"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT - AUR"
An International Newsletter, The Latest, Up-To-Date
In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis, and Commentary
"Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion,
Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World"
"THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT - AUR" - Number 622
Mr. E. Morgan Williams, Publisher and Editor
Washington, D.C., MONDAY, DECEMBER 19, 2005
------------ INDEX OF ARTICLES -----------
1. RUSSIA TURNS UP GAS PRESSURE
Kremlin Uses Energy Deals to Seek Sway Over Pro-West Neighbors
By Gregory L. White, Staff Reporter, The Wall Street Journal
New York, New York, Monday, December 19, 2005
2. VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO ACCIDENTAL HERO
Presidency is turning out to be a hard job
Never before have so many people had so much riding on Ukraine.
Mr. Yushchenko can take a lot of credit for getting his country this far.
COMMENTARY: THE WEEKEND INTERVIEW
By Matthew Kaminski, The Wall Street Journal
New York, New York, Saturday, December 17, 2005
3. THE KREMLIN'S NEW MAN
This is the latest Kremlin strategy -- to co-opt and hush the
Western nations by making them complicit in its crimes.
COMMENTARY: By Garry Kasparov, The Wall Street Journal
New York, New York, Monday, December 19, 2005
4. MIGHT, PIPES AND RISKY WAGERS:
BEHIND UKRAINE-RUSSIA GAS ROW
"Moscow is trying to bring Yushchenko to his knees,"
said Petro Burkovsky, a political analyst in Kiev.
By Yana Dlugy, Agence France Presse (AFP)
Kiev, Ukraine, Sunday, December 18, 2005
5. OWNERSHIP OF UKRAINE'S TRANSIT SYSTEM --
MAIN STAKE IN THE GAS DISPUTE WITH RUSSIA
Gazprom steps up the pressure on Ukraine
ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By Vladimir Socor
Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 2, Issue 234
The Jamestown Foundation, Wash, D.C., Friday, Dec 16, 2005
6. UKRAINE TO BENEFIT FROM GAS PRICE HIKE IN THE LONG
RUN: PRESIDENT VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO IN RADIO ADDRESS
Ukrainian Radio First Programme, Kiev, in Ukrainian, 17 Dec 05
BBC Monitoring Service,UK, in English, Saturday, Dec 17, 2005
7. RUSSIA'S GAS STANCE
"COULD PUT UKRAINE CLOSER TO WEST"
Associated Press (AP), Kiev, Ukraine, Friday, December 16, 2005
8. PRICE WAR THREATENS UKRAINE'S ECONOMY
Reuters, Kiev, Ukraine, Monday, December 19, 2005
9. WHO IS BLACKMAILING WHOM?
Mykhailo Krasnyanskyi, "Ukrayinska Pravda", Kyiv,Ukraine, Dec 12, 2005
10. MARKET PRICES FOR ENERGY SEEN IMPROVING RELATIONS
WITH NEIGHBORS SAYS RUSSIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER
Interfax, Moscow, Russia, Saturday, December 17, 2005
11. RUSSIA THE GAS-HOLDER
The post-Soviet republics ought to act like truly independent states
EDITORIAL: Vedomosti, Moscow, Russia, Thu, Dec 15, 2005
12. TBILISI, KYIV SEEK ENERGY ALLIANCE WITH WEST
By Julie A. Corwin, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)
Washington, D.C., Saturday, December 17, 2005
13. LUKOIL TO INVEST $330 MILLION IN UKRAINE
Tom Warner in Kiev, Financial Times, London, UK, Sat, Dec 17 2005
14. MASSIVE FRAUD,
BUT WHAT OF IT WHEN THERE IS OIL TO BE HAD?
Ukraine has none, Kazakhstan is awash with the stuff
ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: Chris Stephen
Irish Times, Dublin, Ireland, Friday, Dec 16, 2005
15. SQUEEZING UKRAINE IN SPACE
By Yuri Zaitsev, UPI Outside View Commentator
United Press International (UPI), Moscow, Russia, Sun, Dec 18, 2005
16. UKRAINE VICTORS 'UNDERESTIMATING RISK'
Tom Warner in Kiev, Financial Times, London, UK, Sat, Dec 17, 2005
17. UKRAINIAN CATHOLICS' RIGHTS 'VIOLATED'
Local authorities refuse to return properties seized under Communist rule
The Universe Catholic Newspaper (TotalCatholic.com)
Manchester, England, December 19, 2005
18. AN OLD-COUNTRY CHRISTMAS
Ukrainian culture blooms at holiday bazaar
3,000 people of Ukrainian heritage live in or around North Port, Florida
By Erin Bryce, Herald Tribune, North Port, Florida, Sat, Dec 17, 2005
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1. RUSSIA TURNS UP GAS PRESSURE
Kremlin Uses Energy Deals to Seek Sway Over Pro-West Neighbors
By Gregory L. White, Staff Reporter, The Wall Street Journal
New York, New York, Monday, December 19, 2005
MOSCOW -- Russia's increasingly hard line in talks with its neighbors over
natural-gas supplies reflects a new willingness by the Kremlin to use the
terms of energy deals to reward the loyal and pressure the intransigent
among the countries of the former Soviet Union, politicians and analysts
say.
"This isn't the usual winter conflict," says Nikolai Petrov, an analyst at
the Carnegie Moscow Center. "This is a serious shift to much more
pragmatic relations with post-Soviet countries."
For most of the decade and a half since the collapse of the Soviet Union,
Moscow has supplied many of its neighbors with cut-price natural gas, just
as it did domestic consumers.
But recently, the Kremlin has grown disillusioned as neighbors that enjoyed
effective subsidies worth billions of dollars a year turned away from Moscow
on key policy issues. That divergence was thrown into sharp relief after
popular revolutions brought pro-Western governments to power in Georgia
and Ukraine in the past two years.
Kremlin officials blame the U.S. and Europe for fomenting those rebellions
and have grown increasingly worried that the West seeks to replace other
regimes in the region, undermining Russia's influence in what it considers
its back yard. The tough line on natural gas reflects a hardening divide
across the region.
"Russia has for some time been providing politico-economic charity to these
new states, feeding them from its hand and supplying them with cheap
resources, without getting either real political loyalty or appreciable
economic gains in return," Mikhail Margelov, a senator and top
foreign-policy official, told the RIA-Novosti news agency in August.
As winter settles in, Russia's government-controlled gas monopoly OAO
Gazprom has in recent weeks emerged as the Kremlin's preferred tool for its
new, tougher approach.
Gazprom demanded huge one-time increases in rates from Ukraine, Georgia
and Moldova, all of which have hewn a pro-Western line in foreign policy, as
well as the Baltic countries, which joined the European Union last year.
The gas giant insists the policy is driven exclusively by economics, because
it gets much higher prices for the natural gas it ships to Western Europe.
But the suddenness of the increases -- as recently as June, Gazprom
executives said the low-price deal with Ukraine suited the company -- and
the targeted countries suggest otherwise.
"This is largely a political decision," Georgian Prime Minister Zurab
Nogaideli said in an interview last month. He says Gazprom's demand to raise
natural-gas prices to $110 per thousand cubic meters starting Jan. 1 from
about $63 this year will shave as much as seven-tenths of a percentage point
off economic growth next year. Even so, he says he is confident that
Georgia's moves to open up its economy will mean growth will still exceed
10%.
Gazprom's talks with Ukraine, the company's biggest customer among the
former Soviet countries, have triggered the most fireworks. Under a 2001
deal, Gazprom agreed to sell large amounts of natural gas to Ukraine at $50
per thousand cubic meters in return for discounts on the fees Kiev charges
to use Soviet-era pipes that carry about 80% of Gazprom's exports across
Ukraine to Western Europe.
Gazprom until last week said it wanted to raise the rate to $160 per
thousand cubic meters, but company executives now say they are becoming
frustrated with Kiev and will accept only a price pegged to export rates of
as much as $230, which Gazprom says is what Western Europe pays.
Gazprom officials, with the apparent backing of the Kremlin, threaten to cut
off shipments starting Jan. 1 unless Kiev agrees to the new terms. That has
led to fears among some European customers that their Russian supplies
across Ukraine could be interrupted.
The government in Kiev, which has angered Moscow with talk of joining the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the EU, has refused to accept
anything but modest increases phased in over several years. Some Ukrainian
politicians have accused Moscow of using the natural-gas issue to influence
parliamentary elections in March. Moscow's preferred party, now in
opposition, has been gaining strength as popular discontent with the
country's flagging economic performance has grown.
"Russia is pursuing a geopolitical goal, to block Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic
shift and tie it closer" to Russia, says Vladimir Saprykin of the Ukrainian
Center for Economic and Political Studies in Kiev.
Analysts say that while tensions could continue to rise, some kind of
compromise is likely, possibly involving Kiev's giving Gazprom somewhat
greater control over the export pipeline network on its territory or
Gazprom's agreeing to much-higher transit fees.
Governments that toe the Kremlin's line have gotten much gentler treatment.
Belarus, whose authoritarian president also faces elections in March, will
continue to pay about $49 per thousand cubic meters for Russian natural gas
next year, basically unchanged from this year.
Though considered a pariah by the West, Belarus enjoys close ties to Russia,
and Moscow has frequently provided it financial support. Gazprom officials
say they are happy with Belarus's cut-rate deal since Minsk has ceded
control over key export pipelines that carry Gazprom's natural gas to
Western Europe.
Armenia, which also has been a loyal supporter of the Kremlin, similarly
isn't facing any gas ultimatum this year.
To ensure its leverage, Gazprom has sought to lock up alternative sources of
supply, mostly natural gas from countries in Central Asia. Gazprom this fall
reached long-term contracts to buy much of that production or to reserve
critical transit pipelines.
"We're putting the [Soviet-era] unified gas-pipeline system back together,"
Gazprom Deputy CEO Alexander Medvedev said last month. "That's a big
step forward."
