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Action Ukraine Report

                              "THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT - AUR"
                                            An International Newsletter
                                              The Latest, Up-To-Date
                     In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis, and Commentary

                      "Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion,
         Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World"

"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT - AUR" - Number 573
Mr. E. Morgan Williams, Publisher and Editor
Washington, D.C., Kyiv, Ukraine, FRIDAY, September 30, 2005

                                  --------INDEX OF ARTICLES--------
                    "Major International News Headlines and Articles"

1.                 UKRAINE: "DON'T GO WOBBLY ON THE ORANGE"
OPINION: Stephen J. Flanagan and Eugene Rumer
International Herald Tribune (IHT), Neuilly Codex, France
Friday, September 30, 2005

2.                               "A STEP TOWARD NORMALCY"
COMMENTARY: By Peter Savodnik
Political editor of the Hill newspaper
The Wall Street Journal Online (Europe)
New York, NY, Thursday, September 29, 2005

3.     NEW GOVERNMENT IN UKRAINE-POLICY GOALS UNCHANGED
Fitch Ratings, London, UK, Thursday, September 29, 2005

4.                     UKRAINE: PRAGMATIC INTERIM GOVERNMENT
OPINION AND ANALYSIS: Alexei Makarkin
Deputy Director of the Center of Political Technologies.
RIA Novosti, Moscow, Russia, Friday, September 30, 2005

5.   UKRAINE'S NEW PRIME MINISTER YEKHANUROV VOWS TO HELP
                              BUSINESSES TO STABILIZE ECONOMY
Associated Press (AP), Kiev, Ukraine, Thursday, September 29, 2005 .

6.      UKRAINE: NEW PRIME MINISTER YURIY YEKHANUROV HEADS
                          TO RUSSIA FOR FENCE-MENDING VISIT
Associated Press (AP), Kiev, Ukraine, Friday, September 30, 2005

7.                UKRAINE SIGNALS MAJOR CHANGE OF COURSE
                            Ekhanurov's Cabinet would be pro-Russian
By  Nonna Timoshenko, Dnipropetrovsk; Mikhail Zygar
Kommersant, Russia's Daily Online
Moscow, Russia, Friday, September 30, 2005

8. IT IS NECESSARY TO MAKE A PICTURE OF PUTIN AND SPREAD THE
          RUMOR ABOUT THE SUPPER TOGETHER AND SLEEP OVER
INTERVIEW: with Oleg Rybachuk, Head of the
Secretariat of the President of Ukraine
Kommersant, Russia's Daily Online
Moscow, Russia, Friday, September 30, 2005

9.                               BIG DEFEATS AND LITTLE VICTORIES
There is no more revolution in Ukraine, back into the
pre-election, pre-revolutionary & pre-demonstration period
COMMENTARY: By Valery Panyushkin, special correspondent
Kommersant, Russia's Daily Online
Moscow, Russia, Friday, September 30, 2005

10.                      HISTORY OF THE "YULIA TIMOSHENKO CASE"
Kommersant, Russia's Daily Online
Moscow, Russia, Tuesday, September 27, 2005

11.                                ADVANTAGE OF SHOWING UP
              Yulia Timoshenko paid a visit to Russian Prosecution Office
By  Mustafa Nayem, Kiev; Sergey Strokan', Marina Lepina
Kommersant, Russia's Daily Online
Moscow, Russia, Tuesday, September 27, 2005

12.                                         "WHAT A CHANGE"
             Yulia Tymoshenko makes the statement that Vladimir Putin is
                the best president for the Russian people. What a change.
By  Andrey Kolesnikov, special correspondent
Kommersant, Russia's Daily Online
Moscow, Russia, Tuesday, September 27, 2005

13.              THE RIFT THAT WRECKED UKRAINE'S REVOLUTION
LETTER-TO-THE-EDITOR: From Prof Taras Kuzio
Financial Times, London, UK, Thursday, September 29 2005

14.      ASSESSING UKRAINE'S PROSPECTS FOR JOINING THE EU
Remarks by Ambassador Steven Pifer delivered at the
Ukraine's Quest for Mature Nation Statehood Roundtable VI:
"Ukraine's Transition to an Established National Identity"
Panel: Assessing Ukraine's Prospects for Joining the European Union
Washington, D.C, Wednesday, September 28, 2005
The Action Ukraine Report (AUR), Number 537, Article 14
Washington, D.C., Friday, September 30, 2005

15.                             UKRAINIAN - BALTIC RELATIONS
Address by the Ambassador of Latvia Mares Riekstins
Ukraine's Quest for Mature Nation Statehood Roundtable VI:
"Ukraine's Transition to a Established National Identity,"
Wednesday, September 28, 2005, Washington DC.
The Action Ukraine Report (AUR), Number 573, Article 15
Washington, D.C., Friday, September 30, 2005

16.              UKRAINE MARKS ANNIVERSARY OF NAZI KILLINGS
By Natasha Lisova, Associated Press Writer
AP, Kiev, Ukraine, Thursday, September 29, 2005

17.                                  "IN A MORAL QUAGMIRE"
                         The book, Day and Eternity of James Mace
By Kostiantyn RODYK, chief editor of Knyzhnyk-Review
The Day Weekly Digest in English, #29
Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, September 27, 2005

18.                 WILL YUSHCHENKO FOLLOW THE PATTERN OF
                              SERBIA'S KOSTUNICA -- OR DJINDJIC?
               Shadows of Serbia's abandoned revolution hover over Ukraine
COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS: By Taras Kuzio
Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 2, Issue 182
The Jamestown Foundation, Wash, D.C., Friday, Sep 30, 2005
=============================================================
1.                  UKRAINE: "DON'T GO WOBBLY ON THE ORANGE"

OPINION: Stephen J. Flanagan and Eugene Rumer
International Herald Tribune (IHT), Neuilly Codex, France
Friday, September 30, 2005

WASHINGTON - When Ukraine's president, Victor Yushchenko, fired
Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko and her cabinet, he disappointed
Ukraine's fair-weather friends, who were inspired by the drama and
poetry of its Orange Revolution earlier this year.

That revolution was not the last step in Ukraine's long march toward
democracy, stability and prosperity.

There will be many more, not all of them forward, and the trip will be a
long one. For Europe and the United States to lose patience with Ukraine
now would amount to betrayal of its people, as well as our shared values
and strategic interests.

Common sense and the experience of Ukraine's neighbors in Eastern
Europe tell us that Ukraine's transformation will take decades, not years.
Consider where Ukraine is coming from. It achieved independence in 1991
after more than three centuries of Russian and Soviet rule.

Its economy was a product of Soviet central planning ravaged by the
Chernobyl disaster; its government was a holdover from the Soviet era.
Nearly a quarter of the country's population was Russian, countless others
of mixed heritage had strong cultural and family ties to Russia.

    IN HINDSIGHT, UKRAINE'S ACHIEVEMENTS LOOK REMARKABLE
It secured its independence from Russia. It returned to economic growth. It
gained a place in the international arena, establishing strong ties to the
United States, NATO, the EU and key European governments, and its
military is a significant contributor to international coalitions from the
Balkans to Iraq.

After many fitful steps, it took a big leap toward democracy in the peaceful
protests against electoral fraud last winter.

Ukraine isn't perfect. As in many emerging democracies, its politics are
chaotic and rooted in shifting alliances among rival clans rather than
coherent party programs and structures. Its laws are archaic, its military
in need of reform and its bureaucracy notorious for stifling key
initiatives.

And it is corrupt - 122nd of 145 on Transparency International's list of
countries ranging from least to most corrupt - better than Nigeria and
Georgia, but worse than Congo and Uganda.

A UN-sponsored report in early 2005 recommended many reforms that
Yushchenko should enact in his first year in office, including immediate
accession to the World Trade Organization and wide-ranging administrative,
political, judicial, tax and legal reforms that took Eastern Europe's most
successful nations over a decade to devise and realize.

Both Poland's "shock therapy" of frontloaded reforms and the more gradualist
approaches pursued by Hungary and the Czech Republic required determined
implementation of coherent reform programs between 1989 and 2003 to
complete their transitions to flourishing market economies and democracies
eligible for EU membership.

While Ukraine's reformers would like to follow that path, they started from
a much lower base and were further hampered by the legacy of autocratic
politics, mismanagement and corruption inherited from the Kuchma period.

The current crisis in Ukraine is a setback for reformers, and the March 2006
parliamentary election may well become another. There will be others. That
is to be expected in a country where more than a third of the electorate
voted against the Orange Revolution and day-to-day life is full of
hardships. Does this mean that the orange glow has dimmed? Not at all.

Ukraine is in the midst of a profound transformation, but much remains to be
done. Acting Prime Minister Yury Yekhanurov's call for better relations with
Russia does not mean a turn away from the West in a country still divided in
finding the right balance between integration into the Euro-Atlantic
community and maintaining longstanding ties to Russia.

Ukraine's stability and independence are essential to long-term U.S. and
European interests in Eurasia. Now is not the time to be disappointed, but
to stay focused and engaged, offering a helping hand and a critical eye.

What should we do? Stay the course we embarked on years ago: foster
growth of civil society and the rule of law; provide technical assistance on
key reforms, maintain security cooperation, and support training,
educational programs and cultural exchanges.

Anything else would spell failure. Ours, not Ukraine's.  -30-
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stephen J. Flanagan is director at the National Defense University's
Institute for National Strategic Studies, and Eugene Rumer is a senior
fellow there. These are their personal views.
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LINK: http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/09/29/opinion/edflanagan.php
=============================================================
2.                                    "A STEP TOWARD NORMALCY"

COMMENTARY: By Peter Savodnik
Political editor of the Hill newspaper
The Wall Street Journal Online (Europe)
New York, NY, Thursday, September 29, 2005

WASHINGTON -- In its quest to democratize the planet, Washington has
invaded countries, funded fighters, convened high-level summits and pushed
transcontinental trade pacts. Oddly, it has yet to "graduate" Ukraine from
an antiquated human-rights measure that, if left in place, could slow the
spread of freedom in the former Soviet Union.

The 1974 Jackson-Vanik amendment, designed primarily to restrict Soviet
exports to the U.S., remains a canker sore in U.S.-Ukrainian relations. Most
every senior Ukrainian official, from President Viktor Yushchenko to Foreign
Minister Boris Tarasyuk, both of whom traveled to the United States this
month, has called for lifting it.

This emphasis on Jackson-Vanik might seem to be misplaced; Ukraine gets
annual waivers from the provision, so Ukrainians' access to U.S. markets is
not curtailed. But it has political and symbolic meaning for a nation still
struggling to overcome its Soviet past.

There is a widespread feeling among Ukrainians that their country cannot be
considered "normal" as long as this remnant of the old days lingers.

Lifting Jackson-Vanik would cost the U.S. nothing. President George W. Bush
has signaled support for taking action. So, too, have foreign-policy mavens,
Republicans and Democrats alike, on Capitol Hill, as well as Sovietologists
and Russia scholars at the State Department and the National Security
Council.

