yushchenko during the campaign, she added an element of passion
and charisma that may have proved decisive in his eventual victory. But she
remains a controversial figure. In the 1990s she made millions as head of
the country's top supplier of natural gas, and was accused by former
president Leonid Kuchma of paying kickbacks to a former prime minister.
The charges were eventually dropped, but not before Tymoshenko had
spent a month in jail.

During last fall's street protests her speeches kept protesters at the
barricades, even after Yushchenko agreed in closed-door negotiations to
allow the government of opponent Viktor Yanukovych to continue functioning.
Those talks also led to an agreement on a package of constitutional reforms
that could transfer a large chunk of the president's power-including
authority over economic policy and control over cabinet ministers-to the
P.M. If those changes, and Tymoshenko's candidacy, are approved, "she would
be at least as powerful as the president, and in some cases more powerful,"
says Mikhail Pogrebinsky, director of the Kiev Center for Political Research
and Conflict Studies.

Yushchenko signed an agreement going into the election ensuring Tymoshenko
the prime ministership if he won. Many of his closest advisers opposed the
move, and just hours before Yushchenko announced her appointment, some
still believed she wouldn't get the job. But given her populist following,
the president had little choice. "He knew he'd have to pay for it if he
dumped her, since she could eventually go and negotiate with other parties,"
says Oleg Ivantsov, editor of the Dyen newspaper.

Tymoshenko's candidacy may yet be derailed. Last week Russian officials
confirmed that she still faces criminal charges in Russia for allegedly
bribing Russian Defense Ministry officials in 1996. Back home she faces a
tough confirmation vote in Parliament. And even if confirmed, she'll have to
defend her office in parliamentary elections in March. With the people on
her side, though, no one can count Tymoshenko out. -30-
==========================================================
9. "KIEV'S 'PRINCESS' LOOKS FOR REVENGE"

Mark Franchetti, Moscow
Sunday Times, London, United Kingdom
Sunday, January 30, 2005

UKRAINE'S new prime minister, Yulia Timoshenko, has begun a battle
to clear her fugitive husband of corruption allegations and punish his
accusers' allies in the regime ousted in Kiev's Orange Revolution.

She has protested to the Supreme Court about a criminal case brought by
allies of the former president, Leonid Kuchma, against Alexander
Timoshenko, her husband, who is now in hiding abroad.

The action is the first shot in what is likely to be a passionate campaign
by the fiery politician against Kuchma and his cronies to avenge their
attempts to have her, her husband and her father-in-law imprisoned on
charges of embezzlement.

"My husband is living in an undisclosed location abroad," said Timoshenko,
Ukraine's richest woman, whose nomination as premier by the newly elected
President Viktor Yushchenko is expected to be endorsed by parliament this
week. "I would not risk plunging him into a new 'meat grinder' until the
court fully acquits our family."

Timoshenko, 44, has been trying to quash the allegations since she fell out
with Kuchma, who sacked her as deputy prime minister in charge of energy in
2001. Enemies in the Kuchma camp accused the Timoshenkos of siphoning off
state funds from lucrative gas imports when the couple headed United Energy
Systems, a private firm that had a monopoly on gas imports from former
Soviet countries, including Russia.

Timoshenko's wealth is alleged to have come from these contracts, earning
her the nickname "Gas Princess".

She was briefly held by the authorities but the Timoshenkos, whose daughter
Yevgenia, 19, is studying in Britain, have always rejected the allegations
as politically motivated.

In a separate case Russia, which supported Yushchenko's opponent in last
year's presidential elections, accused Timoshenko of bribing Russian
military officers. She denied any wrongdoing and refused to go to Moscow
for questioning. "I have a formally registered hunting gun and shall open
fire on anyone who may try to come anywhere near," she said.

Timoshenko, who was born into a poor family, became the populist face
of the Orange Revolution ­ named after the opposition's campaign colour ­
after joining forces with Yushchenko. She helped bring hundreds of
thousands of supporters on to the streets of Kiev after a first
presidential election was rigged. Kuchma's candidate, Viktor Yanukovich,
was defeated in the election rerun.

Unlike the more moderate Yushchenko, who was poisoned and disfigured
during the election campaign, Timoshenko has in the past called for
Kuchma and some of his allies to be jailed.

She has accused him of corruption and called for his prosecution in
connection with the death of Georgy Gongadze, a journalist whose
decapitated body was found in woods outside Kiev in 2000 after he tried
to investigate corruption allegations surrounding Kuchma.

Timoshenko has also called for a series of privatisation deals from the
Kuchma era to be investigated. At the top of her list is Kryvorizhstal, the
country's largest state steel plant, which last year was sold to a
consortium backed by Viktor Pinchuk, Kuchma's son-in-law, and Rinat
Akhmetov, Ukraine's richest man, who was close to the former regime.

Their bid of $811m was successful even though it was lower than other bids.
The highest came from a US and British consortium which offered $1.5
billion and promised to invest $1.2 billion in the plant.

"Prison was pretty hard for her," said one of Timoshenko's allies. "She
started dreaming of revenge against those responsible for her ending up in
a cell. She is now afraid of nothing." -30-
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additional reporting: Elena Reznikova, Kiev
==========================================================
10. "UKRAINE'S IRON LADY"
Yuliya Tymoshenko still has to convince doubters that she's
the right choice to be the new Prime Minister

By Yuri Zarakhovich, TIME magazine, USA, Sunday, Jan. 30, 2005

Shortly before Viktor Yushchenko announced that Yuliya Tymoshenko
was his choice for Prime Minister, Ukraine's President met with his
controversial political ally and gave her a simple message. Tymoshenko would
have to work hard to overcome the dislike and mistrust many Ukrainians,
especially in the Russian-speaking east, feel for her; she'd have to win
over opposing factions in parliament; and she'd have to do it on her own.