While the immediate adjustments from Russia's new hard-line natural-gas
politics are likely to be jarring, ultimately, market prices for gas will
stimulate greater efficiency, economists say, depriving Russia of the energy
lever against its neighbors.
"This will have very substantial influence now," says Mr. Petrov of the
Carnegie Center. "But it will in the future free these countries, which
depend on Russia economically, from this tool of Russian influence."
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Write to Gregory L. White at greg.white@wsj.com
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[return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
2. VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO ACCIDENTAL HERO
Presidency is turning out to be a hard job
Never before have so many people had so much riding on Ukraine.
Mr. Yushchenko can take a lot of credit for getting his country this far
COMMENTARY: THE WEEKEND INTERVIEW
By Matthew Kaminski, The Wall Street Journal
New York, New York, Saturday, December 17, 2005
KIEV -- Lining the walls of the Soviet-era presidential building are
photographs of protestors in this city's Independence Square. In each,
there is an orange banner, scarf or flag: the color of the "revolution"
that brought Viktor Yushchenko into this office. The man himself takes
his tea in an orange mug emblazoned with his campaign slogan "Tak,
Yushchenko," (Yes, Yushchenko). How sweet those memories must
be amid the trials of government.
For Mr. Yushchenko, the presidency is turning out to be a hard job. A long
year ago he won a free and fair rerun of a fraudulent election. Hundreds of
thousands protested peacefully for 17 freezing days and nights to force the
Leonid Kuchma regime to back down. But now the anniversary celebrations
are muted: The heroes of Independence Square squabbled and parted ways.
A faltering economy and the whiff of corruption saw their popularity drop.
Ask any Ukrainian about their revolution today, and the common response
will be "What a letdown!"
Mr. Yushchenko is more self-assured than he used to be, but also more
testy. "Forgive me, but political battles aren't unique to Ukraine," he
says somewhat snarkily when pressed about his troubles. People who know
him attribute the edge to lingering health problems dating back to last
year's campaign, when a mysterious poison -- diagnosed as a unique strain of
dioxin -- disfigured him and caused severe abdominal problems. The scars
and swelling on his once-chiseled face aren't fading as fast as doctors had
hoped. "Never felt better," he says, with little conviction, adding that
swimming and exercise have brought him down to his pre-revolutionary
weight.
Along with many post-election promises, the investigation into his
poisoning is bogged down. Early on, the Yushchenko camp blamed the
Kuchma secret services; some pointed the finger to a secret KGB laboratory.
"I don't want to go deep into the details of the ongoing investigation, but
I can say there are more than 10 avenues we're pursuing," Mr. Yushchenko
says. The impression, a senior Western diplomat notes, is that maybe they
don't want to know the answer: This pro-Western Ukrainian government is
having enough trouble already trying to preserve "harmonious" -- in Mr.
Yushchenko's euphemistic phrase -- relations with Moscow.
Never before have so many people had so much riding on Ukraine. For the
U.S., a staunch supporter nearly from its surprise birth in 1991, a strong
and independent Ukraine provides a good guarantee that Russia won't
rebuild its old empire. The Orange Revolution added another potential
strategic benefit: Maybe Kiev could teach Moscow democracy!
Vladimir Putin, who watched the outbreak of popular democracy next-door
with evident anxiety, certainly lives in open fear of the "orange"
contagion at home and across his backyard. The Kremlin wants to see Mr.
Yushchenko and the post-Soviet democracy movement falter. The Europeans
are more ambivalent, desiring a stable Ukraine that won't press too many
uncomfortable demands on the eurocrats in Brussels.
Mr. Yushchenko can sound overly defensive. Every recent political turnover
in his region brought disappointment, he points out. "Fifteen years ago,
when Lech Walesa and his prime minister got into a fight, a few months
after the first victory of East European democracy, there was so much
disillusionment," he says. With Poland now in the EU and NATO, he adds,
"Most people have already forgotten about it. . . . Ukraine is going
through the same process."
Mr. Yushchenko's ambitions are plainly to anchor Ukraine in the richer West
without overly antagonizing Russia, its biggest trading partner and close
cousin. Though fluent in Russian, he now insists on using Ukrainian even in
meetings with foreign journalists -- "That's more PC," his aide confides.
His cozy office is littered with pastoral paintings that evoke Ukraine's
deep peasant roots. A picture portrays the 17th-century Cossack leader
Bohdan Khmelnitsky, whose uprising against the Poles was the great national
founding myth until the Orange Revolution overwrote it. And in a nod to the
birthplace of Mrs. Yushchenko, a bust of JFK sits on a mantelpiece.
Mistakes were made, he admits. Just like the Serbian coalition that toppled
Slobodan Milosevic in 2000, Ukraine's opposition was united by a single
goal. Once President Kuchma and his cronies were gone, so was the glue that
held more than 10 opposition parties together. On taking power, the new
crowd behaved a lot like the old one. The foxy Yulia Tymoshenko, the other
face of the Ukrainian democratic turnover, set about to settle scores in
the prime minister's job. Businessmen close to her began eyeing the assets
belonging to Mr. Kuchma's friends. Mr. Yushchenko's wealthy pals were
often no better.
By September, amid widespread public unhappiness with the return of
Politics As Usual, the president fired Ms. Tymoshenko as well his closest
friend. "I brought the team that stood behind me on the Square into power
and gave them good jobs, but in no time they started to act to further
their own personal interests," he says. "For half a year, I tried to stop
this. The ideals of the Square were in danger of being betrayed [so] I
didn't have any other choice but to dismiss them." Yet diplomats point out
that the president isn't pushing very hard to investigate the corruption
allegations.
It's all vintage Yushchenko. He waited too long, letting the populist and
conflict-ridden government do real damage to the economy. GDP growth,
at 12% last year, will be less than half that in 2005, a fact that the
state-controlled Russia media tout to tar the very notion of democracy.
"Yushchenko has an extraordinary absence of focus and discipline," said a
senior Western diplomat in Kiev. Yet the Ukrainian president eventually did
the right thing by sacking his crew, while stopping short of a proper
inquiry. Corruption allegations rarely bring down governments in the former
Soviet Union.
Mr. Yushchenko is an accidental hero. Born in a small town in the
northeast, he is a proud Ukrainian but not an archetypical nationalist. As
central bank governor, he brought inflation down from 10,000% and
successfully introduced the hryvnia -- the new official currency that
replaced the "Karbovanets" (or "Coupon"), a temporary currency used in
Ukraine during the period of separation from the rouble zone. He held other
jobs in the Kuchma regime before going into opposition to topple it.
Last year, his good looks struck a contrast with the Kuchma heir apparent,
Viktor Yanukovych, a former convict who wasn't "the face of a European
nation," in one friend's description. The poisoning was intended to dent
his physical appeal and force him off the campaign trail. Sidelined for a
few weeks, Mr. Yushchenko earned respect for carrying on with intense pain.
The experience gave him moral standing that he never had before. Yet he
never became a beloved figure who, on his own, could have drawn all those
people into the street. He repeats that the Ukrainians basically got fed up
with cynical, cheating rulers and wanted a proper democracy. That sounds
about right, and is not self-deprecation.
In spite of the bad press about the country in recent months, the bigger
picture isn't overwhelmingly negative. Come to Kiev from Moscow to
properly appreciate a vibrant civic society in action. With rare exceptions,
the media is free. A tabloid title best sums it up: "Bez Tsenzury" (or
"Uncensored -- the newspaper for a new country.") "No one in the ruling
circle now orders a temnik," says Mr. Yushchenko, who presumably is in a
position to know. In the Kuchma era, temniks were secret instructions to
journalists on what to say on air or in print. "A year ago, you turned on
five TV channels and watched the same program," he says. "Every TV channel
can now report on the opposition's positions and ideas." Ironically, most
large TV stations are owned by Kuchma cronies, whose holdings have been
untouched, in line with the new commitment to freedom of the press.
The Orange Revolution brought another innovation: Unlike in Russia today or
Ukraine before, "elections can't be won through electoral cheating and the
use of administrative resources," Mr. Yushchenko declares. "No more of that
here." Mr. Yushchenko sounds sincere. He also doesn't have much choice.
By now, Ukrainians know all the electoral tricks. What's more, people are
passionate about politics and take their choices seriously, which can't be
said of most of Ukraine's eastern neighbors. Three months before election
day the parliamentary campaign is already in full swing.
Speaking of neighboring countries, Mr. Yushchenko says that "only a few
people can remain unchanged after seeing the people on the Square who came
out to demand not bread but freedom." So can Russia, Belarus and other
authoritarian neighbors follow suit? He chooses his words slowly. "On our
part there is no desire to try to force any political templates specific to
this country on others," he says, then ventures that young people will
bring about change. "It's only the beginning." Is Mr. Putin a democrat? Mr.
Yushchenko ducks the question altogether.
He provokes the Kremlin, however, by courting the West and making
democracy-promotion a foreign policy goal. Earlier this month, he and
Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, an old friend who started the whole
"color revolution" craze with the "Rose Revolution" in 2003, hosted a
Community of Democratic Choice summit in Kiev. Mr. Putin didn't attend.
Ukraine, perforce, proceeds with care. Mr. Yushchenko is suspect in his
country's eastern, Russian-speaking regions. The geographic and linguistic
split in Ukraine -- carelessly cast as "ethnic" in the more superficial
reports -- is one that Russia can exploit. Russia's state-owned Gazprom
now wants Ukraine to pay full market price for natural gas, while keeping
"friendly" countries on a subsidized regime. The move appears timed to hurt
the democrats and help the pro-Russian forces in the coming elections.
Asked what's behind Gazprom's provocation, Mr. Yushchenko replies
simply, "I want to avoid any political speculation."
At Kiev airport, the sign above the pimply guard gives a "Border Hotline"
number for customer complaints. In town, the altered relationship between
rulers and ruled comes out in small ways. I find myself counting
GAI-ishniky, the ubiquitous traffic cops across the old U.S.S.R. whose
ability to solicit bribes knows no rival. In an hour, I spot only two --
not bothering anyone.