So what's the holdup? Simply put, American democracy is getting in the way
of democracy overseas. Parochial congressional interests -- involving
everyone from chicken farmers to movie stars -- are stalling efforts,
spearheaded by Republican Sen. John McCain and Rep. Henry Hyde and
Democratic Rep. Tom Lantos, to lift Jackson-Vanik from Ukraine.

While most everyone who cares about geopolitics and democracy in the former
Soviet Union backs graduating Ukraine from Jackson-Vanik, some members of
Congress have found the provision useful when bargaining with Kiev and other
former Soviet capitals such as Moscow.

Case in point: In 2002, after Russia and Ukraine imposed quotas on U.S.
poultry imports, Democratic Sen. Joseph Biden rescinded his support for
lifting Jackson-Vanik.

Similarly, the Motion Picture Association wants authorities in Ukraine to
protect intellectual property rights. American oil and gas executives want
access to Ukraine's energy markets. And bankers, lawyers, hotel owners,
car manufacturers, venture capitalists and other potential investors want
Ukraine's banking, torts and law-enforcement systems cleaned up so they
meet Western standards of transparency and accountability.

All of these groups have, directly and indirectly, led lawmakers to take a
cautious stance on lifting Jackson-Vanik. Their demands are reasonable, and
Ukraine would be wise to listen to Western officials seeking to bring the
ex-Soviet republic into the liberal fold. Nor can Sen. Biden and other
lawmakers be blamed for representing the interests of their constituents.

But delaying an end to Jackson-Vanik -- for whatever reason -- would hinder
the democratic transition by depriving Mr. Yushchenko of a much-needed
political win and, possibly, complicating Ukraine's efforts to be admitted
to the World Trade Organization.

This would be an ironic twist. Jackson-Vanik was never intended to be a
bargaining chip for opening markets to U.S. business. It was meant to punish
the Soviets for restricting Jewish emigration, and it did so by barring
Moscow from gaining "most favored nation" status. In other words,
Jackson-Vanik sought a human-rights end via trade-related means.

Never mind that the country Jackson-Vanik was intended for no longer exists.
(A similar argument convinced many Republicans a few years back that the
U.S. should pull out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.) What matters is
that Jackson-Vanik, once meant to foster progress, now runs the distinct
risk of impeding it.

Even Jewish groups concerned that Ukraine has yet to confront its past --
including support of many Ukrainians during World War II for Hitler's
holocaust and the pogroms of the czarist and Soviet eras -- want
Jackson-Vanik lifted now. Despite legitimate reservations, these groups
recognize that it's time to take this step.

Consider the American Jewish Committee. An Aug. 2 letter from David Harris,
the AJC's executive director, to all 535 members of Congress states: "The
Jewish community has come a long way since the end of communism in 1991
and the re-establishment of Ukrainian independence....To be sure, some
difficult issues remain.

First, there is still work to be done by the government in the matter of
restitution of Jewish communal property. And second, manifestations of
anti-Semitism, though condemned by the government and by no means
unique to Ukraine in today's world, remain a matter of concern. Even so,
the current vitality of the Jewish community is a remarkable sight to
behold."

Referring to a recent trip taken by AJC representatives to Ukraine, Mr.
Harris concludes: "One issue in particular on the minds of those officials
with whom we met is the hope for graduation from the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment, a goal we fully share."

Graduating Ukraine from Jackson-Vanik does not mean anti-Semitism is no
longer a problem in Ukraine. It means helping an embattled leader continue
doing what must be done -- razing the old regime and constructing a new
economic order.

In a little more than five months, voters will decide whether they want this
new order in important parliamentary elections. At stake is Ukraine's
nascent democracy and, less obviously, reform movements in Russia,
Belarus, Moldova and Central Asia; efforts to curb arms and drug
trafficking; and the international struggle pitting the civilized world
against terrorists and the criminal states propping them up.

"Lifting this amendment would send a positive signal to the Ukrainian
people," said Sergiy Korsunsky, charge d'affaires at Ukraine's embassy in
Washington. It would show, Mr. Korsunsky explained, that President
Yushchenko is accomplishing something.

Mr. Yushchenko might be a flawed leader, but his aspirations overlap with
the West's aspirations for Ukraine. That is what matters. By lifting
Jackson-Vanik this year, before the parliamentary campaign begins in
earnest, Washington would let everyone know that the Ukrainian president
is not alone. -30-  [The Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Savodnik is political editor of the Hill newspaper
=============================================================
3.     NEW GOVERNMENT IN UKRAINE-POLICY GOALS UNCHANGED

Fitch Ratings, London, UK, Thursday, September 29, 2005

LONDON - Fitch Ratings, the international rating agency, says today that the
newly-unveiled government of Yuriy Yekhanurov, which is dominated by both
members of President Viktor Yushchenko's Our Ukraine party and apolitical
technocrats, should boost the chances of greater near-term political
stability.

Ukraine's Long-term foreign and local currency sovereign ratings are
currently 'BB-' (BB minus) and the Outlook on both ratings was changed to
Positive from Stable in June. Ukraine has a Short-term rating of 'B' and a
country ceiling of 'BB-' (BB minus).

The ratings are supported by Ukraine's low general government and net
external debt ratios, which compare favourably with those of its rating
peers, and the near-term support to the external position provided by a
sizeable, though declining, current account surplus and official foreign
exchange reserves of over USD14 billion.

They are also underpinned by economic and foreign policies based on closer
ties with the European Union, amicable relations with Russia and continued
economic and structural reforms. Despite the dismissal of Prime Minister
Yulia Tymoshenko and her Cabinet on 8 September and their replacement by
Mr. Yekhanurov and his team, Fitch does not expect these goals to change.

Although the dismissal of the Tymoshenko government was a short-term
blow for the Orange Revolution, such instability is common for credits in
the 'BB' rating range. And while political risk is still high in Ukraine, it
remains at far lower levels than it reached last year during the
Presidential election.

The changes in Cabinet members that have been unveiled this week provide
an opportunity to end the political bickering within the government that had
proved increasingly destabilising in recent months and should allow
President Yushchenko to reassert his authority.

Fitch expects the incoming government to act in a caretaker capacity until
the scheduled spring 2006 elections. While this makes it unlikely that
radical reforms will move ahead before the election, this was never the
agency's central expectation.

Even so, Fitch still believes that progress on lower-key technical reforms
will be made. It is also possible that the new government may prove more
able to bring the re-privatisation debate to a close, thereby reducing
uncertainty and providing a much-needed boost to business confidence.

Further changes in Ukraine's sovereign ratings are likely to be driven by
future political developments, macroeconomic management and
performance and progress with structural reforms.

The possibility of a united and strong government emerging after the next
Rada election that is capable of delivering in key policy areas now hinges
on how the main political players respond to the developments and, at times,
acrimonious debates of the last month.

Even with a strong government, institutional weaknesses and opposition from
powerful vested interests will be working against rapid progress. Even so,
the Positive Outlook indicates that Fitch currently continues to expect some
headway to be made over a one- to two-year horizon.  -30-
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch's rating definitions and the terms of use of such ratings are
available on the agency's public site, www.fitchratings.com. Published
ratings, criteria and methodologies are available from this site, at all
times. Fitch's code of conduct, confidentiality, conflicts of interest,
affiliate firewall, compliance and other relevant policies and procedures
are also available from the 'Code of Conduct' section of this site.
=============================================================
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4.                  UKRAINE: PRAGMATIC INTERIM GOVERNMENT

OPINION AND ANALYSIS: Alexei Makarkin
Deputy Director of the Center of Political Technologies.
RIA Novosti, Moscow, Russia, Friday, September 30, 2005

There are no surprises in the new Ukrainian government, although a number
of ministers, who were believed to be favorites by the press, have lost
their positions. On the whole, however, the outcome is not unexpected,
and testifies to the hardened pragmatism of the Ukrainian elite.

Former First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Kinakh has left the Government
but has remained in the system. Experts say that he has even been promoted
to succeed Pyotr Poroshenko in the post of secretary of the National
Security and Defense Council (NSDC).

However, this promotion appears to be purely a formality: unlike his
predecessor, Kinakh cannot take part in appointing judges, Supreme Justice
Council members, regional power department leaders and military rank
conferment.

In addition, the NSDC Secretary has lost the status of a Presidential
advisor as well as the right to be present at the Council of Ministers
sessions and issue orders to the executive bodies. Yet Kinakh has accepted
this "high-status" position, which he probably needs as a stepping-stone for
the post of prime minister.

Finance Minister Viktor Pinzenik, who had been called the Ukrainian Gaidar
in the 1990s, did not hesitate between political loyalty to Yulia Timoshenko
and the desire to remain a minister. While Timoshenko had offered Pinzenik
the prospect of becoming the finance minister in the future, following the
Rada elections, and without any guarantees (as she may never return to
premiership), Yushchenko was in a position to do it now. Acting rationally,
the pragmatic minister joined Ekhanurov's team.

Foreign Affairs Minister Boris Tarasyuk and Defense Minister Anatoly
Gritsenko have remained in the Government. This means that the pro-Western
orientation of Ukraine's defense and foreign policies will remain unaltered.

Kiev Mayor Alexander Omelchenko, though not the member of the new
Cabinet, is still regarded as the winner in this situation. He is the only
regional leader who has kept his position since Yushchenko came to power.
Now his position has become even stronger, since Fuel and Energy Minister
Ivan Plachkov, his representative in the government, has kept his post.

In addition, Omelchenko's old buddy, Stanislav Stashevsky, who had been
Kiev's Vice-Mayor for many years, has become Vice-Premier of the new
Cabinet. Some years ago Stashevsky served as Fuel and Energy Minister,
but without much success.

Ivan Sakhan, another veteran politician, has become Labor and Social Policy
Minister. Some years ago he held this post in three consecutive Cabinets.
Lately he worked as General Director of Ukraine's Aluminum, a subsidiary of
Oleg Deripaska's Russian Aluminum.

Arseny Yatsenyuk (who was member of Sergey Tigipko's team when he was
Head of the National Bank of Ukraine) has become Minister of Economics.
During last year's presidential election campaign Tigipko was head of
Yanukovitch's election headquarters.

Tigipko lost his post as the head of the National Bank as a result of the
"orange revolution", and Yatsenyuk was not able to work with his successor,
Yushchenko's old friend Vladimir Stelmakh.

At that time experts of the stock market expressed their disappointment at
the departure of a high-level market-minded professional, but now Yatsenyuk
has been recruited to join Ekhanurov's team. As for who sided with whom
during the revolution days, it doesn't seem important in the pragmatic
atmosphere of Ukraine today.

On the whole, the new government is an odd assortment of politicians.

There is Pinzenik, a classic liberal professor with an obvious taste for
politics; Stashevsky, a retirement age economic manager of the Soviet mold;
Sakhan, who had worked in Komsomol for many years and in the late 1980s
was the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee inspector; 31-year-old
Yatsenyuk, as well as 29-year-old Viktor Bondar, the new Transport and
Communications Minister, who are young modern managers. Nothing but
political pragmatism unites all these very different people.

Will this government be an efficient union of like-minded people able to
handle the serious problems Ukraine is facing, such as the sharp decline of
economic growth, high inflation, and inability to attract investment?