"Viktor told her she must address people's concerns, starting with
parliament," says Oleg Rybachuk, a Yushchenko confidant and M.P. for
his Our Ukraine party who will soon become Deputy Prime Minister for
European Integration. "That is Yuliya's headache. It's not just about
getting the minimum number of votes needed to win; it's about getting
broad support for the future."

That support may not be so easy to come by. Though parliament is expected
to confirm her nomination this week, Tymoshenko remains a divisive figure.
Roman Bezsmertny, another M.P. for Our Ukraine, which is allied with
Tymoshenko's party, called on fellow deputies to vote against her because
he believes she'll foster disunity - despite the fact that it was her
forceful rhetoric that helped keep demonstrators' spirits high during the
street protests that brought Yushchenko to power.

But questions persist about her integrity, especially about how she acquired
her wealth - estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars - during the
mid-1990s when she ran the country's largest energy firm. Last September, at
the height of Ukraine's presidential campaign, Russian military prosecutors
placed Tymoshenko on Interpol's wanted list, alleging that in 1996-97 she
bribed Russian officers to buy Ukrainian goods from her companies.

Tymoshenko dismisses those charges as a Kremlin trick, and she's convinced
she can help heal the country's political rifts. "Russia now understands
that Ukraine chooses its presidents and appoints its prime ministers
itself," Tymoshenko told Time. "I'm sure I'll handle the job well."

She's certainly got all the right qualifications. Charismatic, competent and
driven, Tymoshenko, 44, trained as an economist and launched one of the
first Gorbachev-era cooperatives - a chain of videotape-rental shops - in
the late 1980s. In 1995 she founded United Energy Systems of Ukraine, which
managed Russian natural-gas supplies to energy-starved Ukraine under
then-Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko. Her ties to Lazarenko, who was arrested
in 1999 and convicted last year in the U.S. on charges of corruption and
money laundering, first raised suspicions about her business dealings.

When Yushchenko himself was Prime Minister in 1999, he made Tymoshenko
his deputy. She forced reluctant businesses to pay cash for energy supplies
but when she tried to take on the country's coal industry in Jan. 2001,
President Leonid Kuchma fired her. She subsequently spent 42 days in jail on
charges of bribery, money laundering, corruption and abuse of power, all of
which were eventually thrown out of court. Indeed, no evidence of any of
these crimes was ever produced. "So either it just wasn't true or she's the
smartest person in the world," says a source close to Yushchenko. In 1999,
Tymoshenko launched her own opposition party and last year joined forces
with Yushchenko's Our Ukraine.

Having clawed her way back into power, does Tymoshenko have a political
agenda? While Yushchenko focuses on diplomacy - last week at the World
Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, he promised the "swiftest possible
attainment" of the criteria for E.U. membership - Tymoshenko says economic
reform is still her priority. "Taxes must become inevitable but affordable,"
she says. "I want to say to people, 'Forget about paying bribes. Pay
taxes.'" Yushchenko is confident that public doubts about her will fade;
"Time is the best doctor," he said in Davos. People "must feel that life is
becoming steadier," Tymoshenko says. "Once they acquire new opportunities,
all the fears and confrontations will collapse like a house of cards."

Still, some Western businessmen are uneasy. "Yushchenko will be flying
around the world and she'll be running things in Kiev - and running circles
around him," says one U.S. exec who does a lot of business in Ukraine. Even
so, Yushchenko is likely to be much better off with Tymoshenko heading his
Cabinet rather than leading the opposition. -30-
------------------------------------------------------------------------
With reporting by Eric Pooley/Davos, Paul Quinn-Judge/Moscow and
Yanina Sokolovskaya/Kiev
==========================================================
11. YULIA TYMOSHENKO TO BECOME UKRAINIAN PRIME MINISTER

By Taras Kuzio, Eurasia Daily Monitor,
Volume 2, Issue 18, The Jamestown Foundation,
Washington, D.C., Wednesday, January 26, 2005

One day after he was inaugurated as Ukraine's third president, Viktor
Yushchenko appointed a powerful and radical triumvirate. Yulia Tymoshenko,
of the eponymous bloc, was named prime minister; businessman Petro
Poroshenko secretary of the National Security Council; and Oleksandr
Zinchenko, the head of the Yushchenko election campaign, became state
secretary. Zinchenko's position replaces that of head of the presidential
administration. Of the three positions, only Tymoshenko's requires
parliamentary approval, and parliamentary speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn expects
her to obtain a large majority when she is proposed this coming week.

Why Tymoshenko? One reason is that a secret agreement between Yushchenko
and Tymoshenko stated that if Yushchenko won, then he would propose her as
his prime minister. The Yushchenko camp denied that such a document existed
(Ukrayinska pravda, January 20), but it was leaked to the anti-Yushchenko
web site temnik.com.ua (January 24) by the Viktor Yanukovych team.

Another reason for Tymoshenko's nomination was that alternative candidates
were unpalatable. Poroshenko had angled for the position but, as a major
businessman, this would have undermined Yushchenko's policy of separating
business and politics. Poroshenko is often labeled as the "oligarch" in the
Yushchenko camp.

A third, more pertinent factor rests on Yushchenko's policy aims. Tymoshenko
is ideally suited to be a radical prime minister during the short period
between now and the implementation of constitutional changes either in
September 2005 or March 2006.