Having carved out its freedom with difficulty, a new nation is under
construction. Monuments to this new Ukraine, with its funky trident symbol
and blue-and-yellow flag, are popping up all over Kiev. On the hill above
Independence Square, previously named for Lenin, a neon sign used to
spell out "Moscow" in large letters, advertising a hotel. The place was
rechristened "Ukraine." Everywhere, the old Soviet ways are petering out.
Kiev is now a pleasant place -- no, above all, a normal one. Normalcy
doesn't come easily in these parts. Mr. Yushchenko can take a lot of credit
for getting his country this far. -30-
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3. THE KREMLIN'S NEW MAN
This is the latest Kremlin strategy -- to co-opt and hush the
Western nations by making them complicit in its crimes.
Germany's most powerful politicians and businessmen can be
purchased the way a Russian oligarch might buy an
aristocratic Bavarian estate to gain entry to high society.
COMMENTARY: By Garry Kasparov, The Wall Street Journal
New York, New York, Monday, December 19, 2005
One small step for Vladimir Putin, one giant leap for corruption in the
West. Just days after being pushed out of office as chancellor of Germany,
Gerhard Schröder made sure he wouldn't add to the high rate of unemployment
he left behind. Last week he accepted a top post with Russian energy giant
Gazprom, the company in charge of a controversial gas pipeline project that
he actively supported as chancellor.
The dubious ethicality of this move and the speed with which it was made
lead to many obvious questions about whether or not Mr. Schröder abused
his office to set up this deal, especially as he was trailing badly in the polls
for most of the campaign against Angela Merkel. But the groundwork for his
new job was laid out in advance as part of a well-organized operation that
brought in capital before personnel.
Mathias Warnig, as head of Russian operations for Dresdner Bank, first
brought in a deal to purchase 33% of Gazprombank in August. (Dresdner
also helped the Kremlin pick the bones of the Yukos oil company headed
by Mikhail Khodorkovsky, now in a Siberian jail.) Accordingly, Mr. Warnig
was given a top position at the North European Gas Pipeline Company.
Finally everything was ready for the arrival of Mr. Schröder. The deal keeps
everything in the family as Mr. Warnig was a spy for the East German secret
police, the Stasi, at the same time Mr. Putin was running agents for the KGB
in Dresden. As Mr. Putin himself has said, there is no such thing as a
former KGB agent.
In reality this is the lesser story -- that Germany's most powerful
politicians and businessmen can be purchased the way a Russian oligarch
might buy an aristocratic Bavarian estate to gain entry to high society. The
larger picture is of how Mr. Putin has made the nation's energy resources
the center of his ruling clique that has erased the lines between public and
private power and assets.
Does the state run Gazprom or does Gazprom run the state? Mr. Putin has
made a priority of further tightening the unholy bond between his regime's
internal and external goals and the company that provides most of the
natural gas to Central and Eastern Europe. They are not state-run companies;
they are the state.
Gazprom's chairman Dmitry Medvedev was recently named first deputy prime
minister while deputy chief of staff Igor Sechin heads the other energy
goliath, Rosneft. That's not the only reason Rosneft is unlikely to be
investigated for its takeover of Yukos's prime asset Yuganskneftegas in a
bogus auction one year ago.
Taking La Famiglia literally, Mr. Sechin's daughter is married to Attorney
General Vladimir Ustinov's son. Mr. Schröder is not joining a company; he
is joining the Putin administration. Mr. Schröder's country and his Social
Democrat Party must censure him for dragging them through the mud on
his way to work.
For Mr. Schröder's price, Gazprom and Mr. Putin's regime are buying
legitimacy in the eyes of the West. By putting the company on the market and
stocking its board with prominent foreigners, he is also creating a backup
plan in case things don't work out on the home front.
After years of dirty dealing, Mr. Putin and his cronies can hardly afford to
lose control and risk having their abuses brought to light. So they are
attempting to spread both assets and culpability. While they proclaim the
need to shield Russia from the evils of Western influence, the KGB are
themselves comfortable with capitalist tricks -- in times of uncertainty,
diversify your portfolio.
These deals also provide the Kremlin with priceless propaganda fodder. They
trumpet their coup abroad and at the same time the state-controlled media
will present it as an example of how the West is only after money and oil.
Totalitarian regimes everywhere love to tell their citizens that, for all
their professed interest in democracy and human rights, Americans and
Western Europeans are just as corrupt as their own leaders. It does
tremendous damage to the pro-democracy cause in Russia when the former
leader of the world's third-largest industrial nation enthusiastically
allies himself with authoritarian thugs.
Using energy as a political weapon is a tried and tested tactic, and with
big Western names out front Gazprom will act with even more impunity.
Having failed to install another Kremlin flunky in Ukraine, Gazprom has
now quadrupled gas prices to Russia's neighbor.
The latest threat is to cut off winter gas supplies entirely if the
Ukrainian administration doesn't bow down to Russia's will. Georgia and
the Baltic states are receiving similar treatment: Toe the Kremlin's political
line or get ready for a long, chilly winter. Call it the new "cold" war.
While Mr. Schröder's leap was causing small outbursts of indignation,
another supplicant headed to Moscow for a job interview. The Russian press
is full of rumors that Donald Evans, former U.S. commerce secretary and an
old and dear friend of George W. Bush, was offered the position of chairman
of Rosneft during recent meetings with Mr. Putin.
They are looking to cover their tracks with a big IPO in 2006 and are
shopping around for a prestigious front man to calm Western fears. Mr.
Evans would formally put the Bush administration's heretofore unspoken
presidential seal of approval on the Kremlin's dirty dealings.
This is the latest Kremlin strategy -- to co-opt and hush the Western
nations by making them complicit in its crimes. When everyone is guilty, no
one is guilty, goes the logic. We have seen the price paid for these
see-no-evil policies on civil liberties and in Chechnya. Now Western leaders
will also have to resist the calls of their bank accounts, not merely the
calls of their conscience.
Oil, gas, politics, intimidation and repression, all are mixed together
while one hand seeks to soap the other clean. When Mr. Putin and his friends
are swept out and independent courts are established in Russia, Mr. Schröder
and other foreigners trying to make a quick ruble may find that oil leaves
stains that are terribly difficult to remove. Out, damned spot! -30-
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Mr. Kasparov, a contributing editor at The Wall Street Journal, is
chairman of Committee 2008 Free Choice and leader of the United
Civil Front of Russia.
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4. MIGHT, PIPES AND RISKY WAGERS:
BEHIND UKRAINE-RUSSIA GAS ROW
"Moscow is trying to bring Yushchenko to his knees,"
said Petro Burkovsky, a political analyst in Kiev.
By Yana Dlugy, Agence France Presse (AFP),
Kiev, Ukraine, Sunday, December 18, 2005
KIEV - Ukraine and Russia will next week try yet again to resolve a
long-running dispute over gas prices, a disagreement which, analysts say,
has become a symbolic battleground for the countries and their leaders.
On Monday, the latest round of talks take place in Moscow with no
compromise in sight on the dispute, which centers on Russia's stated
intention to hike the price of gas for Ukraine to bring it in line with
world market rates.
Currently Ukraine and Russia settle their gas bill by barter, with Moscow
providing Kiev with gas as payment for the transit of Russian gas exports
through Ukraine to Europe, with a base price of 50 dollars (42 euros) per
1,000 cubic meters (35,316 cubic feet).
Moscow wants to switch to cash payments and more than quadruple the
price, to 220-230 dollars per 1,000 cubic meters. It has threatened to cut
gas supplies altogether if new terms are not agreed by January 1.
Ukraine wants a price increase to be gradually phased in over several years.
Analysts in Kiev give THREE main reasons for what lies behind the scenes
of the tense standoff.
[1] The most popular theory sees Russia as flexing its muscles to regain its
traditional position of influence in Ukraine, which suffered a humiliating
blow during last year's "orange revolution" presidential election.
Back then, despite the personal backing of Russian President Vladimir
Putin, Moscow's man lost the bitter campaign to Viktor Yushchenko, who
has vowed to steer Ukraine toward membership in the European Union
and NATO.
Ukraine holds key parliamentary elections in March, and Russia is keen
to help Moscow-friendly groups get into a legislature that will be endowed
with new powers after constitutional changes come into force in the New
Year.
By hiking the price of gas in the middle of winter and just three months
before the election, so this theory goes, Russia is trying to discredit
Yushchenko's government and boost the pro-Moscow parties.
"Moscow is trying to bring Yushchenko to his knees," said Petro
Burkovsky, a political analyst in Kiev.
"The opposition will make political hay by saying Yushchenko is incapable
of finding a common language with Putin and will raise the specter of gas
cuts and business shutdowns."
[2] A second theory views Russia as trying to pressure Kiev into ceding
control of its gas pipeline network -- currently, and for some time to come,
the main route for Moscow's exports to Europe -- to a gas consortium, as
agreed by Yushchenko's Russia-friendly predecessor.
The three-way consortium involving Russia, Ukraine and Germany was to
have operated Ukraine's gas pipeline network, but Yushchenko ruled out
such an option, saying it impinged on Ukraine's sovereignty.
Agreement over the consortium was key to resolving the gas price dispute,
the head of Russian energy giant Gazprom, Alexei Miller, said last week.
"Of course a compromise is possible and the Ukrainian side knows what
it is -- the question of the gas transport consortium," Miller told Russian
television.
[3] Finally, some pundits see Yushchenko as consciously giving Russia an
opening to raise the issue of prices in order to drive through unpopular
but much-needed economic reforms.
"What is being done today is a thought-out approach ... to force structural
reforms ... a forced modernization," said Andriy Yermolayev, an analyst in
Kiev.
With low gas prices, reforming Ukraine's Soviet-era, energy-inefficient
industry and raising energy prices for consumers would have been highly
unpopular.