Looks like the next Cabinet, which will be elected in spring, will have to
deal with all these issues. The purpose of Ekhanurov's government is to get
through the winter without a new government crisis or rigorous rivalry of
ambitious politicians. In essence, it is an interim government, which is
probably not expected to make any fundamental decisions.

Yet there are grounds to assume that even after the elections the new
Ukrainian government will resemble Ekhanurov's Cabinet. New people will
come to it, but the fundamental idea of the elite's pragmatic compromise,
will remain.

It is evident that no Ukrainian political party or even a stable political
coalition will be able to form an election-based government on its own.
So, it is likely that the future Ukraine's Cabinet will have the same
complicated and contradictory structure as Ekhanurov's interim
government.  -30-  [The Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alexei Makarkin is deputy director of the Center of Political Technologies.
http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20050930/41553689.html
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5.   UKRAINE'S NEW PRIME MINISTER YEKHANUROV VOWS TO HELP
                              BUSINESSES TO STABILIZE ECONOMY

Associated Press (AP), Kiev, Ukraine, Thursday, September 29, 2005 .

KIEV - Ukraine's new prime minister, Yuriy Yekhanurov, pledged Thursday that
his government would extend a helping hand to business, saying its main task
was to stabilize this ex-Soviet republic's troubled economy.

"The battle will not be visible, but the victory will be," Yekhanurov told
journalists during a visit to the eastern Ukrainian region he governed
before being named to the country's No. 2 job. His comments were
broadcast live on Channel 5.

Yekhanurov used the visit to Dnipropetrovsk, the heart of Ukraine's
industrial east, to tout his pro-business credentials and advertise his
intention of making peace with business. He said that private property would
be untouchable under his government, and that from now on, all business
disputes would be settled through negotiation.

"The process of re-privatization is over," Yekhanurov said, referring to the
controversial policy of his predecessor, ousted Prime Minister Yulia
Tymoshenko. Tymoshenko's legal action against businesses that she claimed
were illegally privatized under former President Leonid Kuchma aroused
investor fears.

Ukraine's economy has been showing sluggish growth, and inflation is rising;
the Tymoshenko government had also failed to attract the level of foreign
investment that it had hoped for.

Yekhanurov said his government would do more to help small and medium
businesses, which he called a driving force behind last year's Orange
Revolution protests.

He also said that his aim would be to ensure "professional cooperation"
between the central government and Ukraine's big regions. By going to
Dnipropetrovsk, Yekhanurov demonstrated the new importance that his
government will place on good relations with the East, which overwhelmingly
backed Yushchenko's rival in last year's race.

The breakup of the Orange Revolution team, which had its support base in
western Ukraine, has left members of the shattered coalition hunting for new
support ahead of the March parliamentary elections.

With new opinion polls showing Ukrainians' support for politicians plunging,
Yekhanurov said: "If this will be an effective government, we'll get the
confidence of the people."

Yekhanurov, who was born in Siberia, also said that he hoped to meet with
his predecessor, Tymoshenko, as well as losing presidential candidate Viktor
Yanukovych. His backing helped Yekhanurov win parliamentary approval for
confirmation last week.

Yekhanurov heads to Moscow on Friday, a trip he said would likely include a
meeting with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov, and President Vladimir
Putin.

Dnipropetrovsk, the metallurgical heart of the industrial east, has long
been a source of key political players. The city served as former President
Leonid Kuchma's power base and was the birthplace of Tymoshenko. -30-
==============================================================
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6.    UKRAINE'S NEW PRIME MINISTER YURIY YEKHANUROV HEADS
                          TO RUSSIA FOR FENCE-MENDING VISIT

Associated Press (AP), Kiev, Ukraine, Friday, September 30, 2005

KIEV - Ukraine's new prime minister, Yuriy Yekhanurov, travels to Russia on
Friday to reassure the Kremlin that the new government wants good ties with
its giant neighbor.

Yekhanurov was expected to hold talks with his Russian counterpart, Mikhail
Fradkov, and possibly meet with President Vladimir Putin.
Ukraine is heavily dependent on Russia for energy supplies, so fears run
high that Russia could turn off the taps or raise prices and thus prompt an
economic crisis to achieve its political aims.

Yekhanurov's office said the talks would focus on natural gas, in particular
the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine to Western Europe and the price
that Russia charges Ukraine for gas supplies it uses.

Ukraine currently buys Russian gas at a heavily discounted rate of $50 for
1,000 cubic meters, but media reports have suggested that Moscow was
considering doubling the cost.

Ukraine has warned that it would retaliate by raising transit fees. Senior
officials from Ukraine's state-owned Naftogaz and Russia's OAO Gazprom
(GSPBEX.RS) were due to participate in the talks.

The visit is Yekhanurov's first foreign trip since he was named to the No. 2
spot by President Viktor Yushchenko. Earlier this month, Yushchenko ousted
his former Orange Revolution ally, Yulia Tymoshenko, from the prime
minister's post along with the rest of the Cabinet in a political crisis
fuel by allegations of corruption.

Tymoshenko had frosty ties with Russia, where she was wanted on corruption
charges, and never visited while in office. She met with Russian prosecutors
last weekend, however, and the arrest warrant against her was dropped.

Russia continues to wield significant influence in this ex-Soviet republic,
even after the humiliation the Kremlin suffered last year when its
aggressive backing of defeated presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovych
backfired.

Most Ukrainians can tune in to Russian state-controlled television, and
Russian-owned media sources and personalities have increasingly been
seeking markets in this nation of 47 million.

Yushchenko's former chief-of-staff, Oleksandr Zinchenko - whose resignation
and allegations of corruption against other members of the Orange Revolution
team prompted the political crisis - was known as having the closest ties
with Russia.

He has since switched over to Tymoshenko's side, and helped prepare her
fence-mending visit last weekend and again accompanied Tymoshenko to
Russia on Wednesday, where she reportedly met with "influential Russians."

Yushchenko, meanwhile, dispatched his new chief-of-staff, Oleh Rybachuk,
and now Yekhanurov.

"Yushchenko and Tymoshenko have begun the fight for the Kremlin's sympathy,"
the popular Segodnya newspaper declared in its Friday edition.

Yushchenko came to power last year after defeating his Kremlin-backed rival
amid promises of a pro-western course. The president, however, also made
Russia the destination of his first foreign trip -the day after his
inauguration.  -30-  [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
==============================================================
7.                UKRAINE SIGNALS MAJOR CHANGE OF COURSE
                           Ekhanurov's Cabinet would be pro-Russian

By  Nonna Timoshenko, Dnipropetrovsk; Mikhail Zygar
Kommersant, Russia's Daily Online
Moscow, Russia, Friday, September 30, 2005

                                               ORANGE REMAKE
Today new Ukrainian Prime Minister Yuri Ekhanurov will make his first visit
to Moscow. He is well prepared: Ekhanurov lets it be understood that he is
ready to consider the interests of Russia and Russian business. It would not
be hard for him to find a common language in Moscow. The new cabinet of
ministers, compared with the old one, has close ties with Russian business.

Yesterday, Yuri Ekhanurov, as he was promising in the day of his
confirmation in the Supreme Rada, "sent a signal to business from
Dnipropetrovs'k." While visiting the city, where he was working as a
governor until very recently, Ekhanurov announced that "the re-privatization
processes will be over."

The main goal of the new government, according to the prime minister, would
be stabilization of economy. Ekhanurov pointed out that property disputes
would be resolved by peace accords.

In the same time, Ekhanurov said that Krivorozhstal would be excluded from
the process, because its re-privatization was one of the "Orange Revolution"
goals. "My position, (concerning re-privatization -Kommersant) as former
head of the regional administration and as a specialist did not change. But
that does not make any difference now, when I am in this position with
international bidding going on.

We cannot change the rule of the game on the fly," Ekhanurov said. "There
would be separate politics and separate decisions. Currently the
privatization bidding is continuing accordingly to the decisions that were
made earlier by the government and Fund of State Property," the Prime
Minister said.

Answering the questions about the fate of Nikopol Ferro Alloys plant (NFP),
Ekhanurov let it be understood that the re-privatization of this enterprise
would be suspended: "Overall, it is the question of the negotiation process
and some sort of agreement, which we should make with the owners." Let's
remind that Russian companies Renova and Evrazholding have the
controlling shares of NFP.

The decisions sounded by the new Ukrainian prime-minister about the
suspension of re-privatization process, are playing well for the Russian
business -- Yulia Timoshenko's list of enterprises, which is ready for
re-privatization, was containing several business with Russian capital
investments.

For instance, Nikolaev Alumina Plant belongs to Rusal; Lukoil Neftehim holds
52.7 percent of Lukor's stock; holding company Amtel controls Rosava;
AvtoVAZ-Invest owns more than 93 percent of the Zaporozhsky Aluminum
Plant.

The exclusion of temporarily nationalized Krivorozhstal is just another
confirmation of the rule: some time back Leonid Kuchma gave the company
to his son-in-low Viktor Pinchuk and oligarch Rinat Akhmetov, thus taking it
away from Russian company Severstal, which wanted to buy it.

However, the importance of the meaning of Ekhanurov's first public speech is
not only in his words, but also in the place and time of the speech.
Dnipropetrovs'k -- this is not only the former workplace of new prime
minister. It is also the homeland of ex-President Leonid Kuchma and Eastern
regions of Ukraine populated by the people who were "upset by the Orange
Revolution."

Making his presentation on the East instead of in Kiev, Ekhanurov decided to
demonstrate that he is going to have different accents than his predecessor.
The partisans of Yulia Timoshenko already accused the new government of
"kuchmizm": mostly because Ekhanurov's important promise to turn away from
Timoshenko's course and to stop re-privatization.

One more important "signal" that Ekhanurov sent was is his trip to Moscow
straight from Dnipropetrovs'k. Recently Ukrainian politicians have become
frequent guests in Moscow. Twice for the last two weeks the Russian capital
received the head of the Presidential Secretariat Oleg Rybachuk. Last week,
Ukrainian Interior Minister Yuri Lutsenko was visiting Moscow.

On the weekend the leaders of new opposition - Yulia Timoshenko, Alexander
Zinchenko and Alexander Turchinov- made their pilgrimage to the Russian
capital. All this is another proof that Ukrainian politicians follow the old
tradition -- to get closer to Russia right before the parliamentary
elections.

During his yesterday speech in Dnipropetrovs'k, Ekhanurov was talking a
great deal about his coming visit to Moscow: he "hopes very much to meet
Russian President Vladimir Putin." Beside Putin, the other officials that
the Ukrainian prime minister is supposed to meet are: Mikhail Fradkov,
Russian Prime Minister, Boris Gryzlov, Speaker of the Duma, and Patriarch
of Russian Orthodox Church Alexi II.

Before forming the new government, Ekhanurov and Viktor Yushenko promised
that they will have more new apolitical figures and professionals. They
promised to make this government without people who have their own interests
in business. This promise did not come through.

First, as Kommersant already wrote on Wednesday, the majority members
of the old cabinet of ministers kept their posts. While distributing the
positions, the president and prime ministers had to follow political reasons
and to appoint the representative from friendly factions.