Tymoshenko has anti-oligarch credentials. In the Yushchenko government of
2000-2001, She was instrumental in efforts to eliminate loopholes in the
energy sector that had been exploited by the oligarchs; the move returned
over $2 billion to the budget. She has stated, "The oligarchs are cowards.
As soon as they realize that the system has changed, they will be forced to
change their methods or go to jail" (The Independent, December 7).

Finally, Tymoshenko was chosen to reward the maidan, the protestors in
Independence Square who supported the Orange Revolution. Many of its young
participants are ideologically closer to the more radical Tymoshenko than to
the more moderate Yushchenko. During the Orange Revolution she was labeled
the "Goddess of revolution" (AP, December 3).

Her newfound hero-like status completes the evolution of her image. The
process began in February 2001 when, as deputy prime minister responsible
for energy issues in the Yushchenko government, she was arrested. She was
later released, and in subsequent years some courts attempted to indict her
while others dismissed the charges. Tymoshenko's future rested on a
Yushchenko victory. If Yanukovych won the elections, she would have to flee
abroad or go to prison.

Government attempts to remove this key Yushchenko ally came to a head in
mid-July, one week into the presidential campaign, when pro-presidential
parliamentary factions began discussing a motion to have her arrested. The
entire pro-presidential bloc supported the motion, including moderates who
now seek to ingratiate themselves with Yushchenko (Ukrayinska pravda, July
16, 2004). The Prosecutor-General's office then issued fresh indictments
(Ukrayinska pravda, September 15, 2004). Also in July 2004 Russia issued a
search warrant for Tymoshenko and placed her on Interpol's wanted list
(Interpol.org).

This step backfired, because now Prime Minister Tymoshenko cannot travel to
Russia. Russian political technologist Sergei Markov, who worked for the
Yanukovych side, predicted that Russian prosecutors would soon drop their
case against Tymoshenko. Markov also has changed course, asserting, "People
have said Tymoshenko is a radical politician, that Russia is at war against
Tymoshenko and that her nomination will be negative for Russia. I think that
is absolutely wrong" (Financial Times, January 25).

Markov's apparent shift might be attributed to Tymoshenko's confusing
politics. In an op-ed piece written for the Russian newspaper Vedomosti
(January 11) she talked in language that ought to make Ukrainian
nationalists shudder. Ukrainian-Russian relations are "rooted in our common
history," she said. Both peoples belong to the "same civilization" and the
"same geo-economic zone." Furthermore, she wrote that Putin and Yushchenko
have similar goals in removing oligarchs from power and that both states
will re-join Europe together. Ukraine may join NATO but only with Russia,
with whom Ukraine should unify its military-industrial complex.

Despite these Russophile views, Tymoshenko remains the darling of the right
populist and nationalist camps. Crowds numbering tens of thousands rallied
in Lviv in support of her bid to be nominated prime minister. Yet, her
radical, anti-Kuchma, and anti-oligarch views outweigh both her own oligarch
past and her Russophile views.

Tymoshenko first entered politics with the dissident oligarch Hromada party,
led by Pavlo Lazarenko. After Lazarenko fled Ukraine in early 1999, she
created her own Fatherland Party, which merged in 2002 with the
populist-right Conservative Republican Party led by Stepan Khmara.

Tymoshenko took a leading part in the anti-Kuchma protests during the
Kuchmagate crisis, when the opposition created the National Salvation Front
(NFS). At that time, then-Prime Minister Yushchenko opposed the anti-Kuchma
protests. Most of the political parties that made up the NFS, apart from the
Socialists, later joined the "Yulia Tymoshenko bloc," which finished fourth
in the 2002 elections with 7.26%.

Tymoshenko has views similar to those of Yushchenko and Socialist leader
Oleksandr Moroz on the need to implement radical democratic reforms, remove
the oligarchs from power, and combat corruption. But she will differ from
Yushchenko on some aspects of economic reform because, as she pointed out,
"I am not a market fundamentalist" (The Independent, December 7).

Her parliamentary faction was the only one to vote against the December 2004
compromise package that includes constitutional changes. Tymoshenko has
always supported strong executive powers. In contrast, Yushchenko's Our
Ukraine differed from the left and the pro-presidential camp only in the
schedule for introducing constitutional changes (i.e. immediately after the
2004 presidential elections or after the 2006 parliamentary elections).

Tymoshenko's nomination will send shivers down the spines of Ukraine's
oligarchs, particularly those that are grouped around Viktor Medvedchuk's
Social Democratic United Party. -30- [Action Ukraine Monitoring]
==========================================================
12. "MANY WERE CALLED, BUT FEW CHOSEN"

COMMENTARY: By Yulia Mostovaya
Zerkalo Nedeli On The Web, Mirror-Weekly
International Social Political Weekly
Kyiv, Ukraine, Saturday, 29 Jan - 4 Feb 2005

St Sophia Cathedral. The President and his family are praying. The country
is watching them in this intimate act through a television keyhole. I feel
embarrassed and switch off the TV set.

The President’s entourage, however, does not feel ill at ease. For most of
them, Yushchenko is their God, since he makes major personnel decisions.
Therefore they pray to him. The stage in Maidan cannot accommodate all of
the zealots, so professional atheists cross themselves in St Sophia, the
most foolhardy swim in the Dnipro River on Epiphany, thirty officials
accompanying the President in Strasbourg leave the text of the head of state
’s speech to be delivered in CEPA at the hotel - all because the most
important thing is to be near him, not to let their chance slip by.

While demonstrating a lack of unity to the nation and to the world, ordering
comments against one another in the domestic and foreign media, pitting
various influential groups of Yushchenko’s supporters against one another,
all the king’s men are losing their right to be called a team, and to be
treated like one.