"The risk is high," Yermolayev said. "Yushchenko is risking the
parliamentary elections ... but I think he is acting consciously." The key
to the gamble will be who voters blame most for the increases when they
go to the polls in March, pundits say. -30-
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5. OWNERSHIP OF UKRAINE'S TRANSIT SYSTEM --
MAIN STAKE IN THE GAS DISPUTE WITH RUSSIA
Gazprom steps up the pressure on Ukraine
ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By Vladimir Socor
Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 2, Issue 234
The Jamestown Foundation, Wash, D.C., Fri, Dec 16, 2005
The barely hidden stake has now surfaced in full view in the Russia-Ukraine
confrontation over gas prices and transit. The main stake is ownership of
Ukraine's transit pipelines that carry Russian gas to Europe. Moscow appears
willing to accommodate Kyiv on the gas price if Kyiv accepts the
understandings signed in 2002-2003 on turning Ukraine's transit system into
a Russian-Ukrainian consortium, possibly with token German participation.
Should Gazprom will stop delivering gas to Ukraine in compensation for the
latter's transit services, Ukraine would lose 24-25 billion cubic meters of
gas in 2006. Gazprom intends to pump 112 billion cubic meters of gas to
European countries (excluding Ukraine's compensation share).
On December 13-15, Gazprom stepped up the pressure by threatening to stop
supplying gas to Ukraine as of January 1, unless Ukraine bows to Russia's
financial terms: more than tripling the price of gas, from $50 to $160 per
1,000 cubic meters, with payments in cash. Moreover, Gazprom now warns
that it might increase the price to $220 "taking into account latest market
trends." Gazprom chairman Alexei Miller, vice-chairman and Gazexport general
director Alexander Medvedev, and Gazprom spokesman Sergei Kuprianov are
all making televised statements to this effect for maximum political impact in
Ukraine.
The same officials, along with the Kremlin special envoy for relations with
the European Union, Sergei Yastrzhembsky, are publicly accusing Ukraine of
intending to "steal" gas from the transit pipelines, thus "blackmailing"
European countries and "holding European consumers hostage." In such "theft"
occurs after January 1, Moscow warns, Ukraine will be responsible for the
resulting shortfall in supply to European consumers.
Such arguments are designed to turn the EU and certain European governments
against Kyiv and consent to Russian co-ownership of Ukraine's transit
pipelines, ostensibly to ensure reliability of supplies to Europe. In their
public statements, Miller and other Russian officials indicate that the
"consortium" proposal is the way out of this situation.
Kyiv's position -- as publicly presented by Prime Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov,
National Security and Defense Council Anatoly Kinakh, and Fuel and Energy
Minister Ivan Plachkov -- includes the following elements:
1) Ukraine does not accept the 2002-2003 "consortium" scheme; this could
only apply to newly constructed pipelines on Ukrainian territory.
2) Continuation of the status quo on supply and transit after January 1,
2006, based on the terms valid in 2005, until new contracts are negotiated
and signed by Kyiv and Moscow during the course of 2006.
3) In the absence of contracts for 2006, Ukraine will continue to transit
the full volume of Russian gas destined for European countries after January
1. However, Ukraine could in that case unilaterally retain part of the
Europe-bound Russian gas as due compensation for Ukraine's continuing
transit service. If so, Gazprom's actual deliveries to European consumer
countries would fall considerably below the volumes stipulated in the supply
contracts for 2006.
4) Kyiv seeks a gradual transition to Gazprom-demanded "market prices,"
stretching until 2009 or 2010. In that case, Ukraine would compensate
Gazprom for the lost profits. That compensation would take the form of
creating a Russian-Ukrainian joint company on a parity basis, for marketing
Russian and Russian-transited Central Asian in Ukraine. This proposal would
seem to involve turning Ukraine's internal gas distribution network into a
Russian-Ukrainian enterprise, with a corresponding income transfer from
Ukraine to Russia.
5) While the above proposal does not seem to affect Ukraine's gas transit
system, a parallel proposal mooted by Kinakh would do so. Short of turning
the transit system into a consortium, it would establish joint trust
management by Ukraine, Russia, and an unnamed third party. -30-
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(Interfax-Ukraine, UNIAN, RTR Russia Television, NTV, December 13-15)
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The Jamestown Foundation, Washington, DC, http://www.jamestown.org
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6. UKRAINE TO BENEFIT FROM GAS PRICE HIKE IN THE LONG
RUN SAYS PRESIDENT VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO IN RADIO ADDRESS
Ukrainian Radio First Programme, Kiev, in Ukrainian, 17 Dec 05
BBC Monitoring Service,UK, in English, Saturday, Dec 17, 2005
Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko has said that his country will become
truly independent once it starts paying a market price for Russian gas and
charging a market rate for gas transit. Commenting on the ongoing difficult
gas talks with Russia in a weekly radio address, Yushchenko gave assurances
that the spat would be resolved and that no energy crisis was in offing.
Yushchenko reaffirmed Ukraine's resolve to ensure uninterrupted gas supplies
to Europe across Ukraine, but reminded Russia of its obligations not to
jeopardize Ukraine's national security. He stressed the need for national
industry to reduce energy consumption and to boost domestic gas production.
The following is the text of the radio address by Yushchenko carried by
Ukrainian radio on 17 December; subheadings inserted editorially:
Dear compatriots, esteemed Ukrainian society. Today I will speak on
Ukraine's energy security. Each of you wants to be sure that our homes are
warm and cosy in winter while the prices of gas and coal remain affordable.
NO ENERGY CRISIS
I would like to state firmly - there will be no energy crisis in Ukraine. We
have indeed inherited an energy-dependent country. Almost 80 per cent of oil
and more than 75 per cent of gas are imported into Ukraine from Russia.
We have inherited another problem from the previous authorities - each
winter started with speculation on the gas issue. I want this practice to
become a thing of the past. I want economic ties with our neighbours to
develop on a pragmatic and mutually beneficial basis.
We have to admit - one has a price to pay for everything, first and foremost
for independence. If Ukraine truly wants to become economically independent,
sooner or later we will have to accept market relations in the energy field
and switch to rational energy consumption.
The problem is not about our importing energy resources. This is what dozens
of countries are doing. But their relations with partners are based on
market principles and, therefore, there is no room for economic pressure or
blackmail in their relations. We should not dramatize the situation today.
The main thing is to avoid speculation and unnecessary emotion which may
hinder both dialogue in the energy field and bilateral Ukrainian-Russian
ties. It is no secret that there are hotheads both in Kiev and Moscow who
would not mind capitalizing on the gas issue. It is not so much about the
economy as it is about the political kitchen.
I am convinced that we all have learnt lessons from the year 2004, and the
gas issue will not become a new Tuzla in Ukrainian-Russian relations. This
is my position as the president of Ukraine and this is the position that has
been declared by the president of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin.
During a telephone conversation on Friday [16 December], my Russian
counterpart and I agreed that the gas issue should be addressed on the
economic plane, and we should be guided purely by national interests.
Good-neighbourly bilateral relations, which have been developed for
centuries, are part and parcel of our strategic interests.
I think at the moment all political forces should realize the great
responsibility for the formation of friendly relations between the two
fraternal peoples. We should not make a single statement or act which could
provoke mistrust or disrespect in our relations. This is Ukraine's stance in
negotiations with Russia.
UKRAINE TO BENEFIT FROM MARKET RELATIONS
At the moment, Ukraine's gas balance is as follows. Annually Ukraine
receives 23bn cu.m. of blue fuel [gas] as payment for the transit of Russian
gas to Europe. Our own annual domestic production is 20bn cu.m. We
buy 37bn cu.m. of gas from Turkmenistan.
It is worth knowing the following. Ukraine ensures the transit of 115bn
cu.m. of Russian gas to Europe - at a discount rate, by the way.
Simultaneously, as payment for transit, Ukraine gets gas at a discount
price. An increase in the transit rate by one side and a rise in the gas
price by the other is undoubtedly a natural process. Ukraine is ready to
switch to monetary payment for gas. We stand for liberalization of fuel
prices and transit rates.
Both Ukraine and Russia would benefit from a switch to market relations.
Ukraine took the first step towards energy and, consequently, political
independence in 2000 when I had the honour of heading the Ukrainian
government. Back then we managed to steer clear of politicking in our gas
talks.
Once and for all we solved the issue of unauthorized siphoning of gas,
signing five accords that settled all the contentious energy issues between
Ukraine and Russia.
But we failed to solve the main problem - liberalizing prices on the energy
market and ending barter settlements for Ukrainian transit services. Barter
as a form of payment for energy resources contributed to creating obscure
schemes and enriching oligarchs.
For years the Ukrainian budget has not been receiving billions of dollars -
the money that should have been spent on wages, pensions, development of
science and technology, and loans for the countryside.
A switch to monetary settlements in the gas field is beneficial to the
national economy. I am convinced that the price should be increased
gradually - without shock therapy for national industry. Meanwhile, the
price of energy resources should be based on economic rather than political
factors.
A gradual switch to a new price would enable the utilities, budget-financed
and industrial sectors to adapt to new conditions. It is necessary to draft
and implement a transitional system of gas rates which would minimize
repercussions for the population.
The system of transitional rates should be in place for two or three years
and should gradually lead to a single rate which would reflect the real cost
of gas for Ukraine.
The new Ukrainian administration seeks to diversify the energy market and
increase domestic production of gas and oil. This week the Ukrainian
government held negotiations on attracting more than 2bn euros in investment
in prospecting for and extracting energy resources in the Kerch section of
the Black Sea shelf.
ENERGY SAVING
The main problem for Ukraine is not a shortage of energy resources, but
energy saving. Energy consumption in Ukrainian industry is the highest in
Europe. We use three times the amount of gas per unit of GDP that our
closest neighbours do.
Unfortunately, Ukrainian industrial giants are used to paying kopecks for
electricity and, therefore, no money has been invested in modernization for
years. Meanwhile, Europe strives to save every cubic metre of gas, every
kilowatt, every kopeck.