Other candidates for the ministers' portfolios were lobbied by business
structures. The only difference between old and new government -- the new
government is more oriented on Russian business and the one of
Timoshenko's was not.

For instance, the Ukrainian media report that new minister of labor and
social politics Ivan Sakhan', who was holding the same position in
governments of Pustovoytenko, Yushenko and Kinakh, until recently was
General Director of Ukrainian Aluminum Company and head of the observation
council of Nikolaev Alumina Plant. Both of these enterprises are property of
Rusal. Actually, in Kiev they call Sakhan ' the man of Oleg Deripaska.

By the way, while speaking yesterday in Dnipropetrovs'k, Ekhanurov
announced: "Concerning the relationships with oligarchs-- right now we are
working out the clear and understandable questions for the meeting between
the president of Ukraine and the largest Ukrainian businessmen, which will
take place in the middle of October.

We'll prepare standard questions, which will show that we want a sincere
conversation and decide on definitions of allowed ways to compete. We'd
have a special schedule for each financial group: there we'll find out what
questions do they have to us and what questions we might them for them.

Those, who want to have a good relationship with the authorities should
understand that this is mutually beneficial approach."   -30-
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LINK: http://www.kommersant.com/page.asp?id=613600
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8. IT IS NECESSARY TO MAKE A PICTURE OF PUTIN AND SPREAD THE
          RUMOR ABOUT THE SUPPER TOGETHER AND SLEEP OVER

INTERVIEW: with Oleg Rybachuk, Head of the
Secretariat of the President of Ukraine
Kommersant, Russia's Daily Online
Moscow, Russia, Friday, September 30, 2005

                                             POLITICAL TECHNOLOGIES
Yesterday, Oleg Rybachuk, head of the Secretariat of the President of
Ukraine came to Moscow on an unofficial visit. In the Russian capital he
had meetings with officials from the presidential administration and told
Kommersant correspondent Nargiz Asadova why recently Ukrainian
politicians started to be oriented toward Moscow.

[Question] Recently Ukrainian politicians become a quite often guests in
Moscow... Do you come here for a support?

Right now we have the pre-election campaign going. Different political
forces come to Moscow and this is normal competition. But, I am not is this
row of politicians. I don't know Moscow well. It happened that I know more
the logic of Europeans: Brussels, London, Berlin, Washington and even Tokyo.

In the past I was a banker and did not work much with Moscow. And now, I am
trying to catch up with that. In my first visit I was able to establish good
relationships with the head of the administration Dmitry Medvedev. Now I am
meeting with some people who are part of "the institute of the president."

We are preparing visit of Vladimir Putin to Ukraine. There will be visits of
some analysts to Ukraine. So, I am not too fast or over the board -- I am
just filling up the pause.

Actually, when a country has an election coming up, the two sided contacts
always grow sharply. Because these elections are parliamentary ones, the
members of different parties are coming to Moscow. These people are
positioning themselves differently. Somebody might be a person who could
be a prime minister, or just would be able to influence to the policy of new
Ukrainian power.

They trying to get Moscow's support The Communists go to Zyuganov.
Socialists are positioning themselves as more pro-Russian force.
Timoshenko is the third force.

You have to understand -- the elections are coming and a lot of folks feel
necessity to make a picture with President Putin, to be seen, to spread the
rumor that they had supper together and spend night in some dacha. However,
the attempt to play the Russian card has disappointed Ukrainians already
several times.

I mean those who stupidly exploited the issue of Russian language and dual
citizenship. There is tiredness from these games in Ukraine and in Russia.
The people understand --these are election technologies.

[Question] Were you able to establish a contact with Moscow?
You, know, I often heard that in Russia there is a political center, which
decides the policy about the Ukraine. They were rolling their eyes and were
saying -- everything depends only of this center.

[Question] Who is it?

Who? Tsar. Putin. And everybody else are secondary centers. But I thought,
there must be something that makes this person's opinion-- the person who
decides everything in this country. I had to understand how it all works.
And I was very happy that I was able to find direct contacts.

I do not enter here through the business or through the people, who know
everything around here. I went through the official contacts. As I have
said, during my first visit here I spoke with Medvedev and now we can talk
to each other quite sincerely.

[Question] Did you meet with him this time?
I told him that I am here. He knows that I am in Moscow, but we didn't meet
yet.

[Question] How about his deputies? Do you know Vladislav Surkov, for
instance?
I don't know Mr. Surkov personally, but I heard a lot about him.

[Question] Do you consider yourself more pro-Western or pro-Russian?

I am definitely pro-Ukrainian. This is our standard answer. Nothing has
changed. Ukraine is moving to Europe - and if not our children, then our
grandchildren will see that happened. And Russia as well will do everything,
or even more to bring its economic standards to European ones and to
conquer European market. However, politically Russia is not ready yet to be
integrated into the Europe.

You said that you came here to get some experience from your Russian
colleagues, because you are busy reforming the former administration of the
president. You did not like the title of Secretary of State. You have
renamed it into the Head of the Secretariat of President. What else changed
beside the name?

The substance was changed. We had to refuse from the name "Administration
of President", because it has negative tone in Ukraine. Bankovaya Street,
where the administration is located, is considered as a source of evil.

Now, the structure of the secretariat becomes more effective. Earlier, the
administration of president Kuchma acted like a government -- and its
structure was similar, too. For instance, right now there are about 600
people who still work in the structure and nobody knows what their job is.

There are four analytical centers and they suppose to be busy with the
information of some sort. There are to reception departments. In other
words, it is an awful structure and not manageable.

[Question] President Yushenko recently criticized Yulia Timoshenko's cabinet
of ministers, accusing it in reduction of economic indexes. However, the
majority of the ministers kept their positions. It looks like only
Timoshenko is guilty?

I call the management style of Timoshenko -"one man show." I was a member
of her cabinet. We had sessions that lasted for 12-14 hours. But, still she
was making all the decisions -- no matter what people were present at the
government. I was a witness of such conversation, for instance.

The minister of energy informed the government a month before the gas
crisis. He proposed to do certain measures. But he was told by Timoshenko:
"I personally will handle that. I will talk to traders. This is my problem."
And that was typical form of management for Timoshenko.

The main criticism of Timoshenko's government was its inconsistent economic
policies. Its author was a tandem of Timoshenko and Tereknin, Economic
Minister. Any Ukrainian, any investor, who encountered that, will confirm
this fact. I think the government changed by about 30 percent: the Custom
Controls, Ukrainian Security Service, economic block.

[Question] So, in other words, the new cabinet will be working differently?

I think Yuri Ekhanurov is the optimal Prime Minister. The new government
will not be busy with populist or PR actions. Populism is the key word. For
instance, somebody tells you that the government works better than any other
in the world. And I say: "Wait a second, but the GNP dropped down by
threefold!"

They say: "We don't believe! What don't you believe - the statistics? I was
asked in Brussels many times: "Guys, what are you doing with privatization,
what are you doing with investors?" But they could not comprehend that. They
were keep saying that its all enemy's lies and in reality, everybody was
just jealous.

And when the prices for the meat, for the gasoline, for the sugar started to
"boom", at that point, as our comedian Mikhail Zhvanetsky said: "It was time
to change something in the conservatory."  -30-
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LINK: http://www.kommersant.com/page.asp?idr=1&id=613535
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9.                           BIG DEFEATS AND LITTLE VICTORIES
         There is no more revolution in Ukraine, back into the pre-election,
                         pre-revolutionary & pre-demonstration period

COMMENTARY: By Valery Panyushkin, special correspondent
Kommersant, Russia's Daily Online
Moscow, Russia, Friday, September 30, 2005

The appointment of Ekhanurov in political sense brings Ukraine back into
the pre-election, pre-revolutionary and pre-demonstration period.

With some small remarks it is possible to recognize that there is no more
revolution in Ukraine. The country maintains the old traditional way of
passing power to selected successors.

There are no re-privatization and no change of elite. They were privatizing
the industry well enough during the Kuchma, so they might as well continue
to do so. Yulia Timoshenko has started in opposition and she is back in
opposition. With some remarks, this was the same country, which hundreds
of thousand people were trying to change by going in the cities' squares.

With some remarks, the "orange revolution" has failed. However, the remarks
have substance to them.

I remember how exactly one year ago I was sitting with my buddy --Kiev's TV
anchor Mikola Veresen' in little café on Saigadachny Street. Mikola was
telling how difficult to find a job as TV anchor, because all the channels
are following the directions from authorities.

He told me that he suffocates from the absence of the freedom of word. Maybe
now, this feeling of suffocation ought to leave. The revolution earned that
freedom.

Secondly, Veresen' said that is horrible to feel helpless, when the
authorities to make you vote for the president that you do not want. The
throne inheritance in Ukraine did not work. So, this is another small
victory of the revolution.

Also, we were talking about the Gongadze case and felt really mad - the
journalist was killed and nobody investigates that. So, should we consider
the investigation of Gongadze case as another small success of the
revolution?

We also spoke about Yulia Timoshenko. None of us was a big supporter of her.
However, we were frustrated that authorities have chosen a criminal case as
a weapon against the political opponent. They tried to use police methods to
solve their political problems.

Now, Timoshenko is in opposition again. The partisans of her might consider
that as a mistake or enemy's short term victory. But, you must agree that
the country, where political opponent sits in parliament, is different from
the state where leaders of opposition are sitting in jail.

A year has gone by since the "orange revolution". It is clear now that
Ukraine did not turn magically into the European country. It was impossible
as it is impossible to give a birth to a baby within first two weeks or to
grow a forest within a year.

I just disagree to think the government crisis took Ukraine back in pre-
revolutionary times. Imagine just for a second Russia, where the president
does not appoint his successor, where there is free TV, where main political
opponent sits in parliament rather than jail.

That would be totally different country. It wouldn't be European democracy,
of cause, but it wouldn't be Asian tyranny either. And the climate would not
be so suffocating.   -30-  [The Action Ukraine Report Monitoring Service]
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LINK: http://www.kommersant.com/page.asp?idr=520&id=613536
==============================================================
10.                    HISTORY OF THE "YULIA TIMOSHENKO CASE"

Kommersant, Russia's Daily Online
Moscow, Russia, Tuesday, September 27, 2005

MOSCOW - In August of 2000 Main Military Prosecution of Russia (MMP)
brought up criminal charges against General Colonel Georgiy Oleynink,
chief of the Administration for military- budgetary financing at Ministry of
Defense.

According to the information from the investigation, the General in
1995-1997 illegally signed several payment documents in the amount of $450
million, which were transferred to Ukraine. In December of 2000 the General
Prosecution Office of RF asked General Prosecutor Office of Ukraine a
permission to interrogate Yulia Timoshenko in relationship to the case of
Georgiy Oleynik.

On January 25, 2001 the Vice Premier Minister was questioned in Kiev by
Russian inspectors. On Jul.30, 2001 MMP brought up the charges against
Yulia Timoshenko for giving bribes to the Russian Defense Ministry
officials, including, Alexander Izgagin and Boris Churilov, former employees
of Central Department for Material Resources and External Economic
Connections.