Such behaviour discredits the politicians involved in the public eye, calls
into question the new government’s efficiency, and exasperates the
President. The top-level-job seekers should not forget it.

Last week, another essential circumstance was brought to light: President
Yushchenko is independent in his decision-making. The appointments announced
on Monday caught all his allies, including the new appointees, unawares. Do
not believe the experts who say “I knew he would do it”. Nobody did. Yuliya
Tymoshenko heard about her prime ministerial nomination on Monday morning as
she entered Viktor Yushchenko’s office with [the YT Bloc member] Olexander
Turchynov: “I’ve made a decision, you’ll be the Premier. Go and do your job”
. That was it.

Olexander Zinchenko was notified of his new position on board the
presidential plane heading for Moscow. Petro Poroshenko learned about being
appointed Secretary of the Council for National Security and Defence from
journalists.

We will discuss the President’s possible motives in placing these people in
their positions a little later. At this juncture, we would like to call your
attention to several significant points. FIRST, Viktor Yushchenko is not
afraid to appoint strong personalities and skilled politicians to leading
posts, which is good. SECOND, Yushchenko makes his personnel decisions
based on his own principles and criteria. THIRD, his statements in Russia,
Strasbourg, Poland and Davos show that he has a comprehensive, strategic
vision for the country’s further development, which is indispensable for a
head of state.

Yet the question is whether he will be able to set up a system of effective
relations, not amongst the abstract positions on his list of staff members,
but amongst the real people whom he plans to include in this list. Another
question is whether he will be able to get the new presidential team to
share his values. I will venture a guess that very few of the post-seekers
(whose names have often been mentioned in the media lately) have fully
realized want kind of values these are.

All of us have yet to discover President Yushchenko for ourselves. We are
yet to know what kind of person he is, and in what way his personal
qualities and values are going to affect the entire system of power. Some
people think his promises to combat corruption, guarantee independence of
the judiciary, put an end to impunity and arbitrariness of uniformed
wrongdoers, honour Ukraine’s national interests as his top priority, etc are
stories for the Maidan. Some study the President’s face when he says:
“Should I hear that you steal - you’ll lose your job in two ticks” and
expect him to give a wink. But he does not. Nor does he discuss kick-backs
or demand pledges of allegiance. A most unusual President!

We should not blame the post-seekers, though: for ten years they have been
living in a country where the above was the norm, the modus vivendi.
Moreover, the system of power relied on it. What this system will look like
under Yushchenko is still unclear. Leonid Kuchma’s principle was “divide
and rule”. To Yushchenko, on the contrary, squabbles inside his team are
painful, and should they continue, we may expect new presidential decrees,
this time on dismissals.

Some of the abovementioned appointments, particularly Tymoshenko’s and
Poroshenko’s, were inherently antagonistic; there is no doubt of that. And
this is in conflict with the President’s aspiration to build a cohesive
team. He is still trying to pay homage to his staunchest supporters for
their contribution to the election campaign. Yet soon the campaign and
related services will recede into the background, under the pressures of
day-to-day work. Current performance, ability to deliver and future
prospects will be appreciated, rather than former merits. Of course, we need
a system of checks and balances on the system of power, but it should differ
from the model once proposed by a KGB General: “Let us spy on one another,
and everything will be fine.”

Poroshenko should not be checking on Tymoshenko, and Zinchenko should
not be tracking rule-breaking by the former two. This power is vested in the
Prosecutor General’s Office, the Accounting Chamber, the Security Service
and the Parliament, where the President has a loyal majority. Besides, there
are the media and the opposition. The system of checks and balances works
well in a stable state. It is very steady, which is a plus, but at the same
time, it is not at all flexible, which is a minus, under the circumstances.
What we need today is professionals aptly placed in the right positions. The
acting Prime Minister is the only new appointee viewed by the majority as
the right person in the right place. The rest will have to prove it every
day with their work.

Returning to the new President’s requirements and values, I will assume that
where Leonid Kuchma would discharge an official at the slightest hint of his
or her contacts with the opposition, Viktor Yushchenko will do that having
confirmed data of an official’s involvement in corruption schemes, or
embezzlement of budget funds. I will also assume that Yushchenko, the
President, is different from Yushchenko, the “Our Ukraine” leader.

Those of his team members (especially businessmen) who comprehend
and accept it sooner than the others will wind up less psychologically
traumatized and with better chances in the future. Those who try to object
and remind him of their previous services will run the risk of falling out
of favour. Nobody knows what forms that disfavour can take, but it will,
certainly, not be Kuchma’s style of harassing the opposition.

It is critical for the country, and particularly for its political elite, to
understand the difference between the two presidents. We should not try to
fit the new head of state into his predecessor’s stereotypes, methods and
approaches. Of course, big politics is impossible without intrigues. Of
course, the President will not loosen his grip on the situation in vital
political, economic and social spheres. Of course, he will strive to control
and monitor the major processes in those spheres, thus intruding into
various officials’ purview. What matters is the extent, feasibility, methods
and objectives of such interventions.

Most of my interviewees maintained that Viktor Yushchenko is principally
different from Leonid Kuchma in that the former loves Ukraine in himself,
whereas the latter loves himself in Ukraine. Good for a start, isn’t it? We
will see how he changes along the way. Now we can only judge the
President by the company he is choosing for himself…
MANDATE OF MAIDAN
No one, apart from thousands of people in the Maidan, believed that
Yushchenko would nominate Yulia Tymoshenko for the premiership. Ms
Tymoshenko herself seemed to give up and be ready to accept an offer of the
NCSD Secretary’s position. The President, however, had a different opinion,
so he dictated his decree on appointing Tymoshenko acting Prime Minister at
the moment his plane touched down in Moscow. Vladimir Putin looked
flabbergasted during the whole joint press conference.