An agency for energy saving will be set up in Ukraine shortly. This
structure will concentrate all the projects associated with economical use
of energy resources, alternative sources of energy and the development of
the system of extracting oil and gas.
At the beginning of next year, the authorities will also unveil a new
blueprint for this country's energy security. We should not only come up
with a new pattern for producing energy resources and paying for them, but
also have a clear scheme for protecting Ukraine's national interests.
RUSSIA'S OBLIGATIONS
I would like to recall a historical fact. In 1994 Ukraine joined the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. At that time, the Russian
Federation, along with the USA, France, Great Britain and China, being
members of the nuclear club, pledged to refrain from pressure on Ukraine
which would endanger our national sovereignty. I would like to believe, as
the president of Ukraine, that Russia will never forget the commitments it
has undertaken.
Systemic and pragmatic approach should become the basis of Ukrainian-
Russian economic cooperation. I believe that we will manage to successfully
complete negotiations on gas deliveries. Ukraine, for its part, will meet all its
obligations to Russian and European partners as to guarantees of transit of
blue fuel.
NEW ENERGY STRATEGY
Ukraine needs a single and comprehensible roadmap for the development of
Ukrainian power engineering. We need a national energy strategy which would
set out directions and priorities in energy policy for the next decade. This
document is currently in the making. It will be adopted early next year.
I would like to assure you - the gas price will not increase radically for
the population. Domestically-produced gas will mainly be used for the needs
of the utilities and budget-financed sectors.
However, the liberalization of the gas market is a challenge. It is a
challenge to the nation, to the national economy and to the utilities
sector. In a way, it is a lesson - a lesson of how to live economically and
rationally, the way the whole civilized world lives.
Let's trust in ourselves. May our homes always be light, warm and
comfortable. -30-
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7. RUSSIA'S GAS STANCE
"COULD PUT UKRAINE CLOSER TO WEST"
Associated Press (AP), Kiev, Ukraine, Friday, December 16, 2005
KIEV - Russia's hard-line stance against Ukraine in their natural gas price
dispute could backfire and provoke a surge of pro-Western sentiment in
Ukraine, analysts and lawmakers predicted Friday.
Russia wants to raise the price it charges Ukraine for gas more than
fourfold to bring it to European levels. Kiev, which had been paying $50 per
1,000 cubic meters, had asked for the increase to be phased in over five
years to give its energy-inefficient industrial sector time to adjust.
Moscow rejected the request and has threatened to turn off the taps if a
deal isn't signed by Jan. 1.
"We're proceeding from an absolutely clear understanding - the sooner we
liberalize the price on gas, the sooner we will become competitive, and the
faster we can avoid serious political dependence, which often arises around
gas," President Viktor Yushchenko said Friday, according to his office. "But
this isn't a decision that is taken in the morning, and applied in the
evening," he said.
The dispute comes ahead of Ukraine's March parliamentary elections, in which
critics of last year's Orange Revolution are hoping for big wins, propelled
by disappointment over the slow pace of reforms under Yushchenko.
"Russia just doesn't get it. To win influence...don't apply pressure and
make threats," said analyst Serhiy Taran of the International Institute of
Democracy. "It creates problems for all the pro-Russian parties because
Russia doesn't have a very good image right now."
At a protest in downtown Kiev in support of cooperation with Russia,
Valentin Doroshenko was undeterred by the fact that only eight people showed
up. "Being together with Russia means having gas," he shouted into a
megaphone. Most passers-by ignored him.
The political party of former presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovych,
which has its base in the Russian-speaking east, has stayed silent.
Yanukovych's Party of the Regions draws support from industrial leaders,
who could see their factories hit the hardest by the gas price increases.
The Communist Party, whose support has eroded recently, have been the most
aggressive in attacking Yushchenko's government, blaming its pro-Western
policies for spoiling relations with Russia. Some nationalist parties,
meanwhile, are putting pressure on Yushchenko not to cave in, despite
Russian complaints that Ukraine is dragging its feet.
"Whenever Russia speaks about how unprofessional our officials are
acting...it means they are acting in the national interests of Ukraine and
Russia isn't getting what it wants," said Yaroslav Kendzor, a lawmaker from
the pro-government Our Ukraine faction.
Later Friday, Yushchenko spoke on the phone with Russian President Vladimir
Putin, Russian news agencies reported. Putin agreed with Yushchenko that the
discussions about gas supplies "should not be politicized," ITAR-Tass and
Interfax reported. -30-
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8. PRICE WAR THREATENS UKRAINE'S ECONOMY
Reuters, Kiev, Ukraine, Monday, December 19, 2005
KIEV -- A row with Russia that could see dramatic gas price rises will put
the brakes further on Ukrainian economic expansion next year and eat into
profit margins of major exporters, analysts and officials said on Friday.
"A sharp increase in energy prices is coming. It will be a big blow to the
steel and chemicals sectors, which provide over 30 percent of export
revenue," said Anatoly Danilenko, deputy head of the Academy of Sciences'
Economic Forecasts Institute.
Ukraine has a Soviet-style economy in which exports account for over 60
percent of gross domestic product. Industry is dominated by steel and
chemicals, both requiring vast supplies of gas.
Heavy reliance on exports has already cost Ukraine, with the economy
contracting by 2.7 percent year on year in November. That took growth for
the first 11 months of the year to just 2.2 percent, the slowest pace in
five years.
A further slowdown could set in next year. Some analysts predict a
contraction due to the gas dispute with Russia, political uncertainty and
delayed implementation of reforms as politicians gear up for a March
parliamentary election.
Kiev and Moscow have been at loggerheads over gas prices and transit since
Viktor Yushchenko took power in Ukraine in January, propelled to victory
over a Kremlin-backed candidate in the Orange Revolution. But rhetoric has
toughened as the parliamentary election campaign becomes more intense.
Anatoly Kinakh, secretary of the National Defense and Security Council, said
if gas prices climbed over $95, most Ukrainian chemicals companies would go
into the red.
Industrial Minister Volodymyr Shandra said steelmakers' profit margins would
slump to under 3 percent from 13 percent. "The industry will survive but
profitability will be very different," he said, adding the only way out was
to improve energy efficiency. -30-
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9. WHO IS BLACKMAILING WHOM?
Original article by Mykhailo Krasnyanskyi
"Ukrayinska Pravda", Kyiv, Ukraine, December 12, 2005
For a while now, I have been tired to listen and read about how the cowardly
Ukraine is blackmailing Russia with natural gas.
The Russian side's main argument defends the need to raise the price of
natural gas for Ukraine by pointing to the West where the price is
determined by market conditions. Thus, for example, Germany purchases
natural gas at the price of $160.
Can the price which Germany pays Russia for natural gas be considered a
sound, valid reasonable argument? Not really. The only argument that can be
considered is the mutually signed contract between Russia and Ukraine!
In that contract between "Naftogas Ukraine" and Gazprom (to be specific
under the Clause #4 dated 21 June 2002) is written that the value of natural
gas delivered to Ukraine in exchange for transit consists of $50 per 1000
cubic meters, and the value of the actual transition through the territory
of Ukraine - $1.09.
Also discussed, in this contract, is the permanency and obduracy of the
agreement by either side until 2009. The $50 and $1.09 are not prices per
se; these are mutually agreed upon "interconnected digits" by both parties.
In other words, if either party intends to multiply one side of the equation
by any coefficient, for example: 50 (x) 3.2=$160 then the "altering party"
is required to multiply the other side of the equation by the same
coefficient: $1.09 (x) 3.2 = $3.49 - and European price averages have
nothing to do with this.
If, after all, Russia in a unilateral manner wishes to re-evaluate her
agreement on natural gas with Ukraine, then she ought to understand that
this is a PRECEDENT, and that Ukraine has all the basis to re-evaluate her
agreement with Russia regarding the Black Sea Fleet.
The change - demanded by Russia - to market-oriented relations concerning
natural gas should be justly "paralleled" with re-examinations of all other
bilateral agreements (not just those at which the ring of Gazprom is
capriciously pointing), including agreements with regards to the Black Sea
Fleet, and the "understanding" concerning financial accounts between the
Bank of the USSR and the banks of previous Republics dating from 10
October 1991.
As far as the latter mentioned "understanding," Russia received from Ukraine
an interbank credit (zero interest) in the amount of 83 billion of Soviet
rubles which to this day has not been returned. But these legally Ukrainian
83 billion are - with little patience - awaited from Russia by millions of
deceived Ukrainian account holders who placed their savings (na knyzhku) at
the Central Bank of the USSR.
The author experiences a feeling of true admiration and envy when he
observes with what unyielding ruthlessness and a huge chunk of cynicism that
the Russian government fights for the national and geopolitical interests of
Russia.
This position also enjoys the full supports of Russian politicians and mass
media. Learn Ukraine!
Yet when Ukraine's government took on a similar approach the Ukrainian mass
media judged it as "inability to agree about natural gas?!"
The agreements with Russia about oil and natural gas are considered probably
the most noteworthy achievements of former president Kuchma. Indeed, they
represent some of the largest failures of the Kuchma's government.
During the 15 years of Ukraine's independence, the numerous "successful
understandings" brokered by Kravchuk-Kuchma should have been substituted
(or at least alongside with those "understandings") by alternative sources of
energy and energy conserving technologies, including new accounting
techniques. Had this been accomplished, the issue would not have arisen in
the first place.
By today, Ukraine would have rid herself from the monstrous (more than 8-10
times compared with EU) energy dependence in our heavy industry sector and
everyday energy needs!
Ten years ago, what stood in the way for Ukraine to produce her own
synthetic liquid heating substance made out of still "young" coal mines of
Luhansk, red coal of Alexandria, peat of Volyn, by either purchasing United
Arab Republic's coal technology "Sasol" or by developing our own?
During the past 10 years, what stood in the way of reopening and building
more of Ukraine's own small hydroelectric stations?
Why did Crimea not get "dressed" in solar panels, and the steppes of
Ukraine did not get covered with wind turbines?