The prosecution office was insisting that Timoshenko bribed the officers to
obtain their agreement for purchase by the Defense Ministry construction
materials in Ukraine for the higher prices. The case files were sent to
Ukraine, where the criminal case against her was also filed.

In 2003 the court acquitted Izgagin and Churilov, however the MMP brought up
new charges against them, accusing both officers in power abuse.

In 2004 the Ukrainian General Prosecution Office dropped the charges against
Timoshenko. On Sep.13, 2004 the MMP ordered to consider Timoshenko as a
suspect rather than a witness for the organization of bribery. Russian
investigators unsuccessfully tried to invite Timoshenko for the questioning.

After that, on Sep. 23, 2004 Moscow Garrison Court issued the arrest warrant
for Timoshenko and announced the international search.

On Dec.7, 2004 the information about Timoshenko was placed in Interpol
website under the title "Wanted." However, the information disappeared on
the next day. The Interpol representatives explained that by the necessity
to verify the information, which was given to them by the Russian side.

From April 15 to 16, 2005, Yulia Timoshenko, who was already the Prime
Minister at that time, was going to visit Moscow. However, right before her
visit, Vladimir Ustinov, General Prosecutor of RF, announced that the arrest
warrant is still would be enforced. The visit was postponed "due to the
beginning of spring agricultural work."

During the 2005 Vladimir Zherebenkov, Timoshenko's attorney, was
unsuccessfully trying to get a permission from Russian authorities to
familiarize himself with the criminal case.   -30-
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LINK: http://www.kommersant.com/page.asp?idr=1&id=612493
==============================================================
11.                                 ADVANTAGE OF SHOWING UP
               Yulia Timoshenko paid a visit to Russian Prosecution Office

By  Mustafa Nayem, Kiev; Sergey Strokan', Marina Lepina
Kommersant, Russia's Daily Online
Moscow, Russia, Tuesday, September 27, 2005

Yesterday, the Main Military Prosecution of Russian Federation called off an
international search of Ukrainian ex-Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko and
canceled an arrest warrant for her as well. This decision was made after
Timoshenko voluntarily showed up in the General Prosecution Office and
gave explanations about the bribery case.

The materials of this case were charging Timoshenko with giving bribes to
officials in the Russian Defense Ministry. According to Kommersant
information, the former prime minister not only met with the investigator
but also with the representatives of Kremlin Administration. Timoshenko
arrived to Moscow almost in the same time as the head of Ukrainian Interior
Ministry Yuri Lutsenko.

Also, the new Ukrainian Prime Minister Yuri Ekhanurov is expected to visit
Moscow in the next several days. While the fight for the power in Kiev
intensifies, the representatives of different political camps are trying to
get Moscow's support.

                    THE WEEKEND IN THE PROSECUTION OFFICE
Yesterday late night, in Moscow, Yulia Timoshenko was getting ready to talk
with "1+1" - live broadcasting program of Ukrainian TV channel. In this
program she planned to tell about her visit to Moscow, which intrigued a lot
of people in Ukraine and in Russia. Right before the live broadcast she
gathered her closest allies and discussed with them the thesis for the TV.

Her visit to Moscow she interpreted as "victory of the mind over the
emotions." According to her, the interrogation in the General Prosecution
Office proved: the criminal case against her had a political character and
now all the problems with Moscow are settled. That is what she was planning
to tell the Ukrainian audience. However, some details of the ex-prime
minister's visit became known before her TV appearance.

Yesterday, the information agencies, quoting "Russian competent sources,"
published that ex-prime minister of Ukraine Yulia Timoshenko arrived in
Moscow on Saturday and voluntarily went to the General Prosecution Office.

"Timoshenko secretly arrived in the Russian capital in the past weekend and
spent several hours giving the testimonies in the building of the General
Prosecution Office in Dmitrovka Street," the sources reported. She was
interrogated by Vadim Yalovitsky, the investigator of the Main Military
Prosecution.

In the mean time, according to Kommersant information, in Moscow Yulia
Timoshenko met not only with the investigator, but also with representatives
of RF Presidential Administration. Yesterday, when all these meetings were
already over, the General Prosecution published on its Web site: "The
international search for Yulia Timoshenko is called off and her arrest
warrant is also canceled."

"Agreement was reached that Yulia Timoshenko from now on will voluntarily
show up in the Main Military Prosecution for the investigation," the
official information said. It was evident that Timoshenko already received
personal guarantees. Otherwise, she could risk being arrested right in the
airport, arriving to Moscow as a private individual without the prime
minister's shroud.

Yesterday, Vladimir Zherebenkov, Timoshenko's attorney, who represents
his client in Russia, announced that he is calling off his complaints. Let's
remind that earlier the attorney appealed in the Moscow District Military
Court and in Moscow Garrison Court a refusal of the investigation to let him
be familiarized with materials of the criminal case.

Now, the necessity to get these documents has disappeared. "I can only
confirm that the search for Yulia Timoshenko and her arrest warrant are
canceled. And it is not surprising. We were saying all along that the case
will not hold in court."

Zherebenkov told Kommersant yesterday, hinting about the heavy political
presence in the case. The attorney pointed out that the investigation of the
case is still continuing and Timoshenko remains a suspect in the case.

                                               MOSCOW INTEREST
Yesterday, Kiev was discussing the possible motives that made Timoshenko
go to Moscow. Yuri Karamzin, Supreme Rada's Deputy from the presidential
faction"Our Ukraine" in a conversation with Kommersant called Timoshenko's
visit a good move, although a late one. "Ukraine paid dearly for
Timoshenko's personal problems," he reminded.

According to Nikolay Gapochka, deputy from the faction "Bloc of Yulia
Timoshenko," Moscow considers the former prime minister as the most
promising Ukrainian politician. For that matter, her trip was not only a
settlement with Russian justice her complicated problems, but also some
sort of introduction to the Kremlin.

Ukrainian political analyst Vladimir Fesenko thinks that Moscow will not
rely on Timoshenko as a long-term conductor of Russian interests. She is
just being used for achievement of tactical goals in Moscow's attempt to
create a counterbalance for Ukrainian top politics.

In the mean time, the role of Timoshenko in the political life of Ukraine
continues to raise heated arguments in the republic. The recent statement of
Nikolay Martynenko, head of post-presidential parliamentary faction "Our
Ukraine," added more heat. While appearing live in "Fifth Channel,"
Martynenko stated that it was no other than Timoshenko, who was "the author
of corruption scandal scenario," which shook Ukraine in the past few weeks.

One of President Yushenko closest allies also said that Timoshenko was
playing her own game already during the "Orange Revolution" and she has
no real contribution into the revolution. "During the revolution there were
people who came out to fight with the anti-democratic authorities, and there
were people, who during the inauguration chanted: 'Yulia!' I am sorry, but I
think that these people were paid to do so," Martynenko said.

The former Vice Prime Minister Nikolay Tomenko, who is now one of the
closest allies of Timoshenko, made an argument from the name of "other"
people. He presented Timoshenko as a merciless fighter with corruption.
He also said that the political forces that support the ex-prime minister
are discussing the formation of a shadow government with Timoshenko
as its leader.

Tomenko expressed an opinion that Timoshenko's bloc will win in
parliamentary elections of 2006 and second place would be taken by the
Party of the Regions, headed by Viktor Yanukovich.

Kiev's observers noticed that in the heat of the pre-election fight in
Ukraine, the main political forces in the republic more and more pay
attention to Moscow's thinking that Russian support might help them in the
decisive moment. Not only Timoshenko entered the "battle for Moscow."

The team of President Yushenko also got engaged in melee. It is not
coincidental that Yuri Lutsenko, head of Ukrainian Interior Ministry,
visited Moscow in the same time with the former prime minister. And
yesterday the news came that Yuri Ekhanurov, who replaced Timoshenko
in the prime minister office, is coming to Moscow on Sep.30.  -30-
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LINK: http://www.kommersant.com/page.asp?idr=1&id=612491
==============================================================
12.                                           "WHAT A CHANGE"
               Yulia Tymoshenko makes the statement that Vladimir Putin is
                   the best president for the Russian people. What a change.

By  Andrey Kolesnikov, special correspondent
Kommersant, Russia's Daily Online
Moscow, Russia, Tuesday, September 27, 2005

Yulia Timoshenko was not received by Vladimir Putin. However, she would
come if the Russian President would call her. For that reason, her aides did
not reject a possibility of such meeting yesterday until the very late hour.

Actually, Russian President needs Yulia Timoshenko. But he needs even more
Ukrainian president. Putin needs Timoshenko for "taking on" Yushenko before
all. So, ex-prime minister should not have too many illusions. It would be
much easier for Vladimir Putin to talk with Viktor Yushenko, if the
Ukrainian President will realize that in any moment Putin can start to talk
with Timoshenko.

Also, Timoshenko needs Putin as well - strictly in political sense, of
course. Yulia Timoshenko is thinking how to win Ukraine (at least its left
half), but not the sympathies of Russian leader.

The main question here: who is using whom the most. It is more clear with
Timoshenko in this case. She needs Putin' support right now - before the
spring parliamentary elections. Well, it makes easier for Putin. He would
try use her for 100 percent before that time.

However, Timoshenko is not on the rush either. She probably understands all
of that too. And now she makes the statement that Vladimir Putin is the best
president for the Russian people. What a change.

Something was preventing Timoshenko to make this type of statements, when
Putin visited Kiev to support presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovich. It
is understandable; in that time Timoshenko was literary on the other side of
barricades. It is also understandable that nothing prevents her now from
making such statements.

Something was preventing her to cooperate in that time with Viktor
Medvedchuk, one of the closets allies of Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma.
Now, nothing can keep her away from such cooperation. According to my
information, it was no other than Medvedchuk himself, who arranged
Timoshenko trip to Moscow.

Yulia Timoshenko shows herself as extremely flexible politician - nothing
personal and nothing sacred either. It does look like Medvedchuk used his
old connections and helped her to meet with the officers of Main Military
Prosecution Office. The meeting was obviously effective.

Nobody is looking for her anymore. She also became nobody (Especially
taking in consideration that not so long ago she stopped being prime
minister of Ukraine).

In some sense, Timoshenko closed all her accounts (figuratively speaking,
of course).

I think, if it didn't make her scared, it should, at least, to startle her.
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LINK: http://www.kommersant.com/page.asp?idr=520&id=612376
==============================================================
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13.               THE RIFT THAT WRECKED UKRAINE'S REVOLUTION

LETTER-TO-THE-EDITOR: From Prof Taras Kuzio
Financial Times, London, UK, Thursday, September 29 2005

Sir, Ukraine's Orange Revolution, like all revolutions, has a growing a
number of myths surrounding it. One, according to Anders Aslund ("Ukraine's
Orange Revolution can still end in success", September 26), was that Viktor
Yushchenko's election programme supported "liberal market reforms".

Yet any careful reading of his election programme shows it was highly
populist in the economic and social domains.

Mr Yushchenko's election programme became in essence that of the Yulia
Tymoshenko government. Mr Yushchenko supported the inclusion of
Socialists in the Tymoshenko government, including the head of the State
Property Fund.