I do not think that an article on Putin’s meeting with Yanukovych after the
repeat re-run, published in Borys Berezovsky’s “Kommersant” newspaper,
caused Yushchenko to take this decision (although its timing is suggestive
in and of itself). Neither was it caused by his desire to show the Kremlin
he was going to pursue an independent HR policy. Presumably, there were
several reasons behind Yushchenko’s choice of the Prime Minister.

FIRST, Tymoshenko’s appointment means that Yushchenko needs prompt
and visible economic results. Tymoshenko’s hard-line manner, alongside her
creativity - her ability to generate ideas - won in a competition with the
stability and thoroughness associated with Petro Poroshenko. Yushchenko
needs tangible results in general and in particular before the 2006
parliamentary elections. Thus, he has staked his bet on Tymoshenko as a
major engine of the changes he wants to achieve.

SECOND, Yushchenko had certain obligations to Yuliya Tymoshenko, stipulated
in a document. Some say those were secret obligations, but the public seems
quite well-informed about them. One can understand “Our Ukraine” members’
grievances, when they argue that Yushchenko had no right to commit the
entire faction to sustaining Tymoshenko’s appointment in Parliament. In
their opinion, he should have discussed the agreement with the faction
before signing it. On the other hand, the indignant MPs must have known all
along about those arrangements. Could they have expected Yushchenko to
fulfill his obligations?

According to our sources, Yushchenko tried to talk Tymoshenko out of her
prime ministerial ambitions. A week before the appointment, he met with her
twice. In both four-hour-long meetings he advised her to accept the post of
the NCSD Secretary. She almost agreed, but right after the inauguration
Yushchenko changed his mind. We may never learn what the last straw was,
but taking his final decision, he must have understood that it would not be
appropriate for the President to start his term in office by breaking a
promise.

THIRD, Tymoshenko is a favourite of the Maidan, which, to Yushchenko,
epitomizes the people’s will and power. During the inauguration ceremony,
the Maidan was chanting: “Yuliya is our Premier!” The Maidan was her only
lobbyist. The President’s willingness to act on the people’s urgent requests
earns him some brownie points. Should Tymoshenko succeed, both the
President and the people will be happy. Should she fail, he will not be held
accountable for it: he was realizing the people’s will, which he could not
ignore in the wake of the “orange” revolution.

FOURTH, Tymoshenko can initiate revocation of constitutional reform. She
has always been a steadfast opponent to it. Now numerous fellow-MPs,
particularly Olexander Moroz, are demanding that she relinquish her beliefs.
Yet the complaint to the Constitutional Court has been written and signed by
over 60 MPs eager to repeal the constitutional amendments. The document is
presently kept in Olexander Turchinov’s safe. And again, it is all guesswork
how Tymoshenko (and Yushchenko as her ally) will choose to deal with it. As
matters stand, Yuliya Tymoshenko has in her hands a powerful lever for
reversing constitutional reform.

Whether she gets a chance to become a prime minister with the exceptional
powers envisioned by the constitutional amendments will depend solely on her
government’s performance. Another possibility should also be considered,
though. If the system of checks and balances puts spokes in the Tymoshenko
cabinet’s wheels, she may go into the opposition again, hoping for the
presidency in 2009, in which case she would prefer for the President to
retain his current authority.

It is hard to say what Tymoshenko will do about constitutional reform, and
whether she has any clear-cut agreements with Yushchenko on the matter. At
the moment, she says what the MPs whose votes she’ll need in the Rada next
week want to hear from her.

Some people are concerned over Tymoshenko’s radicalism. Yet one should
not confuse the Tymoshenko at the mass rally with the Tymoshenko in the
Premier’s office. She will hardly instigate a total revision of earlier
privatizations. Prevention of abuses by oligarchs is not within her mandate.
Petro Poroshenko will have to see to that. Yuliya Tymoshenko, being true to
herself, will wage a war against the various schemes that the pillars of the
former regime used to rob the state, rather than with those specific pillars
themselves.

When she was Vice Prime Minister for Fuel and Energy, she liquidated
inter-company barter. I hope she will manage to close down all the holes and
illegal corridors on the state border. Her Cabinet will make it impossible
to profiteer from “gray” and “black” schemes of VAT reimbursement. I also
hope Tymoshenko will pay attention to techno-parks and free economic zones,
sort out what is happens to retired people’s money in the Pension Fund, and
scrutinize practices in mining industries, etc, etc, etc.

Today, it is too early to judge to what extent the Cabinet of Ministers will
be Yuliya Tymoshenko’s team, and to what extent it will be made of Viktor
Yushchenko’s people. The President is likely to have the first right to
nominate and approve ministers, and Tymoshenko will have to acknowledge it.
According to some sources, the President will discuss only economic and
cultural segments of the future government membership with her, giving the
prerogative to propose uniformed ministers to Petro Poroshenko. Even if it
is true, I am not sure what legal and constitutional tools, apart from
information-gathering, Petro Poroshenko has at his disposal to control the
uniformed ministries.

Tymoshenko, conversely, has a lot of these tools. She will be able to revive
constitutional norms that never worked under Leonid Kuchma, in particular,
the provision empowering the prime minister to propose ministers and
governors for the president’s approval, and to prevent the president from
discharging them without the prime minister’s written consent. For ten
years, this provision has been a mere formality. Viktor Yushchenko was the
only prime minister in the recent history of Ukraine who availed himself
of it, refusing, for twelve months, to hand to Leonid Kuchma a petition
on Yuliya Tymoshenko’s dismissal from the vice prime minister’s post.