Who or what served as an obstacle, five to six years ago, for Ukraine to
start actively develop the growth of rapeseed (Brassica napus) for the
production of biodiesel (today for a ton of rapeseed pay $160-180, while for
a ton of Ukrainian wheat - only $80; in other words this would have raised
the value of domestic farming sector)?
Why did the previous governing elite - when on numerous and costly foreign
trips - not pay attention at the nearby Austria? Austria meets 50% of its
energy demand with small hydroelectric stations, 30% - by capturing solar
energy, and 5% - by using wind turbines (and only 15% of its energy needs
are met by importing natural gas)?
The facts after all are that the yearly quantity of solar radiation which
covers Austria is equal to that covering Ukraine (1200 kWh/m^2); the level
of potential wind-power is lower than middle Ukraine's, and the energy
potential of Austria's rivers is not that much higher than the potential
held in middle Ukrainian rivers. (Translated by Vitaliy Voznyak)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Professor Mikhail Krasnyanski at Donetsk National Technical
University for "Ukrayinska Pravda"
LINK: http://www.pravda.com.ua/en/news/2005/12/12/4919.htm
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10. MARKET PRICES FOR ENERGY SEEN IMPROVING RELATIONS
WITH NEIGHBORS SAYS RUSSIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER
Interfax, Moscow, Russia, Saturday, December 17, 2005
MOSCOW - A switch by Russia to selling energy resources, such as
natural gas, to CIS countries at prices close to those prevailing on the
world market will be healthy not only for Russia's economy but also
for political relations with neighbors, said Russian Deputy Foreign
Minister Grigory Karasin.
"In my view, a transition to world prices for energy resources, despite
emotional problems, will make not only economic but also political
relations with our partners and neighbors healthier quite quickly," Karasin
said in an interview published in the Saturday issue of the Trud newspaper.
"A systematic and logical approach in such issues is much more helpful
than privileges and some special treatment," Karasin said. "They engender
a lot of illusions and sooner or later lead to soured relations. Take a
simple example: lend a large sum of money to a friend. As a rule, the
expectation of repayment does not improve relations between friends,"
he said.
Karasin said he does not find it reasonable to counterbalance the
integration of former Soviet states with their interaction with various
Euro-Atlantic institutions, including NATO.
"I believe this territory still remains unified in cultural and historic
terms, and most of the people living in this area are still interested in
its strengthening," Karasin said, adding that NATO membership is "a
matter of the choice of each individual state." -30-
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11. RUSSIA THE GAS-HOLDER
The post-Soviet republics ought to act like truly independent states
EDITORIAL: Vedomosti, Moscow, Russia, Thu, Dec 15, 2005
[Russia intends to charge some of its neighbors market prices for gas.
Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and the Baltic states are paying a price
for their lack of foresight. They can't seek political independence while
happily agreeing to accept cheap natural resources at the same time.]
Russia took natural gas politics to a new conceptual level yesterday.
Gazprom Deputy CEO Alexander Medvedev stated in Berlin
that the current market price for gas is $220-230 per thousand
cubic meters; meanwhile, back in Moscow, Industry and Energy
Minister Viktor Khristenko promised the Duma that Russia will
make the transition to charging market prices for gas supplied to
Moldova, Georgia, and the Baltic states.
Alexander Ryazanov said a couple of weeks ago that Gazprom
would prefer to charge the Baltic states $120-125 per thousand
cubic meters, rather than the existing price of $80; for Georgia
the figure was $110 (instead of $63) and for Moldova it was $150-
160 (instead of $80). It's clear why these countries are on the
list: Moldova has a dispute with Russia over the Trans-Dniester
region, Georgia has a dispute with Russia over South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, while the Baltic states keep mentioning occupation and
even demanding territorial concessions. And Ukraine's sins against
the Kremlin are innumerable.
Armenia, on the other hand, recently agreed to a new gas
price of $110, without any fuss. And Belarus is actually cited by
Miller as setting an example. Yes, it gets the lowest gas price of
all ($47) - but the entire gas pipeline across Belarus is owned by
Gazprom, which also has a long-term lease on the land beneath the
pipeline. So Gazprom seems to be telling its partners: "That's
what you get for seeking closer ties with the West." A gas price
of $50 is the carrot held out by Russia.
What's unpleasant is that the changeover to charging our
neighbors market prices for gas is taking the form of ultimatums.
The scope for muscle-flexing is actually limited. Russia has
already tried cutting off gas supplies completely - during the
conflict with Belarus in late February 2004. Secondly, Gazprom's
range of potential clients is restricted; the volumes of
deliveries to Europe are stable, as set out in long-term
contracts, so if Gazprom does cut off deliveries to Ukraine or
Georgia, it wouldn't be able to sell that gas to any other country
at a higher price.
The transition to charging market prices for gas is clearly
in Russia's interests. But it's also evident that the governments
of the countries for which Gazprom is deregulating prices are in a
bind. They are not paying a price for political independence.
They are paying a price for their lack of foresight. They can't seek
independence while happily agreeing to accept cheap natural
resources at the same time. These pricing negotiations should have
been started a long time ago; then it would have been possible to
make the process smoother and extend it over a longer period. But
that wasn't done.
So, rather than using ultimatums or threats of "technical selection,"
we need to seek compromise options at the talks. Gazprom might
soon have to engage in similar negotiations with European Union
countries. And the post-Soviet republics ought to start living like
truly independent states. That would benefit both them and Russia.
"The main task for the governments of post-Soviet countries
is to make their states strong enough to independently resist the
influence of the United States and Russia," says political
scientist Robert Jervis, a professor at Columbia University. -30-
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Translated by Ewgeniya Ryzhikova
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12. GEORGIA: TBILISI, KYIV SEEK ENERGY ALLIANCE WITH WEST
By Julie A. Corwin, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)
Washington, D.C., Saturday, December 17, 2005
Georgia has reacted swiftly to recent Russian announcement of higher
natural-gas prices this winter. Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili
recently traveled to Brussels and Washington to enlist support for a joint
strategy to reduce European energy dependence on Russia. According to
Bezhuashvili, Georgia is acting in concert with its "strategic ally,"
Ukraine.
Washington, 17 December 2005 (RFE/RL) -- Russia's Gazprom announced
earlier this month that it wants to almost double the price of natural gas
to Georgia, raising tariffs from around $60 to $110 per 1,000 cubic meters.
The new price would take effect on 1 January.
Russia insists that the reason for the price increase is not political.
After all, Gazprom wants to charge Armenia, a close Russia ally, the same
price as Georgia. The Georgian government, however, remains skeptical.
Kakha Bendukidze, the Georgian state minister of in charge of economic
reforms, has asked what suddenly happened to Russia's economy that
requires such a dramatic price rise. In an interview with "Kommersant-
Daily" on 16 December, he wondered if there was such economic
necessity before 1 January, then that must mean politics prevented the
prices from being increased earlier.
Yesterday, Georgian Foreign Minister Bezhuashvili told an audience at
Washington's Carnegie Endowment for International Peace that Russia
wants to "send a message" to the new democracies, Ukraine and Georgia,
with the price hikes. And together, the two strategic allies are ready to
form a common front.
"We need to confront these issues. And, we are saying and this is a
common voice -- we had consultations with Ukrainians -- if this is the
price for independence, we are going to pay this price. But we need
to stay together.
My message here in Washington -- speaking in the White House, in the
State Department and other institutions -- will be to elaborate a very clear
strategy, short-term, mid-term and long-term strategy how we will
altogether face this problem, because this is not a problem and issue only
for Georgia," Bezhuashvili said.
Bezhuashvili is seeking not only U.S. support for a common
Georgian-Ukrainian energy policy but also European. He stopped in
Brussels on his way to Washington. There, he said he found support for
diversifying sources of energy supply.
"The understanding in Europe is growing that there is a need for a
trans-Atlantic energy-security strategy. One that will secure Europe from
energy dependence that is taking place in the Eurasia and Europe in
particular. Here we are facing a very tough policy of Russia, playing on
the energy dependence of Europe and its neighbors," Bezhuashvili said.
The response from the Washington audience was not entirely sympathetic.
Nikolai Zlobin, the director of Russian and Asian programs at the Center
for Defense Information, said he was sympathetic to Georgia, but he
wondered whether its current foreign-policy strategy was too focused on
the West.
"What strike[s] me about your presentation [is that] you address your
relations with the West and the United States and European Union, and I
think Georgia really needs to improve drastically its relations with the
near abroad. Your relations with Russia [are] going very bad[ly]. Your
relations in the region with your neighbors [are] not so good and I would
like to know what [is] your strategy -- not to blame Russia, not to blame
anyone else -- but what is your strategy to improve these relations.
Because I doubt the West or United States or European Union will want to
fight or confront Russia over Georgia," Zlobin said.
However, Bezhuashvili insisted that energy dependence on Russian gas
supplies is a problem facing not just Georgia and Ukraine but also "stable
democracies" in Western Europe.
In the meantime, Georgian economists estimate that the doubling of gas
prices in January could chop off an estimated 1.5 percent of Georgia's
annual gross domestic product next year. -30-
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13. LUKOIL TO INVEST $330 MILLION IN UKRAINE
Tom Warner in Kiev, Financial Times, London, UK, Sat, Dec 17 2005
Russia's Lukoil is to invest $330m to renovate a chemicals plant in western
Ukraine using technology from Uhde, part of Germany's Thyssen Krupp
group, the chairmen of the two companies announced yesterday at a signing
ceremony in Kiev.
The deal represents the biggest new Russian investment in Ukraine announced
this year and rare good news for Ukraine's chemicals industry, which is
threatened by increasing prices for Russian gas. -30-
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14. MASSIVE FRAUD,
BUT WHAT OF IT WHEN THERE IS OIL TO BE HAD?
Ukraine has none, Kazakhstan is awash with the stuff
ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: Chris Stephen
Irish Times, Dublin, Ireland, Friday, Dec 16, 2005
Astana Letter: One year ago the government of a former Soviet republic
rigged an election and the West erupted in fury. With protesters filling the
streets, American and European leaders issued strong condemnations.