Mr Yushchenko said Ms Tymoshenko led a "young, enthusiastic and
self-confident government [that] has demonstrated both macroeconomic
culture and increase in social standards".

Throughout this year the president has only intervened after crises reached
boiling point. Whereas his predecessor, Leonid Kuchma, was a micro-manager,
Mr Yushchenko has a distant, hands-off style. His lack of direction was made
worse by his attempt at balancing Ms Tymoshenko with his business ally,
Petro Poroshenko, as secretary of the National Security Council, in effect
creating two competing governments.

While concurring with Mr Aslund that some of the Tymoshenko government
policies were damaging for Ukraine's economy, we should lay the blame fairly
on both Mr Yushchenko and Ms Tymoshenko.

Taras Kuzio, Visiting Professor,
George Washington University,
Washington, DC 20052, US
==============================================================
        Send in names and e-mail addresses for the AUR distribution list.
==============================================================
14.         ASSESSING UKRAINE'S PROSPECTS FOR JOINING THE EU

Remarks by Ambassador Steven Pifer delivered at the
Ukraine's Quest for Mature Nation Statehood Roundtable VI:
"Ukraine's Transition to an Established National Identity"
Panel: Assessing Ukraine's Prospects for Joining the European Union
Washington, D.C, Wednesday, September 28, 2005
The Action Ukraine Report (AUR), Number 537, Article 14
Washington, D.C., Friday, September 30, 2005

                                                 STARTING PREMISES
I would like to begin my talk on Ukraine and the European Union with three
starting premises.

FIRST, joining the EU is a sensible policy for Ukraine.  A Ukraine that
fully reflects Europe's democratic values, has a market economy, and is
fully integrated into Europe will be better positioned to satisfy the
Ukrainian people's aspirations and provide a stable and prosperous future.

SECOND, I believe that having Ukraine as a member is in the EU's interest.
The European Union should want a stable, prosperous member on its eastern
flank.  That said, I'm not sure that many in the EU see it in these terms.
The EU has tended to take a very cautious line on Ukraine; there is, for
example, no "open door" language as NATO has.  The EU's strategic view of
Ukraine has been somewhat myopic.

THIRD, Ukraine in the EU is fully consistent with the U.S. Government's
vision of a Europe that is whole, free and increasingly integrated.  But it
is not easy for the USG to press this point, as EU members regard this as an
internal question.

                         NOT THE BEST TIME TO PURSUE MEMBERSHIP
Let me note that now is a difficult time for Ukraine to be pursuing
membership, for reasons that are entirely beyond Kyiv's control.

FIRST, the EU is still digesting its 2004 expansion wave, when it took in
ten new member-states.  That has posed more issues and challenges than
many in the EU had supposed, and there is little appetite right now for talk
of another wave of enlargement.

SECOND, the EU is facing something of a crisis following the French and
Dutch rejections of the European Constitution.  Historically, when the EU
focuses on an internal problem, it has a harder time taking a coherent view
regarding external issues.

                                       WHAT SHOULD UKRAINE DO?
This does not mean that Ukraine should give up on membership.  It just means
that Kyiv must formulate an approach toward the EU that takes account of
this context.  This means that Ukraine needs to pursue a patient, long-term
strategy.  Entry into the EU will be a 15-year project, so the Ukrainian
government should not set unrealistically short timelines.

A key point to remember is that Ukraine's path to EU does not lie through
Brussels or through the capitals of the member states.  It lies through
Ukraine and effecting the kinds of democratic and economic reforms that will
make clear that Ukraine has embraced Europe's values.

One speaker said yesterday (day one of the roundtable) that the Orange
Revolution had demonstrated that the Ukrainian people have embraced
democracy.  That is partly true.

What Ukraine must show now is that it has institutionalized democratic
institutions, that the Orange Revolution's democratic principles are now
embodied in Ukrainian political practice.

A key benchmark in this regard will be a free and fair process leading up to
the March 2006 Rada elections.  The goal should be an OSCE assessment
that 2006 election process was free, fair and fully consistent with OSCE
standards - with no qualifiers.  This would be huge signal to the EU and the
West that politics in Ukraine have changed in a fundamental way.

A second focus should be economic reform.  This means enabling and
empowering small and medium enterprises, creating a good climate for
investment, and getting into the World Trade Organization as soon as
possible.  Early entry into the WTO will facilitate conclusion of a free
trade arrangement with the EU and, possibly, market economy status.

Progress on democratic and market economy reforms will be strongest point
that Ukraine can make regarding its eligibility for the EU.

Kyiv should also focus on implementation of the EU-Ukraine action plan.
Foreign Minister Tarasyuk said the week of September 19 that Ukraine had met
40% of its commitments; the Ukrainian government should aim to demonstrate
it has met all its undertakings as soon as possible.  That will help
overcome the perception in Brussels that Ukraine is more talk than action.

                                SOME TACTICS FOR ENGAGING EU
As the Ukrainian government engages the EU, it faces several tactical
choices about the best way to do so.

FIRST, Kyiv needs to decide how "loudly" to press its campaign for EU
membership.  One course would be for the Ukrainian government, as it
implements reforms, to keep hammering publicly on its intention to join the
EU.  This will keep that message front and center in the minds of the target
audience in the EU.

An alternative course would be to cut back on the rhetoric and let reforms
do the talking - demonstrate by real actions Ukraine's determination to
become a full member of Europe.  There may be some value in this course now,
given the EU's preoccupation with internal issues such as absorbing its new
members and its constitution.

Does Ukraine want to keep asking the membership question now when it
knows that it will get the wrong answer?

The Ukrainian government needs to think this one out carefully.

SECOND, Kyiv needs to consider how to use Poland, the Baltic states and
others in Central/Eastern Europe, i.e., "new" Europe to help its case with
the EU.  They can be a real asset for Ukraine.  Each of those countries
pursued a difficult reform path to become eligible for EU membership, and
they can provide Ukraine good advice.

Moreover, most of them wish to see Ukraine firmly anchored to, and
ultimately in, the EU, and they can support Ukraine in EU councils.

But the Ukrainian government must be careful as it engages "new" Europe
not to needlessly alienate "old" Europe.  In drawing closer to the EU, Kyiv
needs the support not just of Riga and Warsaw, but also of Paris and Berlin.

THIRD, Ukraine should look for ways to "Europeanize" its foreign and
security policies, to align itself with the EU.  One example is to work
closely with the EU as Ukraine tries to inject new momentum into resolving
the Transnistrian problem in Moldova.

FOURTH, Great Britain currently holds the EU presidency, and the British
government in the past has favored a "broader" view of Europe.  Kyiv should
consider whether this might present an opportunity to secure more welcoming
language for Ukraine at the December EU-Ukraine summit.

And FIFTH, Ukraine should actively engage the European Parliament in
addition to the European Commission and individual member-states.  The
European Parliament has shown itself more sympathetic to Ukraine; its
January 2005 resolution called upon the Commission to create a European
perspective for Ukraine, including the possibility of EU membership.

The Ukrainian mission in Brussels should have an office charged with
parliamentary liaison, with outreach to members of the European Parliament,
and with promoting contacts between them and Rada members.

                                                  IN CONCLUSION
I would like to close with three thoughts.

FIRST, if Ukraine is serious about EU membership, it is imperative that Kyiv
take the democratic and economic reform actions that will make clear that
Ukraine is following Poland and the Baltic states in joining Europe.

SECOND, Kyiv needs to keep in mind that the EU is not in the most receptive
mood now regarding Ukrainian membership.  So Ukraine needs to look to a
long-term effort and design a subtle diplomatic approach to have the
greatest impact in the long run.

THIRD, if Ukraine implements reforms in a focused way and pursues smart
diplomacy, the result can - and, I hope, will - be a gradual and positive
evolution in the EU view toward one that is more welcoming of Ukraine.

Thank you.   -30-  [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ambassador Steven Pifer recently retired from a career as a Senior Foreign
Service Officer (class of Minister-Counselor).  His last tour of duty was as
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of European and Eurasian
Affairs.  From January 1998 to October 2000, Ambassador Pifer served as
the United States' third ambassador to Ukraine.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOTE:  Our special thanks to Marko Suprun, Walter Zaryckyj and the
Ukrainian National Information Service (UNIS), Washington, DC,
unis@ucca.org, for providing information to The Action Ukraine Report
(AUR) from the conference, Ukraine's Quest for Mature Nation Statehood
Roundtable VI, held in Washington this week.   EDITOR
==============================================================
15.                                 UKRAINIAN - BALTIC RELATIONS

Address by the Ambassador of Latvia Maris Riekstins
Ukraine's Quest for Mature Nation Statehood Roundtable VI:
"Ukraine's Transition to a Established National Identity,"
Wednesday, September 28, 2005, Washington DC.
The Action Ukraine Report (AUR), Number 573, Article 15
Washington, D.C., Friday, Sepember 30, 2005

The Baltic and Ukrainian relationship has experienced some changes over the
last decade and a half. Our relationship continues to change even today. One
thing, though, has remained unchanged throughout these years – it is mutual
political support for the strengthening of our new sovereignties and foreign
policy aspirations.

It was quite remarkable and at the same time politically important for us
that, well before the Baltic States were assured to become NATO and EU
members, Ukraine openly and firmly supported our membership into NATO
and the EU.

So we in turn do hope that Ukraine's conclusive decision to join European
and Atlantic structures will set her on the path of necessary reforms to
make the goal attainable. The Baltic States definitely support this decision
and necessary reforms to that end.

What are the changes though? First, at the time of the break-up of the
Soviet Union our peoples had mutual sympathies in the fight for national
determination, as well as our countries were closely inter-linked into the
administered economy inherited from Soviet times. Every successful step of
reformers to build sovereign institutions in one country inspired those in
the other.

Our countries openly co-operated with the international community and had a
shared vision of re-joining Europe, whatever that practically meant. Both of
us had to get rid of former Soviet troops.

Due to the different structure and size of our economies, the Baltic States
re-oriented to the West earlier. The Baltic economies became predominantly
service oriented and economic ties with Ukraine loosened.

Consequently, we had to endure on structural reforms that could sustain an
economic relationship with our new partners.

The Baltic States a lot earlier than Ukraine placed their bid to join the EU
and NATO. And at one time, our relations were more a political sympathy than
anything else.

The latest changes are marked by the accession of the Baltic States to the
EU and NATO on one hand, and the "orange" revolution with consequent
explicit pronouncements of Ukrainian leadership to join these organisations,
on the other.

Thus we in the Baltics acquired an even better and more diverse set of tools
beyond traditional bilateral relations to help Ukraine fulfill its policy
goals.

Those tools are twofold – (1) our own experience of structural reforms, and
(2) policies of the EU and NATO that are formulated and exercised vis-a-vis
Ukraine.

New policys of the EU such as the New Neighbours Initiative were formulated
and we got access to the EU mechanisms like Partnership and Co-operation
Agreement. Here I can mention Intensified Dialogue on Ukraine's aspirations
to NATO membership.

On top of that one should mention that after joining Europe our governments
are relieved from concentrating almost exclusively to the internal reforms
of our own.