Ms Tymoshenko will, undoubtedly, be making use of this law. I cannot rule
out that, in appointing Tymoshenko to the position, Viktor Yushchenko
counted on her toughness of character as a pretext to deny appointments to
excessively power-thirsty coalition allies: “You know, I’m all for it, but
Tymoshenko won’t propose you. Sorry, can’t do anything about it”. It is
just a conjecture, but, who knows, it might come true in some cases.

The possible monitoring of her activities by Poroshenko and Zinchenko will,
naturally, irritate Yuliya Tymoshenko. Presently, her relations with
Olexander Zinchenko are very friendly. Her closest aide, Turchinov, is
engaged in negotiating and drafting regulations on the presidential
secretariat, a new institution to replace the former Administration. He
could become Zinchenko’s first deputy in the Secretariat. If this is the
case, the presidential office, albeit with a new name, and the Cabinet might
find more incentives and opportunities for cooperation, instead of the
eternal rivalry characteristic of the old structures. However, Tymoshenko
should not hope for a standing amicable relationship with Zinchenko: life is
long and a lot can happen…

Today, Tymoshenko gushes with ideas, and froths with tactical and strategic
political plans. She will, undoubtedly, make a remarkable prime minister.
She will not be looking for excuses, but for ways. Of course, she will make
mistakes, given the drive and dynamism of her intended transformations. Yet
she will be working conscientiously to produce positive results. She
realizes, better than anyone else, that her political future is at stake.

In money matters, she should move cautiously, walking on eggshells. Eight
years in the opposition, with a business destroyed by the regime, is a great
challenge for a politician and a party leader with ambitions for the future
and entrepreneurial talents. Her activity in the prime ministerial office
will be thoroughly scrutinized. Thousands of people, including those
officially authorized to do so, will watch her, hoping to catch her in the
act. I hope Yuliya Tymoshenko will not give them this pleasure. I also hope
she will not disappoint us journalists, who are an element of public control
over the government.
WHAT CANNOT BE CURED MUST BE ENDURED?
Olexander Zinchenko has received a brand new position as the State Secretary
of Ukraine. We will not discuss this appointment in detail here, for lack of
information on the nature of the state secretary’s scope of operation. The
terms of reference are being developed, so it is not clear at the moment how
the Secretariat will be different from the Administration. Besides, it
remains obscure how services in charge of the President’s activity support,
protocol, information supply, public relations and everyday life among the
state secretary, the President’s newly appointed first aide Olexander
Tretyakov, Vera Ulyanchenko who has been Viktor Yushchenko’s personal
assistant for five years and Petro Poroshenko will be allocated.

I’ll note en passant that Olexander Zinchenko must be a more significant
political player that Viktor Medvedchuk. The latter did not hit upon the
idea of calling his position “the President’s Head”, humbly contending
himself with the “Head of the Presidential Administration”, while Olexander
Zinchenko will be the State Secretary of Ukraine, take it or leave it.

Now let us consider Petro Poroshenko. Imagine a man who was keen on becoming
a supermarket manager but was hired to be a library director. How he would
feel roughly reflects Poroshenko’s feelings at being appointed Secretary of
National Security and Defence. Of course, various candidates were considered
for the prime ministerial position; the same people were then considered as
potential candidates for other key posts. Yet whereas Yuliya Tymoshenko
could, in theory, think of working in the NCSD, Poroshenko never even
admitted such a possibility.

The whole country seems to know about Tymoshenko and Poroshenko’s
reconciliatory dinner at the time, preceding the inauguration, when their
contention over the post became evident to the public. Yuliya Tymoshenko
did not conceal being invited to the dinner. So it took place in a small
group at the Capuchin restaurant. Yushchenko demanded that his allies find a
common language and come to a compromise. The candidates did their best.

Tymoshenko suggested that if she became the Prime Minister and Poroshenko
was appointed NCSD Secretary, he could form and supervise the uniformed
segment of the government. Besides, she would not claim authority over the
appointments to the Customs Committee and Tax Administration. Poroshenko
declined, proposing the reverse option, which did not suit Tymoshenko. The
dinner was friendly, but fruitless.

Then, Poroshenko learned about his appointment. During the two following
days he would not make an appearance on Kameneva Street, where this once
influential state body is located. He was waiting to talk with Yushchenko,
apparently deciding for himself whether to accept this offer or not. The
incautious comment by Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn might testify to Poroshenko’s
inner emotional struggle: “I am not sure that all the President’s nominees
will accept their offers.”

Lytvyn made this statement 40 minutes after the announcement of Yushchenko’s
new appointments. Lytvyn could not have meant Zinchenko, could he? It is
obvious that he did not mean Tymoshenko. Lytvyn’s statement became public
proof of a fact of which Yushchenko was well aware: Lytvyn and Poroshenko
have an effective channel of communication.

Not only did the tandem of Poroshenko and Lytvyn alert Yushchenko, but so
also did a wider group of Poroshenko-Lytvyn-Malairenko-Azarov-Piskun. Due
to this group, Poroshenko was not given the Prime Minister’s post.

Definitely, Yushchenko likes Yulia Tymoshenko’s position on reform much more
than that of Petro Poroshenko. Poroshenko is convinced that constitutional
reform was a part of the package which included the amendments of the
election law. Had the election law not been changed and the members of the
election commissions remained the same, in the third round of the election
Yushchenko’s opponents would have robbed him not of 6-8 percent as it
happened, but as much as 15 percent, which would have lead to another formal
victory for Yanukovych. Yushchenko, apparently, does not share this opinion
and believes that reform benefited Lytvyn and Moroz but not him.