The weekend before last it happened again, but the West raised not a
whisper. The difference is oil: Ukraine, of Orange Revolution fame, has
none, whereas Kazakhstan is awash with the stuff.
Hence the stony silence from the outside world when president Nursultan
Nazarbayev romped home with an improbable 91 per cent of the vote in a
presidential election teeming with irregularities.
So much for a neutral election press centre - it was run by the president's
daughter in a snowbound hotel in Kazakhstan's capital, Astana. And the
T-shirted handmaidens, who served me free coffee, cake, nuts and chocolate,
did not happen to have the phone numbers of opposition parties.
Downstairs, election monitors spent a lonely press conference recording
fraud, intimidation, censorship, ballot-rigging and media manipulation. They
might as well have been talking to the wall.
"Nobody wants to rock the boat," says a western oilman, sitting with me in
an Italian-style restaurant in one of the glitzy shopping centres in Almaty,
Kazakhstan's former capital and still its commercial hub.
With American, Chinese, Anglo-Dutch, French and Russian oil companies
salivating over Kazakhstan's riches, nobody wanted to upset the president.
Admittedly there are other differences with Ukraine, the first being the
lack of much of an opposition. Deference, inherited from the time when three
tribal chieftains ran this country, is deeply ingrained and protesters are
noticeable by their absence.
For another thing, Kazakhstan's president is a nice guy. Not so nice that he
investigates how a key opponent managed to shoot himself no fewer than
three times while committing suicide - the police verdict - last month, but nicer
than most other rulers in this neck of the woods.
He did not drop poison into the soup of his opponent, as happened in
Ukraine, or shoot dead 200 protesters, as in Uzbekistan, or stage a
Tiananmen Square massacre as did China. "If you look around the
neighbourhood, it doesn't get any better than this," says my oilman, and it
is hard to disagree.
Although Transparency International rates this as one of the world's most
corrupt states, it is also, in the Muslim world, one of the most tolerant.
The best place to see this tolerance is not in its new, antiseptic capital
but in Almaty, the country's beating business heart.
Nestling at the spot where the great steppe that runs north to Russia
collides with the mountains that run south to the Himalayas, it was for
centuries a crossroads for travellers and home to a rough-and-ready
tolerance.
Mosques jostle with churches, pubs with shrines; and bazaars dating from
the time of the great Silk Road sell spices from India, perfumes from the
Orient, and pirate CDs from China.
Bumper-to-bumper SUVs and German saloons bought with oil cash fill the
boulevards, and the first snows of winter provide great entertainment as
speeding drivers reared on Ladas lose control of their powerful new
machines.
There are no political prisoners and police on the streets do not
ritualistically check your ID as they do in neighbouring Russia.
Rather, the culture is so attuned to following orders that it is hard to see
how democracy can get a foothold. At a hotel gym, the receptionist told me
that if I took my sheepskin coat inside, rather than leaving it as required
in the cloakroom upstairs "we will get into trouble".
Finally, the president, while seriously dodgy - witness the billion dollars
of state cash he was forced to admit stashing away in Swiss banks - is at
least a shrewd operator. He has used considerable skill in keeping rapacious
foreign companies from gobbling up his country.
This does not mean Kazakhstan is a jolly old place. Outside busy Almata and
gleaming Astana, poverty is appalling and, for the world's 10th richest oil
state, frankly inexcusable. "The richest people in my family village are the
pensioners, and the state pension is tiny," a young Kazakh human resources
manager told me.
Meanwhile, rampant corruption stifles enterprise, cripples the middle class
and rewards parasites. This corruption and lack of democracy will remain in
place as long as the oil companies - and, to be fair, their customers, you
and me - impose no ethical standards on the people from whom they buy their
oil.
My oilman concedes these points, but he is the exception. Most oilmen prefer
corrupt regimes to straight ones because, with no tiresome social programmes
to attend to, the profits are bigger. But ask an oilman where he banks, or
plans to retire, and he says "in a democracy". -30-
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15. SQUEEZING UKRAINE IN SPACE
By Yuri Zaitsev, UPI Outside View Commentator
United Press International (UPI), Moscow, Russia, Sun, Dec 18, 2005
Despite political differences, Russia and Ukraine used to play on the same
"space" field in pre-"Orange Revolution" times. Today the situation is
radically altered and the Ukrainian space industry risks stagnating and
losing its positions as the space component of the national economy.
Russia and Ukraine have always cooperated in the space effort. Ukraine made
and supplied Russia with the Tsiklon and Zenit launch vehicles, Tselina
signals intelligence satellites, and ocean-monitoring spacecraft.
Russia and Ukraine have formed an international company, Kosmotrans, to
promote launches of the converted RS-20 (SS-18 Satan) missile and are
partnered in the international Sea Launch project. An agreement has been
signed to set up the Ground Launch company involving Russia, Ukraine,
Kazakhstan and Sea Launch. Both ventures make use of the Zenit rocket
manufactured in Ukraine.
Plans also existed to jointly develop a Ukrainian research module to be
added to the Russian segment of the International Space Station. The Russian
2006-2015 space program was harmonized in some respects with the program
Ukraine was envisaging for the previous few years to develop communications
and telecommunications and remote sensing of the Earth.
It is no secret that most of these results were due to direct support for
the Ukrainian space industry by former President Leonid Kuchma, and his
personal arrangements with Vladimir Putin, including easier customs terms
for mutual deliveries of space hardware.
However, the new Ukrainian leadership has announced its emphasis on
"European values" not only in politics but also in the economy. The missile
space branch was not spared: it was told to line up with Western companies
and work on joint projects. But the main point here is not what Ukraine
wants to get from Western cooperation, but what it can give.
One of the central problems of the Ukrainian space and rocket industry is
that it lacks some key production components, specifically capacities to
manufacture high-powered propulsion units. Consequently, despite Ukraine's
desire to cooperate with Western Europe, joint efforts are concentrated on
one program of developing the light-weight Vega European launch vehicle.
The Dnepropetrovsk Yuzhnoye Design Bureau is developing a low-powered
fourth-stage engine, or rather a booster. (The work is being conducted
parallel with the Russian-French Ural program to develop a high-powered
multiple-launch engine -- 50 flights -- fueled by liquid oxygen and methane.
The engine is the basis for a family of promising European rockets.)
Nor does Ukraine develop any launch complexes. This is one of the reasons
why building the Ukrainian-Brazilian Alcantera-Tsiklon-Space launch center
featuring the new Ukrainian Tsiklon-4 carrier rocket has been suspended,
although it is the most impressive project for Ukrainian rocket builders.
Brazil has practically mothballed its part of the effort, pleading delays in
the construction of the complex by Russia's KB Transport Engineering.
A full-blooded and self-sufficient space industry (something for which
China and India have opted) does not yet appear real for Ukraine. It lacks
financial, technological and personnel resources for such a venture. Its
budget is running in the red, to say nothing of the social commitments of
the "Orange Revolution." The actual sum budgeted for space needs is $10
million, or one-fifth of what the Ukrainian law on space activities
stipulates.
The industry's standing is a low priority, and hence problems with retooling
and staff recruitment have developed. According to the general director and
general designer of Yuzhnoye, the average wage is $200 and needs doubling
at the very least if staffing shortages are to be solved.
Space operations have lost a lot of the ground they gained earlier. In 2004,
Yuzhnoye won a tender to develop a satellite for Egypt. The terms of the
contract were thrashed out before the "Orange Revolution" and the changes
later made by the Ukrainian leadership in its budget policy.
A campaign against preferences and perks (which were abolished in March
2005) caused the project to become a losing venture. One way or the other,
an option on two additional Egyptian satellites following the launch of the
first went to Russian enterprises.
Even so, Ukraine's new leadership believes that the country can establish
itself in the launch services market and looks to favorable strategic
prospects with high commercial yields. In recent years Ukraine's share of
space launches has been 12-13 percent of the world's total.
But the launch vehicles Tsiklon-2 and Dnepr (a converted Satan) were
produced when Ukraine formed part of the Soviet Union, and the cost of
Russian components for the currently manufactured Zenit (which likewise
was developed under the direction of Academician Vladimir Utkin) makes
up more than 65 percent of the vehicle's overall price.
Besides, Ukrainian rockets, apart from Sea Launch, lift off from the
Baikonur space center, which is on a long-term lease to Russia. Dnepr
launches, on the other hand, are scheduled in 2006 from Dombarovsky in the
Orenburg region, the missile deployment area of a Strategic Missile Force
unit stationed there. (The first time a Dnepr blasted off from Dombarovsky
was in December 2004.) A point to note: Dnepr launches even from Baikonur
are impossible without direct involvement of Russia's missile men.
The production of the Tsiklon-3 is today halted because of the unraveling of
cooperation between the two countries, including inside Ukraine itself,
while the fairly large number of manufactured Tsiklon-2s may be utilized for
commercial launches only thanks to the fact that the Russian Makeyev Missile
Center in Miass, the Urals, has developed for it the new ADU-600 third stage
(the first lift-off is planned for 2006).
In 2006, it is planned to launch the first Zenit-M (its two-stage version
Zenit-2M and three-stage version Zenit-3M) under the Ground Launch program.
Three to four blast-offs are planned in the course of a year, with full
return on investment expected in five to six years' time. Considering its
contribution to the manufacture of the rocket and development of the launch
complex, Russia's share of profits from the commercial use of the Zenit-M
will be 70 percent, compared with Ukraine's 30 percent.
Ukrainian rocket builders had every chance of sharing in the manned
spacecraft Kliper project by making its Zenit boosters. In line with that,
Russia was to abandon the development of its own Onega rocket. The
Russian leadership made such a proposal despite the fact that the Kliper's
all-up weight was to be reduced from 14.5 tons (launched by an Onega)
to 13 tons (if launched by a Zenit).