Instead, from the perspective of political priorities we are in a better
position now to look around beyond our borders and support and encourage
democratic, economic, legal reforms in countries like Ukraine.

To put it into American terms - we are helping to build Europe whole and
free. And Ukraine is an indispensable part of it.

Why exactly does the experience and advice of the Baltic States matter to
Ukraine? It does because of several important comparative advantages the
Baltic States have against the other reform countries.

FIRST, Ukrainians understand that we had the same economic, social and
legal system that has to be and can be transformed. They see that we have
done this and therefore they know that they can trust our advice.

SECOND, the Westward foreign policy sometimes does entail complicate
relations with Russia and we have certain experience with it. It is no
secret, I guess, that Russia has an interest in pace of internal reforms in
Ukraine.  The reasons are both of political and economic nature.

For instance, as a result of reforms the balance of trade may shift away
from Russia. Today Russia still is the largest foreign trade partner to
Ukraine, which was not the case for us long before we submitted application
to join the EU. However, we still had our sensitivities concerning opening
our market to the West.

There follows the THIRD advantage: we have the experience of rather rapid
re-orientation of our markets on one hand and dealing with public anxieties
associated with it on the other. Last but not least, [FOURTH] we can still
use Russian for communicating, and language does not present a problem.

We also have our interest of what Ukraine ought to do to make the whole
enterprise – anchoring in Europe - a success. By success I mean having
Ukraine democratic, reformed, and economically sound, with free media, a
vibrant civic society and rule of law.

In this context the interest of Latvia and - I am sure the other Baltic
States - is that comprehensive internal reforms become the utmost priority
of internal politics in Ukraine. That includes both – government and
parliament.

My personal opinion is that pre-election time in Ukraine would allow for the
building of political consensus among politicians around the idea of
European integration. The second interest is that the Government in Ukraine
builds solid popular support for the explicit foreign policy goals that will
need long, persistent and painful efforts.

Otherwise, the expectations of Ukrainian people and friends in the West will
remain in vain. One cannot afford it to happen.

The Baltic States favored Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine even before
Ukraine itself firmly decided upon its foreign policy direction. We strongly
hope that there won't be any change of mind. We supported early accession
of Ukraine into the WTO, in practical terms – concluding our bilateral
negotiations already some time ago.

Likewise, we deem it overdue to grant market economy status to this country.
Addressing two remaining issues to become a WTO member is also a part of
integration into the West.

We also supported Intensified dialogue on Ukraine's aspirations to
membership in NATO. At the end of October there will be a high level NATO
meeting in Vilnius entirely devoted to the defence and security reforms in
Ukraine. To help in defence reforms, the Baltic States are about to send
their national advisers to the NATO Liaison office in Kiev.

We are also financing the educating of Ukraine's military officers in Baltic
Defence College. In addition, there has been a longer-term project of the
Baltic States aimed at educating state officials from various governmental
structures.

Of course, it is not that the Baltic states support Ukraine only on their
own. Quite often our co-operation projects are teamed-up with other
countries. For instance, tomorrow the eight speakers of the Nordic and
Baltic parliaments will visit the parliament of Ukraine to express their
support to the democratic reforms and aspirations of Ukraine.

On a more practical level the Latvian State Administration school together
with the US National Democratic Institute is about to begin a 6 month
educational program for Ukrainian public servants in Latvia. Other Baltic
states are developing their own projects with the NDI.

I shortly described our co-operative efforts with Ukraine, and I can tell my
Ukrainian colleagues one thing. Ten years ago when we stepped on the path
of European integration, we saw only a portion of the allies that Ukraine
has today, we had a portion of the programmes and initiatives that Ukraine
has today, and Ukraine has a portion of sceptics that we had.

By accession of the Baltic States to the EU and NATO we have paved part of
the road from Europe to the doorstep of Ukraine. We hope that Ukraine will
complete it through internal reforms.

It has to be understood that the decisions by NATO or EU on accession
negotiations or accession itself are not exclusively political decisions.
Full integration into the West cannot be accomplished by political decisions
alone.

In the end, the reforms are not implemented just by political decisions. I
can tell you that Latvia today – after accession into NATO and EU –
continues its day to day job of integration into the west and one of our
jobs is to assist Ukraine to reform.  These are the lessons we learned
and these are the lessons we hope Ukraine will take from us. -30-
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOTE:  Our special thanks to Marko Suprun, Walter Zaryckyj and the
Ukrainian National Information Service (UNIS), Washington, DC,
unis@ucca.org, for providing information to The Action Ukraine Report
(AUR) from the conference, Ukraine's Quest for Mature Nation Statehood
Roundtable VI, held in Washington this week.   EDITOR
==============================================================
16.                 UKRAINE MARKS ANNIVERSARY OF NAZI KILLINGS

By Natasha Lisova, Associated Press Writer
AP, Kiev, Ukraine, Thursday, September 29, 2005

KIEV, Ukraine - Weeping survivors clutching red carnations paid tribute
Thursday to tens of thousands of Jews massacred by the Nazis 64 years
ago at the ravine known as Babi Yar.

At a memorial park erected at the chasm just outside Kiev's city center,
about 200 people bowed their heads and laid flowers at the bronze monument
marking the area where the killings took place in September 1941. Senior
Jewish community leaders bemoaned the fact that some of the country's most
senior leaders were unable to attend.

"People must understand that this tragedy is important, not only for Jewish
people, but also for all Ukrainians," Ukraine's chief rabbi Yakov Blaikh
told The Associated Press after the ceremony. "If children learned a lesson
from history, no skinheads would attack people on the streets."

The massacre began when Nazi forces occupying Kiev marched Jews to the
brink of the ravine and shot them. More than 33,700 were killed in just a
few days. The killings continued for months, with Nazis also executing
thousands of Red Army prisoners of war and resistance fighters.

The Babi Yar massacre followed weeks of grenade attacks against German
troops staged by Soviet resistance groups. Nazis accused Jews for the
attacks, and ordered them to gather in downtown Kiev and to take with them
documents, money, valuables and warm clothes as if they were to be deported.

The final death toll was never established, since the Nazis destroyed
thousands of bodies, but it was believed to be more than 100,000.
"It reminds everybody that, if misanthropy is not stopped, it can result in
a big tragedy irrespective of your ethnicity or religion," said Mikhail
Frenkel, a Jew whose aunt survived the massacre.

The site also was a monument to Soviet-era silence about the killings. For
two decades, there was no marker until Yevgeny Yevtushenko drew
international attention to it and to Soviet anti-Semitism in his 1961 poem,
"Babi Yar."

When a monument finally went up, it referred only to the "people of Kiev"
who had been executed - not to the Jews.

"Our memory must become a warning for those who want to sow discord in our
multiethnic family," President Viktor Yushchenko said in a statement posted
on his Web site. He did not attend the ceremony because he is suffering from
a cold, his office said.

Parliament Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn was the highest-ranking Ukrainian
official present. He watched silently as giant flower wreaths were placed at
the foot of the statue.

Ukraine's Jewish community has grown increasingly frustrated after a handful
of high-profile attacks on Jews this year, which police have labeled
hooliganism. Skinheads attacked a Ukrainian rabbi and his 14-year-old son,
and in a separate attack severely beat a Jewish student. Jewish leaders
insist the attacks were religiously motivated.

Ukraine is home to 100,000 Jews, who have called on the government to do
more to discourage anti-Semitism.  -30-
====================== ========================================
17.                                      "IN A MORAL QUAGMIRE"
                              The book, Day and Eternity of James Mace

By Kostiantyn RODYK, chief editor of Knyzhnyk-Review
The Day Weekly Digest in English, #29
Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, September 27, 2005

The book, Day and Eternity of James Mace, belongs to the most unexplored
of all literary genres, the only of its kind that, instead of attracting a
mass readership, tells the reader, "Move on, don't linger; you won't find
anything interesting here; this is just a compilation of articles, which you
have probably read in newspapers and magazines."

In fact, this Masonic conspirology, so to speak, is absolutely justified in
this case: Why usher a crowd into an alchemist's laboratory? The pages of
this book contain experiments with time as it was understood by Descartes
and Mamardashvili ("Time is what makes an object different from itself").

Participation in this ritual requires changing your frame of mind by
liberating yourself from daily trappings and shifting your perspective to
things that really count. You must also admit that, regardless of the
abundance of your knowledge, you don't really know anything.

Therefore, by all accounts books like this one have the effect of a
psychoanalytical session, which is too risky for most people. "Why do I,
so wise and successful, need these Freudian games?"

This is literature for the chosen few: "perception through recollection"
(Mamardashvili). For those of you who may have forgotten, James Mace
was an American historian, who defended his doctoral thesis on national
communism in Soviet Ukraine at the University of Michigan and coauthored
the world-famous report to the US Congress on the Ukrainian Holodomor.

Since 1993 he lived in Kyiv, teaching political science at Kyiv Mohyla
Academy and working as a consultant to the English-language digest The
Day, where he published a weekly column. He died unexpectedly in 2004.

The last quarter of the book contains reminiscences about Mace, "a rara
avis - too tolerant, too free, too brave, and at the same time responsible
for his words" (Volodymyr Morenets).

With the help of these fascinating recollections by a group of interesting
people Ukraine is just beginning to repay its tremendous national debt to
this descendant of the North American Cherokee tribe. But more on this
later.

Meanwhile, the following singular opinion, in my view, provides the key to
understanding Mace's journalistic writings: "A characteristic trait of Dr.
Mace was his inability to adapt to injustice" (Klara Gudzyk).

To a researcher, injustice is when facts and documents unearthed while
studying "history as exhumation" are subjected to an "orgy of officially
orchestrated paranoia and forced orthodoxy."

And the whole world, which put him down as a fool, believed in "socialist
realism, the Soviet commandment to portray life the way it ought to be in
the eyes of the rulers." The world believed in "bad harvests" and
expropriations from the allegedly criminally "wealthy kurkuls."

In bringing to light documents from 1932-33, Mace refuted these official
explanations and in the manner of Descartes and Mamardashvili came up
with a historical and philosophical axiom of his own: "The reason lies where
there are no other reasons," namely: "An established system of all-out
violence against the individual..., which exploits the ideology of the mob -
the ignorant, uneducated, or simply apathetic mass.

For Stalin and Stalinists, the main enemy was the class element. It could be
present in any family or working collective, any town or village. Indeed, an
entire country could become a country of class enemies, which is exactly
what happened to Ukraine. That is why the entire republic was slated for
complete extermination."

James Mace's works, written at different times and in different genres and
compressed into a single book, enter into a chemical reaction with the
formula "historian+journalist=historical philosopher."

In his fundamental conclusion ("The Holodomor was an act of genocide") we
see the mind of a political analyst and sociologist at work: "The forcible
replacement of one national pattern of life with another..., the destruction
of the biological structure..., and the expansion of the territory of death
on an unbelievable scale." And finally: "The use of famine as a weapon."

"As my colleagues who have studied the Holocaust know, there are times
when there are no words. Words are only symbols, and some things simply
exceed our ability to symbolize."