Yushchenko gave the major candidates for the Prime Minister’s post some (I
would even say too much) time to present their models of power distribution
and compare their personal ambitions. Some say that Tymoshenko’s proposal
turned out to be better and her position in the public confrontation between
Tymoshenko and Poroshenko irritated Yushchenko less than that of Poroshenko.
Aside from this, something happened between Yushchenko and Poroshenko,
which is known only to them or even only to Yushchenko.

This nullified the chances of one of Yushchenko’s closest companions-in-arms
becoming the Prime Minister. Several assumptions are made regarding this,
but we have no right to cite them, as there is no proof of any of them. On
the whole we can only mention some business plans, allegedly developed by
Poroshenko, that turned on Yushchenko’s table against Poroshenko’s will.

Having appointed Poroshenko NSDC secretary without talking to him,
Yushchenko on the one hand acted quite normally, “since we are a team and
you are appointed assigned important work, you, who have repeatedly stated
your support of the president’s principles, must take it and work
effectively.” Yet on the other hand, the man who did so much for Viktor
Yushchenko’s campaign deserved a more respectful and considerate attitude.
Accordingly, if a decision was made to appoint Tymoshenko Prime Minister,
maybe it was worth discussing with Poroshenko where he saw himself, and
whether the NSDC secretary’s position was interesting for him. If it were a
matter of monitoring the government’s activity, Poroshenko would be
definitely more efficient in his previous position as the head of the
parliamentary budget committee.

Perhaps Yushchenko had grounds to fear that a number of the newly appointed
officials as well as people yet to take the key positions would be trying to
pursue their own agendas in their relations with the president. Due to this,
the President plans frequent, almost daily, meetings of the National
Security Council. It is not quite expedient, however, to turn this important
state body into a place of identification parades. As an alternative, he
might use his predecessor’s experience: frequent dinners with the speaker,
prime minister, the head of the administration and the NSDC secretary. Yet
it is up to the President to define the form.

One way or another, Poroshenko accepted Yushchenko’s offer, and met with
him to discuss a number of issues, including spheres of his influence. One
side insists that Poroshenko was satisfied with this conversation, and will
make law enforcement his priority. The other side says that after this talk,
Viktor Yushchenko could have boiled water without using fire. Dmitriy Vydrin
was only partially right when he said in his TV interview that the influence
of the NSDC secretary is determined by the quality of his team.

Marchuk could have gathered an extremely qualified team, but he would stick
to the assigned role of staff hangman. Radchenko in theory could have
attracted professionals in all spheres (if needed, the list of the national
security issues could be expanded to include everything from the birth rate
to the privatization of Ukrtelecom), nevertheless, at the post of the NSDC
secretary he would always be a person who was pensioned off to vacate the
seat of the SBU head for Ihor Smeshko.

The influence of the NSDC secretary on the situation in the country as well
as on key decisions depends to a greater extent not on his team or authority
laid down in law, but on the degree of trust in his relationship with the
President, and on the personality of those holding this post. These were the
two factors that determined the influence of Volodymyr Horbulin, while their
lack in his successors decreased the importance and influence of the
secretary and of the whole Council after Horbulin’s retirement.

If Poroshenko manages to become Horbulin, and sets up a reliable and
trustworthy channel of communication with Yushchenko, he would be able to
demand a lot. If he fails, he will be like a tiger locked in the cage of the
NSDC secretary’s authorities outlined by the law: organizing meetings of the
National Security Council, naming Council members for presidential approval,
drafting presidential decrees based on the Council’s decisions and
monitoring their fulfillment.

He will be able to appeal to various institutions, ministries, and
departments, and have access to classified documents of all levels to
receive the information necessary for organization of the NSDC meetings.
This is mostly it. In addition to the law on the National Security Council
that clearly states the authority of its secretary, his role is mentioned in
at least 15 other laws. However, they mostly refer to emergency situations
and do not expand his authority.

In the long run, Oleksandr Zinchenko is in a better condition. Only
Yushchenko’s promise to restrict the influence of the Presidential
Administration can limit his levers. Poroshenko was appointed to a
constitutional body. Certainly he will be able to create some additional
levers of his own. But there is another Constitutional rule, which is
currently being enforced. The decision of the National Security Council is
published in the form of a presidential decree, which can be enforced only
if signed by the ministry and the Prime Minister. Thus, Yulia Tymoshenko
has the right to veto all NSDC decisions.

That is why Poroshenko must make every effort to move from Kameneva
Street to Bankova Street and there set up not only his own office but the
entire NDSC staff; to build a team almost from scratch; to change priorities
and to re-qualify, from being a master of a behind-the-scene economic games
into a public figure; to try to enjoy the huge amount of new knowledge which
he is to acquire, and to prove to the president that he has no regrets that
the steering wheel of Ukraine’s economy was given to somebody else.

He has also another way, which is to get into a hard, public and hidden
fight with his more successful competitors. But this could become a very
short way… By that time he will have already stepped down from the deputy’s
mandate and the budget committee, and have broken off his relations… In a
word, Petro Poroshenko should remember that he has a diplomatic education
and act correspondently, otherwise his position will be the most vulnerable
one. -30- [The Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
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L:INK: http://www.mirror-weekly.com/ie/show/531/49086/
==========================================================
13. UKRAINE: HOW I AM GOING TO WAKE THIS SLEEPING
ELEPHANT AND RIDE INTO EU
Viktor Yushchenko tells Anthony Browne and Robert Thomson
how he plans to fulfil his mission to revitalise Ukraine

By Anthony Browne and Robert Thomson
The Times, United Kingdom, Monday, January 31, 2005

VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO, the freshly sworn-in President of Ukraine, has
increased the pressure on the EU to open its doors by saying that it is
essential to start entry negotiations in 2007. Membership was just a
question of time, he declared in an interview with The Times.