The pre-requisite was Ukraine joining the Common Economic Space. Today
even these plans were modified, while a political decision (despite all economic
advantages for Russia and Ukraine) is hard to second-guess. Ukraine is
considering all factors to come to a "carefully weighed conclusion" and
Ukrainian launch vehicles may simply be "banished" from Russian space
programs.
Incidentally, something similar has already happened to a number of military
programs after Ukraine announced its intention to join NATO. Although the
world's best intercontinental ballistic missiles were developed in
Dnepropetrovsk, the new Topol-M and Bulava missiles were designed and are
being manufactured in Russia without any help from its Ukrainian colleagues.
There is some logic to that: it is risky to depend on someone else in such a
matter. -30-
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yuri Zaitsev is an expert of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Space
Research Institute. This article is reprinted by permission of the RIA
Novosti news agency.
United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by
outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The
views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press
International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original
submissions are invited.
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16. UKRAINE VICTORS 'UNDERESTIMATING RISK'
Tom Warner in Kiev, Financial Times, London, UK, Sat, Dec 17, 2005
Three months before tough parliamentary elections, Yulia Tymoshenko is
convinced of her need to patch up differences with Viktor Yushchenko,
the other hard-charging leader of last year's Orange Revolution in Ukraine.
"We're tied together like mountain climbers on the same rope," she says in
an interview with the Financial Times.
The perilous image is apt. Popular support for Mr Yushchenko, the country's
pro-western, reformist president, has fallen steadily since he took power,
as a result of a sluggish economy, cautious reforms, continuing corruption
and worries about worsening relations with Russia.
Mr Yushchenko's party, Our Ukraine, is struggling, with 16 per cent
support. The conservative, pro-Russian Regions party, led by Viktor
Yanukovich, a former prime minister who lost to Mr Yushchenko in last
year's presidential election, is well in the lead with 28 per cent support.
Our Ukraine's and Mr Yushchenko's hopes of victory depend largely on
his potential coalition partners - most notably Ms Tymoshenko, whom he
sacked just three months ago, and Vitali Klitschko, the recently retired
champion boxer who is heading one of five "Orange" groups in the
elections.
Ms Tymoshenko says she worries that Mr Yushchenko may be waking up
to his predicament too late. "After our victory [last year], everyone thought
the war was won. All the political battalions that took part deflated like
balloons, became apathetic, weak, less effective. It scares me," she says.
"It seems to me our whole Orange team, including the president,
underestimates the colossal risk of a revanche."
During the past three months Mr Yushchenko had flirted with the idea of
forming a coalition with the centrist speaker of parliament, Volodymyr
Lytvyn, or even with Mr Yanukovich. But such talk only further dismayed
the president's supporters.
Now Mr Yushchenko has returned to his old base, hoping that after the
March vote he can cobble back together roughly the same coalition of
parties that backed him last year.
Nevertheless, there is an intense rivalry between the Yulia Tymoshenko
Bloc, which has 15 per cent of voter support, and Mr Yushchenko's Our
Ukraine.
Delicate issues - such as who would be prime minister in their coalition -
are being put off until after the vote.
Ms Tymoshenko continually criticises Yuri Yekhanurov, her successor as
prime minister, who is far less outspoken and far more cautious about
economic and bureaucratic reforms than she was.
Mr Yushchenko has said he would like to keep Mr Yekhanurov as premier
after the elections on March 26 but Ms Tymoshenko wants the job back if
her bloc beats Our Ukraine at the polls.
Meanwhile, Mr Klitschko, a former world heavyweight champion who is
one of the country's most popular athletes, has come to the president's aid.
The boxer will lead the electoral list of candidates for a bloc of two
parties aligned with Our Ukraine. Mr Klitschko has hinted he will also run
for mayor of Kiev in simultaneous local elections.
Should Mr Yushchenko manage to hold on to power, however, his influence
will be curtailed. Changes to the country's constitution, hammered out in a
compromise with the preceding, pro-Russian government, will weaken
presidential powers and strengthen those of parliament. -30-
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17. UKRAINIAN CATHOLICS' RIGHTS 'VIOLATED'
Local authorities refuse to return properties seized under Communist rule
The Universe Catholic Newspaper (TotalCatholic.com)
Manchester, England, December 19, 2005
A Ukrainian bishop has written to the Pope and world leaders, urging them
to help resolve his Church's "worsening problems".
The bishop, who said local authorities refused to return Catholic properties
seized under communist rule, asked for help to create "an international
commission of experts that could travel to Ukraine and check out, on site,
the facts of the violation of the rights and freedoms of the Roman Catholic
minority in this region".
"Representatives of our government on all levels declare an open position -
but I must unfortunately confirm that we Catholics consider that the
situation has recently worsened," said Bishop Bronislaw Bernacki of
Odessa-Simferopol. "In Izmail, the neighbours built part of their home
directly under the walls of the church and blocked our windows.
In another city, cars drive over the churchyard. Under the walls of the
cathedral in Odessa, strangers wash their cars and walk their dogs. This is
all open mockery and degradation of the Catholic Church," he said in a
letter to Pope Benedict XVI and heads of government, including British
Prime Minister Tony Blair, US President George W Bush, French
President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Angela Merkel.
He added that his diocese has only a single 43-square-foot room for an
administrative office, while his own residence is a small room above his
cathedral sacristy, which also doubles as a meeting area. "I have many
examples of when they refused us land to build churches in Odessa,
Simferopol and other places," said the bishop.
"For many years now, we have been unable to have a building of the
Roman Catholic Church in the centre of Sevastopol returned. A movie
theatre is now located there, and in the altar section are city pay
toilets."
The bishop said Odessa's former Catholic seminary was still occupied by
Ukraine's Transport Ministry, which had withdrawn an agreement to return
it.
However, he added that local authorities returned several non-religious
buildings to the largest of Ukraine's three rival Orthodox churches, which
is loyal to the Russian Orthodox Church's Moscow Patriarchate.
"We are glad our brother church is growing stronger, we pray for all our
brothers and sisters in the Christian faith that the Lord bless all their
good endeavors. But why is it that for representatives of one religious
community there is a law about restitution of Church property, but for
another there is no law?" said the bishop. -30-
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18. AN OLD-COUNTRY CHRISTMAS
Ukrainian culture blooms at holiday bazaar
3,000 people of Ukrainian heritage live in or around North Port, Florida
By Erin Bryce, Herald Tribune, North Port, Florida, Sat, Dec 17, 2005
NORTH PORT -- When Port Charlotte resident Helen Herina heard about
the homemade pierogies from St. Mary's Ukrainian Catholic Church, she
ordered seven dozen to surprise her Polish family flying in from Illinois
next week. "And my children love them -- that's why I came," Herina said.
The church's annual Pre-Christmas Bazaar on Friday attracted hundreds of
residents purchasing food for the holidays.
The selection was immense. Over three weeks, volunteers cooked more than
750 donuts, 150 poppy seed rolls, 80 walnut rolls, 100 sweet breads and 27
kolachs (braided breads).
Although food was the primary focus of the annual holiday festival, the
event also provided residents like Herina with a glimpse into the Ukrainian
culture.
At least 3,000 people of Ukrainian heritage live in or around North Port,
and they have made the city their spiritual and cultural hub, erecting
Eastern-style churches and scattered food markets.
"For Ukrainians, it's very important that we keep our culture; it's to keep
the tradition alive," said Vira Bodnaruk, a retired college professor and
active member of St. Mary's Ukrainian Catholic Church. "It's really to
keep our culture alive so that people know who we are."
There's no denying that Ukrainians are proud. So proud, they created on
the stage of the church recreation hall a forest of fake Christmas trees
peppered with cotton to suggest a snowy scene from the Carpathian
Mountains of their homeland.
Just below the stage, they loaded a table with the traditional Christmas
Eve dishes so that anyone who walked in could learn about their annual
festivities.
"They like to bring the American community the Ukrainian customs and
Ukrainian traditions," said Orest Lazor, a Port Charlotte resident who
attends church at St. Mary's.
Christmas Eve is the primary Christmas celebration for the Ukrainian
culture. It is celebrated with a dinner, called Svyata Vechera, just after
the first star appears. But for Ukrainians, Christmas falls on Jan. 7.
During a typical Ukrainian Christmas Eve dinner, a handful of hay is placed
under an embroidered white tablecloth, symbolizing Christ's birth in the
manger. At the table's center is a lit candle propped inside a braided
bread, called a kolach.
The dinner begins with the Lord's Prayer and a bite of kutya, a dish of
wheat, poppy seeds, nuts and honey. Kutya dates back more than 5,000
years within the Ukrainian culture.
There are typically 12 menu items. Fish is the only meat because it is the
last day of Advent, a fast. Many of the traditional holiday menu items were
sold at the festival.
But not everyone was there for Ukrainian food. North Port resident Nancy
Bulatow said she saw a sign on the side of Biscayne Boulevard and came
in to buy some pierogies for her husband, who is from Poland.
The Polish community has its own Christmas Eve celebration, called
"Wigilia." Pierogies are the main course at the Polish traditional meal,
much like they are at the Ukraine celebration.
The difference is Ukrainians typically call pierogies "varenyky." "It's
homemade," Bulatow said. "It's nice that they do this for the community."
North Port has the largest population of Ukrainians in the region and is
considered the Ukrainian cultural center here, said Lidia Bilous, one of the
organizers of the festival. Ukrainians first settled in southern Sarasota
County for the 80-degree waters of Warm Mineral Springs, believed to
have healing powers.
The area's Ukrainians arrived in two waves. The first wave came to America
as political refugees during and after World War II. They were left homeless
after the Soviet Union dissolved Ukraine's borders. The country gained its
independence in 1991.
The second wave came for economic reasons. Many Ukrainians have moved to
America for better-paying jobs, Bilous said. "We're part of this community,"
Bilous said. "We were here before North Port was ever on the map." -30-
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By Erin Bryce, erin.bryce@heraldtribune.com
http://www.heraldtribune.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20051217/NEWS/512170310
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