At this point only one question can be asked: What made this horror
possible? " ...it was impossible to exterminate so many [people]... without
the involvement and participation in these actions of a great number of
people who were in principle normal and decent individuals.

This can be done in only one way - by divesting everyone of personal
responsibility. That is why it was so crucial to have propaganda that was
based on a big lie, which, in combination with terror, creates an alternate
reality."

This alternate reality proved so real that it changed the mentality of the
whole nation. In essence, everything that Dr. Mace wrote is not political
archeology but the history of a disease plaguing modern Ukrainian society,
for which there is a clear diagnosis: "I have tried to understand how and
why independent Ukraine has thus far been unable to transform itself in the
ways we might think appropriate and its people deserve.

For this reason I have found it useful to describe contemporary Ukraine as
a post-genocidal society."

To understand what a post-genocidal society is, you should read the book.
Consider one of its characteristics that I have singled out: "The vampire of
Sovdepia is still sucking its blood. It is difficult to see in the state
something other than an enemy, difficult to believe in a state that has
always fooled people

For them the main thing was what Leonid Kravchuk aptly formulated as, 'We
have what we have.' In this sense 'we' means the people who had 'something'
under the Soviets, who still have 'something' and want to keep it."

"After all, one of the basic goals of knowledge is to heal."

Mace dreamed of creating a genocide institute in Ukraine, something along
the lines of Israel's Yad Vashem or Poland's Institute of National Memory.
It was meant to be a research institution with some of the functions of the
obscure Institute of Strategic Research and the advisory powers of the now
embattled National Security and Defense Council.

For a country suffering from acute post-genocidal syndrome, "today the most
important issue is how to protect the nation and the society against a
political, economic, ideological, and psychological assault, how to defend
Ukraine, how to keep it safe. Certain circles are scared by the mere sound
of the words - research of the genocide, because they only know too well
they will mean their political death."

Could it be that this was the very reason that instead of a genocide
institute we only have President Yushchenko's order to establish a "Memorial
Center," a kind of All-Ukrainian Lenin's Room-inside out? I recall Yury
Shapoval's obvious discomfort, when he was commenting on this presidential
order in a live appearance on Channel 5 television.

The following words of James Mace would have been most relevant then: "Add
to this the fact that those in power and those advising them were brought up
in an environment isolated from intellectual discourse in the outside world,
and this renders most of them incapable of understanding even the most basic
things."

Then the thought hit me. Had a genocide institute been created during James
Mace's lifetime, would the Communist Party still have Ukrainians' votes?
Would this Soviet-defined "wise people" still believe pie-in-the-sky
promises?

"Is over a third of an entire country suffering historical amnesia? But
since they do, it becomes scarier than anything Stephen King ever came up
with."

Finally, we come to the question of Ukraine's national debt to James Mace.
This American man "who had defended our dead" (Oxana Pachlovska) and
"demanded that the whole world recognize the genocide of the Ukrainian
people" (Mykhailo Slaboshpytsky) stands alongside some of our fellow
countrymen, who have already found their way into the most recent history
textbooks.

Yet, much like there is no genocide institute, his explosive doctoral thesis
and report to the US Congress on the Holodomor have not been translated
and published in Ukrainian.

Moreover, it turns out that the tape recordings of Holodomor eyewitness
accounts, which James Mace handed over to Ukrainian parliamentarians,
are slowly going to ruin in the basement of the Parliamentary Library.

They represent "the dark Iliad of the Ukrainian people" (Oles Honchar).
Meanwhile, before that "... you had to pay to obtain access to especially
important archival materials" (Natalia Dziubenko-Mace).

All the authors whose reminiscences are featured in the book remember
James as a sanguine optimist who, even when he was gravely ill, answered
the question, "How are things?" with an invariable "Fine!"

Only through his wife's recollections have we learned the cold behind-
the-scenes truth: "Sometimes he would simply weep helplessly."

The disease continues: " You can't save Ukraine from the Ukrainians."

"Having lived here for six years, I can assure my readers that this is a
country where literally anything can happen." (James Mace).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day and Eternity of James Mace. The Day's Library. Kyiv, Ukrainian Press
Group, 2005. 386 pages. http://www.day.kiev.ua/149180
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOTE:   Copies of the book "Day and Eternity of James Mace" are
available from the www.ArtUkraine.com Information Service (ARTUIS).
For information about how to order the book send an e-mail to
ArtUkraine.com@starpower.net.
==============================================================
18.                   WILL YUSHCHENKO FOLLOW THE PATTERN OF
                                  SERBIA'S KOSTUNICA -- OR DJINDJIC?
               Shadows of Serbia's abandoned revolution hover over Ukraine

COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS: By Taras Kuzio
Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 2, Issue 182
The Jamestown Foundation, Wash, D.C., Friday, Sep 30, 2005

This week has been both good and bad for Ukrainian President Viktor
Yushchenko. Good, because his new government headed by Yuriy Yekhanurov
is taking shape. The new government is set to be more market-reform minded,
a step favored by foreign investors.

But these positives come after a severe political crisis that resulted in
Yushchenko having to cut a deal with Regions of Ukraine leader Viktor
Yanukovych. Popular support in the Yushchenko and the authorities has
plummeted.

The current atmosphere in Ukraine recalls that of Serbia after its 2000
democratic revolution. Yushchenko looks increasingly similar to President
Vojislav Kostunica and Yulia Tymoshenko to Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic.
The comparison is not favorable.

Full support for Yushchenko has decreased from 49% in April to 20% now. His
popularity is even lower now than the 26% level he polled as prime minister
in 1999-2001. Yushchenko now has a -8% ratio of trust to distrust
(Tymoshenko has -12%).

Petro Poroshenko, outgoing National Security Council secretary, has the
lowest rating at -78. Yushchenko's People's Union-Our Ukraine party has also
dramatically declined from 24% in the 2002 elections to 13.9% (Ukrayinska
pravda, September 28). If Poroshenko is included on the People's Union-Our
Ukraine list in the 2006 election, the party will lose far more than it will
gain.

The only politician with a positive ratio is parliamentary speaker Volodymyr
Lytvyn with +3%. Other centrist politicians have high negative ratings, with
Viktor Medvedchuk, leader of the United Social Democrats (SDPUo), as low
as -60%.

Currently Ukraine's two most popular parties are Regions of Ukraine (20.7%)
and the Tymoshenko bloc (20.5%). After constitutional reforms come into
effect in January 2006, the party or bloc with the most seats in the fully
proportional 2006 elections will form the government. Thus Yanukovych
could return to government if Regions of Ukraine comes first.

Worse still are the polls that deal with public trust in the Yushchenko
government, which has plummeted even in its strongholds of western and
central Ukraine. Some 47% of Ukrainians believe that their country is not
heading in the right direction, with only 19% believing it actually is
(Zerkalo Tyzhnia/Nedeli, September 24-30, Ukrayinska pravda, September
28).

These poll numbers, and the actions of Ukraine's leaders since the Orange
Revolution, resemble developments in Serbia. Eric Gordy, writing in the
May-June 2004 Problems of Post-Communism, classifies Kostunica, like
Yushchenko, as supporting a "soft transition" while Djindjic, like
Tymoshenko, backed a "hard transition."

The difference between a "soft" and "hard" transition rests upon attitudes
towards dealing with -- and breaking from -- the former regime.

In Serbia the Milosevic regime's complicity in war crimes was far greater
than the charges facing former president Leonid Kuchma.  Nevertheless,
Kuchma has a high negative rating of -71% among Ukrainians, second only
to Poroshenko at -78% (Ukrayinska pravda, September 28).

Whether dealing with war crimes (Serbia), or crimes against opposition
politicians and journalists (Ukraine), the actions taken are a test of the
political will of the president and the ability of law enforcement to
prosecute the accused. Law-enforcement agencies have failed the test in
both Serbia and Ukraine.

While Kostunica denied such crimes altogether, Yushchenko raised them in the
2004 presidential election and subsequent Orange Revolution only to forget
about them once in office. As Yushchenko stated after the vote to confirm
Yekhanurov, "It is time to bury the hatchet and forget where it is."

Not a single criminal case against senior former leaders has made any
progress in Ukraine, and the new Yushchenko-Yanukovych memorandum
proposes an amnesty for election fraud cases.

The individuals accused of running Yanukovych's shadow election campaign
and dirty tricks (Andriy Kluyev) and its support structure, the presidential
administration (Medvedchuk), have not been indicted. The head of the Central
Election Commission (Serhiy Kivalov) is now dean of the Odessa Law
Academy, while other senior figures were permitted to emigrate to Russia
and Israel.

The Ukrainian authorities, past and present, have expressed little real
interest in pursuing the organizers of the murder of journalist Heorhiy
Gongadze.

Prosecutor Sviatoslav Piskun, with public ratings of 1.2%, bungled the
arrest of former Interior Minister Yuriy Kravchenko (who officials claim
committed suicide via two gunshots to his head), and the actual murderer,
Oleksii Pisku. Piskun has not expressed any desire to work with Mykola
Melnychenko, whose taped recordings of conversations in Kuchma's office
uncovered the Kuchma team's involvement in Gongadze's death.

Similarly, investigations into the assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic
in March 2003 and the assassination attempts against Yushchenko between
September and November 2004 have made little progress. Yushchenko has
oddly taken scant interest in pursuing the men who repeatedly tried to
murder him.

Yushchenko's deal with Yanukovych resembles Kostunica's preference for
working with parties that had supported the Milosevic regime. Kostunica
progressively moved away from the multi-party Democratic Opposition of
Serbia coalition that brought him to power in 2000.

Similarly, Yushchenko has moved away from Tymoshenko and Pora towards
a reliance upon former pro-Kuchma parties.

Supporters of a "hard" transition desire a more radical break with the
former regime that would include punishment for their crimes (war crimes,
murder of journalists, abuse of office, corruption, election fraud). On
these issues Yushchenko, like Kostunica, has lacked political will, and both
leaders have instead fumbled.

An opportunity was missed immediately after both revolutions to quickly deal
with the former regime. In the meantime, new corruption scandals damaged
reformers.

Kostunica's Democratic Party of Serbia lost popularity, just as Yushchenko's
People's Union-Our Ukraine has. In Serbia and Ukraine this led to the
revived popularity of parties led by key figures from the former regime
(nationalists in Serbia, Lytvyn and Yanukovych in Ukraine). Ukraine is only
different in that the Tymoshenko bloc is set to gain more popularity than
Djindjic's Democratic Party.

The Serbian experience shows the danger of adopting a "soft" transition,
because it permits the old guard a chance to regroup. This danger was most
clear in Serbia, where those who committed war crimes under Milosevic went
on to assassinate Djindjic.

In Ukraine those who organized the murder of Gongadze, committed election
fraud, and staged three assassination attempts on Yushchenko look set to
remain free. While Milosevic is on trial before the UN International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Kuchma continues to live
comfortably and comment on political developments in Ukraine.

The selection of Yekhanurov may move Ukraine forward economically, but by
not dealing adequately with the past, it could undermine democratic progress
and instituting the rule of law.  -30- (http://www.jamestown.org)
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