He pushed the case for early entry as he made his first appearance on the
world stage since sweeping to office last month, receiving a hero's welcome
from political and business leaders at the World Economic Forum in
Switzerland.

President Yushchenko has made joining the EU his top political priority in
order to entrench democracy and free markets in his corrupt and politically
unstable state.

However, he has had a cold reception from the EU, with many members
worried about letting such a backward country into the union so soon after
admitting eight other former Communist nations in May.

Surrounded by tight security in a hotel room in the ski resort of Davos,
President Yushchenko told The Times that he was committed to a three-year
reform programme already agreed with Brussels, aimed at putting Ukraine ­
the largest country wholly in Europe ­ on the path to Western-style
democracy. He insisted that as soon as the reforms were completed, he
wanted to start official entry talks to join the EU.

"We think it very essential that the joint three-year EU-Ukraine action
plan leads to the launch of membership negotiations in 2007," he said.

Before the interview, he received a standing ovation at the economic forum
as he pleaded to the world leaders for help: "My country has long been a
wise, strong but sleeping elephant. It is waking today ­ democracy opens
the way to implementing its potential to achieving its goals. Please, help
Ukraine ­ and quite shortly, you'll see a beautiful nation."

He received the backing of his neighbour Poland, whose President
Kwasniewski insisted that there was no argument against Ukrainian
membership: "The question is of time, of procedures, but not why or if."

However, the European Commission President, José Manuel Barroso, stuck
to the EU's official position that membership was not on the agenda. After
their first meeting, he deliberately dampened expectations, saying that
"the agenda now is the neighbourhood policy", which applies to all
countries that border the EU.

President Yushchenko nevertheless remained confident. "I am sure that a lot
of things will change in the European position," he told The Times. "The
question of membership is just a matter of time."

He also insisted that his reforms would go ahead irrespective of EU
membership. "The policy we are shaping now is not for the EU. This is the
policy we are shaping for our nation. We want freedom of speech and rule
of law, we want democratic values to be respected, we want the free and
competitive market to work. We need those things irrespective of whether
we join the EU."

He used his visit to the economic forum to forge links with the
international community in a blizzard of meetings with other heads of
government, including Gerhard Shröder of Germany, and his first meeting
since his victory with Senhor Barroso.

He also held met leaders of the International Monetary Fund and the World
Trade Organisation, which he wants to join in November, and urged
businessmen to invest in his country. Mr Yushchenko has announced plans to
balance the budget, regularise the huge black market, start a privatisation
programme and raise more income from big state corporations such as rail,
oil and gas. Pleading for investment, he said: "We want to stretch out our
hand to business. We will be reducing taxes. We will not prosecute
business. You will see this government is a partner to business."

Membership of the World Trade Organisation would help to integrate
Ukraine into the global economy, reducing barriers for its imports and
exports. "There is still a lot of work that needs to be done, but we are
sure that by the autumn we will accomplish it," he said.

The President's face remains shockingly scarred from dioxin poisoning and,
while he tries to keep in good health with a special diet, his condition is
permanent and untreatable. He is presumed to have been the victim of an
assassination attempt by a political rival and the Ukrainian
prosecutor-general said that he had made progress in identifying who
was responsible.

Mr Yushchenko's visit to Switzerland completes a hectic tour of Europe,
which also included a visit to Moscow ­ where he says he was treated as an
equal by President Putin, who had actively campaigned for his election rival
­ and attending the Auschwitz commemorations in Poland. He also intends to
visit London within the next six months.
A WEEK ON THE MOVE
January 23: Kiev, inaugurated as President. Met Colin Powell, the US
Secretary of State, who promised America's support for his leadership
January 24: Moscow, for Yushchenko's first foreign trip as President, to
smooth relations with President Putin of Russia
January 25: Strasbourg, to deliver a speech to the Council of Europe
January 27: Cracow, for the 60th anniversary of the Auschwitz liberation.
Met Dick Cheney, the US Vice-President, and 44 other high-profile
politicians
January 28: Davos, for the World Economic Forum. Received a standing
ovation after addressing world leaders and Bill Gates, the Microsoft
billionaire. -30- [The Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
==========================================================
14. VICTOR YUSHCHENKO'S MOTHER DIED AT AGE 86

Press Service of Ukraine's President Viktor Yushchenko
Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, January 31, 2005

KYIV - Victor Yushchenko's mother, Varvara Tymofiyivna aged 86, died after
lingering death. Today, at 03:00 PM, at St Volodymyr Cathedral in Kyiv, a
burial service to be held. Varvara Tymofiyivna will be buried in her native
Khoruzhivka village, at the local cemetery next to the grave of her husband,
Andriy Andriyovych.

Varvara Tymofiyivna was born on 27 November 1918. All her life she taught
mathematics at Khoruzhivka school. She brought up two sons, she had seven
grandchildren and three great-grandchildren. She was highly respected by her
home-folks. Victor Yushchenko's mother used to say: "If you can walk - get
to work."

Varvara Tymofiyivna was in Kyiv's hospital over the last months. We express
our sincere condolences to Victor Yushchenko, his family and all those who
knew and loved Varvara Tymofiyivna. -30-
==========================================================
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